21st Annual ESHET Conference
University of Antwerp (Antwerp, Belgium)
18-20 May 2017
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Monika Poettinger
Bocconi University, Milan
Gustav Klimt, The Birch Wood (1903), oil on canvas
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Abstract
Otto Neurath (1882-1945) wrote on rationality in the 1910s when he was interested in renewing
the economic science on an empiricist fundament. He discussed rationality mainly in two contexts.
Firstly, he analysed rationality as one of the means that humanity devised for taking decisions. In
Die Verirrten des Cartesius und das Auxiliarmotiv. (Zur Psychologie des Entschlusses), a seminar
held at the Viennese philosophical society in 1913 and later published, Neurath historicised the
use and meaning of rationality, comparing it to religion and magic. In the wake of Ernst Mach,
Neurath disputed the existence of universal truths or natural laws. Decisions would never cease to
entail a measure of uncertainty and men would always err in the forest of Descartes, without any
hope of ever exiting it. Rationality limited the pain of deciding exactly as other methods did and
could not claim to be the way out of the forest. Rationality, though, even if its results did not stand
the test of truth, constrained scientists to a continuous confrontation, avoiding arbitrary decision
making on part of a minority. By applying scientific methods, a limited range of solutions could be
offered, instead, to the democratic choice of the people. Scientists would not become the priests
of future, imposing dictatorial whims on the majority. Contrary to Weber, Neurath so judged
positively the rationalisation of the world because linked to democratisation. Secondly, Neurath
discussed rationality as a fundament of economics, particularly criticizing the homo oeconomicus
formulated by von Wieser. He did so in his Nationalökonomie und Wertlehre, eine systematische
Untersuchung, published in 1911, and in Das Begriffsgebäude der Wirtschaftslehre und seine
Grundlagen, published in 1917. Disputing the fact that rationality would steer humanity toward an
ideal world ruled by natural laws, implied that man was not an irrational being in dire need of
education and training: a pebble bringing the marvellous natural mechanism to a halt. With no
available truth, it was impossible to measure the goodness or badness of a decision. Every decision
would and should be legitimised by an auxiliary motive in respect to rationality. There was no
reason to found the economic science on a man behaving rationally. Economic actions and
economic policies should so be valued not in respect to their rationality but to their capability of
enhancing the wealth and happi ess of people. Neu ath s economics was to be a science of
happiness not of rationality.
2
Monika Poettinger
Neurath, economics and rationality: the Viennese context
Otto Neurath (1882-1945)1 wrote about economics mainly in the years between his dissertation in
1906 and 1917 when the )eits h ift fü die gesa te “taats isse s haft pu lished the summa of
his economic thought, Das Begriffsgebäude der Wirtschaftslehre und seine Grundlagen2. Neurath,
at the time residing in Vienna, was pursuing then an academic career in economics. In fact, in
1918, he obtained, thanks to Eberhard Gothein, Max and Alfred Weber, a professorship in
Heidelberg. On the occasion, Neurath held the required public lecture o
Ad i iste ed E o o
a d Natu al E o o
Wa E o o
,
Sandner, 2014, pp.103-105). I effe t, Neu ath s
career based mainly on his achievements in war economics, appreciated by many contemporaries
(Mises, 1919, p.125; Weber, 1978, pp.104-107). His participation to the key debates of his time, on
the theory of value, the method of social sciences, the normative content of economics and the
possibility of socialist calculation, instead, was much more controversial. Many harsh judgements
were felled on his holistic attempt at a complete reform of the economic science on empiricist
foundations3. Nonetheless his e o o i essa s appea ed i Gusta “ h olle s Jahrbücher für
Nationalökonomie und Statistik (Otto Neurath 1906 and 1907) and Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung,
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft in Deutschland (Otto Neurath 1910a), in Eugen Böhm-Ba e k s
Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Sozialpolitik und Verwaltung (Otto Neurath 1911a), and in Max
We e s Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Otto Neurath 1915a, 1915b and 1918b).
Neurath also joined the Verein für Socialpolitik and his writings are present among its published
and unpublished proceedings4.
While Neurath revolutionised economics, he also was an active and enthusiastic member of the
Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (Blackmore, Itagaki, and Tanaka 2013, p.280). The
Society was active from 1888 to 1938 and in those fifty years represented the main philosophical
discussion forum in Vienna (Fisette, 2014). The openness of the society, to other disciplines and to
extensive debates, was accentuated under the direction of Alois Höfler, particularly from the turn
1
For a complete biography of Otto Neurath see Günther Sandner, 2014; Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck,
Thomas E. Uebel, 2008; and Enza L. Vaccaro, 2005.
2
Otto Neurath 1917, pp. 484-520.
3
Uebel gives a colorful listing of all negative judgments by contemporaries o Otto Neu ath, f o Lujo B e ta o s
defi itio of Neu ath as a o a ti e o o ist of the A ie t Eg ptia s hool to the alte ati e stig atizatio s as a
ou geois p ofesso o as o
u ist
Bukha i a d Gesell. “ee Ue el
, p. .
4
The contributions have been republished in English in: Uebel and Cohen (2006) pp.292-298. For a critical appraisal
see Nau (1913).
3
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
of the century to his death in 19225. The Society reached then a steady membership base of over
two hundred associates, among them economists as Schumpeter and Menger, while up to six
hundred participants took part in the public lectures, held not only by philosophers but also
scientists and mathematicians6. Neurath lectured eleven times between 1908 and 1924 (Table 1)
and accordingly was the most prolific speaker of the Society. The topics he proposed were
controversial and much discussed. Eight extraordinary sessions of the Society were dedicated to
de ates o Neu ath s p ese tations (Table 1). Next to the participation in the gatherings of the
Verein für Socialpolitik and his attendance to the economic seminar of the university of Vienna,
the Philosophical Society was the intellectual circle where Neurath presented his major works and
debated his ideas, refining and defining them. As sho
i Ta le , listi g Neu ath s pu li atio s
along all his lectures at the Philosophical Society, the same topics, from war to value, from natural
laws to rationality, criss-crossed between academic publications in economics and public
philosophy lectures.
Neurath s renewal efforts in economics clearly stem from the discussions held at the Society on
the Machian heritage, Darwinism, Nietzsche and ethics, the origin of value, Platonic ideas, neoKantianism, causation and many more (Blackmore, Itagaki, and Tanaka 2013, pp.280-281). War, as
a topic to be analysed scientifically, was the object of his first lecture, held in March 1908. As seen,
the many publications later dedicated to war economics would become the basis of his
professorship. The public discussions on a priori values and the calculation of maximum pleasure,
held by Neurath in January 1910 and June 1912, would accompany the publication of his seminal
essay on the problem of value in economics (Otto Neurath, 1911). Rationality, discussed with the
title The lost a de e s of Des a tes a d the au ilia
oti e i Ja ua
, would followingly
be the focus of an essay on the problems of war economics that included the main theses of
Neu ath s renewed economics (Otto Neurath, 1913b). In the following years, Neurath published
his most important writings on war economics and the redefinition of the economic science (Otto
Neurath 1917a, 1917b) and presented in front of the associates of the Philosophical Society their
epistemological fundaments. He lectured on Mach, on alternative hypotheses and theoretical
systems and the problem of choice, on Spengler and his historical methodology and finally, in
Fe ua
o
The o eptual uildi g of e o o i theo
5
. The following year, though, marks
Alois Höfler (1853-1922) was among the founders of the Society in 1888. He acted as Obmann of the Society from
1898 to 1903 and was then elected President for life. He again held the position of Obmann from 1912 to 1922.
(Blackmore, Itagaki, and Tanaka 2013, p.279).
6
An English translation of the complete list of lectures held at the Philosophical Society is to be read in: Blackmore,
Itagaki, and Tanaka 2013, pp.283-298.
4
Monika Poettinger
the e d of Neu ath s pa ti ipatio to the Philosophi al “o iet . The ause had ee the death, i
1922, of Alois Höfler. His successor, Robert Reininger, inexorably limited the discussions to a
minimum, restricted the topics to philosophical questions and favoured academic philosophers as
speakers.
Blackmore, Itagaki, and Tanaka (2013, pp.281-282) venture to suggest that the ascension of
Reininger and the changes he introduced in the gatherings of the Philosophical Society gave rise to
a
fa ous i les of i te war Vienna. The circles collected former adherents of the Society
that wanted to recreate a space for open discussion on scientific and philosophical topics. The best
known and the most studied by historiography is Schlick's Circle, later institutionalised as Ernst
Ma h Asso iatio , that egula l
et o Thu sda s e e i gs i the Che ist
Buildi g of the
University (Stadler 2015). Under the guidance of Moritz Schlick, the so- alled Vie
a Ci le
became the preferred locus of debate for many philosophers and scientists, among them Hans
Hahn, Rudolf Carnap and Viktor Kraft. Otto Neurath, also, having held his final lecture at the
philosophical Society in 1924, attended Schlick's Circle, soon becoming one of its driving forces.
Karl Menger organised, instead, his mathematisches Colloquium, while many other professors,
among them Heinrich Gomperz, Robert Reininger, Victor Kraft and Edgar Zilsel, set up their own
gatherings. Most of them, though, were not as open as the Philosophical Society had been:
participation was only upon invitation and therefore discussion mostly limited to people who
shared basic assumptions.
In the interwar years, Neurath not only switched his attention from the Philosophical Society to
the Vienna circle, but also reduced his economic writings to a minimum. In 1918, in fact, he had
abruptly ended his promising academic career in economics by following his ideals down to the
haos of Mu i h s Räterepublik. During the process for treason that concluded the Bavarian
Council Republic, Neu ath s defe se e efited f o
the favorable testimony of many friends,
among them Max Weber7. Neurath escaped with his life, but lost the professorship in economics
he had just obtained in Heidelberg. From then on, he dedicated his efforts to philosophy and to
the democratization of knowledge by devising and directing museums and by experimenting with
his renowned isotype language.
The end of his career as economist and the conclusion of his active engagement in the
Philosophi al “o iet
a ked a
eak i i Neu ath s i telle tual life, o pelli g hi
to sea h fo
We e s testi o has ot ee p ese ed i offi ial a hi es, ut has ee e o st u ted f o a ti les pu lished
the Mὒnchner Neuesten Nachrichten. See Horts Beier (ed.) Max Weber, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16, Tὒbingen, Mohr
Siebeck, 1988, pp.492-494
7
5
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
an alternative source of income and changing the style, content and editors of his writings.
Neurath increasingly published on popular journals and newspapers and wrote educational
booklets and popularization texts. Essays in academic journals, be they of economics or
philosophy, vanished almost completely from his work. The only economic question he continued
to write about, almost obsessively, was socialisation.
Neu ath s former effort in redefining the economic science on his innovative epistemology was
hardly understood by his contemporaries and soon discarded or forgotten. His conclusions,
regarding the development of economic thought, the linguistic analysis of economic terminology,
the relative and historical value of theories and the uselessness of theoretical systems, resurfaced
in academic debates only at the end of the century. The same holds for his evaluation of
rationality, an instrument of choice, in his eyes, comparable to religion or magic. History had made
of rationality one of the characteristics of the modern man, stimulating democratic decision
processes, but economics could not assume it as the basis of its analysis. Economics, for Neurath,
had to study the consequence of choices on the wealth of people, leaving the wanderers of
Descartes to freely search for their own way, be it rational or irrational, out of the forest.
6
Monika Poettinger
Table 1
Selected works of Otto Neurath8, his lectures at the Philosophical Society and the discussions
at the Verein für Socialpolitik (1906-1924)
Type
Essay
Lecture
Book
Book
Essay
Essay
Essay
Essay
Essay
Essay
Essay
Book
Book
Essay
Lecture
Lecture
Essay
Lecture
Essay
Lecture
Lecture
Essay
Essay
Essay
Lecture
Essay
Essay
Lecture
Lecture
Lecture
Essay
Essay
Lecture
Lecture
Lecture
Lecture
Book
Lecture
Lecture
Book
Lecture
Lecture
Lecture
Title
Zur Anschauung der Antike über Handel, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft (Otto Neurath, 1906a;
1906b; 1907à)
War and Moral Principles
Die Entwicklung der antiken Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Otto Neurath 1908)
Antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Otto Neurath 1909)
Ernst Schroders Beweis des 12. Theorems: Für die identischen Operationen gilt das
'Kommutationsgesetz' (Otto Neurath 1909b)
Zum Dualismus in der Logik (Otto Neurath, Olga Hahn 1909a)
Eindeutigkeit und Kommutativität des logischen Produktes (Otto Neurath 1909c)
Zur Axiomatik des logischen Gebietskalküls (Otto Neurath, Olga Hahn 1909b)
Diskussionsbeitrag über die Produktivität der Volkswirtschaft [Verhandlungen des Vereins für
Sozialpolitik in Wien, 1909] (Otto Neurath 1910d)
Definitionsgleichheit und symbolische Gleichheit (Otto Neurath 1910c)
Über die Koeffizienten einer logischen Gleichung und ihre Beziehungen zur Lehre von den
Schlüssen (Otto Neurath, Olga Hahn 1910)
Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Otto Neurath 1910b)
Lesebuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Otto Neurath, Schapire-Neurath 1910)
Zur Theorie der Sozialwissenschaften (Otto Neurath 1910a)
The Concept and Range of Validity of the A Priori
Discussing the Lecture of January 17th on the A Priori
Nationalökonomie und Wertlehre, eine systematische Untersuchung (Otto Neurath 1911)
The Problem of Maximum Pleasure
Date
1906-1907
5-03-1908
1908
1909
1909
1909
1909
1909
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
17-01-1910
14-02-1910
1911
1-06-1912
Das Problem des Lustmaximums (Otto Neurath 1912)
The lost wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive (Toward a Psychology of choice)
Discussing Neurath's Talk of January 27th on Descartes and Decision making
Die Verirrten des Cartesius und das Auxiliarmotiv (Zur Psychologie des Entschlusses), Vortrag
gehalten am 27 Januar 1913 von Otto Neurath Wien (Otto Neurath 1913a)
Probleme der Kriegswirtschaftslehre (Otto Neurath 1913b)
Über die Stellung des sittlichen Werturteils in der wissenschaftlichen Nationalökonomie (Otto
Neurath 1913c)
Classification of Systems of Hypotheses (Concerning Optics)
Zur Klassifikation von Hypothesensystemen (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Optik) (Otto
Neurath 1914)
Prinzipielles zur Geschichte der Optik (Otto Neurath 1915)
Mach's Position on the Problems of Gravitation and Inertia
Discussion of the Mach Lectures by Kraft and Neurath
More Discussion of Mach's Ideas and the Lectures by Kraft and Neurath
Das Begriffsgebäude der Wirtschaftslehre und seine Grundlagen (Otto Neurath, 1917a)
Die Kriegswirtschaftsrechnung und ihre Grenzen (Otto Neurath 1917b)
Schelling and Faraday (with experiments)
Discussion on both Principles: Natural Science is completely independent of Philosophy and
Philosophy is repeatedly dependent on Natural Science (caused by Neurath's concluding remarks
to his April 5th lecture)
Discussing the Question: Can and should there be a "Philosophy of Nature"?
More Discussion on Can and Should there be "Philosophy of Nature"
Antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Otto Neurath 1918a)
Spengler's Concept of Culture
Discussion of Culture and Civilization in Neurath's Lecture on Spengler
Anti-Spengler (Otto Neurath 1921)
Ernst Mach's History of Optics and Theory of Science
The Conceptual Building of Economic Theory. Logical Focus
The Philosophy of History Problem about the Development of Architecture
8
27-01-1913
8-02-1913
1913
1913
1913
2-03-1914
1914
1915
15-12-1916
8-01-1917
22-01-1917
1917
1917
5-04-1918
6-05-1918
27-05-1918
11-06-1918
1918
14-05-1920
11-06-1920
1921
21-01-1922
26-02-1923
13-03-1924
Publications on war economics and monetary politics have been left out of the selection. For a complete
bibliography of Otto Neurath see: Marie Neurath, Cohen 1973, 441-459; Cohen 1983, 255-258.
7
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
The lost wanderers of Des artes a oard Neurath’s ship
From the intense attendance to the gatherings of the Philosophical Society, Neurath acquired his
Problemstellung in relation to epistemology, the value of mathematics, the role of ethics and the
absolute refutation of metaphysics. He also defined there the language he used to tackle those
same problems and his attitude toward semantic analysis. In 1946, Neurath, describing himself as
a logical empiricist and looking back at the time of his intellectual development, wrote: Ma
of
us, beside myself, have been brought up in a Machian tradition, e.g., Franck, Hahn, von Mises.
Because of this, we tried to pass from chemistry to biology, from mechanics to sociology without
altering the language applied to them. We, as many others all over the world, were also influenced
by scientists such as Poincarè, Duhem, Abel Rey, William James, Bertrand Russell, and I, in
particular, by Gregorius Itelson9 (Otto Neurath 1946, p.497).
Collecting all these suggestions, Neurath came to define science as a logical construction, based on
empirical propositions, that justified itself and self-explained itself. Science so renounced every
external legitimation, be it an ideal and absolute truth10, the correspondence to an objective
reality or a group of epistemological rules. Given this definition of science, obviously, every
distinction between natural and social sciences became irrelevant and the Methodenstreit lost all
its significance. The same methodology could and should be used in biology, mechanics, chemistry
and sociology. So Neurath in his scientific deed in 1946:
As a so iologist I disliked all this talk a out the atio al spi it ,
e talit of a ule , et . Wh
should we not speak here in the same simple way as in the laboratory? And, as an empiricist I
asked myself how we might start from simple observation-statements, on which to base all further
s ie tifi dis ussio s. “o I de eloped
P otokolsätze , E ke t iss,
11),
suggestio s deali g ith p oto ol state e ts
f.
frequently discussed since then by various people. I disliked
sta ti g f o
a ague state e t of so ethi g ed floati g so e he e i the ai a d the efo e I
asked fo a
o e e a t fo
ulatio . “u h a fo
ulatio al a s gi es the a e of the p oto olist
9
On Itelson and his influence on Neurath see Gideon Freudenthal and Tataiana Karachentsev 2011, pp. 109-128.
Neu ath ould ot e lea e : … e ha e o possi ilit of dis ussi g the t uth of a thi g, si e the e is o
imagined arbitrator in the chair. Therefore I suggested that we d op the te
t uth ith the hole of its la ge
family. Everything will then be based on the comparison of statements with protocol-statements, leaving open the
many ways in which such a comparison can be made. It is essential that all statements should e o e ti le , as o
Mises happil puts it Otto Neu ath
, p.
. Neurath excluded the existence of an absolute truth. Truth was a
concept that in time had assumed different metaphysical connotations and semantic significances. See: Francesco
Fistetti 1985, p.132.
11
Neurath published this article as part of the controversy with Rudolf Carnap (1932a) that originated the famous
debate on protocols (Carnap, 1932b). While Carnap supported an empiricist position, Neurath considered even
protocols to be subject to revision. See: Uebel 1993 and Uebel 2009.
10
8
Monika Poettinger
fi st a d the adds his sa i gs. Cha les told us he had see a ed ta le i his oo
seemed to
o Ma h
e a fai sta t, hi h e a led us to ask the uestio , Whe , he e, a d ho ?
th
hi h
we are accustomed to ask when we make an astronomical or chemical statement. With one
stroke, I thought, I could overcome a certain cleavage always felt when scientists want to pass
fo
se sual ele e ts to des ipti e state e ts o sta s a d sto es. M suggestio see ed to
ha e the ad a tage that the
otto
he , he e, a d ho
attitude ould e
ai tai ed f o
the
to the top. This I all the ph si alist app oa h (Otto Neurath 1946, p.499).
This simple account contains the core of Neu ath s episte olog , efuti g idealis
a d
metaphysics, but also the kind of empiricism typical of the Vienna Circle12. Only several decades
later would epistemologists elaborate what Neurath already affirmed in the first decades of the
twentieth century (Haller 1985, p.11): science was only one of the methods evolved in history to
construe the Weltanschaaungen through which societies explained themselves and justified their
decisions (Otto Neurath 1913a) and rationality only a belated child of humanity (Otto Neurath
1913b, p. 440). Before science, man had conceived magic and then religion to absolve this function
(Otto Neurath 1931a; 1931b).
This question, as seen, had been the obje t of Neu ath s app e iated spee h given to the
Philosophical Society o The lost a de e s of Des a tes a d the au ilia
oti e . The le tu e
had been debated in a dedicated extraordinary session and later published on the journal of the
Society (Otto Neurath, 1913a). Neu ath ega his a gu e tatio
uoti g the Discourse on the
Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences
René
Descartes (2008). In detail, Neurath cited the third section of the discourse, where Descartes
analyzed how to take decisions when applying his rational method was, for various reasons,
impossible. The necessity to make choices in everyday life, in fact, constrained man, limited by
insufficient information or time, to recur to alternative decision making mechanisms. If finding out
the truth was impossible, Descartes suggested to choose according to what was more likely and
plausible. To this end he strongly advised to rely on traditional thinking - the habits and customs of
o e s ti es -, to adapt to current mores and lastly to follow the chosen path to its end without
erring. To elucidate his reasoning, Descartes represented limited rationality as a forest in which
men were lost without the possibility to see, above the foliage, how to better proceed to exit. In
such a situation, taking a route, whichever it was, on the basis of whatever reasoning line, was the
12
F a es o Fistetti easo a l defi es Neu ath as the Nietzs he of the Vie
9
a Ci le Fistetti
, p.
.
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
best course of action. Following such route without being distracted would then help to find a way
out of the thicket (Otto Neurath 1913a, 45-46).
Neurath extended the provisory decision-making rules of Descartes from the practice of everyday
life to thought. Thinking, affirmed Neurath, was characterized by a complex net of connected
propositions that formed a complete image of the world. Much of this image was shaped by
education and by social intercourse. Rational thinking could substitute one of these propositions
or a few, never all. A lifetime was not enough to do so without recurring to non-rational choice
(Ibid., 47). The same happened when choosing between two alternative systems, both logically
flawless. Whatever the route taken to exit the forest of doubt, Neurath called the chosen method
an auxiliary motive. In fact, the motive had always to be external, and so auxiliary, to the logic of
the chosen system or the complexity of the construed Weltbild, because neither possessed an
intrinsic truth value.
The oldest method that man had devised to solve the problem of choice had been chance: leaving
decision to the roll of a dice. Otherwise man had relied on tradition, instinct, religion or the belief
in oracles and horoscopes (Ibid., 50-53). Modern technology, though, could not be operated
through these methods of choice. Modern man increasingly trusted on rational thinking to make
her/his choices. By reaching logical conclusions from insufficient information, though, she/he
a tuall applied a da ge ous pseudo- atio alit to p o le s, ig o i g the a i gs of Des a tes
(Ibid., 54). Pseudo-rationality was no better than magic or mystical beliefs in deciding which action
to take or which theory to think. While construing a new scientific worldview, an auxiliary motive,
consciously chosen was still needed to free man from the forest of doubt.
Neu ath s s ie e so as i We e s te
s a historically determined rationality: the relation
between ideas, the ends of human action, and the means to realize them, decisions. While Weber,
though, sa i the p o ess of atio alizatio a a
o
o st ai i g
a s f eedo
13,
Neurath14
interpreted technology and the scientific method as instruments through which man could finally
make his utopias come true and exercise his will on the world. How? Thanks to an enlightening
encyclopedic effort to diffuse scientific knowledge. An effort so conceived that the greatest
possible number of people could democratically decide which institutional setting would be the
est to t a sfo
13
14
the desi ed utopia i to ealit . I his o ds: …
See among others: Weber 1944; Weber 2002, p.185.
O Neu ath s iti is to We e ia sociology see: Otto Neurath 1931b, p.57.
10
e logi al e pi i ists a t to
Monika Poettinger
show people that what physicists and astronomers do is only on a grand scale what Charles and
Ja e a e doi g e e
da i the ga de a d the kit he
(Otto Neurath 1946, p.506). The scientist
was in no way different from the common man. He only analyzed a greater quantity of data
regarding the past (Otto Neurath 1968, p.106).
In this sense, scientists should and could not take the place of the magicians and priests of the
past. The platonic ideal could not become reality15: People of the totalita ia ki d
a t
to
make scientists the leaders of a new society, like the magicians, nobles, or churchmen of former
societies. The encyclopedism of logical empiricism does not see why scientists, trained to discover
as many alternatives as possible, should be particularly able to select one alternative only (one
that never can be based on calculation) by making a decision or performing an action for other
people ith diffe e t desi es a d attitudes (Otto Neurath 1946, p.505).
Co t a
to the atio alit of We e s apitalis , Neu ath s s ie tifi
ethod ould ot be a guide
to exit the forest of Cartesio (Otto Neurath 1913a): … i the e d e ha e to ea h a de isio
not based on a calculus. One cannot test the future usefulness of a scientific technique
efo eha d; u p edi ta ilit he e pla s its pa t (Otto Neurath 1946, pp.501-02). This point marks
the substantial difference between Weber and Neurath (Fistetti 1985, p.127). While We e s
atio alit
e tu ed to e o e dete
i i g, Neu ath s s ie e ould o l p opose alte ati e
scenarios to the free decision of man.
If modern science could not definitively solve the problem of decision, what distinguished it, then,
from magic, religion or totalitarian ideologies? They all represented solutions to the anguish of
doubt, of having to decide in conditions of uncertainty, without the data necessary to act
rationally16. Neurath, though, considered science to have one major advantage over the other
alternatives: it hindered a governing minority from appropriating the decision capacity of
individuals as in the case of magical faith, metaphysical ideologies, superstitions or totalitarian
i stitutio s. The sp eadi g of
uddle – affirmed Neurath - does not seem to be as simple as the
spreading of a successful technique. The frivolity of the race theory developed by the Nazis in
many books, on character, physiognomics and heredity, did not even infect the mathematics,
ast o o
, he ist , a d ph si s of the Nazis e
u h (Otto Neurath 1946, p.508). “o it is
possible to sociologically analyze all ideologies one after another, those with a scientific character
O the ha sh iti is e p essed Neu ath to a d the use ade of Plato s epu li o pa t of suppo te s of
Nazism, see: Soulez 1999.
16
This view can also be found in Ernst Mach. See: Mach 1992, pp.448-49.
15
11
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
a d those ith a u s ie tifi o e
ut i the e d the u s ie tifi ideologies a
eo e o e
o l th ough a s ie tifi attitude (Otto Neurath, 1981a, p.350).
Encyclopedism implied cooperation, one of the peculiar characters of modern man, and thusly
guaranteed personal freedom much more than any other decision-making system of the past.
Without pu sui g utopia ideals, - wrote Neurath at the eve of WWII - men capable of judging
themselves and their institutions scientifically should also be capable of widening the sphere of
peaceful cooperation; for the historical record shows clearly enough that the trend has been in
that direction on the whole and that the more co-ope ati e
a is, the
oe
ode
he is (Otto
Neurath 1939, p.132).
In this light, Neurath positively judged the specialization that, from Renaissance onward, had
characterized science, making it impossible for one man to comprehend the totality of knowledge
(Otto Neurath 1918a, p.3). Scientists had been constrained to confront themselves continuously
with one another, to decide which new protocol or new theory to include, being compatible, in
the collective vision of the world, and select which ones to reject, in an unceasing process of
redefinition and reconstruction of the Weltanschauung or Weltauffassung17. A definition of
scientific activity that he inherited from his father (Otto Neurath 1946, p.498), the economist
Wilhelm Neurath18, and applied firstly to the fields of economics.
Neu ath s st le was simple and, in the wake of Itelson, rich in metaphors. The one of the ship19,
loved by Quine and quite famous20, synthetically described the activity of scientific communities.
We a e like sea e – wrote Neurath in 1921 – having to rebuild their ship at sea, without the
opportunity to do it completely. When a beam is taken off, it must immediately be substituted,
while the whole ship acts as a supporting structure. The ship will so be completely renovated,
through old and drifting wood, but only in a g adual p o ess (Otto Neurath 1981b, p.184).
Neu ath s i age o e a st o g
essage: o s ie e ould e e
e o plete; o s ie e ould e
rebuilt from scratch. Scientific innovation resulted from a collective decision process through
which coalitions of scientists discussed, disregarded or approved changes in the currently
prevailing scientific organizing of knowledge. Advancements followed negotiations among the
diverse parts of the scientific community: a sociological process that could have erratic outcomes.
17
The stance of Neurath in the debate on protocols has been the object or recent reappraisal with contrasting results.
See: Uebel 1993; Nottelmann 2006; Uebel 2007; Uebel, 2009.
18
On the influence of Wilhelm Neurath on the ideas of his son, see: Uebel 1995.
19
On the o igi of the seafa e s etapho see: Ca t ight, Cat, Fle k, Ue el
, pp. -95.
20
O the e te si e use that Qui e ade of Neu ath s etapho see: ‘a ossi
.
12
Monika Poettinger
In 1944 Neurath wrote again: I agi e seafa e s that i ope sea a t to ha ge the fo
hea
essel, t a sfo
of thei
i g its plu p ess i to a fish s sle de ess. To e uild the ship s suppo ti g
structure and the careen, they use timber from the old structure and drifting wood. But they
cannot make port to do the renovating work from base up. While they work, they remain in the
old structure, amidst terrible storms and deafening waves. During the renovating they so have to
pay attention not to create some dangerous leak. Step after step a new ship emerges from the old
one, but while they work, seafarers already think of a new structure, not always being of one
opinion about it. It will be impossible to foresee the exit of such a process. This is ou desti
(Otto Neurath 1981d, p.978).
The ship s
etapho that so epeatedl sho ed up i Neu ath s o k as fi stl a ti ulated in
1913 discussing war economics and its role in a new defined economic sciencee (Otto Neurath
1913b, p. 457). In the essay on Probleme der Kriegswirtschaftslehre, Neurath attacked the
pretense of scientists to produce perfect and complete systems of thought with no defects or
a o alies, allo i g o ha ges o a elio atio . “u h s ste atists
ee
o
lia s
e ause a
perfect system, in economics as in science, could only remain an eternal aim, never attainable
(Ibid., p. 456). Trying to build such a deceitful system was neither a scientific nor a philosophical
pu suit: I logi , o ph si s, iolog o philosoph
e a
ot put some undisputable statements
on top and then logically derive from them an entire chain of thought. Inadequacies always
contaminate the entirety of this ideal world, starting from the premises as from later
consequences. No precaution can prevent this outcome, nor renouncing all previous knowledge,
starting from a tabula rasa, to a hie e a ette esult (Ibid.). A clear accusation toward the
systematic turn taken by economics in Vienna.
Neu ath s late use of the
etapho of the ship as so a o se ue e of what he himself had
experienced in his early redefinition of the economic science in his early writings. In 1917, he
su
a ized su h effo ts lea l u eili g the sig ifi a e of the
etapho itself. The
reconstruction of the economic science attempted here – he wrote - wishes to maintain as much
as possible of the past tradition. Something could be retained only changing its form or being
completed, something had to be abandoned. As a result, some explanations, regarding different
strata of the underlying problem, competed with one another. Some erroneous statements did
not have to be refuted completely, but found a useful application in more restricted areas. To
proceed in the right direction in this process of reconstruction it was also necessary to resort to
past arguments (Otto Neurath 1917a, p. 485).
13
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Neurath was determined to build a new supporting structure for the economic science, employing
concepts and logical constructions still in use - the timber of the old ship – or derived from the
past - timber floating on the sea. The role of history in this process was crucial. It was not possible
to make port with the ship of science, nor build a new edifice just with new instruments. As
suggesti e as the ship s, is Neu tah s
etapho of afts e : Imagine craftsmen who are building
a settlement, with a chest of drawers full of instruments, only part of which are well arranged and
the usage of which is only partly known by them; imagine that, from behind, new instruments are
continually put in the drawers, that some instruments are modified by unknown people, and that
the craftsmen learn to use some of the old instruments in a way hitherto unknown, and now
imagine further that the plans of our craftsmen dealing with the building of the settlement are
changing too. This resembles to some extent the situation of our scientists. Otto Neu ath
,
p.217). Parts of old theories had to be maintained modified or completed, perhaps with a validity
in different or more limited fields. Some of the new components, furthermore, innovatively used
concepts already known and perhaps once rejected. Along these lines, Neurath construed an
economic science based on empirical data, widely collected in in-kind statistics, with the aim of
studying the widest possible assortment of organizational structures and classifying them as to
their economy, i.e. their capability to increment the wealth of humanity21.
The economist, then, had to be a sociological technician, with a profound knowledge of the past,
who was able to extract from the historical discourse possible organizational models22, and who
possessed a i id i agi atio , e essa
to uild fi tio al utopias. The s ope of Neu ath s
economics was to present politicians with the array of alternative organizations that would result
from this research activity, arranged on the scale of prospective happiness of men (Otto Neurath
1931, p.17). The decision as to which organization transform into reality could not spring from
economics alone. In the modern world, the economist could not be a politician anymore. While
Colbert and Turgot had been among the best economists of their time, Bismarck stood in no
o pa iso to Ma . Ti es had ha ged: those ho ule the desti
of states do ot possess a
extensive knowledge; those who possess extensive knowledge do not govern states" (Otto
He ote: “ ie tifi p og ess i e o o i s is a hie ed he s ste s of e pi i al o servations build abstractions
and from these abstractions, then, new combinations are derived, the reality or feasibility of which is object of study.
… I ou esea h, so, o l the ele e ts a d the elatio s a o g ele e ts a e st i tl e pi i al, the omplex
o ga izatio s that a e de i ed f o the , i stead, a e o l pa tiall to e et i ealit .(Otto Neurath 1911,
p.82).
22
O Neu ath s theo of histo iog aph a d his ea liest iti gs in economic history, see: Poettinger 2012, pp.12-30.
21
14
Monika Poettinger
Neurath 1913a, p. 56). Specialization, as seen, obliged to cooperation and rationalization to
democratic forms of government.
A new economics without value or rationality
At the beginning of the 20th century, when Neurath returned to Vienna from Berlin with his
Dokto title23, economics was shaken by a wild storm of change. The best minds of the time were
engaged in innumerable debates and endless discussions. A creative destruction that had had its
beginning in the Methodenstreit24, but in time came to involve the very foundations of the
youngest of sciences. The lassi al s ste
of politi al e o o
la s i
ui s (Schumpeter 1908,
p.XI) wrote Joseph Schumpeter in his own dissertation in 1908, condemning the chaos resulting
fo
the oe iste e of
a ifold pa adig s. The
a k upt
of the s ie e (Ibid. p.V) seemed a
menacing reality particularly to young scholars of the discipline. Neurath himself, in a youthful
essa i
,
ote: The
th entury takes over longstanding problems. Several very painful
experiences lie behind us. Economic atomism has fallen out of favor. What will take its place is not
at all lea . … That the fou datio s of the u e t e o o i s ste
a e fault is e o i g
increasingly clear. Everywhere contradictions emerge that are not only of academic importance
but affe t the elfa e a d suffe i g of
illio s
25.
Neu ath s manifold attempts toward the unity
of sciences and holism26 were a forceful response to such fruitless divisions (Cartwright, Cat, Fleck,
Uebel 2008, p.167). “pe ulatio – he would later write – is of interest only in shaping life and
p o u i g happi ess , discussions per se had no meaning aboard his ship of science (Otto Neurath
1928a, p.134).
In Vienna Neurath attended, between 1905 and 1906, the economics seminar held by Eugen von
Böhm-Bawerk. The seminar is renowned for the participation, next to Neurath, of Otto Bauer,
Rudolf Hilferding, Emil Lederer, Joseph Schumpeter and Ludwig von Mises (Hagemann 2012). The
seminar concentrated on the theory of value and the criticism of Marx, but the liberal direction of
Böhm-Bawerk granted participants the freedom to express their ideas and theories, so that often
harsh and heated debates erupted. How unheard of and innovative Neu ath s i te ded
23
In Berlin Neurath attended the economics seminar of Gustav Schmoller and studied statistics with Ladislaus
Bortkiewicz, becoming involved in the Methodenstreit a d i the de ate o Ma s theo of alue. On this debate
see: Heinz Dieter Kurz and Neri Salvadori 1997, pp.384-385.
24
A critical appraisal of the Methodenstreit, instead, is to be found in David Wade Hands 2001, pp. 72-94.
25
Quoted in Uebel 2004, p.16.
26
O Neu ath s defi itio of holis , i de i atio f o Qui e, see: “e estik
, pp. -57.
15
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
reconstruction plan for economics was can easily be deduced from the critics expressed on the
occasion by fellow participants27.
The fi st step i Neu ath s renovation consisted in seeking a definition of the economic science
that nullified the debate on the theory of value, a definition that at the same time could salvage
and include such disparate theories as the ones of Walras and Marx. In 1911, in the essay on
Nationalökonomie und Wertlehre, eine systematische Untersuchung, he affi
old t aditio sele ti g ealth as the o je t of politi al e o o
t aditio , o
ed: We
eet a
(Otto Neurath, 1911, p.53). Such
out of A istotle s Ni o a hea Ethi s, o side ed e o o i s as the s ie e that
aimed at maximizing social wealth and had been relevant until Adam Smith, falling in discredit only
with the rise of liberalism. Its historical development was sketched by Otto Neurath and his wife
Anne Schapire in the reader of economic texts compiled in 1910 for his courses at the Neuer
Wiener Handelsakademie (Neurath, Schapire-Neurath 1910) 28.
Neurath further defined the individual basis of wealth as Lebenstimmung (life mood29), a balance
of pleasure and pain of Epicurean origin (Otto Neurath 1928b). Such Lebenstimmung was directly
linked ith all ki d of hu a e pe ie es, eati g, d i ki g, eadi g, pe eptio s of a t, eligious
sights,
o al efle tio s, lo e, hate,
a e a d o a dl
eha io
(Otto Neurath 1917a, p. 485).
Substituting Lebenstimmung to utility, Neurath denied that men acted only in consideration of
utilitarian motives, rationally pursuing their happiness and pleasure30. Neu ath s
a o di g to atio alit , ut also follo i g p i a
a ope ated
d i i g fo es a d t aditio al eha io . If
so eo e does t a t to a t overvaluing his own wisdom or the wisdom of others – wrote
Neurath in 1913 – he will be obliged, in many cases, to resort to tradition or to his own impulses to
decide his course of action, without being able to correctly evaluate the consequences of it, if not
e e feeli g o st ai ed to appeal to fate (Otto Neurath 1913b, p.441).
Ludwig o Mises i his e oi s e e e ed: Espe iall dis upti e as the o se se that Otto Neu ath asse ted
ith fa ati al fo e o Mises
, p. . O this also: Ku z
, p. .
28
A definition of wealth exactly as his own, though, Neurath found only in Isaak Iselin (2011). On this noteworthy
Swiss illuminist see: Sigrid-Ursula Follmann 2001.
29
This the English translation of Lebenstimmung to be found in: Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel 2008, p.30.
30
„Da it daß man das Glück zum Gegenstande besonderer Untersuchungen macht, soll weder zum Ausdruck
gebracht werden, daß die Menschen ausschließlich im Hinblick auf das Glück handeln, noch auch, daß sie dies tun
sollen, es soll damit auch nicht zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, daß das Glück im Weltgebäude eine besonders
i htige ‘olle spielt Otto Neu ath
a, p.
.
27
16
Monika Poettinger
Neu ath s feli itolog (Otto Neurath 1917a, p.487) did not presume a homo felix, simplistic
reduction of the modern man as was homo oeconomicus31 a d so as ot li ited to that little
isla d o the sea of u k o
(Otto Neurath 1913, p. 441) that was the realm of rationality.
Neurath saved to men the possibility to err. He e tu ed to sa : ‘ightl
a
e pi i ist
economists reproach theorists for eliminating mistakes and errors from their conceptions. This is
even more preoccupying considering that in the thought of many economists it is exactly the
error, the incapacity to evaluate the consequences of single actions, which characterizes our social
order and particularly the market, ausi g its
ost t pi al da ages (Otto Neurath 1911, p.63).
Neurath maintained so a theory of value based on a subjective perception, but through his more
precise definition of Lebenstimmung instead of utility, he increased its hermeneutical value. This
a he also ai ed at e o ili g
e of a tio , usuall diffide t to a ds e o o i s, to the
discipline, offering an alternative to theories based on rational behavior that appeared to
statesmen and entrepreneurs limited and diverting, incapable of grasping the problems of reality
(Otto Neurath 1917b, p.8).
Having increased the hermeneutical validity of his individual theory of happiness, though, did not
particularly help Neurath out of all problems involved in the further necessity to measure and
compare individual Lebenstimmungen o e e su
the
up to g oups o
atio s
ealth indexes.
He was already aware of all difficulties later encountered by welfare economics. In his essay on Die
Kriegswirtschaftsrechnung und ihre Grenzen, published in 1917 on Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
(Otto Neurath 1917b), he clearly faced the impossibility to measure individual sensations, but also
to compare them among different persons and groups32. The comparison of different
Lebenstimmungen for a precise set of people proved feasible only assuming the existence of a
political leader always driven by the conside atio of ge e al elfa e. “u h a states a
is
expected, in such indecisive cases as the ones described, to put himself so intensely in the shoes of
all persons involved, at the same time, that he can compare the ensuing sensation with the one
esulti g f o
a othe state of happi ess of the sa e g oup (Otto Neurath 1917b, p.4). A
benevolent dictator would so be needed to act upon the evaluation of different Lebenstimmungen
of his people.
31
On the critic of Neurath to the concept of homo oeconomicus particularly in the version of von Wieser see Otto
Neurath 1911, p.64; Otto Neurath 1981c, p.32. Von Wieser himself replied to the critics young economists using
Ma hia
ethodolog , o
e ti g “ hu pete s o k Wiese , 1911).
32
An even lengthier discussion of the matter is to be found in: Otto Neurath 1917a, pp. 504-511.
17
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Alternatively, a measurable proxy could substitute the comparison of individual or group
happi ess. Gi e that the statisti al ela o atio of se satio s is i peded
g eat diffi ulties, -
wrote Neurath in 1913 - it is necessary to su stitute it ith the statisti of se satio s auses
(Otto Neurath 1913b, p. 458). Nonetheless, it was equally impracticable to determine single
causes of sensations. It would so be best to analyze entire sets of causes of Lebenstimmungen, as
good air, a clean environment, a good state administration, the availability of food, housing and
education, etc (Ibid, p. 459). In a later essay, Neurath added to these stimuli of sensations also the
capacity of people to perceive pleasure and pain, a set of variables that changed in time and space
(Otto Neurath,1917b, p.6). “i ila ities et ee Neu ath s theo
a d e e t o t i utio s of
Amartya Sen to welfare economics33, as well with statistical instruments as the human
development index are unmistakable and should at least be mentioned.
Neurath further developed his new economic theory by defining as Lebenslagen those life
conditions that influenced individual happiness. Life conditions included primarily goods and
services available for consumption and consequently the productive forces and negative
i pedi e ts of a ou t , ut also its state o ga izatio , the diffusio of i
o ati e apa ilit ,
the organizational know-ho , stupidit a d lazi ess a d so fo th (Otto Neurath 1917b, p.8). All
available data on those quantities should have been collected in statistical tables as had already
been done, under absolutistic rule, by a class of clerks and civil servants of the like of Wenzel
Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg (Ibid.). Neurath, in his later statistical book Modern Man in the
Making, published in 1939, realized this earlier intent and vividly represented statistics regarding
Lebenslagen with Isotypes comparing the availability of food and drinks, raw materials and sources
of power in United States and Canada, Europe and the Soviet Union (Otto Neurath 1939, pp. 6668). Out of these collected data, Neurath further construed silhouettes for many countries,
depicting the average length of life of female population, suicide rates, literacy and the possession
of radio sets. The esulti g isot pe allo ed a i tuiti e o pa iso of the ealth, i Neu ath s
definition, of the respective nations. Compared, for example, with simple data on income per
capita, the suicidal rate cast a shadow on the otherwise brilliant performance of US and Great
Britain, while giving merit to traditionally considered poor countries as India, Spain and Italy.
All the cited magnitudes regarded in-kind measures, not monetary measures. Neurath was
convinced that useful statistical data had to refer to quantities and not prices, and that the quoted
33
On similarities between Neurath and Sen see: Leßmann, 2007.
18
Monika Poettinger
indexes could better represent Lebenslagen than monetary income. The difference between the
two types of measures of wealth, in-kind and monetary, had something to do with economic
theories, but also with their originating Weltanschauungen. In-kind calculations had been typical
of the tradition of universal statistics and economic planning of absolutist rule, while income
statistics and price indexes had spread along with liberalism during the nineteenth century (Otto
Neurath 1981c, p.30). Both represented sources of information useful to measure happiness, but
the fi st, i Neu ath s opi io , ould e olle ted a d e aluated also i a se e of a
a ket
economy and so had a wider use along with a greater hermeneutical value.
At the beginning of time, Neurath considered Lebenslagen as fully determined by the natural and
physical conditions of the world, in form of fields, minerals, forests, water supply, etc. He
consequently defined such situation of the world at a precise time as Lebensboden (life basis)
(Otto Neurath 1917a, p. 487). With the evolution of society, though, an order of society had
emerged that could counter the effect that such primary conditions had on Lebenslagen: the
Lebensordnung. This slow emergence of a Gesellschaft out of the originary Gemeinschaft had also
led to the appearance of theories studying the dependence of individual sensations (pleasure and
pain) from the newly established institutions (Otto Neurath 1913b, p. 442). A calculation of
happiness had arisen, as to be found in Aristippus and Epicurus, that through mercantilism had
developed all the way down to modern economics. On this point, Neurath particularly quoted
James Steuart, also including excerpts of his An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy in
his anthology of economic thought (Otto Neurath, Schapire-Neurath 1910, pp.96-124). Steuart had
defined the task of the political leader to conceive many possible organizations of the state and
then select the one that suited best his people. Steuart had moreover underlined the necessity to
link the new organization to existing traditions and base it on the fact that people would choose
the common good in their own interest (Otto Neurath 1913b, p. 443). Neu ath s o
definition of
the economy derived from this tradition of thought.
Denominations were, as always in Neurath, full of significance: Lebensboden is the basis of life,
Lebenslage is the condition of life, and Lebensordnung is the order of life. Lebensboden is
historically determined, while Lebensordnung, as the institutional construction of the
Weltanschauung, is determined by men and given only in a delimited time-span. Comparing the
Lebenstimmung caused by a Lebensboden with the Lebenstimmung of another, gave as a result a
judgment of relative happiness. Given the same Lebensboden to start with, instead, comparing the
19
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Lebenstimmungen related to diverse Lebensordnungen resulted in a judgment of relative economy
(Otto Neurath 1917a, p. 490).
The renewed use of old concepts on part of Neurath brought so to a definition of economies as
the collected set of actions, prescriptions and attitudes – Lebensordnungen - having in any way
i flue e o the happi ess/ ealth of
e . I his o ds: The s ie tifi stud of these e onomies,
the Lebensordnungen determining the Lebenstimmungen, will be named economic theory, so to
remain sufficiently near the linguistic habit to make it unnecessary to look for a new
de o i atio
(Ibid., p. 492).
Neu ath s spasmodic attention toward the lexical value of his definitions in the reconstruction of
economic theory is apparent. Far away from any polemic or ideological intent, this attention for
the language of economics stemmed from the debates held at the Philosophical Society. Neurath
translated the rejection of metaphysical terminology, practiced by the younger members of the
Society, into economics. This effort of linguistic purification, culminating in the later attempt to
create a universal scientific jargon, begun already du i g Neu ath s university studies. Pa ti ula l
I as us
ith eadi g Ada
“ ith s The Wealth of Nations - he later remembered - along the
lines of an analysis of language. I found out that such butchering criticism lacks constructive power
and that a long self-education should be the first step. I altered successively my own terms in all
a ti les a d ooks i a o da e ith
o eali g a d o fusi g te
i
easi g I de
eli i ati g e otio al ,
s Otto Neurath 1983, p.217). Between his writings of 1911 and
1917, in effect, the terminological evolution clearly reflects the intent to create an empiricist
language for economics. The o d apital
as o e of the fi st i ti s of Neu ath s e pi i ist
purge. Empiricism as methodology needed an empiricist vocabulary. “o Neu ath i
: I did ot
create all these concepts as an artificial intellectual game, but following the stringent necessity to
adequately analyse every days e pe ie es a d important present events through the
observation of their singular o po e ts (Otto Neurath 1917a, pp. 516-17). Nonetheless a
linguistics reconstruction process ould ot do a a
ith the past e olutio of a s ie e s ja go .
The e o st u tio of the o eptual a d li guisti f a e o k he e atte pted – continued
Neurath – must be limited to the essential. Attempting to create an entire new conceptual world
with the related denominations would be futile. In fields of research as ours, unclearly defined, it
is much too easy to end up in the wrong direction by adapting names and concepts, with terrible
results. Every change imposed to an important concept, alters the entire conceptual structure,
ausi g a hai
ea tio of ede o i atio
(Ibid.). Neurath had a very clear view of the relative
20
Monika Poettinger
alue of o ds sig ifi a e, pa ti ula l i s ie e. We
ust t
to aptu e the o ld i a et of
concepts and thoughts with multiple connections. Object of the whole science is to structure the
et s o
e tio s so that e e
pa t of it a
e used i a si ila
a . The efo e, from the old
o eptual fra ework we i herited we wo ’t e a le to es ape at o e. Its reconstruction always
happe s ith the aid of the o epts of the past (Ibid.).
As seen, Neurath exactly followed this research program and, uniting tradition and innovation in
his definition of economics, extended the hermeneutic capacity of the science, at the same time
e o e i g lo g lost k o ledge. Neu ath s e o o i s, depe di g o the g oup of people the
happiness/wealth of which was object of study, could include fa il s e o o
, politi al e o o
and even cosmopolitan economy, all subdivisions that, taken from Aristotle to Friedrich List, were
now granted validity in new fields. Not only past economies, but also present and future
Lebensordnungen possessed the right to e studied a d lassified as to thei effe ts o people s
sensations. Economics became thusly a comparative science based on empirical data statistically
collected, but consisting of an infinite number of models, many of which with no relation
whatsoever to reality.
In this sense, Neurath excluded any kind of ethical prejudice from restricting economic analysis. In
his view, acquiring methods as war and smuggling should have been studied exactly as market
exchange and production, being evaluated, by eco o ists, o l i thei effe t o people s
Lebenstimmungen34. Economic analysis should also comprehend planned and war economies. To
decide, though, which Lebensordnung to implement was not the task of an economist but of
democratic decision-making.
That pillage – Neurath wrote – is prohibited by law, should not impede economists from studying it. Why should
the consequences of trade and domestic manufacture be worth to be analyzed, while the effects of smuggling are
ignored? In consequence of such considerations war has been vastly ignored by economists as a fo of a uisitio
(Otto Neurath 1917a, p.493).
34
21
The Uses of Rationality: Otto Neurath
Conclusions
Descartes had put humanity at work to build a new rational house of thought. While constructing
their new home, though, people had to take decisions in conditions of uncertainty, with time
constraints and insufficient information. A provisory house had so to be assembled on the
fundament of traditional thinking and relying on historically determined habits and customs.
Otto Neurath denied the possibility to construe a new rational home from scratch while inhabiting
a contingent lodging. Scientists were seamen on a ship destined to continuously renovate their
leaking vessel at sea, in the middle of storms and tempests, with no hope of ever docking the
truth. Without a land to navigate to, scientists had no way to evaluate the righteousness of their
oute. Des a tes
ethod as, i this s e a io, a de isio -making process as any other in the
history of humankind, no better than magics, religion or dictatorship. What many men practiced
was a pseudo-rationality bent on convincing others of the justice of their choices.
Technological advancement, though, increasingly constrained men to specialisation in knowledge
and deed and to continuous confrontation. As a result, an auxiliary motive emerged from the
political or moral judgment of the majority, that resolved doubt and determined the form of the
ship of science and its navigation course. Rationality could not guarantee the truth but could
spread democracy.
Given these premises, individual rationality could not be, for Neurath, the founding hypothesis of
economic behaviour and of the economic science. Man had to be happy, not rational. A
judgement of economy could be felled only evaluating the effect of different institutional
organisations, scientific theories, morals and whatever else men devised to enhance her/his life on
people s ealth. E o o i s as a feli itolog , not the science of rational behaviour. Economists
had the task of offering to the democratic decision of people the greatest number of conceivable
Lebensordnungen, along with a scientific measure of their impact on in kind variables
approximating the wealth, in terms of augmented pleasure and diminished pain, of the population
involved.
22
Monika Poettinger
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