The ties that do not bind: party affiliations and the delivery of devolved health services in the Philippines

2012

We investigate the effects of two accountability measures on the decisions of the local governments under decentralization. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities in three election years, we find that term limits have negative but weak effects on the provision of health insurance coverage to poor families and on expenditures on local services. However, yardstick competition (i.e., more subsidized insurance coverage for the poor in neighboring local governments) induces them to cover more poor families, but also reduce other public expenditures. To respond to critiques of health decentralization, our results suggest that the objectives of local politicians can be aligned with those of the health sector. The key insight is the incumbent may extend health insurance coverage like a redistributive transfer to pursue reelection objectives. However, the resulting trade off between subsidized insurance coverage and other public services must be considered.

2001

Using a panel of incumbent provincial governors, this paper estimates the relative contributions of development spending and membership in local political clans to the likelihood of re-election of governors in the Philippines during the 1990s. The results suggest that governors, whether members of political clans or not, respond to local development needs to get re-elected. Further, it is not the presence of political clans per se, but rather the absence of effective electoral competition among clans, that seems inimical to development. Thus to ensure that local development becomes good politics, electoral reforms should be adopted to prevent capture of local governments under a fiscal decentralization program.

Are incumbent governors who put more weight on development spending likely to be re-elected? To answer this question, an economic model of a re-electionist local chief executive is introduced and validated with a panel data of provincial governors who ran for another term of office during the election years 1992, 1995 and 1998 in the Philippines. It is found that incumbent governors improve their re-election chances with higher spending on economic development services, other things being constant. Moreover, governors who are members of political clans also have higher development spending especially when faced with rival clans. Thus, elections are still an effective disciplining device, more especially when rivalry is intense among political clans. The policy implication then is to enhance political competition rather than just ban political dynasties to improve the performance of elected officials under decentralization.

Philippine Political Science Journal, 2004

This paper analyzes the dynamics of health devolution in the Philippines within the context of the 1991 Local Government Code. The paper looks into how the present level of health devolution came about, the reform's impact on the public health system, and the factors involved in improving health service delivery in municipalities under a devolved set up. There are several variables that are tested as possible intervening variables. These are prioritization of health services in resource allocation and management, adequacy of formal health personnel and facilities, and citizens' participation in health service delivery. The sociopolitical context of the local government is also explored. Two case studies are presented to support the arguments of the paper.

The Philippine review of economics, 2012

The 1991 Local Government Code devolved substantial spending, taxing, and borrowing powers to local government units (LGUs). Moving governance closer to the people can generate a welfare gain, but local governments must have adequate revenues to finance local development. The paper examines the current status of the tax-expenditure assignment and the intergovernmental fiscal relations, and identifies areas for reform. There is a need for a clearer and more accountable assignment of expenditure by eliminating particular sections of the code, which serve as a route for national government agencies to be engaged in devolved activities, and for politicians to insert funding for pet projects, which distort local decision making and preferences. There is need as well to review the tax assignment to improve local revenue generation. The allocation of intergovernmental fiscal transfers may be improved by introducing matching grants to improve equalization transfers to local governments, and...

Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review

This study aims at examining the role of coalition parties on local government expenditure. The coalition parties are comprised of several parties that support the regional head in the local government. Specifically, this study focuses on two important aspects of local government expenditure: education and health expenditure. The research question of the study is “Does the coalition parties have a significant effect on the local government expenditure?”. The independent variable of the study is coalition parties that support elected regional heads. The dependent variable is local government expenditure, which consists of education and health expenditures. The sample of the study was the local government in the Republic of Indonesia from the 2016–2018 period. There are 632 observations as the sample of the study. The results revealed that coalition parties have a negative effect on education and health expenditure. The higher percentage of coalition parties has decreased the local go...