Estimating individual financial constraints
Bert D’Espallier1, Ludo Peeters, Sigrid Vandemaele
KIZOK Research Institute, University of Hasselt, 3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium
Abstract
We estimate firm-specific cash flow sensitivities of investment for a panel of manufacturing SMEs, using the
generalized maximum entropy-estimator (GME). Since this estimator easily allows for slope heterogeneity, we
no longer have to rely on ex-ante sample splitting, which has been common practice in this literature. The results
show a wide variation in individual sensitivities in every year, demonstrating the relevance of estimating firmspecific coefficients rather than an aggregate coefficient for assumed sub-samples. On the basis of the
distribution of estimated sensitivities, differences in financial profile and financing behaviour between high
sensitivity firms and the remainder of the sample were analysed . The results provide evidence for the existence
of financial constraints for the high sensitivity sub-sample based on financial profile, but not on the actual use of
various funding sources.
Keywords: corporate finance, small business finance, financial constraints, dynamic panel estimation, entropy
econometrics, slope heterogeneity
I. Introduction
The literature on financial constraints studies the impact of financial policy on corporate
investment. Both theoretical and empirical evidence point towards the existence of liquidity
constraints, that potentially limit the capacity of the firm to develop over time. Theoretical
arguments, referring to agency theory seem compelling and fully in line with the pecking
order corporate finance paradigm (Jensen and Meckling, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; inter
alia.). In the empirical literature several tools have been developed that measure the extent to
which constraints are present within firms. One technique frequently applied is the estimation
1
Corresponding author
Bert D’Espallier, Research Institute KIZOK, Hasselt University, Faculty of Applied Business Sciences.
Address:
Universiteit Hasselt, Campus Diepenbeek, Agoralaan gebouw D, 3590 Diepenbeek
Tel:
+32(0)11 26 86 39
Fax:
+32(0)11 26 87 00
e-mail:
bert.despallier@uhasselt.be
1
of the cash flow sensitivity of investment (Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; inter alia.).
The idea is to extend the traditional neo-classical long-run investment model with variables
capturing net worth (mostly cash flow). It has been found many times, that cash flow is
indeed informative about the level of investment, and especially in firms that are a priori
believed to be more cash constrained. Usually a sample is split up ex-ante using a single
criterion that is likely to reflect differences in the level of constraints, such as size, age, payout policy or access to financial markets. A common finding is that firms, most likely to
suffer from constraints, have a higher cash flow sensitivity of investment, when the
investment equation is estimated using standard regression techniques.
Ever since its emergence by FHP, the cash flow sensitivity tool has been criticized on several
grounds. The main critiques relate to ‘investment opportunities bias’, ‘econometrical design’
and ‘ex-ante sample splitting’. Much attention has been devoted to the first and second
problem. Time-series models, for instance, can be used to verify whether or not cash flow
proxies for increased investment opportunities (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). Also the GMMestimator can be used to account for the potential endogenous explanatory variables (Bond et
al., 2003). The third problem however has received very little attention. The distinction
between constrained and unconstrained firms, based upon an exogenous splitting criterion
remains standard practice in the literature. The distinction is either implemented explicitly or
by means of interaction dummies. Both approaches suffer from the same obvious drawback:
Only one criterion can be tested at the same time, which results in rather limited conclusions.
When the criterion size is used, for instance, one can only conclude that smaller firms are on
average more constrained then larger firms. While this is probably true, it is not very accurate
since is likely that heterogeneity exists within the sub-samples. In other words: some smaller
firms might actually not be constrained and vice versa. Misclassification could occur, because
of the variation within sub-samples.
In this study, we propose an approach that allows for a detailed examination of the cash flow
sensitivity on the firm level. We use entropy econometrics to calculate the parameters of the
investment equation for each individual firm (Golan et al., 1996; Léon et al., 1999; Peeters,
2004). As a result, we can extract the distribution of firm sensitivities and compare firm
characteristics between high sensitivity firms and the remainder of the sample. Such a postestimation analysis allows us to make explicit statements about the profile of high sensitivity
firms. We perform our analysis on Belgian SMEs in the manufacturing sector over the period
2000 - 2004.
2
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section discusses both theoretical
and empirical literature on financial constraints. Section 3 covers our methodological
approach. Section 4 presents the main results of the study. Section 5 concludes and highlights
contributions and implications of the study.
II. Conceptual framework
The cash constrained firm
Economic theory predicts that in a perfect market setting, investment decisions are not
affected by financial decisions, since external financing can always be attracted at the true
cost of capital (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Consequently, all investment opportunities that
yield a positive net discounted value, should be undertaken. In practice, market-frictions cause
financing decisions to interfere with investment decisions. A major source of market-friction
are agency costs. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that asymmetric information between
owner-managers and external investors leads to higher risk born by external investors. This
results in an additional cost-component associated with external funding, since external
investors demand a risk-premium to compensate for additional risk.
The existence of agency costs creates a wedge between the cost of internal funding and
external funding (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). The result is a hierarchy of preferred funding
sources as in the traditional pecking order paradigm. However, when external funding sources
become too expensive, due to excessively high risk premia, firms might be pushed into using
internal funding sources only. At that point, pecking order behaviour is truncated and firms
are ‘constrained to internal finance’.
Asymmetric information problems might be particularly severe for smaller businesses. SMEs
have only limited access to external financial markets, particularly in economies with
relatively less developed stock markets. They usually also have a limited track-record and less
collateral than their larger counterparts, which raises the risk for external financiers and
results in higher risk-premia charged. Overall, smaller firms could be more constrained to
internal finance then larger counterparts (Harhoff, 1997).
The cash flow sensitivity of investment
The standard approach for detecting constraints has been to look at the difference in cash flow
sensitivity of investment between constrained and unconstrained firms. Traditionally, a sample
3
is split-up in constrained versus unconstrained firms based upon prior beliefs. For each subgroup, an investment equation is estimated using standard regression techniques. The
investment equation can take several forms, with several dependent variables, depending on
the nature of the constraints under study.
As a starting point the neo-classical long run investment model described by Jorgenson (1963)
is often used. In this model, the desired stock of capital ci,t is positively related to output yi,t ,
and negatively related to the user cost of capital ji,t :
c i ,t = a + y i ,t − σ j i ,t
(1)
Taking the first differences and applying an approximation for stock of capital:
∆ci ,t =
I i ,t
C i ,t −1
I i ,t
C i ,t −1
− δ yields:
= δ + ∆y i ,t − σ ji ,t
where:
Ii,t
investments in fixed assets during year t
Ci,t-1
the beginning of year capital stock
the rate of depreciation
Ii,t / Ci,t-1
the investment-rate at year t.
This model is usually nested in a dynamic specification to capture long-term effects. Time and
industry dummies are used to model the user cost of capital ji,t. Implementing this into the
specification yields:
I i ,t
C i ,t −1
=α
I i ,t −1
C i ,t − 2
+ β 1 ∆y i ,t + β 2 ∆y i ,t −1 + d t + a i + ε i ,t
where dt is a set of time dummies and ai are the unobserved firm-specific effects.
4
In order to detect financial constraints, this empirical specification is extended by including
variables capturing net worth, typically cash flow. All variables need to be scaled by total
assets in order to remove size-effects. Turnover is often used to proxy for the output yi,t. The
empirical specification we use throughout this paper is very close to the one used by Bond et
al. (2003) and Cincera (2002).
I i ,t
TAi ,t −1
=α +β
CFi ,t
TAi ,t −1
+γ
CFi ,t −1
TAi ,t − 2
+ϑ
I i ,t −1
TAt − 2
+ κ∆turnoveri ,t + λ∆turnoveri ,t −1 + d t + a i + ε i ,t
(2)
To measure potential liquidity constraints, the cash flow sensitivity of investment has to be
analyzed. This is the long term response of investment with respect to cash flow and is given
by:
ˆ
LTS = long term sensitivity = β + γˆ
1 − ϑˆ
(3)
Ex-ante sample splitting
The sample split between constrained and unconstrained firms, is usually performed using a
single criterion that is likely to be informative about the level of constraints (Schiantarelli,
1995). Common choices for the split include size, pay-out policy, age or access to financial
markets. A common finding is that the sub-sample most likely to face financial constraints has
a higher cash flow sensitivity of investment. The reason is that firms, constrained to internal
finance, are dependent upon the availability of internally generated cash flows to finance their
investments. Hence their investment-rate fluctuates with the availability of internal funds. The
sample split might also be performed implicitly, by using interaction dummies for each
splitting criterion as in Pawlina and Renneboog (2005), for instance. The result is the same:
for each dummy-variable, a different cash flow sensitivity of investment is calculated. Again,
the sub-samples constructed as the constrained ones, exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of
investment. Table 1 summarizes some studies using the results from the estimation based
upon ex-ante sample splitting as evidence of financial constraints.
5
Table 1: Ex-ante sample splitting
Name
Year
cash flow sensitivity
constrained sample.
Splitting criterion
dependent variable
Unconstrained sample
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
1988
0.46
0.23
Size
inv. fixed assets
Harhoff
1997
0.42
0.26
Size
inv. fixed assets
0.10
0.05
Size
inv. R&D
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein
1991
0.50
0.04
Group dummy
inv. fixed assets
Carpenter and Petersen
2002
0.46
0.23
Size
total asset growth
Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen
2003
0.24
0.14
Cross country
inv. fixed assets
0.75
0.45
R&D dummy
inv. R&D
Ever since the publication of the seminal paper by FHP (1988), the cash flow sensitivity tool
has been criticized on several grounds. The main critiques formulated involve ‘increased
investment opportunities’, ‘econometrical design’ and ‘ex-ante sample splitting’. Much
attention has been devoted to the first and second problem. Time-series models for instance,
can be used to verify whether or not cash flow proxies for increased investment opportunities
(Abel and Blanchard, 1986). The GMM-estimator can be used to account for the potential
endogenous explanatory variables (Bond et al. 2003).
More studies keep casting doubt on the ability of the cash flow sensitivity of investment to
capture financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Alti, 2003; Almeida
et al., 2004; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004). Other studies accept positive sensitivities as
being evidence of cash constraints, and further develop the methodology (Cincera, 2002,
Bond et al., 2003). In conclusion, the literature recognizes that corporate investment is
sensitive to changes in net-worth. However, it remains unclear whether or not significant
sensitivity is caused by the existence of liquidity constraints (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005).
In the present study, we focus on the issue of ex-ante sample splitting, which has a number of
limitations. Firstly, the chosen criterion has to be conceived beforehand. There has to be some
theory indicating which groups of firms could exhibit constraints. The chosen criterion
however might not necessarily be the most interesting one to focus on. Secondly, the
conclusions remain rather limited, because the investigator can only say something about
differences between assumed sub-samples. The splitting criteria to obtain these sub-samples
are usually rather crude (large vs. small, young vs. old, …) and consequently, the conclusions
remain rather limited. Finally, the regression analysis aggregates all sensitivities of the
6
members of a sub-sample into one single number. Hence, any heterogeneity between subsamples is ruled out and no variation in the level of constraints can be detected. When using
the criterion size for instance, you can only conclude that smaller firms are on average more
constrained then larger firms. While this is probably true, it is not very accurate since is very
likely that heterogeneity might exist within the sub-samples. In other words: some smaller
firms might actually not be constrained and vice versa. The obtained sensitivity of a subsample is an aggregate indicator, which can be very misleading, because we lack information
about individual sensitivities within the sub-samples. Misclassification can occur, because of
this heterogeneity in the sub-samples. Schiantarelli (1995) concludes that using only one
indicator “may or may not be a sufficient statistic for the existence of liquidity constraints.”
Although these draw-back have been recognised by several authors, no attempts, of which we
know, have been made to address the ex-ante sample splitting.
III. Estimating individual cash constraints
We propose an alternative approach that allows for a detailed examination of the cash flow
sensitivity at the firm level, without relying on the ex-ante division into sub-samples. We use
entropy econometrics to calculate the parameters of the investment equation for each
individual firm (Golan et al., 1996; Léon et al., 1999; Peeters, 2004). By doing so we can
extract the entire distribution of firm-specific sensitivities and compare firm characteristics
between high sensitivity firms and the remainder of the sample, which serves as a controlsample. This allows us to compare the profile of high sensitivity firms with the profile of the
control-sample.
We estimate the parameters of the investment equation (2) using the generalized maximum
entropy (GME) - estimator (Golan et al., 1996). The implementation of GME requires that
the parameters of the model be specified as linear combinations of some predetermined and
discrete support values and associated probabilities. The estimation problem is converted into
a constrained maximization problem, where the objective function consists of the entropyinformation criterion, as originally formulated by Shannon (1948). Maximizing this entropy
measure amounts to choosing the probability vector p that is closest to the uniform
distribution, and yet consistent with the available data and the relevant constraints. The
equation to be estimated appears as a data-consistency constraint in the model formulation.
7
Normalization constraints are added to ensure that the estimated probabilities add up to one.
The general notation of the GME problem is as follows:
max H ( p) = −
p k ln p k
p
(4)
k
subject to:
y = Xp
Data-consistency:
(5)
pk = 1
Normalization-constraint:
(6)
k
with:
k
the number of parameters
pk
the probability of each parameter to be estimated
y = Xp
the model you want to fit (data-consistency constraint)
The entropy-measure in (4) reaches a maximum when the probabilities are uniformly
distributed ( p1 = p 2 = ... = p k = 1 / K ). When the entropy in maximized, we obtain the set of
probabilities that “can be realised in the greatest number of ways consistent with what we
know” (Golan et al., 1996). These estimated probabilities can be recombined with the
predetermined support values, in order to get parameter estimates.
The GME formulation of the model (2) is as follows:
Max H (.) = −
p
pαm ln pαm −
m
−
pϑm ln pϑm −
m
pβi ,m ln pβi ,n −
i
m
pκm ln pκm −
m
pγ i,m ln pγ i ,m
i
m
pλm ln pλm −
m
pµi ,m ln pµi,m
i
m
(7)
8
subject to:
I i ,t
TAi ,t −1
=
pα m s α m +
p βi ,m s βi ,m
m
m
p γ i , m sγ i ,m
m
p ϑ m sϑ m
m
CFi ,t
+
TAi ,t −1
CFi ,t −1
TAi ,t − 2
I i ,t −1
TAi ,t − 2
+
+
p λm s λm ∆ turnover i ,t −1 +
p κ m sκ m ∆ turnover i ,t +
m
m
m
p µi ,m s µi ,m
(
(8)
pα m = 1,
m
p β i , m = 1,
m
pϑm = 1,
m
p γ i , m = 1,
m
pκ m = 1,
m
p λm = 1,
m
p µi ,m = 1
m
(9)
The objective function in (7) is the entropy criterion which has to be maximized. The first
constraint in (8) is the data-consistency constraint which is the parametrical version of the
cash flow sensitivity model (2). Each parameter is defined as a linear combination of
predetermined support values and probabilities to be estimated. The second set of constraints
in (9) are the normalization- constraints, which ensure that for each parameter, the estimated
probabilities sum up to one. The probabilities estimated by the GME maximization problem
are recombined with the predetermined support values in order to obtain parameter estimates
as in (10).
9
αˆ =
pˆ α m sα m
m
βˆi =
pˆ β i , m s β i , m
m
γˆi =
pˆ γ i , m sγ i , m
m
(10)
etc ...
We now have a model that estimates for each firm an individual cash-flow sensitivity:
I i ,t
TAi ,t −1
= αˆ + βˆi
CFi ,t
TAi ,t −1
+ γˆi
CFi ,t −1
TAi ,t − 2
+ ϑˆ
I i ,t −1
TAi ,t − 2
+ κˆ∆turnoveri ,t + λˆ∆turnoveri ,t −1 + µˆ i ,t
(11)
with:
βi :
The short-run cash flow sensitivity of investment. It measures, for firm i, the
immediate investment response to a cash flow shock.
γi :
The lagged cash flow sensitivity of investment. It measures, for firm i, the investment
response to a cash flow shock of the previous period.
The equation (11) is equivalent with the equation (2) except for the i-indices who indicate the
firm-specific character of the GME estimator. The firm-specific long-run cash flow sensitivity
of investment (LTSi ) is given, equivalently with (3), by:
LTS i = ( βˆi + γˆi ) /(1 − ϑˆ )
(12)
The use of GME does not require any assumption of random drawings from some particular
distribution, as for example the random coefficient model (RCM) does (Peeters, 2004). In
contrast with the RCM approach, GME allows to estimate a full parametric specification of
the individual, unobserved firm effects, without running into a degree-of-freedom problem
i.e., the problem of under-determinacy due to the fact that the number of parameters to be
10
estimated is larger than the number of observations. As a result, the GME estimator estimates
fixed or non-random parameters, whereas in conventional techniques the parameters are
“predicted”, based on the estimated second-order moment of the expectation vector (Léon et
al., 1999; Peeters, 2004). Moreover, the GME estimator does not suffer from the potential
endogeneity bias due to correlation between the varying parameters and the regressors
(Peeters, 2004).
IV. Data and Results
Data and descriptive statistics
We perform our analysis on Belgian SMEs in the manufacturing sector over a 5 year time
period (2000-2004). SMEs are defined following the standard OECD definition2. Since we are
not interested in the very smallest of firms who have usually very limited asset base, we
remove those SMEs with less then 5 full-time equivalent employees. 9707 firms remain in our
sample. For the GME estimation we require that numbers for investment in fixed assets and
cash flow be available in the observed period. We are left with 2974 firms, which means
14870 firm-years under study. In each analysis, we remove outliers by cutting off top- and
low 1 percentile of every variable used3.
Table 2 reports some important characteristics of the SME – population in the year 2003. The
median firm has total assets of
1 669 000, has 15 employees and is 18 years in operation.
Investments in fixed assets are relatively modest at 4% of total assets for the median firm. The
cash flow of the median firm equals 10% of total assets. The debt-ratio of 66.27% indicates
that the median firm has almost reached the traditional 70-30 proportion of full debt capacity.
Long-term debt is used to a much smaller extent, and the long term debt-ratio remains
relatively small at 23.62%. Reserves and retained earnings constitute 17.36% of total assets,
indicating that SME’s tend to reserve their profits, rather then distributing them to
shareholders.
Table 3 focuses on the use of various funding sources throughout the entire sample period.
We see that the growth in total assets was high at 9.65% in 2000, rapidly declined in 2001 and
2000, and went back up to 9.07% in 2004. This growth was financed primarily with retained
2
An SME has fewer then 250 employees measured in full-time equivalent; total assets are less then
and turnover is less then 50 000 000.
3
This is the standard procedure used in the financial constraints literature (Cincera, 2002)
45000 000
11
earnings, since changes in retained earnings ( ∆RE TA ) exceeded changes in financial debt
( ∆fin.debt TA ) in every year except in the year 2000. External equity financing
( ∆ex.equity TA ) was the smallest funding source used and never exceeded 1 percent of total
assets on average.
From the analysis in Tables 2 and 3, we conclude that growth in our SME-sample is financed
primarily by internal funding, to a smaller extent with debt and to marginal extent with
external equity. These results are in line with SME-financing behaviour described in other
studies (Reid, 1996; Smallbone and North, 1995; Manigart and Struyf, 1997; Hughes, 1994;
Freedman and Godwin, 1994; Audretsch and Elston, 1997).
Table 2: Firm characteristics of the SME-sample
firm characteristics
Min
25
50
75
max
total assets (x 1000)
148
764
1669
4382
28720
turnover (x 1000)
381
1291
3062
7755
42772
employees (FTE)
5
9
15
30
184
years in operation (#years)
5
13
18
29
75
0
0.02
0.04
0.1
0.68
0.02
0.06
0.1
0.16
0.46
9441
investments in fixed assets (% of TA)
cash flow (% of TA)
Net working capital (x 1000)
current-ratio
debt ratio
Ltdebt ratio
-2611
23
221
791
0.27
1.04
1.32
1.87
8.99
10.05%
48.55%
66.27%
78.99%
91.92%
0%
6.09%
23.62%
49.35%
91.83%
Reserves+retained earnings (% of TA)
-50.87%
5.70%
17.36%
35.81%
81.98%
profitability (% of TA)
-12.80%
2.63%
6.38%
12.82%
70.62%
-6.22%
1.15%
3.00%
5.95%
23.96%
sales margin
n = 2974
Only values of the year 2003 are mentioned.
12
Table 3: Financing behaviour throughout the sample period
Use of various funding sources throughout sample period
growth in total assets
internal financing
financial debt financing
external equity financing
TA/TA
RE/TA
fin-debt/TA
ex. equity/TA
all firms
2000
9.65%
2001
6.01%
2002
2.82%
2003
5.14%
2004
9.07%
2000
2.45%
2001
2.24%
2002
2.23%
2003
2.63%
2004
2.50%
2000
2.80%
2001
1.40%
2002
-0.55%
2003
0.12%
2004
1.57%
2000
0.21%
2001
0.46%
2002
0.04%
2003
0.06%
2004
0.55%
n= 2974
Numbers are averages over all firms in the sample.
Estimation results
The model in (11) was estimated for each year in our sample period using the GAMS
optimization software package. Table 4 summarizes the results from the optimization
procedure. The results show that in every year investment is highly sensitive to cash flow for
the vast majority of the sample. However there is a wide variety in individual sensitivities
ranging from 0.17 to 2.00 in the most recent year. This wide range indicates the relevance of
individual estimation rather then aggregate estimation of assumed sub-samples. The average
sensitivity declines over the years from .66 in year 2000 to .51 in year 2004. Figure 1 plots
the probability densities for the individual sensitivities in every year.
13
Table 4: Long-run cash flow sensitivity of investment from the GME optimization procedure
Mean
Min
Median
Max
2004
0.51
0.17
0.47
2.00
2003
0.50
0.18
0.50
1.81
2002
0.55
0.33
0.53
1.96
2001
0.61
0.28
0.58
1.92
2000
0.66
-0.20
0.64
2.54
Long run sensitivity
n=2974
Numbers are the results for long term sensitivity parameter given in (12) which come from the GME optimization procedure
figure 1: Density functions of the estimated long-term sensitivity in every year of the sample period
14
The financial profile of high sensitivity firms
Once we have estimated the distribution of firm-specific sensitivities, we compare firm
characteristics between high sensitivity firms and a control-sample. This allows us to build up
the profile of a high sensitivity firm and analyse whether we can find any evidence of
financial constraints. We assign firms to the high sensitivity sub-sample if the firm has, in
each year, a sensitivity higher then (median sensitivity of that year + 0.05). By doing this we
make sure that firms are assigned to the high sensitivity sub-sample, only if they exhibit a
high cash flow sensitivity in every year of the sample period. This way we capture firms who
really invest at the pace of their cash flow, year after year. Table 5 gives information on the
description of the sub-samples.
Table 5: description of sub-sample
high sensitivity firms
# firms
control-sample
all firms
411
2563
2974
% of sample
13.80%
86.20%
100%
Average sensitivity
0.7904
0.5369
0.5704
n= 2974
We test differences in financial profile and financing behaviour between high sensitivity firms
and the control-sample. We look at the financial profile both in the first and last year of the
sample period, and to the funding behaviour throughout the sample period. The differences
between the sub-samples are investigated using an independent samples t-test. This test uses a
t-statistic to test whether the means of the sub-samples are equal (null-hypotheses) or not.
Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the financial profile for the sub-samples. Table 7
summarizes the use of various funding sources for the sub-samples.
When looking at Table 6, we see two different financial profiles emerging for both subsamples. The high sensitivity firms have a higher financial debt ratio and a higher long term
debt ratio, which results in a higher overall debt-ratio. They also carry significantly less
liquidity and are significantly less profitable. Finally they have less reserves and retained
earnings to use as a cushion to finance future investments. Overall this profile does seem to
confirm the financial constraints hypothesis. The high debt ratio of 71.92% indicates the
difficulty in attracting more debt-financing in the future, unless the asset base would increase.
The lower liquidity, profitability and solvency figures seem to suggest the lower attractiveness
to external investors. It seems these firms do depend on internal sources to be able to finance
future investment opportunities, which is implicit evidence of financial constraints.
15
Furthermore, this observed profile seems to be consistent over time, since we observe the
same profile both in the beginning and at the end of the sample period.
When looking at the funding sources that were actually used throughout the sample period
(Table 7) , we do not find any significant differences between the two sub-samples. The high
sensitivity sub-sample did not use any less financial debt, nor external equity financing then
the control-sample. Also the results for the use of internal funding sources and alternative
funding sources (like trade credit ) do not suggest much difference between the sub-samples.
This result might be driven by the fact that many firms in the control sample have very low
investment demands. These firms do not use external funding sources although they have the
intrinsic balance sheet capacity to attract outside funding sources. This causes overall rates of
external funding to be extremely low, blurring the distinguishing power of the cash flow
sensitivity of investment.
In conclusion, the differences in financial profile do seem to suggest that the cash flow
sensitivity of investment is a parameter that distinguishes between two different groups of
firms. However, the observed difference is not translated into the differences in the use of
various funding sources, possibly because the overall low use of external funding sources.
Table 6: differences in financial profile between high sensitivity firms and the control -sample
financial profile in 2000
financial profile in 2004
variables
definition
high sensitivity firms
control- sample
t-test: p-value
size
TA
3974
4386
0.206
age
years in operation
24.52
24.01
0.541
debt ratio
debt / TA
71.92%
65.75%
0.000***
long term debt ratio
long term debt / TA
40.61%
31.12%
0.000***
financial debt ratio
financial debt / TA
29.55%
26.43%
0.003***
ratio of self financing
(reserves + retained earnings) / TA
15.12%
18.79%
0.008***
ratio of interest expenses
interest expenses / TA
2.83%
2.68%
0.757
profitability
EBIT / TA
5.89%
8.37%
0.000***
current ratio
current assets / current liabilities
1.28
1.66
0.000***
size
TA
4400
5068
0.138
age
years in operation
24.52
24.01
0.541
debt ratio
debt / TA
67.12%
61.14%
0.000***
long term debt ratio
long term debt / TA
34.90%
26.33%
0.000***
financial debt ratio
financial debt / TA
26.63%
24.33%
0.044**
ratio of self financing
(reserves + retained earnings) / TA
18.65%
22.97%
0.021**
ratio of interest expenses
interest expenses / TA
2.42%
2.38%
0.754
profitability
EBIT / TA
5.77%
8.44%
0.000***
current ratio
current assets / current liabilities
1.44
1.94
0.000***
p-value is the probability of the null-hypothesis of no difference
** is the 5 percent significance level
*** is the 1percent significance level
16
Table 7: differences in financing behaviour between high sensitivity firms versus the control- sample
funding sources used
internal sources
financial debt financing
definition
high sensitivity firms
control-sample
RE/TA 04
2.20%
2.44%
0.665
RE/TA 03
2.34%
3.04%
0.082
RE/TA 02
1.72%
2.44%
0.074
RE/TA 01
1.75%
2.03%
0.550
RE/TA 00
1.88%
2.79%
0.067
fin.debt/TA 04
2.51%
2.19%
0.824
fin.debt/TA 03
0.86%
0.38%
0.501
fin.debt/TA 02
-0.55%
-0.13%
0.565
fin.debt/TA 01
1.87%
1.67%
0.821
fin.debt/TA 00
3.41%
2.87%
0.601
ex. equity/ TA 04
0.28%
0.36%
0.895
ex. equity/ TA 03
0.24%
0.22%
0.895
ex. equity/ TA 02
0.25%
0.54%
0.466
ex. equity/ TA 01
0.77%
0.63%
0.546
ex.equity/ TA 00
0.30%
0.48%
0.648
external equity financing
trade credit financing
t-test: p-value
DPO-DRO 04
13.56
5.64
0.006***
DPO-DRO 03
9.91
6.86
0.296
DPO-DRO 02
9.12
9.82
0.808
DPO-DRO 01
11.62
11.62
0.498
DPO-DRO 00
13.31
11.00
0.421
p-value is the probability of the null-hypothesis of no difference
** is the 5 percent significance level
*** is the 1percent significance level
V. Conclusions and discussion
The financial constraints literature uses the cash flow sensitivity of investment to distinguish
between constrained versus unconstrained firms. A major drawback of this approach is the exante sample splitting using one assumed criterion such as size, age, pay-out policy or access
to financial markets. Although this drawback has been recognised by several authors, the
regression based analysis of sub-samples is still common practice in this literature.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach, which allows for a detailed examination of
the cash flow sensitivity at the firm level, without making any prior assumptions. We use the
GME estimator to calculate the parameters of the investment equation and extract firmspecific sensitivities. Our results indicate a wide variety in individual sensitivities in every
year, demonstrating the relevance of individual estimation rather then aggregate estimation of
assumed sub-samples.
17
Once we estimated the individual sensitivities, we compared firm characteristics and
financing behaviour between high sensitivity firms and the remainder of the sample, which
serves as the control-sample. This allows us to make profiles of high sensitivity firms and
analyse whether we can find any evidence of financial constraints. Our results show
differences in financial profile between high sensitivity firms and the control-sample. In fact,
we see that the profile of the high sensitivity firm does seem to match with the profile of a
financially constrained firm. This conclusion, however, is not translated into differences in the
actual use of the various funding sources. This is possibly because the overall low use of
external funding sources because of low investment demands. We conclude that in the case of
SMEs, the cash flow sensitivity of investment is, at least to some extent, able to capture
differences in financial constraints.
We believe the preceding results have some interesting implications. Firstly, we address the
limited capacity of a regression analysis to test for financial constraints. A regression analysis
makes an aggregate sensitivity of the entire sub-sample without taking into account individual
heterogeneity. This leads to limited conclusions in the best case, and serious misclassification
in the worst case because of overlap between the sub-samples. Our approach does not suffer
from aggregation and hence allows a more detailed analysis of the usefulness of the
sensitivity parameter.
Secondly, we believe the cash flow sensitivity of investment is, to some extent, an interesting
tool to determine the severity of constraints. However, the parameter does not a perfect job in
distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained firms. For instance, we find that many
firms in the control-sample use very little external funding sources, blurring the distinguishing
power of the cash flow sensitivity of investment. Firms might be reluctant to use external
equity and external debt funding because various reasons such as loss of control, pride,
transaction costs, etc. (Freel 2000; Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Hughes, 1994; Lopez-Garcia
and Aybar-Arias, 2000). This causes low demand for outside funding sources and leads to
demand-constraints rather then supply-constraints (Howorth, 2001). These demandconstraints might be especially severe in case of SME-financing.
Finally, we emphasize the difficulty of finding a quantitative measure that adequately captures
the concept of financial constraints. A more integration of qualitative and quantitative
research could help to develop a reliable tool that measures financial constraints.
18
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22
Data-appendix
Data are taken from the BELFIRST DVD, published yearly by Bureau Van Dijk. This dataset consists of detailed balance sheets, as well as income statements for the entire population
of Belgian companies. Following Table gives the extracted variables, definitions and number
according to the MAR-account numbers classification (Minimaal Algemeen Rekenstelsel).
Variables
definition
MAR-number
total assets (x 1000)
20/58
turnover (x 1000)
70
employees (FTE)
9087
years in operation (#years)
investments in fixed assets (% of TA)
(investments in fixed assets/ total assets)*100
cash flow (% of TA)
(cashflow / total assets)*100
net working capital (x 1000)
current assets-current liabilities
current-ratio
limited current assets/current liabilities
debt ratio
debt/total liabilities
Ltdebt ratio
Ltdebt/total liabilities
Reserves+transferred profits (% of TA)
(Reserves+ transferred profits)/total assets
profitability (% of TA)
net-profits after tax and depreciation / total assets
sales margin
net-profits after depreciation before tax / turnover
RE
retained earnings
ex. Equity
external equity
fin. Debt
financial debt
DPO
days payable outstanding
DRO
days recievable outstanding
(8029+8169+8365)/(20/58)
(70/67-67/70+630-8089-8289+8475-8485-694/6)/(20/58)
(29/58-29-42/48-492/3)
(29/58-29)/(42/48+492/3)
(16+17/49)/10/49
(16+17)/10/49
(13+140-141)/10/49
(70/66-66/70-65+780-680-9126-656)/20/58
(70/64-64/70+9125)/70
11+12+13+(140-141)+15
10/15-(11+12+13+(140-141)+15))
170/4+178/9+43+47/48
44/((600/8+61+9145)/365)
40+9150/((70+74-740+9146)/365)
interest expenses
65
23
24