Time as a periodization of management practices

This art icle was downloaded by: [ luchien karst en] On: 22 Decem ber 2014, At : 02: 20 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Management & Organizational History Publicat ion det ails, including inst ruct ions f or aut hors and subscript ion inf ormat ion: ht t p: / / www. t andf online. com/ loi/ rmor20 Time as a periodization of management practices Luchien Karst en a a Universit y of Groningen, Global Economics and Management , Groningen, The Net herlands Published online: 08 Dec 2014. Click for updates To cite this article: Luchien Karst en (2014) Time as a periodizat ion of management pract ices, Management & Organizat ional Hist ory, 9: 4, 414-432, DOI: 10. 1080/ 17449359. 2014. 980270 To link to this article: ht t p: / / dx. doi. org/ 10. 1080/ 17449359. 2014. 980270 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTI CLE Taylor & Francis m akes every effort t o ensure t he accuracy of all t he inform at ion ( t he “ Cont ent ” ) cont ained in t he publicat ions on our plat form . However, Taylor & Francis, our agent s, and our licensors m ake no represent at ions or warrant ies what soever as t o t he accuracy, com plet eness, or suit abilit y for any purpose of t he Cont ent . Any opinions and views expressed in t his publicat ion are t he opinions and views of t he aut hors, and are not t he views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of t he Cont ent should not be relied upon and should be independent ly verified wit h prim ary sources of inform at ion. 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Term s & Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Condit ions of access and use can be found at ht t p: / / www.t andfonline.com / page/ t erm sand- condit ions Management & Organizational History, 2014 Vol. 9, No. 4, 414–432, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449359.2014.980270 Time as a periodization of management practices Luchien Karsten* Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 University of Groningen, Global Economics and Management, Groningen, The Netherlands Most studies in management and organizations take time for granted. They apply time in a simple form: the past is gone, the present is passing, and the future is coming. In that sense, time is considered as natural and underestimated. Additionally, the clock time concept in the management and organizations discourse is dominant and closely associated with the development of industrial society. However, in the periodization of management and organizational literature, this topic is not consistently respected. The purpose of this article is to describe the periodization of management literature by primarily focusing on the impact of clock time itself as a universally dominant abstract concept. Clock time opened the way for the development of controlling time by management leading to chrono-management. By taking a longitudinal perspective, it will be demonstrated that the management literature can be divided into three periods that have all developed different versions of an efficient application of mechanical time. Periodization, of course, is a political decision and, in my version, the history of management can be viewed as the discipline to primarily rule over the time of subordinates. I will attempt to show that the three distinguished periods of management practice are all components of chrono-politics and are the result of the three industrial revolutions that generated three consecutive forms of managerial controlling of clock time: ‘disciplining time’, ‘speed’ and ‘timing’. Yet, with the increasing importance of global business in cross-cultural environments, the study of time deserves broader attention from scholars focusing on concepts of social time reaching beyond clock time in international business and management practices. Keywords: chrono-politics; industrial revolutions; longitudinal perspective; periodization; acceleration; chrono-management; time-scape management Introduction Historians are interested in change and therefore select a particular periodization to demonstrate the changes that they have identified. This is also the case when the development of management and organization literature is being studied (Wren 1987; Wren and Bedeian 2008; Witzel 2009; Witzel 2012). Recently, historians Keulen and Kroeze (2014) have repeated the need for a clear periodization to understand the development of the management discourse during the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Keulen and Kroeze have remained within the perimeters of the prevailing narrative about management. They follow certain protagonists and present the unfolding events that these characters have incited as having a ‘causal, sequential, linear and intentional form’ (Klinke 2013, 7). Keulen and Kroeze (2014) consider business historian, A.D. Chandler, as the person who has shaped the field of business history and state that many studies on *Email: l.karsten@rug.nl q 2014 Taylor & Francis Management & Organizational History 415 Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 the history of management are construed in line with the Chandlerian approach to business history. Unlike Nobel prize winner R. Coase, who stressed that the functioning of an organization can be understood by focusing on transaction costs, Chandler emphasized that transaction costs are a consequence of the talents of managers efficiently running an organization and setting out a convincing strategy. According to Keulen and Kroeze, Chandler’s approach opened the possibility of distinguishing between different types of management practices.1 The five periods identified by Keulen and Kroeze are inspired primarily by the contributions about management from specific dominant authors: . 1911– 1940 – scientific management of the shop -floor prevailed; . 1940– 1960 – humanistic or behavioristic management of the shop -floor drew the most attention; . 1960– 1980s – strategic management of top management became dominant; . 1980– 2000 – the manager as symbolic figurehead (the individual in popular fashion) took the lead; . After 2000 – ‘the end of management’. A new phase in the development of time management. (2014) Such a periodization may provide a detached perspective on history as it carves management development up into neat periods, thereby placing the historian in the superior position of ‘he who knows time’ (Klinke 2013, 3). Yet, to choose a particular periodization is also a political move. Keulen and Kroeze have selected one point of view, namely staying close to the prevailing literature output, but they could have selected another one as well. Let me mention, as an example, that organization theory itself consists of ‘clusters of research programs held together by the discourse of specific communities of theorists with overlapping interests’ (Clark 2000, 37). Chandler clearly belongs to the research program of organizational sociology within which structural contingency prevailed, and he became well known for his strategy-structure thesis. Due to its emphasis on industrial organizations, management began mainly from the business sector perspective. However, new research programs have been added, such as, for example, organizational economics, that have primarily embraced an efficiency theory that neglects power issues as well as social and political processes in favor of explaining organizations solely in terms of cost minimization. Certain other research programs move away from a Western-biased perspective and opt for a more longitudinal perspective. I have opted for a more distantial perspective from the prevailing literature regarding management and organization as such and focus primarily on the efficient application of mechanical time or, more specifically, how to rule over the time of subordinates. Over the years, this topic extended from the shop floor to the level of managerial staff by also focusing on the regulation of throughput-time for the provision of reliable information in large-scale organizations. The overall objective subsequently became to provide top management with reliable information in a prompt manner to facilitate making decisions within the bureaucratic structures and processes of their businesses while outmaneuvering their competitors (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel 1998). Even in strategy, decisionmaking as well as systematic planning clock time remained the fundamental dimension (Lee and Liebenau 1999). However, in the 1980s, western managers, in general, completely ignored the impact of the sudden rise of the Japanese business community and the way that Japanese engineers, managers and businessmen reinterpreted the concept of clock time. The consequence was a sudden rise of the Japanese economy evolving into a world player. The Japanese introduced the concept of ‘timing’ in the car manufacturing Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 416 L. Karsten and electronics industry. The impact of this concept has lasted into the twenty-first century. To clarify my point of view, this paper is organized as follows. I will first explain the role that mechanical time began to play at the end of medieval Europe and how the concept of abstract time was introduced. Next, I will attempt to demonstrate how, during the three Industrial Revolutions, the application of clock time in organizations intensified. During the First Industrial Revolution, the business community in Great Britain began to learn how to master employees’ time in workshops and factories by introducing the mechanical clock. During this period (1780 – 1860), the factory system became the center of social conflicts regarding the control of time. The most imaginative examples are the way that the businessman Josiah Wedgwood introduced the Bell Works and the manager/entrepreneur Robert Owen revolted against extended working hours (both discussed later). During the Second Industrial Revolution and more particularly in the USA, the concept of clock time became translated into speed. This is illustrated by the way that time-and-motion studies were introduced and assembly line production was organized. During this period (1860 – 1980), the modern factory system in the USA began to hasten manufacturing practices and became the new challenge for modern society. Scientific Management and the Human Relations approach became two sides of the same coin focusing on the improvement of efficiency in large-scale organizations. Furthermore, two other processes can be identified in this aspect: bureaucratization and a more prominent focus on strategy but, even here, the time dimension was prominently evident. During the Third Industrial Revolution (1980 – 2000), the presence of Japan as a new player in the globalizing world economy shifted the focus on time from speed to timing. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and modern transportation facilities such as air cargo and logistics began to address the possibilities of diminishing the role of space and facilitating the delivery of goods and services at the correct time. From the 1980s onwards, multinational enterprises (MNEs) began to learn that acceleration in manufacturing and distribution was no longer the single most important criterion for survival. From Japanese firms, the western world began to learn that timing is more important. This topic was subsequently translated into flexibilization as the main driver for the success of economic organizations. Yet, MNEs also began to understand that operating globally within so many different national-cultural contexts could no longer only be structured according to clock time. In conclusion, I will bring forth the argument that there are more temporalities than only clock time at stake, which require a different type of chrono-politics providing the basis for a new version of management: time scape management. Mechanical clock Archaeological records suggest that cultural structuring of social time with reference to cosmic and natural phenomena dates back to prehistoric times (Elias 1992; Duncan 1998). Nearly every ancient culture worshipped the moon as the planetary source of cultural forms of time reckoning and it was associated with rhythmic practices that integrated all of the significant levels of existence. Calendars were designed to shape the pace of life in terms of rhythms, sequences and synchronies, attuning social activities to one another. In ancient Egypt and Babylonia, India and China, time reckoning was based on a culturally established unity between cosmos and nature, the divine and social organization. Pyramids and temples of ancient Egypt, as well as the temple structures of the Inca, Maya and Aztec cultures, have been related to the analysis of extreme positions of the moon and other Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Management & Organizational History 417 planets to bring heavenly and earthly activities into unity. Despite the fact that all of these early societies had at their disposal the same physical data of the moon and other planets and the sun and stars, there were significant differences between the knowledge systems, which led to calendars (Adam 2004). For centuries, empires, dynasties, kings and other royal representatives, with the assistance of priests, determined when and how certain political, military and other social events should be scheduled within the cycles of days, months and seasons. Priests introduced the first forms of periodization to conserve or challenge the socioeconomic order. This practice initiated the first steps towards a governance-through-time, which, in the hands of rulers, became a more common practice once the mechanical clock was introduced in late medieval Europe. During the period 1271 – 1283, the mechanical clock became the new lord and arbiter of time. The heart of the mechanical clock is its escapement, the device that regulates the running down of the motive power. The application of this verge-and-foliot escapement was an invention of radical originality (North 2005). Once invented and displayed, there was a clear sense of excitement and pride about mechanical clocks. They became, like computers today, a technical sensation of the period (Landes 1983; Mayer 1986). Slowly, but surely, mechanical clocks introduced a transition from an economy based on a concept of social time ruled by religious festivals, governed by agrarian cyclical rhythms, free of haste, careless of exactitude and unconcerned with productivity, to a new commercial economy based on chronological clock time (Le Goff 1977). ‘Time was recognized as a commodity of great value and as a source of material gain’ (Gurevich 1985, 150). In medieval towns, institutions of government, church, trade and protoindustry came together and increasingly constructed new artificial time frames. The pressure for time signals was especially strong in cities such as Florence that were engaged in textile manufacturing, which was the first and greatest of medieval industries. The history of the late medieval and Renaissance city states and powerful towns of the Western world is pervaded by initiatives of rulers to turn the actions of their subordinates over the days and hours into productive activities that are based on the systematic application of the mechanical clock and to the detriment of other temporalities. Rulers reinforced the practice of chrono-politics, which denotes how time is used efficiently. Since then, chrono-politics in terms of ruling over the time of others increasingly became a common business practice that also impacted public administration. In my narrative, I will attempt to clarify how chrono-politics has subsequently developed through three different but consecutive stages of industrial development that can easily be recognized as key drivers in the prevailing management and organization discourse. The first Industrial Revolution: disciplining labor time By the end of the eighteenth century, Great Britain not only assumed a leading commercial role in international waters but also succeeded in combining international trade with industrial production. Whereas, according to Crafts and Venables (2003, 335), ‘in 1750, more than 50 per cent of the world’s industrial output was produced in China and India, compared to some 18 per cent in western Europe’, over the next 80 years, the British Industrial Revolution generated an industrial output that increased by a factor of seven. Great Britain became the first society broadly ingrained by clock time patterns. In the second half of the seventeenth century, it took over clock manufacturing from continental Europe. With the support of Charles II, an observatory was built on Greenwich Hill. Amateur clock builder John Harrison succeeded in manufacturing the first marine Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 418 L. Karsten chronometer in 1753. Due to the pioneering work of John Arnold, who miniaturized the chronometer, the British turned the marine chronometer into an object of industrial manufacture and commercial use. In the meantime, the quantifiability of clock time led to another important concept of time. ‘As labour got paid by time, and entrepreneurs became sensitive to the productivity of their enterprises calculated by the formula in which time is the denominator, time began to be recognized as a resource’ (Lee and Liebenau 1999, 1039). As clock time became objective, absolute, homogeneous, linear and uniform, so could time also be reified and spent, saved, wasted, possessed, alienated, invested, budgeted, and so on. This can best be illustrated by the innovations that Wedgwood introduced in the eighteenth century. The general rise in the British standard of living brought about an increase in tea and coffee drinking, which created an increasing demand for inexpensive earthenware. In response, Josiah Wedgwood innovated and standardized the production process. In his Brick House Works, he changed the work patterns and regulated working hours. He demanded punctuality from his workers ‘to make such machines of the Men as cannot err’ (McKendrick 1960, 409). To do so, he installed a factory clock on top of the roof to announce the start and end of each working day and each break. The presence of the factory bell caused resistance among the artisans who usually worked long hours and took a break whenever they preferred. The bell in the tower at top center summoned laborers to begin work at a quarter to six, which caused the factory workers to soon rename the pottery factory The Bell Works. Installing the bell was Wedgwood’s first management innovation (i.e. chronomanagement) and reduced other temporalities that artisans were familiar with (Karsten 2013). In other manufactures, similar practices were introduced (Thompson 1967, 1974). Manufacturing for anonymous (inter)national markets facilitated the establishment of a factory system. Along with the coordination of time in local places such as these factories, the ability to control time across geographical spaces with the building of canals, turnpikes, railroads and steamships advanced in a spectacular way. With the first trains and telegraph systems, an increasing practice of abiding to clock time was introduced. Initially, British manufacturing ventures remained small family firms and, for a long period of time, were organized as a single proprietorship or as a partnership, and kinship connections continued to be of utmost importance in the operation of firms. Larger firms, however, became a common phenomenon in the cotton textile industry. Several technical improvements stood out to increase production – for example, new spinning facilities supported improvements of weaving output. Through a combination of improved factory organization and new technology, the average throughput per cotton textile firm grew by a factor of 13 between 1792 and 1850. After the invention of Eli Whitney’s cotton gin in 1793, a rapid increase of the supply of cotton from the USA was assured. Improvements in process technology in the cotton industry ‘provided the competitive strength for British exports to undercut Indian and other Asian textiles and, indeed, all other producers’ (Freeman and Louca 2001, 155). Economic historian Sidney Pollard (1968) has linked the Genesis of modern management to the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain when managers began to imitate entrepreneurs and businessmen in ruling over subordinates. Irregular working time patterns were eradicated and long working hours became a common practice in the textile industry (Thompson 1967; Voth 2000). Robert Owen, once a manager and later an owner of a textile factory in Scotland, became a prominent entrepreneur who attempted to improve deplorable production practices in the textile industry and reduce working hours to a normal level. In 1815, his mills employed 1600 workers, whereas similar companies employed fewer. As a social Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Management & Organizational History 419 entrepreneur, he decided to introduce a 10-hour working day for women and children. During the period 1815 –1819, he participated in the movement for factory reform and became convinced that the reduction of factory hours were partly humanitarian and partly legitimated on the grounds of improved efficiency. He continued to plea for legislation to protect the workforce and to improve their health and psychological well-being and began to agitate for the eight-hour working day as a justified balance between working time, sleeping time and leisure time. Yet, the factory system demanded the synchronization of labor and therefore chrono-management became a key factor of control for the factory owner and manager alike. Karl Marx intensively studied the factory practices and developed a Labor Theory of Value to explain the exploitation and alienation of workers in the factory system. In 1866, he spoke to the International Working Men’s Association (the First International), which gathered in Geneva, and stated that the organization should strive for the legal introduction of the eight-hour day. Pollard concluded that the new practice of continuous employment in the factory ‘became one of the most hated aspects of factory work’ (Pollard 1968, 196). The rising labor movement in the western world demonstrated a strong resistance against the consequences of the factory system and fought for the shortening of working hours (Marglin 1991). From 1890 onwards, labor unions and socio-democratic political parties jointly and internationally demonstrated for the legal implementation of the eight-hour day during May Day, which became widely implemented after the First World War (Panaccione 1989). The American system of manufacture The great exhibition in London’s Hyde Park, held in the Crystal Palace in 1851, symbolized the scale and scope of a growing industrial dynamism. Within the building, American rifle maker Samuel Colt, from Hartford (Connecticut), demonstrated that his rifles were constructed with interchangeable parts. A British military commission investigated the machinery that could produce weaponry with such standardization and uniformity. Its report of 1854 coined the term ‘the American system of manufacture’. The Colt Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company played a significant role in enhancing the process of centralization within the factory system by refining and improving the production process with interchangeable parts. The gun factory was fitted with 400 machines producing approximately 24,000 pistols per year (Shenhav 1995). Its approach, however, was inspired by the work of the American watchmaker Ely Terry, one of the first to initiate a mass production process with interchangeable parts for making timepieces. The mechanization of the manufacturing made watches so inexpensive that, in 1852, they became an immediate success. The piece workers and inspectors complained about the regular hours and protested against the installation of time clocks. The Waltham Watch Company fathered most of the American factories developing mass production systems. The new production techniques spread to technically related industries and ‘by the late 1850s, could be found in factories making sewing machines, pocket watches, railroad equipment, wagons, and hand tools’ (Smith 1985, 78). During these years, clock making as much as clock time had definitely been transformed into generally applicable concepts in industrial production. The second Industrial Revolution: speed The dramatic growth of the factory system in the USA did not immediately replace traditional organizational forms. For instance, rural forges and small foundries still Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 420 L. Karsten coexisted during the 1860s and 1870s along with giant rail mills, employing more than 1000 workers. By the 1880s, however, industrial production processes with modern techniques eroded the power of the artisans and skilled workers in production practices. New industries such as electrical appliances and chemicals were based on a technology that could not rely on artisanal techniques. Traditionally, the first American management practices originated in the cotton plantations, where slave overseers and slave drivers became ‘the first large group of managers in American private enterprises. Cotton plantations presented a managerial challenge and brought into being America’s first significant body of management writing, mainly by the slave owners’ (Hoopes 2003, 10). Yet, as long as slaves were considered property of the plantation owners, disciplining and controlling them could be accomplished without clock time. However, in the expanding American factory system, scheduling of work processes according to temporal sequences became essential. Mechanical engineers pioneered in metalworking industries where a highly developed division of labor necessitated greater coordination of operations. The shift to a large-scale factory production disrupted the traditional methods of production that workers were accustomed to. Industrial development was often accompanied by dangerous working conditions, longer hours of work and low wages. The modern factory system of the Second Industrial Revolution rapidly eliminated craft production and began to employ an unskilled workforce in a setting where new technologies increasingly determined the nature of work and the organization of the workplace. Company owners, managers and workers struggled regarding the issue of who might control the work process, how the work was performed, at what speed, and on what type of system work rewards would be based. In this struggle for control of the workplace, superintendents of large American factories increasingly employed the ‘drive’ system of managing labor, which had been common for plantations. It is within this context that Frederick Winslow Taylor introduced his chronotechnology. He accepted employment at the Midvale Company and, as a chief engineer, began experiments with metal cutting for which he used a stopwatch to time the work that was required. In the Bethlehem Steel Company, he studied the loading of pig iron onto railroad wagons by deconstructing each task into a series of precise activities. By counting and calculating, Taylor transformed management practices, which were traditionally of an oral type, into a set of calculated and written techniques (Kanigel 1997; Rabinbach 1990). In 1910, Taylor’s methods and the work of other efficiency experts came to nationwide attention when several national railroad companies petitioned for higher freight rates to cover a pay increase for workers. Lawyer L.D. Brandeis defended the public interest and explained that the increases of freight costs were due to inefficient and wasteful management of the railroad companies, which led to the increase of internal operating costs. He referred to the work of Taylor and other efficiency experts as ‘scientific management’. Brandeis eventually won his case, and scientific management obtained national popularity and created a national craze for efficiency (McCraw 1984; Strum 1993). The proponents of Scientific Management – or Taylorism as it became referred to – created a clockwork world of tasks timed to the 100th of a minute and standardized factories with men and women working in formalized ways like machines. It reinforced chrono-centrism, the belief that the manager’s perception of clock time is the true and superior concept of abstract time and that it promoted an approach, a state of mind, applicable to every aspect of life. Henry Ford’s Motor Company exemplified this development. When he opened his Highland Park factory in 1909, Ford soon installed an assembly line that facilitated full control of the production system. Although mass Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Management & Organizational History 421 production was already utilized in the manufacturing of Colt revolvers and Singer sewing machines, Ford extended the mass productions of cars in a completely synchronized production process. The pace of the conveyor belt and assembly line determined the work rhythm and ‘speed of production’. However, the work became so boring, monotonous and alienating that staff turnover increased dramatically. Ford attempted to reinstall commitment from the workmen by offering them the eight-hour day for which the American labor unions and political parties had been constantly rallying. In January 1914, Ford raised wages to five dollars for an eight-hour working day in a three-shift system (Brinkley 2003). Four years later, Ford opened the largest industrial complex in the world, the Rouge Plant, which evolved into a ‘mass producing warship’, (Grint 2000) but not without protests. During the pre-First World War years, American society became confronted by numerous reform initiatives due to increased unionization and greater activism from the side of the unions. In 1916, the American Government passed the Adamson Act – the eight-hour law – to prevent a nationwide strike by the railroad workers. Labor issues received more public attention. The Bell Telephone Company in particular stood out. Western electric and human relations The dramatic growth in demand for telephones in the last decade of the nineteenth century placed tremendous pressures on international business enterprises that were involved in the layout of the infrastructure of the modern economy – the telegraph, electricity provision, telephone and radio. One of them was the Bell Telephone Company, which was established by Alexander Graham Bell in 1877. In 1881, Bell purchased a controlling interest in the Western Electric Company of Chicago, which soon became a main manufacturer of telephones. Western Electric had initially responded to the capacity crisis by renting additional space in Chicago and operating around the clock. The company, however, was concerned about the negative publicity concerning night working and overtime in its plants in a city where organized labor was prominently evident (Roediger and Foner 1989). The strike of the machinists in 1900 over the recognition of their union and the reduction of working time to nine hours continued to worry the board of management. The company decided to relocate its plants from downtown Chicago to a rural setting close to the town of Hawthorne, where higher levels of compensation and welfare were offered ‘as a bulwark against the rise of organized labour’ (Hassard 2012, 1438). The new Hawthorne Works, which, in 1913, employed 14,000 workers, was the single biggest employment site in the Chicago area and grew quickly to 25,000 by 1917. In 1919, Western Electric appointed a manager to bear responsibility for personnel relationships and the destination of modern industrial relations policies. By 1921, a personnel department was installed to handle routine testing, test development and job specification. The new focus on ‘the human element’ echoed the highly popular Bell approach to encourage ‘the development of elaborate personnel policies’ (Gillespie 1991, 24). Western Electric initiated a campaign to demonstrate that using adequate lighting would save workers’ sight, prevent accidents and lead to an increase in productivity. In the early 1920s, it launched a series of studies to explore the possible causes of unsatisfactory results of lighting tests. While the various experiments with an intention of artificial lighting did not provide conclusive answers, the team of Hawthorne engineers/researchers initiated, in 1927, new research focusing primarily on working time patterns. The question was whether the variables of rest periods and various hours of work increased the efficiency of the operators. ‘The relay assembly was chosen for study because it involved Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 422 L. Karsten the kind of highly repetitive work with which fatigue was commonly associated’ (Gillespie 1991, 49 –50). A separate test room was installed with six women assembling, adjusting and inspecting relays – a labor-intensive operation in which the speed of the individual operator determined productivity. Here, the engineers examined the effect of rest periods and working hours on the effectiveness of the work. The experiments continued until June 1932 and corresponded to the ideas of industrial democrats who ‘took an affirmative view of human nature and sought to maintain if not extend the role of labour’ (O’Connor 1999, 120). The labor aspect in the relay room experiments was well regarded and the women’s involvement respected by management (Gillespie 1991). Yet, with the introduction of Elton Mayo from the Harvard Business School to Hawthorne in 1928, who was asked to review the research outcomes, the focus shifted from working time, per se, to his particular perceptions on the interactions between managers and employees. Mayo was primarily interested in the irrational behavior of workers whose agitation-prone mind could only be calmed if a managerial elite counseled and governed them properly (Bruce and Nyland 2011). Mayo (1924) had argued that monotonous work and physical fatigue led to reveries that caused industrial unrest. However, after the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the impact of the Human Relations approach remained modest. Paternalistic practices were kept in place. Western Electric could no longer afford the extensive range of interviews and the budget for these major programs was cut. Yet, the Harvard Business School together with the financial support of John D. Rockefeller Jr. propagated Mayo’s Human Relations approach as a new way to legitimize managerial authority and increase efficiency (Bruce and Nyland 2011; O’Connor 1999). However, throughout the 1930s, Western’s management was pressured to increase workplace control and increase productivity by focusing on work time efficiency (Hassard 2012). This policy was an outcome of the Great Depression when more companies began to limit production by cutting back weekly hours to 40 in 1931 and then to 30 in 1932. Reduction of working hours was no longer considered an opportunity for workers to obtain more free time, but as a way to save employment. In terms of chronopolitics, the American government took the initiative for a general 30-hour week to spread out employment and put people back to work. However, the business community presented fierce opposition (Schor 1992). Within this climate of economic crisis and recovery, French-born American Charles E. Bedaux, who combined personal flamboyance with blockbusting business tactics, established a business as a consultant. He disseminated the gospel of Scientific Management by securing increased productivity by stressing both the importance of new equipment and better manpower control. Large corporations in the USA and Europe visited Bedaux’s offices for advice. His successful experiences enabled him to take his consultancy methods to Britain, where he established an office in London in 1926 (Nelson 1992). Bedaux introduced a new rating assessment that was referred to as the B: an hour of work containing 60 units of effort combined with rest. He insisted that a rest allowance was essential for the recovery from fatigue and included that into the basic calculations of any B unit value. His consultants assessed the rating value for the speed and effectiveness with which work was performed. Large firms became a receptive audience to the Bedaux system (Tisdall 1982), and the consultancy firm encountered positive responses in Nazi Germany and the French Vichy regime. By 1937, 500 American, 225 British, 144 French, 49 Italian and 39 Dutch firms had purchased Bedaux’s industrial services (Nelson 1992). ‘If the Bedaux archives reveal anything, it is that managers and employers were literally bombarded by statistical evidence that factories could be run much more efficiently’ (Nelson 1992, 163). Although, after the Second World War, the Human Relations Management & Organizational History 423 Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 approach – as it was propagated by Mayo and his collaborators – became extensively disseminated, suggesting that it had a positive impact on the increase of efficiency, many large firms continued to apply Bedaux’s practices. Even the Dutch Philips Company, which, through its chief executive officer Frits Philips favored the Human Relations approach, maintained Bedaux’s engineering techniques until the early 1960s. Bureaucracies and speed During the Second Industrial Revolution, the emphasis on speed in the operational activities of the production process prevailed. Large American companies not only demonstrated a growing concern about the lack of control within their operations at plant level, they also began to worry about activities needed at the top level. With the growing volume of economic activities in America, large-scale businesses with complicated organizational structures emerged, which required more administrative coordination than mere market coordination. Although the attention shifted from the shop floor to headquarters, the puzzle about the consequences of speed remained more or less the same. Processing information about their growing size operating in national and international markets forced them to increase the levels of formal bureaucratic structures. They began to invest in organization building and professional management. When more technologies were introduced, such as the assembly line intensifying the pace of work and telephones speeding up the transmission of information, more intensive control was required. ‘Producers with the best control technologies could maintain the greatest speeds and produce at the lowest costs’ (Beniger 1986, 28). Leading firms in the capital-intensive manufacturing industries made substantial investment in production, distribution and management to cope with rapidly growing markets and achieved economies of scale and scope in order to deal effectively with the speed required to serve potential markets (Chandler 1977). Large firms in information –processing and electrical appliances internalized all steps involved in making and selling goods within their operations and became organized as corporations. Around the turn of the century, the large corporations ‘accounted for three quarters of the United States industrial output’ (Blackford 1998, 81). During the interwar years, the purpose of bureaucratic control was to improve the reliability and speed of the throughput of information within corporations that remained within the confines of the main target of the second industrial revolution. Within this context, P.S. du Pont, owner of the chemical firm DuPont, took over General Motors (GM) and asked A.P. Sloan, an engineering graduate from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), to design a new company structure that would increase bureaucratic control. Sloan introduced the multidivisional decentralized structure (the M-form) with a general office and autonomous but integrated divisions. Each division obtained a distinctive product line like Buick or Chevrolet. This quickly increased efficiency through decentralization. Sloan extended control of production from the factory, through his distributors and dealers, to the consumer. Continual comparison based on efficient and speedy throughput of registered data, information from dealer reports and market projections served to control inventories, calibrate internal flows and refine forecasting techniques (Freeland 2001). Headquarters’ executives were responsible for touring, evaluating and coordinating the activities of the various divisions and carried out longrange planning for the corporation as a whole. They were freed from routine operational responsibility, which afforded them the time to analyze the throughput of information and focus on long-term planning (Chandler 1977). Bureaucratic structures in GM and similar corporations began to display greater levels of procedural formalization, functional 424 L. Karsten Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 specialization of activities and centralization of decision-making. The overall purpose was to increase the speed of decision-making and to tap the knowledge and energy of the subordinates in an efficient way (Roberts 2004). Strategy authors and consultants Peter Drucker in The Practice of Management (1954) and A.D. Chandler in Strategy and Structure (1962), in their individual way, were both impressed by Sloan’s strategic perspectives. Drucker noticed that the higher that the levels of hierarchy a manager achieves, the more strategic decisions he/she must make. Chandler stressed the perfect blend of coordination and control in GM, which enabled the company to rapidly move forward and become dominant in the car manufacturing industry. He observed that many other major American corporations adopted the M-form and concluded that ‘unless structure follows strategy, inefficiency results’ (Chandler 1962, 314). In the 1950s and early 1960s, many corporations had primarily borrowed strategic concepts from military science and clung to certain ingrained bureaucratic practices (Quinn 1998). Within the thinking regarding strategy, decision-making as well as systematic planning clock time remained the fundamental dimension in which strategic planning and decision-making took place (Lee and Liebenau 1999). A host of literature about the negative aspect of bureaucracies, especially their slow adaptation and uninspired leadership, was published. To improve coordination and control among managers, corporations allowed for experiments to restructure their organization. For this purpose, consultants of McKinsey & Company, for example, were invited to introduce an idealized version of the M-form as their primary selling point. They assisted American and European conglomerates to divisionalize their organizations and respond more rapidly to market challenges. However, even the improvements that McKinsey’s consultants advised could not prevent conglomerates being confronted with the negative effects of overly strict practices of bureaucracies after the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. Strategic planning had remained too much a cerebral activity that took little interest in using information that companies could receive from the marketplace in a quicker manner. Conglomerates were urged to adapt their bureaucratic structures to changing international market conditions. Railroads and steamships had drastically reduced travel time and transporting costs. New transportation technologies such as faster cars, buses, tramways, subways and improved infrastructures strengthened the expansion of industrial globalization. The fascination for mobility was translated into words such as acceleration and velocity, which became the emblems of modern times. In the 1960s, the shipping industry was transformed by the widespread adoption of the standardized shipping container, which was developed by the American trucking entrepreneur Malcolm McLean (Levinson 2006). The advent of faster transport by air shipping created a spirit of timesaving in the aviation industry. The aviation business exemplified the overall acceleration with ever-faster airplanes and more people flying more frequently (Doganis 2002). The nature and efficiency of distribution systems based on strict schedules and the precise provision of information at the right time accelerated the principle of ‘time is money’. Harvey (1989) has referred to this rapid and accurate flow of information as the time-space compression. With new transportation facilities in the air and at sea, the number of large multinational corporations grew tremendously and, by 1980, their numbers had grown to about 10,000 with approximately 19,000 affiliates. To overcome the slow response of multinational corporations to this acceleration, two McKinsey consultants, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, published In Search of Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Management & Organizational History 425 Excellence (1982). Instead of addressing the need for new organizational structures, which McKinsey & Company had previously propagated, they put the emphasis on a modern version of Human Relations, focusing on the role of employees, customer-orientation, leadership styles and shared values. American corporations lacked entrepreneurial abilities, which hampered innovativeness. Peters and Waterman pointed out that a different approach of management was required, less in terms of engineering cost reductions but more in terms of the shift of mentality among the staff of American companies. The book stressed that excellent corporations have strong cultures and coherently composed shared values, which lead to an entrepreneurial set of capabilities and competencies. The success of the book produced a proliferation of management concepts with an increasing transience into fashions (Abrahamson 1991). Throughout the 1980s, managers, consultants, gurus, academics and management authorities invented and popularized challenging new management concepts, among which topics concerning leadership and (organizational) culture figured prominently. This might explain why historians Keulen and Kroeze have discerned a separate period (1980 –2000), where ‘the growing attention for the role and behavior of the top manager and the spread of strategic management concepts come together in the individualization and popularization of management.’ Yet, in my opinion, the main contribution to the improvement of the management and organization of conglomerates did not come from these publications, but from the Japanese contribution to the application of clock time in a new version. Impressed by the sudden success of Japanese firms turning Japan into an economic world player, two consultants from the Boston Consultancy Group (BCG), Stalk and Hout, published a remarkable book. Their Competing against Time: How Time-based Competition is Reshaping Global Markets (1990) made a compelling case for clock time as the key topic for international business. Stalk and Hout (1990, 52) noticed that the Toyota car manufacturing company realized ‘just-in time production, close supplier relations, total quality control, simplified production flows, and a scheduling mechanism that enabled employee decision-making on the factory floor’, which was immediately imitated by other Japanese as a strategy to exploit flexibility. Stalk and Hout’s experience with Japanese firms led them to conclude that, in international business, only a timely response to the desires of customers leads to a competitive advantage. The best way for Western businesses to improve the performance of their companies should be to imitate Japanese multinationals that pioneered the use of timing as a competitive weapon in the globalized economy. Speed was no longer sufficient to achieve lasting success, as the Japanese were demonstrating with their new business model. In Forbes, Stalk emphasized that many executives believe that competitive advantage is best achieved by providing the most value for the lowest cost. “This is the traditional paradigm for corporate success. Providing the most value for the lowest cost in the least amount of time is the new paradigm for corporate success. (1998, 1) The third Industrial Revolution: timing Japan had become highly involved in the development of ICT. Japanese computer companies, such as Fujitsu, evolved into a serious competitor and, in the early 1990s, had become the world’s largest computer maker behind IBM (Chandler and Mazelish 2005). The Japanese government initiated programs for improving manufacturing capabilities and the quality of products to challenge American dominance in the computer industry. Japanese firms in the manufacturing of computer memory products, for example, produced chips of a remarkably higher quality than those of their American competitors (Langlois and Steinmueller 1999). At the same time, the Japanese reshaped common perspectives 426 L. Karsten Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 about the coordination and control of internationally operating corporations applying ICT. The initial steps for this new approach had been taken in the car manufacturing industry. Timing During the period of the supremacy of the American economy, a Japanese miracle dawned, which was based on Just In Time (JIT). In order to produce JIT, manufacturing firms needed to be assured of the quality of the material and spare parts that suppliers were delivering. The biggest Japanese car manufacturer, Toyota, introduced the concept of timing as a novel version of the application of clock time that subsequently paved the way for flexible production systems serving the customers at the right time. Toyota began to design a no-inventory, continuous production system that was geared to customer demand. To attain this goal, the company needed to obtain the assent of the worker, humanize austere Taylorist practices, and integrate the worker fully in the organization of work (Tsutsui 1998). The company stressed the importance of JIT for the identification and avoidance of waste in the shape of idle labor rather than unused raw materials and spare parts. The company increasingly relied on multifunctional workers and systematically restructured jobs so that their operations became more versatile and also demanded less skill than before. The policy of Toyota was that actual demand determined the pace of production. To introduce variety, the production line had to be stopped to allow for sudden changeovers needed for different products. The success of this strategy depended on minimizing waste in terms of quality and in the time required to make the necessary changeovers since downtime reduced volume and raised costs. Quality became an integral part of management, and quality control circles were introduced to fine-tune, in the most detailed manner, the sequences in the production process from planning to execution. ‘Japanese managers, engineers and workers grew accustomed to thinking of the entire production process as a system and thinking in an integrated way about product design and process design’ (Freeman and Louca 2001, 280). Toyota’s main focus was to reduce total costs by consuming no more resources (material, labor, supplies, power, capital, and the like) than necessary to produce what was needed to serve customers. The company therefore introduced a flexible production system that could convert the line from one type of component to another. Quick conversion processes – so-called Quick Die Change (QDC) – reduced changeover times to a fraction of those that were customary in western car manufacturers. In response to customer orders flowing in on a computer printout into the factory from dealers, the JIT delivery system from suppliers avoided inventories of parts, and the total quality control eliminated the losses involved in the withdrawal of defective cars from the line and kept production costs to a minimum. JIT production systems increased workers’ bargaining power because it increased the vulnerability of the production system to disruptions in the flow of manufacturing. The result was a development of lean production with teams of highly qualified members, flexible production facilities, and a well-coordinated flow of information (Womack 1991; Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1997). Toyota’s overall success was not only related to technology, but was as much based on continuous improvement of the work organization. Changeover time flexibility was the result of an efficient reorganization of manpower deployment based on process flexibility. This new approach became increasingly imitated by other Japanese firms like the computer industry. Although JIT initially suited the car manufacturer, its application was soon widened to cover electronics and most other industrial sectors (Taylor 1999; Management & Organizational History 427 Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Chandler and Mazelish 2005). Toyota developed computer systems that linked its salespeople directly to the factory scheduling operations, which cut delays in sales and distribution and improved customer services. It developed the same practices for the supply of spare parts that were provided by its outsourced suppliers (Iyer, Seshadri, and Vasher 2009). Overall responsiveness of these companies therefore improved nationally as well as internationally. In the early 1990s, a network production system was created between suppliers, manufacturers and sales departments, referred to as the Toyota Production System (TPS). This system turned into a learning model and led to the movement referred to as lean production. It was a massive transformation, displacing the mass production techniques initiated by Ford. JIT ensured that the correct products of the right quality and amount were delivered in the right place at the right time. With JIT, the Western concept of clock time in terms of speed and acceleration had found a new translation, but it had undergone a serious process of ‘Japanization’ (Butman 1997). Flexibilization With the success of TPS, Toyota became the icon of a corporation that introduced a new approach to clock time centered on timing (Watson 2009). Japan’s lean management practices made its manufacturing system ideally suited to take advantage of the new computer-aided design and manufacturing technologies, which were quickly applied elsewhere (Biesebroeck 2007). Management literature displayed a growing interest in timing and launched new concepts such as time-based competition and time to market, which were in great demand to reduce the time needed to provide the required product or service. JIT, the shortening of design and production cycles, flexibility, flextime and deadlines became common terminology in management speak. The overall purpose was to make time-based firms capable of increasing the overall value of their manufacturing and delivery systems. With Toyota’s example on display, the international business community turned its attention en masse toward flexibilization of companies and labor markets. The acceleration of the transmission of information across borders reinforced an intensification of the movement of capital, goods and people. Flexible approaches are currently required for companies operating in the global market (Castells 2007). The discourse on the flexible work organization, however, is still primarily driven by a hegemonic chrono-managerial language embracing a long working hour culture that is still predicated on the assumption that management staff must abide to the clock time regime and work long, full-time hours to be effective in performing their jobs (Perlow 1998). Time-scape management The globalization of managerial and organizational practices challenges the hegemonic perspective on clock time as described above. The clock defines some but not all social times, although in the coordination of global relationships it structures relationships between multiple locations. In the nexus of the global and the local, the potential conflicts between biology, clock, sun and sociality can become significant.(Birth 2007, 216) Clocks, calendars and time zones have been efforts to erase culturally defined social times in order to serve temporal standardization. However, there is a serious challenge for managers from the western hemisphere globally operating MNEs to take local cultural differences in the use of social time more seriously. Glennie and Thrift (1996) have argued Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 428 L. Karsten that it is not correct to believe that the ethnocentric Western views on social time are the only possible approach and that global Western management is the only reliable approach for international management practices. The Western pattern of dealing with social time is neither culturally universal nor constantly present. Anthropologist Edward T. Hall has conducted studies about intercultural communication and has drawn several different distinctions to better understand the impact of diversity of views on social time and the way that cultures deal with it. Hall (1976, 1983) was the first to introduce a distinction between high-context cultures primarily driven by event time and low-context cultures where the clock time regime prevails. In high-context cultures, social time does not exist outside events, but time is in the events. ‘Event times flow unevenly, are discontinuous, and contain various levels of contingency and indeterminacy with respect to the onset of event trajectories and even to their actual occurrence’ (Lee and Liebenau 1999, 1046). In these cultures, the pace of life is slow and people focus less on punctuality, scheduling, deadlines and efficient time use. Events begin when people arrive and end when people leave. Hall has called this a diffused point pattern. Anthropologist Levine (1997) has noticed, for example, that the walking speed of pedestrians in low-context cultures is much higher than in high-context cultures. Event times depend more on nature-related patterns such as the seasons, the weather, and even on the position of the sun in the sky. Event time patterns can be discerned in the southern part of Europe, South America, south-east Asia and Africa. These regions still extol event-time as a philosophy of life. Hall has stressed the need to adequately respond to tensions between high-context and low-context cultures and accept the possibility of reverse innovation in the sense that high-context cultural practices be balanced out with low-context cultural practices. A nascent literature on heterogeneous forms of social time in organizations stresses the increasing presence of pluri-temporalism (Yakura 2002; Appadurai 2004; Semler 2007). Adam (2004) emphasized that, although clock time may still be dominant, it does not eliminate the fact that other social time perspectives are also evident in high-context societies. She urges management to integrate multiple social time views that have disappeared in the drains of industrial clock time-based domination. As a landscape has a variety of different geological and geographical patterns, so managers operating in the global landscape might develop a new form of chrono-management called time-scape management to integrate locally embedded concepts of social time that previously were excluded or destroyed. However, to realize this, an ecological revolution is necessary (Adam 2004). Conclusion The purpose of this paper is to describe the periodization of management literature by primarily focusing on time as a hegemonic abstract concept. Once standard time had been experienced through the device of the mechanical clock in the late medieval period, it has since found a remarkable translation in the age of early capitalism. Technological and social innovations in the factory system became rooted in a frantic drive for greater organizational efficiency. Factory owners, businessmen and managers were able to discipline the time of their subordinates by specific, economically driven chrono-politics in the factories of the First Industrial Revolution. In industrialized countries, clock time became integrated in infrastructural provisions by subsequent revolutions and transportation, communication and production, which presently underpin a worldwide infrastructure. It has introduced concepts such as punctuality, deadlines, efficient time use and a faster pace of life. Speed, velocity and acceleration created a frantic drive for Downloaded by [luchien karsten] at 02:20 22 December 2014 Management & Organizational History 429 efficiency during the Second Industrial Revolution. JIT, timing and flexibility through quality improvement and customer satisfaction became the new labels of abstract clock time during the Third Industrial Revolution and have created an amazingly impressive, modern, industrialized world, driven by chrono-management. Industrialized countries moved away from standard employment arrangements and have introduced a greater diversity in flexible working time arrangements that contain less regularity and create a new setting for flextime. Notions of regularity, standardization and central coordination, which had been embedded culturally and economically since the late nineteenth century, are now liable to shift due to specifically social-cultural and political changes as well as an acceleration of technological innovations. Keulen and Kroeze have stressed the period where the manager as a symbolic figurehead is in decline and see the next stage as the one where modern ‘management is disappearing’. Within my narrative, there is still a challenging perspective looming with time-scape management. Globalized production affects time concepts, tempo of work and timing; start times and end times need to be aligned with different time zones. Patterns of social time that harmonize with natural, circadian, technological and socio-cultural rhythmicities of the individual time arrangements that still prevail in Western companies create a new time-scape. In that sense, chrono-politics should not only be understood as simply embodying one logic illustrated by a review of three different Industrial Revolutions with an increasing dominance of abstract clock time according to which the world functions; it also requires us to understand that it is an arena in which different temporalities interact and clash. Acknowledgements I am grateful to Jenny Hill, who not only improved my English but also helped me in structuring this paper. I am also indebted to three anonymous reviewers from Management & Organizational History. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. Note 1. Keulen and Kroeze did not mention that according to Whittington and Mayer (2000, 20), a distinction has to be made between Chandler and Chandlerism, the last one referring ‘to a particular vision of the corporation developed in the specific context of early post-war America, its key elements fixed and universalized at one moment in history’. Notes on contributors Luchien Karsten (1947) is a Professor Emeritus of the History of International Management. He studied economics and philosophy in Groningen and history at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris. His employment at the University of Groningen lasted from 1978 till 2012. He initiated and managed with Pervez Ghauri a Consortium for International Business with the University of Stirling and the Business School at Nice (CERAM). He has been a visiting professor in Nottingham, Rennes and Newcastle. He coordinated projects of cooperation with universities in Burkina Faso, Russia and Indonesia. 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