Elizabeth Huang Essay 5 20/2/16 Assess eliminative materialism Eliminative materialists take the initial suggestion of physicalism, that everything is composed of physical ‘stuff’ to its furthest logical conclusion by arguing that mental states and concepts simply do not exist in the sense that we currently conceive of them. This essay begins with a discussion of what eliminative materialism claims before outlining the arguments in support of a) the theory itself and b) its core argument that folk psychology is false, and then moves onto an analysis of the main objections to such arguments. Ultimately, it seems that eliminativism is just too ambitious – so much so that it ends up denying the very mechanisms of argument that it requires to sustain itself. Eliminative materialism is an eliminative theory of mind. The claim that mental states, properties and so on do not exist is importantly different to the reductionist claim that they do exist but are in fact ontologically identical to other kinds of properties e.g. physical, behavioural, or functional ones. By proposing that what we currently call mental properties are just brain processes, the eliminativists are arguing for a radically different account of the ‘mind’ (or what they would argue is the brain). According to the eliminativist, our current talk of mental concepts such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘fear’, ‘pain’ etc. is the vestiges of ‘folk psychology’ i.e. the (admittedly complex) network of common-sense rules and laws which we have developed, in lieu of actual scientific data, to explain behaviour. For example, if someone is ‘thirsty’, then according to the laws outlined by folk psychology, they will, under normal conditions, look for something to drink. Eliminativism argues that folk psychology is merely an empirical theory, which has developed probabilistic laws based on collective human experiences. The crux of the eliminativist argument then is the claim that as an empirical theory, folk psychology is weak and ought to be rejected as unconvincing. The argument is as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. Folk psychology is an empirical theory. An empirical theory should be abandoned and replaced by a theory with greater explanatory power if, when tested, it proves to be inaccurate. Folk psychology is inaccurate. Therefore, we should replace folk psychology with a better empirical theory i.e. the theories offered by neuroscience. To clarify the implications of (4) – if we are going to replace folk psychology, it would not be enough to merely adjust the network of laws it proposes. Instead, the whole system of concepts e.g. talk of ‘beliefs’, ‘desires’, ‘emotions’ that go along with it must also be replaced. The baby 1 Elizabeth Huang Essay 5 20/2/16 has to be thrown out with the bath water because the concepts proposed by folk psychology acquire their meaning from their position in the network of laws. For example, desires motivate behaviour, beliefs lead to certain emotional responses and so on – mental states are interconnected with other mental states. So if the network of laws turns out to be incorrect, then the concepts which emerge from it should also be rejected. Although eliminative materialism’s parsimony is one of the theory’s strengths, more important is its argument against the status quo, ‘folk psychology’. Therefore, it is this argument which merits rigorous analysis. The obvious premises to examine are (1) and (3) – is folk psychology an empirical theory and is it actually inaccurate? To begin by being charitable to eliminativism, let us assume that folk psychology is an empirical theory. Proponents of eliminativism, such as Paul Churchland, offer several arguments to support that claim that folk psychology is inaccurate. Firstly, it seems that folk psychology struggles to explain ‘mental’ processes such as sleep, mental illness and learning. This is a valid objection though noneliminativists can argue that our current talk of mental concepts is not yet ‘completed’ i.e. a complete folk psychology would be able to explain such things. In response, the eliminativist can however point out (as Paul Churchland does argue) that as a theory folk psychology has been stagnant for the last 2,500 years – no substantial development has occurred, suggesting that there is no ‘complete folk psychological theory’. This seems to rebut the noneliminativist’s response. To further compound the problem for ‘empirical theory-folk psychology’, it also seems to be the case that folk psychology would also be irreducible to neuroscience. This means that if neuroscience proves to be more accurate, folk psychology must be done away with totally as it would incompatible with neuroscience. This is because mental states have intentionality i.e. are ‘about something’ – for example, my desire to eat chocolate is ‘about’ or directed towards, chocolate. In contrast, physical states do not have intentionality – a brain process that is driven by changes in biochemical states does not seem to be ‘about’ anything. So if this is the case, then mental states cannot be reduced to brain states. In an attempt to salvage their own theory, mind-brain type identity theorists may want to attempt to deny this conclusion by arguing that some physical states can be intentional. For example, road signs seem to have intentionality – e.g. a red octagonal sign is ‘about’ stopping. However, as critics point out, this intentionality is not really inherent in the physical make-up of the sign itself – rather its intentionality is attributed by the intentional agents i.e. people who understand the signification of road signs perceiving it. Therefore it seems that it is true that folk psychology cannot be made coherent with neuroscience. So – if folk psychology is an empirical theory, then it seems to be true that 2 Elizabeth Huang Essay 5 20/2/16 it is relatively inaccurate and incompatible with neuroscience, and therefore should be roundly rejected in favour of a more empirically robust theory (such as neuroscience). However, as noted before, the entire argument noted above rests on the premise that folk psychology is an empirical theory. This is arguably where eliminative materialism falls down and begins to undermine its own theoretical foundations. Essentially, the problem is that eliminative materialism attempts to use arguments that rely on beliefs (e.g. the belief that folk psychology is an inaccurate empirical theory) to change the beliefs of its interlocutors while claiming, at the same time, that beliefs do not exist. It seems therefore that by accepting such a method of argumentation, eliminative materialism is tacitly accepting the existence of the mental concepts proposed by folk psychology. The claim that a proposition is true or false rests on the possibility of intentional content – as shown earlier, eliminativists themselves argue that physical states do not, and cannot have intentional content. Thus, unless they provide an alternative account of meaning which doesn’t rely on intentionality, eliminative materialism must use the tools of folk psychology to argue against folk psychology. This is clearly a contradictory position. This objection, that eliminative materialism undermines itself really seems to be the deathblow for the theory. To push the implications further, what this suggests is that it is in fact inconceivable to think that folk psychology is false because the idea that ‘folk psychology is false’ relies on folk psychological mental concepts. So rather than being an empirical theory, folk psychology actually offers a necessary explication of certain conditions of intelligibility and meaning (dissolving the basis of the eliminativist’s arguments against folk psychology). That said, eliminativists are not without any response. They could argue for example, that to raise such an objection is to beg the question i.e. it is to already assume that the folk psychological account is true. In a sense this is true – but only because folk psychology is the only account that offers a coherent explanation of meaning in this way. After all, though the eliminativists have argued against folk psychology, they have not offered an alternative explanation of how we might attribute meaning. Neuroscience does not provide an explanation of this. A further issue, though less serious than the conceptual one outlined above, is the fact that the claims of eliminative materialism are highly counterintuitive. For thousands of years, philosophers such as Descartes have argued that it is just obvious that we have mental states. Based on the transparency of our own minds, our capacity for introspection and the alleged infallibility of our knowledge of our own mental states, most people would probably agree that the fact we have mental states is possibly the most certain of all the facts we may hold about ourselves. However, this argument is suspect and so it is right that eliminativists are dismissive 3 Elizabeth Huang Essay 5 20/2/16 of it. Throughout history there have been countless ‘obvious’ things e.g. that the world is flat, that the sun revolves around the earth etc. which have been proven false by further scientific inquiry. Therefore, alone, the counter-intuitiveness argument is quite weak. However, coupled with the previous point, that eliminative materialism’s use of ‘argumentation’ itself undermines its own theory, its counter-intuitiveness is really the final nail in its coffin. So to conclude, eliminative materialism does not provide a convincing account of ‘mind’ – this is because its core arguments against the status quo (folk psychology) fail, as folk psychology proves not to be an empirical theory. Moreover, the arguments provided by the theory seem to undermine its own theoretical assumptions. Therefore, we ought to conclude that mental states are not able to be eliminated. This does however still leave open the possibility that they are reducible, meaning that physicalists can lend their support to theories such as logical behaviourism, functionalism or mind-brain type identity theory. 4