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This essay argues that eliminative materialism, while providing an appealingly parsimonious physicalist position, is too quick to reject folk psychology. Furthermore, it fails to provide a convincing alternative account to fill the explanatory gaps left by folk psychology.
2008 •
The eliminative materialist position holds that the ontology of folk psychology, i.e. all talk of propositional attitudes, will not be vindicated in the ontology of a mature neuroscience, and so should be eliminated. This is motivated by two claims regarding folk psychology: (1) folk psychology is a theory, and (2) folk psychology is radically wrong. This paper examines the weight of evidence for and against (1) and (2), drawing upon both philosophical considerations and cognitive science. Ultimately, (1) and (2) are defensible, with appropriate modifications, but these positions need not entail a position as radical as eliminative materialism. It is suggested that eliminativism may be an appropriate ontology for dealing with the microstructural features of cognitive systems.
Philosophical Forum
The United Shades of Eliminative Materialism2022 •
This paper aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the claim of eliminative materialism (EM), espoused by Paul and Patricia Churchland. It will identify and clarify alternative understandings of that view, and assess which version is the most plausible interpretation in the light of the Churchlands' writings and contemporary discussions. The result of the analysis is that eliminativism is best understood as a methodological thesis regarding the scope and depth of the possible revision of (scientific and folk) usage of FP terms and principles. The problem is important not only, and nor primarily, for exegetical purposes. EM functions in contemporary metaphysics of mind mainly as a point of negative reference: for this reason it is important to carefully formulate the main claim of EM so that the theorists taking part in the debate know what they actually disagree with. The careful formulation provided by this paper could show other philosophers that their position is not, in fact, as far from EM as they might have thought.
South African Journal of Philosophy
In defence of Churchland-style eliminative materialism: Objections and replies2023 •
The Churchlands are notorious for their theory of eliminative materialism (EM). This theory has become associated with scientism and a possible death of philosophy. In this article, I will closely examine the most common accusations made against EM and try to give an overall assessment of them. The conclusion is that EM survives most of the criticisms levelled against it. For sure, there are many things to do to improve on the current form of the theory, but none of them seems to be unsurpassable. The charges of blind enthusiasm, reductionism, neuroscience exceptionalism and scientism originate from widespread misconceptions about the nature of actual science. Furthermore, the objection that EM is self-defeating is answered.
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 3.3 (2012), 281–292.
Materialism (preprint; penultimate draft)Materialism is nearly universally assumed by cognitive scientists. Intuitively, materialism says that a person’s mental states are nothing over and above his or her material states, while dualism denies this. Philosophers have introduced concepts (e.g., realization, supervenience) to assist in formulating the theses of materialism and dualism with more precision, and distinguished among importantly different versions of each view (e.g., eliminative materialism, substance dualism, emergentism). They have also clarified the logic of arguments that use empirical findings to support materialism. Finally, they have devised various objections to materialism, objections that therefore serve also as arguments for dualism. These objections typically center around two features of mental states that materialism has had trouble in accommodating. The first feature is intentionality, the property of representing, or being about, objects, properties, and states of affairs external to the mental states. The second feature is phenomenal consciousness, the property possessed by many mental states of there being something it is like for the subject of the mental state to be in that mental state.
Journal for The Theory of Social Behaviour
Elimination, Enlightenment and the Normative Content of Folk Psychology1988 •
Journal of the Society for Psychical Research
Review of Why Materialism is Baloney by Bernardo Kastrup, JSPR 79, 165—171 (2015).2015 •
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