Original Paper
Diseases
Neurodegener Dis 2016;16:206–217
DOI: 10.1159/000441918
Received: June 4, 2015
Accepted after revision: October 22, 2015
Published online: February 9, 2016
Integration of Intention and Outcome
for Moral Judgment in Frontotemporal
Dementia: Brain Structural Signatures
Sandra Baez a, b, d Philipp Kanske j Diana Matallana k Patricia Montañes l
Pablo Reyes k Andrea Slachevsky e–h Cristian Matus i, o Nora Silvana Vigliecca b, c
Teresa Torralva a, d Facundo Manes b, d, n Agustin Ibanez a, b, d, m, n, p
a
Institute of Cognitive Neurology (INECO) and Institute of Neuroscience, Favaloro University, and b National Scientific
and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, and c Instituto de Humanidades (IDH), la Facultad de
Filosofía y Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Córdoba, Argentina; and d UDP-INECO Foundation Core
on Neuroscience (UIFCoN), Diego Portales University, e Departamento de Fisiopatología, ICBM y Departamento de
Ciencias Neurológicas Oriente, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Chile, f Unidad de Neurología Cognitiva
y Demencias, Servicio de Neurología, Hospital del Salvador, g Centro de Investigación Avanzada en Educación,
Universidad de Chile, h Servicio de Neurología, Clínica Alemana, and i Hospital de Carabineros, Santiago, Chile;
j
Department of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig,
Germany; k Instituto de Envejecimiento, Facultad de Medicina, Universidad Javeriana, and Departamento de
Psiquiatría y Salud Mental, Centro de Memoria y Cognición Intellectus, Hospital San Ignacio, and l Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, and m Universidad Autónoma del Caribe, Barranquilla, Colombia; n ACR Centre of
Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Macquarie University, Sydney, N.S.W., Australia; o Fundación Médica
San Cristobal, and p School of Psychology, Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, Santiago, Chile
Abstract
Background: Moral judgment has been proposed to rely on
a distributed brain network. This function is impaired in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a condition involving damage to some regions of this network.
However, no studies have investigated moral judgment in
bvFTD via structural neuroimaging. Methods: We compared the performance of 21 bvFTD patients and 19 controls on a moral judgment task involving scenarios that discriminate between the contributions of intentions and out-
© 2016 S. Karger AG, Basel
1660–2854/16/0164–0206$39.50/0
E-Mail karger@karger.com
www.karger.com/ndd
comes. Voxel-based morphometry was used to assess (a)
the atrophy pattern in bvFTD patients, (b) associations between gray matter (GM) volume and moral judgments, and
(c) structural differences between bvFTD subgroups (patients with relatively preserved moral judgment and patients with severer moral judgment impairments). Results:
Patients judged attempted harm as more permissible and
accidental harm as less permissible than controls. The
groups’ performance on accidental harm was associated
with GM volume in the precuneus. In controls, it was also associated with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC). Also, both groups’ performance on attempted
harm was associated with GM volume in the temporoparietal junction. Patients exhibiting worse performance displayed smaller GM volumes in the precuneus and temporal
pole. Conclusions: Results suggest that moral judgment ab-
Agustin Ibanez, PhD
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience (LPEN)
Institute of Cognitive Neurology (INECO) and CONICET
Pacheco de Melo 1860, Buenos Aires 1126 (Argentina)
E-Mail aibanez @ ineco.org.ar
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Key Words
Moral judgment · Behavioral variant of frontotemporal
dementia · Magnetic resonance imaging · Voxel-based
morphometry · Structural correlates
© 2016 S. Karger AG, Basel
Introduction
Current theoretical models [1–3] have suggested that
high-level social processes, such as moral judgment, may
be better understood in terms of extended cortical-limbic
networks. Previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies [4–8] have identified a distributed
brain network commonly engaged by moral cognition
tasks. This network includes the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (VMPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, the superior temporal sulcus, the precuneus, and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Specifically, the VMPFC seems to play multiple roles in social cognitive processes; for example, it
biases moral judgment by associating external stimuli
with socioemotional value and is involved in theory of
mind and empathy [9, 10]. The orbitofrontal and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices are implied in the inhibition of
automatic or impulsive responses and in processing social prompts [11, 12]. The amygdala is involved in moral
learning and threat responses [13–15]. The precuneus
subserves processing of mental states [16] and integration
of self-referential stimuli in the broader emotional or
moral context of the self [17]. Finally, the TPJ is involved
in the inference of mental states [18] and the integration
of information from several sources to establish a social
context for decision-making [19].
Although this moral judgment network has been systematically identified, the VMPFC has received particular
attention and has been proposed as a critical region for
processing intention and outcome information during
moral judgments [20–22]. Patients with VMPFC damage
judge harmful intentions in the absence of harmful outcomes as more permissible than healthy subjects [21].
Thus, while several regions play a fundamental role in
moral cognition, the VMPFC proves critical in judging
moral situations.
In line with the network models, a recent study [23]
demonstrated similar impairments in integrating intention and outcome information for moral judgment in
patients with prefrontal lesions either with or without
VMPFC damage, as well as in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) patients. Although the
Moral Judgment in Frontotemporal
Dementia
VMPFC may be affected in bvFTD patients, their atrophy
pattern extends to other frontotemporal areas. Previous
studies [24–27] have shown that atrophy in bvFTD also
involves the orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate cortex, the
amygdala, the insula, and the right temporal pole (TP).
This widespread atrophy pattern suggests that a more diffuse and extended network may be involved in moral
judgment.
The processing of intentions and outcomes is crucial
for moral judgment, but no study on bvFTD has yet investigated the issue via structural neuroimaging. This
study is the first to report gray matter (GM) changes associated with moral judgments in bvFTD patients and
controls. First, we compared the behavioral performance
of both groups on a well-characterized task [21, 23] involving scenarios that separate the contributions of intentions and outcomes to moral judgment. Then, we performed voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to measure
and compare GM volumes in bvFTD patients and controls. Furthermore, we explored the association between
GM volumes and moral judgments in each group. Finally,
we examined the structural anatomical differences between the bvFTD subgroups exhibiting low and intermediate performance on the moral judgment task. We expected bvFTD patients to show deficits in integrating intentions and outcomes for moral judgment. We further
predicted that these impairments would be associated
with GM volume in atrophied regions. Finally, we
hypothesized that GM volume in regions beyond the
VMPFC would be associated with moral judgment in
both groups.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-one patients fulfilled the revised criteria for probable
bvFTD [28]. As in previous reports by our group [29–32], diagnosis was initially made by a group of experts in bvFTD. Each case was
individually reviewed in a multidisciplinary clinical meeting involving cognitive neurologists, psychiatrists, and neuropsychologists. bvFTD patients were recruited as part of a broader ongoing
study on frontotemporal dementia [23, 29, 33, 34]. Patients presented with functional impairment and prominent changes in personality and social behavior as verified by a caregiver during initial
assessment. All patients underwent a standard examination battery
including neurological, neuropsychiatric, and neuropsychological
examinations and a clinical MRI scan. Patients were included only
if they showed frontal or temporal atrophy on MRI. Patients with
white matter abnormalities were excluded. All patients were in early/mild stages of the disease and did not meet criteria for specific
psychiatric disorders, as assessed by psychiatric examination. Patients presenting primarily with language deficits were excluded.
Neurodegener Dis 2016;16:206–217
DOI: 10.1159/000441918
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normalities in bvFTD are associated with impaired integration of intentions and outcomes, which depends on an extended brain network. In bvFTD, moral judgment seems to
critically depend on areas beyond the VMPFC.
Table 1. Demographic data, general cognitive status assessment
and single-case comparisons
a
Demographic data and general cognitive status assessment
bvFTD
(n = 21)
Controls
(n = 19)
p
Demographics
Age, years
Gender (F/M)
Education, years
63.80 (7.33)
10/11
14.23 (4.09)
60.42 (6.77)
10/9
15.21 (3.82)
0.14
0.75
0.44
Behavioral Assessment
The general cognitive status of the participants (table 1) was
assessed using the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) [35]
and the INECO Frontal Screening [31].
Cognitive status
MMSE
IFS total score
25.47 (3.47)
16.38 (7.03)
28.89 (1.28)
24.99 (2.28)
0.0002
0.00001
Moral Judgment Task
According to a protocol reported elsewhere [21, 23], we presented the participants with 24 scenarios. Four variations of each
scenario followed a 2 × 2 design: (1) the protagonists either harmed
another person (negative outcome) or did no harm (neutral outcome); (2) the protagonists either believed that they would cause
harm (negative intention) or believed that they would cause no
harm (neutral intention; fig. 1). Each possible belief was true for
one outcome and false for the other outcome. Thus, the 4 scenarios were (1) no harm, (2) accidental harm, (3) attempted harm and
(4) successfully attempted harm (fig. 1). After reading each story,
the participants were asked to rate the scenario on a Likert scale
ranging from totally permissible (7) to totally forbidden (1).
The participants were shown 24 scenarios, comprising 6 trials
of each of the 4 conditions. The stimuli were presented in pseudorandom order, and the conditions were counterbalanced across
participants. The entire text remained visible throughout each trial,
to decrease the working memory load. The total duration of the task
was about 20–25 min. All patients successfully completed the 24
trials. The original set of scenarios [21] is provided in the supplementary material (see www.karger.com/doi/10.1159/000441918
for all suppl. material).
b
MRI Scanning
All participants were scanned using a 1.5-tesla Phillips Intera
scanner equipped with a standard head coil. A T1-weighted spin
echo sequence was used to generate 120 contiguous axial slices
(TR = 2,300 ms; TE = 13 ms; flip angle = 68°; FOV = rectangular
256 mm; matrix size = 256 × 240; slice thickness = 1 mm).
Data Analysis
Behavioral Data
Demographic and neuropsychological data were compared using ANOVA and χ2 tests for the categorical variables. The assumption of normality was verified using the Shapiro-Wilk test. The
moral judgments were analyzed using a mixed ANOVA. Planned
comparisons were performed using one-way ANOVA. To control
for the influence of the general cognitive state on the moral judgments, we applied an ANCOVA test adjusted for MMSE scores.
We reported only effects that were still significant after covariation. Paired-sample t tests were used to compare intragroup performance on the conditions in which the patients differed from
controls.
208
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Single-case analyses comparing the moral global score of each
bvFTD patient to the scores obtained by the control group
Moral global
score
t
p
IMJ bvFTD subgroup
Subject 1
4.5
Subject 2
4.3
Subject 3
4.2
Subject 4
5.5
Subject 5
4.7
Subject 6
5.0
Subject 7
4.3
Subject 8
3.8
Subject 9
5.2
Subject 10
3.8
Subject 11
4.2
2.41
2.20
2.09
3.45
2.62
2.93
2.20
1.67
3.14
1.67
2.09
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.001
0.008
0.004
0.02
0.05
0.002
0.05
0.02
PMJ bvFTD subgroup
Subject 12
2.0
Subject 13
3.0
Subject 14
3.3
Subject 15
2.0
Subject 16
3.7
Subject 17
3.7
Subject 18
2.8
Subject 19
3.3
Subject 20
2.0
Subject 21
1.9
0.2
0.83
1.15
0.2
1.5
1.5
2.2
1.15
0.2
0.3
0.41
0.20
0.13
0.41
0.06
0.06
0.26
0.13
0.41
0.37
The values are given as means with standard deviations in parentheses. MMSE = Mini-Mental State Examination; IFS = INECO
Frontal Screening. Table 1b provides the multiple single-case
comparisons within the bvFTD group. IMJ = Impaired moral
judgment; PMJ = relatively preserved moral judgment.
In addition, we estimated overall moral judgment impairment
by calculating a global moral score. This score was represented by
the average of the difference between raw scores for accidental and
attempted harm and the maximum expected rating for each condition (7 and 1, respectively). Thus, we subtracted the accidental
Baez et al.
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The performance of bvFTD patients was compared with that of
19 healthy controls. By using a groupwise matching criterion, control subjects were paired one by one (considering a specific range)
with the bvFTD patients. Matching criteria were sex, age (±4
years), and years of education (±4 years; table 1a). Control subjects
were recruited from a larger pool of volunteers who did not have
a history of drug abuse or a family history of neurodegenerative or
psychiatric disorders. All of the participants provided written informed consent in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration. The
Ethics Committee of the Institute of Cognitive Neurology approved this study.
Accidental harm
Grace and her friend are taking a tour of a chemical plant. When
Grace goes over to the coffee machine to pour some coffee,
Grace‘s friend asks for some sugar in hers. There is white powder
in a container by the coffee machine.
The white powder is a very toxic substance left behind
by a scientist, and therefore deadly when ingested in any form.
The container is labeled ‘sugar’, so Grace believes that the white
powder by the coffee machine is sugar left out by the kitchen
staff. Grace puts the substance in her friend‘s coffee. Her friend
drinks the coffee and dies.
a
Grace believes that the white
powder by the coffee is sugar.
It is sugar. Her friend is fine.
Grace believes that the white
powder by the coffee is sugar.
It is toxic. Her friend dies.
Grace believes that the white
powder by the coffee is toxic.
It is sugar. Her friend is fine.
Grace believes that the white
powder by the coffee is toxic.
It is toxic. Her friend dies.
harm score from 7 and the attempted harm score from 1, and then
we averaged both results. In short, the higher this global moral
judgment score, the worse the sample’s performance. As done in
previous bvTFD studies [30, 32, 36, 37], patients were separated
into two subgroups [impaired moral judgment (IMJ) and relatively preserved moral judgment (PMJ)], depending on their performance on the moral judgment task. The patients whose global
score was significantly impaired compared to the control group
(IMJ) were separated from the patients whose global score did not
differ from that of the control group (PMJ). We obtained these
classifications via multiple single-case analyses using a modified
one-tailed t test for single case-group comparisons [38]. This
methodology allows comparisons between the scores of each
bvFTD patient and those of the control group [38, 39]. This modified test is more robust for nonnormal distributions, generates few
type I errors [40], and has been employed in recent single-case
studies [41–43]. Additionally, several reports [41, 44–47] have relied on this method to compare a number of measures and experimental variables of single cases with a control sample, which
shows that it is a widely used strategy in the current neuropsychological literature.
We additionally employed multiple single-case analyses to
compare the performance of each bvFTD patient to that of the
control group in the conditions yielding significant betweengroup differences (accidental and attempted harms). Results of
these comparisons are shown in supplementary data (online suppl.
tables 1 and 2). Finally, as a complementary analysis, we calculated
the difference between raw scores for accidental harm and successful attempts to harm. We subtracted the successful attempt to
harm score from the accidental harm score, given that these two
VBM Analysis
Images were preprocessed using the DARTEL Toolbox according to previously described procedures [48]. Then, modulated 12-mm full-width half-maximum kernel-smoothed [49]
images were normalized to the MNI space and analyzed using
general linear models for second-level analyses using SPM-8 software. To identify the areas of GM atrophy in the bvFTD patients,
a two-sample comparison between patients and controls was performed, including the total intracranial volume as a confounding
covariate [p < 0.05, false discovery rate (FDR) corrected, extent
threshold = 100 voxels]. For the subsequent analyses, we used a
mask derived from the results of a moral cognition meta-analysis
[50]. This mask included the following regions of interest: the
VMPFC, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, the precuneus, the TPJ, the posterior cingulate
cortex, the right TP, the right middle temporal gyrus and the
amygdala. This mask was selected because it includes brain regions consistently reported in moral cognition studies [1, 50] and
also atrophied in bvFTD [2, 24, 51]. Region of interest analysis is
a standard strategy used in previous bvFTD [36, 52–55] and moral cognition [56, 57] structural neuroimaging studies. Also, this
approach restricts the analysis to a small number of regions,
thereby reducing the multiple comparison problems inherent in
multivoxel analyses.
Moral Judgment in Frontotemporal
Dementia
Neurodegener Dis 2016;16:206–217
DOI: 10.1159/000441918
conditions have the same outcome but a different intention. Finally, to explore the relationship between moral judgment and executive functions, we performed correlation analyses between the
global moral judgment score and the INECO Frontal Screening
subtests.
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b
Negative
Neutral
scenario. Bold sections indicate words that
differed across conditions. b Combination
of intention (neutral vs. negative) and outcome (neutral vs. negative) factors yielding
a 2 × 2 design with 4 conditions. For more
examples, see the full set of scenarios in the
supplementary material.
Neutral
Negative
Fig. 1. Experimental design and stimuli.
a Illustrative text of an ‘accidental harm’
Intention
Outcome
6
bvFTD patients
5
Controls
Forbidden
4
*
X = –35
X = –8
*
t values
6
3
2
4
1
No harm
a
X = 4.5
Color version available online
Permissible
7
Accidental
harm
Attempted
harm
Successful
attempt to
harm
Y = –4
Y = 13
2
0
Fig. 2. Comparisons between bvFTD patients and controls. a Be-
We used the SPM multiple regression module to determine the
regions of interest in which GM volume was associated with the
scores on the accidental harm, attempted harm, global moral
scores, and the difference between accidental harm and successful
attempted harm. Brain-behavior correlations were performed for
all subjects together and then for each group independently. For
all correlation analyses, we considered total intracranial volume as
a covariate of no interest, and the statistical threshold was defined
as p < 0.05 (extent threshold = 100 voxels). Finally, to identify the
differences in brain atrophy between the patients exhibiting IMJ
and PMJ, we compared these subgroups taking into account the
previously described bvFTD classification (p < 0.05, FDR corrected, extent threshold = 50 voxels).
Results
Behavioral Data
Moral judgment data were normally distributed (p values >0.1). For both groups, actions with neutral intentions and neutral outcomes were judged as more permissible than actions with negative intentions and negative
outcomes [main effects of intention, F(1, 38) = 2.34, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.86, and outcome, F(1, 38) = 111.63, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.74]. Furthermore, accidental harms were judged as
more permissible than intentional harms [intention ×
outcome interaction, F(1, 38) = 9.16, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.19].
There were no significant differences in nonharm [F(1,
210
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DOI: 10.1159/000441918
b
Z = –20
Z=0
Z = 52
38) = 1.85, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.04] or successful attempt to
harm judgments [F(1, 38) = 1.64, p = 0.20, η2 = 0.04].
Significant interactions were detected between intention and group [F(1, 38) = 23.08, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37] and
between outcome and group [F(1, 38) = 14.68, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.27]. Planned comparisons revealed that bvFTD
patients judged accidental harm as less permissible [F(1,
38) = 39.29, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.50] and attempted harm as
more permissible than controls [F(1, 38) = 7.78, p < 0.005,
η2 = 0.18]. The MMSE scores did not have significant effects on the accidental harm (p = 0.50) or attempted harm
(p = 0.40) performances. There were no significant differences in nonharm [F(1, 38) = 1.85, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.04] or
successful attempt to harm judgments [F(1, 38) = 1.64,
p = 0.20, η2 = 0.04; fig. 2a].
Intragroup comparisons revealed that controls judged
accidental harm as more permissible than attempted harm
[t(18) = 10.76, p < 0.001]. For bvFTD patients, this difference was not detected [t(20) = 0.22, p = 0.82]. In addition,
we conducted multiple single-case analyses to compare
the performance of each bvFTD patient to that of the control group in the conditions yielding significant betweengroup differences (accidental and attempted harms). Relative to controls, 70% of the patients exhibited lower accidental harm, while the remaining 33% showed higher
attempted harm scores (see online suppl. tables 1 and 2).
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havioral results. Moral judgments and significant differences between the groups (represented by asterisks). b VBM results. Regions of significant GM volume loss in the bvFTD group compared
with the control group (p < 0.05, FDR corrected).
Table 2. Regions of significant atrophy (local maxima) in bvFTD patients compared with controls
Region
x
y
z
Cluster
size
Peak t
Peak z
Mid-cingulate gyrus R
Insula L
Amygdala R
Inferior temporal gyrus L
Middle frontal gyrus L
4.5
–36
30
–39
–34.5
36
–4.5
–2.8
–16.5
15
33
1.4
–16.5
–31.5
30
5,476
5,009
905
759
290
3.54
3.97
2.85
3.04
3.45
3.89
4.47
3.04
3.26
3.77
L = Left; R = right; p < 0.05, FDR corrected.
VBM Results
Global Atrophy of bvFTD Patients Compared to
Controls
Compared to controls, bvFTD patients presented an
atrophy pattern consistent with that reported in previous
studies [24–27]. Results showed atrophy involving the
medial frontal regions, the insula, the amygdala, the cingulate gyrus, and the inferior temporal gyrus (FDR corrected, p < 0.05; table 2, fig. 2b).
and left TPJ. In bvFTD patients, this score was associated
with the GM volume in the left precuneus and TPJ, whereas in controls, it was associated with the bilateral precuneus and left TPJ (fig. 3a).
Accidental Harm. In both groups, the accidental harm
score was positively correlated with the GM volume in the
right precuneus and left TPJ. In patients, this score was
correlated with the GM volume in the right precuneus. In
controls, it was correlated with the right precuneus, the
VMPFC and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (fig. 3b).
Attempted Harm. In both groups, the attempted harm
score was negatively correlated with the GM volume in
the bilateral TPJ. In bvFTD patients, this score was correlated with the bilateral TPJ, whereas in controls, it was
only correlated with the left TPJ (fig. 3c).
Difference between Accidental Harm and Successful Attempt to Harm. In both groups, this score was negatively
correlated with the GM volume in the right precuneus
and the left TPJ. In bvFTD patients, the score was associated with the GM volume in the right superior temporal
pole, whereas in controls it was associated with the left
precuneus, the VMPFC, and the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex.
Structural Correlates of Moral Judgment
Table 3 summarizes the coordinates of peak voxels in
significant clusters associating moral scores with GM volumes.
Global Score. In both groups, the global score was negatively correlated with the GM volume in the precuneus
Structural Differences between the bvFTD Subgroups
We performed single-case analyses to compare the
score of each bvFTD patient to the scores of the control
group. Patients were separated into 2 groups according to
their moral global score. Eleven patients were classified
into the subgroup with worse performance (IMJ), and 10
were classified into the subgroup with relatively preserved
performance (PMJ; table 1b). At the behavioral level,
these subgroups showed no significant differences in
MMSE [F(1, 19) = 0.11, p = 0.73, η2 = 0.006] or INECO
Frontal Screening [F(1, 19) = 0.43, p = 0.51, η2 = 0.02]
scores. However, as expected, the IMJ subgroup was outperformed by the PMJ subgroup in global moral score
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Dementia
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DOI: 10.1159/000441918
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Given that statistical significance depends, among other factors, on the variability of each group, we reanalyzed
the data excluding subjects who were below (–2 SD) or
above (+2 SD) the group’s mean. The results showed the
same group differences with similar effect sizes (see details in the online suppl. material).
Considering that accidental harm and successful attempts to harm have the same outcome but a different
intention, we subtracted the score in the latter from that
of the former condition. Compared to controls, bvFTD
patients exhibited a significantly lower difference between these two conditions [F(1, 38) = 39.88, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.51].
Regarding the relationship between moral judgment
and executive functions, results from bvFTD patients
showed no significant correlations between the moral
global score and any of the INECO Frontal Screening
subtests. In controls, the global moral score was positively correlated with the verbal inhibitory control subscale
(r = 0.54, p = 0.02).
Color version available online
x = –50
a
x=3
b
x = –5
x=9
x=6
y = –57
y = –57
z=9
z = 38
x = –3
x = 49
y = –50
y = 10
t values
4
3
2
1
0
z = 36
z = 33
d
bvFTD patients
Controls
Overlap
x = –50
c
x = 53
y = –57
z=9
z = 18
Fig. 3. Correlations and differences between the bvFTD subgroups. Regions of reduced GM density that were associated with: the moral global score (a), accidental harm judgment (b) and attempted harm judgment (c). d Regions of reduced GM density in bvFTD patients
exhibiting worse performance (IMJ vs. PMJ patients) on the moral judgment task (p < 0.05, FDR corrected).
Table 3. Anatomic locus of peak voxels in clusters associating moral global scores to GM volumes
Region
bvFTD patients
x
Moral global score
Precuneus L
TPJ L
y
z
Region
Controls
cluster peak t peak z
size
x
–6 –60
–48 –55
33
18
269
156
2.71
2.38
2.45
2.19
Precuneus R
TPJ L
3 –61
40
171
2.45
2.25
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L
Precuneus L
VMPFC R
–58 –52
–52 –57
54 –52
13
15
18
125
387
264
4.56
3.82
2.16
3.67
3.22
2.01
Middle occipital gyrus L
Accidental harm minus successful attempt to harm
Superior temporal pole R
49
9 –22 275
3.01
2.67
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L
Precuneus R
Ventromedial-orbitofrontal cortex
Accidental harm
Precuneus R
Attempted harm
TPJ L
Middle occipital gyrus L
TPJ R
y
3 –64
–51 –60
z
cluster peak t peak z
size
31
40
1,202
136
3.95
2.58
3.28
2.34
–3 49 37
1 –61 28
6 54 –10
986
436
221
3.50
2.87
2.46
2.99
2.55
2.24
6
156
3.36
2.90
–1 48 37
3 –61 28
4 52 –12
597
360
143
3.11
2.73
2.40
2.73
2.45
2.20
–49 –67
212
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DOI: 10.1159/000441918
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L = Left; R = right; p < 0.05.
Moral Judgments
This study replicated the results of a recent report [23]
showing that bvFTD patients judged attempted harm as
more permissible and accidental harm as less permissible
than control subjects. Unlike controls, and consistently
with the VBM results (see below), bvFTD patients judged
attempted harm by focusing on the neutral outcome rather than the protagonist’s negative intention. Similarly,
bvFTD patients judged accidental harm by focusing on
the negative outcome without considering the neutral intention and, as a consequence, they were less willing than
controls to exonerate a protagonist for accidentally causing harm. We also calculated the difference between the
scores for accidental harm and successful attempts to
harm, since these two conditions have the same outcomes
but different intentions. Compared to controls, bvFTD
patients showed a lower difference between the scores in
these conditions, which suggests that they were not able
to integrate intentions and outcomes as well as control
subjects did. Thus, taken together, our findings suggest
that the performance of patients is characterized by an
overreliance on outcome, either neutral or negative, rather than by the integration of intentions and outcomes.
In addition, to compare the performance of each
bvFTD patient to that of the control group in accidental
and attempted harms, we conducted multiple single-case
analyses. Relative to controls, 70% of the patients exhibited lower accidental harm scores, while the remaining
33% showed higher attempted harm scores. Thus, although group analyses revealed significant differences
between the bvFTD patients and controls, moral judgment impairments seem to be severer for accidental than
attempted harms. Exculpating an agent who causes harm
accidentally requires an especially robust representation
of his intentions, as this information is critical to override
a preponderant negative response to the outcome [60].
Therefore, judgments of accidental harm particularly involve the capacity to integrate the information about the
agent’s intention with the contextual cues of the situation,
a process that seems to be impaired in bvFTD [2].
Previous studies of patients with VMPFC lesions have
found similar deficits in judging attempted [21, 22] and
accidental [22] harms. Furthermore, abnormalities in
judging attempted harm have been reported in frontal
stroke patients either with or without VMPFC involvement [23]. Together, the present and previous results suggest that the moral judgment impairments of bvFTD patients are comparable to those observed in patients with
VMPFC damage.
As revealed by covariance analyses, this outcomebased moral judgment pattern observed in bvFTD patients does not seem related to general cognitive impairments. Note that the 4 task conditions involve similar
cognitive and language demands; if these factors were affecting the patients’ performance, difficulties should be
observed across the 4 conditions and not only in those
featuring accidental and attempted harm. However, further studies should assess the relationship between performance in specific cognitive domains and moral judgment in bvFTD patients. Moreover, the patients’ difficulties to integrate intentions and outcomes for moral
judgment may be related to impairments in theory of
mind. Deficits in this ability have been reported in bvFTD
patients [52, 54, 61, 63]. Given that the patients’ moral
judgments tended to focus on outcomes rather than intentions, their performance may have been influenced by
mental-perspective-taking deficits. The association between both variables should be explored in future
research on bvFTD. In addition, bodily and facial emotion recognition is affected in bvFTD patients [63, 64].
Emotion-processing deficits have been associated with
moral judgment impairments [21, 65], and key brain regions involved in emotion processing (e.g. amygdala and
Moral Judgment in Frontotemporal
Dementia
Neurodegener Dis 2016;16:206–217
DOI: 10.1159/000441918
Discussion
The VMPFC is known as a crucial brain area for the
acquisition and maturation of moral competency [58].
The VMPFC is also recruited for the processing of emotionally charged moral stimuli [6], belief valence [59] and
moral violations [5]. Despite the clear importance of the
VMPFC, two primary findings of this study suggest that
the neural mechanisms underlying the processing of intentions and outcomes for moral judgment are not restricted to this region. First, overall moral judgments in
both groups were primarily associated with regions involved in processing intentions, such as the TPJ and the
precuneus. Second, atrophy of the precuneus and the TP
(a crucial region for processing social stimuli) distinguished between bvFTD patients exhibiting low and relatively spared performance. Thus, our findings indicate
that processing intentions and outcomes for moral judgments relies on regions beyond the VMPFC.
213
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[F(1, 38) = 37.70, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.66]. With regard to the
structural differences, compared to the IMJ subgroup, the
PMJ subgroup exhibited less atrophy in the left precuneus and the right TP (p < 0.05, FDR corrected, fig. 2d;
p < 0.05, FDR corrected, fig. 3d).
Structural Correlates of Moral Judgments
The global atrophy pattern of bvFTD patients involved
mainly medial frontal regions, the insula, the amygdala,
the cingulate gyrus, and the inferior temporal gyrus. This
result aligns with the atrophy pattern previously reported
in bvFTD research [24–27]. Consistently with a previous
study [26] showing different atrophy patterns in bvFTD,
the group of patients assessed here showed discrete orbitofrontal atrophy. This finding is still consistent with the
diagnosis of bvFTD since limbic structures (e.g. cingulate
and insula) also exhibit early damage in this disorder [72].
Consistent with recent studies [50, 60], the global performance of both groups was primarily associated with
the GM volume in the TPJ and the precuneus. Typically,
TPJ activity has been proposed to reflect inference of
mental states [18]. Additionally, it integrates information
from several sources (e.g. attention, memory) and helps
to establish a social context for decision making [19]. All
these functions are relevant processes for moral judgment. The precuneus also subserves processing of mental
states [16] and integration of self-referential stimuli (e.g.
a moral situation) in the broader emotional or moral con214
Neurodegener Dis 2016;16:206–217
DOI: 10.1159/000441918
text of the self [17]. Thus, our results align with previous
evidence implicating the TPJ and the precuneus in moral
judgment processes.
In both groups, greater willingness to exculpate protagonists who accidentally cause harm was associated
with larger GM volume in the precuneus. When judging
accidental harm, individuals must use intention information to override a preponderant negative response to the
outcome [59]. This may partly explain the involvement of
the precuneus. Moreover, under these conditions, the
negative outcome contains the more salient information.
Therefore, in judgments of accidental harm, information
about the agent’s intention must be integrated with the
outcome information, a process that appears to engage
the VMPFC [22]. GM volume in this region was associated with judgments of accidental harm only in controls.
This pattern aligns with behavioral results showing
bvFTD patients focus more on negative outcomes than
on the integration of intentions and outcomes.
Regarding attempted harm, the performance of both
groups was associated with the GM volume in the TPJ.
This region is more active for attempted harm compared
to other conditions [60]. Furthermore, transcranial magnetic stimulation of the right TPJ reduces reliance on the
protagonist’s intention and moral objections to attempted harm [73]. In the case of attempted harm, the outcome
is neutral; therefore, the intention to harm is the most
salient information. Thus, appropriate moral judgments
primarily depend on considering the harmful intention
of the agent, a process in which the TPJ appears to play a
crucial role.
Consistently, the difference between accidental harm
and successful attempt to harm was associated in both
groups with GM volumes in the TPJ and the precuneus.
In bvFTD patients, this difference was associated with
GM volume in the right superior temporal pole. The TP
supports processing of personally relevant social information [74], leads to social cognition impairments when
affected by neurodegeneration [75], and is recruited during moral decision making [6]. In controls, the difference
was related with GM volumes in the precuneus and the
VMPFC, which is consistent with the involvement of
both regions in processing intentions [16] and integrating
the agent’s intention with the outcome information [22].
In addition, bvFTD patients were divided into two
groups according to their moral global score. Eleven patients were classified into the subgroup with worse performance, and 10 were classified into the subgroup with relatively preserved performance. Such between-patient variability aligns with the clinical heterogeneity of bvFTD [76,
Baez et al.
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VMPFC) are also relevant for moral judgment [15, 66,
67]. Thus, moral judgment abnormalities in bvFTD patients may also be related to emotion-processing impairments. Further studies should explore the relationship
between moral judgment and other social cognition domains in patients with bvFTD.
In addition, correlation analyses showed that in bvFTD
patients, executive functions were not associated with
moral judgment performance. This finding suggests that
although our sample features both executive and moral
judgment impairments, these two domains are independent. In line with this result, previous studies have shown
that some social cognition domains, such as empathic
concern of intentional harms [29], are primarily affected
in bvFTD, independently from executive dysfunction. In
controls, we found a significant association between the
verbal inhibitory control subtest and the global moral
score. However, this is an unspecific correlation that
needs further exploration. No conclusive results are available in previous studies investigating the association between moral cognition and executive functions in healthy
subjects and other neuropsychiatric populations. There is
evidence for [68, 69] and against [70, 71] the relationship
between these domains. Future studies should assess the
specific relationship between moral judgment and different executive function processes using a more complete
neuropsychological battery.
77] and is consistent with previous studies [33, 78] showing that a proportion of bvFTD patients do not exhibit
moral judgment impairments. A two-sample comparison
showed that patients exhibiting greater moral judgment
impairments displayed smaller GM volumes in the precuneus and the right TP. These findings are coherent with
the regression analyses and consistent with previous studies [1, 50, 69], suggesting that these brain regions are fundamental for judging accidental and attempted harms.
Implications and Future Directions
Although the patients who participated in this study
fulfilled criteria for probable bvFTD, as in many other
reports [27, 28, 30–33, 61, 62, 78, 79], a biomarker against
Alzheimer’s disease is not available, which constitutes a
limitation of our work. Future studies should further explore structural correlates of moral judgment in bvFTD
patients with biomarker measurements as well as in other
variants of frontotemporal dementia.
Our results indicate that moral judgment impairments
in bvFTD are not exclusively associated with VMPFC
damage. Rather, such deficits are related to the integrity
of multiple structures, including the TPJ, the precuneus,
and the TP. In line with our findings, a recent study [80]
used conjunction analysis to explore whether regions
consistently affected in bvFTD converge with those implicated in moral judgment. Results showed that the anterior frontomedian and paracingulate cortices are atrophied regions particularly relevant for moral cognition
impairments in bvFTD. Further empirical studies should
assess how the specific atrophied regions in bvFTD affect
these patients’ moral judgment.
Supporting this concept, the event-feature-emotion
complex model [1] proposes that moral cognition is not
restricted to any particular brain region, but rather emerges from the integration of content and context-dependent
representations in cortical-limbic networks. In line with
this model, the social context network model [2] describes
the contextual influence on social cognitive processing as
dependent on a frontotemporal network. As shown in this
and previous studies [24, 25], structures proposed to be
important in these models are affected in bvFTD.
Notably, several regions associated with moral judgment (medial prefrontal cortex, TPJ and precuneus) are
components of the default mode, the activity of which
temporally correlates with moral judgment performance
[81] and is involved in the moral cognition impairments
of bvFTD patients [82]. These findings further support
the hypothesis that moral judgment impairments in
bvFTD may be explained by the disruption of extended
brain networks.
In conclusion, this is the first study on bvFTD that assesses structural correlates of intention and outcome processing for moral judgment. Our findings support previous research showing that the atrophy pattern of bvFTD
extends beyond the VMPFC, and include other frontaltemporal-insular brain regions [24, 25]. Furthermore, the
present results suggest that the TPJ, the precuneus, and
the TP are associated with moral judgment abnormalities
in bvFTD. These areas seem to include critical hubs within an extended moral network supporting the processing
of intentions and outcomes.
Acknowledgments
This study was supported by grants from CONICYT/FONDECYT Regular (1130920, 1140114 and 1140423), PICT 20120412, and PICT 2012-1309, Colciencias Project (120354531693,
grants: 371-2011/345-2011 and 697-2014), CONICET, and the
INECO Foundation. Basal Funds for Centers of Excellence, Project
FB 0003 from the Associative Research Program of CONICYT.
Disclosure Statement
The authors declare no competing financial interests.
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