The paper overleaf (here in uncorrected proof form) has appeared as: Philip G. Cerny, “Plurality, Pluralism, and Power: Elements of Pluralist Analysis in an Age of Globalization”, in Rainer Eisfeld, ed., Pluralism: Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy (Opladen and Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers, on behalf of the International Political Science Association, Research Committee No. 16 [Socio-Political Pluralism], 2006), pp. 81-111.  IPSA “World of Political Science” Series Pluralism Developments in the Theory and Practice of Democracy Edited by Rainer Eisfeld  Contents Preface 7 Introduction Rainer Eisfeld 9 The Plural Forms of Pluralism Theodore J. Lowi 19 Pluralism and Democratic Governance: A Century of Changing Research Frameworks Rainer Eisfeld 39 Pluralism and the Politics of Diversity Avigail Eisenberg 59 Plurality, Pluralism and Power: Elements of Pluralist Analysis in an Age of Globalization Philip G. Cerny 79 Bibliography 109 Philip G. Cerny Plurality, Pluralism, and Power: Elements of Pluralist Analysis in an Age of Globalization The central conceptual conundrum in pluralism involves a tension between two fundamental assumptions: “plurality” as an analytical assumption; and “pluralism” as a predictive and normative assumption. The plurality assumption, on the one hand, is a statement about inputs. It asserts: (a) that social, economic, and political interaction (including that based on normative values) takes place among people categorized by and/or organized into groups, rather than among atomistic individuals or through reified institutional structures like the state; and (b) that despite significant power differentials among such groups, their fractionalization and the fluidity of their conflict and competition means that power can only be exercised by an ongoing (if uneven) process of coalition-building, rather than through static, embedded power structures. The pluralism assumption, on the other hand, is a statement about outcomes. It asserts: (a) that the interaction of “organized” and “potential” groups (Truman 1951), “cross-cutting” affiliations (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956) and “overlapping memberships” (Truman 1951), along with the competitive character of liberal democracy, social modernity, and capitalism, together lead to a political system of inherent socio-political checks and balances that prevents monistic forms of domination becoming embedded; and (b) that this condition is normatively desirable, i.e., that a pluralist system is a “good” system (or a “least worst” system) that effectively promotes a quasi-democratic political marketplace of ideas and policies and/or a healthy “civil society” (Eisfeld, this volume). This chapter argues that the plurality assumption and the pluralism assumption are not only problematic in themselves but also in essential and chronic tension with each other. This tension has become more acute in the era of globalization. These questions have only been unsatisfactorily addressed within the pluralist canon by concepts such as “democratic elitism” and “neopluralism” (e.g., Lindblom 1977). More importantly, however, both assumptions, and the connection between them, are further problematized by their extrapolation to contemporary issues such as commodification and marketization, post-Fordism, consumerism, multiculturalism, postmodernism, the “new security dilemma”, state fragmentation and rescaling, transnationalization, globalization, etc. – some of which will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter. The nearest thing to a pluralist analysis of globalization in recent years has been the revival of the concept of “civil society”. However, that concept is both too narrow and too broad to provide an accurate picture of the political sociology of the contemporary world. On the one hand, in seeking to locate civil society somewhere between, but not fully including, both the market and the state, it focuses on too narrow a range of actors. It can tell us something about, for example, social capital and advocacy coalitions, but not about how political processes work. On the other hand, it is an inherently normative concept which suggests that the emergence of a global civil society is a good thing mainly because of the sorts of groups it encompasses – i.e., those pursuing more radical and/or solidaristic social agendas (environmentalism, poverty alleviation, etc.) rather than self-interested economic interests (firms, markets) or control-and-stability-oriented political actors (politicians and bureaucrats). In this chapter I argue that an expanded neopluralist analysis of globalization has significant advantages in terms of understanding not only how globalization itself works in practice but also how globalization in turn reshapes both the configuration of interests and the way inputs are translated into outputs. The result is a complex and conflictual world that, although lacking the homogeneity of a true “civil society”, creates possibilities for a fairly broad range of actors at multiple levels and pressure points to influence and manipulate outcomes and to reshape global political processes in significant ways, in both empirical and normative terms. I. Pluralism as a Contemporary Paradigm Globalization in analytical terms lies at the crossroads of political science and international relations. Pluralism – especially its near-paradigmatic post-Second World War version – has been on the defensive as an approach to political science since the 1960s, and has never been a major contributor to the development of international relations analysis. In the first place, as regards political sociology, scholars on both left and right (though mainly the former) have always argued that the maldistribution of resources in society distorts the potential for interests to compete effectively, skewing politics through class, elitism, and/or corporatism. Furthermore, the attention of mainstream political science has increasingly focused on institutions and structures rather than political processes as such, constraining the role that actors – the main empirical focus of pluralist analyses – can play in determining outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996). Finally, in epistemologically hegemonic realist approaches to international relations, external imperatives deriving from the anarchical character of the international system are said to compel endogenous groups and institutional structures alike to merge into virtual “unit actors” with regard to key issues (Waltz 1979). This chapter will attempt to go beyond the existing limits of both domestic political science and international relations by reconfiguring both pluralism and globalization – and asserting that the relationship between the two is the central analytical question of the 21st century. Pluralism, especially in its post-Second World War variant (see chapters by Eisfeld and Eisenberg in this volume), is arguably the most important paradigmatic concept in modern political science, although it is also one of the most contested of such concepts. Unlike the concept of power, traditionally the core of the idea of politics per se, it implies that a particular kind of configuration of power is at the heart of modern politics; that empirically such pluralist power configurations are for secular reasons becoming more and more hegemonic; and that pluralist politics underlies, and is analytically and temporally prior to, a range of normative as well as empirical considerations such as liberalism, democracy, civil society, human rights, and the like. Unlike ideas such as justice, which underlie forms of political philosophy, pluralism rejects monistic assumptions about how such values may be put into practice; it gives normative primacy to enlightened pragmatism and to the sociological primacy of “groups” (often poorly defined) rather than to categorical values. This aspect of pluralism sometimes misleads normative political theorists into assuming that the interaction of “groups and interests” that is at the core of pluralist analysis represents merely “the competitive struggle for advantage among private interests and economic utilities”, thus “deny[ing] the possibility of arriving at any notion of the common or public good” (Fontana, Nederman, and Remer 2004: 4). This could not be further from the case. Both radical and conservative pluralists see pluralism as either (or both) empowering popular groups lacking money and control of the means of production potentially to pursue their normative values (as well as their material interests, of course) through normal politics (the radical version), and/or establishing a system of checks and balances that enables a normatively superior consensus to be reached through peaceful competition among those values and interests (the conservative version) (see Eisfeld, this volume). Finally, unlike structuralism and institutionalism, pluralism gives priority to process and agency – giving the voluntaristic goals of actors ontological as well as epistemological primacy, albeit in the context of bargaining rather than outright conflict or violence – instead of sociological determinism. Pluralism is about real people interacting in the modern (or even postmodern) world in ways that channel power struggles and faction-fighting into negotiation and compromise, smooth the sharp edges of belief into toleration, and engage people in positive-sum coalition-building activities that will not merely lead to stability but – one hopes – to cooperative, positive-sum, “win-win”, or at least Pareto-efficient, welfare outcomes. It is a statement about how complex social reality can give rise to ongoing mutual adjustment – and, indeed, the emergence of a pragmatically arrived-at public or common good – rather than to the fragmentation, stalemate, institutional bias, and/or negative-sum outcomes associated with theories of power, domination, and hegemony. Nevertheless, the very discursive power of the pluralist paradigm is also its greatest weakness. Pluralism can alternatively be seen as overstated, overdetermined, and giving rise to a bland, polyanna-ish misconstruction of what is really going on in political life. To see pluralism everywhere, first of all, is to miss the real, underlying power struggles that determine “who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1950). Furthermore, the apparent hegemony of pluralism may be first and foremost a mask for a particular embedded structure of power, especially that of capitalism. As Lenin said, “Democracy is the best shell for capitalism”, and much has been made of pluralism as mirroring the surface level of competing capitals while the power relations of the capitalism system as a whole not only remain unaltered but also determine the most significant outcomes of political processes. Pluralism may also fundamentally misconstrue the struggle discussed above over normative beliefs and values. When those beliefs, as they often do, form around competing interpretations of metaphysical truth, compromise and toleration may simply represent temporary and unstable balances of power just waiting to be challenged in the name of higher certainties. Twenty-first-century religious fundamentalism, like mid-20th century political ideologies before it, is a case in point. Finally, the basic categories of pluralist analysis – individuals categorized and/or organized into groups – may simply confuse dependent and independent variables. In Marxist analysis, of course, the apparent or surface-level politics of groups is a form of false consciousness that misses the underlying structural homologies of class, whereas for Weberians and institutionalists those groups simply coagulate around structured points of access and control. The consequence of the interaction of these trends has been that scholarly debates about globalization have tended to focus on independent variables rooted in structural change – or continuities. These debates concern such phenomena as the significance of economic globalization in bringing about political change, the domestic “hollowing out” (or not) of the state, and/or whether the development of complex interdependence, international regimes, global governance and the like are altering the fundamental character of international – and transnational – relations. What is not always clear in this context is what sort of capacity and scope individual and group actors may possess to determine outcomes and, indeed, to shape the sociological, institutional and international contexts in which they operate. I have argued elsewhere that it is possible to construct a range of hypotheses about the roles and potential scope for political action of different types of actors in the context of globalization using a structurational approach (Cerny 2000a). (The term “structuration” in social science theory was first used by Piaget and has been developed in particular by Anthony Giddens [1979].) I have also applied neopluralist theory to globalization in a somewhat different way than in this chapter (Cerny 2003a). Here I will expand this analysis by constructing further hypotheses about how globalization and pluralization interact dynamically, altering the character of political processes in a globalizing world. In doing so I will distinguish my notion of a pluralist – or neopluralist – approach from what I take to be the closest approximation to a pluralist analysis of globalization in current political science and international relations, i.e. the notion of “global civil society”. Of course, this concept can be defined in a way that is quite like some traditional pluralist analyses. It focuses on the role of interest and pressure groups and sees these as developing an autonomous political capacity to organize and operate transnationally, affecting the issues highlighted earlier – the distribution of resources, the degree of interlock between groups and the state, the structure of institutional constraints and opportunities, and the development of new political and institutional strategies and tactics to cope with interdependence and international system change. In the development of this analysis, structural and institutional factors, such as path dependency and change, will be treated not as fully-fledged independent variables. Rather they will be seen as a mix of dependent, independent, and facilitating variables that constitute so-called “choice points” or “multiple equilibria”: relatively constraining and/or permissive conditions within which actors operate and which they can also manipulate and, to a greater or lesser degree, reshape (Cerny 2000a). II. Pluralism and Modernity Pluralism is, first and foremost, an approach to modernity. In particular, pluralism stands in opposition to explanations of modernity couched in the language of gigantism – whether the all-seeing Panoptikon bureaucratic state (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Weber 1947), the submergence of people in increasingly larger (and fewer) socio-economic classes (the Marxist tradition), the collaboration of corporatist or neocorporatist “peak associations” (Schmitter 1974), or the all-encompassing “nation”. In contrast, pluralism is rooted in the notion that a complex array of individuals and groups operates within multi-level state – and other institutional – structures with “multiple points of access” (Truman 1951). Such groups include “overlapping” (Truman 1951) and “cross-cutting” groups, (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956), socio-economic “sectional” and value-based “cause” groups. These groups are inherently involved in a process of fungible coalition-building that is always at least to some extent in flux (“a great moving process”: Bentley 1908) and they bring together multiple loyalties and identities. While the need to reconcile these differences among groups at one level appears to make the nation-state a necessary but not sufficient condition for compromise and political progress (Cerny 1999a), at the same time such differences contain within them the potential to problematize both the nation and the state. At the same time, unlike purely individualistic interpretations of modernity, pluralist modernity suggests that individuals will not become anomic, alienated beings, nor will they spontaneously act out rationalistic games with each other; rather, they will find both identity and choice rooted in their underlying social plurality, their multiple group memberships. In this context, the plurality assumption – which is the main positivistic, analytical root of pluralism – has been seen to be inextricably intertwined with the normative assertion that pluralism is a good thing. In this context, nations are not organic units of which people are subsidiary members. Rather they are cumulative, pragmatic, conventional expressions of multiple coalition-building processes. Those coalitions form, break up and re-form, providing a repertoire of choices that is asserted to be greater than that which is available through simple territorial representation. Classes, elites, and corps neither dominate perpetually nor struggle holistically, but are themselves riven by cleavages that permit more complex coalitions form around more specific shared interests and value goals. And the best form of government is assumed to be characterized – like the system of separation of powers and federalism in the United States (especially for Truman 1951) – by institutions that provide multiple points of access and checks and balances, to ensure that politics, like a well-functioning political marketplace, will eventually produce a more efficient allocation of resources and values (Easton 1953) than would be possible where more rigid hierarchies rule by fiat – or, indeed, where anomic individuals become alienated and abdicate their already marginalized sovereignty to those hierarchies. A pluralist version of modernity therefore provides stability by replacing class conflict with stabilizing, cross-cutting conflicts; gives real or virtual representation to the greatest possible number; provides an institutional bulwark against monism; and rewards those actors who choose enlightened self-interest over predatory or monopolistic politics. Pluralist theory also exists in ongoing interaction with the development of modern society – positing that industrial society actually multiplies underlying socio-economic “interests”, rather than shoehorning them into classes, while the development of mass culture, rather than indoctrinating people into macro-level “groupthink” (Orwell 1949), actually provides a growing repertoire of competing ideas and values that civilize and expand people’s horizons. The latter is, of course, a hugely controversial notion in the debate over the increasing corporatization (and “dumbing down?”) of the mass media. The critical problem with this vision, of course, is that the normative outcome – pluralism as an “-ism” – does not necessarily arise from plurality. Indeed, traditional concepts not only of class but more directly of “faction” suggest that plurality will normally lead to increased conflict and disorder if not somehow counteracted by other structural and political constraints. Competing interests would lead not to consensus but to endemic power struggles – anarchy instead of accommodation. A number of both critics of and apologists for pluralism (e.g., Michels 1962, on the one hand, and Rose 1967, on the other) have argued that interest groups are themselves inherently undemocratic and monistic in their endogenous structure, because even when a group starts out as a democratic association, the necessities of managing that group and competing with other groups means that strategic and even tactical control, including financial control, is increasingly ceded to elites within the group. Therefore the interaction of those groups with others – their exogenous activities as distinct from their endogenous processes – will ultimately be determined to a large extent, perhaps even hegemonically, by the self-interests of the groups’ leaders, especially their interests in organizational and personal survival and maintaining their own status – something they have in common with the leaders of other groups. In such a case, mutual accommodation and bargaining would lead to oligopoly and cartel-like behavior rather than democratic or liberal pluralism. Furthermore, “group politics” might well be likely to lead to greater inequality among groups; many goals, including economic goals but also “positional” goals (Hirsch 1976) are in essence zero-sum in nature, so that when one group wins, another loses. Individuals, as has been pointed out incessantly in collective action and rational choice theory (Olson 1965), will often “free ride” on the activities of groups. This makes the group’s action less effective and, paradoxically, potentially both more conflictual and more hierarchical. Indeed, the very fact of multiple or overlapping group membership may undermine the capacity of individuals to act in a coherent participatory manner; conflict among their various identities, loyalties and values creates an inner conflictedness that can once again lead to alienation and openness to conflictual behavior (Haugaard 2003), especially in a privatized world of eroding social capital (Putnam 2000). Groups, rather than acting in pluralistic fashion, may on the contrary act in monopolistic or oligopolistic fashion to entrench their influence and power – indeed, as they have always done. What looks like open pluralism may, on the contrary, be a form of closed corporatism, whereby “iron triangles” and relationships of “capture”, “patronage”, and “clientelism” in effect make groups part of the ruling bureaucracy and vice-versa (Streeck and Schmitter 1986). Even without a division of society into Marx’s form of class structure, some groups simply possess far more relevant resources of various kinds than others and are likely to control outcomes because of their “privileged positions” (Lindblom 1977). And, of course, political and economic institutions, whatever their internal structure, are always inherently biased in that they provide greater access to some claimants than others. Therefore pluralism seems less like a spontaneous, bottom-up process in which the existence of plurality as such produces the desired normative outcomes in some linear or predetermined fashion, but instead one in which pluralism must be manufactured through the transformation of plurality into pluralistic practices by other means. Structural and institutional factors are crucial facilitating variables in this process. In analogous fashion to the way neo-Marxist theorists such as Nicos Poulantzas and Bob Jessop argue that the capitalist state is not produced automatically by economic or material factors but is rooted in “extra-economic coercion” (Jessop 2002), so pluralism must be channeled through, and may even be seen to be generated by, structural and institutional frameworks that enable, sustain, and reinforce pluralist practices – extra-group support structures. In other words, for plurality to be transformed into pluralism, it is necessary for there to be a pluralism-generating and pluralism-reinforcing playing field in existence (or at least under construction) that maximizes (or at least supports) the possibilities for groups to associate, to construct identities that legitimate and internalize pluralistic practices, to develop strategies and tactics around bargaining and coalition-building rather than conflict and violence, and to be able effectively to influence socio-economic and political outcomes in significant ways. The existence of pluralism as distinct from mere plurality, then, requires the presence of two conditions. The first is that there must be in one form or another a genuine plurality of socio-political and/or socio-economic forces in society at large – at whatever level, from the local to the global, and not just at the level of the nation-state – whether extant or potential, organized or spontaneous, manifest or latent. The second is that a supportive context for pluralism – in terms of both the structural/institutional environment and the practices of relevant actors – must be in place or in the process of being created. Whether a plurality of forces is present can therefore be the result of either the existence of an already functioning plural socio-political structure or the possibility of creating or generating such a structure through proactive politics, especially by what have been called “political (or institutional) entrepreneurs”. Pluralism therefore is mutually constituted through the interaction of an existing (or constructed) plurality of social forces, on the one hand, and the presence (or construction) of a pluralism-generating playing field, on the other. The key to this process of mutual constitution is the role of individual and group actors in intervening, managing, manipulating, reshaping, and reconstructing both plurality and pluralism. Thus pluralism is what actors make of it. In this sense, of course, pluralism will only be constructed when actors act in a pluralizing or pluralism-supporting fashion; it can be blocked, constrained, and/or eroded either by hierarchically-oriented actors (authoritarian politicians, high-handed bureaucrats, monopolistic or oligopolistic economic actors, patriarchical social elites, monistic religious leaders, etc.) or by defecting individuals and groups that act through conflict, violence, or exit rather than through bargaining and compromise. Pluralistic political processes require the capacity not only to counteract such actors (and their structural/institutional resources) but also to generate and maintain alternative, more pluralistic structures and practices. In effect, pluralism must be supported by what Foucault has called “governmentality”, which he defines as the capacity and will of key actors reflexively and proactively to reconcile, in an ongoing and ever-evolving fashion, the core paradox of modernity – i.e., the tension between its Saint-Simonian administrative (or “police”) dimension, on the one hand, and its liberalizing, individualizing, and pluralizing dimension, on the other (Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991; Cerny 2003b). Thus, for example, the state – especially a kind of pluralistic, liberal-democratic national state, with most politicians and bureaucrats either dedicated to or enmeshed in the practices of governmentality – has often been seen to be functionally necessary to the development of pluralism itself. Such a national state constitutes a playing field that brings conflicting factions into some sort of stable coexistence, even mixing pluralism with supporting organizational props that may not be pluralistic in and of themselves, but which paradoxically contribute to stabilizing, functioning, and maintaining pluralist processes. Classic examples include the sort of top-down coercion, including varieties of absolutism, that undermined feudal structures in 17th century Europe, the institutionalization of formally differentiated, command-style bureaucratic hierarchies (Weber 1947), various quasi-spontaneous hierarchy-producing organizational processes (Michels 1962: “Who says organization says oligarchy”), the continuing and sometimes renewed influence of status-based social hierarchies or authority structures (Eckstein 1965; Huntington 1968; Mayer 1981), or a combination of these. David Truman (1951), one of the main post-war theorists of the pluralist paradigm, includes much that is virtually institution-centered in his analysis. However, rather than emphasizing the organizational aspects of these institutions, he focuses on their pluralism-supporting and pluralism-generating aspects – especially his emphasis on the multiple points of access characteristic of the American system of government. Similarly, nations as such can be seen to be artificial political-cultural creations intended to inculcate, through a sense of belonging, an identity with a particular form of common good or public interest that would transcend faction (Anderson 1983). Indeed, democratic or quasi-democratic forms of nationalism would be crucial for channeling factions into pluralistic behavior. Socio-political elites, whether ruling monistically through a pyramid-like structure, or competing with each other for popular votes (Schumpeter 1942), would in effect impose order while indirectly supporting a limited pluralism (“democratic elitism”). Political parties would “aggregate interests” in order to create a kind of artificial, manipulated pluralism through “polyarchy” (Dahl 1972; Duverger 1951). Norms handed down through “political culture” would socialize people into thinking pluralistically (Almond and Verba 1965). And, of course, liberal – pluralistic – democracy could still be seen as “the best shell for capitalism”, assuming of course that it was a relatively competititive – non-monopolistic – form of capitalism, ruled by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” – i.e., a kind of market capitalism that could in theory both prevent capitalists from coalescing to permanently dominate the system and allow non-business groups to exert significant influence in shaping outcomes. In advocating a “neopluralist” approach, Lindblom (1977) argues that despite the “privileged position of business”, the scope for pluralism is still significant in contemporary capitalist societies. III. Pluralism as a Political Project All in all, then, an understanding of how plurality and pluralism are related in the real world, and not just the world of traditional pluralist theory, requires an understanding of how all of these factors are managed and manipulated by political actors – especially those more influential actors often called “political entrepreneurs” or “institutional entrepreneurs” – into moving towards a more normatively desirable form of pluralistic stabilization, mutual adjustment, liberal democratization and representation (territorial and virtual), the protections of a functioning and open legal system, civil rights, free and competitive elections, fairly widespread participation, informational transparency, and an acceptance of common norms of civility, compromise and consensus-building. Such a process, as argued above, is rooted in the mutual constitution of plurality and a pluralism-supporting playing field. In fact, none of these goals are ever achieved once and for all, and there is no pure pluralism found anywhere in the world. Pluralism, like all political projects, has to be imagined and constructed by means of a normative political project that is always contested. This contestation takes two main forms. In the first place, pluralism is contested internally. There are always conflicts, whether rooted in inequalities or clashing values. These include old conflicts that are embedded or entrenched, not only in society and the economy, but also in the relationship among various institutions, agencies, and levels of the state. As governments have become increasingly involved in redistributive and regulatory activities over the past century and a half, there have always been winners and losers. Within the state, competing priorities are never fully reconciled – whether social spending versus defense spending, poverty reduction versus support for growth-producing business elites, finance ministries versus “spending ministries”, etc. Within society, old inequalities persist and new ones develop. Secondly, pluralism is contested externally. New claimants continually arise, especially through globalization and the transnationalization of group linkages, whether among businesses – especially multinational corporations, but also including any businesses and workers affected by restructuring, downsizing, outsourcing, reskilling/deskilling, and/or the search for export markets to replace lost domestic markets – consumer interests, diasporas, environmental or other cause groups, religious and ethnic communities, transgovernmental networks (Slaughter 2004), AIDS sufferers, tsunami victims, or terrorists (Cerny 2005). Resolving these conflicts does not come easily. Nevertheless, key elites and groups, in trial and error fashion, have throughout modernity sought to develop what sociologists call reflexive “practices” that revolve around the continuing and ever-evolving necessities of achieving such resolution(s) on a day-to-day as well as on a long-term basis. IV. Pluralism and Globalization: The Disaggregation of the Political Process In a globalizing world, the tools of manipulation and conflict management are far more complex and problematic than within the traditional playing field (partly materially real, partly imagined or even mythical) of the nation-state. In the first place, the state, once part of the solution, is increasingly seen to be part of the problem, whether in terms of its organizational and institutional structures and processes, its character as an arena of collective action, or its capacity to constitute a “unitary actor” and make “credible commitments” in international affairs. Globalization has increasingly “problematized” the state itself, undermining it in some ways, transforming it in others, and reinforcing it in yet others (Cerny 1999b). Secondly, the nation and the notion of national identity are increasingly problematized too. Whether through cultural heterogeneity and fragmentation – McLuhan’s “global village” often looks like a “global jungle” – consumerism or civil wars, the focus of a basic sense of belonging on the nation and the nation-state is slipping away, despite attempts to resurrect and reinforce it. Thirdly, economic policy and policymaking are increasingly constrained and homogenized by the need not just for states but for businesses to compete in the global marketplace, even if that process of convergence produces its own old and new inequalities and divergences. Finally, the process of group politics is increasingly complicated by the emergence of a complex, multilayered set of new groups – often called, or confused with, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – that are characterized by all the same ambiguities and distortions that have been found in national-level pressure groups, but without the same kinds of constraints. Meanwhile, political parties, corporatist structures, and other national-level “intermediaries” (to use de Tocqueville’s term: de Tocqueville 1955), are increasingly at a loss to cope with the challenges of the disaggregation of the political process that comes with globalization. Actors and groups are thus enmeshed in a long-term learning process. The state, firstly, is still there – it is not disappearing, but it is disaggregating. It has long been a key element of pluralist analysis that the existence of multiple points of access to the political process is a fundamental part of the way plurality is stabilized and channeled into “pluralism”. But in a globalizing world, the further multiplication of points of access – both their verticalization into international organizations, regimes, and other dimensions of “global governance”, on the one hand, and their transnational horizontal expansion across borders – comes without the organizational constraints that a centripetal set of domestic state institutions possesses. Eckstein’s and Huntington’s notion that the maintenance of underlying non-democratic social authority structures is required for democratic stability (Eckstein 1965; Huntington 1968) not only does not work in a globalizing world – authority structures are too fragmented and hegemony too is a fragile reed (Cerny 2006) – but attempts to impose authority in a still quasi-anarchic international order can exacerbate conflict and be self-defeating. In this context, groups have to organize in ways that demand both flexibilization and stronger elite leadership. The emerging concept of “multi-level governance” represents a structurally open and problematic playing field; indeed, it is probably better conceived as complex, multi-nodal politics (Cerny, forthcoming). Of course, to use Lindblom’s term, the privileged position of business is dramatically increased, as multinational corporations and international financial markets possess the lion’s share of the kind of resources necessary to pursue their interests on this complex playing field. But in a more open, globalizing world, it is harder for multinational corporations to be economically or organizationally monopolistic, as there are more competitors out there from different points of the compass, including from increasingly vibrant emerging markets. Only in certain product areas, like commercial aircraft, are economies of scale and transactions costs so large that only one or two producers can corner the global market and act oligopolistically. States, too, as Slaughter (2004) has demonstrated, have lost much of their endogenous policymaking coherence as transgovernmental networks of regulators, lawyers and judges, and even legislators form the backbone of an informal but increasingly dense process of indirect global governance. The politics of redistribution is everywhere being replaced by the “beanbag” politics of regulation, as regulations – often adopted in the name of so-called “deregulation” – proliferate and become ever more all-encompassing and hierarchical (Moran 2003; Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). The more you punch the beanbag, the more it just absorbs the punishment and mutates into new shapes. In this world, although political parties and foreign policymakers still pretend that the state constitutes a sovereign arena of collective action, it is increasingly drawn into transnational webs of governance (Cerny 2002). Paradoxically, democratization too means absorption into this world of pooled (and lost) sovereignty, regulatory diffusion, marketization, and the hegemony of neoliberalism. And at the level of foreign policymaking, even the United States under the current George W. Bush administration, keen to demonstrate its autonomy and hegemonic leadership, is increasingly pulled into the quagmire of imperial overstretch (Cerny 2006). Global governance or the “new international architecture” or “public sphere” simply does not have either the coercive power or the organizational coherence to promote and stabilize plurality and transform it into pluralism – yet. In this world, secondly, alternative points of identity are crowding out national identity. Nation-states rarely go to war with each other, but civil and cross-border wars, tribalism and ethnic conflicts, and other new forms of international violence like terrorism are proliferating. Push them down in one place and they pop up in another. Transnational diasporas are increasingly significant as the internet and other forms of long-distance communication and information transfer allow migrant groups to maintain contacts in ways that were far more difficult (although still significant) in the past (Yuval-Davis 2000; Nordstrom 2000). In economic terms, the common identity that in the “modern” nation-state (i.e., from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries) derived from producer interests that linked Second Industrial Revolution enterprises with national industrialization, the rise of trade unions, and the welfare state, is being increasingly swamped by transnational markets, post-Fordism, and fickle consumer interests (Cerny 1995). These interests care only about buying the cheapest goods available on the world market. This is not to belittle consumerism, because it has enabled many groups previously subsumed into class and caste identities to improve their standard of living and to exercise an important if problematic form of “choice”. But consumerism, and indeed marketization itself, are essentially a-national and diffuse, undermining collective solidarities as industries themselves flexibilize in post-Fordist fashion and lose their national identities; the globalization of financial markets has been a key driver of this process (Cerny 1993). A true McDonaldization of world culture may be a long way away and consumer tastes can be highly diverse, but that does not mean that they can generate the kind of social capital once believed to be at the heart of domestic social solidarity and identity within a relatively insulated national economy. Lifestyles of all classes are globalizing, but in ways that augment plurality while potentially undermining pluralism. Thirdly, as has been so often observed, economic policy and policymaking are increasingly being shaped by international and transnational factors. Macroeconomic policy is constrained by global flows of trade and finance. Domestic social policy is converging around the streamlining and marketizing of welfare states. Trade and industrial policies are concerned primarily with the competitive position of domestically based economic activities in international marketplaces – the shift of emphasis from the welfare state to the “competition state” (Cerny 1990, 1997, 2000b). And regulatory policies, noted above, are increasingly focused on pro-market re-regulation rather than deregulation or decommodification (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). Such shifts do allow for – and even necessitate – domestic variation, which creates some scope for groups of winners and losers from globalization to organize (Lütz 2004; Soederberg, Menz, and Cerny 2002). However, the technocratic imperatives of adapting to globalization increasingly take priority over redistributive and welfare goals. Fourthly, of course, new groups are emerging and exerting pressure at international and transnational levels. Indeed, the proliferation of NGOs, whether business organizations, environmental groups, broad social movements, or pressure groups in specific issue-areas, must focus not only on national governments but also on coordinating a range of pressure-type activities from the local to the global levels. Some international regimes, like the United Nations, have been very active in attempting to co-opt such groups into more formalized arenas of consultation on a whole range of issues and decisionmaking processes, while others have tried to keep them at arm’s length. Some international regimes have indeed been “captured” by such groups, and vice-versa. These groups, as noted above, also exhibit the same internal organizational tendencies to elite hierarchy as traditional pressure groups and are conflicted as to whether to become virtual parts of the growing bureaucracy of global governance or to maintain their outsider status. At the same time, they must both cooperate and conflict with other groups in overlapping issue-areas, forming alliances and coalitions across borders. Activist groups in issue-areas like the environment, for example, must coordinate local activism, pressure on local and sub-national regional governmental structures, national governments and international regimes, with media and other communications activities at all levels, as well as interacting with other interest and pressure groups both locally and in other parts of the world (Betsill 1999; Cerny 2000a). The requirements of influence are highly complex and require not only a high degree of flexibilization but an increasingly proactive role on the part of political and institutional entrepreneurs to create new arenas and networks to coordinate that influence. At the peak, business and governmental groups come together in arenas like the World Economic Forum with its annual meetings in Davos, Switzerland, where business leaders and political decisionmakers debate global issues, while social-sectional and cause groups increasingly attempt to provide an alternative focus through the World Social Forum that until recently has been meeting annually in Puerto Alegre, Brazil. Political leaders of the center-left, such as President Luis Inaçio Lula da Silva of Brazil, attempt to bridge both sorts of meetings. V. Pluralism and the Limits of Global Civil Society In this wider, multi-level and multi-nodal world, the relationship between plurality and pluralism becomes more and more complex and problematic. The privileged position of business interests is of course augmented by their control of financial resources, information, managerial skills, network complementarities deriving from the globalization of trade, production, financial and information flows, and other advantages. At the same time, “resistance” to globalization, as expressed in the demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 1999, are giving way to more complex, globally-oriented networks, strategies and tactics among cause and social-sectional groups. These developments have given rise to the concept that pluralism is simply reorganizing itself at transnational level into a phenomenon called “global civil society” (Edwards 2004). However, the notion of global civil society is both too narrow and too broad to provide an accurate picture of the changing political sociology of the contemporary world. On the one hand, in seeking to locate civil society somewhere between, but not fully including, both the market and the state, the global civil society literature focuses on too narrow a range of actors. Of course, the concept of civil society itself is notoriously fungible and in the history of political thought it has been defined sometimes to include, sometimes to exclude, both economic processes like markets and political structures like the state (Ehrenberg 1999; Fontana 2006). Civil society is usually defined to exclude both of these, to identify a middle ground, rooted in political culture, normative values and social interaction, that constitutes and independent variable alongside markets and states – a kind of third force in the globalization process. Thus it can tell us something about, for example, social capital and advocacy coalitions, and how they organize people and influence political outcomes, but in this context both the economy and the state are exogenous to civil society itself. I argue that this does not tell us very much about how political processes actually work, as it underestimates the extent to which individual and group actors are themselves embedded in economic and political-institutional contexts. Civil society is too narrow a concept to comprehend the politics of globalization. On the other hand, in the history of political thought civil society is and always been an inherently normative concept which, extended to present-day issues, suggests that the emergence of a global civil society is a good thing. In contrast to the self-interest of economic actors and the institutional vested interests of politicians and bureaucrats, civil society is often seen as aiming higher and infusing globalization with the kind of values that can create a new normative order in a changing world (Ehrenberg 1999). This potential for positive normative outcomes derives mainly from the sorts of groups civil society is said to encompass – i.e., those pursuing more solidaristic cross-border social agendas such as environmentalism and ecology, poverty alleviation, improving the position of women, aiding politically oppressed groups, opposing inequalities on a world scale rather than just within one country, and the like (Keck and Sikkink 1998). These are essentially what traditional pluralist analysis called “cause groups”, as distinct from “sectional groups”. They are said to have an increasing capacity, although always problematic, to “think globally” but “act locally”, to possess a sort of “variable geometry” that allows them to operate tactically and strategically on a range of different institutional planes and through differentiated political processes, and to create new agendas that would normally be precluded by the operation of economic interests and embedded political-institutional structures and processes. In this sense they are strategically located within global society in ways that reinforce their capacity to shape change (Cerny 2000a). At the same time, however, the very attractiveness of the concept of global civil society limits its usefulness as an analytical framework. For all the potential of global civil society, it is to a large extent an analytical mirage. For its very emergence, and the political and economic processes the groups that make it up operate within, are also the product of more general political and economic changes that have created not only these groups but a much broader pluralization of global politics. To look at the attainments of global civil society does highlight some real achievements, but it also draws a veil over what I believe to be even more important dimensions of pluralization. In this analysis I am to some extent critiquing my own earlier work. Although I have asserted previously that what I identified in highly schematized form as “social actors” may have greater potential to shape the future order of a globalizing world than “economic actors” and/or “political actors” (Cerny 2000a, 2003a) – arguing that social actors are more likely to take an increasingly proactive or “transformative” approach to political action, while economic and political actors in the narrow sense are more likely to be “reactive” or “adaptive” – I now believe that the impact of social actors is somewhat more limited because of the very fact that they do not sufficiently penetrate economic structures and political processes across the board. Indeed, most of the concrete changes in the way actors influence political processes and outcomes do tend to stem from the more indirect impact of changes in habits and patterns of action by reactive/adaptive (political and economic) actors and not just from the more direct impact of proactive/transformative ones. Therefore it is crucial to identify those more indirect influences by looking at (a) the redistribution of resources and the organizational restructuring of the socio-economic base, (b) the changing ways different groups interact and interlock with states and other state-like institutional structures, and (c) the restructuring of the playing field itself. This chapter argues that at all three levels it is possible to identify a broad but uneven pluralization of world politics, whether at the level of what one might call the “raw material” of those political processes in terms of individual and group actors and the Bentleyan “interests” they reflect and represent or in the way those interests are reshaped in the translation or transformation of raw inputs into those political processes that in turn shape outcomes. In this sense, it is the mutual, reciprocal interaction of actors and structures that is at the core of the analysis. However, what is important is not structural change in and of itself, nor just how that change involves new sets of constraints and opportunities for actors, but, again, what actors do with those constraints and opportunities. Institutional change is at one level a set of constraints, but at another level a process which enables and empowers actors to re-conceive what they are doing and wish to do, and indeed to re-conceive what their interests really are in a changing world. Actors do not operate on a tabula rasa or make history in conditions of their own choosing, but globalization, I argue, actually opens up new spaces for action more than it closes them down. Globalization, while not yet a finished pluralist construct, increasingly involves a set of “permissive conditions” for change, not just for civil society actors but for a much larger set or sets of actors. Whereas “modern” (i.e., 17th–20th century) national culture societies, national political systems, and “inter-national” relations restricted most actors, except for state actors (diplomats) and certain international businesspeople, to the domestic stage, globalization pulls more and more actors outwards, downwards, and upwards, both forcing and drawing them in to operate on, and to attempt to manipulate and reshape, a complex mix of old and new international, transnational, regional, translocal, and local stages and playing fields. Given the range of alternative “multiple equilibria” that are becoming available for actors to aim at across these different stages, globalization is increasingly what actors make of it. Therefore globalization is pluralism in the making – or at least a kind of uneven pluralization – but in a more thoroughgoing, less bounded sense than traditional national-level pluralism. A globalizing world is a pluralizing world. However, that pluralism is not the ideal-type, fractionalized (see below), self-regulating, self-stabilizing pluralism of mid-20th-century American pluralist political theorists. It is not the political equivalent of (relatively) perfect competition – or, as today’s economists would have it, of portfolio diversification with its balancing of speculation and hedging. It can be dis-equilibrating and destabilizing, rooted in unequal distributions of resources, locked in through restructured socio-political hierarchies and changing coalitions, and filtered through increasingly complex institutional webs reaching above, below and through the state. At first glance it looks more like what Dahl and Lindblom called “neo-pluralism”, but it lacks the embeddedness and hierarchical simplicity of that sort of structure; it is in flux. Therefore what actors do – how they pursue their interests and values, how they organize themselves, how they determine political outcomes, and how they reshape the institutional superstructure – will become more and more important in the future. What kind of pluralization emerges will determine what sort of world order crystallizes out of that flux. In looking at these issues, I will first address the question of how pluralism can be developed as an analytical framework in the context of globalization. I will then examine globalization itself, focusing on its character as a set of permissive conditions in which actors’ opportunities are expanded, however unevenly. And finally I will look at how the interaction of globalization and pluralization leads to a messy but increasingly pluralized but uneven and shifting world order with complex new levels and spaces – but one which is likely to be shaped over time through practices developed by actors themselves in the process of pluralization through a combination of trial-and-error plus increasingly strategic rationalization. VI. Globalization and Pluralization: A Multi-Level Approach The processes of globalization and pluralization are inextricably intertwined. Actors of various kinds – whether political entrepreneurs, reactive/adaptive state and economic actors, interest groups (both “sectional” and “cause” or value groups), or even “masses” – are not only constrained but also empowered in several ways by both path dependency and by long-term structural changes. In this ever-evolving context, such actors act strategically not simply to pursue their material interests and normative values, but even more significantly to shape and reshape the emerging politics of a globalizing world in complex ways. Hendrik Spruyt refers to “institutional selection” (Spruyt 1994), although that term is too limited, as it does not in itself focus enough attention on the shaping of political processes and practices as well as more formal institutions. Bob Jessop calls this aspect of political life “strategic selectivity”, a term that is perhaps more apt in the context of this chapter (Jessop 2002). The strategies and tactics adopted by actors to cope with, control (including damage control), manage, and restructure political institutions, processes, and practices that determine what sort of globalization we get. Spruyt, in his perceptive analysis of the transition from feudalism to the nation-state, develops an extremely useful three-stage model to analyze such broad patterns of historical change. A revised version of this model lies behind the analysis here. The first stage involves the emergence and consolidation of certain political, social, and material preconditions for transition, which he calls “exogenous independent variables”. In the case of the transition from feudalism to the nation-state in Europe, those conditions consisted mainly of various underlying social and economic changes, in particular the emergence of what he calls “translocal trade”. In other words, a combination of technological developments that enabled early manufacture to grow, plus innovations in transportation and communication, plus the emergence of new classes of merchants and producers to compete with the feudal aristocracy, plus an explosion of new consumer demands in swelling late medieval cities, etc., transformed the socio-economic environment within which political institutions, processes, and practices functioned. Some old groups declined in wealth, prestige, and political clout, while others were able to profit from these changes by altering their own practices; at the same time, some new groups – especially new merchants and manufacturers – drove the processes of change while others, like the urban poor, lost out. The second stage involves the “restructuring of socio-political coalitions”, i.e. a changing cosmos of political allegiances and alliances vying to get a grip on change and reorient policy outcomes accordingly. Developments such as standing armies, navies, new financial systems, trade promotion and protection, taxation, bureaucratization, etc. – including deep conflicts over such changes, as in the English Civil War and later the French Revolution – were part and parcel of this process. For example, some parts of the aristocracy became isolated in their agricultural fastnesses while others linked up with rising financial and commercial elites and converted their old resources into new, profit-making activities – re-entrenching their political power through absolutism. In the third stage, these tactics of conversion began to be transformed into broader structural strategies not so much for simply managing change and controlling power as for constructing the future through establishing new political institutions, developing new political processes, and embedding new political practices. These strategies were not just about reacting to change but also capturing the benefits of those changes in the longer term, whether for personal or group advantage, or for the direct or indirect advantage of the society as a whole – e.g., political stabilization, economic growth, or social development. Clearly this was a process with plurality, and a certain amount of proto-pluralism, at its heart, characterized by complex changing patterns of conflict, competition, and coalition-building among an evolving (and sometimes rapidly changing) cast of group characters. Eventually, after a couple of false starts (the Venetian city-state and the Hanseatic League), the 16th-century French nation-state emerged as the dominant “arena of collective action” or playing field for uneven political processes and reinforced its structural dominance through the emergence of an international “states system” based on the mutual acceptance of the legitimacy and autonomy of other, similar states (the capacity of states to make “credible commitments”) (Spruyt 1994). In adapting this model and applying it to the relationship between globalization and pluralization, we are therefore concerned primarily with three overlapping and linked levels of analysis – not the two levels, “inside” and “outside”, that have previously characterized the division of political and academic labor between political science and international relations. These reflect an old, Tocquevillean tradition in political sociology, between the base, intermediaries, and the superstructure and political processes characteristic of the political system – not in this case, however, confined to national political systems, but involving a complex, multilayered, and multi-nodal global political system. Although this analytical schema at first glance appears synchronic, as distinct from the historical analysis of Spruyt, in fact these three levels link well with his three stages, which indeed are not chronologically distinct stages in any case but rather a mixture of synchronic and asynchronic processes. Globalization as a political process involves the interaction of actors functioning at – and across – all three of these levels. The first, the base, concerns such factors as: the distribution of resources in society; the kind of processes of production, distribution and exchange prevalent therein; the state of consciousness or the perception of interests, values and possibilities of the various individual and group actors; and the sorts of basic solidarities and alliances of a more political nature that emerge from the first three. The second concerns what de Tocqueville called the character of “intermediaries”, or the openness or closure of political processes and coalitions that transform the raw material of the base into more specific political and economic resources within a narrower political process – sometimes called the power structure. How open or closed are elites? Is there a coherent, instrumental “ruling class”, or a more nebulous Gramscian “hegemonic bloc” (Fontana 1993 and 2006)? Do interests interact systematically with politicians, bureaucrats, etc., in a corporatist or neo-corporatist fashion? What embedded alliances have evolved over time, and how open or flexible are they? Is public policy made by iron triangles, closed policy communities, wider policy networks, or transparent, competitive, quasi-democratic processes? And the third concerns the structure of the institutional playing fields themselves, whether concentrated or diffused, unitary or fragmented, and the sorts of rules and practices that have evolved to coordinate different levels and/or pillars of the political system. A. The Base The key to understanding the role of the base (plurality) in enabling the construction of pluralism as such is to understand the distinction between simple plurality, on the one hand, and fractionalization, on the other. There are qualitatively and quantitatively different configurations of plurality. The first concerns the number of significant group actors in any political system. Elitist, class-based and corporatist approaches all posit the existence of a small number of groups acting in cartel-like fashion, or even one group, oligopolizing or monopolizing power in the system, even where there is an apparent plurality of groups. It has been a mainstay of pluralist theory since Bentley (1908) to argue that there is a always large number of potentially significant actors in any political system, although as Truman (1951) pointed out it is important to distinguish between “organized” and “potential” (or “manifest” and “latent”) groups. But in any case, the configuration of interests in traditional pluralism is always a complex one, always potentially in flux, and open to individual or particularly strategically-minded group actors – “political entrepreneurs” – to reshape or reorganize their activities to some extent within the bounds of preexisting bargains and/or habits. But the existence of an apparent plurality of groups, as argued earlier in this chapter, is only a necessary condition for ideal-type, competitive, self-regulating, stable pluralism, not a sufficient one. For ideal-type pluralism it is also crucial that groups be relatively fractionalized. This means that none is/are so much larger than the others that they become overly dominant or hegemonic. Their clout is, if not equal, then at least sufficient to resist domination and to be able to engage in what international relations theorists call “balancing” behavior, i.e. to make coalitions to counteract the relative strength of other group(s). Of course, groups may also engage in “bandwagoning” – coalescing with more powerful groups – if they perceive that to be favorable to the pursuit of their interests and/or values. This is akin to what Durkheim called a “simple structure” (Durkheim 1949) in which there is a certain bottom line similarity among groups – although it is not clear whether this refers to an endogenous isomorphism or merely analogous exogenous characteristics or behavior (Waltz [1979] is never entirely clear on this, although he tends towards the latter) – as distinct from a “complex structure”, in which there is a division of labor among groups, systematically differentiating them by function – and therefore clout – within the system. Of course, this sort of ideal-type pluralism, like perfect competition in economics, is never realized in practice in the real world. Nevertheless, there is an analogy here with a relatively competitive political marketplace, with its self-stabilizing and self-regulating characteristics in principle operating to maintain the system and to improve overall economic welfare outputs. However, most pluralist analysts – whether theorists or empirical analysts – tend to assume, as in Austrian economics, that pluralist politics do not exhibit automatically self-correcting tendencies towards equilibrium. Rather, as argued earlier in this chapter, what I have called “plurality” needs to be converted or translated into relatively stable competition through institutionalized, pluralism-supporting rules of the game, embedded informal conventions, and the pluralistic practices of political, economic, and social actors – conditions that ensure a relatively high degree of competition of interests and values in practice. Huntington and Eckstein, for example, famously argue that non-democratic, authoritarian underlying social structures and practices are needed in order to stabilize democratic political systems. Dahl (1972) and Lindblom (1977) do not go quite so far, but do suggest in their notion of neo-pluralism that balanced, fractionalized pluralism is rarely if ever found in the real world. Some groups are always “more equal than others” in the Orwellian sense of the term, possessing greater resources and the ability to deploy them tactically and strategically in systematic ways over time, locking in a certain hegemony. Nevertheless, unlike elitism, class analysis, and most forms of neo-corporatism – although Schmitter (1974) is ambiguous on this, as his “liberal corporatism” is pluralistic up to a point – pluralism, including neopluralism, does suggest that control of policy outcomes even in relatively oligopolistic and monopolistic political systems is always vulnerable to coalitions of outsiders, or of outsiders aligned with sub-groups of insiders. The issue is not one of a clear demarcation between pluralism and non-pluralism, but of a scale from an ideal-type political monopoly or monism (never entirely realized in practice despite the concept of totalitarianism, as historians of Stalinism and the Third Reich have shown), at one end of the spectrum, to ideal-type competitive, fractionalized pluralism at the other end. Thus the base is always skewed, even in pluralist analysis, despite a certain underlying normative bias towards more competitive forms as the best substitute for (also non-achievable) ideal-type democracy. Actors are thus never free of underlying structural constraints although they do have a certain autonomy and ability to exert direct or indirect influence in a relatively pluralized context through the practices that constitute governmentality. B. Intermediaries Whether one is talking about “the state” in the strict sense of modern, domestic nation-state political systems or a wider category of “state-like” structures, the key question for pluralism is whether such structures are relatively open or closed. The plural base, as outlined above, concerns the “raw material” of pluralism – the configuration of interests and political market actors that constitute and generate inputs into a political system. However, those inputs never arrive in their original form. They are translated, reshaped and transformed into resources or currency that can be used, manipulated and exchanged within the system itself. The main circuit of transformation consists of relations between formal and informal representatives of the different interests that comprise the base, whether politicians, pressure groups, latent categories of voters, protestors, or whatever, on the one hand, and politicians and bureaucrats in their official capacities, along with other members of policy communities and other well-connected influentials or “notables”, on the other. Of course political officials fall into both categories, as they would be expected to do in a representative liberal democracy, and as they do in practice in other types of political system as well. These relationships often take the form of networks. They are sometimes said to produce certain types of “withinputs”, i.e. coming somewhere between inputs and outputs. (Our next category, below, institutionalized playing fields, constitutes another kind of classic withinput in political systems analysis.) These networks can be either relatively open or closed, as noted above. Ideal-type pluralism requires that networks be relatively open, i.e. that the transformation of inputs into withinputs and relationships between their members across the “input/withinput” divide be relatively transparent and open to competition, new entrants, and straightforward bargaining. Many of the more closed patterns identified by political sociologists have been more relevant to the nation-state level, including neocorporatism, private interest governments, and the corporate state. However, others, including policy communities and networks, epistemic communities, transnational elites, transgovernmental networks, civil society, the power of financial market actors and multinational corporations, and actors within cross-border institutional structures such as “international regimes”, “global governance” processes, etc., have a wider application and are at the heart of the globalization/pluralization nexus. C. Institutional Superstructures A great deal of attention has been paid in the international relations and international political economy literature to institutional changes linked with globalization, especially through the concept of “multilevel governance”. This institutionalist approach looks not so much at actors as at structures, but paradoxically it too focuses on a kind of institutional pluralism (or even institutional schizophrenia). We argued earlier in this chapter that pluralism is mutually constituted by the interaction of a plurality of groups and the existence or construction of a pluralism-supporting playing field, mediated by a range of actors engaging in various pluralistic and/or quasi-pluralistic practices. In this sense, the pluralization/globalization nexus is inextricably linked with the coexistence and multilayered interaction of not just national states and traditional international institutions, but also various regimes and governance institutions, transnational linkages and networks, local and regional institutions (whether sub-national/regional like cities or development zones, or international/regional like free trade areas and the European Union), private regimes and webs of governance, etc. The world cities literature, in particular, refers to the “rescaling of statehood” (Brenner 2004) above, below, and cutting across the level of the nation-state, which then becomes enmeshed in overlapping “webs of governance” (Cerny 2002). Thus the changing institutional superstructure embodies a growing institutional plurality that plural, strategically selective actors may or may not be able to manage or reshape in ways that reinforce or generate pluralism on a global or transnational scale. VII. Globalization as Constituting Permissive Conditions for Pluralism The most perplexing aspect of globalization is its complexity. Analysts have identified a range of dimensions of this complexity. In the first place, globalization involves transnational interpenetration, or the violation and undermining of the “inside/outside” distinction with regard to the nation-state. Furthermore, it involves the reconstitution of the public-private divide. With the notion of “publicness” being historically associated with the nation-state and “economic” institutions and processes being identified as essentially “private” (despite the crucial economic role of states), globalization is often seen, particularly by “anti-globalization” critics, as reinforcing the role of actors primarily concerned with pursuing their private (and antisocial?) economic interests to the detriment of the common good or public interest. Although some writers talk about the emergence of a global “public sphere” (Germain 2001), the main thrust of the literature on globalization is that globalization makes such publicness more problematic – creating a need for a new politics of reshaping multi-level governance around various “new architectures” that will recreate the “public” either at a higher level or through a more complex network structure. At the same time, however, as noted earlier, globalization also involves the uneven multiplication of points of access and control, which, allied with plurality, pluralistic practices, and pluralism-promoting strategic actors, might involve the evolution of a new kind of global pluralism, however uneven. A. The Base: Monopoly or Competition? In this context, what is happening with the base, or the “exogenous independent variables” identified by Spruyt? Do such changes support genuine competitive pluralization, or do they merely entrench new forms of political oligopoly or monopoly at a transnational and/or global level? In the global economy, shifting patterns with regard to economies of scale and scope do not provide conclusive evidence either way. Of course, multinational corporations hold a “privileged position”, as do financial market actors in an integrated, 24-hour global financial marketplace. But small and medium-sized enterprises also increasingly operate on a transnational scale, and it is even argued that globalization is leading to a long-term Ricardian process of the equalization of wages in the world (Kitching 2001). Only where particular industries such as commercial aircraft manufacturing, possess overwhelmingly global economies of scale are oligopoly and monopoly clearly winning (usually with state support), whereas in nearly every other industry new entrants have been proliferating. Of course, “old groups” have in many cases been able to parlay their existing resources into new profits by developing new investment strategies, restructuring and “flexibilizing” enterprises, etc. Perhaps more important, however, has been the emergence of “new” groups of entrepreneurs, whether in countries that have traditionally supported such groups like the United States or in those that have in the past suppressed or inhibited their activities, like China and India. The power of latent or potential groups or categories has been growing as well. Perhaps the most important of these is consumers, whose role in the allocation of resources has dramatically increased in contrast with that of more traditional producer groups. Of course, new categories of losers have been created as well, although in many cases these are groups that have long been disenfranchised, suppressed, or subsumed in authoritarian social hierarchies, such as tribes. Existing hierarchies are everywhere being challenged by new coalitions, whether coalitions seeking greater participation in global capitalism and economic growth or those seeking to resist change such as traditional kinship hierarchies, anti-capitalist movements, or religious fundamentalists. B. Intermediaries: Complex Networks A dialectic of fractionalization and reorganization is therefore taking place that is analogous to the “restructuring of socio-political coalitions” that Spruyt identified with regard to the earlier transition from feudalism to the nation-state. The control of politics by preexisting iron triangles, corporatist blocs, or domestic policy coalitions is everywhere being challenged by different coalitions at different levels of aggregation and organization. Perhaps the most important change in developed countries has been the growing predominance in economic policymaking of transnationally linked interest and value groups and the decline of nationally-based, protectionist politics. While it is always possible for geographically concentrated groups whose position is worsened by economic globalization, such as workers displaced by import competition or by outsourcing, to organize resistance up to a point – and often to receive media attention for doing so – the increasing imbrication of both small and large businesses in international markets, production chains and strategic alliances has tended to diffuse such effects more widely across the economy. Together with the combination of deskilling and reskilling of the workforce, along with the flexibilization of production methods and the long-term decline of trade unions, it is becoming more and more difficult to organize politically effective resistance. Meanwhile the restructuring of financial markets has drawn more sectors of the population into marketized finance, whether directly or through institutional investors such as pension funds, while traditional banking institutions have themselves become more marketized. In other words, the socio-political balance between what were once called “national capital” and “international capital” has both blurred and shifted, as there is little purely national capital left. The blurring of these traditional lines between what once formed the basis for the left-right divide at national level has switched the focus of group politics toward other kinds of linkages – whether the translocal restructuring of influence around multiculturalism and/or mutually exclusive but cross-border religious and ethnic identities, diaspora communities, world cities, and the like, on the one hand, or the transnational/global reorganizing of businesses and market structures around more extended networks, the development of epistemic communities of scientists and experts, the rapid growth of transnational advocacy coalitions and networks (NGOs, civil society, environmentalism, etc.), on the other. Certain dimensions of public and economic policy have increasingly become embedded and overdetermined – the reduction of barriers to trade and cross-border finance, the shift of government policy away from direct intervention toward regulation, the transformation of the state from the welfare state to the competition state, the expansion of mixed governance and the outsourcing of traditional governmental functions to private and/or mixed public/private providers, the flexibilization of labor markets, etc. – constitute a new “embedded neoliberalism” (Soederberg Menz, and Cerny 2006). And across borders, more and more policy issue areas are debated and competed over in various mixed arenas of transnational regimes and global governance. As noted earlier, actors must themselves be able to operate on the basis of flexible response, shifting coalition-building, and variable geometry in terms of both choosing short-term and/or long-term allies and developing policy strategies that involve the coordination of policymaking across borders. Long-term left/right blocs are giving way to mixed, complex, and shifting coalitions. Indeed, this process is running well ahead of consciousness of the implications of such changes, leading to political cognitive dissonance and, at times, to strange alliances that distort preferences rather than effectively pursuing them (Frank 2004). C. The Superstructure: Regimes, Governance and Complexity As stated before, this kind of political transformation has led to a range of new debates, and not a few confusions, concerning the nature of the superstructural complex that is evolving – and being continually shaped and reshaped by actors. Pluralism is particularly relevant to a context where institutional parameters are in flux; it is, after all, as Bentley (1908) contended, itself a “great moving process”. Probably the central debate has been about the role of the state. Despite all of the debate about the “hollowing out of the state”, for example, it is still clear that the nation-state remains the most durable and strongly organized institutional structure in the world (Cerny 1990, 1999b; Jessop 2002). Little can be achieved politically without the nation-state. But in many ways, the state itself can do less (Strange 1996) – or at least the state is increasingly led to do things differently. Its role is being transformed as different demands are made and different outcomes are seen to be relevant. For example, in the making of economic policy, treasuries are more limited by what they can do in an era of tax cuts, while central banks, with their relative independence from “political” control and their close links to international financial markets, are increasingly the source of the most important decisions not only for the national economy but also for the global economy. The shift of the core of policymaking and policy outputs from redistribution to regulation, noted earlier, has, paradoxically, meant the construction and imposition of increasingly restrictive and hierarchical regulatory regimes (Moran 2003). The “agencification” of national, subnational/regional, and local governance has created new spaces for special interests to inhabit and capture. But control of the state no longer means the control of policy outcomes, as the multiplication of levels of governance leads not so much to a more effective division of labor among decisionmakers and decision-implementers as to a multiplication of sites of conflict, competition, and coalition-building. This kind of institutional schizophrenia makes it more difficult for groups to act strategically, as they must be continually rethinking and reorganizing their strategies and tactics – not to mention their internal organizations and external alliances. Nevertheless, this involves a learning curve, and the literatures on global civil society and global governance essentially focus on that learning curve, even if mainly from an institutional-determinist perspective rather than from an actor-oriented one. The development of multi-nodal politics is both an existing reality and a pluralist project in the making. VIII. The Mutual Constitution of Globalization and Pluralization Pluralism is plastic. The number, character, and configuration of groups changes shape and modus operandi depending upon the configuration of rewards and penalties, constraints and opportunities characterizing the predominant playing field – institutions, processes, and practices – or what Crozier and Friedberg called the “structured field of action” of politics (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). At the same time, actors none the less have a certain both manifest and potential strategic as well as tactical autonomy in seeking to modify, tinker with or fundamentally alter that playing field. The changing constellation of actors in a globalizing world plus the increasing complexity of the structured field of action creates opportunities for reactively and/or proactively restructuring that playing field itself as particular problems and issues are confronted in practice, at all levels – micro, meso and macro. This process not only gives political entrepreneurs more scope for action but also creates openings and spaces within which institutional entrepreneurs are likely to attempt strategic restructuring. New patterns of influence and control are generated – not merely fractionalization, but also new hierarchies, control mechanisms and unequal power structures. In a globalizing world, some get more than others, while new patterns of rewards and penalties, etc., lead to attempts to innovate in patterns of coalition-building, competition and conflict. In the meantime, the state, along with all the other emerging levels of political interaction, decisionmaking, and implementation, remains, as in pluralist theory, less the reified source of policies and outcomes in and of itself, and more a terrain or site of conflict and coalition-building as competing groups, old and new, attempt to come to terms with the implications of politics in a transnationally interpenetrated world. Perhaps the most significant feature of pluralism as a paradigmatic concept is that it is not static. Unlike theories of politics based on domination or consensus for its own sake, it involves a great moving process. Of course, its ideal-type form is fragile, because it is never realized in practice and depends upon political practices and institutional rules of the game for its stabilization and continuity. At the same time, however, it is inherently dynamic and the very plurality of groups in a changing structural context gives it a critical fungibility in a world in flux. In this context, actors are the link that makes plurality pluralistic – or constrains it from being so. Just as Adam Smith argued that getting two or three businessmen together in the same room is likely to lead to a conspiracy against the public interest, it is of course only to be predicted that political actors are likely to engage in monopolistic behavior much, if not all, of the time. But pluralism is also normatively necessary for the pursuit of wider interests, for the pursuit of political stability, economic growth, and social development – what has been called “enlightened self-interest”. New coalition-building opportunities, the rethinking of the substance of interests by key actors, and attempts by political and institutional entrepreneurs to innovate and shape the emerging structured field of action give those actors a kind of potential strategic institution-building role analogous to that which characterized earlier periods of historical organizational change such as the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the consolidation of the nation-state and the international states system, and the spread of mass politics, bureaucracy and liberal democracy characteristic of structural trends, from the 15th to the 20th centuries. At the same time, opportunities for shaping change today are unprecedented because of the complexity of the institutional structure of a globalizing world added to the internationalization, transnationalization, and translocalization of networks and webs of governance and the uneven pluralization of the group universe itself. Globalization is both the source and the product of pluralization, and vice-versa; they are mutually constituted, and that is what gives both of them together a new dynamic potential for shaping change. Processes of change will not be smooth or self-regulating; there will be the development of new inequalities, conflicts and destabilizing events, interacting with old inequalities, conflicts and destabilizing events in a heady brew represented in its more extreme form by cross-border ethnic and religious conflicts and terrorism. Paradoxically and for this very reason, pluralism’s structural plasticity along with the skills of political and institutional entrepreneurs puts it at the heart of the action. Whether what emerges is a messy continuation of neo-medievalism (Cerny 2000c), or something more structurally integrated and culturally holistic, is in question. 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