Journal of Community Positive Practices, XV(3) 2015, 3-13
ISSN Print: 1582-8344; Electronic: 2247-6571
UNDERSTANDING HOW PEOPLE
DECIDE: DECISION-MAKING
THEORIES AS MENTAL
REPRESENTATIONS1
Alexandra GHEONDEA-ELADI2
Abstract: This paper argues that instead of seeing the most influential theories in decisionmaking as competitive, one may contemplate the possibility that they are part of a wider theory of
decision-making. This theory looks at how people decide based on how they structure a mental
representation of a complex reality. Further, it gives a brief presentation of the mainstream
theories in decision-making: expected utility theory, prospect theory, bounded rationality, parallel
games, Rawls' theory of justice and multi-criteria decision-making. The conclusions suggest that
research in the field should include the current theories of decision-making as possible mental
representations, while also acknowledging some important epistemological problems in this field.
Keywords: mental representations, decision-making, expected utility, prospect theory, bounded
rationality, parallel games, justice, multi-criteria decision-making.
Understanding how people decide purports the problem of knowing what how means.
What is it that we expect to find when studying decision-making of people in real-life
situations? How far can we and how far should we go in pursuing an answer to this
question? Suppose we consider the example of a sculptor who wants to model in clay
the portrait of a person. First of all, the task can be summarized as follows: a threedimensional subject is to be re-constructed in a three-dimensional representation of it.
The sculptor should decide at every step where and how a surface should be
constructed, usually by using only the eye and the movement of the hand, without the
aid of a computer or of a scanner that can transpose the portrait point by point. The
decision-making of our sculptor is mostly performed subconsciously. On the other hand,
constructing a clay model in a conscious manner would imply the ability to name and
explain why each action has taken place, thus giving justification. This process is usually
called post-hoc rationalization. It is usually the basis for the assumption that conscious
acts are also logical.
1This
2
paper is made and published under the aegis of the Research Institute for Quality of Life,
Romanian Academy co-funded by the European Union within the Operational Sectorial
Programme for Human Resources Development through the “Pluri and interdisciplinary in
doctoral and post-doctoral programmes” Project, POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086.
Ph.D. Scientific Researcher III, Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy,
Bucharest. Romania. E-mail:alexandra@iccv.ro
4
Alexandra GHEONDEA-ELADI
The rationality of an act depends on the definition of rationality. Eilon (1969) argues
that conscious decisions can also be irrational if the preferences are circular. For him
and the scholars of rational choice theory based on the writings of von Neumann and
Morgenstern, rational decisions are decisions based on a set of preferences that an
individual is able to rank order. Therefore, if individuals do not "abide by an agreed
criterion that specifies how a choice between alternatives is to be made" of if they
cannot rank order their preferences, then their actions are considered to be irrational
(Eilon, 1969: B177). On the other hand, rank ordering preferences implies the use of
numbers, ratios, proportions, comparison and/or of quantification. In other words,
there is also a problem of measurement in the definition of rationality (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Framework for understanding rational decisions in terms of measurability and
consciousness of decision-making process
measurable
irrational
unconscious
conscious
rational
wider rational
non-measurable
What scholars usually call rational decisions are conscious decisions based on measurable
preferences. Irrational decisions are usually unconscious (Kahneman, 2011) or based on
both conscious and non-measurable preferences. Not far ago, rationality was defined as
also emotion-less, until sociological critique (Archer & Tritter 2000) and psychological
research has shown that decisions are impossible without emotions (see for example
Sacks, 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002) and that preferences are influenced by emotions
(Andrade & Ariely, 2009).
However, it is not decisions or choices that are rational, at least not in the sense of
decision as resolution. Instead, the mental representations on which they are based and
the way in which these representations are built can be rational or irrational. A mental
representation in this case is a mental re-construction of a perceived reality or a
cumulated set of perceived stimuli. In decision research this is a relatively new term1
which has the potential to de-construct the classical boundaries between different
decision theories (Loewenstein, 2001; Mazur, 2015; Arentze et al., 2008; Huber et al.,
1however
not new in psychology and linguistics (Mental Models and Reasoning Lab n.d.;
Wittgenstein, 1922)
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES AS MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
5
2011). It is important to note that this is not a strictly psychological definition as the
stimuli does not have to be strictly external or based only on the human sensorial
organs. A mental representation can be made based on the perception of an "intangible,
formless idea" (Solomon, 1991: 12). In this way, a representation is a symbol, but it can
also be a representation of a symbol. Thus, the perception of stimuli generates a mental
representation based on which decisions are made, followed by actions in the chosen
direction. Actions are followed by verbalization which leads to meaning (Figure 2).
Figure 2. The construction of meaning in decision-making
The very idea of decision frames proposed by Tversky & Kahneman (1981) touches on
the idea of mental representations presented here when it describes frames as "the
decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a
particular choice. The frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the
formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and personal
characteristics of the decision-maker" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981: 453). The
difference between the notion of frames used by Tversky and Kahnmann and the
notion of mental representations used here is that mental representations are not
necessarily in terms of acts, outcomes and contingencies associated with a particular
choice. Mental representations can be constructed in any terms an individual wishes,
from justice, to prospects, to power or social relations. The structure of a mental
representation is left at the individual's choice. It is also close to the concept of
cognitive image used by Zamfir (2005). Taught representations are socially constructed
and can be transmitted from generation to generation. Loewenstein (2001) shows how
previous research in decision-making points out that people "figure out what kind of
situation they are in and then adopt choice rules that seem appropriate for that
situation" (p. 503).
The construction of mental representations requires an act of "seeing" not only in the
sense of visual stimulation of the eye, but in the sense of absorbing information about
the environment in any form and in this way making sense about it. In her brilliant
article on what a line is, Solomon (1991) points out the paradox of the line as both a
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Alexandra GHEONDEA-ELADI
discrete physical object and a continuous representation of it in an attempt to
emphasize the difficulties of understanding "the experience of 'seeing' which is the core
of inquiry" in general (p. 12). It is this very difficult of the experience of 'seeing' that is
at the core of decision-making as well.
Scientists have mostly proposed models of decision that are meant to reveal human
judgment errors or normative models of how decisions should be made in order to
achieve the desired goals. In this sense, scientists have been "seeing" the world in many
ways. But what is it that they have exactly "seen" when looking at how people make
decisions?
Let us consider how decision making can be studied by:
1) looking at what decisions people make
2) looking at how they justify their decisions
3) looking at how neuronal networks in the brain are activated when making decisions
In short, there are three proxies that scholars use in order to understand how decisionmaking is performed: actions, language and the bio-physical. However, these proxies do
not provide information about the way in which information is used or aggregated in
the mind, either consciously or unconsciously. In decision-making, research has been
performed by observing actions and language (Slevin et al., 1998; Laughlin, 2011;
Hinsz, 1999; Sniezek, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2002; Frederick et al., 2002) as well as
neuronal networks (Wang 2008; FitzGerald et al. 2015). In the case of observing
decisions from language there is a problem of double-reflection. Unlike in the formal
representations of language (Reach, 1939: 59) human language in itself is yet another
representation of the mental representation of the perceived situation and not a direct
representation of the objective world (Wittgenstein, 1922). This is why observing
decisions through language is like looking at the back of your head by using two selffacing mirrors: you can see everything, except the back of your head. However, if two
mirrors are not positioned to reflect each other, there is potential to actually see the
back of the head. In other words, the main problem for a researcher is to understand
not just which of the elements of the stimulus (or situation) are chosen to make up the
mental representation, but also why these elements are more important than others.
Norretranders (2009) shows that mental representations cannot be identical
reproductions of the situation or element that is being reproduced because of the
known limitations of mind. The problem of understanding which of the elements of
the stimulus are chosen to make up the mental representation purports the usual
problems of mathematical modelling. The problem of why the chosen elements have
been deemed more important than others is a problem of sociology. The issue of how
the information that has been considered important is aggregated is associated with the
cognitive sciences (Thagard, 2005).
Mental Representations in Decision-Making
The theory that has been briefly presented in the previous section regards most
decision-making theories as potential mental representations of the decision-making
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES AS MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
7
situation. In the following section several such candidates will be described and their
constitutive elements emphasized in a way that allows their view as mental
representations.
Expected Utility Theory
Expected utility theory in sociology is part of the wider theory of rationality or of
rational choice, which comprises of game theoretical applications to social situations. In
2013 I synthesized the history and the evolution of this theory (Gheondea-Eladi, 2013).
Game theory predicts certain behaviours only if certain assumptions are met, like
comparability, transitivity and contextual stability of pay-offs and complete or
incomplete knowledge (Colman, 2003; Dixit & Skeath, 1999). In recent publications,
game theory has been developed by models which relax assumptions. For example the
fact that the rules of the game are given is replaced by inductive trial and error attempts
until knowledge is acquired about the rules of the game (Kaneko & Kline, 2006;
Kaneko & Mitra, 2011; Kaneko & Matsui, 1999).
Another direction in rational choice theory was drafted by Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky (1979), called Prospect Theory. Utility is replaced by value functions which
take into consideration relative gains and losses instead of pay-offs (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979b; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Yet another theory developed as a
response to expected utility is called bounded rationality proposed by (Simon, 1965) and
developed by many others (Kahneman et al., 1982; Heckathorn et al., 1996; Gigerenzer
& Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). Bounded rationality states that
since cognitive abilities of human decision-makers are limited, certain judgment
heuristics are employed to compensate these limitations. In general rational choice
theory has been the target of criticism (Frisch, 2001; Archer & Tritter, 2000; Colman,
2003; Martin, 1978).
Other contemporary problems of decision-making added more weight to the questions
above: the inconsistency between game theoretical predictions and human behaviour in
ultimatum games (Gil-White, 2004; Marlowe, 2004; Henrich, 2000); the lack of
arguments sustaining the modelling of social factors as additional costs/benefits and
adding them into one game's final pay-offs (as is done in (Alesina & Angelotos, 2005;
Rabin, 1993); the lack of alternatives to this modelling choice; the inconsistency
between game theoretical assumptions of transitivity and non-contextual nature of
preferences (Colman, 2003; Archer & Tritter, 2000; Rawling, 1990; Bondareva, 1990;
Philips, 1989). Most game-theoretical models introduce fairness or social constraints or
relational variables as costs in one model (Alesina & Angelotos, 2005; Rabin, 1993). In
doing so, they assume that such variables can be commoditized. Although not all game
theoretical applications assume that the pay-offs can be commoditized, they do assume
that they are comparable, even in such widely applied games as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD). In the PD, it is not the absolute value of the pay-offs which is of importance, but
the relations between them that matters and this implies that the pay-offs are
comparable, namely that it is always possible to say that, for example, either x < y or
that y < x. The problem of the comparability of pay-offs appears from the properties of
binary relations which are usually employed when using game theoretical models to
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Alexandra GHEONDEA-ELADI
explain social phenomena and interactions. The use of binary relations in economy
appeared mainly as an answer to the problem of not being able to commoditize all
possible pay-offs (Bridges & Mehta, 1995).
Parallel Games Models
In a different line of thought, George Tsebelis' theory of nested games unveiled a new
perspective in political science. He observed that more than one game may be played in
parallel in different arenas. Together with Alt & Eichengreen (1989), Hausken (1995),
Bednar & Page (2007) and myself (Gheondea-Eladi, 2013b) they form a theoretical
paradigm built around parallel games. Tsebelis (Tsebelis, 1988; Tsebelis, 1990; Tsebelis,
2010) argues that the actor and the observer may not share the same view over an
objective situation. Therefore, he proposed that players play "games in multiple arenas"
and "nested games with institutional design" (Tsebelis, 1990). However, he did not
formalize his theory and despite the intuitive nature of his theory it lacks the rigour that
allows testing and further applications outside of political science (Poulson, 2009;
Croissant, 2004; Zuber, 2010; Schedler, 2002). On the other hand Alt and Eichengreen
(1989) defined "parallel games" and "overlapping games". They show that cooperation
is fostered within parallel and overlapping games. Parallel games involve simultaneous
games with the same players, while overlapping games involve simultaneous games with
different players. Similarly, Putnam (1988) proposed the notion of "two level games" to
describe national and international games that may develop in parallel. In my Ph.D.
theses (Gheondea-Eladi, 2013b) I placed the bases of a parallel games model with noncomparable pay-offs. Considering that people decide within multiple games that are
played at the same time on different abstraction levels, with different players and for
different types of pay-offs, the problems of non-comparability, intrazitivity and
contextual instability of preferences are given a solution. Each game is built around a
certain type of pay-off which allows a certain ordering of the alternatives of action.
However, the pay-offs from different games are not comparable. The same objective
action may lead to two or more types of pay-offs in two or more games.
Hausken (1995) identifies several directions in the study of multiple games such as:
network studies, two-level, nested or hierarchical games, collective games and versions
of the principal-agent theory (p. 471). However, he gives no consideration to the
problems of commodification and non-commodification of certain pay-offs such as
prestige, appreciation, self-esteem and so on. A more recent research in parallel games
is given by Bednar & Page (2007) who wish to explain cultural differences. They create
a formal model for parallel games played by finite state automata which move the
player from one state to another. Just like most of the researchers in this field they do
not discuss the way in which the utility function can be built or how it may be created
based on non-comparable pay-offs. However, they only assume that pay-offs are
comparable, such that only the order between the pay-offs is important and not their
value.
DECISION-MAKING THEORIES AS MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS
9
Rawls' Theory of Justice
In Rawls theory, justice 'is the first virtue of social institutions, just as the truth is the
first virtue of systems of thought" (Rawls,1971/2011: 26). Justice for Rawls is also
fairness, which according to the Romanian Dictionary refers to two aspects. On the one
hand, it is „righteousness, equity and honour; humanity" and on the other hand is an
"ethical and legal principle at the basis of all social relations in the spirit of
righteousness, equality, collaboration and mutual respect" (Academia Român ,
Institutul de Lingvistic „Iorgu Iordan”, 2009). Although the notion of fairness appears
also in the expected utility models as a result of experimentation and thereafter in the
behavioural game theoretical models, the two theories differ only in the degree of
relativization of social equity. In this way, "the principles of justice are the principles
which free, rational and self-interested persons would choose in an initial state in which
equality defines the fundamental terms of their association" and that "would govern all
other subsequent agreements" (Rawls, 1971/2011: 33, emphasis added). This vision
represents for Rawls the "theory of justice as equity" (p. 33).
Although in both expected utility and in the theory of justice individuals act in a
rational manner for the promotion of their interests, starting from a position of equality
but based on conflicting or cooperative interests, the criteria of evaluation of the
alternatives are different. One is based on the evaluation of expected utility, which is a
subjective measure for the individual, and the other is based on the evaluation of justice
or equity/fairness. Another element of differentiation is that in the theory of justice
players are in a "vail of ignorance", unable to know their social position, status, class or
power offered by certain natural assets. This "vail of ignorance" ensures the position of
equality which is at the onset of the fair social contract (p. 33). Nevertheless, Rawls
defines "good" as "rationality" such that "a good for a person is determined by the
most rational life plan, given certain sufficiently favourable conditions" (p. 353). In
essence, the theory of justice has been built to offer an alternative for the expected
utility theory. For the purposes of this paper, this theory proposes in fact that there is
another possible criterion for decision-making: justice, as equity or fairness.
Multiple objective decision-making and multi-criteria decision
analysis
The expected utility model and the theory of justice assume that there is a single
criterion based on which pay-offs may be ordered. To address this limitation, multiplecriteria decision-analysis has been proposed (Roy, 1996; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). It
encompasses a generalization of the expected utility theory for the case in which payoffs can no longer be ordered based on a single criterion. One such order is the
lexicographic order (the order in which words in dictionaries are ordered). Other
situations which purport multiple criteria comparisons are given by the choice of cars
based on safety, security, esthetics, consumption level or carbon dioxide emissions and
so on (Roy, 1996).
In multiple criteria decision-making there are two main schools of thought: the
American and the French (Lootsma, 1992). The French school is based on the model
proposed by Bernard Roy in 1985 and translated in English in 1996 (Roy, 1996), while
10 Alexandra GHEONDEA-ELADI
the American school departed from the sistematization performed by Keeney and
Raiffa (1976). Although both models begin by successive comparisons of evaluation
criteria, they use different mechanism of preference aggregation (Lootsma, 1992).
Moreover, the ELECTRE algorithm, built by Roy allows the possibility that after
evaluating all criteria a series of main alternatives is built (Lootsma, 1992: 254). By
means of the Analytic Hierarchy Process built by Saaty (1980) based on the models of
Keeney and Raiffa (1976), the "value of the impact score which approximates
subjective values of the alternatives" for each criterion and the corresponding weights
are obtained in order to be aggregated in a unique value, similar to a utility function for
each single criterion. Despite the critiques of the general utility theory of Keeney and
Raiffa (Treadwell and Myiamoto, 1996), multiple criteria decision analysis lead to the
construction of computer programs meant to assist decision-makers, as well as a series
of "interactive methods" which "alternate computation steps with consultation steps"
(Vincke, 1989/1992: 79).
Conclusions
In the process of understanding how decisions are made, the current decision-making
theories seem to be only parts of a bigger picture. Expected utility, the theory of justice,
parallel games, multi-criteria decision-making are all possible mental representations of
complex social situations proposed by researchers who are also human decisionmakers. Unlike Loewenstein (2001), who dismisses these theories as possible mental
representations, in this paper I argue that they may in fact be used by some people,
alongside other representations. Two implications arise from this. First, instead of
seeing these theories as competitive theories, they may be integrated in a wider
paradigm of mental representations. Secondly, further research should comparatively
test the extent to which either one of these theories or any other theories not included
in this review are actually used by human decision-makers. However, such an endeavor
is bound to the perils of differentiating between what is part of the human decisionmaking abilities and what is socially or culturally acquired or simply learned. To
conclude, understanding how people decide brings important epistemological issues
such as: (1) understanding how people say they decide vs. understanding why they
choose what they choose; (2) understanding how people are naturally equipped to
decide vs. what people learn about how to decide; (3) understanding how people create
mental representations of decision-making situations vs. understanding why they
choose certain aspects and not others.
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SOCIAL PROBLEMS REVEALED IN ART – THE BALKAN EXPRESSIONISM MOVEMENT 115
short story, if not an entire novel in every family photo. And there is also a challenge in
every painting.
The Balkan Conclusion
Expressionism Movement is just at its beginning. Time will tell whether this artistic
movement will impact universal art as the previous art movements did.
The Balkan expressionism movement arose and is making the world aware that the
artists from the Balkans are ought not to be forgotten or left aside. There is a culture
that is in a continuous development without forgetting the tradition. There is a pure
outcry: we are here; we are worthy!
The Balkan artists pride in the confidence they have in their creative ideas as they find
their inspiration in the Balkan folklore, the surrounding stories in the urban areas.
There is a story behind every Balkan expressionism painting and one can wonder if the
world is prepared to witness the emergence of a new art that combines life in reality in
such a way that it trespasses times and ages.
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