Intellectual property and global health: from corporate social responsibility
to the access to knowledge movement
Cristian Timmermann and Henk van den Belt
Wageningen University / Centre for Society and the Life Sciences
This is a “post-print” accepted manuscript, which has been published in:
“Liverpool Law Review”
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Please cite this publication as follows:
Timmermann, Cristian, and Henk van den Belt. 2013. Intellectual property and global health: from corporate
social responsibility to the access to knowledge movement. Liverpool Law Review 34 (1):47-73.
You can download the published version at:
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1
Intellectual property and global health: from corporate social responsibility to the access to knowledge
movement
Cristian Timmermann and Henk van den Belt
Applied Philosophy Group, Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University
Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands
Centre for Society and the Life Sciences
PO-box 9010, 6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands
cristian.timmermann@wur.nl
Abstract
Any system for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) has three main kinds of distributive effects. It
will determine or influence: (a) the types of objects that will be developed and for which IPRs will be sought; (b)
the differential access various people will have to these objects; and (c) the distribution of the IPRs themselves
among various actors.
What this means to the area of pharmaceutical research is that many urgently needed medicines will not be
developed at all, that the existing medicines will not be suitable for countries with a precarious health
infrastructure or not target the disease variety that is prevalent in poorer regions. Such effects are commonly
captured under the rubric of the "10/90 gap" in biomedical research. High prices will also restrict access to
medicines as well endanger compliance to treatment schemes. IPRs are mainly held by multinational
corporations situated in the developed world, which not only raises egalitarian concerns, but also severely limits
the possibilities of companies in poorer countries to realize improvements on existing inventions, as they cannot
financially afford to secure freedom to operate, which systematically shrinks the number of potential innovators.
Those inequities lead to an enormous burden for the global poor and since no institution is willing to assume the
responsibility to fulfil the right to health and the corresponding right of access to essential medicines, we have to
analyse alternatives or additions to the actual intellectual property regimes in order to create new incentives to
fill this gap.
Keywords: global justice; intellectual property rights; access to medicines; innovation policy; neglected diseases
2
Introduction
For slightly more than a decade, the recognition has become increasingly common that there may exist a deep
conflict between intellectual property rights (the collective name for a set of rights encompassing patents,
copyrights, trademarks, plant breeders rights and the like) and basic human rights. In their campaigns for access
to essential medicines, for example, civil-society organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam
invariably insist that patents should never be put before the human right to health. Likewise, in 2005 Brazil and
Argentina and other developing countries supported their proposal to broaden the narrow mandate of the United
Nations (UN) agency WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) by arguing that “under no circumstances
can human rights – which are inalienable and universal – be subordinated to intellectual property protection”1.
The Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property that was issued in October 2005 also
declared that “[IP] laws must serve, and never overturn, the basic human rights to health, education, employment
and cultural life”2. And as a final example: The UN special rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter,
used the human right to adequate food as a normative yardstick for assessing the effects of patents and other IP
rights in the field of agriculture and nutrition3.
The human rights that are often invoked against certain IP rights are enshrined in such classical documents as the
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and the UN International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966. The human right to health is encompassed in a rather broad article
of the Universal Declaration: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”4. The International Covenant gives a more specific
formulation: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”5. Rights to participate in cultural life and to share in
the benefits of the advance of science are also formulated in both human rights documents. Thus the Universal
Declaration states in article 27.1: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”6. However, the tenor of this
paragraph seems to be counterbalanced by the very next paragraph: “Everyone has the right to the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author”7. This might be seen as providing a justification for IP rights as themselves based in fundamental human
rights, thus creating a (potential) tension with the human rights of participation and sharing that are stated in the
first paragraph. The same tension recurs in the International Covenant: “The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific
1
World Intellectual Property Organization (2005) 17.
RSA (2006)
3
De Schutter (2009)
4
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 25.1 (1948).
5
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 12.1 (1966).
6
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 27.1 (1948).
7
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 27.2 (1948).
2
3
progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”8.
To escape from the legal deadlock in which one set of human rights might seem to negate another set of human
rights, the precise status of IP rights definitely needs to be clarified. Some would argue that such rights must
indeed be recognized as fully-fledged human rights, even to the point of overriding any possible claim of
patients to have access to essential medicines9. However, in 2005 the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights issued an interpretative comment which cautioned against equating the human right recognized
in ICESCR 15.1.c (and in UDHR 27.2) with intellectual property rights as defined in national laws and
international agreements. According to the Committee, human rights are “fundamental, inalienable and universal
entitlements belonging to individuals and, under some circumstances, groups of individuals and communities”,
whereas IP rights are “first and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and
creativity” and IP regimes “primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments”10. In short, it
would be wrong to grant legally recognized IP rights the full dignity of basic human rights11.
The awareness that IP rights might sometimes clash with basic human rights such as the right to health and the
derivative right of access to essential medicines is of fairly recent origin. It is apparent that the issue of a
potential conflict was not foremost on the minds of those who were involved in the formulation of the
international human rights charters. This general lack of awareness can be attributed in part to the so-called
“Westphalian assumption” that it is the national government of each and every country which is primarily
responsible for the protection of the human rights of its citizens. Although increasingly contested in recent years,
this assumption has been the dominant and often taken-for-granted axiom in international affairs throughout the
entire United Nations period. Moreover, before the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 as part of the overall WTO package, the design of national
intellectual property laws was largely left to the needs, desires and insights of the government of each country.
Thus, for example, national governments could, if they wished, exclude pharmaceutical products from patent
protection. All of this changed with the arrival of the TRIPS agreement, which imposes relatively high minimum
standards of protection for intellectual property rights on all WTO member states. The TRIPS agreement
mandates for example that, with few exceptions, “... patents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology”12. Countries like India and Brazil that had previously excluded
patents for pharmaceutical products (allowing patents on pharmaceutical processes only), were obliged to
introduce new legislation by 2005 to allow the patenting of pharmaceuticals (Brazil complied with this
requirement already in 1996, India in 2005). More generally, TRIPS created for the first time a de facto global IP
regime. Only after the establishment of such an international system of protection of intellectual property rights
could concerns about human rights and global justice vis-à-vis patents and other forms of intellectual property be
sufficiently elaborated. A new institutional arrangement on a global scale was needed for such concerns to attain
8
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15.1 (1966).
Cass (2009)
10
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2006)
11
See also Chapman (2009); for a criticism of the Committee’s interpretative comment, see Millum (2008).
12
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 27.1 (1994).
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more articulation and a sharper focus. However, it would take some time before these concerns assumed more
definite shape.
As a preliminary to the subsequent discussion, we will set out the very useful threefold perspective that has been
introduced by the American philosopher Matthew Wayne DeCamp for the ethical scrutiny of IP systems. Any
system for the protection of intellectual property rights or IP regime, DeCamp points out, has three main kinds of
distributive effects. It will determine or influence: (a) the types of objects that will be developed and for which
IPRs will be sought; (b) the differential access various people will have to these objects; (c) the distribution of
the IPRs themselves among various actors13. Because of these distributive effects, any IP regime can be judged
from the angle of (distributive) justice. The claim that it is simply the purpose of an IP system to maximize
innovation does not provide an exemption from ethical evaluation, as no regime is distributionally neutral. As we
have at present a global IP regime, or at least the incipient forms of a global regime, the relevant standards of
judgment must be derived from a credible conception of global justice.
There are diverging views on global justice, but a common ground between the most important views is a shared
recognition of the importance of basic human rights14. This means that we can pragmatically use internationally
recognized and codified human rights (as defined in UDHR and ICESCR) as a proxy criterion for assessing IP
systems in terms of their compatibility with global justice. When discussing pharmaceutical patents, for instance,
we would obviously want to refer to the human right to health as codified in UDHR 25.1 and ICESCR 12.1, and
the derived human right of access to essential medicines. A relevant distributive effect of the current
international IP system relates to the prices of the lifesaving drugs it generates, and hence their affordability for
various categories of patients. This effect concerns DeCamp’s second dimension (b). But we could also wonder
what type of innovations will be promoted by the present system: will it primarily stimulate the development of
lifestyle drugs like Viagra and remedies against baldness or rather encourage the development of medicines for
conditions that afflict the lives of the global poor? This question refers to DeCamp’s first dimension (a). This
distributive effect is also a hot issue in the international debate on pharmaceutical patents and access to essential
medicines. What is often overlooked in the debate, however, is the relevance of DeCamp’s third dimension, the
distribution of the IPRs themselves. When the IP system functions in such a way that almost all exclusive rights
end up in the hands of a few big multinational corporations headquartered in western countries, such an outcome
might also be problematic from a global justice angle, even if the performance of the IP system on the two other
dimensions were fully satisfactory. Here, other basic human rights beyond the right to health may be at stake,
such as the right to take part in cultural life and to share in the advancement of science. Concerns about capacity
building can also be subsumed under this rubric.
The TRIPS Agreement and the HIV/AIDS crisis
The TRIPS Agreement was the culmination of years of intensive lobbying by a (predominantly US) coalition of
business firms in such IP-intensive industries as pharmaceuticals, software, agricultural chemicals and
biotechnology, and the music and movie sector15. In the early 1980s Pfizer’s CEO Edmund Pratt was a key
13
DeCamp (2007) 50f. and 315-317.
DeCamp, ibid., 253.
15
See Drahos and Braithwaite (2003), and Sell and Prakash (2004).
14
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figure in building this coalition. The very notion of ‘intellectual property’ was instrumental in bringing the
interests of patent holders (e.g. the pharmaceutical industry) and copyright holders (e.g. the music and movie
industry) together under one umbrella16. The IP coalition thundered against what it considered the “theft” of USowned intellectual “property” abroad. The unauthorized copying of Hollywood movies and the production of
generic equivalents of patented medicines, even if perfectly legal according to foreign laws, were labeled as
“piracy” and “stealing from the mind”. The IP coalition used its privileged access to policymakers to institute
policies destined to end such practices. By threatening trade retaliations (denying access to the American
market), the US government brought enormous pressure to bear on recalcitrant foreign countries that showed
insufficient respect for IPRs, in the end more or less forcing them to accept the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.
For the IP coalition the insertion of the protection of intellectual property into the WTO framework was of
strategic importance, as it would allow sanctioning non-compliant countries with punitive damages. Thus the
TRIPS Agreement has real teeth. No wonder then that a leading figure in the pro-IP business coalition, Jacques
Gorlin, could declare: “we got 95% of what we wanted”17. The remaining 5% that they did not get relate to the
transition period that the TRIPS Agreement granted to developing countries for introducing product patents for
pharmaceuticals and the perhaps somewhat ambiguously defined options for compulsory licensing that the
agreement still retained (in articles 30 and 31), a crucial element of the so-called “TRIPS flexibilities” (ibid.).
Ethical judgments about the TRIPS Agreement vary. Bruce Lehman, president of the International Intellectual
Property Institute and commissioner of the US Patent and Trademark Office during the Clinton Administration,
holds that “the TRIPS Agreement was intended to create a more equitable system of international trade”18. The
philosopher Thomas Pogge, by contrast, arrives at a strongly negative judgment: “The TRIPS Agreement and its
imposition are plainly unjust and will, in terms of the magnitude of harm caused, number among the largest
human rights violations in history”19. No less critical is economist Joseph Stiglitz: “When the trade ministers
signed the TRIPS agreement in Marrakesh in the spring of 1994, they were in effect signing the death warrants
on thousands of people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries”20.
It was the worldwide HIV/AIDS crisis that would put the TRIPS Agreement to a severe test in the years around
the turn of the millennium. There is no cure for HIV/AIDS, but in 1996 medical researchers discovered that the
progressive advance of the disease could be effectively controlled by a combination treatment of three different
antiretroviral (ARV) drugs. The annual cost of the use of the three patented medicines together would be
between 10,000 and 15,000 US dollars per patient. Such costs could perhaps be affordable in wealthy countries
with robust health insurance systems, but would surely be out of reach for developing countries. In 1997 South
Africa passed a new Medicines Act, which would allow the Minister of Health to initiate compulsory licensing
or parallel importation of HIV/AIDS drugs. Thereupon 40 international pharmaceutical companies (and the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa) filed a lawsuit against the South African
government, claiming that the new law breached the TRIPS Agreement and even the constitution of the Republic
of South Africa. The US government exerted additional pressure by placing the country on the so-called “Section
16
Kapczynski (2008).
Sell and Prakash (2004) 160.
18
Lehman (2003) 6.
19
Pogge (2008) 76.
20
Stiglitz (2008) 1701.
17
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301 Watch List” (enumerating countries that “misbehave” in the IP area as potential targets for retaliatory
measures). The European Union also increased the diplomatic pressure. The initiative of Big Pharma led to a
strong backlash, however, after HIV/AIDS activists mobilized international public opinion against the lawsuit,
which turned into a PR nightmare for the pharmaceutical companies. It also caused the US and EU authorities to
withdraw their support21.
A decisive turning point in the evolving drama occurred in January 2001, when the Indian generics manufacturer
Cipla offered to sell the triple-therapy cocktail to Médecins Sans Frontières for 350 US dollars per patient per
year22: “Cipla’s dramatic price reduction, which received widespread media attention, hammered the message
home that the multinational drug companies were abusing their monopolistic position in the face of a
catastrophic human disaster. It also focused attention on the effects of generic competition in bringing drug
prices down”23. In April 2001, the pharmaceutical companies dropped their lawsuit against the South African
government. The same month UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the creation of the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The price drop also led the international policy-makers to change course:
earlier they had approved the use of donor funds only for prevention, but not for treatment24.
Finally, in November 2001 the WTO Ministerial Conference assembled in Doha, Qatar issued the famous
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (or Doha Declaration), stating that “the Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all” (our italics). This was at least an ideological
victory for the access-to-medicines campaign waged by MSF, Oxfam and several other organizations.
Unfortunately, it did not mean that in actual practice developing countries would henceforth be free to use the
“TRIPS flexibilities” such as compulsory licensing to the full without having to fear any retaliations from more
powerful countries.
Access to medicines: a contested terrain
The worldwide HIV/AIDS crisis has brought the problem of access to life-saving medicines into sharp relief,
much to the dismay of the (non-generic) pharmaceutical industry. Drug companies resent the one-sided focus on
patents and high drug prices as a major obstacle to access. A more impartial investigation of the situation in
developing countries, they insist, would show that access to medicines is actually impeded by a great variety of
factors, such as lack of an adequate infrastructure, lack of well-equipped hospitals, lack of well-trained doctors,
nurses and pharmacists, lack of clean water and adequate storage capacity, lack of good governance, and so on
and so forth – in short, an endless array of factors that can be summed up in the one underlying factor of extreme
poverty. Thus the international pharmaceutical industry holds that it is inappropriate and unfair to concentrate on
intellectual property protection as if this were the single or decisive factor impeding access to essential
medicines. A report issued by the International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI) in 2000 even stated
categorically that “the intellectual property rights and the TRIPS Agreement are not, in themselves, impediments
21
‘t Hoen (2009) 21.
see Sell and Prakash (2004) 162, and Love (2009) 17.
23
‘t Hoen (2009) 25.
24
Love (2009) 16f.
22
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to the availability of HIV/AIDS therapies in sub-Saharan Africa”25; the focus on patents tended to divert
attention away from the “real factors” constraining the availability of and access to drugs in this region. The
position that patents do not constitute a major obstacle for access to essential HIV/AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan
Africa was further elaborated in an academic article by Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White26; Amir Attaran27
put the argument in the general form that patents do not impede access to essential medicines for all sorts of
diseases in the developing world as a whole. However, the methodological assumptions of this work have been
severely criticized by NGOs involved in access-to-medicines campaigns28.
In debates on access to medicines, representatives of the non-generic pharmaceutical industry constantly reiterate
their mantra that the big problem is not patents but poverty29. Yet there is something disingenuous about this way
of framing the problem. By blaming lack of access on the root cause of poverty and arguing that an effective
solution should address the “real factors” underlying the problem, the proponents of Big Pharma turn the critical
spotlight away from their intellectual property rights. It is an easy way to get off the hook, as no one would
contest the desirability of more aid and assistance to tackle global poverty – least of all the NGOs campaigning
for greater access to medicines. There are indeed more barriers impeding access, but that would be no excuse not
to clear the one particular barrier making patented medicines so expensive as to be unaffordable for poor patients
and poor countries30. As a number of NGOs declared in response to the Big Pharma position: “We agree that
donor aid is extremely important, and continue our work to advocate for such aid. But it is entirely irrational, and
in our opinion, deeply cynical, to pit donor aid against efforts to overcome patent barriers. Everything possible
needs to be done. Every barrier for cheaper medicine needs to be removed”31.
By robustly protecting their global intellectual property rights and insisting that access to essential medicines
should be ensured by increased donor aid rather than by lowering their prices and/or licensing generic
manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies effectively shift the burden of solving the access problem onto
governments and international donor funds. This approach is vehemently defended by the president of the
International Intellectual Property Institute, Bruce Lehman. Thus after first extolling the stimulating effect of the
patent system on the development of new medicines, Lehman refuses to blame the same system for the high drug
prices: “None of the new drugs in the pipeline, much less the 74 medicines that already have caused deaths from
AIDS to plummet in the United States, would have come into existence without the patent incentive and the
prospect of a return on investment provided by that incentive. This is not to dismiss the fact that many patients in
the world cannot pay for these drugs and do not have access to them. However, this is not the result of the patent
system. It is the result of lack of a source of funding for the purchase of drugs for those currently too poor to buy
them themselves”32. In other words, high prices for patented drugs are apparently an inevitable fact of nature.
Lack of access of the world’s poor to such medicines can only be remedied if governments or donor funds are
willing to pay the full price for them. Lehman would not be appreciative at all if donor funds like the Global
25
International Intellectual Property Institute (2000) 54.
Attaran and Gillespie-White (2001)
27
Attaran (2004)
28
Consumer Project on Technology et al. (2001)
29
Leisinger (2009) 7f.
30
Sell (2007) 45-47.
31
Consumer Project on Technology et al. (2001)
32
Lehman (2003) 8, (our italics).
26
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Fund used their limited budgets to purchase much cheaper generics, even if they would thereby reach many more
patients33.
The sad fact, however, is that governments or international charities may sometimes consider the prices of
patented medicines prohibitively high to act as a source of funding for the poor. James Love tells us about a
meeting he had in 2003 with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President
George W. Bush, Mitch Daniels, who declared that when prices were more than $1,000 per year, the OMB could
not justify spending money on AIDS treatment, but that when the price fell below $1 per day, he felt they could
not justify not spending money on AIDS medicines34.
The drop in prices for antiretroviral drugs, mainly thanks to increased competition from generic manufacturers,
induced US President George W. Bush in early 2003 to launch a major initiative, the Presidential Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). In his State of the Union Address of January 28, 2003, he declared:
“There are whole countries in Africa where more than one-third of the adult population carries the infection.
More than four million require immediate drug treatment. Yet across that continent, only 50,000 AIDS
victims – only 50,000 – are receiving the medicine they need . . . A doctor in rural South Africa describes his
frustration. He says, ‘We have no medicines … many hospitals tell [people], ‘You’ve got AIDS. We can’t
help you. Go home and die.’ In an age of miraculous medicines, no person should have to hear those words.
AIDS can be prevented. Anti-retroviral drugs can extend life for many years. And the cost of those drugs has
dropped from $12,000 a year to under $300 a year, which places a tremendous possibility within our grasp
……… [T]onight I propose the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief – a work of mercy beyond all current
international efforts to help the people of Africa. . . . I ask the Congress to commit $15 billion over the next
five years, including nearly $10 billion in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in the most afflicted
nations of Africa and the Caribbean.”35
For all its generosity the PEPFAR initiative would have been unthinkable were it not for the inroads made by
generic manufacturers on the patent monopolies of the world’s leading drug companies. In his address to the
nation Bush implicitly affirmed the universal right to health and the derivative right of access to essential
medicines (note the line: “In an age of miraculous medicines, no person should have to hear those words”). So,
for once, the US president did not put patents before patients. His stance represented a remarkable departure
from the “patents-are-sacrosanct” position usually adopted by the pharmaceutical industry and also, most of the
time, by the US government.
The general thrust of US trade policy during the last fifteen years or so has been to aggressively defend the
global IP interests of the pharmaceutical industry. The American government has concluded several bilateral and
regional trade agreements containing so-called “TRIPS-plus” provisions aimed at eliminating the “flexibilities”
of the TRIPS Agreement and it has also exerted heavy economic and political pressure on Third World countries
intent on using these same “flexibilities” (e.g. compulsory licensing) for the sake of protecting public health or
33
Lehman, idem., 10.
Love (2009) 18 n. 36.
35
Bush (2003)
34
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promoting access to medicines for all36. A case in point is the US response to the decisions taken by the Thai
government in 2006 and 2007 to issue compulsory licenses for the production of the first-line AIDS drug
efavirenz (Stocrin), the second-line AIDS drug lopinavir/ritonavir (Kaletra) and the antiplatelet drug clopidogrel
(Plavix), patented respectively by Merck Sharp & Dohme (the UK subsidiary of the US firm Merck), the US
firm Abbott and the European company Sanofi-Aventis. Although these decisions were fully in line with the
TRIPS Agreement (as reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration), they were branded by the international
pharmaceutical industry as illegal appropriations of private-sector property37. US and European ambassadors
signaled their strong disapproval of the compulsory licenses to the Thai government. Abbott retaliated by
announcing to withdraw all applications to register its new drugs in Thailand. The US Trade Representative
placed Thailand under the Special 301 “Priority Watch List Surveillance” and threatened to terminate Thailand’s
privileges to export to the US market. According to some legal experts, however, it is not the Thai government’s
resort to compulsory licensing, but the contemplated US reprisal against Thailand that is in contravention of
international law38.
In its conflict with the US government and pharmaceutical companies, Thailand received support from an
unsuspected quarter, namely from Bill Clinton. Accompanying the Thai minister of health during her visit to
New York in May 2007, the former US president defended Thailand’s decision to issue compulsory licenses:
“No company will live or die because of high price premiums for AIDS drugs in middle-income countries, but
patients may”39. For Clinton, affordable drug prices were a life-and-death issue. Since 2002 the William J.
Clinton Foundation had been active in making first-line AIDS medicines available to the needy in Africa and
elsewhere by striking advantageous deals with generic manufacturers. The relative success of this program
created a new financial burden because part of the patients who have been kept alive develop resistance to the
first-line drugs and need to be treated by the newer and much more costly second-line AIDS drugs. Typically,
patented brand-name versions of the latter are more than 10 times as expensive as the first-line generic drugs,
thus causing an enormous strain on the health-care budget. The Clinton Foundation therefore struck new deals
with the Indian manufacturers Cipla and Matrix to provide generic versions of second-line AIDS drugs at greatly
reduced prices, with average savings of 50 percent in middle-income countries like Thailand. Needless to say
that Clinton’s initiative was not welcomed by the big multinational drug companies and the US government, but
their demurral did not deter him. He criticized Abbott’s “hard-line position” over what he considered to be “a life
and death matter”40.
The human rights obligations of pharmaceutical companies
While states have the primary responsibility for realizing the human right to health and increasing access to
medicines, other national and international actors, including private business firms, also share in this
responsibility. Although pharmaceutical companies normally have extensive Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) policies in place and often subscribe to the loftiest humanitarian aims in their mission statements
36
Sell (2007)
Limpananont and Kijtiwatchakul (2010) 442.
38
Reichman (2009) 256.
39
Bill Clinton quoted by Dugger (2007).
40
Bill Clinton quoted by Usborne (2007).
37
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(typically placing the relief of human suffering before profits), they generally do not want to be strictly held to
account with regard to more specific commitments and obligations.
When the previous UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Dr. Paul Hunt, undertook to create more clarity
on the human rights obligations of drug companies in relation to access to medicines, he found few firms that
were ready to participate in the consultation process and his draft and final guidelines met with negative
comments from the pharmaceutical industry41. The drug firms felt that the human rights obligations that had
conventionally been placed on the nation state (and the international community) were illegitimately shifted onto
their shoulders, and they rejected this move: “Most companies will argue that it is not their role to step in when
those first in line of responsibility fail to perform their duty”42. Let us have a closer look at Hunt’s guidelines to
see whether or to what extent this response is warranted.
Hunt’s definitive list contains no less than 47 guidelines, grouped into 14 themes. Some of the guidelines refer to
such general requirements as the need for transparency, monitoring and accountability. It is further held
imperative that companies disclose all their advocacy and lobbying activities and their attempts to influence
public policy (guidelines 17 and 18). Companies are also called upon to respect the letter and spirit of the Doha
Declaration (guideline 27) and not to impede those states that wish to use the flexibilities of the TRIPS
Agreement (guideline 28). There are also interesting requirements on licensing and pricing. Thus drug
companies “should issue non-exclusive voluntary licenses with a view to increasing access, in low-income and
middle-income countries, to all medicines” (guideline 30). With a view to ensuring that a company’s medicines
are affordable to as many people as possible, the former UN Special Rapporteur suggests that it should adopt
differential pricing between countries and within countries (guideline 33), charging lower prices in poorer
countries and for poorer patients and communities. Drug companies should also do more research and
development on neglected diseases and make public commitments in this respect (guideline 23). Hunt recognizes
that drug companies also have a responsibility to enhance shareholder value (preamble) and thus are no charities,
but he insists that they should do everything they reasonably can to help realize the human right to health: “The
seminal right-to-health responsibility is to take all reasonable steps to make the medicine as accessible as
possible, as soon as possible, to all those in need, within a viable business model”43. Moreover, companies have
to make themselves accountable in this regard by having their efforts to enhance access to medicines monitored
and reviewed by independent agencies.
While working on the guidelines, Hunt also undertook a mission in 2008 to the headquarters of the UK-based
drug firm GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) to interview several senior managers on the company’s policy with regard to
access to medicines. GSK is widely recognized as a strong exponent of Corporate Social Responsibility policies
within the pharmaceutical industry. In 2008 it ranked first on Access to Medicine Index and in 2010 it came out
on top again. As GSK’s policy might be considered as constituting ‘best practice’ in this area, Hunt’s findings
are particularly interesting44. While he thinks some aspects of GSK policy are indeed admirable and
commendable, he still concludes that across the board the company fails to live up to its human rights
41
See Hunt (2008) and Hunt and Khosla (2010).
Leisinger (2009) 10f.
43
Hunt and Khosla (2010) 2.
44
Hunt (2009)
42
11
obligations. GSK does quite a lot of research on so-called “neglected diseases” with special relevance to
developing countries. The company also has made a commitment to offer its antiretrovirals and anti-malarial
treatments to least-developed countries and all of sub-Saharan Africa at not-for-profit prices (which cover costs
including insurance and freight). These price reductions are in line with GSK’s right-to-health responsibilities,
but Hunt observes that they have been forced by competition from generic producers: “Crucially, generic
competition played a vital role in driving down these prices. In most cases, generic companies have pushed their
prices below the NFP [not-for-profit] prices of innovator companies”45. The former UN Special Rapporteur also
notes that the price of GSK’s HPV (human papilloma virus) vaccine against cervical cancer, Cervarix, remains
so high (US $ 300) as to be beyond the reach of most people in developing countries.46 Although GSK grants
licenses for some of its products in some markets, Hunt holds that the company is too reluctant to use this
instrument and that it should enter into voluntary licensing (both commercial and non-commercial) on a much
wider scale across a range of medicines and markets. GSK has also experimented with a new marketing
approach of differential pricing between countries and within countries. This approach would hold much interest
and promise, Hunt remarks in his report, if it could be extended considerably beyond its present far too modest
scale. Hunt is also critical of GSK’s lobbying activities to discourage the full use of the TRIPS flexibilities by
countries like India, Indonesia and the Philippines and its support for the inclusion of “TRIPS-plus” provisions in
bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Finally, the company has not lived up to standards of accountability
by failing to provide for external review of its Corporate Accountability Report for 2008.
Hunt’s recommendations (not to say prescriptions) to GSK and the pharmaceutical industry in general are based
on the assumption that drug firms have definite human rights obligations in relation to access to medicines. It is
precisely this assumption that is bluntly rejected by the pharmaceutical industry. In this regard GSK’s response
to Hunt’s report on the company’s policies is highly significant: “The ‘right to health’ is an important issue,
though not well defined, especially as it relates to non-state actors. Therefore we do not accept the suggestion –
implicit in the development of this Report – that GSK’s programme and ongoing commitment is in any way
required by international legal norms, whether in the human rights or other areas.”47. In other words, the
company prefers to see its Corporate Social Responsibility policies as “good works” that are supererogatory and
45
Hunt (2009) 18.
Hunt states in his report: “As a patent holder of a life-saving medicine, GSK has a right-to-health
responsibility to do all it reasonably can to put in place, as a matter of urgency, mechanisms that enhance access
to Cervarix in middle-income and low-income countries […]”, Hunt (2009) 18. However, beyond being
financially unaffordable, Cervarix is also not the most appropriate HPV vaccine for use in developing countries.
The same holds for the other HPV vaccine that is currently on the market, Merck’s Gardasil. Both vaccines have
actually been designed and developed with a view to be used in developed countries. They are expensive to
produce; require refrigeration and a cold chain for storage; they require delivery by intramuscular injection in
three doses over a six-month period; they work against HPV16 and HPV18, but not against virus variants such as
HPV35 that are more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa; they may be less effective in women with other infections
(like HIV); their ideal target group is females in early adolescence, but this may make them culturally
inappropriate in some developing countries. For all these reasons, Cervarix and Gardasil are not optimally
designed for use in developing countries, despite the fact that more appropriate alternative options would have
been possible, see Intemann and de Melo-Martín (2010). Thus, these two HPV vaccines not only illustrate the
problem of access to existing medicines or vaccines due to their high prices, but also show the biased orientation
of the global R&D effort towards the demands of affluent markets. It is not just that HPV vaccines are “largely
unaffordable where [they are] most needed”, Hunt (2009) 18; as Hunt notes, but appropriate forms of HPV
vaccines are not even available where they would be most needed.
47
GlaxoSmithKline (2009)
46
12
not required by international legal norms. The implication is that a pharmaceutical company cannot be held to
account for not living up to any alleged human rights obligations in relation to access to medicines.
GSK’s position is in fact representative for the entire pharmaceutical industry. The editors of PLoS Medicine
argue that pharmaceutical companies “blunt their own responsibilities by instead emphasizing their corporate
social responsibility initiatives” and that by persistently claiming that “the primary responsibility for delivering
the right to health lies with the State” the industry allows “to exculpate itself from its own human rights
responsibilities”48. Business ethicist Richard De George also points out that the Corporate Social Responsibility
initiatives in which pharmaceutical companies engage seem to imply that they are not to be held accountable for
failing to live up to any commitments: “In their various programs, many pharmaceutical companies give a
variety of drugs away free to the needy, be they AIDS victims in Africa or poor people in the United States.
These are most often presented as meeting part of the company’s social responsibility. So framed, it sounds as if
these are voluntary, non-obligatory programs that the companies adopt as good citizens or through their
philanthropic foundations. They might be considered supererogatory, or good works that are not required, and
ones for which they deserve praise; but failure to engage in them would deserve no blame. This approach puts
the actions of pharmaceutical companies in the realm of charity, and portrays them as generous and caring”49.
The language of social responsibility, he also observes, “carries with it no non-self imposed obligations and so
no broader accountability beyond what the company defines its responsibility to be”50.
Pharmaceutical companies often cite the reduced prices for antiretrovirals or other essential medicines that they
charge in developing countries, or their willingness to engage in differential pricing schemes on a case-by case
basis51, as proof of their good intentions to help enhance access to medicines. It is doubtful, however, whether
such price reductions are always of an entirely voluntary nature. In many cases, as Paul Hunt also pointed out in
his report on GSK, prices have been driven down by increased competition from generic producers and
pharmaceutical companies were simply forced to follow suit (although Hunt noted that GSK’s not-for-profit
prices were still above the prices of generic versions). It might be naïve to expect that drug companies would
introduce drastic price reductions entirely on their own accord, without being pressed to do so by strong external
forces. In their study of Brazil’s successful policy of securing access to low-cost AIDS medication, William
Flanagan and Gail Whiteman also show that pharmaceutical companies were only willing to concede drastic
price reductions in the face of strong pressure from NGOs and especially from the Brazilian government, which
credibly used the threat of compulsory licensing. They conclude: “Action undertaken in terms of voluntary CSR
alone may be insufficient”52.
In view of the fact that pharmaceutical companies generally reject the notion that they have definite obligations
flowing from the human right to health and that their CSR initiatives are often just a reaction to NGO campaigns
and other external pressures, it would seem that a direct moral appeal to their sense of social responsibility is not
the best approach to realize global justice with regard to access to and availability of medicines. One may also
insist that “all pharmaceutical companies have a responsibility to take reasonable measures to redress the historic
48
PLoS Medicine Editors (2010)
De George (2005) 557f.
50
De George, idem., 557.
51
Leisinger (2009)
52
Flanagan and Whiteman (2007) 65.
49
13
neglect of poverty-related diseases”53, and it would of course be nice if companies would do more research on
“neglected diseases”, but this moral appeal remains rather futile as long as the profit opportunities of wealthy
markets exercise a powerful pull in the contrary direction. It might be too much to expect that companies, which
also have a responsibility to enhance shareholder value, would resist this pull.54 In short, a more structural
approach may be called for.
Thomas Pogge and the Health Impact Fund
The German philosopher Thomas Pogge has thought long and hard about the working of the international patent
system from the perspective of global justice. He is also concerned about the human right to health, but he thinks
it is inappropriate and unhelpful to assign the responsibility for realizing this right to national states or to
individual business enterprises. Instead, he holds that this right is to be secured by a just global institutional
order. Pogge also holds that the right of access to essential medicines, as a derivative of the right to health, not
only demands that existing essential medicines are accessible to all, but also that a fair allocation of research
efforts ensures that work is being done on the right kind of diseases (e.g. also for life-threatening diseases that
are currently being “neglected” due to lack of profitable markets). Thus Pogge pays special attention to the first
two distributive effects of IP systems distinguished by DeCamp: (a) the types of objects that will be developed
and for which IPRs will be sought; and (b) the differential access various people will have to these objects55.
What is more, Pogge holds that any attempt to re-design the international patent system according to principles
of global justice has to deal with these two dimensions together and to solve the twin problems of availability
and access simultaneously. Any solution alleviating the one problem at the expense of aggravating the other must
be avoided.
Pogge starts with a fairly conventional economic analysis of the role of patents. Patents are intended to address a
well-known “market failure”, namely the lack or insufficiency of innovative activities on the part of firms in the
absence of legal protection for the results of their efforts. If any inventions could be easily copied by “free
riders”, firms would not be able to recoup the expenses incurred in their innovative efforts and would therefore
have no incentive to engage in such pursuits in the first place. The patent system helps to overcome this problem
by providing the inventor a temporary monopoly on the use of the invention for which he is granted a patent,
currently for a period of 20 years from the date of filing the patent application. This amounts in effect to solving
one “market failure” (the undersupply of innovations) by creating another “market failure”56. As any economics
textbook explains, a monopoly will lead to a static inefficiency or welfare loss that is known as a “deadweight
loss”. A patent on a drug allows the patent holder to charge what the market will bear, that is, to set the price at
the level where his profits will be maximized. Because the monopoly price is so much higher than the marginal
cost price, this will prevent transactions with all those potential users who are able and willing to pay more than
the marginal cost but not the full monopoly price of the patented medicine. Some quantitative calculations
indicate that the deadweight loss in the US pharma market may be no less than 60 percent of sales revenues and
53
Hunt (2009) 23.
Here is a concise expression of this viewpoint: “Pharmaceutical companies prosper by catering to the affluent;
and they would be violating their responsibilities to their shareholders if they purposefully served poor patients
at the expense of their bottom line.” Hollis and Pogge (2010) 12.
55
See DeCamp (2007) 50f.
56
Pogge (2005) 186.
54
14
that the relative share in developing country markets may be even higher57 – thus it is clear that, simply in
economic terms, enormous amounts are involved. In the case of patents for essential, life-saving medicines, this
“market failure” leads to morally unacceptable situations, as deadweight losses in economic terms translate here
to dead bodies in human terms.
In theory, the deadweight loss of a monopoly could be mitigated or even overcome if the monopolist were able
to charge different prices for different customers, according to their respective ability and willingness to pay,
instead of charging a single price for all customers. This solution requires that the monopolist can differentiate
his customers into different “classes” and also that any re-sale of the product between these different “classes”
can be prevented – conditions that in practice may be extremely hard to fulfill58. Nonetheless, we have seen that
the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Paul Hunt, strongly urged pharmaceutical companies to
use differential pricing schemes, both between and within countries, on a wide scale in order to fulfill their
human rights responsibilities. Some drug firms have indeed made modest attempts in this direction (examples
are GSK and Novartis), but most are very reluctant to engage in deliberate price differentiation at all for fear of
spoiling their markets in affluent countries. It is not just that they are afraid that medicines will be diverted from
low-price markets in poor countries to high-price markets in rich countries. It is also because of the practice of
reference pricing: “some high-income and middle-income countries try to use, as benchmarks for the prices at
which they buy, the preferential prices offered to low-income countries”59. For all these reasons Pogge concludes
that differential pricing is not a workable solution to the deadweight-loss problem, or in other words, to the
problem of access to essential medicines60. He also holds that it is unreasonable to expect drug companies “to
systematically lower prices in developing countries on the basis of altruism”61. In his eyes it is even unfair to
impose such a requirement on the pharmaceutical industry “when other industries (which do nothing for poor
people) have no such expectations placed on them” (ibid.).
It thus becomes apparent that Pogge does not wish to go along with all those NGOs that relentlessly continue to
press pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices in developing countries ever further in the belief that this is
the right way to proceed in the search for solutions to global health problems. He also highlights the limitations
of compulsory licenses, noting not only the fierce opposition of the pharmaceutical industry and the risk of
political retaliation but also pointing out that their widespread use might undermine the incentivizing effect of
patents: “But [..] compulsory licensing, especially if it were to become more common, brings back the first
market failure of undersupply: Pharmaceutical companies will tend to spend less on the quest for essential drugs
when the uncertainty of success is compounded by the additional unpredictability of whether and to what extent
they will be allowed to recoup their investments through undisturbed use of their monopoly pricing powers”62. It
is almost as if we hear the well-known mantras of the pharmaceutical industry. Drug firms also tend to
emphasize that it is incorrect to look at the prices of patented medicines only from a static point of view. After
all, patents are temporary monopolies that are precisely intended as incentives to stimulate the search for new
57
Grootendorst (2009)
Lipsey and Steiner (1972) 258-263.
59
See Hunt (2009) 16 and also Hollis and Pogge (2008) 85.
60
See Pogge (2005) 187 and Hollis and Pogge (2008) 98f.
61
Hollis and Pogge (2008) 95.
62
Pogge (2005)188 and see also Hollis and Pogge (2008) 99f.
58
15
medicines. No patents, no innovation. Higher prices in the present (until the competition of generics after the
expiration of the patent brings them down), the industry argues, are simply the “price” we all have to pay to
enjoy the fruits of progress. A substantial erosion of price margins might well endanger pharmaceutical
innovation.
Pogge agrees that one should not consider the problem exclusively from the point of view of static efficiency but
also take into account the dynamic role of the patent system to foster innovation. In so far he subscribes to the
industry position. However, one cannot simply trade off static efficiency (wide access to existing medicines)
against dynamic efficiency (innovation). Pogge insists that access to essential medicines is a human right that is
to be secured by a just international system. This human right cannot be sacrificed on the altar of pharmaceutical
innovation. Even more, when looked at from a dynamic perspective, the international patent system does not
meet the requirements of global justice either: it generates innovations, indeed, but it does not generate the right
kind of innovations. As financial incentives, patents operate by orienting research towards the needs of the
wealthy and the affluent, that is, those who exercise effective demand backed up by purchasing power, and not
towards the needs of the poor and needy who are unable to do so. The result is an enormously skewed
distribution of the global pharmaceutical research effort. The well-known “10/90 gap” illustrates this effect:
“Only 10 percent of global health research is devoted to conditions that account for 90 percent of the global
disease burden”63. There are therefore many “neglected” diseases, especially in the Tropics, which fail to receive
adequate attention from the international research community.64
Pogge concludes that any proposal for a re-design of the international patent system in the field of medicines has
to solve the access problem (cf. deadweight loss) and the availability problem (cf. the 10/90 gap) simultaneously.
He has proposed his own institutional solution for dealing with these two problems, the so-called Health Impact
Fund, which has been further elaborated with the help of economist Aidan Hollis65. Irrespective of how one
judges the merits of his reform proposal, Pogge certainly deserves credit for bringing home so clearly that these
twin problems define a major part of the task-set for any attempt at institutional re-design.
In Pogge’s view, an international public fund based on obligatory contributions (mostly) from developed
countries, the Health Impact Fund, should be established to create the possibility of rewarding pharmaceutical
63
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group (2001) 10.
Actually, we use the notion of the “10/90 gap” as a shorthand to denote the skewed allocation of worldwide
medical and pharmaceutical research effort over diseases and conditions differentially affecting various parts and
populations of the globe. This stylized formula may be appropriate as a first-order indication of global
imbalances, but needs to be refined in a more thorough scrutiny of the problem. The WHO’s Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) offers a more sophisticated approach. It
distinguishes between Type I diseases (incident in both rich and poor countries, with large numbers of vulnerable
population in each), Type II diseases (incident in both rich and poor countries, but with a substantial proportion
of the cases in poor countries), and Type III diseases (overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in the developing
countries). Diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries would thus by definition be Type II and
Type III diseases. However, this approach may be too simplistic, as some Type I diseases (like cardiovascular
diseases) may be expected to rise in importance in developing countries while showing decreasing mortality
rates in developed countries. As the CIPIH report rightly remarks: “The criterion should be diseases or
conditions of significant public health importance in developing countries for which an adequate treatment does
not exist for use in resource-poor settings – either because no treatment exists whatsoever, or because, where
treatments exist, they are inappropriate for use in countries with poor delivery systems, or unaffordable” CIPIH
(2006) 26.
65
Hollis and Pogge (2008)
64
16
companies for developing essential medicines, the size of their reward being proportional to the impact of their
invention on the global disease burden. In essence, the scheme means that companies are offered a choice. Once
they have taken out a patent for a new drug, they can either attempt to earn money on it in the usual way by
exploiting the monopoly and setting prices that affluent markets can bear, or they can choose the option of
registering with the Fund and being rewarded according to a formula that is geared to the health impact of the
new drug (measured in terms of QALYs, i.e. the number of quality-adjusted life years saved worldwide). In the
latter case the drug will have to be made available at an administered price that is set by the Health Impact Fund
to reflect average manufacturing and distribution cost. In return the registrant will receive, after market approval
of the new medicine, annual reimbursements from the Fund that are proportional to the global health impact of
the drug for a period of 10 years. (The absolute size of the reimbursements will be determined by the size of the
Fund and the measured health impacts of the other registered products.) After this period the medicine will be
freely available for generic producers. The second option would entail a different metric of success for the drug
company. Success will not be measured then in terms of net sales to those who can afford to pay the high prices
of a monopolized invention, but in terms of the reduction of the global disease burden, irrespective of the
purchasing power of those who suffer from it. In this way it is hoped that the Health Impact Fund will redress the
existing imbalance of availability (epitomized by the “10/90 gap”) by providing incentives that are not geared to
purchasing power but to medical need. Setting an administered price at roughly the level of average
manufacturing and distribution cost will ensure that the problem of access is also addressed, at least for drugs
registered with the Fund.66
According to Pogge, there is a strong moral obligation for the governments and citizens of affluent countries to
support the Health Impact Fund (HIF). He holds that the citizens of affluent countries are indirectly responsible
for the international institutional order which their governments have the power to impose on the entire world. In
his eyes, the status quo of the TRIPS system of IP protection, which “foreseeably and avoidably deprive[s]
human beings of secure access to the object of their human right”67, is thoroughly unjust. Given the claim that a
large part of these human rights violations can in principle be avoided by installing the HIF, the ethical
conclusion is that they should be avoided: “Maintaining SQ [= the status quo] without the HIF constitutes a
massive violation of the human rights of the global poor. So long as there will be poor people in this world –
whether in poor or rich countries – who are unable to obtain expensive medicines still under patent, SQ will
gravely harm, and kill, many of them”68. The SQ + HIF option drastically changes the moral landscape and is
even ethically preferable, in Pogge’s judgment, to a return to the pre-TRIPS era.69
Criticism
Several commentators have questioned the political and practical feasibility of the Health Impact Fund. One
critical issue is funding. The whole initiative needs initially some 6 billion dollars from governments or other
contributors to take off. Will such funds really be forthcoming and can pharmaceutical companies base their
long-term R&D decisions with any confidence on government pledges to provide funds over a longer period of
66
For a detailed exposition of the whole scheme, see Hollis and Pogge (2008) and Singer and Schroeder (2010).
Pogge (2005) 199.
68
Hollis and Pogge (2008) 60.
69
Hollis and Pogge, idem., 54.
67
17
time? “Providing public funds to drug companies is unlikely to be politically popular: competing demands will
always seem more urgent and desirable”70. It has also been pointed out that the measurement procedure for
assessing the impact of a new medicine on the global disease burden is rather complex, which would make the
assessment vulnerable to corruption71.
In many respects the Health Impact Fund is similar to the prize fund that has been elaborated by James Love and
others as an alternative system for rewarding pharmaceutical innovation.72 Love’s ideas have also inspired the
legislative proposals introduced by US Representative Bernard Sanders from Vermont in 2005 and 2007 to
create a Medical Innovation Prize Fund in the United States. The HIF as well as James Love’s prize fund aim to
break the link between incentives for R&D and product prices, or in other words to separate the market for
innovation from the product market. However, there are also important differences. Whereas the HIF allows
registrants to retain their IP and only requires them to accept the price to be set at average cost as a condition for
being eligible to reimbursements from the HIF, Love’s scheme would make the patented invention on
registration available to generic competitors through open licensing73. The consequence is that this scheme
actively harnesses the forces of economic competition to bring the prices of new medicines down. Furthermore,
while the HIF is a voluntary complement to the existing pharmaceutical innovation system, Love’s prize fund
ultimately aims to become a complete replacement. An obvious drawback of a voluntary system like the HIF is
that it would not address the access problem if the patent owner chose the traditional patent monopoly rather
than the HIF option74. Finally, Love and Pogge also strongly disagree about the role of compulsory licensing.
For Love, this option continues to be vital to secure access to medicines in poor countries by relying on the
potential of generic competition. Pogge, by contrast, is rather critical of this option and emphasizes that
“compulsory licenses weaken the innovation incentives that were supposed to result from the extension of strong
intellectual property rights into the less developed countries”75. In Love’s view, this alleged ‘trade-off’ between
innovation and access is extremely overstated as the potential demand from poor countries does not provide
much of an incentive at all, with or without patent protection. Love refers to the report of the WHO’s
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, which concluded that strong global
IP protection (without compulsory licensing) is unlikely to boost pharmaceutical research on diseases
disproportionately affecting developing countries (i.e. Type II and Type III diseases), given insufficient market
incentives.76 Love fears that Pogge’s statements may readily play into the hands of patent-owning companies
opposing compulsory licensing.77
70
Buchanan et al. (2011) 326. This lack of trust in governments’ commitments is shared by Philip Hedger,
executive managing director of international affairs at Pfizer: “The sustainability of a government-funded reward
system has various areas of uncertainty. Governments change, as do their objectives and their funding mandates.
Totally unpredicted issues can arise, as the world is currently witnessing. These and more reasons provide plenty
of opportunity for governments to review their commitments, whatever the nature of the original agreement.”
quoted in Schulz (2008).
71
Sonderholm (2010)
72
See Love and Hubbard (2007) and see Gombe and Love (2010).
73
Compare Hollis and Pogge (2008) 105f.
74
Love and Hubbard (2007) 1535.
75
See Hollis and Pogge (2008) 54 and also 99f.
76
CIPIH (2006) 85
77
Love (2008)
18
It is a notable feature of Pogge’s reform proposal that the whole scheme still relies very strongly on the
“incentivizing” effect of patents.78 The main problem with the present patent system, in Pogge’s view, is that the
incentives are geared to (potential) market demand in wealthy countries that is backed up by purchasing power.
The “trick” of the HIF scheme is to leverage the unmet medical needs of the South by backing them up with
additional funds, so that they too carry some weight in the market pull directing pharmaceutical innovation. It is
all a matter of setting the incentives “straight” – but by the same token the scheme still counts on the role of
patents as incentives. In this regard Pogge’s ideas are clearly out of sync with the emerging “A2K” (Access to
Knowledge) movement, which radically questions the need for exclusive intellectual property rights as a
condition for stimulating creativity and innovation.79 The success of free and open-source software provides the
paradigmatic example for the A2K movement: “The production process of free and open-source software is
central to the imaginary of the A2K mobilization because it offers a model of collaborative, distributed
innovation that does not rely on the incentivizing effect of IP rights”80. Another plank of the “A2K” platform is
that “under no circumstances can human rights be subordinated to intellectual property protection”81. The A2K
movement is however concerned with a wider range of human rights than the right to health and the right of
access to essential medicines that constitute the major focus of Pogge’s concerns.
The pharmaceutical industry is usually seen as a sector where patents are indispensible for innovation, due to
high investment costs of R&D and the relative ease to reverse engineer any resulting product. Lately, however,
the presumed “incentivizing” effect of patents even for the pharma sector is increasingly called into question. For
one thing, the track record of the industry over the recent period is not particularly impressive (even apart from
the global imbalance epitomized in the 10/90 gap). Official figures show that in the last three decades “the
productivity of the pharma R&D enterprise – the number of new molecules brought to market per dollar spent on
R&D – has declined markedly”82. This productivity slowdown occurred in a period when new technologies like
genomics, combinatorial chemistry and knock-out mice were supposed to make the drug discovery process more
rapid and more efficient. The conditioned reflex of the pharma industry to a drying pipeline of new inventions is
to clamor for more patent protection, but the fact of the matter is that their wishes on this score have been
answered rather well during the past decades. Ironically, some hard-boiled economic analyses locate the root of
the problem in the patent system itself and the very high profit margins that it generates. Grootendorst sums up
the social costs that are caused by the current system of pharmaceutical innovation centered on patents: (1) the
costs to the healthcare system of medication non-compliance due to higher drug prices; (2) the resources
consumed in the battle over the innovator’s profits; (3) the resources spent by the innovator to expand unit sales
and extend patents; (4) the increased costs of pharma R&D when this R&D builds on patented upstream
discoveries; (5) the distortions in research direction caused by non-patentability of certain compounds; and (6)
78
As Singer and Schroeder explain: “The Health Impact Fund leaves intact strong incentives for the
pharmaceutical industry around the globe, thereby preserving the TRIPS advantages, whilst mitigating its main
challenge, namely to block access to life-saving medicines to the poor. By registering a patented medicine with
the Fund, a firm would agree to sell it globally at cost. In exchange, the firm would receive, for a fixed time,
payments based on the product’s assessed global health impact. The arrangement would be optional and it would
not diminish patent rights, it therefore aligns the interests of pharmaceutical companies with the interests of poor
patients. Such a win-win situation has to be welcomed!” Singer and Schroeder (2010) 17.
79
See Kapczynski (2008) and Kapczynski and Krikorian (2010).
80
Kapczynski (2008) 869f.
81
Kapczynski (2008) 866.
82
Grootendorst (2009) 2.
19
the administrative costs of the patent system.83 To this list can be added the unknown but most likely very
considerable extent of bias and distortions in the medical literature due to widespread practices like “ghost
management” and “publication planning” that result from the dominance of marketing imperatives over the
research process.84 Thus there is every reason to question Pogge’s assumption that patents are indispensible as
incentives for innovation.
A broader panorama
Looking at Pogge’s ideas and proposals through the lens of the emerging A2K movement reveals some
conspicuous blind spots. While concentrating his attention on the human right to health (or rather, more
narrowly, on the derived human right of access to essential medicines) and on the design of a workable patentbased system that is able to address the twin problems of access to and availability of medicines, Pogge tends to
ignore or dismiss other areas of science, technology and culture and other forms of intellectual property that may
raise issues of global justice. There is of course no denying that access to essential medicines is extremely
important, but it would be rather weird to suggest that it is the only issue in which basic human rights are at
stake. Proponents of the A2K movement typically bring into play a wider range of human rights, as transpires
from the following statement from the Adelphi Charter already quoted above: “[IP] laws must serve, and never
overturn, the basic human rights to health, education, employment and cultural life”85. The rights to participate in
cultural life and scientific advancement are also enshrined in the Universal Declaration (UDHR 27.1) and other
official human rights charters. Pogge’s narrow focus on the right to health may also explain why he pays no
attention to what DeCamp refers to as the third distributive effect of an IP system, beyond the effects on access
and availability, namely the distribution of the IPRs themselves86. For Pogge it seems to present no particular
problem of global justice when most pharmaceutical patents are possessed by a handful of western drug
companies. Access to knowledge, however, is crucially about participation in the global networked knowledgeand-information economy. The key issue is “whether information production will be primarily centralized and
proprietary or whether large parts of it should be decentralized and participatory”87.
While Pogge may sound fairly radical when he criticizes the restrictive effects of patents on access to medicines,
his judgments are rather timid when he occasionally turns to other forms of IP and to other areas of science,
technology and culture. He even deems the exclusion brought about by “other categories of intellectual property
(for example, software, films, and music)” perfectly “acceptable”.88 Proponents of free and open-source software
and of the A2K movement hold a different view. Brazil’s former Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, saw free
83
Grootendorst, idem., p. 32. In Grootendorst’s paper, each of these rubrics of social costs is further specified
and discussed in detail. A very interesting category is the second rubric. When a patent allows very high profit
margins on a certain drug, this will attract others seeking their share of the spoils. A lot of effort is simply wasted
on keeping these rent-seekers at bay: “The innovator will need to spend resources fending off counterfeiters,
resellers, competing drug companies (both generic and branded me-toos), and negotiating with and lobbying
price regulators and drug insurers …” (idem, p. 32).
84
Sismondo and Doucet (2010)
85
RSA (2006)
86
DeCamp (2007) 318.
87
Balkin (2006)
88
Pogge (2005) 187. The conflict between participation in scientific advancement in general and the principle
behind the Health Impact Fund is further explored in Timmermann and van den Belt (2012) and Timmermann
(2012).
20
software as central to Brazil’s collective sovereignty (“a cultural question par excellence”) and as an essential
contribution to the promotion of skills and knowledge that will enable historically disenfranchised Brazilians to
participate in various forms of cultural production such as music, design, publishing, software development and
photography.89 One could think here of the fourth category, called ‘Senses, Imagination, and Thought’, in
Martha Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities, representing a key element of human flourishing.90 In this
connection worldwide access to educational materials and scientific publications, often effectively blocked by
copyright protections, also comes to mind as an issue of global justice.91
Access to knowledge can refer to four different things: (1) human knowledge (education, know-how, embodied
skills); (2) information (news, data, reports); (3) knowledge-embedded goods (KEGs) like drugs and computer
software; (4) tools for the production of KEGs (e.g. research tools, materials and chemical compounds, computer
programs).92 Sectors like the multinational biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry try to control the
production of knowledge-embedded goods by using IPRs and monopolizing the tools of production. Sometimes,
however, attempts are made to wrest control from the hands of the few oligopolistic companies dominating the
industry. Special importance in this regard accrues to the initiative taken by the molecular biologist Richard
Jefferson to set up BiOS (Biological Innovation for Open Society or Biological Open Source) at CAMBIA in
Australia. His aim is to make and to keep the basic techniques of agricultural biotechnology, the “tools” and the
“technology platforms”, accessible to everybody. Freeing the tools from the stranglehold of patents would make
the development of numerous potential applications benefiting the poor and needy of the world economically
viable. It would also facilitate the active participation of developing countries in the process of biotechnological
innovation. Interestingly, in an interview Jefferson declared that “the most fundamental human right is the
freedom, or the capability, to make and use tools to solve problems”93.
It might seem just wishful thinking to expect that in the foreseeable future developing countries could build the
capacity to undertake fully-fledged drug research and to become actively involved in such a complicated,
knowledge-intensive and capital-intensive industry as pharmaceutics. However, there are some considerations
that mitigate this skepticism. For one thing, the established shape of the pharmaceutical industry and the
corresponding pattern of innovation are by no means set in stone – if only because of the widely recognized
productivity crisis of the current R&D model. It is also notable that middle-income countries like Brazil, India
and China (the so-called BIC countries) have built up quite formidable industries for producing generic
medicines (although their continued survival will crucially depend on maintaining the “flexibilities” of the
TRIPS agreement). It would be inappropriate to consider generics production simply as a “copycat” industry (the
image that the non-generic pharmaceutical industry wants to convey). As Amy Kapczynski notes, “it was Indian
[generic] firms that first incorporated all of the necessary anti-HIV drugs into one pill, thereby making it easier
89
see Schoonmaker (2007) 1015f.
“Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, reason – and to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way
informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing
and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth …” (Nussbaum
2006) 76.
91
Willinsky (2006)
92
Balkin (2006)
93
Richard Jefferson quoted by Poynder (2006).
90
21
for patients to adhere to treatment and prevent viral resistance”94. The need to drive production costs down also
requires skills to effect incremental process innovation.
The international pharmaceutical industry is definitely in flux. Companies are casting around to find new models
for drug research and development. Under the leadership of its new CEO, Andrew Witty, GlaxoSmithKline is
embracing a model of “open innovation” – which involves making a library of 13.500 compounds freely
available for testing against malaria, granting access to patents and know-how of the company, and creating
broad-based partnerships around a so-called “Open Lab” where researchers are allowed to access GSK’s
expertise and infrastructure – all in the name of breaking down barriers to innovation and access to medicines
and vaccines95. Jeffrey Sturchio, former vice-president of Merck and currently president of the Global Health
Council, also sketches a broad panorama of the changing landscape of innovation in the international
pharmaceutical industry which in his view heralds a “new era for intellectual property”96. Sturchio notes that
more and more companies, just like GSK, are adopting an “open innovation model built around licensing and
alliances”, and he also refers to the rise of partnerships between non-generic pharmaceutical companies and
generic firms, an increased interest in innovation and IP among the latter, and finally to the rise of PDPs or
product development partnerships (e.g. the Medicines for Malaria Venture, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
Initiative, the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and the Malaria Vaccine Initiative). The upshot of all these
trends: “IP is still important, but it is being used now as a tool to foster more open innovation, rather than an end
in itself”97. The reason Sturchio gives for the increasing popularity of the open innovation model among
pharmaceutical firms is also revealing; it is “the realization that they cannot hope to generate or control within
their four walls more than a small fraction of global biomedical research in areas of interest”98. It thus seems that
the days of pharmaceutical laboratories as closed bulwarks of research and innovation are numbered.
During the last decade Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) and other forms of Public-Private Partnerships
(PPPs) have been proliferating in the area of neglected diseases. Although this new wave of activity is of course
highly welcome, its institutional setup is not without criticism. Hollis and Pogge have pointed at some of the
problems inherent in PDPs such as the difficulty to monitor contractual compliance among partners and the lack
of sufficient incentives to push products through regulatory approval and promote their use by healthcare
personnel99. Their claim is that these problems could be alleviated if a Health Impact Fund were in place.
Shortcomings related to local participation have escaped their critical notice, however. Complaints have been
raised about the lack of indigenous (in most cases here: African) representation on the boards of these
partnership organizations, which is said to result in a perpetuation of “neo-colonial” dependency relationships,
with monies being channeled through first-world head offices and decisions taken in the USA or Europe100. A
related complaint is that the ethical acceptability of drug trials and other projects carried out in developing
countries is often judged by the criteria set up by ethical committees in the USA or Europe rather than by local
94
Kapczynski (2008) 872.
Witty (2010)
96
Sturchio (2010)
97
Sturchio, idem., 5.
98
Sturchio, idem., 4
99
Hollis and Pogge (2010)
100
Tucker and Makgoba (2008)
95
22
standards.101 Another complaint is that a large part of funding for PDPs originates from a single source, the
(admittedly very generous) Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which thereby gains enormous power to set
priorities.102 Rumors are circulating that decision-making on the malaria research agenda has been effectively
“captured” by the Gates Foundation and that the WHO feels threatened by the latter’s growing influence.103
However that may be, it would seem that developing countries in Africa and elsewhere desperately need to build
indigenous clinical, research and regulatory capacity in order to better set their own priorities, advance their own
ethical standards and secure their own interests.104 Otherwise they will continue to find themselves at the
receiving end of decisions taken by companies and agencies headquartered in first-world countries.
Acknowledgements
This article is the result of a research project of the Centre for Society and the Life Sciences in The Netherlands,
funded by the Netherlands Genomics Initiative.
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