III
Elections and After
7
THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND
CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN MYANMAR
Michael Lidauer
The watershed Myanmar 2015 elections are widely regarded as more
credible and inclusive than any previous polls in the country, and were
largely experienced as peaceful and without disruptions. Despite a
mostly quiet election day, the electoral process, however, was not free
of conlict. One major cluster of conlicts impacting the electoral process
revolved around tensions between ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the
national government’s military forces, the Tatmadaw — usually termed
‘ethnic conlict’ (see Laoutides and Ware, this volume). Another cluster of
conlicts concerned the growing anti-Muslim sentiment, with the potential
for violent escalation. A third conlict cluster evolved around questions
of constitutional justice.1 This chapter briely outlines the conceptual
framework for elections and conlict, and then proceeds by reviewing the
major clusters. The section on elections and the peace process is followed
by a discussion of a little understood element of the electoral process, the
partial cancellation of elections. The chapter concludes by summarizing
some nascent conlict-mitigating measures of the 2015 electoral process
and provides an outlook for challenges ahead.
138
Michael Lidauer
ELECTORAL PROCESS AND RESuLTS IN BRIEF
Despite low expectations based on historical experience and criticism in
the period prior to 8 November 2015, the Union Election Commission
(UEC) enabled a positive election-day experience for most of Myanmar’s
voters, and left little doubt that the will of the electorate was respected. The
voter list, digitized and publicized for public scrutiny — which had been
criticized for inconsistencies and omissions in earlier versions — stood its
test on election day. More than a year prior to the polls the UEC engaged
in unprecedented stakeholder meetings with political parties and CSOs.
It introduced new integrity measures such as transparent ballot boxes,
numbered seals, and indelible ink to create better safeguards in polling
procedures, and supported the dissemination of voter education materials,
including in the mass media and by new communication technologies.
International and national observers were deployed in large numbers,
all across the country and throughout the pre-election and election day
period, with limitations only in conlict-afected areas and around military
installations. Observers largely agreed in their assessments of an overall
positive election day, while also sharing concerns about undemocratic
restrictions in the electoral legal framework.2
The National League for Democracy (NLD) won an historic victory,
similar to its 1990 results. It now dominates the upper and the lower houses
of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the legislature at union level, in such a way
that it can nominate two vice-presidents and select the president; and
can oppose, propose, or pass any law without consent of the opposition
— with the exception of changes to the constitution which are regulated
under chapter 12. Section 436(a), in particular, requires the consent of
military members of parliament who still hold twenty-ive per cent of the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The NLD was also successful in the race for most
region and state legislatures, winning the majority in all regions (two with
100 per cent of the elected seats) and in the three eastern ethnic states
(Mon, Kayah, Kayin). The winning party also returned ifty per cent of
the total number of seats, that is, including military representatives’ seats,
for the Chin State Hluttaw, and around forty-nine per cent in Kachin
State. The Arakan National Party (ANP) was the most successful party
in Rakhine State (see Than Tun, this volume). The large Shan State holds
the only legislature where the Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP) remains the strongest single political party, followed by the Shan
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
139
Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). Thus, together with the
members of parliament appointed from the military, the USDP has the
ability to form a working majority in the Shan State Hluttaw.3
The challenges for the incoming government are vast. They include
continued economic liberalization, democratic reforms, continuation of
the peace process, the necessary balance of power with the military, and
hardly any experience in governance. Challenges also come from the
overwhelming NLD victory itself: how will the victor engage with the less
successful in the future? Very few parties that decided against a boycott
in 2010, as the NLD and its allies did, won seats ive years later. While a
diversity of ethnic representation continues to exist in parliament, most
members are from the NLD. As the Transnational Institute (TNI 2015,
p. 12) notes, “Ethnic-based parties, in contrast, hold few seats which is
reminiscent of Myanmar’s post-independence democratic period." Ahead
lies an unscripted future, including the resolution of major conlicts, which
were prominent throughout the electoral process. However, all sides,
including the military, have made reconciliatory signals in the early postelection period.
THE NExuS OF ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT
As a point of departure, this chapter suggests that elections are rarely the
root cause of conlict, but have the potential to exacerbate pre-existing
levels of conlict. Further, the angle on conlict taken here is wider than a
mere focus on electoral violence occurring during the campaign period, on
election day, or in its immediate aftermath, which is usually deined by its
intentional character (for example, Höglund 2009). The analysis of conlict
and its entanglements with the electoral process should not be limited to a
focus on escalation of physical violence, but also extend to forms of structural
violence and disenfranchisement, although mitigation strategies derived
from such an analysis should aim to minimize the risks of physical harm.
Practitioner communities supporting elections internationally
increasingly view elections as cyclical (Tuccinardi et al. 2007). This allows
their analysis over a longer time frame and takes the preparations and
organization of the ballot into account. The longer periods of the electoral
cycle are less visible to the public eye and grow in intensity as election
day approaches.
140
Michael Lidauer
The key elements towards the end of the electoral cycle are the review
and inalization of the legal framework governing the elections; the
production or update of the voter roll until its inalization; the deadline
for the registration of political parties; the deadline for the nomination
of candidates; the electoral campaign period; the deinition of electoral
constituencies and the allocation of polling stations; arrangements
for electoral security; the training of polling staf; the production and
distribution of electoral materials, in particular ballots and relevant
forms to administer electoral procedures; the arrangements for results
management; and the adjudication of complaints that arise during the
entire process. All these elements can trigger conlicts, or assist in their
mitigation, at various levels and at particular times, albeit with difering
degrees of intensity and impact.
ELECTIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS
Myanmar and its territorial sovereignty have been consistently challenged
by armed actors since the colonial era. Subsequent centralist military
regimes ofered truces to these actors without achieving lasting peace.
When President Thein Sein took oice in 2011, he made peace with EAGs
a major goal of his term. While some old ceaseires were reconirmed and
new bilateral ceaseires could be agreed, there has also been ierce ighting
in recent years, including the use of heavy artillery and air strikes. The
bilateral ceaseire with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO),
which was in place since 1994 and gave Kachin State a period of relative
stability, broke in 2011 (see Farrelly 2014).
Since then, armed conlict has been ongoing in parts of Kachin State
and northern Shan State, and it continued over the electoral period. For
the irst time since 2009, on 9 February 2015, ighting broke out between
the Tatmadaw and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army at
the Chinese border in the northeastern corner of Shan State, in the Kokang
SAZ. On 17 February, the president declared a state of emergency and
martial law in the area, and transferred executive and judicial powers to
the commander-in-chief. This was the irst time during Thein Sein’s term
that martial law had been declared. The state of emergency remained in
place until mid-November, about one week after the elections.
Notwithstanding the escalation of conlict at the beginning of the
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
141
electoral year, and the continuation and outbreak of ighting on various
fronts, a (partial) Nationwide Ceaseire Agreement (NCA) was signed
less than a month prior to the elections, on 15 October 2015. Eight EAGs
signed the NCA, while others were not allowed to participate, and more
abstained from signing for this reason.4 The signing ceremony had been
preceded by a irst agreement on a draft ceaseire text on 31 March, but
negotiations continued for another six months.5
During all this time, the peace negotiations were largely disconnected
from the electoral process. Although President Thein Sein repeatedly called
on all sides to work towards both peaceful elections and an NCA, the
processes had no visible institutional links on the side of state agencies.
Both the UEC and the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) — entrusted with the
facilitation of ceaseire negotiations on behalf of the Union Peacemaking
Working Committee (UPWC) — were careful to stay within the boundaries
of their respective mandates (see Su Mon Thazin Aung, this volume).
The UEC had some encounters with EAGs, but did not appear to pursue
contact as part of a broader policy. Opportunities for convergence of the
two processes were not explicitly pursued. For example, it could have
been conceivable to tie agreements for ceaseire monitoring mechanisms to
arrangements for electoral security, but this did not occur, partly because
the NCA was agreed much later than initially expected — and too late to
have a substantive impact on the electoral process.
This is not to say that the electoral and peace processes were unrelated.
In an interview conducted in February 2014, chief negotiator Minister U
Aung Min had already expressed concerns that the window of opportunity
to reach a conclusive agreement would be closing ahead of national
elections. Indeed, for much of 2015, elections were perceived to disrupt
the longer-term peace negotiations, which were in principle open ended.
Unlike in other countries where a brokered peace deal set the timing
for elections, in Myanmar the electoral time frame was constitutionally
mandated. At the same time, the raised stakes of the peace process created
risks in the security environment ahead of the polls. Outbursts of violence
occurred before or between crucial negotiation meetings, in particular in
Kachin State and northern Shan State. Perceptions that violence preceded
key meetings possibly as a deliberate strategy may have deepened the
trust deicit in the talks.
It can be tempting to paint the potential electoral interests of ethnic
armed actors and their relationships with political parties in black and
142
Michael Lidauer
white, but any attempt to do so would oversimplify matters. Based on
their historical experience with the 2010 elections (and for Kachin State,
also the 2012 by-elections), most stakeholders had no trust in the election
administration. The upcoming elections were also not a priority for most
armed groups and their constituents. Their attention was on ighting,
advancing the ongoing peace negotiations toward the NCA, maintaining
the bilateral ceaseires, and proiting from them through increased access
to local markets and services. For many EAGs, their continued nonacceptance of the 2008 Constitution also contradicted an intensiied interest
in elections, even if an earlier change of their legal status would have
allowed increased engagement. Some alleged that EAGs denied political
parties access to their territories, however, many said they would not
disrupt the electoral process even prior to the NCA. It is in this context
that elections were partially cancelled.
The Partial Cancellation of Elections
The 2015 elections did not take place in all parts of the country. Elections
were cancelled (postponed) in seven townships and partially in some
townships in 416 additional wards or village tracts6 in conlict-afected
areas, as announced by the UEC in two rounds, on 12 and 27 October 2015.7
The number of excluded voters did probably not exceed half a million
(see TNI 2015, p. 5), or roughly 1.5 per cent of the population registered
to vote. The October notiications were largely expected by observers and
followed a similar pattern of announcements ahead of the 2010 elections.
Nevertheless, the cancellations are one of the least understood and least
transparent elements of the Myanmar elections.
The authority to cancel and postpone elections lies with the UEC, and
ultimately with its chairman; however, the decision-making process is
informed from below. Administrative personnel with electoral duties at
ward and village tract level inform township and district subcommissions.
The state/region subcommissions then provide the recommendation to
postpone elections, if needed, to their superiors in Naypyitaw. While the
internal administration of this process appears to involve several levels, the
decision-making for cancellations is little understood outside the involved
apparatus. There were some negotiations around whether to hold elections
under the condition of volatile ceaseires — for example in Kayin State’s
Kyainseikgyi township or in northern Shan State’s Mongmit township —
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
143
however, if these negotiations occurred at all, they usually took place at the
local level, between village administrators and members of armed groups,
while higher-level subcommissions, and even the central UEC, could be
entirely unaware of them.
The elections postponement is based on UEC law section 10f and section
50 of the electoral laws.8 The language of these laws, as in many areas of
the electoral legal framework, is ambiguous, and vulnerable to diferent
interpretations. Sections 10f and 50 establish that the UEC has the authority
to postpone elections in constituencies where a natural disaster prevents
them, or where the security situation makes voter list updates and polling
impossible. While the 'security situation' is not further clariied, the laws
state that elections can be partially cancelled within a constituency, and
that results from such constituencies are valid if ifty-one per cent of all
enrolled constituents participate in the elections. Excluding eligible voters
in conlict areas and only needing ifty-one per cent of registered voters
to hold an election increases malapportionment, with the potential of
creating easy-to-win seats. The natural disasters during the 2015 rainy
season did not result in election postponement. All cancellations in 2015
were for security reasons.
UEC public communications did little to clarify the reason for
cancellations beyond a simple reference to security. The ambiguity of this
language, the lack of public communications and transparent decisionmaking, or of a publicized participatory approach that would involve
various stakeholders led to speculation about the potentially arbitrary
or politically motivated nature of these decisions. Such assumptions are
grounded in past electoral experiences. Partial cancellations are related to
concerns about the potential misuse of advance votes (often of military
voters) and about candidates using the inluence of local militia to coerce
voters. Allegations like this occurred in ceaseire areas where, from the
perspective of the voters afected by the cancellations (for example, in
Kyainseikgyi), there were no obvious security threats (see HURFOM 2015).
Relative to 2010, and as a result of new or renewed bilateral ceaseires,
the southeast witnessed signiicant improvements to its 2015 electoral space.
Most Kayah State townships were afected by cancellations in 2010, but
none were in 2015. In Mon State, the nine village tracts without elections
in 2010 were reduced to one. In Kayin State, the electoral space increased
by approximately a third over this period.9 Shan State is the only place
where cancellations also led to vacant seats in the legislature, and the
144
Michael Lidauer
number would have remained consistent with 2010 had a second round
of cancellations not occurred on 27 October. In Kachin State, the number
of partial cancellations increased from 2010, however, this did not directly
lead to increased disenfranchisement, as will be explained below.
The cancellations must be understood in their respective geographical
and political contexts, but with few exceptions they have one element in
common — the absence of the state. In most situations where elections
were cancelled, a voter list had never been established. Creating the voter
list requires data from local oices, namely the Department of Immigration
and Population at township level, and oices of the General Administration
Department (GAD) at ward and village tract level.10 In addition, the GAD
fulils electoral functions on the lower levels of the administration. Thus,
if there is no GAD at the local level, there is no voter list and no oice to
organize elections in that area.
Therefore, the partial election cancellations seem to equate to the absence
of the state’s administrative capacity in most cases. This is particularly
evident in the areas under the control of the KIO in Kachin State; in those
parts of Hpapun township under control of Karen National Liberation Army
(KNLA) Brigade 5 in Kayin State; in territories controlled by the United
Wa State Army (UWSA) in the Wa Self-Administered Division (SAD), and
by the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in Mongla township
in Shan State, formerly termed Special Regions 2 and 4. Only a few of the
cancellations declared on 12 October concerned areas assessed as having the
potential for actual violence on election day, or that saw physical disruptions
to earlier phases of the electoral cycle, such as the voter list display. These
exceptional cases included the conlict-ridden township of Mansi in southern
Kachin State, and Kawkareik township in Kayin State, where tensions
between the state security apparatus and several EAGs caused insecurity
along the Asia Highway during the voter list update period.
The cancellations have diferent administrative consequences, depending
on the size of the administrative units concerned. Vacant seats occur only
where elections are cancelled for an entire constituency; this was the case for
seven townships in Shan State, resulting in seven vacant seats in the Pyithu
Hluttaw and fourteen vacant seats in the Shan State Hluttaw (the Amyotha
Hluttaw is not afected). Contra to this, the cancellation of elections in
speciic wards and village tracts smaller than a constituency do not translate
into vacant seats in the legislature, leading to the disenfranchisement of
voters as the election goes ahead regardless of their involvement, as well
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
145
as candidates coming to power in seats without universal sufrage of their
constituents.11
There was a lengthy preparation for the first announcement of
cancellations on 12 October. It occurred somewhat later than expected as the
UEC was busy with candidate scrutiny and its contestation (see below) in
September. The second announcement, less than two weeks before election
day, seemed to occur as an ad hoc response to real security concerns. On
27 October, elections were cancelled for the two townships of Monshu and
Kyethi, as well as for eight additional village tracts in neighbouring Tangyan
township in Shan State.12 These cancellations followed the responsible
district subcommission’s demand to partially cancel elections after ighting
had broken out between the Tatmadaw and the Shan State Army-North
(SSA-N). The subcommission later argued that they could not “send the
ballots” and had genuine concerns about the safety of electoral personnel
and materials if elections went ahead.13 Political spectators disputed the
legitimacy of this decision. Representatives of other EAGs understood
the escalation of ighting in this area as a consequence of the SSA-N’s
non-participation in the NCA signing ceremony on 15 October, and the
Tatmadaw’s attacks — similar to those in Mohnyin township, Kachin State,
with “unusual intensity” (TNI 2015, p. 4) — as a punishment for their
absence.14 The SNLD accused the UEC of political motivation, seeing the
cancelled constituencies as potentially safe wins for its party. Meanwhile
the SNLD’s direct political opponent, the SNDP, encouraged and welcomed
the UEC’s decision to safeguard campaigners’ safety and voters’ rights,
which, from its perspective, were under threat.15
While the UEC might have had good reason to cancel elections in most
cases, due to past experience few stakeholders trusted the genuineness of
their motivations prior to the 2015 elections. The UEC’s decisions were also
interpreted as synonymous with decisions of the Tatmadaw and other state
institutions, while in reality they might not have been related. The collective
positive experience of the 2015 elections, and the generally well-trusted
results, may lead to increased conidence in this particular government
institution in the future. More clarity about UEC law section 10f and election
laws section 50 would help to avoid the potential for politically motivated
contrasting interpretations of partial election cancellations. Currently,
these suspensions are a more complex phenomenon related to diferent
reasoning, motivations, and opinions than a simple ‘security’ explanation
might suggest.
146
Michael Lidauer
Electoral versus Census Space
From the perspective of the state’s access to its peripheries, it is interesting
to compare the 2015 partial election cancellations with the 2014 census.
There are apparent overlaps in areas where neither the census nor the
elections were possible, where enumerators experienced hindrances, or
where data for the census were provided by the local administration of
armed actors rather than by government enumerators.16
The census reports share some information about accessibility and
collaboration between the state and ethnic armed actors in ceaseire areas.
Apart from Rakhine State, where the government’s refusal to allow the
term Rohingya as self-ascription led to a situation where the census was
not fully conducted in ten out of seventeen townships (see below), the
population count also faced accessibility restrictions in Kachin State and
Kayin State. In Kachin State, the KIO did not allow enumerators to count
people in villages under their control, leaving twenty-ive village tracts
(ninety-seven villages) out of the census. In parts of Hpapun township
of Kayin State, the KNLA denied access to enumerators and provided
their own data about the total number of households and population by
gender. As a consequence, the populations in these areas were estimated
and included in the overall census results, but not in the analysis and
presentation of detailed information (MoIP 2015, pp. 8–10).
The Kachin and Hpapun situations during the census parallel the
non-accessibility experiences with the establishment of the voter list in
these areas. However, the census seems to have been possible in other
locations where the voter list was not established, in particular in the Wa
SAD townships under UWSA control, and in Mongla, which is under
NDAA control. One explanation is that the leaders of these armed groups
might have had an interest in knowing how many people reside in their
realm, for purposes of recruitment or taxation, but had no interest in their
populations' participation in general elections.
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
147
ANTI-MuSLIM SENTIMENT AND
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar is not a novelty of the political
transition, but results from the country’s historical ethno-linguistic
complexity. Expressions of Buddhist nationalism earned integral status in
Burmese politics during the anti-colonial struggle. Religious legitimation
of political power was relevant for all regimes following independence
— parliamentary, socialist, and military. This continues to be so both for
state and opposition leaders of the Burmese mainstream (Schober 2006, p.
91). Those who are perceived as foreigners — including Indians, Chinese,
and Muslims — were often targeted in times of political crisis. Extremist
expression and violence linked to Buddhist-inspired nationalism was
already part of monks’ riots in the 1920s and 1930s. There are also reports
of occasional anti-Muslim violence over the period of the Ne Win and
SLORC/SPDC governments. Egreteau (2011) argues that contemporary
“Islamophobia” has developed as a broader “Indophobia” — Indians were
perceived as agents of the colonial regime — and was reduced to its antiMuslim direction over the last period of the military regime.
New freedom of expression, coupled with the use of new technologies,
led to an increase in religiously framed political hate speech, both oline
and online (see Schissler 2016), prior to the electoral contest. The major
protagonists were religiously conservative and extremist monks such as
Ashin Wirathu, who was convicted for political instigation in 2003, but
was released under a general amnesty for political prisoners in 2011. Since
2012, the increase in anti-Muslim sentiment became visible in public space
with the emergence of the 969 movement and its Buy Buddhist campaign.
The political policy agenda of the Organization for the Protection of Race
and Religion, known by its abbreviation MaBaTha, founded in early
2014, started to target the legislature more directly with the propagation
of four laws relating to interreligious marriage, religious conversion,
monogamy, and population control (Walton and Hayward 2014, pp. 12–16).
Acknowledging that these movements are “a relexive defense against
what is perceived by some to be the threat of a globally spreading Islam,
as well as the motivation to preserve and promote Buddhist practice and
behavior in Myanmar during a time of signiicant change”, Walton and
Hayward (2014, p. x) argue that they are inherently political in nature.
Ahead of the elections, the political process appeared increasingly held
148
Michael Lidauer
hostage to Buddhist-nationalist discourses. Neither incumbents nor the
opposition could aford to publicly display any empathy towards Muslim
minority causes during the campaign, or risk losing votes.
Deadlock in Rakhine State
Internationally, anti-Muslim sentiment, inter-communal violence, and
Muslim disenfranchisement in Myanmar are mostly associated with
Rakhine State and the disputed legal status of its Muslim population. These
developments are part of the national discourse on Islam, and are sometimes
directly inluenced by extremist Buddhist leaders. The dire humanitarian
situation of most Muslims in northern Rakhine State led INGOs and NGOs
to provide support, although this was at times hindered by the military
government. The aid was mainly directed towards returning refugees, but
was perceived to leave out the majority of the Rakhine population, which
in Myanmar is also marginalized and poor. This situation hardened the
Rakhine’s deep dislike of their Muslim neighbours.
The 1982 Citizenship Law (which establishes complex rules governing
citizenship by descent), its 1983 Procedures, and a citizenship inspection
process in 1989 worsened the already diicult conditions for Muslim
people in Rakhine State to acquire or maintain citizenship status — and,
in fact, made many who had citizenship stateless. While this has been the
case for nearly two decades, the politics of identity and identity labels
increased over recent years and notably worsened in the 2015 pre-election
context. Prior to 2012, Muslims lived as integrated minorities in Sittwe and
across many townships of northern/central Rakhine State — although
settlements were often separated in rural areas where the impoverished
Muslim population is cut of from the outside world.
Following the rape of a Rakhine Buddhist woman by Muslim men and
retaliation for this act with a revenge killing of Muslim travellers in May/
June 2012, violence erupted in and around the state capital of Sittwe and
subsequently led to the displacement of 145,000 people (ICG 2014). The
great majority of the displaced live in Sittwe and neighbouring townships.
While many are stateless Muslims, Rakhine and Kaman — who are oicially
Myanmar ethnic nationals — are also included. For most of these people,
return to their place of origin is not expected anytime soon.17 As a result of
the 2012 violence and displacement, the March/April 2014 census exercise
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
149
could not be fully carried out from Sittwe northwards, thus afecting ten
out of Rakhine State’s seventeen townships.
The census results proclaimed an estimated total population of
over three million inhabitants, making Rakhine State the second-most
populated ethnic state after Shan State. Of the total, nearly 2.1 million
were enumerated, however an estimated 1,090,000 were not (MoIP 2015,
p. 9). 18 It is believed these were largely Rohingya, or ‘Bengalis’, without
citizenship. The government had previously committed to allow selfidentiication as Rohingya as a response to the question on ethnicity in
the census questionnaire. Following pressure from Buddhist nationalist
groups, this possibility was revoked just prior to the start of the count.
This last-minute decision led to a variation in the enumeration practice
across the townships concerned, and households where people decided
to self-identify as Rohingya were not taken into account. The disputes
around this led to new outbreaks of violence in Sittwe.
The term Rohingya — also used by international advocacy groups to
speak of Muslims in Rakhine State — has gained more weight in recent
years. Before the violence of 2012, it was mainly signiicant for Muslims
in the northern parts of the state, but less so for those who were more
integrated in Sittwe and in central townships. While for some Muslims in
Rakhine State this term is still not the label of choice, its use has become
more important for many and helps to forge more of a political identity
(see ICG 2014, p. 23). For the ethnic Rakhine as much as for the union
government, the term Rohingya is unacceptable, and the very existence of a
Rohingya group in Myanmar is denied. Instead, most people in Myanmar
use the term ‘Bengali’ which clearly carries connotations of Muslims as
foreigners whose citizenship status should be rightfully denied, or at least
veriied.19
The lack of a compromise term such as ‘Rakhine Muslim’ rendered the
2014 census and pilot citizenship veriication impossible to execute fully,
or at least very diicult to implement. From mid-2014, the government
implemented a voluntary pilot citizenship veriication process in Myebon
township. The ethnic Rakhine thought this would end allegedly illicit
Muslim claims to citizenship. However, more applications have resulted
in at least ‘naturalized’, if not full citizenship, than was expected.20 The
process was stopped (or at least did not proceed to other townships)
over this controversy and resumed in the beginning of 2015, but with
few applications. In informal conversations, Ministry of Immigration and
150
Michael Lidauer
Population employees have said this would be the Rohingyas’“last chance
to register”, and that “the conditions after this will be very diferent,
especially with a new government in place”, without specifying the reason
for this perception.21 In this situation, franchise was linked to citizenship,
constituting a departure from past practices.
In 2010, the holders of temporary registration cards (TRCs) — so-called
‘white cards’ — were encouraged to take part in the elections. The outgoing
SPDC regime distributed more white cards to increase the turnout for the
USDP. However, the political rights of the formally stateless population
were again infringed in late 2014 with an amendment of the political party
registration law, which deprived white-card holders of the right to found
or be members of political parties. As a consequence, the UEC required
all parties to change their membership lists.
The next controversy arose at the beginning of 2015, with a Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw draft national referendum bill, stimulating a new debate around
temporary identity certiicate enfranchisement. Ashin Wirathu said in a
press statement, “I warn [parliament] not to betray the over 50 million
national people by giving priority to the over one million illegal people.
If you allow them to vote in the coming election, I will lead the people to
ight against them all.”22 Other press statements called for public protests
in Rakhine State and Yangon. The president turned the situation around
by declaring the expiry of white cards altogether by 31 March 2015. The
two-month period for collection started on 1 April, and facilitated by
village leaders the cards were handed in without much resistance. As
a consequence, white-card holders were not included in the voter list
updates, which started about the same time these decisions were taken.
The electoral laws were later amended accordingly; it was estimated that
half a million voters were disenfranchised by these changes in the legal
framework (TNI 2015, p. 5).
A year ahead of the ballot, fears were high that Rakhine State was
steering towards another signiicant outbreak of violence and potential
humanitarian disaster. From a perspective of electoral security, the largescale disenfranchisement of formerly eligible voters decreased the risk for
violence to escalate, but the environment remained charged. The electoral
contest turned into a battle between the ANP, the USDP, and the NLD. The
ANP emerged as the most successful party, albeit with lower results than
anticipated and more seats lost to the NLD than expected.23 Following the
expiry of white cards, Muslim voters hardly participated in the electoral
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
151
process in Rakhine State, with the exception of Kaman voters in Thandwe,
some dozen remaining Muslim voters in Maungdaw, Sittwe, and in a small
number of IDP camps where electoral arrangements were made for a few
voters who legally qualiied as citizens. Kaman voters who were caught up
in the violence of 2012 and had been displaced (for example, from Kyauk
Phyu to Pauktaw or Sittwe), and had lost their ID documents, lost their
right to vote. In Myebon, as a consequence of the 2014 pilot citizenship
veriication, around a thousand people who had accepted being called
‘Bengali’ and who were rewarded with citizenship, regained their voting
rights. However, deprived of the freedom to move, they cast their ballots
secluded from other voters inside their settlement, and expressed fears
about possible retaliation if their vote would stand out as diferent from
the overall township results.24
Loss of union-level Representation
Soon after the Rakhine State crisis in 2012, waves of violence also
occurred in other parts of Myanmar, starting in Meikhtila in March 2013.
Most incidents followed a similar pattern, with a small dispute between
Buddhists and Muslims escalating quickly, resulting in the loss of life
and the destruction of mosques and other property. The involvement
of “dark forces”, a “hidden power”, or a “third hand” was attributed to
these events, implying the instrumentation of violence against Muslims
for political purposes (see ICG 2013).
Given MaBaTha’s growing voice and its apparent popularity ahead
of the ballot, increasingly open statements by Wirathu and others against
the NLD and its leader, and some political parties’ use of Buddhistnationalist campaign rhetoric, many analysts saw the risk of another wave
of anti-Muslim violence increasing with the electoral competition. With
few execptions religiously motivated violence did not occur during the
campaign period, and nationalist parties were surprisingly unsuccessful
at union level. However, it would be short-sighted to believe that antiMuslim sentiment, advocacy and the potential for religiously inspired
violence have disappeared with the relative calm of election day, and the
NLD victory (see Walton 2015).
Disenfranchisement also occurred with the candidate nomination
deadline in August 2015. As a result of increased anti-Muslim sentiment,
and in a break from the past, neither the USDP nor the NLD ielded a
152
Michael Lidauer
single Muslim candidate in the electoral race. Furthermore, the candidate
nomination process revealed intensiied scrutiny to verify candidate
eligibility based on the 2010 electoral laws, in particular in relation to
candidates’ citizenship. As of 2 September 2015, eighty-eight candidates
had been rejected by the UEC, with the majority coming from Rakhine
State (twenty-eight) and Yangon Region (twenty-four). Following massive
criticism of these decisions, including from the international community,
several candidate rejections were later revoked. However, in Rakhine State,
based on the combined efects of restrictions to political parties, voter
disenfranchisement, and increased candidate scrutiny, Muslims have lost
— with the exception of a few remaining voters who might have voted for
the NLD — any electoral representation. This is quite dramatic, and adds
to the series of future governance challenges and to the inheritance of a
worsening human rights situation in Rakhine State with an unresolved
citizenship problem. How the NLD will deal with the problems and interests
of citizen and non-state Muslims who do not have any representative of
their own in the legislatures remains to be seen.
IN SEARCH OF SOLuTIONS
Demands for reform by the former Burmese opposition and ethnic actors
coincide with constitutional reform debates that have been part of the
political transition process since it started. After the 2012 by-elections,
expectations were high that signiicant changes of the 2008 Constitution
could happen prior to 2015. The most prominent elements that many outside
the hitherto governing elite want to see changed are the participation
of military appointees in the legislature, the qualiication criteria for
presidential candidates which by design make Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible
for this post, and the further establishment of a federal system, as well as
the conditions for changing the constitution which is de facto not possible
without military consent (see Lidauer 2014). Ethnic parties’ demands for
constitutional changes also include the possibility of electing chief ministers
of states and regions directly, rather than have them appointed by the
president from among elected or appointed state or region members of
parliament, as is currently the case.
Despite the introduction of the draft bill for a national referendum to
change the Constitution — which triggered the legal formalisation of TRC
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
153
holder disenfranchisement — a referendum did not take place prior to the
2015 elections. Attempts to bring about constitutional changes included
a parliamentary commission 2013/2014, an NLD signature campaign in
2014, some high-level talks between leaders since 2014, and a vote for
selected constitutional amendments in parliament in 2015, which did not
change any of the constitutional conditions disputed by the majority of
the opposition at that time. The obstacles to changing the Constitution will
likely see much debate over the tenure of the NLD government. It remains
to be seen to what extent these debates will also take place outside the
legislature, to which the NLD brings electoral legitimacy.
The partial NCA, which has now become President Thein Sein’s
legacy, established the idea of a structured political dialogue. Quite
remarkably, given the major electoral process taking place at the same
time, the government and EAG signatories followed a rigid three-month
time frame to establish the structures foreseen in the NCA, including the
Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), and the Union Political Dialogue Joint
Committee (UPDJC). The UPDJC led to the irst Union Peace Conference
held in Naypyitaw between 12 and 17 January 2016. Aung San Suu Kyi
had not attended the NCA signing ceremony, and no NLD representative
signed the document. Despite its initial scepticism about the outcomes of
the USDP- and Tatmadaw-led peace process (and about the MPC as the
vehicle to facilitate the negotiations), the NLD joined the UPDJC drafting
committee after the elections, and Suu Kyi spoke at the opening of the
Union Peace Conference alongside the president, the commander-in-chief,
and senior EAG leaders. If and how the NLD will use the nascent peace
and political dialogue structures — which could include constitutional
reform — is not yet apparent.25 Of course, the electoral process could not
bring about constitutional change by itself, and how the core disputed
elements will be resolved, if at all, remains to be seen.
CONCLuSION
Despite considerable fears, the 2015 elections were not marred by electoral
violence. These fears were fed by the long-term armed conlict between
the Tatmadaw and EAGs and escalation of ighting with unusual ferocity
during the electoral period; the recent history of inter-communal violence
in Rakhine State and beyond, with anti-Muslim rhetoric becoming a
154
Michael Lidauer
dominating feature during the election period; and in view of the major
stakes at this watershed election for old and new power brokers. Further
research into why the ballot remained peaceful should be encouraged;
for now, it appears that the political will for peaceful elections was strong
enough, and the costs of escalating political violence deemed too high to
bear. International support, incentives, and diplomatic pressure for credible
and peaceful elections also contributed to a peaceful transfer of power.
The lessons learned during this electoral process should be transferred
from the old to the new UEC leadership. A new cycle of capacity building
in the UEC should have a dedicated focus on conlict sensitivity and
reaching conlict-afected communities, such as the internally displaced.
Conlict-afected communities and their representatives (whether members
of political parties or EAGs) should become targeted beneiciaries of civic
and voter education in the future, in particular in ceaseire areas and areas
where elections were cancelled. Whatever form of parliamentary or extraparliamentary discussion and decision-making forums will develop, they
should include and address outstanding electoral reforms. The existing
majoritarian electoral system deserves a review in a participatory manner,
although it is unlikely the NLD would embrace major change to the current
system, which helped it to convert the popular vote to a disproportionately
high number of seats (see Lemargie et al 2014). If the existing system
remains, however, to enable a more equal sufrage, as a minimum the new
administration would be advised to review the constituency boundaries
to avoid another election with severe malapportionment. As the existing
boundaries derive from the 2008 Constitution and new delimitation would
require constitutional change, this topic has to be addressed in a transparent
and consultative manner.
The UEC proved open to enhancing the electoral process towards
international standards. Some of these measures were developed following
international advice, such as new integrity measures for the polls, increased
interaction with political parties and CSOs, and intensiied voter education.
Other elements of the process came from within the institution. New
measures to mitigate the risks of electoral violence included the introduction
of a political party Code of Conduct, signed by almost all registered
parties; the introduction of UEC-led mediation committees, which helped
difuse tensions between parties in some cases; the introduction of
police-led electoral security management committees, largely consisting
of administrators and security forces, to operationalize electoral security
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
155
around election day; and some improvements concerning the use, costs,
and transparency of the electoral dispute resolution process. All these
measures deserve further development to make them more participatory,
transparent, and functional. In any case, future electoral stakeholders have
a better foundation to work from now than prior to the 2015 elections.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
This contribution cannot deal with all nuances of conlict which occured during
the electoral period. For example, it omits conlicts within the (formerly)
governing, military-proxy elite, or a detailed discussion of the electoral
conditions for internally displaced persons in conlict-afected areas.
See the reports of international election observation missions, that is, ANFREL
(2015), EU (2015), and TCC EOM (2015).
The UEC publicized oicial election results via its results centre in Naypyitaw
in the period between 9 and 20 November 2015, and later on its websites via the
following links (last accessed 5 February 2015): http://uecmyanmar.org/index.
php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/884-1-12-2015-pyithuhluttaw, http://uecmyanmar.
org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/885-1-12-2015-amyotharhluttaw, http://
uecmyanmar.org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/886-1-12-2015-sanddhluttaw,
http://uecmyanmar.org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/887-1-12-2015nationality. Compare the IFES-MIMU results maps for further details: http://
www.themimu.info/election (accessed 5 February 2015).
The following eight armed groups participated in the NCA: All Burma Students’
Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front
(CNF), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen National Liberation
Army-Peace Council (KNLA-PC), Karen National Union (KNU), Pa-O National
Liberation Organization (PNLO), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS).
Together with the leaders of these groups, the NCA was signed by the president,
the vice presidents, the commander-in-chief, the deputy commander-in chief,
the speakers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and other members of parliament on
behalf of the government. Representatives of the UN, the EU, China, India,
Thailand, and Japan were invited to sign as international witnesses.
The author has written elsewhere in more detail about this period (Lidauer
2015).
For an overview of Myanmar ’s administrative structure see http://
www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Myanmar_
Administrative_Structure_Aug_2015.pdf (accessed 5 February 2015).
UEC Notiications No 61-65/2015 (October 12) and No 67/2015 (October 27).
Together with the Union Election Commission Law and the Political Party
156
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Michael Lidauer
Registration Law, the election laws extend to the Amyotha Hluttaw, Pyithu
Hluttaw, and State and Region Hluttaw laws. All these laws have been in force
since 2010, and some have been amended since (see Lidauer and Saphy 2014).
Elections were also cancelled in forty-one village tracts in Kyaukkgyi
and Shwegyin townships in eastern Bago Region. Note that the UEC
annnouncements of cancellations in 2010 did not include eastern Bago, but it
is almost certain that there were no elections as this area had been under KNU
control for decades. The 2010 notiications only cover areas where elections
were oicially cancelled, while the number of areas where elections did not
take place in practice might have been signiicantly higher.
See the UEC FAQ on Voter List Update, February 2015. This and other electoral
reference documents can be found on http://www.merin-online.org/englishresources/ (accessed 6 February 2015).
In several situations in Kachin State and in northern Shan State, the cancellations
concern areas that have been vacated during years of conlict, meaning that
villages were either destroyed or left at some point during the last two to three
decades. The names of these places are nevertheless still part of oicial records
and get included in constituency demarcation, and therefore elections were
declared for these locations in the irst place. In these cases, the cancellations
can be interpreted as rectifying an administrative error while still relating to
the security narrative commonly used to explain the phenomenon.
The second announcement included the partial cancellations of elections in
Hopang township in the Wa SAD which appeared to have been forgotten in
the irst notiication.
Interview with the Loilen subcommission on 7 November 2015.
Interview with an RCSS Liaison Oicer on 12 January 2016.
Radio Free Asia on 27 October 2015 http://www.rfa.org/english/news/
myanmar/election-10272015172919.html (accessed 5 February 2016).
The census data is inherently diferent from the voter list as it relates to
anonymous household-based information from people who were present at
particular locations during the enumeration. The voter list consists of data
of individuals based on their registration status. Census enumeration was
conducted in a proactive manner, while the voter list was at irst established
passively, on the basis of Immigration household lists and GAD logbooks,
before voters were encouraged to actively check their inclusion on the list. This
is not to say that census data were of no use for electoral preparations, but
to underline that the census did not generate the voter list. Census data can
be used to interpret patterns in the voter list with degrees of approximation,
and can be used to interpret particular elements of the process, for example,
literacy in relation to voter education or the availability of ID documents among
voters, while acknowledging that gaps remain.
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
157
17 People who were displaced within their home communities in rural areas
started to resettle in February 2015.
18 For want of more detailed information, the data contained in the 2013 Rakhine
State Commission Report are still regarded as the most accurate, although
changes might have occurred due to refugee departures, notably during the
2015 boat crisis.
19 In a joint press conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry on 22 May 2016,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that neither of the "emotive terms" Rohingya and
Bengali should be used (Mizzima, 22 May 2016), which constitutes a change
in governmental practice.
20 The above-mentioned 1982 Citizenship Law established three categories of
citizenship: full, naturalized, and associate.
21 Conversation with the author on 25 March 2015.
22 Press release on 3 February 2015, translation by IFES.
23 It was expected that the NLD could be successful in southern Rakhine State;
the wins in the island constituency of Munaung, where ANP leader Dr Aye
Maung stood unsuccessfully, were not expected.
24 Interview with IDP camp leaders in Myebon on 29 October 2015.
25 Since the inauguration of the new government, the MPC has been renamed
the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre and a new peace conference has
been announced.
References
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). “Interim Report on the 2015 Myanmar
General and Local Elections”, 10 November 2015 <http://anfrel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/ANFREL-Interim-Report-on-the-2015-MyanmarGeneral-Elections.pdf>. Acccessed 6 February 2015.
Egreteau, Renaud. “Burmese Indians in Contemporary Burma: Heritage, Inluence,
and Perceptions since 1988”. Asian Ethnicity 12, no. 1 (2011), 33–54.
European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM). “Preliminary Statement”,
10 November 2015 <http://www.eueom.eu/iles/dmile/101115-ps-myanmar_
en.pdf>. Accessed 6 February 2015.
Farrelly, Nicholas. “War, Law, Politics: Relections on Violence and the Kachin”.
In Law, Society and Transition in Myanmar, edited by Melissa Crouch and Tim
Lindsey. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014.
Höglund, Kristine. “Electoral Violence in Conlict-Ridden Societies: Concepts,
Causes, and Consequences”. Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 3 (2009):
412–27.
Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM). “Burma 2015: Ballot Denied.
158
Michael Lidauer
Disenfranchised Voters in Kyar Inn Seik Gyi Township, Karen State”, November
2015 <http://rehmonnya.org/reports/Ballot-Denied-Full-Report-Eng.pdf>.
Accessed 6 February 2015.
International Crisis Group (ICG). “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against
Muslims in Myanmar”. Asia Report 251, 2013 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/251-the-dark-side-oftransition-violence-against-muslims-in-myanmar.pdf>. Accessed 6 February
2015.
———. “Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State”. Asia Report 261, 2014 <http://
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/261myanmar-the-politics-of-rakhine-state.aspx>. Accessed 6 February 2015.
———. “The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications”. Asia Brieing 147, 2015
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/
b147-the-myanmar-elections-results-and-implications.aspx>. Accessed 6
February 2015.
Lemargie, Kyle, Andrew Reynolds, Peter Erben, and David Ennis. “Electoral System
Choice in Myanmar's Democratization Debate”. In Debating Democratization
in Myanmar, edited by Nick Cheesman, Nicholas Farrelly and Trevor Wilson.
Singapore: ISEAS, 2014.
Lidauer, Michael. “Towards a New State in Myanmar”. In Burma/Myanmar —
Where Now?, edited by Mikael Gravers and Flemming Ytzen. Copenhagen:
NIAS Press, 2014.
———. “Background Brieing on Electoral Risks: Elections in Areas Afected by
Armed Conlict”. IFES internal report, 12 October 2015, pp. 13–22.
Lidauer, Michael and Gilles Saphy. “Elections and the Reform Agenda”. In Law,
Society and Transition in Myanmar, edited by Melissa Crouch and Tim Lindsey.
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014.
Ministry of Immigration and Population (MoIP), Department of Population. “The
2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. The Union Report.” Census
Report Volume 2, 2015 <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/
census/2010_phc/Myanmar/MMR-2015-05.pdf>. Accessed 6 February 2015.
Mizzima. “Aung San Suu Kyi Calls for Patience Over 'Rohingya' Controversy”.
Mizzima 22 May 2016. <http://mizzima.com/news-domestic/aung-san-suukyi-calls-patience-over-‘rohingya’-controversy>. Accessed 23 May 2016.
Schissler, Matthew. “New Technologies, Established Practices: Developing
Narratives of Muslim Threat in Myanmar.” In Islam and the State in Myanmar:
Muslim-Buddhist Relations and the Politics of Belonging, edited by Melissa Crouch.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Schober, Juliane. “Buddhism in Burma. Engagement with Modernity”. In Buddhism
in World Cultures. Comparative Perspectives, edited by S.C. Berkwitz, Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006.
The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar
159
The Carter Center Election Observation Mission (TCC EOM). “Preliminary
Statement”. 10 November 2015 <http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/
pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/Myanmar-PreliminaryStatement-111015.pdf>. Accessed 6 February 2015.
Transnational Institute (TNI). “The 2015 General Elections in Myanmar: What
Now for Ethnic Politics?” Myanmar Policy Brieing 17, December 2015 <https://
www.tni.org/iles/publication-downloads/bpb17_web_def.pdf>. Accessed 6
February 2015.
Tuccinardi, Domenico, Paul Guerin and others. Focus on Efective Electoral Assistance.
2007 <http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/focus-on-effective-electoralassistance>. Accessed 6 February 2015.
Walton, Matthew and Susan Hayward. “Contesting Buddhist Narratives.
Democratisation, Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar”. Policy
Studies 71. Honolulu: East-West Center, 2014.
Walton, Matthew. “The Post-election Future of Buddhist Nationalism in
Myanmar”. East Asia Forum, 19 November 2015 <http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2015/11/19/the-post-election-future-of-buddhist-nationalism-inmyanmar/>. Accessed 6 February 2015.