III Elections and After 7 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN MYANMAR Michael Lidauer The watershed Myanmar 2015 elections are widely regarded as more credible and inclusive than any previous polls in the country, and were largely experienced as peaceful and without disruptions. Despite a mostly quiet election day, the electoral process, however, was not free of conlict. One major cluster of conlicts impacting the electoral process revolved around tensions between ethnic armed groups (EAGs) and the national government’s military forces, the Tatmadaw — usually termed ‘ethnic conlict’ (see Laoutides and Ware, this volume). Another cluster of conlicts concerned the growing anti-Muslim sentiment, with the potential for violent escalation. A third conlict cluster evolved around questions of constitutional justice.1 This chapter briely outlines the conceptual framework for elections and conlict, and then proceeds by reviewing the major clusters. The section on elections and the peace process is followed by a discussion of a little understood element of the electoral process, the partial cancellation of elections. The chapter concludes by summarizing some nascent conlict-mitigating measures of the 2015 electoral process and provides an outlook for challenges ahead. 138 Michael Lidauer ELECTORAL PROCESS AND RESuLTS IN BRIEF Despite low expectations based on historical experience and criticism in the period prior to 8 November 2015, the Union Election Commission (UEC) enabled a positive election-day experience for most of Myanmar’s voters, and left little doubt that the will of the electorate was respected. The voter list, digitized and publicized for public scrutiny — which had been criticized for inconsistencies and omissions in earlier versions — stood its test on election day. More than a year prior to the polls the UEC engaged in unprecedented stakeholder meetings with political parties and CSOs. It introduced new integrity measures such as transparent ballot boxes, numbered seals, and indelible ink to create better safeguards in polling procedures, and supported the dissemination of voter education materials, including in the mass media and by new communication technologies. International and national observers were deployed in large numbers, all across the country and throughout the pre-election and election day period, with limitations only in conlict-afected areas and around military installations. Observers largely agreed in their assessments of an overall positive election day, while also sharing concerns about undemocratic restrictions in the electoral legal framework.2 The National League for Democracy (NLD) won an historic victory, similar to its 1990 results. It now dominates the upper and the lower houses of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the legislature at union level, in such a way that it can nominate two vice-presidents and select the president; and can oppose, propose, or pass any law without consent of the opposition — with the exception of changes to the constitution which are regulated under chapter 12. Section 436(a), in particular, requires the consent of military members of parliament who still hold twenty-ive per cent of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The NLD was also successful in the race for most region and state legislatures, winning the majority in all regions (two with 100 per cent of the elected seats) and in the three eastern ethnic states (Mon, Kayah, Kayin). The winning party also returned ifty per cent of the total number of seats, that is, including military representatives’ seats, for the Chin State Hluttaw, and around forty-nine per cent in Kachin State. The Arakan National Party (ANP) was the most successful party in Rakhine State (see Than Tun, this volume). The large Shan State holds the only legislature where the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) remains the strongest single political party, followed by the Shan The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 139 Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). Thus, together with the members of parliament appointed from the military, the USDP has the ability to form a working majority in the Shan State Hluttaw.3 The challenges for the incoming government are vast. They include continued economic liberalization, democratic reforms, continuation of the peace process, the necessary balance of power with the military, and hardly any experience in governance. Challenges also come from the overwhelming NLD victory itself: how will the victor engage with the less successful in the future? Very few parties that decided against a boycott in 2010, as the NLD and its allies did, won seats ive years later. While a diversity of ethnic representation continues to exist in parliament, most members are from the NLD. As the Transnational Institute (TNI 2015, p. 12) notes, “Ethnic-based parties, in contrast, hold few seats which is reminiscent of Myanmar’s post-independence democratic period." Ahead lies an unscripted future, including the resolution of major conlicts, which were prominent throughout the electoral process. However, all sides, including the military, have made reconciliatory signals in the early postelection period. THE NExuS OF ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT As a point of departure, this chapter suggests that elections are rarely the root cause of conlict, but have the potential to exacerbate pre-existing levels of conlict. Further, the angle on conlict taken here is wider than a mere focus on electoral violence occurring during the campaign period, on election day, or in its immediate aftermath, which is usually deined by its intentional character (for example, Höglund 2009). The analysis of conlict and its entanglements with the electoral process should not be limited to a focus on escalation of physical violence, but also extend to forms of structural violence and disenfranchisement, although mitigation strategies derived from such an analysis should aim to minimize the risks of physical harm. Practitioner communities supporting elections internationally increasingly view elections as cyclical (Tuccinardi et al. 2007). This allows their analysis over a longer time frame and takes the preparations and organization of the ballot into account. The longer periods of the electoral cycle are less visible to the public eye and grow in intensity as election day approaches. 140 Michael Lidauer The key elements towards the end of the electoral cycle are the review and inalization of the legal framework governing the elections; the production or update of the voter roll until its inalization; the deadline for the registration of political parties; the deadline for the nomination of candidates; the electoral campaign period; the deinition of electoral constituencies and the allocation of polling stations; arrangements for electoral security; the training of polling staf; the production and distribution of electoral materials, in particular ballots and relevant forms to administer electoral procedures; the arrangements for results management; and the adjudication of complaints that arise during the entire process. All these elements can trigger conlicts, or assist in their mitigation, at various levels and at particular times, albeit with difering degrees of intensity and impact. ELECTIONS AND THE PEACE PROCESS Myanmar and its territorial sovereignty have been consistently challenged by armed actors since the colonial era. Subsequent centralist military regimes ofered truces to these actors without achieving lasting peace. When President Thein Sein took oice in 2011, he made peace with EAGs a major goal of his term. While some old ceaseires were reconirmed and new bilateral ceaseires could be agreed, there has also been ierce ighting in recent years, including the use of heavy artillery and air strikes. The bilateral ceaseire with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), which was in place since 1994 and gave Kachin State a period of relative stability, broke in 2011 (see Farrelly 2014). Since then, armed conlict has been ongoing in parts of Kachin State and northern Shan State, and it continued over the electoral period. For the irst time since 2009, on 9 February 2015, ighting broke out between the Tatmadaw and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army at the Chinese border in the northeastern corner of Shan State, in the Kokang SAZ. On 17 February, the president declared a state of emergency and martial law in the area, and transferred executive and judicial powers to the commander-in-chief. This was the irst time during Thein Sein’s term that martial law had been declared. The state of emergency remained in place until mid-November, about one week after the elections. Notwithstanding the escalation of conlict at the beginning of the The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 141 electoral year, and the continuation and outbreak of ighting on various fronts, a (partial) Nationwide Ceaseire Agreement (NCA) was signed less than a month prior to the elections, on 15 October 2015. Eight EAGs signed the NCA, while others were not allowed to participate, and more abstained from signing for this reason.4 The signing ceremony had been preceded by a irst agreement on a draft ceaseire text on 31 March, but negotiations continued for another six months.5 During all this time, the peace negotiations were largely disconnected from the electoral process. Although President Thein Sein repeatedly called on all sides to work towards both peaceful elections and an NCA, the processes had no visible institutional links on the side of state agencies. Both the UEC and the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC) — entrusted with the facilitation of ceaseire negotiations on behalf of the Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC) — were careful to stay within the boundaries of their respective mandates (see Su Mon Thazin Aung, this volume). The UEC had some encounters with EAGs, but did not appear to pursue contact as part of a broader policy. Opportunities for convergence of the two processes were not explicitly pursued. For example, it could have been conceivable to tie agreements for ceaseire monitoring mechanisms to arrangements for electoral security, but this did not occur, partly because the NCA was agreed much later than initially expected — and too late to have a substantive impact on the electoral process. This is not to say that the electoral and peace processes were unrelated. In an interview conducted in February 2014, chief negotiator Minister U Aung Min had already expressed concerns that the window of opportunity to reach a conclusive agreement would be closing ahead of national elections. Indeed, for much of 2015, elections were perceived to disrupt the longer-term peace negotiations, which were in principle open ended. Unlike in other countries where a brokered peace deal set the timing for elections, in Myanmar the electoral time frame was constitutionally mandated. At the same time, the raised stakes of the peace process created risks in the security environment ahead of the polls. Outbursts of violence occurred before or between crucial negotiation meetings, in particular in Kachin State and northern Shan State. Perceptions that violence preceded key meetings possibly as a deliberate strategy may have deepened the trust deicit in the talks. It can be tempting to paint the potential electoral interests of ethnic armed actors and their relationships with political parties in black and 142 Michael Lidauer white, but any attempt to do so would oversimplify matters. Based on their historical experience with the 2010 elections (and for Kachin State, also the 2012 by-elections), most stakeholders had no trust in the election administration. The upcoming elections were also not a priority for most armed groups and their constituents. Their attention was on ighting, advancing the ongoing peace negotiations toward the NCA, maintaining the bilateral ceaseires, and proiting from them through increased access to local markets and services. For many EAGs, their continued nonacceptance of the 2008 Constitution also contradicted an intensiied interest in elections, even if an earlier change of their legal status would have allowed increased engagement. Some alleged that EAGs denied political parties access to their territories, however, many said they would not disrupt the electoral process even prior to the NCA. It is in this context that elections were partially cancelled. The Partial Cancellation of Elections The 2015 elections did not take place in all parts of the country. Elections were cancelled (postponed) in seven townships and partially in some townships in 416 additional wards or village tracts6 in conlict-afected areas, as announced by the UEC in two rounds, on 12 and 27 October 2015.7 The number of excluded voters did probably not exceed half a million (see TNI 2015, p. 5), or roughly 1.5 per cent of the population registered to vote. The October notiications were largely expected by observers and followed a similar pattern of announcements ahead of the 2010 elections. Nevertheless, the cancellations are one of the least understood and least transparent elements of the Myanmar elections. The authority to cancel and postpone elections lies with the UEC, and ultimately with its chairman; however, the decision-making process is informed from below. Administrative personnel with electoral duties at ward and village tract level inform township and district subcommissions. The state/region subcommissions then provide the recommendation to postpone elections, if needed, to their superiors in Naypyitaw. While the internal administration of this process appears to involve several levels, the decision-making for cancellations is little understood outside the involved apparatus. There were some negotiations around whether to hold elections under the condition of volatile ceaseires — for example in Kayin State’s Kyainseikgyi township or in northern Shan State’s Mongmit township — The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 143 however, if these negotiations occurred at all, they usually took place at the local level, between village administrators and members of armed groups, while higher-level subcommissions, and even the central UEC, could be entirely unaware of them. The elections postponement is based on UEC law section 10f and section 50 of the electoral laws.8 The language of these laws, as in many areas of the electoral legal framework, is ambiguous, and vulnerable to diferent interpretations. Sections 10f and 50 establish that the UEC has the authority to postpone elections in constituencies where a natural disaster prevents them, or where the security situation makes voter list updates and polling impossible. While the 'security situation' is not further clariied, the laws state that elections can be partially cancelled within a constituency, and that results from such constituencies are valid if ifty-one per cent of all enrolled constituents participate in the elections. Excluding eligible voters in conlict areas and only needing ifty-one per cent of registered voters to hold an election increases malapportionment, with the potential of creating easy-to-win seats. The natural disasters during the 2015 rainy season did not result in election postponement. All cancellations in 2015 were for security reasons. UEC public communications did little to clarify the reason for cancellations beyond a simple reference to security. The ambiguity of this language, the lack of public communications and transparent decisionmaking, or of a publicized participatory approach that would involve various stakeholders led to speculation about the potentially arbitrary or politically motivated nature of these decisions. Such assumptions are grounded in past electoral experiences. Partial cancellations are related to concerns about the potential misuse of advance votes (often of military voters) and about candidates using the inluence of local militia to coerce voters. Allegations like this occurred in ceaseire areas where, from the perspective of the voters afected by the cancellations (for example, in Kyainseikgyi), there were no obvious security threats (see HURFOM 2015). Relative to 2010, and as a result of new or renewed bilateral ceaseires, the southeast witnessed signiicant improvements to its 2015 electoral space. Most Kayah State townships were afected by cancellations in 2010, but none were in 2015. In Mon State, the nine village tracts without elections in 2010 were reduced to one. In Kayin State, the electoral space increased by approximately a third over this period.9 Shan State is the only place where cancellations also led to vacant seats in the legislature, and the 144 Michael Lidauer number would have remained consistent with 2010 had a second round of cancellations not occurred on 27 October. In Kachin State, the number of partial cancellations increased from 2010, however, this did not directly lead to increased disenfranchisement, as will be explained below. The cancellations must be understood in their respective geographical and political contexts, but with few exceptions they have one element in common — the absence of the state. In most situations where elections were cancelled, a voter list had never been established. Creating the voter list requires data from local oices, namely the Department of Immigration and Population at township level, and oices of the General Administration Department (GAD) at ward and village tract level.10 In addition, the GAD fulils electoral functions on the lower levels of the administration. Thus, if there is no GAD at the local level, there is no voter list and no oice to organize elections in that area. Therefore, the partial election cancellations seem to equate to the absence of the state’s administrative capacity in most cases. This is particularly evident in the areas under the control of the KIO in Kachin State; in those parts of Hpapun township under control of Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 5 in Kayin State; in territories controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in the Wa Self-Administered Division (SAD), and by the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) in Mongla township in Shan State, formerly termed Special Regions 2 and 4. Only a few of the cancellations declared on 12 October concerned areas assessed as having the potential for actual violence on election day, or that saw physical disruptions to earlier phases of the electoral cycle, such as the voter list display. These exceptional cases included the conlict-ridden township of Mansi in southern Kachin State, and Kawkareik township in Kayin State, where tensions between the state security apparatus and several EAGs caused insecurity along the Asia Highway during the voter list update period. The cancellations have diferent administrative consequences, depending on the size of the administrative units concerned. Vacant seats occur only where elections are cancelled for an entire constituency; this was the case for seven townships in Shan State, resulting in seven vacant seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw and fourteen vacant seats in the Shan State Hluttaw (the Amyotha Hluttaw is not afected). Contra to this, the cancellation of elections in speciic wards and village tracts smaller than a constituency do not translate into vacant seats in the legislature, leading to the disenfranchisement of voters as the election goes ahead regardless of their involvement, as well The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 145 as candidates coming to power in seats without universal sufrage of their constituents.11 There was a lengthy preparation for the first announcement of cancellations on 12 October. It occurred somewhat later than expected as the UEC was busy with candidate scrutiny and its contestation (see below) in September. The second announcement, less than two weeks before election day, seemed to occur as an ad hoc response to real security concerns. On 27 October, elections were cancelled for the two townships of Monshu and Kyethi, as well as for eight additional village tracts in neighbouring Tangyan township in Shan State.12 These cancellations followed the responsible district subcommission’s demand to partially cancel elections after ighting had broken out between the Tatmadaw and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N). The subcommission later argued that they could not “send the ballots” and had genuine concerns about the safety of electoral personnel and materials if elections went ahead.13 Political spectators disputed the legitimacy of this decision. Representatives of other EAGs understood the escalation of ighting in this area as a consequence of the SSA-N’s non-participation in the NCA signing ceremony on 15 October, and the Tatmadaw’s attacks — similar to those in Mohnyin township, Kachin State, with “unusual intensity” (TNI 2015, p. 4) — as a punishment for their absence.14 The SNLD accused the UEC of political motivation, seeing the cancelled constituencies as potentially safe wins for its party. Meanwhile the SNLD’s direct political opponent, the SNDP, encouraged and welcomed the UEC’s decision to safeguard campaigners’ safety and voters’ rights, which, from its perspective, were under threat.15 While the UEC might have had good reason to cancel elections in most cases, due to past experience few stakeholders trusted the genuineness of their motivations prior to the 2015 elections. The UEC’s decisions were also interpreted as synonymous with decisions of the Tatmadaw and other state institutions, while in reality they might not have been related. The collective positive experience of the 2015 elections, and the generally well-trusted results, may lead to increased conidence in this particular government institution in the future. More clarity about UEC law section 10f and election laws section 50 would help to avoid the potential for politically motivated contrasting interpretations of partial election cancellations. Currently, these suspensions are a more complex phenomenon related to diferent reasoning, motivations, and opinions than a simple ‘security’ explanation might suggest. 146 Michael Lidauer Electoral versus Census Space From the perspective of the state’s access to its peripheries, it is interesting to compare the 2015 partial election cancellations with the 2014 census. There are apparent overlaps in areas where neither the census nor the elections were possible, where enumerators experienced hindrances, or where data for the census were provided by the local administration of armed actors rather than by government enumerators.16 The census reports share some information about accessibility and collaboration between the state and ethnic armed actors in ceaseire areas. Apart from Rakhine State, where the government’s refusal to allow the term Rohingya as self-ascription led to a situation where the census was not fully conducted in ten out of seventeen townships (see below), the population count also faced accessibility restrictions in Kachin State and Kayin State. In Kachin State, the KIO did not allow enumerators to count people in villages under their control, leaving twenty-ive village tracts (ninety-seven villages) out of the census. In parts of Hpapun township of Kayin State, the KNLA denied access to enumerators and provided their own data about the total number of households and population by gender. As a consequence, the populations in these areas were estimated and included in the overall census results, but not in the analysis and presentation of detailed information (MoIP 2015, pp. 8–10). The Kachin and Hpapun situations during the census parallel the non-accessibility experiences with the establishment of the voter list in these areas. However, the census seems to have been possible in other locations where the voter list was not established, in particular in the Wa SAD townships under UWSA control, and in Mongla, which is under NDAA control. One explanation is that the leaders of these armed groups might have had an interest in knowing how many people reside in their realm, for purposes of recruitment or taxation, but had no interest in their populations' participation in general elections. The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 147 ANTI-MuSLIM SENTIMENT AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT Anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar is not a novelty of the political transition, but results from the country’s historical ethno-linguistic complexity. Expressions of Buddhist nationalism earned integral status in Burmese politics during the anti-colonial struggle. Religious legitimation of political power was relevant for all regimes following independence — parliamentary, socialist, and military. This continues to be so both for state and opposition leaders of the Burmese mainstream (Schober 2006, p. 91). Those who are perceived as foreigners — including Indians, Chinese, and Muslims — were often targeted in times of political crisis. Extremist expression and violence linked to Buddhist-inspired nationalism was already part of monks’ riots in the 1920s and 1930s. There are also reports of occasional anti-Muslim violence over the period of the Ne Win and SLORC/SPDC governments. Egreteau (2011) argues that contemporary “Islamophobia” has developed as a broader “Indophobia” — Indians were perceived as agents of the colonial regime — and was reduced to its antiMuslim direction over the last period of the military regime. New freedom of expression, coupled with the use of new technologies, led to an increase in religiously framed political hate speech, both oline and online (see Schissler 2016), prior to the electoral contest. The major protagonists were religiously conservative and extremist monks such as Ashin Wirathu, who was convicted for political instigation in 2003, but was released under a general amnesty for political prisoners in 2011. Since 2012, the increase in anti-Muslim sentiment became visible in public space with the emergence of the 969 movement and its Buy Buddhist campaign. The political policy agenda of the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion, known by its abbreviation MaBaTha, founded in early 2014, started to target the legislature more directly with the propagation of four laws relating to interreligious marriage, religious conversion, monogamy, and population control (Walton and Hayward 2014, pp. 12–16). Acknowledging that these movements are “a relexive defense against what is perceived by some to be the threat of a globally spreading Islam, as well as the motivation to preserve and promote Buddhist practice and behavior in Myanmar during a time of signiicant change”, Walton and Hayward (2014, p. x) argue that they are inherently political in nature. Ahead of the elections, the political process appeared increasingly held 148 Michael Lidauer hostage to Buddhist-nationalist discourses. Neither incumbents nor the opposition could aford to publicly display any empathy towards Muslim minority causes during the campaign, or risk losing votes. Deadlock in Rakhine State Internationally, anti-Muslim sentiment, inter-communal violence, and Muslim disenfranchisement in Myanmar are mostly associated with Rakhine State and the disputed legal status of its Muslim population. These developments are part of the national discourse on Islam, and are sometimes directly inluenced by extremist Buddhist leaders. The dire humanitarian situation of most Muslims in northern Rakhine State led INGOs and NGOs to provide support, although this was at times hindered by the military government. The aid was mainly directed towards returning refugees, but was perceived to leave out the majority of the Rakhine population, which in Myanmar is also marginalized and poor. This situation hardened the Rakhine’s deep dislike of their Muslim neighbours. The 1982 Citizenship Law (which establishes complex rules governing citizenship by descent), its 1983 Procedures, and a citizenship inspection process in 1989 worsened the already diicult conditions for Muslim people in Rakhine State to acquire or maintain citizenship status — and, in fact, made many who had citizenship stateless. While this has been the case for nearly two decades, the politics of identity and identity labels increased over recent years and notably worsened in the 2015 pre-election context. Prior to 2012, Muslims lived as integrated minorities in Sittwe and across many townships of northern/central Rakhine State — although settlements were often separated in rural areas where the impoverished Muslim population is cut of from the outside world. Following the rape of a Rakhine Buddhist woman by Muslim men and retaliation for this act with a revenge killing of Muslim travellers in May/ June 2012, violence erupted in and around the state capital of Sittwe and subsequently led to the displacement of 145,000 people (ICG 2014). The great majority of the displaced live in Sittwe and neighbouring townships. While many are stateless Muslims, Rakhine and Kaman — who are oicially Myanmar ethnic nationals — are also included. For most of these people, return to their place of origin is not expected anytime soon.17 As a result of the 2012 violence and displacement, the March/April 2014 census exercise The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 149 could not be fully carried out from Sittwe northwards, thus afecting ten out of Rakhine State’s seventeen townships. The census results proclaimed an estimated total population of over three million inhabitants, making Rakhine State the second-most populated ethnic state after Shan State. Of the total, nearly 2.1 million were enumerated, however an estimated 1,090,000 were not (MoIP 2015, p. 9). 18 It is believed these were largely Rohingya, or ‘Bengalis’, without citizenship. The government had previously committed to allow selfidentiication as Rohingya as a response to the question on ethnicity in the census questionnaire. Following pressure from Buddhist nationalist groups, this possibility was revoked just prior to the start of the count. This last-minute decision led to a variation in the enumeration practice across the townships concerned, and households where people decided to self-identify as Rohingya were not taken into account. The disputes around this led to new outbreaks of violence in Sittwe. The term Rohingya — also used by international advocacy groups to speak of Muslims in Rakhine State — has gained more weight in recent years. Before the violence of 2012, it was mainly signiicant for Muslims in the northern parts of the state, but less so for those who were more integrated in Sittwe and in central townships. While for some Muslims in Rakhine State this term is still not the label of choice, its use has become more important for many and helps to forge more of a political identity (see ICG 2014, p. 23). For the ethnic Rakhine as much as for the union government, the term Rohingya is unacceptable, and the very existence of a Rohingya group in Myanmar is denied. Instead, most people in Myanmar use the term ‘Bengali’ which clearly carries connotations of Muslims as foreigners whose citizenship status should be rightfully denied, or at least veriied.19 The lack of a compromise term such as ‘Rakhine Muslim’ rendered the 2014 census and pilot citizenship veriication impossible to execute fully, or at least very diicult to implement. From mid-2014, the government implemented a voluntary pilot citizenship veriication process in Myebon township. The ethnic Rakhine thought this would end allegedly illicit Muslim claims to citizenship. However, more applications have resulted in at least ‘naturalized’, if not full citizenship, than was expected.20 The process was stopped (or at least did not proceed to other townships) over this controversy and resumed in the beginning of 2015, but with few applications. In informal conversations, Ministry of Immigration and 150 Michael Lidauer Population employees have said this would be the Rohingyas’“last chance to register”, and that “the conditions after this will be very diferent, especially with a new government in place”, without specifying the reason for this perception.21 In this situation, franchise was linked to citizenship, constituting a departure from past practices. In 2010, the holders of temporary registration cards (TRCs) — so-called ‘white cards’ — were encouraged to take part in the elections. The outgoing SPDC regime distributed more white cards to increase the turnout for the USDP. However, the political rights of the formally stateless population were again infringed in late 2014 with an amendment of the political party registration law, which deprived white-card holders of the right to found or be members of political parties. As a consequence, the UEC required all parties to change their membership lists. The next controversy arose at the beginning of 2015, with a Pyidaungsu Hluttaw draft national referendum bill, stimulating a new debate around temporary identity certiicate enfranchisement. Ashin Wirathu said in a press statement, “I warn [parliament] not to betray the over 50 million national people by giving priority to the over one million illegal people. If you allow them to vote in the coming election, I will lead the people to ight against them all.”22 Other press statements called for public protests in Rakhine State and Yangon. The president turned the situation around by declaring the expiry of white cards altogether by 31 March 2015. The two-month period for collection started on 1 April, and facilitated by village leaders the cards were handed in without much resistance. As a consequence, white-card holders were not included in the voter list updates, which started about the same time these decisions were taken. The electoral laws were later amended accordingly; it was estimated that half a million voters were disenfranchised by these changes in the legal framework (TNI 2015, p. 5). A year ahead of the ballot, fears were high that Rakhine State was steering towards another signiicant outbreak of violence and potential humanitarian disaster. From a perspective of electoral security, the largescale disenfranchisement of formerly eligible voters decreased the risk for violence to escalate, but the environment remained charged. The electoral contest turned into a battle between the ANP, the USDP, and the NLD. The ANP emerged as the most successful party, albeit with lower results than anticipated and more seats lost to the NLD than expected.23 Following the expiry of white cards, Muslim voters hardly participated in the electoral The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 151 process in Rakhine State, with the exception of Kaman voters in Thandwe, some dozen remaining Muslim voters in Maungdaw, Sittwe, and in a small number of IDP camps where electoral arrangements were made for a few voters who legally qualiied as citizens. Kaman voters who were caught up in the violence of 2012 and had been displaced (for example, from Kyauk Phyu to Pauktaw or Sittwe), and had lost their ID documents, lost their right to vote. In Myebon, as a consequence of the 2014 pilot citizenship veriication, around a thousand people who had accepted being called ‘Bengali’ and who were rewarded with citizenship, regained their voting rights. However, deprived of the freedom to move, they cast their ballots secluded from other voters inside their settlement, and expressed fears about possible retaliation if their vote would stand out as diferent from the overall township results.24 Loss of union-level Representation Soon after the Rakhine State crisis in 2012, waves of violence also occurred in other parts of Myanmar, starting in Meikhtila in March 2013. Most incidents followed a similar pattern, with a small dispute between Buddhists and Muslims escalating quickly, resulting in the loss of life and the destruction of mosques and other property. The involvement of “dark forces”, a “hidden power”, or a “third hand” was attributed to these events, implying the instrumentation of violence against Muslims for political purposes (see ICG 2013). Given MaBaTha’s growing voice and its apparent popularity ahead of the ballot, increasingly open statements by Wirathu and others against the NLD and its leader, and some political parties’ use of Buddhistnationalist campaign rhetoric, many analysts saw the risk of another wave of anti-Muslim violence increasing with the electoral competition. With few execptions religiously motivated violence did not occur during the campaign period, and nationalist parties were surprisingly unsuccessful at union level. However, it would be short-sighted to believe that antiMuslim sentiment, advocacy and the potential for religiously inspired violence have disappeared with the relative calm of election day, and the NLD victory (see Walton 2015). Disenfranchisement also occurred with the candidate nomination deadline in August 2015. As a result of increased anti-Muslim sentiment, and in a break from the past, neither the USDP nor the NLD ielded a 152 Michael Lidauer single Muslim candidate in the electoral race. Furthermore, the candidate nomination process revealed intensiied scrutiny to verify candidate eligibility based on the 2010 electoral laws, in particular in relation to candidates’ citizenship. As of 2 September 2015, eighty-eight candidates had been rejected by the UEC, with the majority coming from Rakhine State (twenty-eight) and Yangon Region (twenty-four). Following massive criticism of these decisions, including from the international community, several candidate rejections were later revoked. However, in Rakhine State, based on the combined efects of restrictions to political parties, voter disenfranchisement, and increased candidate scrutiny, Muslims have lost — with the exception of a few remaining voters who might have voted for the NLD — any electoral representation. This is quite dramatic, and adds to the series of future governance challenges and to the inheritance of a worsening human rights situation in Rakhine State with an unresolved citizenship problem. How the NLD will deal with the problems and interests of citizen and non-state Muslims who do not have any representative of their own in the legislatures remains to be seen. IN SEARCH OF SOLuTIONS Demands for reform by the former Burmese opposition and ethnic actors coincide with constitutional reform debates that have been part of the political transition process since it started. After the 2012 by-elections, expectations were high that signiicant changes of the 2008 Constitution could happen prior to 2015. The most prominent elements that many outside the hitherto governing elite want to see changed are the participation of military appointees in the legislature, the qualiication criteria for presidential candidates which by design make Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible for this post, and the further establishment of a federal system, as well as the conditions for changing the constitution which is de facto not possible without military consent (see Lidauer 2014). Ethnic parties’ demands for constitutional changes also include the possibility of electing chief ministers of states and regions directly, rather than have them appointed by the president from among elected or appointed state or region members of parliament, as is currently the case. Despite the introduction of the draft bill for a national referendum to change the Constitution — which triggered the legal formalisation of TRC The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 153 holder disenfranchisement — a referendum did not take place prior to the 2015 elections. Attempts to bring about constitutional changes included a parliamentary commission 2013/2014, an NLD signature campaign in 2014, some high-level talks between leaders since 2014, and a vote for selected constitutional amendments in parliament in 2015, which did not change any of the constitutional conditions disputed by the majority of the opposition at that time. The obstacles to changing the Constitution will likely see much debate over the tenure of the NLD government. It remains to be seen to what extent these debates will also take place outside the legislature, to which the NLD brings electoral legitimacy. The partial NCA, which has now become President Thein Sein’s legacy, established the idea of a structured political dialogue. Quite remarkably, given the major electoral process taking place at the same time, the government and EAG signatories followed a rigid three-month time frame to establish the structures foreseen in the NCA, including the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC), and the Union Political Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). The UPDJC led to the irst Union Peace Conference held in Naypyitaw between 12 and 17 January 2016. Aung San Suu Kyi had not attended the NCA signing ceremony, and no NLD representative signed the document. Despite its initial scepticism about the outcomes of the USDP- and Tatmadaw-led peace process (and about the MPC as the vehicle to facilitate the negotiations), the NLD joined the UPDJC drafting committee after the elections, and Suu Kyi spoke at the opening of the Union Peace Conference alongside the president, the commander-in-chief, and senior EAG leaders. If and how the NLD will use the nascent peace and political dialogue structures — which could include constitutional reform — is not yet apparent.25 Of course, the electoral process could not bring about constitutional change by itself, and how the core disputed elements will be resolved, if at all, remains to be seen. CONCLuSION Despite considerable fears, the 2015 elections were not marred by electoral violence. These fears were fed by the long-term armed conlict between the Tatmadaw and EAGs and escalation of ighting with unusual ferocity during the electoral period; the recent history of inter-communal violence in Rakhine State and beyond, with anti-Muslim rhetoric becoming a 154 Michael Lidauer dominating feature during the election period; and in view of the major stakes at this watershed election for old and new power brokers. Further research into why the ballot remained peaceful should be encouraged; for now, it appears that the political will for peaceful elections was strong enough, and the costs of escalating political violence deemed too high to bear. International support, incentives, and diplomatic pressure for credible and peaceful elections also contributed to a peaceful transfer of power. The lessons learned during this electoral process should be transferred from the old to the new UEC leadership. A new cycle of capacity building in the UEC should have a dedicated focus on conlict sensitivity and reaching conlict-afected communities, such as the internally displaced. Conlict-afected communities and their representatives (whether members of political parties or EAGs) should become targeted beneiciaries of civic and voter education in the future, in particular in ceaseire areas and areas where elections were cancelled. Whatever form of parliamentary or extraparliamentary discussion and decision-making forums will develop, they should include and address outstanding electoral reforms. The existing majoritarian electoral system deserves a review in a participatory manner, although it is unlikely the NLD would embrace major change to the current system, which helped it to convert the popular vote to a disproportionately high number of seats (see Lemargie et al 2014). If the existing system remains, however, to enable a more equal sufrage, as a minimum the new administration would be advised to review the constituency boundaries to avoid another election with severe malapportionment. As the existing boundaries derive from the 2008 Constitution and new delimitation would require constitutional change, this topic has to be addressed in a transparent and consultative manner. The UEC proved open to enhancing the electoral process towards international standards. Some of these measures were developed following international advice, such as new integrity measures for the polls, increased interaction with political parties and CSOs, and intensiied voter education. Other elements of the process came from within the institution. New measures to mitigate the risks of electoral violence included the introduction of a political party Code of Conduct, signed by almost all registered parties; the introduction of UEC-led mediation committees, which helped difuse tensions between parties in some cases; the introduction of police-led electoral security management committees, largely consisting of administrators and security forces, to operationalize electoral security The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 155 around election day; and some improvements concerning the use, costs, and transparency of the electoral dispute resolution process. All these measures deserve further development to make them more participatory, transparent, and functional. In any case, future electoral stakeholders have a better foundation to work from now than prior to the 2015 elections. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 This contribution cannot deal with all nuances of conlict which occured during the electoral period. For example, it omits conlicts within the (formerly) governing, military-proxy elite, or a detailed discussion of the electoral conditions for internally displaced persons in conlict-afected areas. See the reports of international election observation missions, that is, ANFREL (2015), EU (2015), and TCC EOM (2015). The UEC publicized oicial election results via its results centre in Naypyitaw in the period between 9 and 20 November 2015, and later on its websites via the following links (last accessed 5 February 2015): http://uecmyanmar.org/index. php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/884-1-12-2015-pyithuhluttaw, http://uecmyanmar. org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/885-1-12-2015-amyotharhluttaw, http:// uecmyanmar.org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/886-1-12-2015-sanddhluttaw, http://uecmyanmar.org/index.php/2014-02-11-08-31-43/887-1-12-2015nationality. Compare the IFES-MIMU results maps for further details: http:// www.themimu.info/election (accessed 5 February 2015). The following eight armed groups participated in the NCA: All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNLA-PC), Karen National Union (KNU), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). Together with the leaders of these groups, the NCA was signed by the president, the vice presidents, the commander-in-chief, the deputy commander-in chief, the speakers of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and other members of parliament on behalf of the government. Representatives of the UN, the EU, China, India, Thailand, and Japan were invited to sign as international witnesses. The author has written elsewhere in more detail about this period (Lidauer 2015). For an overview of Myanmar ’s administrative structure see http:// www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Myanmar_ Administrative_Structure_Aug_2015.pdf (accessed 5 February 2015). UEC Notiications No 61-65/2015 (October 12) and No 67/2015 (October 27). Together with the Union Election Commission Law and the Political Party 156 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Michael Lidauer Registration Law, the election laws extend to the Amyotha Hluttaw, Pyithu Hluttaw, and State and Region Hluttaw laws. All these laws have been in force since 2010, and some have been amended since (see Lidauer and Saphy 2014). Elections were also cancelled in forty-one village tracts in Kyaukkgyi and Shwegyin townships in eastern Bago Region. Note that the UEC annnouncements of cancellations in 2010 did not include eastern Bago, but it is almost certain that there were no elections as this area had been under KNU control for decades. The 2010 notiications only cover areas where elections were oicially cancelled, while the number of areas where elections did not take place in practice might have been signiicantly higher. See the UEC FAQ on Voter List Update, February 2015. This and other electoral reference documents can be found on http://www.merin-online.org/englishresources/ (accessed 6 February 2015). In several situations in Kachin State and in northern Shan State, the cancellations concern areas that have been vacated during years of conlict, meaning that villages were either destroyed or left at some point during the last two to three decades. The names of these places are nevertheless still part of oicial records and get included in constituency demarcation, and therefore elections were declared for these locations in the irst place. In these cases, the cancellations can be interpreted as rectifying an administrative error while still relating to the security narrative commonly used to explain the phenomenon. The second announcement included the partial cancellations of elections in Hopang township in the Wa SAD which appeared to have been forgotten in the irst notiication. Interview with the Loilen subcommission on 7 November 2015. Interview with an RCSS Liaison Oicer on 12 January 2016. Radio Free Asia on 27 October 2015 http://www.rfa.org/english/news/ myanmar/election-10272015172919.html (accessed 5 February 2016). The census data is inherently diferent from the voter list as it relates to anonymous household-based information from people who were present at particular locations during the enumeration. The voter list consists of data of individuals based on their registration status. Census enumeration was conducted in a proactive manner, while the voter list was at irst established passively, on the basis of Immigration household lists and GAD logbooks, before voters were encouraged to actively check their inclusion on the list. This is not to say that census data were of no use for electoral preparations, but to underline that the census did not generate the voter list. Census data can be used to interpret patterns in the voter list with degrees of approximation, and can be used to interpret particular elements of the process, for example, literacy in relation to voter education or the availability of ID documents among voters, while acknowledging that gaps remain. The 2015 elections and conlict dynamics in Myanmar 157 17 People who were displaced within their home communities in rural areas started to resettle in February 2015. 18 For want of more detailed information, the data contained in the 2013 Rakhine State Commission Report are still regarded as the most accurate, although changes might have occurred due to refugee departures, notably during the 2015 boat crisis. 19 In a joint press conference with US Secretary of State John Kerry on 22 May 2016, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that neither of the "emotive terms" Rohingya and Bengali should be used (Mizzima, 22 May 2016), which constitutes a change in governmental practice. 20 The above-mentioned 1982 Citizenship Law established three categories of citizenship: full, naturalized, and associate. 21 Conversation with the author on 25 March 2015. 22 Press release on 3 February 2015, translation by IFES. 23 It was expected that the NLD could be successful in southern Rakhine State; the wins in the island constituency of Munaung, where ANP leader Dr Aye Maung stood unsuccessfully, were not expected. 24 Interview with IDP camp leaders in Myebon on 29 October 2015. 25 Since the inauguration of the new government, the MPC has been renamed the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre and a new peace conference has been announced. 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