Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Separation of Civilian and Military Facilities
Author(s): Ashwin Kumar
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 40, No. 53 (Dec. 31, 2005 - Jan. 6, 2006), pp. 55305532
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Indo-US
Nuclear
Deal
Separationof Civilian andMilitaryFacilities
If the India-USdeal movesforward, this would give theformer
greaterfreedom to pursue cooperation with countries
possessing nuclear materials and technology. However,
international cooperation would requirethefacilities receiving
assistance to be subject to safeguards, and to that extentIndia's
priorities for international cooperation must be articulated.
Having clear priorities would also help India's negotiators
navigate a situation in which offers of cooperationcome with
strings attached.
ASHWINKUMAR
s partof the nucleardeal withthe
US, Indiahas agreedto identify
andseparateall civilianandmilitarynuclearfacilitiesin a phasedmanner
and place all civilian facilities underthe
InternationalAtomic Energy Agency's
(IAEA)safeguardsregime.l The successful implementationof the deal would
dependon how the US views India'splan
for separationof facilities as well as its
commitmentto compliancewith an addiZ
tionalprotocol.In November,the US am;n
bassadorto India David Mulfordstated
thatIndiamustpresenta planfor civilianmilitaryseparationbeforethe US administration would request congressional
action[Baruah2005]. The planwouldbe
reviewed by US experts, and if judged
credible, the US administrationwould
approach the Congress so that the
lattercould consideramendmentsto US
legislation.2Recently, the Indian prime
ministerManmohanSingh made the reassuringstatementthatworkon separating
India'scivilianandmilitarynuclearfacilities wasata fairlyadvancedstage[Baruah
2005a]. This articledescribesthe issues
that should be considered, and outlines
in broadstrokeswhat separationshould
look like.
A
Legal Landscape
Since 1978, US law requiresthat US
nuclearexports to states that were not
NPT-recognisednuclearweapons states
(NWS)couldnotbe authorisedunlessthey
havefull-scopesafeguardson all peaceful
nuclearactivities[Squassoni2005]. India
is a non-NWSunderthe NPT and also
accordingto US law, and thereforethis
conditionappliesto it. WhenIndiarefused
5530
In December, RichardLugar,the chairman
of the US Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations mentioned to a visiting Indian
delegation that the current debate in the
US Congress on the nuclear cooperation
agreement focuses on the facilities separation aspect of India's obligations.3
According to Lugar, the Foreign Relations
Committee and the US Congress is likely
to assess the separation plan according to
three criteria. Firstly, the safeguards plan
should ensure that all materials exported
to India and all material used in safeguarded nuclear facilities are subject to
IAEA safeguards. Second, the plan
should ensure that civilian cooperation
does not assist India's nuclear weapons
programme. Thirdly, the plan should be
transparent, as an opaque plan would
raise questions about India's intentions
within the US Congress.4
to accept this condition, US fuel supplies
to the Tarapurlight water reactors (LWR)
ended in 1980 [McGoldrick et al 2005].
Between 1978 and 1980, the US administration under president Carter had ex- Safeguards Constraints
ported two shipments df fuel for Tarapur
An important aspect of the plan would
reactors under executive order. But this
became untenableafter 1980. Later,France, be the nature of safeguards being impleChina and Russia exported fuel but this mented between India and the IAEA. The
is no longer possible as they too are con- joint statement does not commit to any
strainedby theirmembershipin the Nuclear particular form of safeguards. In the
Suppliers Group (NSG), which adopted voluntary-offer safeguards agreements
the full-scope safeguards requirement in between the NWS and the IAEA, coun1992, and some of them also by domestic tries submit to the IAEA a list of facilities
legislation requiringfull-scope safeguards eligible for inspection. Further,countries
signing voluntary safeguards agreements
[Squassoni op cit].
Whateverthe natureof safeguardsagree- have the right to withdraw any facility
ments implemented between India and the from this list for national security reasons
IAEA, they would not be full-scope since and the transfer of material out of them.
India would continue to retain un-safe- However, as suggested by senior US
guarded military facilities [Perkovich governmental officials such as senator
2005]. Therefore, nuclear cooperation on Lugar, such an arrangement are unlikely
a continued basis would require changes to be acceptable to the US.5 It is possible
to US laws, and two options are available that India would be expected to adopt
to the US administration. It could try to safeguards in perpetuity on facilities that
amend sections of the US Atomic Energy are declared as civilian, requiring that
Act requiring full-scope safeguards. Or these facilities may not be used to process
instead, it could introduce stand alone nuclear materials for the military sector.
legislation to create an exception for India The exact form that safeguards arrange[Squassoni 2005]. As for the NSG, the US ments take will influence the extent of
administrationcould press for an excep- separation. For example, in the Tarapur
tion or a set of criteria that would allow reprocessing plant safeguards currently
cooperation with India while retaining the apply only while processing safeguarded
full-scope safeguards. Alternatively, the spent fuels such as the fuel from the
group would decide at the plenary to its Rajasthan reactors.6 So underthe present
next meeting whetheror not to allow exports arrangement this plant can be used to
to India, on the basis of its history and also process un-safeguarded materials too. In
its commitments as described in the joint contrast, a complete separation would be
statement (ibid).
one in which all material used in a reBoth the US Congress and the NSG will processing plant thatis declared as civilian
follow the progreAs India makes in its is safeguarded. It remains to be seen what
separationplans and, in addition, are likely form the new arrangements will take and
to want to know what form the safeguards whether they will override the existing
would take before arriving at a decision. safeguards agreements.
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The Choice
The Indiannegotiators of the deal would
be steering a course between what is
desirable, given the requirement of a
beneficial outcome for the civilian and
military sectors at an affordable cost, and
what is acceptable to the US, the NSG
members, and the international nonproliferation regime. In any separation arrangement, the civilian sector would benefit if a large number of existing facilities
are declaredcivilian for two reasons. First,
access to inputs from abroad such as
financing, technology and fuel supplies
would accrue only to this sector. To illustrate,India'spowerprogrammeis uraniumconstrainedandsome heavy-waterreactors
have slowed operations to conserve
naturaluranium fuel. The enriched uranium that Russia has supplied for the
Tarapurlight water reactors is expected to
be exhausted in 2006 [Ramachlandran
2005]. To conserve enriched uranium,fuel
containing 10 per cent mixed oxide fuel
(MOX) has been used at Tarapur and it
is possible to increase this fraction up to
30 per cent without expensive design
changes [Chari 2005]. Therefore, India's
need for uranium imports would place a
lower bound on the number of power
reactors in its civilian nuclear complex.
Second, to the extent thatsafeguardswould
result in the duplication of many facilities
to separatelyserve the civilian and military
sectors,the cost of duplication would affect
the economics of nuclear power.
On the other hand, since there is no
constrainton transferof materials from the
militaryto theciviliansector,itmight appear
expedient for India to retain its military
option by declaring a large number of
facilities to be military. Recently, the
chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) stated that only
facilities that have no national security
significance will be civilian [Subramanian
2005]. Most Indian facilities have played
a dual role in the past, and this approach
would minimise the size of the civilian
sector. In addition to being detrimental to
the civilian sector, such a strategy is
unlikely to be acceptable to the US or
the NSG.
Plutonium Reserves
The main reason why sections of the
Indianstrategicandnuclearestablishments
would want to keep a. large number of
facilities in the military sector is to
retain India's options for generating
weapons-usableplutonium. Currently,
India's weapons-gradeplutoniumis produced in two researchreactors- CIRUS
andDhruva,locatedattheBhabhaAtomic
Research Centre (BARC) campus
[Rajaraman2005]. These reactors are
operatedwith a low-bumup,and the fuel
rodsareremovedafterbriefirradiation
and
the resultingplutoniumseparated.Such
low bumupsare not efficient for power
production.High bumupsused in power
productionresult in higher isotopes of
plutonium, which are suboptimal for
weaponsproduction.However,the inherentlydualnatureof thispartof thenuclear
programmelies in thefactthat,despitethe
higherisotopesinreactorgradeplutonium,
itcanalsobeusedtomakefissionweapons.
Theplutonium
producedinIndia'spower
reactorsis also anintegralpartof its plans
for three-stagepower programme- the
plutoniumproducedin thefirststageis to
be usedin thesecondstagein its proposed
Fast BreederReactors(FBR) to produce
fissile uranium-233.The rate at which
uranium-233fuel is madeavailablefor its
thirdstagethatwoulduse India'splentiful
suppliesof thorium,thereforedependson
thequantitiesof plutoniumproducedin its
first stage. In addition,plutoniumseparatedfromits powerreactorscan be used
as MOX for its light water reactorsin
Tarapur.
One implicationof wherethe lines are
drawn in separating India's nuclear
facilities, therefore, is the partitioning
of plutoniumsuppliesfor weaponsproductionon themilitarysideandas fuel for
FBRs and MOX fuel for the civilian
programme.This calls for reflectionand
discussionwithinthenuclearandstrategic
establishmentson what India's nuclear
posture should be. For example, some
analystsestimatethat India alreadyhas
a stock of weapons-grade plutonium
from CIRUS and Dhruvafor a hundred
weapons of 20-kilotonneseach (ibid). If
this is sufficient, there is no reason for
the power reactors to remain in the
militarysector.
Uranium Enrichment and
Fuel Reprocessing
India'smainuraniumenrichmentplant
inRattehalli,
Karnataka,
producesenriched
uranium for its nuclear submarine
programme.Its enrichmentcapacity is
muchlowerthanwhatis neededto power
a singlelightwaterpowerreactor[Ramana
2004]. Itis notclearwhethermaterialfrom
facilitiescanbe usedto power
safeguarded
nuclearsubmarinesunderthis agreement,
butits statusas a potentialsourceof highly
enricheduraniumforIndia'sthermonuclear
weaponsprogrammemakesit likely that
it wouldbe in themilitarysector.Indiahas
a pilot-scale ultracentrifugeenrichment
plant in BARC's Trombaycampusthat
can produce 2 kg of weapons grade
uraniumeachyearandis likelyto become
a partof the militarysector.7
Spentfuel reprocessingis whereduplicationof facilitiesis likely to arisein any
separationprogramme,becausetheplutoniumextractedfromspentfuel is useable
in the weaponsprogrammeon one hand
andintheproposedfastbreederprogramme
and in MOX fuel on the civilian. The
medium-scale reprocessing facility
operatedby the AEC in Trombayis not
under internationalsafeguardscurrently
and processesfuel from the CIRUS and
Dhruvareactors.8As the main sourceof
plutoniumfor the weaponsprogramme,it
is likelytobepartof themilitarysector.The
large-scaleplantthatis partof theTarapur
Atomic Power Station (TAPS) complex
reprocessesfuelmeantfortheFastBreeder
TestReactor(FBTR)andTarapur'sMOX
fabricationfacilities.9In the past, it has
also processedfuel fromCIRUSandalso
from the Kalpakkam and Rajasthan
reactors.A third plant, the large-scale
KalpakkamAtomicReprocessingPlantis
managedby the IndiraGandhiCentrefor
AtomicResearchandhasbeenearmarked
forIndia'sFBRprogramme,
andcurrently
reprocessesfuel from the heavy water
inKalpakkam
reactor
andalsofromFBTR.10
Theeventualstatusof thesetworeprocessing plantswould dependon the statusof
theupstreamanddownstreamfacilities.If,
as senior Departmentof Atomic Energy
(DAE) officialshave suggested,FBTRis
declaredmilitary(T S Subramanian
op cit)
then under complete separationthe reprocessingplantthatsuppliesthemcannot
remainin the civilian sector.
Contours of Separation
As part of its plans for separatingits
facilities,Indiawill eventuallybegin discussions with the IAEA aboutthe nature
of safeguardsit will implement.Current
safeguards on Indian facilities do not
enforcecompleteseparation.
Forexample,
to
the
safeguardsapply
reprocessingplant
in Tarapuronly while processing safeguardedspentfuels such as the fuel from
theRajasthanreactors.India'snegotiators
should gauge whether continuing such
arrangementson currentlysafeguarded
Economicand PoliticalWeekly December31, 2005
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5531
facilities would be acceptable to India's
partners in the deal.
In the face of uncertaintyabout the exact
form the safeguards arrangements would
eventually take, Indian planners must be
willing to make choices in the context of
complete separation. Given the existing
plutonium stocks and the potential for
further plutonium production using the
research reactors Dhruva and CIRUS, the
power reactors are not necessary for
weapons production and should be open
to safeguards. The FBTR is likely to
remain unsafeguarded, and it remains to
be seen what plans the DAE has for operational FBR's once they come on stream.
Keeping these reactorsin the militarysector
will complicate access to uranium for the
first stage reactors that would supply the
second stage of this programme.Therefore
the power reactors should be subject to
safeguards.Inpartitioningdual-use enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing
facilities the following questions should
be asked: First, are they useful to the
civilian nuclear power programme?
Second, are they essential to the military
nuclear weapons programme? Because
materials, facilities and personnel are
involved this is likely to be an extended
process in which the DAE experts, in
consultation with Indian negotiators of the
agreement, work out the details of separating these facilities.
If the India-US deal moves forward and
is approvedby the US Congress and NSG,
this would give the formergreaterfreedom
to pursue cooperation with countries
possessing nuclear materials and technology. Perhapsits greatest benefit would be
the flexibility to cooperate with countries
thathave experience with FBRs. Or maybe
the emphasis would be on obtaining access
to natural and enriched uranium fuel for
its first stage reactors. While all these
avenues may be simultaneously pursued,
it must be remembered that international
cooperation would require the facilities
receiving assistance to be subject to safeguards,and to that extent India's priorities
for internationalcooperation must be articulated. Having clear priorities would also
help India's negotiators navigate a situation in which offers of cooperation come
with strings attached.
A Note of Caution
The ancillary costs of nuclear power in
India will increase if dedicated facilities
haveto beestablishedto separatelyservice
thecivilianandmilitarysectors.TheDAE is
5532
clearly sensitive to this fact, and the chairman of the AEC indicated that cost would
be a factor in identifying what is civilian
(ibid). But if facility-specific safeguards
happen, then some of the initial costs of
replication will be unavoidable. Efforts
must be made to understandthe effects of
separation on the costs of nuclear power
by studying the costs of the kind of facilities that are being duplicated over their
lifetimes.
Progress in the deal should not be seen
as a referendum in favour of nuclear
power. Rather, the choice of generation
technology should be based on assessment of costs. To assess the economics of
nuclear power in comparison to other
sources such as natural gas and coal a
complete analysis of its economics,
including the costs of fuel fabrication,
heavy water, spent fuel reprocessing,
and waste storage and disposal is necessary [Gopalakrishnan2002]. The cost estimates published by the DAE omit these
factors. More generally, there is a need for
establishing methodology for integrated
resource planning to identify energy
choices and this must be openly subject
to discussion. 'ZI
Facilities, Last Updated September 2003,
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/
Nuclear/2103_2473.html)
8 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear
Facilities, Last Updated September 2003,
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/
Nuclear/2103_2497.html)
9 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear
Facilities, Last Updated September 2003,
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/
Nuclear/2103 2499.html)
10 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear
Facilities, Last Updated September 2003,
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/
Nuclear/2103_2495.html)
References
Baruah,Amit (2005): 'IndiaMust SubmitPlan on
NuclearFacilities', The Hindu,November 15.
- (2005a): 'Work on Separatioh of Nuclear
Facilities at Advanced Stage'., The Hindu,
December 12.
Chari, P R (2005): 'Indo-US N Deal', Margin,
Vol 37, No4, July-September,NationalCouncil
of Applied Economic Research.
A (2002): 'Evolutionof theIndian
Gopalakrishnan,
Nuclear Power Programme',Annual Review
of Energy and the Environment, Vol 27,
pp 369-95.
McGoldricket al (2005): 'The US-IndiaNuclear
Deal: Taking Stock', Arms Control Today,
October.
Perkovich,George (2005): 'FaultyPromises:The
US-IndiaNuclearDeal', CarnegieEndowment
Email: ashwin_k@MIT.EDU
for InternationalPeace, September.
Rajaraman, R (2005): 'Save the Indo-US
Agreement', Seminar on Nuclear Energy:
India's Challenges and Opportunities,Indian
1 Joint statementbetween presidentGeorge W
Pugwash Society, November 25-26.
Bush and prime minister ManmohanSingh, Ramachandran,R (2005): 'The Indo-US Nuclear
Deal:TheDimensionsof theBargain',Seminar
office of the presssecretary,the White House,
on Nuclear Energy: India's Challenges and
July 18, 2005.
2 'US Clarifieson India's Next Step in N-deal',
Opportunities, Indian Pugwash Society,
November 25-26.
Express News Service, November 15, 2005.
3 'Lugar Addresses US-India Nuclear Co- Ramana,M V (2004): 'India's UraniumEnrichment Programme', INESAP Information
operation', UnitedStatesSenate,December6,
2005.
Bulletin, No 24, December.
4 Ibid.
Sq'uassoni, Sharon (2005): 'US Nuclear
5 Ibid.
Cooperationwith India:Issues for Congress',
CRS Report for Congress, October 24.
6 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear
Subramanian,T S (2005): 'Identifyinga Civilian
Facilities, Last Updated September 2003,
Nuclear Facility Is India's Decision',
(http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/
Interviewwith Anil Kakodkar, The Hindu,
Nuclear/2103_2499.html)
7 NTI: Country Overviews: India: Nuclear
August 12.
Notes
CALLFOR PAPERS
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Abstracts may be sent via email to gandhiancentre.jamia@.gmail.comor through
telefax: +91-11-2698 5473. The fulltext of the call forpapers is availableon the Jamia,.
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Thedeadlineforsubmittingabstracts
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Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Separation of Civilian and Military Facilities
If the India-US deal moves forward, this would give the former greaterfreedom to pursue cooperation with countries
possessing nuclear materials and technology. However, international cooperation would require the facilities receiving
assistance to be subject to safeguards, and to that extent India's priorities for international cooperation must be articulated. Having clear priorities would also help India's negotiators navigate a situation in which offers of cooperation come with strings attached. ...Read more
