DEMOCRACY AND MULTIPARTY POLITICS IN AFRICA Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho Denis Venter* Abstract: The shift from one-party to multiparty politics in many African countries has made the issue of democratisation a crucially equally important part of the development agenda. Efforts to create an economically enabling environment and build administrative and other capacities will be wasted if the political context is not favourable. This article1 focuses on political developments in Zambia to illustrate how a government elected on a ‘democratic ticket’ can become corrupted by the conscious development of a personality cult, and how the hunger for power can lead to the erosion of democratic values, electoral fraud, and the near breakdown of a relatively well-functioning multiparty system. A brief note on Zimbabwe is presented to amplify the Zambian case, and reform of the electoral system in Lesotho is outlined to suggest that the successful completion of elections on 25 May 2002 may serve as an excellent example of how, and under what conditions, ‘free and fair’, multiparty elections can be conducted in an African country. 1. INTRODUCTION As Africa is entering the new millennium, there is a profound sense of hope being frustrated, of stereotypes being reaffirmed, once again of a country (this time Zimbabwe) embarrassing the African continent. The most common perception is that of a democratic government under siege, of constitutional governance being undermined, of the rule of law being flagrantly disregarded. This situation presents itself not because of ‘biased media coverage’, ‘racial prejudice’, the ‘arrogance of Western powers’, or ‘an un-African response’ to a particular problem; rather, it is because there is no binding commitment to democratic governance and the consequences that flow from such a commitment (Slabbert 2000). The promotion of ‘democracy’ in Africa focuses primarily on political reform. Many African leaders fear such a situation: as they are being pushed by internal societal pressures, some resist energetically, others stall, and still others play charades with both internal and external critics (Callaghy 1991, 59). The emphasis on ‘governance’ is designed to address the corrupt, capricious and arbitrary practices which seem to afflict Africa’s politicians and bureaucrats (Arnold 1991, 17). Ultimately, better governance requires political renewal and a concerted attack on corruption. * Africa Consultancy and Research, Pretoria, South Africa. E-mail: Africore@iafrica.com 2 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) This can be done by strengthening the transparency and accountability of representative bodies (inter alia, by free elections in a multiparty system), by encouraging public debate, by nurturing press freedom and civil society organisations, and by maintaining the rule of law and an independent judiciary (Callaghy 1991, 58). However, for all their sermonising on governance, donor countries and agencies remain rather reluctant to translate their verbal sabre-rattling into any sort of action and apply the yardsticks of political conditionality: Kamuzu Banda’s Malawi, Daniel Arap Moi’s Kenya, Charles Taylor’s Liberia, and – still, in a very limited sense – Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe being among the few exceptions. Then there is the aid lobby’s argument that it is wrong to punish a country’s poor and underprivileged for the misdeeds of its government. This argument is unconvincing since there are many ways in which aid can be provided to a country in a manner that expressly demonstrates disapproval of the ruling regime (Hawkins 1990, 207). But, clearly, both bilateral and multilateral aid donors will have to walk a very dangerous tightrope between nudging African leaders towards democracy, and assuring them that politically dangerous reforms will be rewarded in the short to medium term (Herbst 1990, 957). Almost imperceptibly, the narrower concerns of governance have shifted to the more expansive notion of democracy. But without stable and reasonably developed economies and some degree of industrialisation, a literate and educated citizenry, a sophisticated communications network, and a relatively homogenous civic culture, it is difficult to see how democracy will ever truly flourish in Africa (Arnold 1991, 15-16). This is not to suggest that it is impossible for democracy to take root in African countries. Political elites will just have to work much harder at it; critically important is the political will to uphold the basic principles of democracy, as well as to create the necessary enabling environment for democracy to thrive. No longer pre-occupied with national security considerations, Western donor countries are pushing aggressively for ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ (Hutchful 1991, 55). Seemingly, a Western consensus has developed that, in Africa and elsewhere, democracy is to be the human rights issue of the 1990s (Arnold 1991, 15) – and into the 21st century. Although one might wish to argue that the decline of ideology inaugurates an era in which each nation can follow its own path to development and democracy, unfortunately this is not likely to be realised in practice. The open resort to political conditionality may well pre-empt distinctive local paths to democracy (Hutchful 1991, 55). Whatever its merits, political conditionality has proved particularly controversial and unpopular in Africa. Western efforts to dictate the form and speed of democratisation (to usurp, in other words, the role of determining local political change), while overlapping to some degree with the aspirations of democratic movements in Africa, have come into conflict with local sentiment. Therefore, the final product of these transitions, in Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 3 spite of the attempts of external forces to read their own agenda into them, may yet take distinctive national forms (Hutchful 1991, 55 & 58). Moreover, the pro-democracy changes that have taken place all over the continent will take time to consolidate and stabilise. And Africans should also not take these moves towards liberalisation and reform for granted: rather, they should seek to institutionalise change, and prevent retrogression (Nyati 1992, 7). What, then, are the prospects that these changes might lead to the consolidation or sustainability of reasonably fair and enduring multiparty democracies in at least an appreciable number of African countries? It may be necessary to use a broad definition of multiparty democracy to mean any system in which opposition parties are allowed to form and peacefully contest elections – even if, in practice, there is only one dominant party whose electoral victory can almost be taken for granted. The dismal record of democracy in Africa raises the question of whether there is anything about sub-Saharan Africa that makes it inherently difficult to sustain democracy (Clapham 1991, 1). The political argument against democracy suggests that, in what are essentially artificial African states, democracy must inevitably lead to the mobilisation of ethnic identities, which will then, in turn, split the state into its constituent ethnic communities and render impossible any form of government based on popular consent. Evidence, however, strongly indicates that multiparty democracy is much more likely to promote national unity than destroy it, whereas, conversely, those regimes which have nearly destroyed the unity (Sani Abacha’s Nigeria, Hassan al-Bashir’s Sudan, and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe) or even the existence of their states (Samuel Doe’s Liberia, and Siyad Barre’s Somalia) have all been autocratic (Clapham 1991, 1-2). Also, economic growth and sustained development are of the essence in supporting Africa’s fledgling democracies and preventing further tragic relapse into despotism and authoritarianism. Moreover, democracy has to be carefully nurtured, because democratic values (especially, political tolerance) cannot be inculcated in African societies overnight; and relatively sound economies (to provide basic human needs) seem to be essential ingredients for the ultimate success of a democratic order in Africa (Venter 1995, 184-185). Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s contention that there is ‘an African variant of democracy’ (although he is not the first African leader to make such an assertion) is quite disconcerting, especially in a context where, throughout the 1990s, there has been a disturbing phenomenon in international life: the rise of illiberal democracy, also in Africa. Beyond any doubt, the values inherent in democracy are universal: democracy is liberal because it emphasises individual liberty; it is constitutional because it rests on the rule of law. As a political system, democracy is marked not only by ‘free and fair’, multiparty elections – a rather ‘mechanistic’ conception, so prevalent in the pseudo-democracies in Africa and elsewhere, and fuelled by the fad of election monitoring and observation – but also by what might 4 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) be termed constitutional liberalism: the rule of law, a separation of powers, and protection of the basic civil liberties of freedom of speech, assembly and religion, as well as the right to property (Zakaria 1997, 22 & 26). Indeed, there is far more to a free society than multiparty elections (Hawkins 1990, 207). But, very often, the arduous task of inculcating democratic values in society is widely being neglected; and today, the two strands of liberal democracy are coming apart: democracy, seen in the context of multiparty elections and rule by the majority, is flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not (Zakaria 1997, 23). It is, perhaps, salutary to note that constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power; democracy, in its oversimplified form, is about the accumulation and use, or misuse, of power (Zakaria 1997, 30). One should be mindful of the Actonian dictum that ‘power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Therefore, democracy stripped of constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous (Zakaria 1997, 42). Clearly, as Woodrow Wilson said in a different context, the challenge is not ‘to make the world safe for democracy’, but ‘to make democracy safe for the world’. 2. ZAMBIA: DEMOCRACY DERAILED? Underlying Zambia’s post-independence politics has been the legacy of colonialism: an indigenous society without control of capital or skills, without a developed middle class, or the institutions to govern such a society. This gave centrality to the role of the post-independence state: the state was important not only for what it could do (in the form of growth and development), but also for what could be done with it – as a mechanism for ensuring upward mobility or patronage, and private access to public resources or corruption (Szeftel 2000, 208 & 209). In such circumstances, the apparatus of the state primarily became the means for an elite to acquire wealth, rather than serving as a corrective mechanism to promote social justice and economic development. Very often, the net result was social breakdown – and, frequently, the widespread abuse of human rights (Jafferji 2000, 15). This also ensured that multiparty structures, and the governing middle class that operated them, would be insecure, weak and ineffective (Szeftel 2000, 209). Politics in Zambia has always been concerned, to a significant extent, with the management of spoils (of patronage and corruption) within the political system. However, corruption, while widespread and seemingly on the increase, is not and has not been endemic. While the ‘face’ of corruption has been modified by political change, the phenomenon itself has not been significantly contained or reduced. Although concepts of honest and dishonest governance survive and figure in political debate, what political reform would seem not to have been able to do is to alter the fundamental structural determinants of corruption that have remained largely unaffected by the progress of reform (Szeftel 2000, 208). If anything, liberalisation may have increased rather than decreased the scope of corruption. Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 5 Clientilism has proved difficult to eradicate, liberalisation has weakened the regulatory capacity of the state, privatisation has afforded opportunities for the political elite to acquire public assets cheaply or fraudulently, and market forces have not measurably reduced the charging of gate-keeping rents or bribes (Szeftel 2000, 221). Despite the initial hopes of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), development policy remains, too often, contingent upon how government plans overlap with personal enrichment projects. Where foreign donor pressures for anti-corruption policies have intruded too deeply on particularistic political imperatives, government and donors have come into conflict and the government has even been prepared to forego aid rather than give way. Consequently, Zambia has had aid suspended since mid-1996 because of donor anger over alleged corruption, electoral fraud, and government suppression of the opposition (Baylies and Szeftel 1997). Indeed, Zambia regularly comes under the international spotlight: Zambia’s main international donors in the Paris Consultative Group annually discuss the country’s governance record in areas such as human rights and corruption within the ruling MMD; London-based Amnesty International focuses on the police force, providing evidence of an increase in extra-judicial shootings and torture, as well as rising political interference including the active recruitment of MMD supporters into the police force; while New York-based Human Rights Watch reports cases of torture, and gives examples of government harassment of the independent press and opposition parties. Also, the 2001 global corruption survey of the Berlin-based nongovernmental organisation, Transparency International (TI) – which ranks countries on both a bribe payers’ and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and is based on several independently conducted surveys – rates Zambia as the second most corrupt country in southern Africa, a situation that could lead to renewed donor pressure for increased transparency in government. In fact, Zambia is rated substantially lower (than in 2000) among those countries covered in southern Africa, being ranked 75th out of the 91 countries surveyed. This ranking confirms that Zambia is regarded as a place where corruption in public and business life is widespread. Clearly, post-1991 political change in Zambia has not managed to reduce the levels of factional conflict and the corruption associated with it, despite the fact that the management of these forces was one of the objectives that change was intended to achieve. The new politics managed to change the forms that corruption took, to limit its incidence in certain ways, and to make Zambians conscious of the problem. However, like water seeking its level, clientilism, factional competition and corruption flourished – if not in one way, then in another. There is, therefore, a need to develop strategies that uncouple private accumulation through corruption from access to public office through politics (Szeftel 2000, 222). 6 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) 2.1 A Dominant Ruling Party and a Fragmented Opposition2 Zambia is a constitutional republic and the latest constitution, Zambia’s third, became law in 1996, preserving for the most part a balance of power between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. The president has executive powers, must seek re-election after a five-year period, and can serve only two terms. The presidency is a powerful post in Zambia, giving the incumbent wide discretionary powers and considerable scope for patronage. For all the achievements of democratic reform in Zambia, presidential power and patronage continue to be concentrated and centralised. The 1996 constitution has also strengthened the powers of the legislature – the National Assembly, a 158-seat body – in which the ruling MMD currently holds 77 seats. Prior to September 2001, when the ruling party had a comfortable two-thirds majority in parliament, MMD parliamentarians rarely challenged the government or gave much critical scrutiny to legislation, although debate in the assembly chamber was lively and occasionally forced the government to amend controversial bills. The constitution circumscribes the power of the judiciary to pronounce legislation as unconstitutional, and also empowers the president to remove high court judges if he decides they have committed ‘gross misconduct’. Despite this, however, the spirited Zambian judiciary has been fairly successful in preserving its independence from the executive and legislature. The 1996 constitution was passed despite hostility from opposition parties, human rights groups, churches, trade unions, the independent press, lawyers’ associations, and many international bodies. The close identification of the constitution with the ruling party mirrors that between the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the constitutions of 1973 and 1991, entrenching the unfortunate Zambian tradition of politicised constitutions which lack universal consent. A faction espousing a neo-liberal economic agenda gained control of the MMD shortly before the 1991 elections, and consolidated its position once the party was in power, largely at the expense of the trade unions. Business people rushed to join the new governing party, and their influence remains strong; membership has proved highly profitable for some, and the party leadership has been generally reluctant to investigate or punish corruption, unless strongly pressured to do so by donors. Since 1992, the MMD has been engaged in the planning and implementation of economic reforms backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and various donor governments who had initially been willing to provide economic assistance because they wanted to see that democratisation in Zambia succeeds. However, owing to the weakness of the copper price – Zambia’s principal commodity, which accounts for more than 60% of exports and a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP) – severe economic decline has set in, which the MMD government is struggling to reverse. Unfortunately for the government, very little progress has been made to improve the lot of the ordinary Zambian; there is much to criticise in Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 7 present-day Zambia because the MMD regime has proven to be virtually as inept, corrupt and oppressive as the previous UNIP single-party dictatorship. Yet, the various austerity measures necessitated by the IMF reform programme have proved to be extremely unpopular with the public, a situation that is vigorously exploited by the ruling party’s opponents, notably UNIP, whose mismanagement contributed in no small way to the economic difficulties inherited by its successor. Now, more than ten years on, the MMD remains generally neo-liberal in outlook, but the ardour of its faith has cooled considerably and many Zambians now struggle to discern any clear ideology in party policy. The MMD was established in December 1990 as a loose alliance united around the aims of ousting UNIP and modernising Zambian politics. Despite the newly introduced multiparty system, until December 2001 control of government resources made the MMD almost as dominant as UNIP was before October 1991. Significantly, the elections of 1991 replicated those of 1964 to the extent that it left a small opposition confined largely to a regional enclave, and the elections of 1996 saw only three smaller parties – the National Party (NP) with five seats, and the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) and Agenda for Zambia (AZ) with two seats each – and a number of independents (10 in all) with representation in parliament, the contest having been boycotted by UNIP. As a result, the main feature of Zambian politics is, once again, jockeying for position and patronage within the ruling party – this time the MMD. Indeed, the survival of clientelism and its adhesion to the liberalisation of the economy produces clear opportunities for corruption. Moreover, clientelism and presidentialism often run counter to efforts at democratisation and decentralisation of power (Szeftel 2000, 221). Also, divisions within the MMD resulted in an array of democratic reformers being expelled from the government and ruling party between 1992 and 2001. Thus, in contrast with UNIP’s attempts to keep, by coercion if necessary, all political forces inside the ruling party, and to balance the claims of various factions, the MMD has permitted, indeed encouraged, dissidents to leave, perhaps because the economy affords them few private resources for political organisation. Contrary to the pre-1991 UNIP one-party state, government is no longer an activity undertaken in the name of the nation as a whole; rather, it is conducted for the benefit of those who support the MMD government. The regime of President Frederick Chiluba became mired in controversy, including increasingly erratic and paranoid behaviour by the ruling elite; alleged coup plots and conspiracies were regularly ‘uncovered’ in order to justify a resurgence of state repression and brutality, while the reform agenda was overtaken by electoral fraud and government suppression of the opposition. Over time, the MMD regime became more and more characterised by gross mismanagement, patronage, cronyism, nepotism, widespread corruption, factional competition and, as a consequence, increasing acrimony within the ruling party. 8 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) The local government elections of December 1998 would serve as a harbinger of what was to happen three years later. Voter turnout was poor by any standards: less than half the eligible voters had bothered to register and of these only 27% cast their vote (some put it closer to 10%). Independent observers accused the electoral commission of incompetence and the government of a selection of familiar irregularities, including bribing the electorate with food handouts, and noted isolated cases of missing ballot boxes. Nonetheless, opposition parties grudgingly accepted the results, though many called for the electoral commission to be dissolved, and foreign diplomats decided that the abuses were not of sufficient magnitude to warrant serious protest. The extremely low turnout confirmed that most Zambians had become disillusioned with the electoral process. Although the elections had shown that UNIP and the newly formed United Party for National Development (UPND) would be the main political challengers to the ruling MMD in the run-up to the 2001 presidential and legislative elections, UNIP had major leadership and internal organisational problems. This left the UPND with the best chance of successfully opposing the MMD; the party did sufficiently well in the elections, and the other opposition parties sufficiently bad, for its leader to be able to present a strong case to other opposition parties to join an alliance headed by him. The alternative for them was to continue losing members to the UPND while facing almost certain defeat at the polls. An opposition alliance would have presented a real challenge to the MMD, and this possibility caused the governing party to embark on a vicious propaganda campaign against the UPND, other opposition parties, and MMD dissidents prior to the December 2001 elections. In the absence of a unified opposition, the MMD managed to cling to power; incumbency allowed the ruling party to fully utilise the state apparatus to promote its cause. And in the run-up to elections, political opponents were increasingly harassed, while fraud in the voter registration process and rigging at the polls became all the more likely. Neither the UPND, nor UNIP shows any sign of diverging significantly from the ruling MMD’s economic reformist policies, including privatisation – although the latter seems to have been put temporarily on hold. However, UNIP seems confused about how it should attempt to regain power, and none of its senior figures has a significant public profile. A lack of genuine leadership in the party has caused divisions at all levels of party structures – a process that has destroyed what political and moral authority, prestige and organisational capacity UNIP still had left. Its chances of regaining power at any time soon seem remote indeed; the party remains badly divided and has proved unable to present a coherent alternative to the MMD’s economic policy, beyond a vague denunciation of IMF structural adjustment programmes, and an adherence to ‘economic nationalism’, a ‘mixed economy’ and ‘social democracy’. Moreover, Zambians remain harsh in their assessment of the UNIP years in government, and the party leadership Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 9 will struggle to convince them that things would be different if UNIP were given another chance in office. Also, the party seems to have lost interest in joining any opposition coalition, following its relatively healthy performance in the 1998 local government elections and 2001 general elections. The primary asset of UNIP’s new leader appears to be his family name, but party officials insist that Tilyenji Kaunda (heir to the Kaunda dynasty) has the talent required to revive UNIP. But speculation is that expresident Kenneth Kaunda will now be able to continue, even more than before, to exert his influence from behind the scenes. Conversely, the UPND has an extremely capable and relatively well-known leader in Anderson Mazoka, the former managing director of Zambian operations for Anglo American Corporation (AAC). Frustrated in his attempts to ascend the MMD hierarchy, which some attribute to his being Tonga rather than Bemba, Mazoka was for a time courted by other opposition parties before forming his own. Since its establishment in December 1998, the UPND has managed significant electoral gains, has consolidated its position in the Western, North-Western and Southern provinces, and is now the official opposition in parliament after the 2001 legislative elections. But the UPND’s main failing is its inability to negotiate an alliance with other opposition parties, which many ascribe in part to Mazoka’s autocratic leadership style. 2.2 Chiluba’s Third-Term Bid: A Boost to Further Political Fragmentation As early as January 1998, President Chiluba appealed to members of the ruling MMD not to contemplate re-electing him for a third presidential term. He was purported to have said: “When my term of office [as president] comes to an end, do not even think of retaining me, because umuntu nga akota namano yala chepa” – Bemba for ‘when a person gets old, he runs out of ideas’ (Sunday Mail 1998). However, a saying that does the rounds in Zambia is that ‘politics refers to the art of governing by deception’; Chiluba would eventually push Zambia to the brink in a bid to have him installed as head of state for a third term, “[destabilising] the fragile democratic system in a country already facing a near-overwhelming range of adversities” (Banda and Saidoo 2001, 20). So now, at the beginning of what South African President Thabo Mbeki has labelled the ‘African century’, there are worrying signs that those who replaced dictators are themselves reluctant to relinquish power. Chiluba may have felt justified after watching Namibian President Sam Nujoma and his ruling South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) change that country’s constitution to allow the president to successfully seek a third term in 1999 – Nujoma has only recently announced that he will desist from seeking a fourth term. In Malawi, aides to President Bakili Muluzi have been campaigning publicly to change the constitution to allow him to stay in office beyond his second term ending in 2004 – a move recently blocked by 10 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) the Malawian parliament, perhaps only temporarily; and in Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe, who has been at the helm for 21 years, stood for re-election in March 2002 and won what has been described as, ‘a stolen election’. These manoeuvrings have been seen by many observers as signs of a reversal of the democratic revolution, or the so-called ‘second liberation’, that spread across Africa in the 1990s. When in September 1999, elements within the MMD started clamouring for Chiluba to stand for a third term, it appeared that the way might be paved for a constitutional amendment, despite the fact that – because of the controversy surrounding the constitution and the way it prevented former president Kenneth Kaunda from contesting the 1996 presidential election – any such attempt would attract widespread condemnation. But, for some time, Chiluba preferred to keep people guessing about his intentions to seek a third term, in order to prevent an open power struggle and damaging leadership contest that had the potential to destroy the fractious ruling MMD. However, pressure grew for Chiluba to clarify his position, not least from South Africa’s President Mbeki, who had made it clear that he wanted the Zambian president to abide by his country’s 1996 constitution, which stipulates that no president may serve more than two terms. Mbeki issued a veiled warning, saying that if he respected the constitution, Chiluba would send out a positive message to the southern African region, whereas moves to change the constitution would clearly send out a negative signal. Though donor countries and organisations remained generally quiet on the thirdterm issue, statements that had been made argued that the debate around the third term was ‘a sign of the deepening of Zambia’s democracy’. But Chiluba was all along thought to have worked out a strategy to retain power. In 2000, he appointed new district administrators who clearly owed their loyalty to him. Soon thereafter, ‘party cadres’ and district administrators started a campaign urging him to stand again; and magnanimously, Chiluba responded by saying he would bow to ‘the wish of the people’. Simultaneously, he barred senior party members from campaigning for positions in the executive committee. Opposition (also from within the MMD) was brutally suppressed; rallies were broken up by the police and by Chiluba sycophants, and people who spoke against the president were censured. Militia, known as MMD Youth, jostled with or assaulted several prominent anti-third term ruling party members, including cabinet ministers; and Paul Tembo, former deputy secretary-general of the MMD, became the victim of assassination after joining the opposition. However, the campaign from within the MMD to amend the constitution to allow Chiluba to stand for a third presidential term galvanised Zambia’s lethargic civil society organisations into action. In the Zambia of 1991, civil society organisations, and particularly the churches and trade unions, played an important role in enabling Chiluba to come to power by ensuring that the outgoing president, Kenneth Kaunda, and the then ruling UNIP, caved in and allowed political liberalisation and a mainly ‘free and fair’ election. Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 11 Now, a coalition of influential civic organisations, including the Law Association of Zambia, the Zambia Episcopal Conference, the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), and the Non-Governmental Organisations’ Co-ordinating Committee (NGOCC), argued that since the 1970s there have been repeated calls from the Zambian public, made to three constitutional review commissions, to limit the presidential tenure and that, therefore, a third term would be a violation of ‘the will of the people’ – a viewpoint supported by many ordinary Zambians. But the political scenario that played itself out in Chiluba’s third-term bid was ample proof that the lure of political office, in Africa and elsewhere, was far more intoxicating than the principle of ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’. Although the constitution of Zambia prevented Chiluba from contesting the presidency again and, despite considerable and growing opposition both within and outside the governing MMD, the party voted at the end of April 2001 to nominate him for a third term. Meanwhile, there were clear signs that the MMD was becoming increasingly and violently divided on the third-term issue. Emboldened by civil society support, 50 MMD members of parliament (MPs) – including 7 cabinet ministers and 13 deputy ministers – joined opposition MPs in signing a petition against a third term for Chiluba. Numbering around 80, there were enough opponents to the thirdterm bid to block a constitutional amendment, which required a two-thirds majority in parliament (up to that point, the MMD held 131 of the 158 seats in the legislature, well over two-thirds). However, the anti-third term lobby now became subjected to constant harassment and intimidation – even violent attack. An extraordinary April 2001 party congress of some 1400 delegates, drawn mainly from rural constituencies supportive of Chiluba, was characterised by the illegal disbarment of party delegates thought to be Chiluba opponents. As a consequence, a number of cabinet dissenters and over 300 delegates felt compelled to stay away from that crucial party meeting. Chiluba took personal charge of deciding who should contest for what party post. The result was that nominees for nearly every influential position were elected unopposed, assuring Chiluba of a wholly compliant party executive; and, consequently, despite strong internal opposition, particularly from some cabinet ministers and non-Bemba party members, the MMD congress endorsed the call for constitutional change allowing him to stand for a third five-year term. Meanwhile, the MMD has been rocked by revelations of high-level corruption. There have been allegations that top government and party officials plundered or helped in looting state resources, further denting the party’s image and re-election prospects. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) started investigating allegations that three ministers, including the then finance minister Katele Kalumba, had diverted US $700,000 from road repairs to finance the MMD’s extraordinary Kabwe congress; and the auditor-general reported that the MMD bought campaign materials with 12 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) defence ministry funds. Substantial kick-backs were allegedly taken by officials during the sale of the government’s Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) holdings, directly implicating Chiluba. At the same time, a large number of ‘thick brown envelopes’ – the local euphemism for bribes – have been making their way to various parts of the country and into the hands of wavering anti-third term politicians. With public sentiment overwhelmingly against him, the anti-third term campaign gained momentum with support from unexpected quarters: the military and the security services seemed content to sit on the sidelines, confident that parliamentary processes would be sufficient to force Chiluba out. The death sentence imposed on nearly 60 soldiers accused of involvement in an October 1997 coup attempt may well lead to growing discontent within the military. But the harsh punishment meted out to the putschists will send a strong signal to those considering an unconstitutional eviction of any democratically elected government. By early May 2001, coming in the wake of unprecedented international and domestic pressure, Chiluba had to abandon his divisive (and unconstitutional) third-term bid: a move that had split the MMD and alarmed Western creditors and donors. The Zambian president’s dramatic about-turn came just four days after the special party congress. Chiluba acted by expelling Vice-President Christon Tembo and 21 senior party members for allegedly ‘bringing the party into disrepute’, while two MMD dissenters retaliated by filing a motion backed by more than a third of the House of Assembly calling for Chiluba’s impeachment on several counts of gross misconduct, resulting from moves to extend his presidency, and his creating conditions which endangered the lives of the vice-president, government ministers, and senior party officials at the special congress. It seems that Chiluba decided to back down on the third-term issue because he was unable to garner a two-thirds majority in parliament in order to push through a constitutional amendment. For quite some time he had faced a cabinet revolt on the issue: he had been criticised by Vice-President Tembo, MMD Vice-Chairman Godfrey Miyanda, several other cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, and many ordinary MMD MPs. But Chiluba unceremoniously sacked Tembo and, in a major cabinet reshuffle (enabling him to surround himself with loyalists who would not oppose his political ambitions), dropped seven other dissenters. Subsequently they were all, along with several MPs, expelled from the MMD for opposing his thirdterm bid. Chiluba also declared that he would stay on as party president and would focus on party matters once he had stepped down at the forthcoming elections. However, party sycophants continued to prevail on him to serve another term, ‘in the national interest’ and in order ‘to preserve party unity’. By retaining the post of president of the ruling MMD at the special party congress, Chiluba engineered a determining role in the selection of who the MMD presidential candidate would be: trying to play the role not only of the ‘king-maker’, but also that of éminence grise – the real power behind Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 13 the throne. For more than a year, many potential candidates had been expelled, had resigned from, or had been hounded out of the party. By ridding the MMD of a number of high-profile contenders, he now had the authority to impose his choice of candidate on the party. He seemed not to care whether this could lead to further – and, potentially, significant – splits in the MMD, substantially weakening the party, and making it electorally vulnerable. Chiluba’s handpicked successor was sure to alienate important sections of the party, leading to further infighting and defections in the runup to elections – internal wrangling which would benefit the equally divided opposition parties. In fact, Chiluba’s last cabinet was one of the most inexperienced ever assembled; and it indicated the damaging impact high-level defections from the MMD had on the party and its capacity to govern effectively. Clearly, Chiluba’s presidentialism was corrosive and ran counter to all efforts at democratisation in Zambia. But, tragically, “[Zambia’s] constitution lends itself to personalisation by vesting too much power in one man … [many] national leaders and political actors in Zambia are not concerned about the full extent of the erosion of democracy since 1964 … They are not concerned about the constitutional cancer arising … [from] the removal of the referendum clause in the 1964 independence constitution. Their all-binding concern is with getting individuals or themselves … to the state presidency and … [parliament], without changing the system” (Mbikusita-Lewanika, quoted in K. Chirambo and M. Muleya 2001, 7). From quite early on, the most overt in his campaigning for the presidency has been the former environment minister and MMD founder member, Ben Mwila, who went so far as to criticise the political leadership and economic management of the Chiluba regime while still in government, describing Zambia’s economy as in ‘intensive care’ and saying that the government was guilty of ‘autocracy and arbitrariness’. His subsequent expulsion from the MMD for ‘gross indiscipline and contravening party regulations’ sent a clear message that those indicating their presidential ambitions too early risk the premature destruction of their political careers. Launching the Republican Party (RP) in August 2000, Mwila said it was time for Zambians to break away from ‘the current system of bigotry, persecution, fear and mass hopelessness’ brought about by the MMD regime. Concerted and determined action had to be taken to end ‘widespread poverty, corruption, mediocrity, drug trafficking and mismanagement of national affairs’. In February 2001, Mwila merged the RP with the Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP) to form the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP), creating an opposition party that enhanced the electoral prospects for both constituents – although it managed only a single seat in the 2001 legislative elections. The political situation became particularly fluid when, later in 2001, MMD dissidents decided to form several new parties. The last casualty in the long list of MMD presidential aspirants was Michael Sata, national secretary of the MMD and minister without portfolio – ironically, Chiluba’s 14 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) ‘hit man’ in the elimination of other ‘contenders to the throne’. Sata protested the nomination of Levy Mwanawasa as MMD presidential candidate saying the process was ‘illegal’ and ‘fraudulent’ and that the vote in the National Executive Committee (NEC) was ‘rigged’ through ‘sham elections’, subsequently forming his own party, the Patriotic Front (PF). Previously, Chiluba’s botched third-term bid had already given rise to two other splinter parties, Tembo’s Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) and Miyanda’s Heritage Party (HP). The most promising of the new parties formed by former MMD cabinet ministers, the FDD, performed well in a couple of parliamentary by-elections. Although these FDD victories were a major boost for the fledgling party, they were partly made possible by being able to concentrate its limited resources on a few constituencies. On a national level, the FDD’s resources would be stretched to match those of the MMD, the UPND, and UNIP in the legislative and presidential election campaigns. This political fragmentation was amplified by the inability of opposition politicians to come together and fashion a working electoral relationship. And, in a rather confused and confusing political scene, almost incomprehensibly of Chiluba and the MMD’s own making, both seemed to be on a mission to self-destruct. For years, Zambia’s problems were compounded by the extreme sensitivity to criticism and intolerant responses on the part of the MMD regime, which (for the most part of Chiluba’s second term) had an overwhelming parliamentary majority – a typical consequence of the dominant-party syndrome. The government’s authoritarian behaviour can also be ascribed to a lack of confidence in the face of the sheer magnitude of its problems, or feelings of insecurity resulting from the criticisms meted out by opposition parties, the press and organised labour – all of which had the capacity to ‘destabilise’ the country – and the knowledge that only a minority of eligible voters supported the president and ruling party in the last two general elections. 2.3 The December 2001 Elections: Political Pluralism Embedded? In preparation for legislative and presidential elections, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) announced that only 2,5mn out of a potential 4,6mn Zambians eligible to vote were registered to participate in the December 2001 polls. Registration of voters began on 26 June 2001 and ended a month later, after two extensions to the originally envisaged 21-day period. The ECZ claimed that registration had been more heavily advertised than ever before, but there had been general disappointment with the low level of registration, which was well short of the target of 3,6mn, although higher than the 1996 registration figure of 2,2mn. Moreover, the Commission blamed the poor registration figures on the lack of financial resources but, especially, logistical problems that caused the late delivery of registration materials to inaccessible rural areas. Although this was a factor, the deeper reason for the low registration results was the increasing belief Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 15 among Zambians that the electoral process does not have enough impact on them to make participation worthwhile. The reluctance of voters to register was seen as “a powerful, if negative, form of communication to the political leadership to remedy an inadequate system. In short, they are saying: ‘without us, there can be no legitimacy’… [People] had invested too much confidence in the multiparty system and the MMD, but were disappointed with their performance, and apathy was a way of demonstrating it” (Chirambo and Muleya 2001, 6-7). The current proliferation of more than 40 political parties and the welter of political corruption scandals have only intensified the cynical and popular view that Zambian politicians are driven entirely by self-interest, and that whoever occupies the top positions in future will behave no differently from their predecessors. The ruling MMD was always capable of surviving sufficiently intact to wage a relatively successful election campaign, and it could make use of its government incumbency to fully utilise the state apparatus to bolster its election effort. In fact, there have been numerous allegations of vote buying and diversion of government funds to MMD party-political activities. Quite pointedly, as Southern African Centre for the Co-ordination and Resolution of Disputes (Saccord) director Lee Habasonda asserts, corruption lies at the very heart of the political establishment in Zambia. Corruption has turned “the electoral process in Zambia into a mockery – a meaningless system, resulting in a corrupt leadership presiding over a corrupt citizenry” (The Post of Zambia, 27 August 2001). In the run-up to elections, political opponents were increasingly harassed by the MMD Youth, while fraud in the voter registration process was widespread – with rigging in the presidential and legislative polls almost inevitable. Zambia’s main opposition parties, therefore, pressed the MMD government to agree to reform electoral laws before the 27 December 2001 elections to prevent ballot fraud, bribery of voters at polling stations, intimidation and harassment of opposition leaders and supporters, as well as biased reporting by the state-owned media. Dean Mung’omba of the ZRP lamented that “after [the experience of] the 1991 elections, Zambia need[s] … decent elections, a proper and well managed registration of voters, a … [well functioning and] transparent electoral system, a meaningful and issue-based [election] campaign, a competition free of acrimony, bitterness, insults and dishonesty, and a … [smooth] transition” to a new administration (The Post of Zambia, 9 October 2001). Analysts also point to the fact that freedom of assembly and association in Zambia has been gradually diminishing; political parties often are denied permits to hold rallies or to undertake meet-the-people tours. Human rights groups, like Afronet and the Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), complained that the government used the contentious Public Order Act to harass and intimidate the opposition. Whereas fear of international criticism (and possible damage to relations with donors) could normally have been expected to keep such actions in check, the turbulent situation in neighbouring Angola, the 16 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe ensured that such criticism remained muted. With continued unrest in the southern African region, donors will need Zambia to remain ‘stable’; they will thus be reluctant to withhold their support. Nevertheless, Zambia’s aid dependency is such that the requirements of donors are an important element of the country’s domestic political agenda, and donors will exploit this to maximize the pressure they can exert on the government. Donor countries and agencies will aim to ensure that governance promises made are quantifiable, and will seek to tie fresh aid delivery to the fulfilment of specific governance targets. However, governance is far less easily quantifiable than macro-economic performance and the government, informed by the deep-seated patronage-driven imperatives of Zambian politics, will almost certainly find ways to carry on broadly as before without jeopardizing donor funding. Chiluba’s third-term bid did the MMD a great deal of harm, while a high level of inertia and corruption in the civil service, a serious lack of professionalism in the police force, and a grave violation of human rights (that includes a lack of respect for diversity of political opinion, religion and culture) had become quite prevalent in the governing establishment. Moreover, the government has failed to launch an effective programme to combat HIV/AIDS that has been decimating skilled personnel, and pays mere lip service to fighting rampaging urban and rural poverty. Many Zambian children still die of preventable diseases, while safe drinking water, essential medicines, and decent sanitation facilities are out of reach of the ordinary citizen. By the end of 2001, therefore, the MMD’s popularity hit an all-time low, leading Father Komakoma (executive director of the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace) to declare that Chiluba’s “inconsistencies … [had] broken the trust of the people”, (Kunda 2001, 7) and the large-scale expulsions of prominent figures from the ruling party merely reinforcing Chiluba’s reputation for intolerance of rivals and strong-arm tactics. However, the president has sought to deflect criticism at home, pointing to his relative success in mediating in the war-torn DRC. Immediately after Chiluba capitulated to intense public protest to his third-term bid, and anticipating the next elections to be heavily contested, the MMD started hunting desperately for a presidential candidate with an untainted reputation. Eventually pulling Levy Mwanawasa from obscurity only led to increasingly bitter behind-the-scenes infighting within the MMD and further fragmentation of the party. Mwanawasa, a respected University of Lusaka-educated lawyer, belongs to a small ethnic group in central Zambia, the Lenje. He served as Chiluba’s vice-president after the MMD won the October 1991 elections and, in 1992, was involved in a near fatal car accident that some said was an assassination attempt; it left him physically incapacitated, and he has had serious health problems ever since. He resigned as vice-president in 1994, complaining of Chiluba’s bad record on human rights and corruption, and stating that there was ‘an emergence of Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 17 the politics of one man’. His resignation from government won him some public sympathy and enhanced his stature as a man of integrity; it also afforded him several years free of any association with the baggage of corruption, graft, and bad management that dogged other members of Chiluba’s inner circle. Tactically, the very reason for Chiluba to select Mwanawasa as the MMD presidential candidate was that he was untainted by corruption scandals. However, Mwanawasa is seen as rather ‘dull’, and ‘a bit slow’, in fact, “[he] has never been known to be a shrewd politician, even at his best” (The Post of Zambia, 27 August 2001). Mwanawasa promises that his government will provide a clear policy direction on issues of development, and programmes aimed at poverty alleviation and job creation, acceleration of industrial activity, promotion of manufacturing, and reversal of the decline in agricultural production. He wants to establish a foundation for ‘transparent and accountable governance’, and ensure ‘respect for human rights and the rule of law’. But, clearly, he is Chiluba’s choice, his appointee; Chiluba did not fashion this candidature for nothing: there is absolutely no way he would have appointed a person he thought was going to probe his presidency. Nevertheless, Mwanawasa will have a tough time working within a party tainted by corruption and mismanagement. As things stand today, he has no political following or constituency of his own and knows nothing, or very little, about what is going on inside the MMD. He will never be given an opportunity, as only an appointed trustee of the party’s NEC, to be able to change or restructure the MMD and influence party matters in a meaningful way or in a way that suits his style, because he has been out of the party’s inner circle for too long. He will have an uphill struggle, what with Chiluba (as the ‘elder statesman’) calling the shots from behind the scenes – an unseen puppet master. Chiluba has positioned himself by manoeuvring loyalists into strategic positions in both government and party. Therefore, Mwanawasa will perpetually remain dependent on Chiluba for his tenure in office and for political survival, inevitably leading to political impotency. As far as Chiluba is concerned, Mwanawasa has completed his course in political reorientation; he has undergone, metaphorically speaking, a successful political lobotomy (The Post of Zambia, 27 August 2001). With a Chiluba stand-in (essentially, a puppet figure in the person of Mwanawasa) nominated as presidential candidate, the MMD hoped that it still had a good chance to win the presidential and legislative elections, even with substantially reduced majorities. In a scenario where there were as many as 11 presidential candidates, and without provision for a run-off election between the two candidates with the largest number of votes – a provision dropped when the widely condemned 1996 constitutional amendments were rammed through parliament – it was always likely that a president would be going into State House without any clear majority support. With a political situation that had become particularly fluid when the majority of MMD dissidents decided to form the FDD, much depended 18 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) on the ability of politicians within the broad spectrum of opposition parties to forge a credible coalition, or even a united front or alliance, to effectively challenge the MMD at the December 2001 polls – also to come forward with a single, capable and charismatic candidate for the presidential race, perhaps in the person of Mazoka or Tembo. Tragically, this proved to be an even bigger challenge than defeating the MMD at the polls. Although it was reported that the three main opposition parties (the UPND, UNIP, and the FDD) plus four other political parties agreed “to work together in an effort to remove the MMD from power and, subsequently, form a government of national unity” (The Post of Zambia, 27 August 2001), these hopes were soon dashed. Such an alliance or coalition was sure to remove the MMD from power. But, in the end, the vote of those opposed to both the MMD and UNIP, which was potentially large, was split between the UPND, the FDD, the HP, and 6 other smaller parties. With all 9 parties vying for the same constituency, this was a real opportunity lost by politicians who could have put their differences aside and forged a broader alliance. Although most Zambians seem to have become disillusioned with the electoral process, the UPND, UNIP, and the FDD proved to be the main challengers to the ruling MMD in the presidential and legislative elections. UNIP had major internal problems and this left the UPND and the FDD, in the absence of an opposition alliance, with the best chance of successfully opposing the MMD. Social behaviour, even more so in a politically charged situation, will never be easily susceptible to prediction. However, growing public disenchantment with the MMD regime exponentially increased the electoral chances of, especially, the UPND and the FDD, and confronted the MMD with an uphill struggle to stay in power. In the end, Chiluba’s dithering over his successor and the failure of the MMD to reduce the burden of poverty and unemployment in Zambia could well have cost the party the elections. In fact, Chiluba created a very costly political vacuum, and it was only massive election rigging that eventually secured Mwanawasa and the MMD their positions in government. The elections in Zambia were held on 27 December 2001. A complicating factor in holding elections in late December would always have been the fact that the rainy season might not have come to an end, preventing the smooth running of the poll, including the ability of, especially, rural voters to reach their polling stations and to freely express their electoral preferences – thus, being effectively disenfranchised. Other detrimental factors were that the vote took place just after Christmas, and was not scheduled on a public holiday. But surprisingly, a high percentage of the 2,5mn registered voters, some 67%, participated in the polls. Amidst allegations of massive vote-rigging and electoral fraud, the MMD presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, garnered 28.7% of the popular vote, narrowly defeating (by a mere 33,997 votes) the candidate of the UPND, Anderson Mazoka, who managed to secure 26.8% of the vote. These were the most closely contested elections the country had ever Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 19 witnessed. It became clear in the final stages of the election campaign that support for Christon Tembo (and the FDD) was faltering and that Mazoka (and the UPND) was pulling away from the other opposition presidential contenders. Significant, though, is the fact that the combined opposition vote (for Mazoka and 9 other presidential candidates) was 69.9%, thus pointing out that if the opposition was not so fragmented – splitting the vote and manifesting what has become known as the ‘Kenyan syndrome’ – they could have secured the presidency; even in a reduced presidential field of, say, three opposition candidates: Mazoka, Tilyenji Kaunda of UNIP, and Tembo of the FDD. Only 19.5% of registered voters cast their ballot for Mwanawasa, just 10% of those eligible to vote, leaving him with the weakest electoral mandate of any Zambian president. Table 1. Zambia presidential election results, December 2001 Candidate Levy Mwanawasa Anderson Mazoka Christon Tembo Tilyenji Kaunda Godfrey Miyanda Ben Mwila Michael Sata Nevers Mumba Gwendoline Konnie Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika Yobert Shamapande Total Party MMD UPND FDD UNIP HP ZRP PF NCC* SDP* AZ* NLD* Votes 506,694 472,697 228,861 175,898 140,678 85,472 59,172 38,860 10,253 9,882 9,481 1,737,948 Vote Reg/Voters % % 28.7 26.8 13.0 1.0 8.0 4.8 3,4 2.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 98.6 19.5 18.2 8.8 6.8 5.4 3.3 2.3 1.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 67.0 SOURCE: Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). * NCC: National Citizens’ Coalition; SDP: Social Democratic Party; AZ: Agenda for Zambia; NLD: National Leadership Development The MMD managed 69 seats in the legislature, winning the contest in four of Zambia’s nine provinces: Central (7 of 14 seats), Copperbelt (20 of 22), Luapula (13 of 14), and Northern (20 of 21). The UPND eventually mounted the most credible challenge to the MMD, taking 49 seats in the National Assembly, winning three provinces: North-Western (9 of 12 seats), Western (13 of 17), and Southern (18 of 19); while UNIP could only manage 13 seats, in the process winning only one province: Eastern (12 of 19 seats). The FDD, who secured 12 seats, also won one province: Lusaka (6 of 12 seats). Earlier, speaking on the FDD’s election prospects, party chairman Simon Zukas was of the opinion that “there is merit in having a 20 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) well-balanced parliament, to ensure checks and balances for the sake of good governance. It would be arrogant for any political party to think in terms of a landslide …” (quoted in Kunda 2001, 39). What these results show, then, is that the MMD will no longer be able to play the same dominating role in Zambian politics than in the 1991 to 2001 period. The new parliament contains unprecedented numbers of opposition members, will be the most representative since Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, and will therefore not be the compliant body the government has become used to. Despite election irregularities, the combined opposition vote in parliament is 81, and even after Mwanawasa appointed all 8 additional parliamentarians from amongst his supporters in the MMD, to add to the ruling party’s 69 MPs, he is still not able to command an ordinary majority in parliament – that is, if the opposition stands together. However, the horse-trading and allegiance-buying season has now commenced; party cadres are reportedly negotiating with opposition MPs, apparently with offers of patronage from the Zambian president, which might well, in the end, secure the MMD a majority in parliament. Moving from the opposition to the MMD is, however, not being encouraged, since an anti-defection clause in the constitution will force risky by-elections on the MMD. But, as far as coalition and allianceformation are concerned, various permutations now enter the realm of possibility. Table 2. Zambia parliamentary election results, December 2001 Party Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) United Party for National Development (UPND) United National Independence Party (UNIP) Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) Heritage Party (HP) Patriotic Front (PF) Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) Independent Total Total number of seats 69 49 13 12 4 1 1 1 150 SOURCE: Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). The MMD had a large majority in the last parliament, and the body has thus acted as little more than a rubber stamp for legislation handed down by the cabinet. However, as the MMD has failed to win an overall majority in the current parliament (77 against 81), opposition private members’ bills will, for the first time, have a chance of becoming law, and opposition parties could also gain control of parliamentary scrutiny committees, which Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 21 have powers to censure government ministers. It should, therefore, be possible for opposition parties, voting as a bloc, to obstruct the MMD’s legislative efforts. The speaker of the National Assembly may accept and reject motions for debate, and the post would have been a key prize for the opposition parties. But the MMD was determined to prevent this from happening and was able to secure the election of Amusaa Mwanamwambwa, the incumbent, as speaker of parliament, when one UPND and two HP MPs voted with the MMD. The opposition parties rejected the initial proposal of the clerk of the National Assembly that there should be a secret ballot, accusing the government of wanting to bribe opposition MPs to vote with the government without being detected. In the end, the vote was open, and the result highlighted the ability of the MMD to secure the votes of opposition MPs. This makes it more likely over the short to medium term that the MMD will persuade certain opposition MPs to vote in its favour on legislative issues. Opposition parties are contesting a number of constituency results in the courts, and some of these applications may well succeed, further weakening the government’s position in parliament. Clearly, the MMD’s lack of a majority in the National Assembly may threaten the government’s legislative programme, leading to a deadlock in parliament as the opposition blocks policy initiatives, and Mwanawasa’s immediate challenge is to find a way around this. In all, President Mwanawasa has retained seven ministers from Chiluba’s last cabinet, including Enock Kavindele as vice-president, and Katele Kalumba, who was moved from the finance ministry to foreign affairs. In a surprising move, Mwanawasa has taken the post of defence minister himself, and has reshuffled almost the entire command of the armed forces. By replacing the army commander, Lieutenant-General Georjeago Musengele, with Isaac Chisuzi, he removes a link with Chiluba and reduces the likelihood of the army hierarchy remaining beholden to the former president. In another move to establish his authority, Mwanawasa oversaw a comprehensive reshuffle of the civil service, with many dismissals and new appointments, particularly at the senior level. Although the new president has tried to distance himself from the Chiluba government’s record and promised to revive the economy and fight corruption, he will find it difficult to get his policies past Chiluba’s men. Says Mwelwa Muleya, head of the influential Foundation for Democratic Process (FDP): “… [Mwanawasa] will need something like two years to gain political ground and detach himself from Chiluba” (East African Standard, 4 January 2002). But, in a rather surprising development, after earlier declaring that he, ironically, wanted “to concentrate on building democracy in Africa” (East African Standard, 4 January 2002), Chiluba resigned from his MMD party presidency at the end of March 2002. 22 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) 2.4 Evaluating the Election Results: Democracy Endangered3 Independent local and international election observers have expressed serious reservations about the vote: Coalition 2001, an alliance of Zambian non-governmental organisations, declared the elections ‘neither free nor fair’, while the European Union (EU) election monitoring team characterised the results as ‘not credible’, saying that it was not confident that the election outcome reflected ‘the wishes of the Zambian people’. But the respected Carter Center was even more damning in its criticism; it had deployed six long-term and 30 short-term observers – including prominent figures such as former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former Beninoise President Nicéphore Soglo, and former Tanzanian Prime Minister Judge Joseph Warioba – to scrutinise the Zambian elections. Members of this election observation team visited all nine provinces and 47 of 72 districts during the pre-election period, as well as 190 polling stations and 20 constituency tabulation centres during the elections to assess the voting and counting processes. In its 7 March 2002 final statement on the 2001 Zambian elections, which provides a comprehensive overview of all the problem areas, the Carter Center made the following observations4. First, there was an uneven playing field in the pre-election period due to problems with voter registration, the delayed announcement of the election date, misuse and abuse of state resources, involvement of civil servants in political activities, unbalanced coverage by the state-owned media, and biased application of the Public Order Act, which disadvantaged the opposition and created barriers for full participation by all stakeholders in the electoral process – especially, providing critical information in a timely manner. Requiring Zambians to obtain a national registration card (NRC) as a prerequisite for receiving a voter registration card (VRC) was a barrier that disenfranchised approximately one million otherwise eligible voters. Second, although many of the election problems can be attributed, in part, to a flawed electoral law, the ECZ had the authority and discretion to formulate and implement regulations to ensure that the elections were administered effectively and transparently. Unfortunately, however, the ECZ leadership lacked the political will to take the necessary steps, often using the flawed electoral law as an excuse for inactivity. Most of the complaints brought against the ECZ could have been resolved if the commission had engaged stakeholders. At the provincial and district levels there were concerns about inadequate resources and facilities, and failing communications systems. Problems such as delays in opening polling stations (about 25% opened late), late delivery and/or insufficient voting materials, and inadequate time allocated to process voters led to inordinately long queues, and a slow and cumbersome voting process. Third, there were inadequate logistical arrangements for the polls and a lack of procedures to ensure transparent vote counting at the polls. In some centres, officials waited for all polling station boxes to arrive before Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 23 counting, while in others counting began as soon as boxes began to arrive. Although party agents and monitors were generally present during counting, they were not always able to verify the count and to adequately inspect ballot papers for spoiled ballots. In addition, the transparency process was hindered by the fact that Zambian law does not provide for party agents to sign and receive copies of polling station result forms, or for the results to be posted for public view at the polling station. As a result, the polling station results were vulnerable to manipulation. Last, the ECZ has failed to implement a transparent verification process open to all party agents and observers. There are serious unanswered questions about the accuracy of the results. Although it is now several months after the elections, the ECZ says that final results cannot be announced until the verification of results at the district level has been completed. The legal regulations outlining the verification process are weak, and do not provide sufficient opportunities for stakeholders to check the results. In most cases, political parties and domestic observers were not informed or invited to monitor the verification process, and in some instances (as in Solwezi) were barred from participating. The process is uncoordinated and random, and therefore almost impossible to monitor. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to obtain solid information about the verification process, in some cases due to poor communications, and in most cases the outright refusal of election officers to release any information. In fact, some district level election officials have been instructed by the ECZ not to supply information about the verification process to anyone, apparently under the pretext that any such documentation will be presented as evidence in court. Given these concerns, the Carter Center concludes that the ECZ and government have failed to meet the state burden of responsibility to administer a ‘fair and transparent’ election and to resolve electoral irregularities that clearly could have affected the outcome of a close presidential race. It refers to ‘anomalies, unexplained discrepancies, and inaccuracies’ in the presidential and parliamentary results. As a consequence, the Center finds that the election results are ‘not credible’ and ‘cannot be verified as accurately reflecting the will of Zambian voters’. The major problem areas are large and unexplained variations between the number of votes cast for presidential and parliamentary candidates;5 an unusually high number of constituencies where no invalid ballots were recorded; and discrepancies between figures obtained from the constituency and national levels. Unless and until the ECZ provides clear evidence to dispel doubts about the accuracy of official results, the Center believes ‘the legitimacy of the entire electoral process will remain open to question’. It, therefore, urges the ECZ, the government, and the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the prompt and transparent verification of results and the expeditious review of electoral petitions in order to resolve 24 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) outstanding disputes about the final results and the legitimacy of the new government. Zambia is at a critical point in its democratic development. It is clear that in the December 2001 elections, the people of Zambia voted for change and expressed their support for a multitude of political parties. Leadership that embraces multiparty co-operation and broad participation by civil society could provide a foundation for improved governance (Carter Center 2002, 1-3 & 7). But, clearly, the MMD is feeling regional strains; power within the party has shifted away from the north to the Central Province, home of Mwanawasa, who is Lenje, and a stronghold of Mazoka, a Tonga – here the dominant Tonga, Ila and Lenje groups share a history and identity. This prompted MMD functionaries from the Luapula, Northern and Copperbelt provinces to call a closed meeting to discuss what is known as the ‘Mwanawasa influence’. Amid the intrigue, respect for Mazoka, once tarnished by a tribalist tag, is growing; he has changed style and now cooperates much better with the other parties in the so-called united opposition front, which is dominated by his UPND. Also, his decision to call off a plan for nation-wide civil disobedience avoided an embarrassing possible flop, and removed the pretext for Mwanawasa to crack down on the opposition. There have been threats by other opposition leaders that they would take to the streets to protest their claim that the ruling party rigged the elections. However, the police have threatened to invoke public order laws, dating from the colonial era, to quell any violence that might occur. These provide for the police to arrest anyone who demonstrates without a permit, which must be obtained from the authorities 14 days in advance (Southern Africa Report 2002, 5). Analysis of the parliamentary election can only be provisional while the credibility of the official results is in doubt, but it seems that the ethnic base of party politics, apparent in the early 1960s, remains – it was one reason why former President Kenneth Kaunda introduced the one-party state in 1972. During the 1960s, Tonga and Lozi people of southern and western Zambia allied with Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC), whereas the Bemba of the Copperbelt and Luapula, apart from some disgruntled miners, supported Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP. Members of today’s parliament, representing Tonga and Lozi areas, are almost all UPND;6 whereas nearly every constituency in the Bemba heartlands of the Copperbelt, Northern Province and Luapula is represented by the MMD. However, the court actions being prepared by opposition parties to challenge individual constituency results may change this, and may reveal the MMD’s hold over Bemba areas to be weaker than the current results indicate. Zambian legal experts say challenges to the result in individual constituencies have a far greater chance of success in the courts than the petitions currently before the Supreme Court over the presidential election result. One important consequence of a successful challenge to a constituency result is that, in a recount of the votes cast in that constituency, Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 25 the votes cast in that constituency in the presidential election must also by law be recounted; the amended results could erode Mwanawasa’s mandate even further.7 3. ZIMBABWE: DEMOCRACY MORTALLY WOUNDED The Road to Zero8 The campaign for the re-election of Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe began as far back as February 2000, when his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government – smarting from a shock referendum defeat inflicted by the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) of Morgan Tsvangirai – moved to unilaterally amend the constitution. These changes, inter alia, included clauses extending Mugabe’s presidential powers even further, and sanctioning violent land invasions – effectively negating the referendum result. While the reason for this was ostensibly to expedite the land-reform process, the sub-text was the creation of a climate of fear and terror in the country. Operating under the cover of ‘war veterans’-instigated lawlessness, ZANU-PF fought a bloody parliamentary election campaign in mid-2000 – a campaign that, nonetheless, failed to stem the tide of antipathy towards Mugabe and the ruling party, with the MDC winning 57 of the 120 contested seats in parliament. In terms of the provisions of the current Zimbabwean constitution, Mugabe could nominate a further 30 MPs: 10 chiefs, 8 provincial governors, and 12 ordinary MPs – all ZANU-PF – giving the ruling party a comfortable majority of 92 seats in a 150-member House of Assembly. So, between June 2000 and the presidential election in March 2002, this violent campaign had to be cranked up several notches. The constitutional changes rammed through parliament after February 2000 endowed Mugabe with overwhelming powers, probably making him the most powerful president in the world. That explains why he did not have to consult any of his cabinet ministers, and even parliament, before he made the controversial decision to deploy a third of Zimbabwe’s armed forces in the DRC. It also explains why Mugabe could, over the last two-and-a-half years, rule Zimbabwe under an unofficial state of emergency, issuing decrees to override the courts, firing judges, and usurping the role of the legislature. By declaring an end to market reforms, he abandoned an IMF and World Bank-sponsored economic structural adjustment programme and returned the country to a Marxist command economy (which he originally pursued in the early 1980s), imposing price controls and a fixed exchange rate system – and nationalising large-scale commercial farming enterprises, effectively turning Zimbabwe into a peasant economy. Elections are always acrimonious affairs; even in the world’s most developed democracies, they are usually followed by recriminations and accusations of vote-rigging, vote-buying, and gerrymandering. Those who 26 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) dare enter the game of electoral politics know that it is in the nature of governments to use their incumbency to tilt the balance in their favour. So why the outcry when the government of Zimbabwe uses its position to entrench its hold on power? Because, unlike those instances where the game is played in a manner which can be challenged by using the instruments of democracy, Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF government went to absolute extremes in corrupting what some would see as a fragile democracy, but what has already been a pseudo-democracy since the mid-1990s. It overstepped all the rules of decent practice: disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of voters through executive decrees, manipulating the state-owned media to demonise its opponents and promote the ruling party, bullying the judiciary by overturning court rulings, harassing its opponents by giving the police the right to ban election rallies and jailing their leadership on trumped-up treason charges, using military personnel in the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and civil servants as election officials, accrediting only 500 out of an estimated 12,500 independent local poll monitors (drawn from a coalition of 38 churches, civic bodies, and trade unions) and banning scores of international election observers, and physically preventing voters from casting their ballots. But, most crucially, it used violence by the security forces, war veterans and ZANU-PF militias – intimidation, abduction, assault and torture, even murder – in an attempt to cow its opponents into submission. The presidential poll was, therefore, not a two- or three-day event: it needs to be looked at in the context of a process of two years of lawlessness that the Mugabe regime has spawned, beginning with its embarrassing referendum defeat in early 2000. Riding on the back of a campaign of terror and unbelievable intimidation, the party that brought freedom to the people of Zimbabwe turned its wrath against them. In short, this was an election in which there could only be losers: the people of Zimbabwe. Final election results showed that out of a total electorate of 5,647,812, only 3,130,913 voters managed to go to the polls: Mugabe secured 1,685,212 votes (53.8% of the vote), while Tsvangirai managed 1,258,401 votes (40.2%). There were three other presidential candidates: Shakespeare Maya, the candidate of the little-known National Alliance for Good Governance, and two independents, Wilson Kumbula and Paul Siwela, who together drew 187,300 votes (6% of the vote). What a hollow victory this was – evidence abounds that the election was anything but ‘free and fair’; indeed, it was among the most shambolic, most rigged, and most fraudulent in recent history, stage-managed almost to perfection: from loading Harare, its biggest constituency, with a triple vote for president, mayor and city councillors, and then reducing the number of polling stations and election officials to deal with a deluge of over 800,000 registered voters – mostly opposition supporters; to restoring a ban on postal votes, a move which saw hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans living or travelling abroad disenfranchised. Earlier, Zimbabwe’s military chiefs performed what Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 27 almost amounted to a ‘coup by proxy’ when they emphatically declared that they would not accept a head of state that has not participated in the chimurenga – the anti-colonial, liberation struggle. In the aftermath of the election, Mugabe is now likely to proceed to consolidate his grip on power by destroying the institutions of democracy: what is left of a free press, an independent judiciary, and bipartisan civil society organisations – indeed, it is “doubt[ful] whether it is within Mugabe to relinquish power; he wants to rule in perpetuity.” (Mukonoweshuro 2002). The personality cult built around Mugabe and his personality makeup (extreme arrogance and vanity) argues against national reconciliation and an externally propagated government of national unity. In fact, a recent psychometric study has found that Mugabe suffers from a ‘bureaucraticcompulsive’ syndrome, and that he is likely to become more and more dogmatic (self-righteous and impervious to correction), inflexible (thinskinned and vengeful), and paranoid (increasingly suspicious). Leaders with this syndrome are noted for their ‘officious, high-handed bearing; intrusive, meddlesome interpersonal conduct; unimaginative, closed-minded cognitive style; grim, imperturbable mood; and scrupulous, if grandiose, sense of self” (Mail & Guardian 2002). But, amid Zimbabwe’s slide into political and economic oblivion, the brethren leaders of the African continent cajoled Mugabe, cautioned him in private, and publicly defended their virtual complicity in the systematic retrogression of the country into an ‘Orwellianstyle’, totalitarian state. This runs the risk of encouraging a pessimistic investment world to stop taking issues of good governance and democracy in Africa seriously, with negative repercussions for the entire continent and for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The US and the EU have broadened the ‘smart sanctions’ that they already had in place against Mugabe and his major henchmen; and, in addition, the Commonwealth troika of John Howard (Australia), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Thabo Mbeki (South Africa) decided to suspend Zimbabwe for a period of one year, but not to impose economic and other sanctions. Quite predictably, none of these actions is likely to be a major constraint, or have any persuasive effect, on the Mugabe regime. 4. LESOTHO: DEMOCRACY ASSURED OR BACK TO THE FUTURE? 9 A total of 19 political parties were registered to participate in general elections in Lesotho, scheduled for 25 May 2002. This proliferation of political parties, and the political fragmentation it reflects, is seen by some commentators as beneficial for the development of democracy in Lesotho. In a move to level the electoral playing field, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) allocated M320,000 to support the campaigns of all political parties; and a further M30,000 went to independent candidates. Half of the funding was shared equally among the parties and the rest distributed in proportion to the number of constituency candidates for each 28 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) party. Also, the number of registered voters for the elections was revised downwards to some 840,000, from an originally estimated 920,000. Earlier the IEC had decided to use a voter registration system combining the partial use of fingerprint technology with indelible ink. A process of voter validation -- where voters could check whether their entry on the electoral register was correct and their photograph recognisable – followed the publication of intermediate voter registers for each constituency. Publication of a final electoral register was scheduled for March 2002, after which polling cards, which included photographs, were issued to all eligible voters. A fingerprint had been taken from each registered voter; these are kept on file and will be utilised only in the event of a contested vote. Clearly, in any democratic society, it is of crucial importance that some form of personal identification documentation be introduced to underpin a credible process of voter registration. In order to implement a fail-safe system, also to determine voter eligibility based on age and citizenship requirements, fingerprinting should be obligatory. Although costly, every effort should be made to eliminate any perception that ‘the authorities’ can use incumbency to fraudulently manipulate the voter registration process (and the actual poll) to the ruling party’s advantage. Moreover, any modern society needs a system of personal identification to run, for example, a proper banking and judicial system. Several weeks before the poll, the chairman of the IEC, Leshele Thoahlane, gave the assurance that Lesotho’s parliamentary elections would not repeat the marred presidential poll in Zimbabwe, which favoured the ruling party. In Zimbabwe, irregularities included ‘an unstable legal framework, with electoral laws changing even a few days prior to polling, leading to confusion among the electorate’. Thoahlane stressed that the electoral register in Lesotho had been published and scrutinised by the public; furthermore, the IEC would ensure that there was a polling station for every 600 voters throughout the country: where queues were too long, despite this precautionary measure, and logistics caused problems, people would be allowed to vote even after polls officially closed – a promise made good when voting continued on 26 May. He was of the opinion that there could be confidence in an electoral system that would ensure ‘free, fair and credible elections’, because his commission was adamant to successfully address the problem areas which caused the results of the 1998 elections to be questioned: ‘under-age voting’, ‘ghost-voting’, and ‘doublevoting’ – also ‘absent-voting’, prior voting of election officials, police, security personnel, hospital staff, and other emergency services on the day before elections, and the safeguarding of their votes to the satisfaction of all parties. Although he believed that a ‘democratic culture’ still had to be established in Lesotho, and that an ‘inclination to pursue avenues of violence’ had to be replaced by a ‘persuasive attitude’, he was nevertheless convinced that the introduction of an electoral code of conduct to encourage political tolerance, free campaigning and public debate, including respect Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 29 for the media, would enable him and his commission to conduct what the vision statement of the IEC committed itself to – delivering an ‘acceptable, free, fair, transparent and accessible election’ to the Lesotho voting public. Moreover, a tribunal would hear complaints about violations of the code of conduct, which reflects the general acknowledgement that past elections have suffered from the failure of participants to abide by the norms and rules of democratic politics. ‘Schedule 5 – Allocation of Seats in Accordance with the Principle of Proportional Representation’ of the National Assembly Elections Amendment Act of 2001 sets out the method by which the 40 seats to be elected by proportional representation will be allocated by the IEC (calculated on the basis of 80 plus 40 – that is, 120 seats – and not on 40 only),10 and prohibits MPs elected in this way from changing their political allegiance during the parliamentary term. The Act includes measures to ensure fair play by all the parties in the elections: ‘Schedule 4 – Electoral Code of Conduct’ (Lesotho Government Gazette Extraordinary 2001, 1166-1171). Dr. Sehoai Santho, Director of the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM), sees the code of conduct as a ‘harmony pact’ (equivalent to South Africa’s ‘peace accord’), solidifying a moral commitment to accept any post-election outcome. Generally, political parties in Lesotho are organisationally weak and, although they are vehicles for representing and channelling voter interests, as institutions for consolidating democracy they are not well developed. Whereas the Independent Political Authority (IPA), representing 12 post-1998 political parties, was a ‘peace-building initiative’, the LNCM and other NGOs are in partnership with the IEC to promote ‘capacity-building in conflict management’. Also, a positive development in a society that has been chronically unstable is a greater measure of professionalism in the military and the police. This should improve the chances for stability in any postelection scenario. In the period before the election, there was some concern that there would be confusion among the Lesotho voting public about the new electoral model, which required the casting of two votes: one for a singlemember constituency representative, and one for the seats to be allocated by way of proportional representation. Then, much work still had to be done around the vitally important issue of voter education – an area that was very often neglected, and only later regretted. This concern was confirmed by Seabata Motsamai, Executive Director of the Lesotho Council of NonGovernmental Organisations (LCN), who said that the experience of NGOs in voter education had been that some voters were somewhat apprehensive of the two-ballot system, fearing that their vote in the single-member constituency (SMC) or ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) election could somehow be manipulated by the ballot in the proportional representation (PR) election. Here, there was a clear need to explain to the electorate, in very simple terms, that the allocation of seats according to the PR system could 30 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) only add to the strength of their choice under the SMC/FPTP election – the PR vote could not detract from their strength in the SMC/FPTP election (or diminish or weaken that position). Therefore, there was an urgent need for a programme of institutional training at the grassroots level, especially in view of the new and complex electoral system – a task in which the services of NGOs and, hopefully, the media would have supplemented those already performed by the IEC. In the past, the Lesotho political scene was a ‘closed system’ based on the ‘politics of hatred’, and informed by negative issues that caused constant political instability. After the 1998 general election, the legitimacy of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) government was a severely contested terrain, manifested in allegations of electoral fraud, and popular protest – degenerating into considerable violent unrest preceding an extremely unpopular South African military intervention, under the guise of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandate. Nonetheless, Motsamai felt that this negative politics was now slowly being replaced by ‘issue-based politics’, and ‘new and shifting political allegiances’. There are no real ideological differences between the major political players. Differences are more about the way in which policies are applied or executed, rather than the policies themselves; allegiances revolve primarily around personalities and are based on the localities from which politicians draw significant support – what National University of Lesotho (NUL) academic Dr John Akokpari calls ‘compass politics’. Prior to the 25 May poll, the political situation in Lesotho was extremely fluid and the electoral strength of individual political parties was, therefore, hard to predict. Nevertheless, the general consensus in Lesotho projected the LCD to comfortably win the parliamentary elections – despite the fact that, in its contestations with other political parties, the ruling party comes across as ‘extremely power conscious’ and ‘obsessed with control’. However, none of the opposition parties appeared to have convinced the electorate that it could do a better job of running the country. The LCD had a much wider network of national support, it was more organised than its political rivals, it marketed itself better, and it could use government incumbency to manipulate the system to its own advantage – to the extent that manipulation was still possible. The Basotho National Party (BNP) was perceived to be gaining popularity, and it would fight the elections as the largest single unit; despite some internal wrangling, caused by minor fringe elements, it had not split, which could not be said of the ‘Congress parties’. The BNP was, therefore, expected to come in second in the poll, while the newly formed Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), having split from the LCD, was also projected to attract healthy support. A whole array of smaller parties was expected to come in next on the continuum of electoral strength: the Basotho African Congress (BAC), having split from the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), the Lesotho Workers’ Party (LWP), the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), and the Popular Front for Democracy Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 31 (PFD). The vote in the urban areas was usually highly contested, while the LCD was expected to perform well in the rural areas of Lesotho’s northern districts (fighting it out with the LPC) and the BNP to do well in the southern districts. In Lesotho’s urban areas, the personal needs and aspirations of people, informed by ‘bread-and-butter-issues’ and burdened by massive unemployment, would be central in shaping the electoral contest. Conversely, although suffering under the effects of grinding poverty, the rural population of Lesotho was less directly affected by the actions of government, because the state had not managed to assert itself as an extractive force – they would, therefore, be more inclined to stick to traditional, party-political voting patterns. The single-member constituency, ‘first-past–the-post’ (SMC/FPTP) electoral system had led to strange voting behaviour in the past, grossly exaggerating the strength of the winning party – the BCP in 1993, and the LCD in 1998. This totally marginalised opposition parties, a situation which the new mixed SMC/FPTP-PR electoral system is meant to alleviate – to some extent, at least. However, ‘the jury is still out’ on whether this will be an adequate measure to prevent any future constitutional crisis revolving around the conduct and results of parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, a strong opposition presence in parliament was expected after the elections, further boosted by the fact that proportional representation would be to the advantage of some of the smaller parties. This should help to establish a sense of ‘inclusiveness’ and, therefore, strengthen democracy. In the end, Lesotho’s ruling LCD scored a landslide victory in the polls on 25 and 26 May 2002, endorsed as ‘free and fair’ by international and regional observers, but criticised by the main opposition BNP. Although the LCD retained its overwhelming majority in the SMC/FPTP election by winning 77 of the 78 declared seats – replicating the voting pattern after the elections of 1993 and 1998 – its dominance in an expanded National Assembly of 120 members will be tempered by the 40 additional seats, allocated to other parties under the new proportional representation (PR) system. The sole SMC/FPTP election success of an opposition party was that of Seqonoka in the northern Berea district, which was won by the leader of the opposition LPC, Kelebone Maope. There were two constituencies at Hlotse in the northern Leribe district, and Mount Moorosi in the southern Quthing district, where elections were undeclared due to the death (from natural causes) of two candidates prior to the election date – constituencies now subject to by-elections. Overall voter turnout was high, at 68%, although in some constituencies it was as high as 90% (see table 3). 32 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) Table 3. Lesotho: May 2002 election results Party Votes cast % of votes cast No of Seats MC Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) Basotho National Party (BNP) Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) National Independent Party (NIP) Basotho African Congress (BAC Basotho Congress Party (BCP) Lesotho Workers’ Party (LWP) Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) National Progressive Party (NPP) Undeclared Others (9 parties) Total 304,316 124,234 32,046 30,346 16,095 14,584 7,788 6,890 6,330 3,985 7,772 554,386 54.8 224 5.9 5.5 2.9 2.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.4 99.9 77 1 2 80 PR 21 5 5 3 3 1 1 1 1 40 SOURCE: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of Lesotho. Local, regional and international observers gave the poll a clean bill of health. The Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCN) Observer Mission found that the general elections in Lesotho have been ‘peaceful, and the voting environment very conducive for every Mosotho, despite weaknesses in logistics and training’ (EISA 2002). But in an uncharacteristically low-key response to the elections, the South African government (by way of President Thabo Mbeki’s office) merely saw the poll as ‘a significant milestone on the road to democracy and good governance’ in the country, and expressed the hope that ‘a durable and secure political system will emerge in Lesotho’ (SAPA 2002). The SADC Extended Troika Observer Mission (comprised of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) was of the opinion that the elections ‘were transparent, free, fair, peaceful, orderly and, therefore, reflecting the will of the people’ of Lesotho; while the Electoral Commissions Forum of SADC Countries was satisfied that ‘the criteria of secrecy, transparency, fairness and freeness were met during the poll and the count[ing of votes]’. The SADC Parliamentary Forum Election Observer Mission found that the election was ‘peaceful, free, fair, and transparent; it is thus a true reflection of the will of the people of Lesotho. Indeed, … [the election] largely conforms to the SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region’. Similarly, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Observer Team was of the opinion that ‘in general, the elections were held in a transparent and credible environment, which enabled the Basotho to exercise their democratic right in dignity’, while the Commonwealth Observer Group found that ‘up to the time of the close of polls, the election was – despite some administrative and logistical Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 33 problems – conducted in a manner that provided the people of Lesotho with the opportunity to vote freely for the candidates of their choice’. And, finally, the International Election Observation Delegation of the United Nations Electoral Assistance Secretariat (UNEAS) expressed the view that ‘the polling on 25 May 2002, and the extended polling on 26 May … [was] free, fair, peaceful, lawful and transparent’(EISA 2002). Southern Africa simply could not afford another major electoral crisis; and bluntly, after the experience in Zimbabwe, where the manifestly fraudulent presidential election result was endorsed by various election monitoring bodies from the region, an electoral monitoring effort dominated by South Africa and the SADC could well have lacked credibility. Bodies like the Commonwealth and the UN were, therefore, badly needed to give the election in Lesotho, whatever the outcome, proper legitimacy – an election whose symbolic importance eclipses Lesotho’s otherwise limited political significance. After the dubious legislative and presidential elections in Zambia in December 2001 and the more recent presidential election disgrace in Zimbabwe in March 2002, southern Africa and South African President Mbeki’s push for NEPAD badly needed a democratic success. Surprisingly, they got one from a most unlikely source – Lesotho. After four years of difficult negotiations between the country’s feuding political parties, which have been nudged along by the SADC, and careful preparation for a new electoral contest by Lesotho’s IEC, the prospects for an efficient and fairly conducted election (one whose results could not credibly be challenged), seemed remarkably bright (Southall 2002). But why this attempt at holding a widely accepted election against the backdrop of the contested 1998 election results, and often extremely acrimonious disagreements between the IPA and the ruling LCD? Why should any agreement hold in the cauldron of Lesotho politics, which is characterised by a desperate struggle for political office in a povertystricken economy? There are five principal reasons (Southall 2002): First, and foremost, there was enormous pressure upon Lesotho’s politicians to deliver: neither South Africa nor the SADC wanted another Zimbabwe (nor, indeed, another Lesotho 1998). International donors, principally the EU, the UK, and the US, have made it plain that aid flows (already reduced to a trickle) will almost completely dry up if the 25 May 2002 election results in further chaos; and civil society in Lesotho – NGOs, trade unions, churches, and independent newspapers – have made their growing impatience with bickering politicians quite clear. Second, the combination of PR with SMC/FPTP will ensure that there is no repeat of the 1993 and 1998 election results, which were classical examples of ‘winner-takes-all’. The electoral model adopted for May 2002 works to compensate parties (through PR) disadvantaged by voting in the SMC-FPTP election – although a party (the LCD) which has gained more seats (77) under the SMC-FPTP system than it is entitled to under the PR 34 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) vote will obtain none of the additional 40 seats.11 Losers are included by the political system, not excluded – and they will now have less reason to spoil the outcome. A third reason for success is the thoroughness and openness of the IEC’s preparations for the elections. The May 2002 election in Lesotho was probably the most technologically advanced election to have taken place anywhere on the African continent – outside South Africa.12 Political parties had been involved throughout the process, and were represented on a range of IEC committees dealing with law, data management, logistics, security, voter education, media, election co-ordination, and conflict management. The fourth, and extremely important, reason why 2002 should turn out differently from 1998 is that the government had been enabled, by SADC backing, to undertake a significant restructuring of the security forces, most notably the army, by a combination of prosecution in the courts of past military indiscipline, paid retrenchments, and retraining.13 It was precisely the antipathy of the security forces to elected BCP/LCD governments, which lay at the root of the perennial crises that Lesotho had to endure after 1993. The final reason why the 2002 election should work to stabilise rather than destabilise Lesotho is that the LCD government has proved relatively successful – however, it cannot claim all the credit, for the environment in which it has worked has been relatively benign.14 Immense challenges to stability do remain; yet the country is at greater peace than before, and this has allowed space for the LCD to attempt significant socio-economic improvements, pride of place amongst which must be the highly popular introduction of free primary education. Long-term economic prospects for Lesotho remain grim, but the LCD – which has captured the support of the majority of the country’s middle class professionals – displays a greater air of competence than any of its predecessors. Yet, nothing in Lesotho is guaranteed – despite electoral and other reforms, the political situation remains fragile. The BNP’s Metsing Lekhanya, who lost his own constituency vote, has questioned the election results, saying that ‘distinct patterns in voter behaviour … indicate a strong possibility that the results were predetermined’ (Associated Press 2002). The problem is that Lekhanya always had an inflated idea of how many seats his party would win in the SMC-FPTP poll, rather over-confidently and unrealistically predicting a haul of between 46 and 60 seats. This was never within the realm of possibility. But the IEC has undertaken to investigate all allegations ‘on a case-by-case basis’, if served with a court order. However, these shenanigans seem a bit out of place and nothing much is expected to come of them. Although tensions might initially rise, this grandstanding will eventually peter out, especially as all the significant smaller parties now have a voice in Lesotho’s parliament. Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 35 5. CONCLUSION Generally, SADC member states had been reluctant to exercise regional leadership in issues related to good governance. One reason for this reluctance has been that certain heads of state have themselves been facing severe criticism for authoritarianism and intolerance in their own countries and, as a consequence, have been coming under intense pressure to allow a greater degree of accountability, freedom and democracy – for example, King Mswati III of Swaziland, former President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia and, quite pointedly, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Small wonder, then, that the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security – the protocol of which enshrines principles of democracy, good governance and human rights, and which lays down clear and unequivocal guidelines – had not yet been operationalised for fear that it might be used against them. Therefore, the greatest deficiency within the SADC remains the absence of integrated systems, processes and mechanisms to deal with human rights abuses, and the advancement of democracy and good governance. Naturally, these are contentious issues about which many SADC countries are very sensitive: Swaziland is regarded as non-democratic and is still frozen in time on the political dead-end road of a no-party, feudal monarchy; Zambia and Zimbabwe are accused of being undemocratic in election-related practices and flaunting the principles of good governance; Angola and the DRC may now finally be able to extract themselves from a state of anarchy (having faced prolonged civil war, and having had to deal with internal rebellion and incursions from foreign forces) with tentative moves towards finding a lasting peace; Namibia and Malawi are characterised by growing authoritarianism; Lesotho is struggling to move away from dominant party government to a more inclusive democracy; and South Africa is seen to be drifting towards one-party dominance and increasingly authoritarian tendencies. The common thread running through these hiccups is a latent conflict potential that might suddenly erupt and spill over into neighbouring countries, with disastrous consequences for the southern African region’s security and stability. Obviously, this is an extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs: southern Africa cannot hope to escape from its current economic malaise where there is no democracy. After all, a fundamental relationship exists between good governance (based on universal democratic principles), foreign investment, and economic growth. Now, because of its apparent success, the new Lesotho electoral model (which borrowed elements from the electoral systems in New Zealand and Germany) could be recommended as a solution for the conflict-ridden countries of southern Africa. But it would be to the benefit of southern African countries and their peoples to remember that, as a political system, democracy is marked not only by ‘free and fair’, legitimate, multiparty elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and protection of the basic civil liberties of freedom of speech, assembly and religion, as well as the right to property. Too often 36 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) there is still an inadequate commitment to multiparty democracy and politics, if at all, by leaders and politicians who sometimes mouth the niceties of democracy, but use undemocratic means to remain in power. NOTES 1. This is an updated version of a paper first presented at the ISS/OSSREA workshop on ‘The Sustainability of African Political Parties’, 6 to 8 May 2002, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia under the title, “Democracy, Multiparty Politics, and Elections in Southern Africa: Realities and Imageries”. It was subsequently read at the Biennial Conference of the African Studies Association in Germany, University of Hamburg, 23 to 26 May 2002. The author wishes to thank Prof. Mohamed Salih of the Institute of Social Studies (The Hague, The Netherlands) for his invaluable assistance in shortening this article. 2. The rest of this section – ‘Zambia: Democracy Derailed?’ – under the subsections, ‘A Dominant Ruling Party and a Fragmented Opposition’, ‘Chiluba’s Third-Term Bid: A Boost to Further Political Fragmentation’, and ‘The December 2001 Elections: Political Pluralism Embedded?’, is based on consultancy reports, written by the author, during the course of 2000, 2001 and the first months of 2002 – unless another source is indicated. 3. The first part of this sub-section -- ‘Evaluating the Election Results: Democracy Endangered’ – is based on a consultancy report, written by the author, in March 2002, unless another source is indicated. For the rest of the sub-section, the sources are as given. 4. The rest of this sub-section is based on the Carter Center, Final Statement on the Zambia 2001 Elections, 7 March 2002, pp 1-7 & 8. 5. Usually when parliamentary and presidential elections are held at the same time, there is a close correlation between the numbers of votes cast in each election. Yet, in the December 2001 Zambian elections, 29 constituencies had at least 1000 more people voting in the presidential than in the parliamentary election, most of them apparently voting for Mwanawasa. Although some analysts postulated that, on the grounds of the presidential vote, the opposition should have commanded around 70% of the vote in the parliamentary poll, this has not been borne out by the results – again pointing to the clear possibility of massive vote-rigging. It is highly unlikely that voters in an underdeveloped country like Zambia will exercise, on a massive scale, the rather sophisticated electoral practice of vote splitting – voting for the presidential candidate of one party and for the parliamentary candidate of another party – which is not even prevalent in highly developed, democratic countries. 6. The secessionist aspirations among the Lozi tribe in western Zambia is rooted in the land issue, and they are demanding at least local autonomy; Imasiku Mutangelwa is the leader of the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), which Denis Venter. Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa 37 campaigns for Lozi self-rule. Under the so-called Barotseland Agreement the British colonial administration held out the prospect of self-determination for the Lozi, but these hopes were dashed at independence in 1963 when the new government insisted on a unified Zambian state. In the political arena, the Agenda for Zambia (AZ) – led by Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika – is dominated by ethnic Lozi and is closely associated with Lozi attempts to secure selfdetermination. Lewanika wants secession from Zambia for the Lozi region of Barotseland in Western Province, propagates a referendum on the issue and, presumably, can offer useful Lozi votes in return. The UPND has been courting the Lozi vote and as early as June 1999, the UPND’s Mazoka visited Lozi King Litunga Ilute Yeta III, and told him that he envisaged an important role for traditional leaders in local government. 7. Based on a consultancy report, written by the author, in March 2002. 8. Based on a consultancy report written by the author, in March 2002 – unless another source is indicated. 9. This section is based on consultancy reports, written by the author, during the course of 2000, 2001 and the first months of 2002, and a series of interviews conducted with politicians and civil society leaders on 29-31 January 2002, and on 9-11 April 2002 – unless another source is indicated. 10. See Lesotho Government Gazette Extraordinary. 2001. National Assembly Amendment Act, No 16 of 2001, Vol XLVI, No. 105 (31 December): 11711176. The procedures to allocate seats on the PR list are described in the finest detail. 11. The mechanics of the system is beyond the vast majority of voters, but the important outcome is that leading politicians of the principal defeated parties, who have not obtained entry into parliament through the SMC/FPTP election, will now do so through PR. 12. A computerised voters’ list had been drawn up and made available for inspection by political parties. Voters, who were required to dip their fingers into indelible ink (whose stain lasted for weeks) when registering, could only vote upon presentation of a voter registration card which displayed their photograph, fingerprint, and signature. Furthermore, ballot boxes were transparent, and the EU financed an Election Results Centre, to which results were dispatched electronically from the constituencies after they had been announced and displayed locally. 13. By becoming involved in SADC military structures and ventures, young professional army officers – now recruited from the university and sent abroad for technical training – are enabled to see a career ahead of them that extends beyond Lesotho to the southern African region as a whole. 38 EASSRR, vol. XIX, no. 1 (January 2003) 14. Unlike the post-1970 BNP government, the LCD government has not been at perpetual odds with South Africa, and unlike its pre-1997 BCP predecessor, it has not been directly challenged by the military. 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