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The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro

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The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro In this essay I pay homage to one of the most important but neglected philosophers of liberation in Latin America, Luis Villoro; by considering what possible lessons we can learn in his philosophy about better and worst ways for philosophers to approach injustices in the Americas. Villoro was sympathetic to liberatory-Left philosophies in Latin America. However, he became concerned with the direction they took once they grew into philosophical movements centered on shared beliefs or on totalizing theories that presume global explanatory power. They became vulnerable to extremes or vices that undermine their disruptive function. In order to show the contemporary relevance of Villoro, I will examine some of these worrying tendencies among that body of literature roughly described as “decolonial thought.” My aim is not to undermine or refute decolonial thought, but to help them or any new liberatory-Left movement avoid some costly mistakes. In other words, this is an effort to warn fellow-travelers away from some looming pitfalls and dead-ends. Luis Villoro and the Decolonial Left in Latin America Villoro (1922-2014) was the last living member of the 1948 Hyperion philosophical group in Mexico, one of the most distinguished groups in the history of Latin American philosophy. i His original work drew from the most important philosophical currents of the second half of the previous century: existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, analytic, and continental. ii Villoro was an accomplished academic philosopher that also participated in social movements to ameliorate problems of injustice; a rare quality in philosophers, even among those intellectuals that write about liberation. iii Latin American scholars have long known via Villoro’s writings that the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico left a profound impression on him, but it is not until recently that the world found out that Villoro was a member of the Zapatista group. This secret was disclosed on May 2nd (2015) by Subcomandante Marcos who reappeared (after years in hiding) in a ceremony, organized by the Zapatistas, for the families of Luis Villoro in Chiapas in homage to his live. iv Villoro’s philosophical views on injustice, power, revolution, and ideology were modified according to the lessons he learned from his experiences as a Zapatista. I will here tap into some of these views as they bear on his criticisms and worries about his fellow Left-radical-liberation philosophers in Latin America. Villoro was concern about the direction taken by Latin Americanism (e.g. Leopoldo Zea) and Marxism (e.g. Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez); a direction that has led to the recent philosophies of liberation and decolonial philosophies. To affirm this continuity is not to deny the differences and positive developments. What is now the decolonial turn or project is part of the critical liberation thought in Latin America that has continued to rectify its own blinders that come from European bias. For instance, the social-historical reality in Latin America is such that injustices cannot simply be analyzed in terms of class, so that the new categories such as “coloniality” v or “western hegemonic modernity” vi was needed to capture better the injustices that are the legacy of colonialism in other realms of social life that are not just narrowly political, e.g., knowledge. vii While these last categories predominate in the analysis of decolonials it is important not to homogenize a movement that is in process of development centered on overlapping beliefs and methodologies. viii There is, however, some consensus that in the Americas there
2 has been a “decolonial turn” ix in philosophy and that it is proper to characterize the thought or approach of such philosophers as Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Ramon Grosfugel as “decolonial” or as being centered on some form of “decolonialism”. I will not here attempt a full genealogy and description of this turn or project, it will be enough for my purpose to examine just the most broad and common assumptions in how they approach problems of injustice. x Decolonials overlap in some of their assumptions (including some general categories as their favorite tools of analysis) and in their general approach to the problems of injustice in the Americas. For sure, in spite of their differences, most of them shared a sense on what is the central problem and the direction in which we should seek a possible solution. Maldonado admits as much: “The decolonial turn does not refer to a single theoretical school, but rather points to a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as a fundamental problem in the modern (as well as postmodern and information) age, and of decolonization or decoloniality as a necessary task that remains unfinished.” xi Decolonials see themselves as taken the theme of “decolonization” (the new synonym of “liberation”) into far-reaching and systematic critique of European and USA dominance, and modernity-liberalism, conceived as a colonial ideologies that have concealed Latin American voices. They see recent decolonial indigenous movements everywhere as evidence that their approach has current relevance and a future. xii The decolonials see themselves as rectifying the blind spots of other liberatory philosophies, as having a more extensive explanatory power since it presents a large historical narrative, from a global perspective, where class, race, and gender are co- implicated in the long history of the oppressed in Latin America. But here is where the contrast with Villoro will prove instructive. While Villoro is part of the same intellectual history as the decolonials, he does not share the same methodological approach to the same injustices. How should we approach the problems of injustice in the Americas? One strength of Latin American philosophy is its commitment to context and its avoidance of Western universal (Archimedean) starting points. This makes a difference in regard to how to approach problems of injustice. The Latin American approach shared by Decolonials and Villoro can be contrasted with an atomistic approach to problems of injustice. The atomistic approach is one that stresses the particularity of an injustice event by neglecting history, and in general the relation of that event with others or with structural causes. This is a failure to appreciate the larger connections of single events with more systematic problems that have a long history and larger scope. xiii For example, it is unreasonable to describe and think about the present injustices in Mexico or the Dominican Republic without considering the histories of these countries and maybe even the larger geo-political context in which they have been. Villoro and the decolonials are nothing like this atomistic approach that have been use to hide oppressions; they insist in taking seriously structural injustices and starting with history. However, there is a different understanding of what this actually means. Let’s start with Villoro.
The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro In this essay I pay homage to one of the most important but neglected philosophers of liberation in Latin America, Luis Villoro; by considering what possible lessons we can learn in his philosophy about better and worst ways for philosophers to approach injustices in the Americas. Villoro was sympathetic to liberatory-Left philosophies in Latin America. However, he became concerned with the direction they took once they grew into philosophical movements centered on shared beliefs or on totalizing theories that presume global explanatory power. They became vulnerable to extremes or vices that undermine their disruptive function. In order to show the contemporary relevance of Villoro, I will examine some of these worrying tendencies among that body of literature roughly described as “decolonial thought.” My aim is not to undermine or refute decolonial thought, but to help them or any new liberatory-Left movement avoid some costly mistakes. In other words, this is an effort to warn fellow-travelers away from some looming pitfalls and dead-ends. Luis Villoro and the Decolonial Left in Latin America Villoro (1922-2014) was the last living member of the 1948 Hyperion philosophical group in Mexico, one of the most distinguished groups in the history of Latin American philosophy.i His original work drew from the most important philosophical currents of the second half of the previous century: existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, analytic, and continental.ii Villoro was an accomplished academic philosopher that also participated in social movements to ameliorate problems of injustice; a rare quality in philosophers, even among those intellectuals that write about liberation.iii Latin American scholars have long known via Villoro’s writings that the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico left a profound impression on him, but it is not until recently that the world found out that Villoro was a member of the Zapatista group. This secret was disclosed on May 2nd (2015) by Subcomandante Marcos who reappeared (after years in hiding) in a ceremony, organized by the Zapatistas, for the families of Luis Villoro in Chiapas in homage to his live.iv Villoro’s philosophical views on injustice, power, revolution, and ideology were modified according to the lessons he learned from his experiences as a Zapatista. I will here tap into some of these views as they bear on his criticisms and worries about his fellow Left-radical-liberation philosophers in Latin America. Villoro was concern about the direction taken by Latin Americanism (e.g. Leopoldo Zea) and Marxism (e.g. Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez); a direction that has led to the recent philosophies of liberation and decolonial philosophies. To affirm this continuity is not to deny the differences and positive developments. What is now the decolonial turn or project is part of the critical liberation thought in Latin America that has continued to rectify its own blinders that come from European bias. For instance, the social-historical reality in Latin America is such that injustices cannot simply be analyzed in terms of class, so that the new categories such as “coloniality”v or “western hegemonic modernity”vi was needed to capture better the injustices that are the legacy of colonialism in other realms of social life that are not just narrowly political, e.g., knowledge.vii While these last categories predominate in the analysis of decolonials it is important not to homogenize a movement that is in process of development centered on overlapping beliefs and methodologies.viii There is, however, some consensus that in the Americas there has been a “decolonial turn”ix in philosophy and that it is proper to characterize the thought or approach of such philosophers as Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Ramon Grosfugel as “decolonial” or as being centered on some form of “decolonialism”. I will not here attempt a full genealogy and description of this turn or project, it will be enough for my purpose to examine just the most broad and common assumptions in how they approach problems of injustice.x Decolonials overlap in some of their assumptions (including some general categories as their favorite tools of analysis) and in their general approach to the problems of injustice in the Americas. For sure, in spite of their differences, most of them shared a sense on what is the central problem and the direction in which we should seek a possible solution. Maldonado admits as much: “The decolonial turn does not refer to a single theoretical school, but rather points to a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as a fundamental problem in the modern (as well as postmodern and information) age, and of decolonization or decoloniality as a necessary task that remains unfinished.”xi Decolonials see themselves as taken the theme of “decolonization” (the new synonym of “liberation”) into far-reaching and systematic critique of European and USA dominance, and modernity-liberalism, conceived as a colonial ideologies that have concealed Latin American voices. They see recent decolonial indigenous movements everywhere as evidence that their approach has current relevance and a future.xii The decolonials see themselves as rectifying the blind spots of other liberatory philosophies, as having a more extensive explanatory power since it presents a large historical narrative, from a global perspective, where class, race, and gender are coimplicated in the long history of the oppressed in Latin America. But here is where the contrast with Villoro will prove instructive. While Villoro is part of the same intellectual history as the decolonials, he does not share the same methodological approach to the same injustices. How should we approach the problems of injustice in the Americas? One strength of Latin American philosophy is its commitment to context and its avoidance of Western universal (Archimedean) starting points. This makes a difference in regard to how to approach problems of injustice. The Latin American approach shared by Decolonials and Villoro can be contrasted with an atomistic approach to problems of injustice. The atomistic approach is one that stresses the particularity of an injustice event by neglecting history, and in general the relation of that event with others or with structural causes. This is a failure to appreciate the larger connections of single events with more systematic problems that have a long history and larger scope.xiii For example, it is unreasonable to describe and think about the present injustices in Mexico or the Dominican Republic without considering the histories of these countries and maybe even the larger geo-political context in which they have been. Villoro and the decolonials are nothing like this atomistic approach that have been use to hide oppressions; they insist in taking seriously structural injustices and starting with history. However, there is a different understanding of what this actually means. Let’s start with Villoro. 2 In a letter to Subcomandante Marcos, Villoro writes, “our starting point should be our present particular experiences of marginalization and injustices and from there we can project possible remedies.”xiv Villoro argues for a “negative” approach to justice. The core of his proposal is that different than the usual theoretical path taken by philosophies of justice we must try out a “negative” path, i.e., to try to understand justice from his absence, from experiences of injustice. While Rawls thought of justice from a veil of ignorance in which a subject imagined what was to be a just society, Villoro thinks of justice from the standpoint of particular people suffering injustices at a particular time and place. Villoro argues that this metaphilosophical position is an intellectual strategy that it makes sense that it is suggested by a philosopher from Latin America. For in countries like Mexico, the experience of injustice is daily, so it comes natural to think about justice starting from the vivid experiences of injustices. For Villoro the proper starting point of the ethical and political reflection about justice is not some form of consensus, factual or hypothetical (a la Rawls), nor the large metanarratives that assume a universal standpoint and tend to occlude injustices; it should be the concrete problematic situations of injustice or as Villoro says “the lived suffered experience that is an injustice.”xv Villoro starts by pointing and providing a generic description of the direct personal experiences of exclusion and not the usual abstractions in philosophy. He says, “we are not referring to a general exclusion [myself as a worker or female in any society] but to a lived relation in the midst of a concrete society.”xvi These harms are experienced as a forced exclusion that can be of different types and to different degrees (e.g. full participation in different areas of life; economical, cultural, political) and are usually linked to some difference. Villoro presents phenomenological descriptions of these experiences and is attentive to particular historical circumstances before he ventures into speculation about probable global causes and becomes the basis for his philosophical effort to defend the rights of indigenous pueblos.xvii Notice how different is Villoro’s starting point from the usual “global” in scope approach of the decolonial turn. Decolonials as reaction to the hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated, but “situated” where? The context in which knowledge is situated, as well as of the injustices they care to diagnose, are often described as power structures (“global hierarchies”) located in a geo-political context (in a “world-system”).xviii They prescribe that Latin Americans think from a particular historical and social reality, but this is understood as seeing oneself in the periphery of a global order. The tendency among decolonials to favor this starting point and to gravitate towards global views of injustice comes from the influence of “World-system” and “dependency” theory analysis in economics.xix However, a key influence, not often recognized, is a general way of thinking about problems of injustice that is, ironically, “European” in origin (I say ironically because they are against “Eurocentrism”). There is a long tradition of socio-political thought in Europe whose starting point is the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. According to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order 3 to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that “a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of society in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes.” xx This particular European approach to injustice is also present in some recent African American political philosophers. For instance, Charles W. Millsxxi claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illnessthe legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.xxii For decolonials the “sickness” that affects Latin America is the global hegemony (economic, military, political and cultural) of the West (first via Europe and then the USA) broadcasted under the philosophy of the enlightenment with Europe as carrying the mission. As Vallega explains “Latin America suffered and continues to suffer under western hegemonic modernity and its system of power and knowledge.”xxiii A theory of grand historical evil and systematic sickness in the Americas can have great explanatory power and provide theoretical comfort, but this has its own limitations and dangers. There is no doubt something impressive about how extensive is the theoretical explanatory power of decolonial theoriesxxiv but, where we are standing when we start with such large historical metanarratives? How is it this not a God's-eye view of history? Is there a danger of slipping back into a form of universalism (which they have explicitly avoided)? Isn’t there a danger that when a theory explains so much that it becomes nonfalsifiable and therefore non-empirical? One cannot help but wonder if Villoro saw these dangers and were the reasons why he did not jump on the decolonial bandwagon. In any case, the adoption of historical global standpoints and quest for a comprehensive explanation as a result of large historical metanarratives has also the danger of not capturing the historical and the concrete particularity (pluralism, complexity, uniqueness) of actual injustices. The more we can explain the better is our diagnosis and possible solutions to concrete problems? This goes against the common wisdom expressed in Latin American cultures by the saying “el que mucho abarca poco aprieta” [“he who grasps too much loses a good grip”]. When we start at the broad level of globality and history, as decolonials often do, there is a risk of oversimplifying and encouraging blindness about concrete injustices. In fact, one may argue that almost the contrary of seems reasonable. That is, the wider or more global is an explanation of an injustice the more we should be skeptical of its validity; the wider they are the more the burden of proof is on the one making the simple diagnosis. Consultation of recent rigorous research done by historians and social anthropologist about Latin America (more on this later) confirm what many know from simply living there: most injustices in different parts of the Americas are so complex that any simple explanation merits the suspicion of being wishful thinking. Let’s be fair, compare to Marxism, the decolonial turn added complexity and made a significant shift. Marxism as a tool was not sensitive enough to the realities on the ground in Latin America. It was a universal model that did not address adequately its particular problems. However, decolonials do not seem to have abandoned or questioned the quest for a global standpoint and explanations that rely on large historical metanarratives. As a result decolonial theories may sometimes be presented with the same 4 pretension of offering a universal diagnosis of the complex and tragic problems of Latin America. Perhaps a more "pluralistic" and "context sensitive" approach can avoid some of the dangers I have presented. Here is where the contrast with Villoro is useful. Villoro was critical of the same things as the decolonials: the Eurocentric narrative,xxv Modernity, Liberalism, etc. But when he takes a reflective historical perspective about this large historical and lumpy categories there is a difference in how he does it. He anchors his account on his local present situation, and is very specific about what particular aspects of modernity or liberalism are problematic; and does not have one preferred category of analysis, such as coloniality. For most decolonials, however, the legacy of colonialism is central (understood broadly as “coloniality”), and the situation of the oppressed is to be analyzed in relation to a global narrative where Europe is at its center or in relation to modernity or a global capitalist system. This is hardly at the center of Villoro’s project of liberation. At the center of Villoro is liberation from domination and the causes of domination are plural and contextual, and therefore, too complex to be articulated or framed by a global theory of domination. The decolonial project, on the other hand, is centered on detecting plural manifestations of the single evolving domination (a social pathology) that started in 1492. Liberation is understood as decolonization via undoing “the coloniality of power” and affirming what has been “conceal by the Western modern epistemic hegemony.”xxvi For Villoro, Liberation is local event where one of its tools is to take sometimes a global perspective, and the complexity of the problems in the ground may not be fully captured by even our best academic global historical narratives and categories. He inquired into the history of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice. If injustice is an illness then Villoro’s approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, i.e., the particular injustice in a corner of Mexico, and not a global “social pathology” or some single trans historical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. As concepts and categories “global hierarchies”, “white supremacy”, and “coloniality” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique relationship in a situation. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique circumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to them. Regardless of how much a theory of global domination centered on “coloniality” may actually explain, it is reasonable to worry about what it leaves out and question the extent to which it really helps those that are victims of injustice. A wider net may bring 5 more fishes from the ocean, but I am not sure this applies to injustices. Such theories may lead to analysis or diagnosis that while true at some level may actually have very little to offer in terms of more specific diagnosis and solutions that can be of any help to someone suffering an injustice. In other words, taking global standpoints and seeking global explanations in inquiry risk lack of sensitivity to context. In present situations (events) of injustice in the Americas there are not only intersecting histories of white supremacy, capitalist exploitation, and patriarchy; there are also unique events, multiple countries with different complex histories and present circumstances; as well as a variety of agents responsible (local and international governments, corporations, particular individuals and communities).xxvii “Coloniality” is, however, to Mignolo “the underlying logic of the foundation and unfolding of Western civilization from the Renaissance to today”xxviii Coloniality helps explain how race and gender became the basis of classification in the Americas, but it remains an open question how these categories actually operate in particular countries or even in particular injustice events. For instance, how race operates in the Dominican Republic is different than in the USA and other places in the Americas. As academics equipped with our favorite theories of domination we tend to forget where the structural injustices that we write about ultimately located: in particular unique circumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. We can say all we want that the oppressed live in power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system”, but that does not fully capture where they are. These are abstractions, however useful and true they may be about someone’s particular circumstances. Knowing how people have been classified according to a colonial matrix of power is important but only in so far as it may help us inquire about the present actual causes of an injustice. The same concern I am raising about the decolonial approach has been expressed recently by Sally Haslanger about Charles Mill’s view. She writes, “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistorical), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times.”xxix For “the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn't necessarily a single causal explanation; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context.”xxx Villoro never denies that colonialism, modernity, and neoliberalism are important to consider in a full diagnosis of the injustices in Mexico; but he resisted providing some grand casual narrative for the particular injustices he witnessed in Mexico. He was anticolonial, but probably saw the danger in making such abstractions as “European colonial modernity” the culprit of concrete injustices. It is not obvious how the use of a single name and the prism of a single cause help in trying to ameliorate the particular and context specific evils that particular countries and people in Latin America suffer. One could reply that my worries are misplaced. Calling decolonization the cure may suggest that coloniality is some sort of single homogeneous cause. But the decolonials have distinguished between different types of coloniality and have included in their diagnosis a plurality of causes such as exploitation of resources, political manipulation, and assimilation of people from other cultures. If this is the case, then why not address these more particular evils, unless one does believe in some unitary account where all evils are reduced to one? 6 One way to avoid reductionism is to stress as Ramon Grosfugel has, that “coloniality” is nothing more than “an organizing principle”xxxi ; a useful concept that makes us see what we would not see without it. It is useful in so far as it allows us to see that underneath progress in liberation from political colonialism, there may be unjust colonial relationships and structures that need to be taken care of. The usefulness of the concept is undeniable. However, as an organizing principle it has limitations and dangers. In may be too narrow because it makes us see forms of domination that originated only from a particular history where capitalism (based on racial classification) was its economic basis. But the most obvious limitation is that it is too broad in so far as it “abarca pero poco aprieta”. It tends to lump the history of countries and people with different histories subjected to different sorts of exploitation and manipulations and not always by the same colonizers. And the direction that the decolonial movement has taken in recent years is towards more lumping. For now we are at a point where there is coloniality of knowledge, gender, and being. Maldonado calls it “the matrix”xxxii . Mignolo refers to it as a “structure of management and domination” that is still around all over and in all domains.xxxiii The concept starts to look as if it does not itself have any externality or limits. What is next? coloniality of my colon?xxxiv There is the danger that coloniality is colonizing all other categories of analysis of concrete injustices. In sum, even though Villoro shares with the decolonials an approach that is historical (v. ahistorical), it seems more sensitive to historical particularity. One of the reasons for this difference is Villoro’s view of the history of ideologies (a topic of the next section). To be sure, there is some truth captured by decolonial approach, i.e., they track actual causes of injustices, but there are some dangers with it, including the oversimplification of concrete injustices and, as a consequence, proposing limited remedies or ones that do not work. Villoro should be mandatory reading for all decolonials. For there is no other philosopher so close or similar and yet reach different conclusions. But there are also lessons to be found in Villoro’s more explicit warnings he gave to his fellow Left philosophers in Latin America. While he has sympathetic to the direction taken by Latin Americanism (e.g., his teacher Leopoldo Zea) and Marxism (e.g. Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez); he became concerned with the excesses and vices they slip into once they grew into philosophical movements. Lets examine some of these concerns and the extent to which decolonials may be vulnerable to them as they continue to grow as a Left project. Luis Villoro on “panideologismo” and other totalizing tendencies Villoro thought that any serious philosophy of liberation needs to inquire into the nature of ideologies. For history shows how common and effective they have been to hide domination. The revolutions of the 20th century have taught us that we can no longer be naïve. However, Villoro was concerned how as a reaction, the Left has gravitated towards “panideologismo”xxxv , i.e., a totalizing tendency to see all beliefs as ideology, which fosters even worst attitudes such as “the politization of all beliefs. Every belief is seen under the prism of what class interest and political function it serves. Nothing escapes that perspective.”xxxvi The danger of over-stressing the political is “reductionism” or a narrow view of the richness of lived experience where religion, art, morals, and science are the object of constant suspicion as ways of masking some political agenda or maintaining a power relation. 7 Villoro thinks slipping into “panideologismo” has been a tendency of the Left in part as a consequence of a broad conception of ideology as a set of beliefs conditioned by the interest of the group one belongs to. He thinks this is a useless notion since all beliefs can be said to be to some degree socially conditioned or serve the interest of some group. This view of ideology is not useful in detecting ideologies and encourages the following type of fallacious argumentation: “We must find out what group in society a philosopher belongs to in order to find out what hidden motives grounds their theories and determine their truth or falsity.” Villoro was not naïve about power relations and how the place of a philosopher in a society can affect and corrupt his/her ideas, but he was also concerned about the excesses of certain types of criticisms based on stretching the meaning of ideology and in general the dangers of having an overly political view of life. For Villoro these intellectual vices is often accompanied by other pernicious totalizing dichotomies such as “all beliefs, of any type, have to be subjected to either total condemnation or absolution”; “in praxis one is either on the side of the oppressor or the oppressed.”xxxvii The same logic is applied in judging individuals: “If some beliefs of an individual are ideological, then the rest must be also ideological.”xxxviii All that is needed to judge the moral, aesthetic, and religious beliefs of another person is to figure out where they stand politically. The above tendencies feed into each other in some intellectuals, and before long, they can lead to intolerance or closedness to any other view about present problems. Anyone is susceptible to any of the above vices but Villoro thought that the sort of global explanations common in modern timesxxxix that justify some political outlook upon the world, are more vulnerable to these totalizing excesses. He admire Marxism when it was used as a tool of local criticism and liberation, but was critical of Marxists that overextended its reach to become a totalizing explanation of all problems and all aspects of life.xl Any philosophy, no matter how insightful and disruptive of the status quo it may be, starts on the road towards becoming an ideology when “it is no longer a critical reflection on accepted beliefs but a presentation of doctrines in opposition to all other philosophies”xli; i.e., when it becomes an “ism”. Hopefully the decolonial movement will never become an “ism” of the sort that concerned Villoro. Otherwise, their global explanatory power may end up undermining the possible liberatory function of their philosophies. If the decolonial movement remains pluralistic and open to self criticism it may be able to avoid the above excesses; but some will remain vulnerable as long as they assume the broad sense of ideology that Villoro criticized or if they presuppose a notion of “praxis” that is narrowly political. For instance, for Enrique Dussel all ideas and philosophers are conditioned or determine by a sociopolitical context because for him they always occur in the context of “Praxis” understood as the “structural totality of human actions of a group, a social class, or a historical community” means that “even in the case of the greatest philosophers, it is impossible to avoid a significant share of ideological ‘contamination.’”xlii Therefore, philosophy is always implicated in an ideology.xliii Villoro’s context sensitive view of ideology To avoid “panideologismo” and other vices of the Left, Villoro worked on a sophisticated theory about the nature of ideologies. He inquired into the history of the 8 concept in philosophy and, more importantly, the function of ideologies in the history of Mexico.xliv For Villoro what makes something an ideology are both its unwarranted aspect and its mischievous function of concealing or perpetuating domination.xlv With these two conditions in mind and a more rigorous and critical inquiry that is sensitive to historical context, he thought the Left could avoid the simplistic tendency to condemn certain ideas as being always ideological and on the side of domination. For the important relation between the ideas and the evils it conceals or perpetuates is historical, contingent, contextual, and changing. Villoro witness in his country the legacy of Spanish colonial ideologies, always mutating in their content, sometimes under the name of racial or national unity (e.g. Mestizaje) at other times in the name of the finest ideals, such as liberty, equality, and even democracy; but always serving the partial interest of different elites and different times and regions in Mexico. For instance, in the early 20th a nationalist ideology of social progress and unity, by a state which claimed to be revolutionary, would use these ideas to assimilate and dominate the Indians but later a different elite would “manipulate ideas about "ethnic" difference to divide lower class people.”xlvi For Villoro a serious study of ideologies has to be specific to time and places and open to the idea that ideologies change, have a complex history. For him this was an important warning for the Left; and continues to be an important one for decolonials who wish to trace back to 1492 and across different countries the ideologies that have supported “coloniality” (e.g., modernity, capitalism, liberalism). Villoro did not ignore how historically colonial structures common with other places in the Americas subsisted in Mexico, but for him ideologies and the logic of domination that operates in one place and time may not operate in the same way in another, especially in such a complex and diverse region as Latin America. If domination and exclusion via ideologies are local; its diagnosis and remedies also have to be local. We need to be careful when we extrapolate from one context to another. Villoro study of history made clear to him that the actual relation between an idea or ideal and the actual domination or liberation was complex and ambiguous. Hence, he became critical of the tendency of Left intellectuals to judge what is liberatory or on the side of domination based on the content of the beliefs and not their actual historical function at a particular time. The present ideological function of a concept/category is not always determined by its past use or the original purpose that it was created. The means of domination or liberation changes because of circumstances. A distinction created to oppress may play a different or have different functions in different social contexts. Modernity and Liberalism has not always functioned as an ideology and to the same degree; nor does it make sense to claim that it always will. Even native thought (“Indigenismo”) can become an ideology if adopted by the natives to keep them in their place, i.e., that perpetuates their subordination or oppression.xlvii For Villoro the much needed philosophical criticism of neo-liberal ideology in Latin America Left needs to be careful not to fall into another ideology.xlviii For this goes against that the disruptive and liberatory function of philosophy. He hopes that we can avoid ideology via critical reflection and commitment to certain values.xlix In order to effectively detect an ideology requires critical reflection (epistemological and sociological) and in order to undermine or eliminate it may require, beyond critical awakening, changes in the actual conditions that sustain an ideology. 9 Villoro’s reconstruction of what it means to be “Left” As critical as Villoro was of the Left, he wanted to identify himself with the label by first redefining it. He argued in “La izquierda como una postura moral” that to be Left is not to hold a particular set of beliefs, let alone embrace an ideological doctrine but a “moral posture” or an attitude towards society. It is “an attitude of disruption in regard to the present social reality that gives place to a transformatory practice, and is at the same time the negation of an established order and the projection of another one that seems more rational and human.”l Villoro, as a historian of revolutions, was interested in investigating the sources of corruption of the Left, i.e. how collective movements of resistance have ended up practicing domination and exclusion. The road or danger towards corruption usually begins when a Left talks a lot about “praxis” but its actual emphasis is on belief, on theoretical explanations, on logics of domination, or any other intellectual abstraction. The Left has made the mistake to try to be “an explanation of the world”, when it should be “a posture towards the world.”li This is not to deny that a Left centered on praxis needs theories (logics of domination), but the later are nothing more than tools of critical reflection, that may have to be modified and changed as we engage in the struggle: dogmatic adherence to anyone is counterproductive. To be sure, Villoro’s redefinition of the Left is a call for a more intelligent and moral praxis and not a mere venting-action-resistance or disruption for its own sake. Liberatory movements need to rely on a planned organization based on some provisional regulative principles and ideals. But these more theoretical or discursive resources need to be revisable and “thin” enough not to undermine the moral unity of the movement, while at the same time providing some guidance, enabling a more intelligent practice. Villoro is fully aware of the dangers with this advice. It is easy for our ideals to become utopias and for principles to become dogma. This is why he insists that the more intellectual resources need to be taken as nothing more than “caminos” (roads), and repeated in his talks the famous line by Antonio Machado, “no hay camino, se hace camino al andar” (there is no one road to follow; we make the road as we travel).lii For instance, Villoro proposed that the Mexican Left should take seriously in its journey the Zapatista principles such as “mandar obedeciendo” “todos para todos, nada para nosotros”liii but he did not think of them as rules, but as principles that summarize a different “camino”. Villoro hoped that by redefining what it means to be Left, this would help rectify “the greatest mistake of the Left”: its identification with a system of beliefs.liv The Left gets corrupted when after a victory in liberation settles in a power position and takes for granted that the noble content of their ideas is sufficient; and thereby abandons its previous posture of being “critical in reflection and disruptive in action”lv in the face of domination. This “contrapoder” posture is required because “one same political doctrine can have a disruptive function in one context and in another be supportive of a situation of domination.”lvi Hence, for Villoro what is Left in history has varied in very complex and ambiguous ways. Liberalism may have been disruptive in a particular European context, that is, from the Left, when it faced absolutism, but then it became conservative, i.e. from the Right, when it served capitalism. Marxism-Leninism was Left when it fought against capitalist exploitation, but it became the Right when it became the instrument of an oppressive bureaucratic class. “The socialist movements and reforms were able to transform the unbridle capitalism into a more just state of affairs, but often they become an 10 accomplice in a system of domination.”lvii It has also been the case that doctrines that once served domination can be later lived in such a way that they contribute to liberation. A religion (e.g. Christianism or Catholicism) has sometimes been an ideology that sustains an oppressive power system, but at other times, has been an instrument of human emancipation. How are Villoro’s warnings about the liabilities of the Left applicable to decolonial views? To what extent is the decolonial project centered on a belief (e.g., about history or about a global logic of domination that pervades relationships and institutions in the Americas) instead of a shared moral posture? To what extent is their use of the ideas and doctrines flexible and context sensitive? Given the changing and plurality aspect of the movement we may not be able to answer these question in a definitive way. However, if Villoro is correct, decolonials should, at the very least, take these questions seriously. For Villoro a Left centered on some set of beliefs or some explanation of the world is also susceptible to the following exclusionary attitudes that can affect the inner workings of the movement. (1) If you do not share the same beliefs or theory of domination as I do, then you are not one of us (against domination) or should be subjected to suspicion. (2) If your philosophy is not explicitly political and about what we believe is the cause of domination, then it is not a philosophy that works on behalf of liberation. (3) Only those that interpret the set of beliefs (that ground our movement) correctly, usually intellectual leaders, can direct the movement of resistance; and those that question the beliefs are heretics; and inauthentic philosophers. Villoro was himself victim of these exclusionary attitudes. Latin Americanist and Marxists perceived Villoro and others philosophers as not really doing authentic Latin American philosophy and betraying the cause of liberation. For them the fact Villoro did not adopted their theoretical framework and wrote some non-political books (e.g. about epistemology) meant that he was not really part of the Left and it worked against his credential as a philosopher of liberation. The Left tend to dismiss or exclude Villoro and others as ““academista”, “elitista” o incluso “colonialista”.lviii This must have been difficult for Villoro who was a Zapatista and thought of himself foremost as a philosopher of liberation. Is there any reason to think that decolonials are more susceptible to these last set of problems? The dangers are present as long as they stress at the center of their project a belief. For example, for some recent decolonial thinkers there is a distinctive Latin American problem or circumstance: the problem of coloniality. This belief or idea could become the basis to claim that decolonial philosophies are the truly authentic, liberatory, and Latin American, because they are concerned with the problem that should ground Latin American inquiries in philosophy: the hidden agenda of modernity (that is, coloniality) in the sphere of knowledge, power and being. In a recent APA Hispanic Newsletter, Grant Silva published an article that was interpreted by Milan in making precisely this sort of claim, and as a consequence the sort of exclusion (even if not intended) that concern Villoro. She writes in her comments, "Silva seems resigned to accepting exclusions…I think that Silva’s desire to preserve the tradition of LAP is of the highest value…but I don’t think we need to accept exclusions born of scorning Latin American thinkers who are not concerned with colonization.”lix This is the sort of exclusionary direction that Villoro fear in Zea and its followers and that decolonials must avoid. If it were to becomes commonplace in the project it would 11 be counterproductive since it may be interpreted as Decolonial thought trying to “colonize” the field of Latin American Philosophy. Villoro lived the tension in Mexico between professional philosophers totally detached and unconcerned with the Mexican circumstances and philosophers of liberation that as a reaction to the political apathy of this group, came close to abandoning philosophy for politics. Villoro thought both of these extremes were mistaken and based on a serious mistake about what a philosophy for liberation means and needs. Villoro does not defend the “purity” of philosophy or the notion that philosophers are not implicated politically, but not all thought that contributes to liberation is philosophy. As important as political causes are, the invaluable critical nature and function of philosophy should not be confused with political thought to carry on a political agenda. Villoro agrees that philosophy is always in a social context, implicated and perhaps contributing to a system of power, but the proper function of philosophy is disruption. However, and this is the important point, such disruption should not be reduced to political thought and action. For “the disruptive function of philosophy is implicated in its criticism of accepted beliefs and need not be explicitly political.”lx Villoro’s insight applies to other aspects of culture. It is false that the most politically disruptive art needs to have an explicit political message and intention. For the Left to abandon or neglect areas of philosophy that are not explicitly political is a mistake with practical consequences in regard to liberation. This is an argument that Linda Alcoff has raised about the present direction of the Left, including decolonial thinkers like Mignolo, who are “too quick to dispense with some of the aims of epistemology”. In “An Epistemology for the Next Revolution” she argues that while the critical Left in philosophy have become great at political criticism (raising suspicions) based on logics of power or domination, they have become weak in other areas of philosophy. She says “We can all now critique existing knowledge with great sophistication; we can describe with great precision the interlocking matrices of power and knowledge…But epistemology proper has been surrendered to the analytic philosophers.” lxi Villoro would see this as a weakness with political consequences, as a failure of the Left to use to the fullest the distinctive liberatory-disruptive power of philosophy. For Villoro a liberatory-Left philosophy should be disruptive in ways that go beyond explicit deconstructive political criticism. It must work on: (a) criticism via imaginative reconstruction of ideals and (b) constructive philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, etc.) that is not solely political. Villoro’s view is not without difficulties. First, there are good reasons to be skeptical that his proposal to change the meaning of the term ‘Left’ will actually work. The notion that the Lef/Right labels designate a different system of beliefs or explanations of the world; instead of moral posture, is deeply entrenched everywhere (perhaps as the legacy of the Cold war years). Secondly, Villoro presupposes some very high, and perhaps unrealistic, expectations of the Left. The actual Left will always fall short of the conscientious and critically reflective political agents Villoro envisions as an ideal. For Villoro to be truly on the side of liberation requires one to be context sensitive and resists dogmatic commitments to any particular political view. The ideal Left person has the reflective capacity to make context sensitive judgments as to when an idea or ideal is liberatory and when it is an ideology. He thinks this context sensitive reflection is particularly needed in countries where there is a plurality and complexity of dominations that co-exists in the ground. Villoro is aware of the tendencies of the Left in Latin America to reduce its analysis of domination to one single factor (e.g. class, race, gender, coloniality, 12 etc.) depending of their favorite theory of domination.lxii But this is a mistake that leads to reductionism and oversimplification since “in each existing society the system of domination is different; the dominated sectors are different depending on the concrete situation of every social formation.”lxiii In some societies, like in Mexico, “a collective attitude against domination is plural. In a complex society, the groups that suffer from domination are different”, their interests and circumstances may be different. Therefore, the Left should be sensitive to this complexity and plurality.lxiv Villoro’s expectations of the Left imply some unusual consequences in terms of actual political alliance in countries in Latin America. Villoro’s ideal Left person need not commit herself to actual Left wing parties, governments, or platforms. Villoro’s view allows him to be critical of both the actual Left and Right governments in Latin America. This is why, as Guillermo Hurtado says “Villoro has stood up against the leftist ideologies and utopias that have been used to tyrannize people and exterminate dissidents. Villoro has never been a card-carrying member of any political party.”lxv This last point can be considered a virtue of Villoro’s view since we have witness in Latin America how both the Left and the Right have been oppressive. The need for a framework by which we can be critical of both without any inconsistency is long overdue in Latin America. In Latin America, the actual Left/Right bifurcation has not been good for analysis of its problems. In many countries the Left politicians usually presents a one sided and simplistic analysis that the only cause of a problem in a country are structural and "external", i.e. come from outside capitalist interest. The "Right" on the other hand, argues that the only causes are "internal", i.e., the masses, the government, or socialism. Both are lazy and predictable self-serving answers coming from political ideologies and both fail to intelligently and open-mindedly assess the complexity of the problems. This is why recently a group of intellectuals in Latin America signed and circulated an online manifesto titled “For a new social and political imagination” to move imaginatively beyond the Left/Right blinders to problems. “We need to transform the horizons of the debate settled the boundaries of conventional ways of conceptualizing and articulating the social context of a radically new political and social imagination of Latin America.”lxvi However, it is questionable whether decolonials can provide the much needed framework that can be critical of the Left as much as the Right. For most of them are theoretically committed to the idea that capitalism and liberalism is constitutive of coloniality and modernity. This is perhaps why, for example, Dussel has been relatively silent in criticism of Chavez or Fidel.lxvii This is what you are compelled to do when you assume coloniality as a theoretical barometer for where evil resides. This is another example of why the category of coloniality in spite of its usefulness can constrain and blinds us about concrete injustices. To be clear, for Villoro it was clear that the particular form of capitalism in Mexico and other parts of Latin America (“Neo-Liberalism”) is a serious cause of domination, but this is consistent with a critical context sensitive approach where evaluation of a particular economic system as bad/good cannot be determined a priori or theoretically; we need to find out how they function in a particular country. One can argue that some of the indigenous movements praised by the decolonials are actually practicing this sort of intelligent judgment, since they have come up with a mixed economic system tailor to the circumstances. Bolivia's economic policy, for example, is pragmatic. It is a mix of state and market ownership and some have argued that it has had superb results. lxviii 13 If Villoro’s Left lacks a single system of beliefs or a theory of domination, how then can there be any solid basis for unity? Villoro argues in favor of a “pluralistic Left”. Even individuals with different political doctrines can belong to the ideal Left if they have a genuine interest in the wellbeing of those excluded or dominated. The basis of the unity is the fact that in spite of the pluralism of oppressions in the ground, “all dominated groups to different extent and degrees have a common interest: liberation from domination”lxix Villoro sees this as a possible basis for coalitions based on rejection of the status quo and projection of a different society; an emancipated one. In this coalition there would be some “common principles regulative of coordinated action that would admit or include a multiplicity of ways to conceive them depending on the perspective and situation of each group.”lxx Villoro is not clear on what he means, except these common principles should not be “propositions about current political facts” nor “premises of a theory” (or a “system of beliefs”). The principles would be about “social shared values to be realized”. They would be nothing more that regulative and will not say exactly what do in the face of concrete problems. lxxi Villoro wishes to ground moral solidarity on a shared moral posture against all forms of domination and at times on a concern for recognition of “others” in all of their differences.lxxii The emphasis that Villoro places on praxis for the ideal Left understood as a collective but plural movement of resistance raises a good challenge to the actual Left in the Americas which is sometimes split on a theoretical basis. The decolonials are aiming at a pluri-verse type dialogue (no center) among the marginalized or the periphery. While this seems consonant with Villoro’s proposal, it would not be if this means that the basis of unity is belief in some historical account of present injustices or a global explanation of domination. Villoro’s call is to resist unity based on an intellectual belief or doctrine as the basis of solidarity; instead seek a shared moral commitment. For Villoro most systems of domination create many diverse groups under its power. The ideal “contra-poder” movement must attend to this diversity. If it relies on some theoretical framework for unity it risks in practice exercising exclusion, conflicts between Left groups based on theoretical disagreement about who is the most oppressed in a society or which theory-logic of domination can explain more from the comfort of their arm chairs. These theoretical disputes are usually counterproductive; it benefits the status quo, and misses the importance of praxis. Villoro on liberation, authenticity, and the dangers with Left’s Manichean barometers of good/evil Villoro considers himself as part of the tradition in Latin American philosophy that stands for the idea that philosophy should be an instrument of liberation. However, he thinks there has been some confusion about what this actually means for philosophy and Latin Americans. Because of the reality of colonialism in the region there has always been a concern in all aspects of culture (including philosophy), that Latin Americans need to do more than copy and depend on external forces and models. The problem here goes beyond a mere lack of originality or authenticity; Eurocentrism can undermine Latin American’s own liberation. Villoro was a critic of Eurocentrism and admirer of indigenous thought, but he warned Zea (and the Latin Americanist or indigenismos movement) against prescribing simple formulas that we just need to embrace what is "ours" and reject what is European. We must be careful not to react to Eurocentrism and the colonial Manichean ideas (where what is “ours” or indigenous is denigrated) by a mere inversion of the Manicheanism.lxxiii 14 Concerned that the Latin American Left avoids this uncritical inversion, Villoro gave his own view on what makes a philosophy “authenticity” and “liberatory”. He presented two requirements (a) congruence of the philosophy with the philosopher’s circumstances (needs and problems) and commitments; and (b) based on critical reflection.lxxiv Hence, to follow and copy national or indigenous doctrines because they are ours can be equally inauthentic as is to imitate or copy others (e.g. Europe), if it is done without critical reflection. For Villoro, the Left must resist the temptation to rely on lazy theoretical barometers of good and evil. It must be able to provide a basis for being critical of Western ideas beyond the fact that they are Western or come from the oppressor. Not all western concepts, standards, categories are oppressive to even the most non-western people. To decide between good and bad requires intelligent discriminative judgment and not easy theoretical formulas according to geo-political coordinates or cultural origins. Even Native thought (“Indigenismo”) can become an ideology.lxxv He expected the Left to be sensitive to this, but what he actually experienced was a Left dangerously slipping towards subtle Manichaean assumptions, i.e. simplistic barometers about the boundaries between good/evil. This, I am afraid, is a danger in Decolonial thought, one that seems unavoidable as long as they make central to their project the coloniality axis that relies on binaries to determine the direction of good/evil. These binaries or poles are very similar to the ones assumed by the Latin Americanists that Villoro criticized. I am aware that it is not easy to oppose a binary without just inverting it but we must be careful. To be fair, decolonial thought have been critical of Manichaeism as part of the colonial legacylxxvi and there is no doubt about their good intentions to move in pluralistic direction where there is not one central epistemology. But this center versus periphery framework is easily susceptible to slipping into the simplistic view that all evil comes from what is at the center (Europe, Western, Modernity, Liberalism, Capitalism). For instance, Mignolo describes the decolonial project as “delinking” from the West and recovery of the indigenous as if this is determines what is the right path from evil towards the good.lxxvii This smells like a subtle Manichaeism or at least a position that does not permit contexthistorically sensitive inquiry. The Decolonials criticism of the hegemony of the West is warranted and important, but for it to continue as a growing project that does not succumb to the excesses (vices) of the Left, that Villoro diagnosed, it must be careful not to slip into any of the following assumptions: *Modernity and Liberalism was and is totally bad (it is an ideology to dominate, colonize, oppress) or only it has a darker side. *Eurocentrism (interpretation, standpoint) is bad; but philosophy from the periphery is good. *Western concepts have been used to distort or occlude indigenous (non-western) ones therefore all or most western concepts distort, contaminate, or are tools of domination. *Western epistemologies are imperialistic: the epistemologies of each of the colonialized regions are good. 15 *Indigenous diets are good whereas Western diets are bad; we must therefore “decolonize” indigenous diet.lxxviii Finding particular instances where these assumptions have been explicitly articulated in the decolonial project is not necessary, since the point is about a latent danger of slipping into these assumptions in virtue of what the project is centered on or stresses. However, to make the case that I am pointing to a real danger. I will next present some examples and controversies within the Decolonials where a subtle Manicheanism has raised already its ugly head. Mignolo has come closer than any other decolonial to assume the view that western epistemologies are imperialistic. Linda Alcoff has noticed and criticizes Mignolo for “often operating with what appears an overly simplified account of Western philosophical positions.” lxxix One way to make Manicheanism work is to provide or assume simplistic accounts of both sides in the good/bad poles. In Mignolo’s case, varieties of epistemologies in Europe and the United States get lumped into a single category, before they are all easily dismissed according to the implicit barometer of what is on the side of domination/liberation. What about Modernity and Liberalism? Is the modern project an emancipatory project or a colonial one as is often stressed by decolonials? This question is too general or assumes that there is a simple answer. If one stipulates by definition that “modernity” stands for ideas and events that anyone would regard as evil, then of course total condemnation of modernity is the only logical conclusion. However, one has to wonder about the historical accuracy of a philosopher that uses the category of “modernity” to include (lump) events and ideas in different places and during long periods of time. This is why some historians, such as Ricardo Salvatore, have been puzzled by how some decolonials use the notion of “modernity” and “coloniality”. He says, “historians are likely to resist the homogenization into a single polarity (modernity/coloniality) of different types or waves of modernity.”lxxx Salvatore argues that no one doubts that events and structures of power invented in 1492 have had lasting effects in a region, but “To the extent that these processes have had a differential impact upon distinct regions and according to different moments of time, generalizations about the persistence of the modern/colonial seem to erase crucial differences among localities and periods.”lxxxi Thus, according to Salvatore from a historical point of view, “we need to challenge this homogenization of a long-term persistence of the colonial.”lxxxii The impact of European colonization was very different in different regions of Mesoamerica. I am not a historian; my concern is rather how the tendencies in decolonial towards this sort of historical lumping and linear narratives about a single source of evil across history can result in oversimplifications in the diagnosis and solutions of local present evils.lxxxiii What is admirable about Villoro was his respect for historical accuracy and complexity when it comes to the relation between ideas, movements, events and the actual good/evil consequences.lxxxiv Villoro, as much as Dussel and Mignolo, made occasionally overall negative assessments about modernity and liberalism, but he would qualify them and admit that history reveals a much more ambiguous and complex reality on the ground in regard to good and evil. For instance, the relation between the European enlightment and the actual conditions in the ground in different societies was complex. While in some places it had an anti-authoritarian and liberatory function in regard to certain issues (religion, dogma), in other time and places, it did nothing but support oppression of certain 16 groups. Villoro acknowledged the same complexity of good/evil in regard to scholasticism, the church, positivism, modernity, the project and ideals of the Mexican and US revolutions, the civil rights movement, etc. If the relation between ideas and evil is context relative, changing and complex, then the Manichean temptation to necessarily fix good and evil along the lines or poles usually suggested by decolonial thinkers must be resisted. Today, however, the intellectual Left (not just some decolonials) has sometimes failed to be careful in their historical claims. For instance, Falguni A. Seth claims in “How Liberalism and Racism are Wed” (a NY Times interview) claims that racism is in the “deep structure of Liberalism”, “systemic racism was even necessary to liberalism”, “racism, racial exclusion, racial violence, is part and parcel of liberalism.”lxxxv While this has good rhetorical effect, does she means that there is something inherently, necessarily and eternally and evil in “Liberalism” as the ideas? the practice? the institutions? Without qualification this sounds as essentialism or some necessary relation between Liberalism and particular concrete conditions and consequences. The same can happen if a notion like “coloniality” is assumed to be the same structural evil across history tied in necessary ways to “modernity” and “capitalism”; as if these last historical realities have not significantly been subjected to change and diversification depending on the context. Let me be clear, decolonials are correct that Liberalism has been used to mask oppression and white supremacy. They are also correct in their rejection of the idea that colonialism and oppression were a separate or just an unfortunate side effect of Modernity; the danger is slipping into claims about necessary relations or assuming that modernity or liberalism can never be nothing, but an ideological excuse to dominate, colonize, or oppress. This can be avoided by encouraging more rigorous, careful, and historically sensitive analysis of what particular aspects-assumptions (e.g., ontological, epistemological, ethical ones) are problematic instead of just blanket statements or relying on some theoretical barometer of domination. This is what Luis Villoro did. He was critical, for instance, of the prioritization of the individual over the social in Liberalism, how it denies the fundamental sociality of human beings and assumes a hostile self/other relation that makes it easy to justify domination.lxxxvi It is because decolonials rely so much on the West-European/indigenous axis in their analysis that it makes them susceptible to certain objections. They are aware that their position better not rely on the suspicious “purity” of indigenous thought versus European. The way they put it, is that there may be no absolute exteriority, and instead proximate exteriority.lxxxvii However, Decolonialism is often based on the hope that there are still places in Latin America that have not been totally destroyed or affected by the Western modernity ideas. These places in the periphery can then build from relative exteriority and have an inter-epistemic dialogue without a center (universalism).lxxxviii Notice the subtle Manicheanism presupposed in this last prescription for decolonization. The bifurcation between what aspects or a pole of the Americas is good and evil is clear. It may be unreasonable to expect all Latin Americans to totally separate what is "western" or "European" from their being; however, the call for decolonization is understood as having a critical awareness of aspects of ones being that come from the colonizer. Decolonization requires for those in the periphery to look into their own tools (that have been for years denigrated) and using them to critique the European residuum left 17 in them. Decolonization is a process of emancipation from or transformation of what is European. As a result of this geo-political barometer of good and evil decolonials have been on the defensive about their use of Western categories in their philosophies. Manuel Vargas has raised the “Eurocentrism Problem” (2005) as an inconsistency or tension in some decolonials. If they are against Eurocentrism why some of them rely so much on Western categories? Defenders of Dussel have gone out of their way to show how a lot of his work in history or philosophy done from the side of the ethnic pueblos or showing that there is no inconsistency. Mendieta for instance claims that Dussel recognizes the “co-determination of both center and periphery.” Working in between European (the center) and nonEuropean discourses (the periphery) is okay as long as the goal is eventual delinking or decontamination.lxxxix Among the decolonials it makes sense to live with the anxiety of avoiding in their theories “contamination” from the West or ideas that originated from the colonizer. Raising the suspicion of “contamination” in other philosophers and even among themselves is one of their favorite mode of criticism. For example, are the categories of gender and class used by Dussel and Quijano suspiciously from the West?xc Decolonials would not be susceptible to these challenges and anxieties if they would just not make geo-political references so central to their project. Villoro is not as susceptible to any of them because at the center of his project of liberation is the liberation from domination and not from eurocentrism or modernity. There is no pre-established assumption or theory about where domination comes from or which geographic-ethnic direction are the tools for liberation to be found. Villoro does not go out of his way to try as much as possible to be suspicious of, relinquish, or reform Western categories. Which categories work better; those that come from Europe or those that come from different local pueblos is an open question. He did argue that many of the Zapatista principles are better for Mexico than many of the Liberal ones, but he would support these claims with specific reasons why the Zapatistas happen to be correct. Some Western ideas may sometimes be best in dealing with local needs. The Dangers in “using” indigenous thought and “speaking for” the oppressed One important point of commonality between Villoro and the decolonials is their solidarity and inspiration from grass roots and indigenous movements and thought.xci They have adopted notions and principles from indigenous thought in their philosophies. For instance, Villoro and Dussel have appealed to the notion of “pueblo” and the principles of good association in Zapatismo; while Mignolo (and others) have adopted the notion of “nepantla.”xcii The fact that all of them are Left “criollo” intellectuals opens them to certain dangers worth exploring. One danger is the misinterpretation of indigenous concepts since the philosophers in question belong to a different culture. When notions are taken out of their original cultural context and in the hands of people removed from those cultures the original meaning can be distorted. However, is there anything wrong or problematic about such borrowing, adoptions, and distortions? In fact, one can argue that the emergence of new great cultural products (including philosophies) are the result of borrowing and even distorting in the sense of transforming what was taken. But problems start to quickly emerge if the person or group doing the “taking” (1) do not admit or are explicit that they are transforming what 18 they take, or worst, (2) when those who” take” do so in ways that are disrespectful and exploitative (e.g., take all the credit or benefits). This same situation may even be more problematic when the one doing the taking, borrowing, and transforming is from the dominant culture known for historically doing the wrong sort of “taking” (colonialism). I do not wish here to lay out some criteria or rule about when using or taking indigenous ideas is wrong or problematic. For sure, absolute prohibitions or rules make no sense; context matters on this issue. The only point to be made is that there is a danger of slipping into the sort of appropriation of indigenous thought that is problematic, especially when it comes from non-indigenous philosophers. From this is does not follow that only indigenous philosophers should do indigenous philosophy or that only they can do it well. This may be considered as ridiculous as claiming that only Blacks should play jazz or that there cannot great White jazz musicians or that all great jazz bands need a Black player for legitimacy. Let me return to Villoro and the decolonials. Are these cases of the objectionable sort of cultural appropriation? Is one view more susceptible than the other? There is nothing about their ideas or approaches that makes one more vulnerable than the other since this danger has more to do with the actual relationship between the “criollo” philosophers and the indigenous pueblos as well as the actual motives. In the case of Villoro, since his recent death, scholars are still investigating the biographical details of his relationships with the indigenous people in Chiapas. So far there is no evidence to suggest that he used indigenous thought or people in the objectionable ways suggested. On the contrary, the fact that he was accepted and celebrated as a Zapatista by the indigenous communities suggest that Villoro was not perceived as an outsider that communicated with them just to use their ideas. Moreover, in various publications he makes very clear that his goals were the autonomy of the indigenous communities and demonstrates to the rest of Mexico (criollos, mestizos) that “tenemos que aprender de ellos”xciii [“we have to learn from them”] Have decolonials misinterpret or misappropriated indigenous thought? This is a difficult question to answer, and perhaps even unfair to ask, given the pluralism and changing character of the movement. But there is already some anecdotal and textual evidence that should make decolonials worry. I know someone that recently sent me an email saying: “I am thinking about writing a paper entitled “Decolonizing Nepantla" because a lot of decolonial border and queer studies help themselves to the notion of Nepantla. But it is simply not what the Mexica intended. I do find it rather scandalous, ironic and amusing that Mignolo would miss-appropriate a native concept as the name of his journal!” “Writing such an article will certainly make me a lot of enemies!” There are also stories of conferences where in the presence of indigenous scholars the non-indigenous decolonials are too quick to tell the indigenous speakers what they really meant to say in their paper. In once case, during the Q & A for an indigenous thinker, the decolonials asked questions that attempted to frame, incorporate, and subsume the paper about being indigenous within Mignolo's philosophical framework. To some of the people present it seemed an attempt try to appropriate indigenous scholarship. While this may seem nothing more than anecdotal evidence, it at least makes vivid enough the presence of a danger. In any case, the more solid evidence of a potential problem for decolonials comes from the recently published work by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, an indigenous (Aymara) thinker. From her article “Ch’ixinakax utxiwa: 19 A Reflection on the Practices and Discourses of Decolonization”xciv I have selected some of the most salient passages as evidence that the danger of appropriation is more than a vague speculative possibility: “The cultural studies departments of North American universities have adopted the ideas of subaltern studies and launched debates in Latin America, thus creating a jargon, a conceptual apparatus, and forms of reference and counter reference that have isolated academic treatises from any obligation to or dialogue with insurgent social forces. Walter Mignolo and company have built a small empire within an empire, strategically appropriating the contributions of the subaltern studies school of India and the various Latin American variants of critical refection on colonization and decolonization. “At one point, Dr. Mignolo … taking up my ideas about internal colonialism and the epistemology of oral history, he regurgitated them entangled in a discourse of alterity that was profoundly depoliticized. He took on, out of context …” “Neologisms such as decolonial, transmodernity, and eco- si-mía proliferate, and such language entangles and paralyzes their objects of study: the indigenous and Africandescended people with whom these academics believe they are in dialogue. But they also create a new academic canon, using a world of references and counter references that establish hierarchies and adopt new gurus: Mignolo, Walsh, Enrique Dussel …. Equipped with cultural and symbolic capital, thanks to the recognition and certification from the academic centers of the United Sates, this new structure of academic power is realized in practice through a network of guest lectureships and visiting professorships between universities.” “Through the game of who cites whom, hierarchies are structured, and we end up having to consume, in a regurgitated form, the very ideas regarding decolonization that we indigenous people and intellectuals of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have produced independently.” Decolonials should be concerned with the danger of misappropriation. If they are not careful in how they use indigenous thought it may lead to the serious inconsistency that they are themselves colonizing indigenous thought. There is a related and perhaps more serious danger: when a non-indigenous intellectual assume the sort of authoritarian stance that they start “to speak for” the 20 indigenous. But let’s be clear what the source of the problem is. Take a look at this picture. I think this is an important message even though there is plenty of ambiguity. First, it is obvious that some cases of "speaking for" are non-problematic, context matters. But putting that aside, she is pointing to a danger. There is a way of reading this via the decolonial lens that polarizes and oversimplifies the issue in terms of the West “speaking for” the indigenous. The problem is actually that others with a theory (regardless of their identity-origin) speak for the oppressed in an imposing (colonial way) and not that the ones with a theory belong to a different group or location. This can happen to any intellectual or even militant leaders of movements who are members of the same group they are trying to help. It happens when they “speak for” in a paternalistic way and without listening to the people they are trying to help. The problem, then, is in the nature of the relationship or interaction (I would say it is a non-democratic one). However, this is not to deny that it is worst (uglier) when those intellectual trying to help an oppressed group that is voiceless is a member of the dominant culture in that society. In the article of Cusicanqui, she makes clear that she resents not just the taking her ideas (and of other indigenous thinkers) but the problematic “speaking for” of the above picture. She does not see much difference between the old Marxists and the “new Gurus” (the decolonials) insofar as they “reproduce the cultural domination” …”by their proficiency in the legitimate language and Western thought. It was obvious that to do so, and to proclaim themselves spokespeople and interpreters of the demands of indigenous people, it was necessary to use obfuscating discourses.”xcv If I am correct that the problematic cases of “speaking for” are so because of the nature of the relationship or interaction between the intellectual liberator and the oppressed, 21 then there are things that intellectuals can do to avoid this problem or danger. For starters, it would help if they take steps like making sure indigenous scholars are invited to conferences aiming at decolonizing Anglo-European knowledge. But inviting members of the oppressed groups to the table is never enough, it does not guarantee that we will not continue “to speak for them”. To avoid the problem of “speaking for” what needs to happen is an improvement of the relationship with the indigenous oppressed. That the problem has to do with the relationship is made clear when Cusicanqui adds that “the North American academy does not follow the pace of our discussions; it does not interact with the Andean social sciences in any meaningful way.”xcvi In other words, what is missing is the sort of reciprocal egalitarian democratic interaction that Villoro thought was ideal (and has been the aspiration of some indigenous communities.) There is a lot to learn from Paulo Freirexcvii on this last issue. Freire was critical of Left Marxist leaders for assuming in their relation to the oppressed the following attitude: “since I have the true theory of why you are oppressed; I will help you (save you) by teaching it to you and speaking for you”. Notice that this is the sort of Left that stresses doctrine or ideas, the kind that Villoro criticized. What Freire would add is that this is a way of communicating and helping that is damaging for both the oppressors and mostly for the oppressed. It does not mean that intellectuals from the West should never try to help or speak for the indigenous. Freire wants whoever is “helping” to listen first, not to speak *for* the “voiceless,” not to speak *over* those who are trying to find their voice, but for whoever wants to help to speak *with*.” Freire was critical of dogmatic ideologues of any type, but were more worried about those on the Left because they often assume that having the right theory of world domination entitles them to “speak for them” in a non-democratic and paternalistic way. Notes i See Alexander Stehn’s entry on “Latin American Philosophy” on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://www.iep.utm.edu/latin‐am/) ii Villoro studied them all and had different phases, but never stop at any of them to the point of becoming a minister of a “philosophical church”. Villoro’s breadth of subjects in his writings is as impressive as it is the breadth of his knowledge in philosophy. Besides his writing on indigenismo he has incisively analyzed the ideological process of the revolution of independence and the issues of multiculturalism, cultural relativism, ethical reflections about justice, the ethical foundation of power, the link between knowledge and power, the nature of democracy and ideology, and so on. Among his most important works are: Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en Mexico ((México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1950). El proceso ideologico de la revolucion de Independencia (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1953) iii As Hurtado says, Villoro’s “legacy goes beyond his writing: to the end of his days, he was our best example of how to live as a philosopher; task that requires uncommon virtues such as not to succumb to the temptations of power and the narrow mindedness of academic life.” Ibid (my translation). 22 iv See http://contraparte.mx/2015/05/03/65116/reaparece‐marcos‐galeano‐para‐ rendir‐homenaje‐a‐luis‐villoro‐y‐al‐zapatista‐asesinado/#.VaVO2xNVhBc v The concept of coloniality interrelates the practices and legacies of European colonialism in social orders and forms of knowledge. It as been used most prominently by Anibal Quijano, Ramón Grosfoguel, Walter Mignolo, and Nelson Maldonado-Torres. See Grosfoguel, R. "The Epistemic Decolonial Turn." Cultural Studies 21(2): 211-223. 2007); Mignolo, W. "Delinking: the rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality, and the grammar of de-coloniality." Cultural Studies. 21(2): 449-514. 2007); Maldonado-Torres, N. "On the Coloniality of Being." Cultural Studies 21(2): 240 -270. 2007. vi Vallejo, Alejandro Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority (Indiana University Press, Spring 2014) p.3. vii The concern for the legacy of colonialism has a long history in Latin American philosophy, but decolonialism as a self‐conscious movement with common projects (including publications and conferences) is actually a recent phenomenon. There are different factors that have led to the solidification of this movement, including recent events as well as a reaction to developments in the academy. They developed in part as a reaction to the philosophical and ideological blind spots of contemporary postcolonial theory. They argue that colonialism in Latin America originated centuries earlier, in the transoceanic adventures from which European modernity itself was born, and that this has important implications today in regard to what decolonization entails. viii As with any recent philosophical movement, there is so much plurality and even disagreement among themselves, that trying to formulate some common theoretical claim or essence seems impossible and perhaps undesirable. Still, there is a common thread that unites them while distinguishes them from others, and the contrast with Villoro will also serve this purpose. ix Maldonado claims “The concept of the “decolonial turn” first came to light in a conference at the University of California, Berkeley in 2005. I was the main organizer and the concept reflected a long interest of mine in finding a way of articulating the massive theoretical and epistemological breakthroughs in the works of Third World figures, such as, for instance, Frantz Fanon, Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, and Sylvia Wynter. It was the kind of breakthrough that I also identified in the works of a younger but not less illustrious generation of scholars, including Linda Martin Alcoff, Lewis Gordon, María Lugones, Walter Mignolo, Chela Sandoval, and Catherine Walsh, and in collectives such as the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality network, the Caribbean Philosophical Association, and in a varied group of Latina/o philosophers and critics. And so, the idea was to bring together a number of scholars from these groups, and a number of others with similar theoretical approaches in the effort of fomenting further intersections in their work. Conference presenters received a selection of each other’s writings before the conference, 23 including essays by keynote speakers Enrique Dussel and Sylvia Wynter.” MaldonadoTorres, Nelson “Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction” TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World, 1(2), 2011, p.5-6. x As with any other “turn” in philosophy there have been different accounts and perhaps some disagreement as to exact historical and theoretical boundaries of the turn. xi Maldonado-Torres, Nelson “Thinking through the Decolonial Turn”, p. 2 xii As Maldonado-Torres says “the decolonial movements of racialized populations in as varied places as the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, to name only a few, make clear that decolonization is relevant in the present and will continue to be doing so in the considerable future.” Ibid., P. 3. xiii I am afraid there have been recently too many examples of this approach, not just by academic intellectuals, but also by the press and people in general. Take for example, the so many recent cases of excessive force or death by the police toward a Black person in the United States and how afterwards the event is treated and inquired into as an isolated incident. This approach invite us to rush into judgments that only scratch the surface, or worst, to moral quarantine the perpetrator as broken and then proceed as if nothing systematic or deep has happened. xiv Second letter from Luis Villoro to Subcomandante Marcos in Villoro, Luis La alternativa: perspectivas y posibilidades de cambio  (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 2015). P. 105 (my translation) xv “Only when we have the life experience (vivencia) that a direct harm suffered in a relation with others have no justification, do we have a clear perception of injustice” Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir (México: Fondo de Cultura economica. 2007), p. 19. xvi Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir (México: Fondo de Cultura economica. 2007), p.22. Villoro starts with a general phenomenological description of these experiences as harmful and intrinsically connected to awareness of ones identity and living in a power relation with others. Villoro claims that the immediate experiences of injustice is experienced as an exclusion or harm that quickly turns into an awareness that it may be caused by acts or omissions of others. xvii His approach led him to critic the way the West has universalized a particular conception of humans, rights, and justice. In Los retos de la sociedad por venir he argues that if any positive and regulative conception of what is the just social order and what are 24 the basic human rights must emerge and be grounded in trying to ameliorate experiences of injustice, then we cannot assume that the circumstances of exclusion are the same everywhere and at all times. According Villoro, the doctrine of human rights was formulated in a particular place and exact date: the result of the experience of exclusion of the European bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century. In many countries, like Mexico the fact of exclusion is very different: the desired individual freedom cannot be exercised without other conditions such as food, housing, health, education and membership in a community. If we are really serious about coming up with a theory of basic rights for all societies, then we need to start with an honest and thorough inquiry in all corners of the world about what exclusions are experienced so that we can figure out what actual rights are needed. xviii For an excellent article that explains the influence of world system and dependency theory on this movement see “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn” by Ramon Grosfoguel in Cultural Studies, 21: 211-223 (2007). xix See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World‐systems_theory xx Frega, Roberto "Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory: Social Philosophy Today," Human Studies (Springer Netherlands), October 2013, 6. xxi Mills, Charles W. The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). xxii The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. xxiii Vallega, Alejandro Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority, p.3. For recent excellent work that demonstrate this see Decolonizing Epistemologies, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011); Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs (Boston: Princeton University Princeton U. Press is in Princeton, NJ, 2012); Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate, Moraña, Dussel, and Jauregui (Duke University Press, 2008). xxiv xxv A narrative that have been and continue to be used to justify the subjugation of Indigenous, Afro-descendent since the late 15th century xxvi Vallega, Alejandro Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority, p.10. xxvii As academic intellectuals, we inquire into oppression along the axes of race, class, and gender but these theoretical axes may be limited, and may blind us to how they operate in each particular context. I recently asked someone from Mexico what is the logic of domination operative in Mexico. He replied, “that changes sometimes every day, and there 25 is no single logic, there are many sometimes depending on what Narco, politician, or business has taken over in what particular town or region.” xxviii Mignolo, Walter 2011: The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options (Durham: Duke UP, 2011) p.2. xxix Sally Haslinger, “Comments on Charles Mills' ‘Race and the Social Contract Tradition’” (Presented at the Central APA, April 22, 2000; http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/MillsAPA2.html) xxx Haslanger also argues that large historical narratives about the domination of one group over another also need to be “vigilant in avoiding over-generalizations about the attitudes, experiences, or social position of members of the groups” as well as sensitive to the “overlapping nature of social groups” and the fact that “the meaning of group memberships can vary significantly with context.” Moreover, we must be careful with our theoretical explanations of the causes of group domination since “it is the result of the complex interplay of multiple determinants [whose significance varies depending on context].” Haslanger issues these warnings as “desiderata” that arise out of “at least one strand of feminist/anti-racist theorizing,” but they are also what follow from the Pragmatist’s methodological commitments. “Comments on Charles Mills' ‘Race and the Social Contract Tradition’” (Presented at the Central APA, April 22, 2000; http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/MillsAPA2.html) xxxi Grosfoguel, Ramon “Transmodernity, border thinking, and global coloniality” (2008) http://www.humandee.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=111 xxxii Maldonado-Torres, Nelson “Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique—An Introduction” xxxiii Mignolo, Walter The Idea of Latin America (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 7. xxxiv There is in fact already blogs, books and research initiatives that have adopted “decolonization” in regard to eating and its effects. See http://decolonizingdietproject.blogspot.ca xxxv Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX. (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 1995), p. 159. xxxvi Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX. (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 1995), p. 163 (my translation). xxxvii xxxviii Ibid (my translation) Ibid (my translation) 26 xxxix See Villoro, Luis. El Poder y el Valor: Fundamentos de una ética política (México: Fondo De Cultura Económica, 1997), p.191. xl Villoro says “Aparece como una concepcion del mundo y de la vida, que presenta un punto de vista sobre todos los problemas filosoficos.” Villoro, Luis En Mexico entre libros. p. 146. In the case of Marxism, Villoro does not blame Marx. The problems started when Marxism was transformed from a critical and local liberatory tool to “a global conception of the world”; for this he blames Lenin and Stalin, but he sees the same dangerous tendencies in any philosophy that starts as a tool of criticism. xli Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX, p. 165 (my translation) xlii Dussel, Enrique. “Philosophy and Praxis.” English translation of sections of Filosofia de la Liberacion. <http://www.enriquedussel.com/DVD%20Obras%20Enrique%20Dussel/ Textos/c/1980–115.pdf>. p.159. xliii Dussel states, “The inevitable reference to praxis, … as the total structure of the actions of an epoch places philosophy on an ideological level, if by ideology is understood the systematic whole of ideas which explains, justifies, conceals or critiques the said praxis.” Ibid. xliv From the times of the conquistadores as it was used to cover up colonial exploitation to a careful study of the self-serving conceptions of the indigenous people by first the criollo and later the mestizo; Villoro studied how ideologies served in Mexico as mechanism of exclusion. See Luis Villoro, Los Grandes Momentos del Indigenismo en México (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1950). xlv He proposes that ideologies be understood as shared beliefs or ideas that (a) lack support (by reasons or evidence), i.e. are not sufficiently justified and (b) have the social function of promoting or sustaining domination. See El concepto de ideología y otros ensayos. (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 1985), p.28-29. xlvi Lectures in London and Manchester by John Gledhill, Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology http://jg.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/Peasants/mestizaje.html See his book edited with Patience A. Schell, New Approaches to Resistance in Brazil and Mexico (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012). xlvii See Villoro, Luis El Poder y el Valor: Fundamentos de una ética política. (México: Fondo De Cultura Económica. 1997) pp.175-197 xlviii Villoro warns us that “la crítica de la ideología no puede ser, ella misma, ideológica.” 27 xlix There is no God’s eye view (authority of universal reason) from which to criticize an ideology, we start were we are, and Villoro started from his long life preoccupation for the concrete problems of Mexico. For Villoro it was important to criticize particular historical ideologies in Mexico not mere for the sake of liberation from them but in order to permit a community with the “other” in Mexico. He stood for an ethics of relationships and intercultural recognition. l Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir (México: Fondo de Cultura economica. 2007), p. 130 (my translation and emphasis). This disruptive attitude “against domination” is embedded in a “practice of social transformation” oriented by a “regulative ideal to change the society”p. 133) li Ibid., p. 132 (my translation) lii See reference to Machado in Villoro, Luis La alternativa: perspectivas y posibilidades de cambio  México: Fondo de Cultura economica. (2015), p.104 liii see http://www.leadershiplearning.org/system/files/Some%20Zapatista%20Principles%20%25 26%20Practices.pdf) liv In Los retos de la sociedad por venir (México: Fondo de Cultura economica. 2007). Villoro claims that “The confusion of the Left with a particular ideological doctrine has been one of the causes of its perversion” p. 131 (my translation) lv Ibid. p.132. lvi Ibid. p.131. lvii Ibid. lviii Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX. (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 1995), 108. Zea misunderstood Villoro’s stand for rigor as a quest for professionalism in the narrow sense of development of technique for its own sake. Villoro almost resented that he was accused of being another analytic philosopher with the same stereotypes that usually come along with that name. He thought that this was as if analytic philosophers invented the philosophical skills of careful argumentation. lix Elizabeth Millán Brusslan "Philosophy Born of Struggle: One Theme or the Whole Story of the Latin American Tradition?” is a commentary on Grant J. Silva’s "Why the Struggle Against Coloniality Is Paramount to Latin American Philosophy" both published in http://www.apaonline.org/?hispanic_newsletter Volume 15, number 1 (fall 2015) 28 lx Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX. (México: Fondo de Cultura economica, 1995), p. 117-118 (my translation) lxi Linda Martin Alcoff, “An Epistemology for the Next Revolution,” Transmodernity 1, no. 2 (2011): 69. lxii He uses as an example marxism. The risk of onesidedness or reductionism in it comes from becoming an ideology that “tries to accommodate in a theoretical scheme the relation between different groups under one predominant interest: class.” Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir p. 134 (my translation) lxiiilxiii Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir , 133 (my translation) lxiv Ibid. The Left must avoid getting caught up on theoretical schemes centered upon some axis or category (class, gender, race, coloniality) that can actually function as blinders to the actual forms of oppression in the ground. Villoro’s high expectations of the Left are perhaps unrealistic, but they can be part of a regulative ideal that functions as a tool of criticism and as a warning to intellectuals on the Left caught up on debates about what should be the main or sole “frameworks of analysis” (e.g. gender, race, class). One often wonders if all sides are making a genuine effort to end actual oppressions on the ground; or they are just trying to win an academic debate centered on which theory-logic of domination can explain more from the comfort of the arm chair. One important positive contribution of Decolonials and “third world” thinkers is questioning if the European frameworks and categories fit the Latin American experience. They have questioned the universalism in the logic of domination in Marxism and feminism, but one lesson from Villoro, is that they need to be careful not to rest too comfortable in their own categories of analysis. For they have limitations and can distort particular complex and sometimes unique oppressions on the ground. lxv Hurtado Guillermo "Portraits of Luis Villoro," APA Newsletter in Hispanic/Latino Issues Volume 15, number 1 (fall 2015). lxvi (my own translation of the title), see http://viaductosur.blogspot.com/2014/03/por-unanueva-imaginacion-social-y.html (March 19 2014) lxvii And on the contrary has explicitly supported the Left. Dussel writes in Thesis 15, regarding the liberation praxis of social and political movements, “The winds that arrive from the South—from Nestor Kirchner, Tabaré Vásquez, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, Hugo Chávez, Fidel Castro, and so many others—show us that things can be changed. The people must reclaim sovereignty!” https://www.dukeupress.edu/twentytheses-on-politics lxviii See http://www.democraticunderground.com/110836649 29 lxix Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir (México: Fondo de Cultura economica. 2007), p.143 (my translation) lxx Ibid. lxxi Then he adds, “On the basis of this regulative ideas, one would have to device of each situation, programs of collective action.” Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir. P.134 (my translation). lxxii There is more that can be said about this deep moral commitment in Villoro and one could question the extent to which he is basing the unity of the Left on belief as much as anybody else. In some of his writing Villoro says that “the last step in the attitude of nondomination is the recognition of the other.” Villoro sees the need of articulating this more positive value basis. This recognition of the other is what stops one short from dominating the previous oppressor once one gets rid of the oppression. This is a common temptation that accompanies vengeance. Revolutions that just shift the role of the dominator must be avoided. “Only recognition of the other, in its difference, would be the end of domination of one pueblo over another.” Villoro, Luis Los retos de la sociedad por venir. p.135. (my translation) lxxiii According to Guillermo Hurtado Manichaeism has had a history in Latin America and he defines it as “the doctrine which holds that things in the universe are either good or evil, applied to social life: there are only two groups of people and two types of social structures (systems), good or bad. These two are in a constant struggle and the historical aim should be resistance or overcoming of evil via solidarity, revolution or some other means. The conflicts between the political Left and the Right usually presuppose the truth of Manichaeism. One presupposes that the other is on the side of evil. It is very hard to argue with someone that adopts this conception of the moral dimension of politics. For it is not a matter of arguments or evidence but of presupposing a faith in this Manichaean worldview. Manichaean people do not like democracy; it seems a messy jumble-scramble that allows the good and evil to become confused.” Guillermo Hurtado, editorial essay at Razon newspaper Mexico City http://www.razon.com.mx/spip.php?article237889&tipo=especial (Feb 22, 2015) (my translation) lxxiv What makes a philosophy from Latin America authentic is the manner in which it is an “adaptation of thought or ideas to its necessities and aims.” Villoro, Luis En México, entre libros. Pensadores del siglo XX, p,96. More important than the distinctive origin and content of philosophical ideas, or whether they address local needs and problems, is for Villoro, how they are processed and adopted. There must be the sort of critical and reflective adaption that is philosophy. He says, “The activity of philosophy that is authentic entails a change of attitude: from a mere presentation of ideas received or accepted to their examination and critical evaluation.” Ibid. 98-99 (my translations) 30 lxxv This stance is consistent with Villoro’s view of ideology already presented. The relation between ideas and good and evil have historically been messily intertwined and changing; in different societies and at different times. lxxvi Inspired by Fanon’s notion that “The colonial world is a Manichaean world.” http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/187444/frantz-fanon-me lxxvii Mignolo, Walter “DeLinking. The rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and the grammar of decoloniality.” Cultural Studies, 21 (2–3), 449–514. lxxviii There some truth that could be distilled from this last broad assertion once we make some important qualifications. First, it is not clear why use the term “decolonization”, except to stress the obvious historical fact that it was via the process of colonization that the indigenous were forced to change their diet. That may be the historical cause but we cannot remove the past colonization; all we can do is remove or reject the fatty and sugary junk of some Western foods that are, for instance causing obesity and diabetes among indigenous peoples. Whether it is causing harm to the rest of society is an open question but there is also empirical evidence that it is. This also means, and this is a more important second qualification, the cause of badness is the fatty and sugary junk of some processed Western foods (for some scientific and ecological reasons that can easily be spelled out) and not that it comes from the West or even that fact that it was imposed to the indigenous people. Not all indigenous diets are good nor all Western diets are bad; and the good/badness of the diets is to be subjected to good judgment relative to contextual factors. It is not even obvious that in a particular situation the global-ethnic origin of a food (Indigenous/Western) is a reliable indicator or rule of thumb as to its goodness. There is Western food that is great for almost anyone even if a lot of it is not because, for instance, it is the sort of process food that has been mass produced with only profit in mind. Of course, we can also make the reasonable generalization that indigenous diets worldwide tend to be good because there have been much ecological wisdom in the sense that they are “are varied, suited to local environments, and can counter malnutrition and disease.” "For many tribal and indigenous peoples, their food systems are complex, self-sufficient and deliver a very broad-based, nutritionally diverse diet," says Jo Woodman, a senior researcher and campaigner at Survival International, a UK-based indigenous advocacy organisation.” These above qualifications are important because from the above reasonable generalizations there is the danger of slipping into the easy (lazy) comfort of some ready made and fixed barometers of good/evil (a theoretical “Manichean” one) where food from the West is unhealthy just as ideas from the West (Liberalism, Capitalism, Technology) are on the side of domination (instead of liberation) just because they come from the West. When someone says that we must “decolonize indigenous diet” they better not mean that we must simply remove anything and all that is “Western” because it is bad. We must abandon the quest for theoretical, prefabricated, or academically designed barometers of good/bad. The lines to be drawn are between good and bad food, as well as who is the oppressor and who are the oppressed, and figuring out what are the causes of the bad health 31 and domination require a more complex inquiry that needs to be nuanced and contextualized. Sometimes I wonder if we, humans, are capable of such a thing. It is a regulative ideal. lxxix Linda Martín Alcoff "Mignolo's Epistemology of Coloniality" The New Centennial Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter 2007, p. 91. lxxx Ricardo Salvatore, Ricardo“The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: a Historian Point of view” A Contracorriente; Fall 2010, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p.332. In a review of Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate (The Americas, Volume 66, Number 3, January 2010, pp. 420-421) Fabricio Prado says “There is a paucity of historians participating in this debate in which sociologists, philosophers, and literary critics draw heavily on historical arguments. This constitutes the main pitfall of the volume, occasioning an oversimplification of historical arguments about the Latin American past, which at times undermines subsequent arguments and concepts.” lxxxi Salvatore, Ricardo “The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: a Historian Point of view”, p. 339 lxxxii Ibid. lxxxiii “Thus, from a historical point of view, the term “coloniality” appears as describing an undifferentiated continuity of forms of governmentality, subalternity, and marginalization of native knowledges proper of Spanish and Portuguese colonization in the Americas. We need to challenge this homogeneization of a long-term persistence of the colonial. It is better to speak of different degrees of coloniality.” Ricardo Salvatore “The Postcolonial in Latin America and the Concept of Coloniality: a Historian Point of view”, p.332. lxxxiv Villoro was a historian. In fact his work on the history of Mexico, especially on the revolutions, has earned the respect of the best historian in Mexico. lxxxv http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/how-liberalism-and-racism-arewed/?_r=0 lxxxvi Similar points have been argued recently by, for example, Michale Monahan in The Creolizing Subject: Race, Reason, and the Politics of Purity, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011) lxxxvii See Vallejo, Alejandro Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority P. 60 lxxxviii To be in the border is actually a source of hope to escape from total domination. Decolonial thought attempts to break with the imposed position of difference and attempts to liberate any remaining ties with Europe through the process of border thinking….ftn ALejo 32 lxxxix In other words, since the periphery cannot easily disentangle from aspects of the center appropriating European discourse is unavoidable and okay but so long as “the categories of the center are reconfigured and undermined” and where possible “supplemented with terms, categories, and discourses from various local of peripheral sources.” Vallejo, Alejandro Latin American Philosophy from Identity to Radical Exteriority, p. 9. xc See Lugones, Maria Lugones “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System”, Hypatia vol 22 no 1 (winter 2007); Ofelia Schutte, “Origins and Tendencies of the Philosophy of Liberation in Latin American Thought: A Critique of Dussel’s Ethics:, Philosophical Forum 22 (3):270-295 (1991) xci In Latin America, the decolonials see the indigenous movements for liberation as consonant with their approach since “the problem of liberation is as central to the project of decolonization”. xcii See Mignolo, Walter “Introduction: From Cross-Genealogies and Subaltern Knowledges to Nepantla” Nepantla: Views from South, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2000. xciii Last sentence of a newspaper article in 1995 by Villoro (forthcoming publication provided by Guillermo Hurtado, p.10). xciv Cusicanqui, Silvia Rivera “Ch’ixinakax utxiwa: A Reflection on the Practices and Discourses of Decolonization” The South Atlantic Quarterly 111:1, Winter 2012, pp.95101. xcv Ibid. xcvi Ibid. xcvii See the work of Kim Diaz, e.g., "Dewey and Freire's Pedagogy of Recognition: A Critique of Subtractive Schooling," Pragmatism in the Americas, edited by Gregory F. Pappas. New York: Fordham University Press, 2011. 33