ELEPHANTS IN THE SELEUCID AND
ROMAN ARMIES, 350-150 B.C.
Kathryn Murphy
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of BA (Honours) in Ancient History, The University of Auckland, 2017.
Dedication
To Anjalee and Burma who inspired me to combine
my passion for animals with ancient history.
Anjalee (left) and Burma (right) from Auckland Zoo.
Photo taken by Kathryn Murphy, 29/6/2017.
Contents
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. I
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
The Capabilities and Limitations of the Elephant in a Military Context............................. 4
The Trunk .................................................................................................................................... 4
The Tusks ..................................................................................................................................... 5
The Ears ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Limbs and Adaptability................................................................................................................ 6
Elephants used as a Threatening Device ...................................................................................... 7
Elephants used as a Weapon ...................................................................................................... 10
Elephants used in Sieges ............................................................................................................ 12
Elephants used as Beasts of Burden........................................................................................... 14
Elephants in the Seleucid Kingdom................................................................................... 16
The Seleucid Army .................................................................................................................... 16
Elephants and the Ideology of Hellenistic Kingship .................................................................. 19
Elephants and the Roman Army ........................................................................................ 25
Elephants and Rome in the 3rd century B.C. .............................................................................. 25
The Manipular Army ................................................................................................................. 28
The Practicalities of Elephants in the Roman Army .................................................................. 30
Ideology of Roman Warfare in the Republic ............................................................................. 32
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 34
Illustrations ........................................................................................................................ 37
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 43
Transcript of Interview with Andrew Coers, Elephant Keeper at Auckland Zoo ...................... 43
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 48
Acknowledgements
I would first like to thank my imperator Dr. Jeremy Armstrong for guiding me through this
dissertation. In every meeting you inspired me with new ideas and provided constructive
feedback that was greatly appreciated. We always found time for laughter, even if it was initiated
by terrible elephant puns. Thank you for your continuous assistance as I embark on future studies.
Thank you to the Honours cohort from the Ancient History and Classics Department for your
support during my research. A special thanks to Aaron, Robert, and Neda who were second
readers of this dissertation, and Tommy who was always by my side.
I would like to express my gratitude to Andrew Coers and the crew at Auckland Zoo for
providing me with invaluable opportunities to observe these beautiful animals.
Finally, thank you to my family and friends on the home front who have supported me over the
many years, especially to my mother Gina who offered unlimited hugs and tea. Finally, I would
like thank Julia who has been, and continues to be my rock on campus.
I
Introduction
The elephant was, and continues to be, used as a vehicle for political, military, and social
expression. Since ancient times it has featured in mythology, religion, militaries, royal courts,
and in social activities such as spectacles. Whilst the societies who had contact with elephants
varied significantly, the animal itself did not evolve. Rather, the reputation and meaning of the
elephant was shaped uniquely in accordance with these societies, as well as the period.
Accordingly, the elephant can be used to discuss cultural developments over different
civilisations and ages. The objective of this study is to explore the use of elephants in the Seleucid
and Roman armies between 350-150 B.C. The Hellenistic period was a time when militaries in
the Mediterranean were incredibly mobile, and with them came the movement and exchange of
knowledge. The phenomenon of war elephants travelled in this context. Modern studies on war
elephants have provided valuable insights into the tactical deployment of elephants on the
battlefield. Glover and Gowers, among others, have evaluated the animal’s practical contribution
to large-set battles, whilst Scullard and Trautmann offered a broad overview of their military
history throughout Asia Minor and the Mediterranean.1 However, what seems to be lacking in
the scholarship is a reception study on how elephants were conceptualised differently by the
various powers who used them for war. The Seleucid and Roman armies have been chosen for
comparison in this study because they demonstrate very different ways of perceiving and
exploiting elephants. Although both recognised the animal’s political and military value, the
usage of elephants in the Seleucid kingdom significantly outweighed that of the Romans. In order
to appreciate how and why the elephant was used, it is fundamental to understand what
characteristics of the animal made it suitable and attractive to the respective powers. In doing so,
we will gain a valuable insight into the cultural, political, military, and ideological constructions
of the Seleucid and Roman societies for which we otherwise lack information.2
Chapter 1 opens with an exploration of the elephant’s capabilities and limitations in a military
context. The aim here is to provide an overview of the animal’s anatomical and cognitive
characteristics, and consider why the elephant was useful (or problematic) on the battlefield. This
discussion is supported by observations from modern natural historians, such as Sikes, and other
sources concerned with elephants in conservation.3 It is reasonable to assert that the elephant’s
1
Glover (1950, 1948); Gowers (1947); Scullard (1974); Trautmann (2015).
Compare the minimal extent of available archaeological and textual evidence on the Seleucids and Romans from
the Hellenistic period to the extensive material from the late Republic and early Imperial periods.
3
Sikes (1971), Coers (2017): see Appendix for transcript of interview.
2
1
innate behaviour has remained largely unchanged from ancient times. Its physical features and
behaviour under stress can still be observed today, thus modern observations of the elephant are
applicable to this study. Following this is an exploration of the elephant’s practical and
psychological roles in military contexts. This covers its use as a threatening ‘device’, as a
weapon, their use in sieges, and as beasts of burden.4 Examples will be drawn from conflicts
outside the Seleucid and Roman context.5 Again, modern observations of elephant behaviour
will be used as a point of reference to discuss the plausibility of the elephant’s activity on the
ancient battlefield. This chapter serves to introduce the reader to the elephant’s nature, and its
diverse functionality in the military setting.
Chapter 2 explores the usage of elephants in the Seleucid kingdom. The primary focus will be
on how the elephant was used in the Seleucid army, and what associations it had with the
Seleucid kings. Particular attention is given to the scythed chariot which played a similar role on
the battlefield as that of the elephant. Both were deployed to intimidate opponents, and carried
similar symbolic overtones. The elephant’s role as a vehicle for interaction between the monarchs
and their subjects will also be explored. Here, I argue that the elephant can be seen working as a
representation of the king and his heterogeneous kingdom. These discussions will demonstrate
how and why the elephant came to represent the military, political, and economic power of the
Seleucid kingdom.
The final chapter analyses the elephant within the context of the Roman Republican army. Unlike
the Seleucids, the Romans chose not to use elephants as an instrument of war. However, they did
recognise their political and symbolic significance in the Roman triumph.6 This chapter will
explore the practical, economic, and ideological reasons for why the elephant was not suitable
in the Roman army. Although the Romans understood the value of elephants in a military
context, they were not compatible with their own army. Elephants were an elite commodity
which was traditionally associated with kings, and so they did not fit within the clan-based
ideology of the Roman Republican army. The manipular army as it was during the First and
Second Punic Wars (264-241 B.C., 218-201 B.C.) is given particular attention in this discussion.
Importantly, geography and the logistics of warfare also influenced the Roman’s reception of
elephants. The implication of this chapter is that we cannot generalise the use of elephants in the
Mediterranean between 350-150 B.C. These were complex animals that evoked different ideals
I apply the term ‘device’ to illustrate that the ancients used them as a tool to aid them in battle.
For example, elephants in the Carthaginian, Pyrrhic, Ptolemaic, Macedonian, and Mughal armies.
6
Elephants also served a symbolic and political significance in the Roman arena, particularly in venationes and
damnatio ad bestiae. However, this topic will not be discussed due to the restraints of the scope of this study.
4
5
2
in different armies. As such, the Seleucids and Romans used elephants in accordance with their
political, military, and ideological systems. The present study therefore demonstrates the value
of zoology in the study of ancient history. By using animals, here specifically elephants as a
focus, we gain a unique insight into how the ancients conceptualised their ideological systems.
This reception study on the elephant in a military context therefore offers valuable discussions
on the Seleucid and Roman societies.
3
The Capabilities and Limitations of the Elephant in a Military Context
The following chapter discusses the elephant’s anatomical and cognitive capabilities and
limitations, as well as its use in both ancient and modern armies.7 The intention here is to explain
why we can talk about the elephant within a military context.
The Trunk
Out of all the elephant’s features, the trunk appears to be most common in both ancient and
modern texts that discuss the animal’s military history. Aristotle described the trunk as a χε
(tool) used for all purposes.8 This includes tearing up trees, pushing heavy objects, eating, and
drinking.9 The elephant’s brain receives detailed messages on its surroundings from its trunk due
the numerous nerves at the tip (Fig. 1).10 Thus when damaged, the elephant loses its primary
sensory organ and will either starve or die as a result.11 In captivity, the strength of the trunk is
of particular use for its exploiters. In the expeditions of Elephant Bill, Williams’ Elephant
Company was invaluable for the extraction of teak timber.12 However, such tasks can lead to the
paralysis of the trunk. Torn muscles cause severe disability to the elephant and are often caused
by lifting excessive loads.13 Therefore, as a tool the trunk serves a variety of practical functions,
yet due to its dependence on this feature, it also serves as a burden when injured. The trunk can
also be used as a weapon.14 Aristotle believed the elephant’s trunk was comparable to the sting
of an insect’s tongue.15 It could be used as a dangerous implement against an opponent. Due to
the flexibility of the trunk, its end could roll-up and injure a victim with a strong downward
Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium and Historia Animalium are valuable to our understanding of the ancient
elephant’s innate behaviour. He partially drew upon the works of Ctesias from Cnidus who had first-hand
experience with elephants. Aristotle also had a keen zoological interest, and although his works are focused on the
Indian species, there are enough physical and cognitive similarities between the Elephas maximus (Indian
elephant) and the Loxedonta africana cyclotis (African forest elephant) to apply his notes to both species. Modern
observations of the elephant will be used to support Aristotle’s findings.
8
Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium 2.16; Historia Animalium 2.1. For discussions on the use of the trunk as a tool
see Poole (1996) 129.
9
Aristotle, Historia Animalium 2.1; Sikes (1971) 39. Using its trunk, the elephant can consume up to 9 medimni
of fodder at one meal (Aristotle H.A. 8.9). Scullard (1974, 20) argued these figures are too large, considering a
medimnus is believed to equal to c.104 lb (47 kg). The modern African species can consume 300-350 lb (136-159
kg) of vegetation a day, whilst the Indian species consumes at least half of this. Because Aristotle’s figures more
than double the modern equivalent, (9 medimni = 936 lb or 424 kg) it is more credible to use the modern
elephant’s diet as a model for the animal’s food consumption.
10
Sikes (1971) 39.
11
Ibid., 202-203.
12
Williams (1954) 208.
13
Sikes (1971) 202-203.
14
Ibid., 281. The primary offensive weapons of the elephant are its tusks, forelegs, trunk and forehead.
15
Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium 2.17: ἐ
οὖ ού ο οῖ ῴο ἡ ῲ α ο αύ
φύ ἐ
, ὥ πε
ἀ
φω ἔχου α ῳ υ ῆ ῳ ῲ ἐ εφ ω · α
ἐ ε ο π
ο εα ὁ υ
, α ού ο ἡ ῲ α
ἀ
ου ἐ
.
7
4
slap.16 Alternatively the elephant could use it to pick up victims and hurl them into the air.17
These qualities heightened its value on the battlefield.
The trunk also serves as an important means of communication.18 Muscular movements within
the trunk help the elephant to express itself, particularly when threatened.19 In a study carried out
at Uda Walawe National Park from January to December 2007, 3921 vocalisations were recorded
from a herd of Asian elephants.20 These calls were organised into 14 categories, the most
common being growls.21 Interestingly, all vocalisations were at some point associated with
aggression, fear, and distress. Long-roars were audible from great distances despite the
disturbance of environmental sounds and were often followed with an aggressive attack such as
biting or pushing.22 Trumpets were always associated with disturbance and were often followed
by squeaks which triggered the physical movement of curling up the trunk and slapping the
ground loudly.23 These results testify to the diversity of an elephant’s communicative
repertoire.24 More importantly, their association with fear and distress suggests that vocalisations
would have featured prominently in a military context where fear was easily generated. This is
particularly significant when considering the psychological effect on the elephant’s opponents.
The Tusks
The tusks are another important feature of the elephant. As with the trunk, an elephant primarily
uses its tusks as tools. They are used for uprooting trees, and in conflict they can be used to
damage light fortifications as well as strike an opponent.25 Elephants who are not born with tusks
are still effective in a fight, for any additional strength is transferred into the trunk alone. 26 An
elephant’s tusks are also vulnerable to injury. Fracture in a tusk often leads to infections which
cause aggressive behaviour if the nerves are significantly exposed.27 In these circumstances, the
effectiveness of the elephant in a military context can diminish.
16
Sikes (1971) 40.
Ibid., 40, 283.
18
Aristotle, Historia Animalium 4.9.
19
Sikes (1971) 113-114.
20
de Silval (2010) 831.
21
Ibid. For a summary of these categories see Table 1. p.832.
22
Ibid., 842.
23
Ibid., 844.
24
For further discussions on the elephant’s auditory capabilities, see Spinage (1994).
25
Aristotle Historia Animalium 9.1; Strabo, 6.43. Strabo was using Onesicritus as his source, who likely
witnessed this aggressive behaviour during Alexander’s Indian campaigns.
26
Williams (1954) 50; The tusk-less Asian elephant in Thai tradition (si-dor) was considered to be stronger than a
one-tusked elephant (ekathant). Ringis (1996) 41-42.
27
Sikes (1971) 82, 209.
17
5
The Ears
An elephant has an acute awareness of its surroundings due to the sensitivity of its ears. Elephants
respond to a repertoire of sounds which makes them incredibly “amenable to training”.28 For
example, in South East Asia the technique of repeatedly banging timber logs with sticks is used
to control their elephant work force.29 Ringis believed that repetitive drumming alarms an
elephant.30 If we consider the context of a battlefield, it would be essential for armies to condition
their elephants to such noises. In appearance, the African species have distinctly larger ears
compared with the Asian species. When displayed at a right angle, the elephant’s size is enlarged,
which serves to intimate and frighten an intruder.31 Another function of the ears is to regulate the
heat of an elephant.32 Injury to the ears is detrimental to the elephant’s heat-regulatory system,
as well as its ability to determine surrounding sounds and scare intruders.
Limbs and Adaptability
The elephant is adaptable to a range of conditions. The structure of an elephant’s foot illustrates
their adaptive capabilities. The bones of their feet are embedded in a shock-absorbing cushion.33
When compressed, the cushion expands which enables the foot to adjust to a variety of surfaces.34
Moving across rough terrain is thus manageable, even for an animal of its size. Inevitably
elephants have been, and continue to be, used as both an effective mode of transport and as beasts
of burden, particularly throughout Asian history.35 For example, elephants were used to clear
debris and bodies in western Thailand after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.36 Here, they proved
their ability to work in challenging conditions that were too difficult for humans and vehicles to
operate in. However, there are limitations to their movement. An elephant cannot jump, due to
the muscular arrangements of their limbs.37 Dislocation or fracture of the limbs would
consequently debilitate the animal.38 A war elephant with injured limbs would be made
redundant.
28
Ringis (1996) 12.
Ibid., 40.
30
Ibid.
31
Sikes (1971) 42.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid., 32.
34
Ibid.
35
See Hallet’s observations of Asian elephants (1980, 25-26).
36
Shell (2015) 66-67.
37
Coers (2017).
38
Sikes (1971) 207.
29
6
Elephants used as a Threatening Device
The psychological effect of elephants on a battlefield is difficult to measure when many of our
ancient narratives are based on hearsay rather than eye-witness accounts. Nevertheless, there is
a pattern in that almost all seem to stress the elephant’s sight, sound and smell.39 The following
discussion explores the use of elephants as threatening devices against both men and cavalry.
A common tactic used by many ancient armies was to align the elephants in the front row of their
main troops. Ctesias reported that in battle, an Indian king organized 100,000 war elephants in
the frontline, with a further 3000 of the strongest beasts at the rear. 40 Those at the rear were
trained to tear down the enemies’ walls, whilst those in the front were strategically positioned to
terrify the opponent. Although these figures are clearly exaggerated, it is interesting that the
larger elephant force formed the vanguard. The sight of these animals would have been
demoralising for the opponent, causing them to break up their formations.41 According to Lucian,
after the Macedonians’ victory against the Gauls in 275 B.C., Antiochus I claimed that the battle
was won by the formidable appearance of their war elephants at the front of their army. 42 This
suggests that, as ‘showpieces’ elephants could shape the outcome of a battle significantly without
even participating in the physical combat.
The tactic of placing elephants in the front row also had the effect of making an army appear
stronger and superior. At the Battle of Hydaspes in 326 B.C., Porus organized his war elephants
at the front of the bank in full view of Alexander’s army.43 According to Diodorus and Curtius,
the effect of this tactic was that it visually enhanced the strength of the army which looked like
a city wall or towers.44 According to Plutarch, Porus was Πῲ ο ὑπε α ο α ε
ω (‘four
cubits and a span high’) which matched the grandeur of the elephant he was riding.45 Curtius
believed that the height of Porus’ elephant elevated the general’s appearance above all men.46
The elephants’ appearance was therefore central to their role as deterrents to prevent Alexander’s
army from crossing the river. Moreover, should the elephants have needed to cross the river,
In regards to the elephant’s sight, it is important to remember that elephants differed in size. The Forest African
elephant (used by the Carthaginians and Ptolemies) was smaller compared with the Asian elephant (used by the
Seleucids). We see this differentiation in Polybius’ narrative of the Battle at Raphia (3.84-85). For further
discussion on this see Charles (2007).
40
Aelian, On Animals, 17.29.
41
Eady (1926) 84. For example, see Pausanias 1.12.
42
Lucian, Zeuxis 10-11.
43
Diodorus, 17.87; Curtius, History of Alexander, 8.13; Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, 5.15.
44
Ibid. Although Porus’ elephants did not fight with turrets, when used, turrets also enhanced the animal’s height.
45
Plutarch, Alexander, 60. This is equivalent to six feet and three inches.
46
Curtius, History of Alexander, 8.14.
39
7
their anatomical capabilities would not have failed them. An elephant’s skull has air-filled
sinuses which helps to keep it balance whilst it is moving in water.47 This is useful for Asian
elephants such as Porus’, whose natural habitat is semi-aquatic. The modern use of Asian
elephants for transportation in difficult conditions illustrates their physical capabilities in water.
During monsoon seasons in Thailand, elephants are often the only method of transportation for
crossing to flooded islands.48 Their size enables them to move through deep water unlike other
pack animals such as horses and mules, and their sensory intelligence helps them to calculate
difficult obstacles.49 Positioned in the front row, Porus’ elephants could serve practical as well
as psychological functions. Therefore, they added a new dimension of danger to the battlefield.
Elephants were also used to terrify cavalry. This was most commonly achieved by aligning the
elephants in front of the army’s wings which faced the opponent’s cavalry. Unless specifically
trained, the sight, sound, and smell of elephants undoubtedly troubled the horses.50 Moreover,
an elephant has the physical capabilities to throw a horse.51 At the Battle of Hydaspes, Arrian
tells us that Alexander had to formulate a stratagem that would counteract the collision of Porus’
elephants with his cavalry, who were untrained in elephant-combat.52 Accordingly, Alexander
ordered his general Craterus to withhold from crossing the river with his cavalry until Porus’
elephants were moved to another part of the bank. Although Alexander’s cavalry were
inexperienced in elephant combat, this does not mean that horses in general were untrainable for
such encounters. Auckland Zoo’s Elephant Keeper Andrew Coers argued that both animals can
learn to confront one another.53 Anti-elephant weapons could also be used to neutralise the
elephant’s threat against cavalry. For example, at the Battle of Gaza (312 B.C.) Ptolemy and
Seleucus effectively turned Demetrius’ elephants against his own cavalry. According to
Diodorus, Demetrius positioned 30 of his elephants at the forefront of his left wing.54 It appears
that these animals served a double role: to shield the cavalry behind them, and to threaten the
enemy cavalry ahead.55 Ptolemy and Seleucus shielded their cavalry with men equipped with
‘spiked-devices’ which were successful in preventing the elephants from reaching their
47
Sikes (1971) 54.
Shell (2015) 65.
49
Ibid., 66.
50
Eady (1926) 84.
51
Coers (2017).
52
Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, 5.10.
53
Coers (2017). As evidenced by Pyrrhus and Hannibal who both effectively deployed units of elephants and
cavalry simultaneously.
54
Diodorus, 19.82.
55
Hannibal’s elephants in the Battle at the Trebia also took on this double role. See Gowers (1947) 45.
48
8
cavalry.56 Moreover, when the elephants were harmed, they turned on their own cavalry which
caused fear and panic amongst the horses.57 The result of this battle shows that the organisation
of elephants on the wings also posed problems for their own army. The use of elephants as a
threatening device against cavalry could thus influence a varied result.
Elephants also served as threatening devices at the rear of an army. This was particularly
effective against opponents who were not accustomed to the sight or sound of these animals. For
example, in 153 B.C. Fulvius Noblior positioned his unit of 10 elephants (sent by Masinissa) at
the rear of the army where they were hidden.58 As the Roman army approached the Celtiberians,
Noblior divided the army so as to expose the elephants to the enemy who had never encountered
these animals on the battlefield. This effectively caused the soldiers and cavalry to flee. An
important factor to consider in this scenario is the element of noise. This tactic required the
elephants to remain stationary at the rear of the army, regardless of the chaos that was unfolding
ahead. Given the variety of noises that arose from a battlefield, it is difficult to imagine that an
animal could hold back from disrupting the army’s formations. The plausibility of this can be
understood by appreciating the elephant’s ability to learn to become desensitised to loud noises
that would normally disturb them. The Surin Elephant Round-up festival in Thailand is a useful
parallel. This festival is as much an auditory spectacle as it is visual. It features choirs, musical
instruments, and cannons, which are all tolerated by the performing elephants. Their uniformity
in this parade is particularly impressive, given their varying regional backgrounds and therefore
unfamiliarity with each other (Fig 2).59 Such discipline suggests that trained elephants would be
able to stand their ground if they were positioned at the rear of an army, despite distractions
further ahead.60 However, not every elephant could reach this level of training. It is likely they
would be discarded for military use if these skills were not obtained.61 Unfortunately, the ancient
narratives tend not to focus on the individual animals. Because of this, we should consider that
some elephants were not capable of working as threatening devices at the rear of an army.
56
Diodorus, 19.83.
Ibid.
58
Appian Spanish Wars 46.
59
Ringis (1996) 28.
60
Coers (2017).
61
Ibid.
57
9
Elephants used as a Weapon
The elephant’s trunk, tusks, and limbs all played important roles in the execution of warfare. In
close combat, the elephant was a “serious fighting weapon”.62 The trunk acted as a hand to throw
opponents, their tusks could be used like swords for piercing armour, and their limbs could
powerfully kick in all directions or simply crush a victim with a single push. Elephants on musth
were particularly dangerous due to their unpredictable and raging behaviour as well as their
inability to differentiate between friend and foe.63 In Sanskrit literature, musth was often
perceived as a desirable state for war elephants because it made them more aggressive and was
a sign of the animal’s vigour.64 However, these perceptions are idealised as they do not consider
the inconvenience and difficulty of controlling these animals.65 Injured elephants were more
liable to display aggression, and given the nature of a battlefield, we can assume such was the
case for many who fought in close combat. Our ancient sources provide vivid descriptions of
how soldiers became victims of elephant attacks. Passage 84 from Caesar’s account on the Battle
of Thapsus (46 B.C.) illustrates a graphic observation from a soldier who witnessed the execution
of an unarmed camp follower (sutler). Accordingly, the elephant used its weight to crush the
sutler, and proceeded to throw the soldier into the air with its trunk.66
It is important to understand that this behaviour of a bull elephant is a reflection of its natural
instincts rather than a reflection of its training. Modern parallels of elephant attacks suggest a
continuity in the way elephants use their trunk, tusks, and limbs to harm an opponent. During
July 2007 to August 2010, a study of 14 elephant attacks was conducted by the department of
Forensic Medicine, B.S. Medical College in Bankura.67 The autopsies revealed that trampling
injuries were identified in all subjects, in the form of bruises, abrasions, and punctured
lacerations.68 Only one of these cases died from tusk injuries.69 This suggests that the trunk and
limbs were the elephants’ most effective weapon. The study concluded that tusks are less
effective against humans than they are against large animals due the elephant’s difficulty in
puncturing the organs of small creatures.70 It is possible that ancient writers who recorded tusk
62
Tarn (1930) 92.
Musth is a state of aggression experienced by a bull elephant generally once a year, and is often attributed to the
temporal gland. During this state, the temporal gland secrets fluid which is increased during times of danger when
the elephant is experiencing fear or stress. Sikes (1971) 33-37.
64
Ramayana. 1.6.19-22. Selby (2003) 154.
65
Trautmann (2015) 62; Gommans (2002) 123.
66
Caesar, African Wars, 84.
67
Das and Chattopadhyay (2011) 154.
68
Ibid., 155.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., 156.
63
10
injuries may have felt the need to exaggerate the danger of the elephant as part of their narrative
agenda. Adrenalin is another factor that contributes to the elephant’s behaviour in both ancient
and modern attacks. When elephants reach a high state of adrenalin, they naturally go into “fight
mode”.71 Because this is the natural instinct of an elephant, we can assume that such descriptions
of ancient elephant attacks are, to an extent, credible.
Elephants carrying archers on their backs were seen as a double weapon. The height of the
elephant naturally provided archers with height from the enemy. Because of this, they could
cover a wider ground while protecting their beast.72 Riding an elephant is reasonably stable, and
so we can assume that the archers had little difficulty in loosening an arrow, regardless of
whether the elephants were stationary or moving.73 Kistler believed that Hannibal’s elephants
functioned as “missile platforms”74 to combat the Roman infantry at Trebia (218 B.C.).
According to Aelian and Strabo, elephants commonly held four passengers: 1 mahout to control
the beast, and 3 bowmen to cover all directions.75 In Mughal warfare, the elevation of troops was
a reflection of superiority and prestige, hence we find the generals taking this position on the
elephant.76 This was particularly common in the 16th century under the rule of Akbar.77 These
war elephants carried a hauda (platform) which functioned in a similar manner as the ancients’
turrets.78 The generals under Akbar were primarily elevated for the purpose of being visible to
their own troops.79 This is because battles were often lost due to the disappearance of an army’s
commander.80 Similarly in Thai warfare, the elephant was essential for communication. The
signaller was positioned on a hauda above the mahout.81 As shown in Figure 3, the signaller held
peacock feathers in both hands which he used to give commands to other mahouts on the
battlefield. These examples demonstrate the value of an elephant’s height in the context of
warfare. The elephant’s back was a strategic position for both archers and generals who relied
on its height to oversee the battle.
71
Coers (2017).
Kistler (2006) 120.
73
Coers (2017).
74
Kistler (2006) 121.
75
Aelian, 12.9; Strabo, 15, I.52. Similar arrangements are found in Thai warfare. Ringis (1996) 65-66.
76
Gommans (2002) 123.
77
Ibid., 124.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ringis (1996) 66.
72
11
Elephants used in Sieges
Elephants were also used to assist sieges. During these operations, elephants provided valuable
physical aid. Their trunk, tusks, and limbs were desirable tools for combating fortifications.
Elephants could damage light fortifications with their weight, as shown in Perdiccas’ failed siege
at Ptolemy’s camp where elephants were used to tear down palisades and parapets. 82 The trunk
was particularly useful for grabbing opponents from fortified walls. This is illustrated in a
Mahosadha Jataka mural of a besieged city from Wat Nayrong (Fig. 4). Recordings of elephant
attacks in modern villages can be used to understand the impact of elephants on siege victims.
In 2012 a tusker (bull elephant) rampaged through 6 villages in the Achanakmar Tiger Reserve
located in Chhattisgarh, India, causing destruction to crops and at least 12 mud houses.83 A
similar disaster was recorded in 2015 from the Randah village where a herd of 20 elephants
destroyed 8 houses, leaving 4 of their livestock dead.84 In the context of ancient warfare, the act
of an elephant destroying fortifications, livestock, and crops could have serious ramifications for
an army. The destruction of livestock would be particularly devastating in the case of campsites
where baggage animals and food supplies were essential for the army’s existence.
Ancient armies discovered ways to neutralise the elephant’s threat and thus prevent them from
reaching the army’s supplies. Interestingly, our sources seem to record more failed attempts of
sieges where elephants were in fact the root of the army’s downfall, than successful attempts.
The elephant’s sensitivity to sudden noises, and their reliance on the mahout for control, meant
they were naturally vulnerable in military operations such as sieges.85 Moreover, its trunk and
limbs could be rendered useless once wounded. Armies became familiar with these
vulnerabilities and found ways to disable their natural weapons, thus forcing the beasts upon
their own troops.86 An example of this is Polyperchon’s siege at Megalopolis. Diodorus recorded
the use of ‘spike-studded frames’ (tribulus) disguised in the ground to paralyse the elephants’
feet.87 This stopped the animals from advancing, and instead forced them to turn on their own
troops.88 Vegetius described the tribulus as an offensive weapon used against both chariots and
82
Diodorus 18.34.
Bagchi (2012).
84
Binay (2015).
85
Scullard (1974) 249.
86
Livy (27.14) describes the elephant as a genus anceps (double-edged sword) because of its tendency to harm its
own troops as well as the enemy.
87
Diodorus 18.71.
88
Ibid.
83
12
elephants.89 In Thailand’s history of elephant warfare, “spiked ball projectiles”90 served a similar
function to the ancient tribulus and the modern caltrop. Coers believed that a tribulus would need
to be at least a couple of inches per spike in order to inflict significant harm on an elephant.91
This is because an elephant’s pain threshold is relatively high.92 Thus, in a state of high
adrenaline, an elephant would be able to withstand the force of this weapon. However, other
factors need to be considered including the durability of the trubuli, their number on the
battlefield, and the strength of the individual elephant’s soles. Assuming that the spikes and soles
of the elephant were strong, Coers argued that the multiplicity of these weapons on the battle
grounds would be the determining factor for whether the elephants fought or fled.93 An important
characteristic of the tribulus is that it was an unbiased weapon, meaning it could harm both
armies. Therefore, in order to avoid the same fate as their opponents, armies deploying tribuli
had to ensure their devices were carefully mapped out.94 Arguably, these devices were more
effective for an army in a defensive position.
Another method used to combat elephants in siege attacks was to dig a trench. An example of
this is found in Plutarch’s account of Pyrrhus’ siege at Sparta. According to Phylarchus, the
Lacedaemonians prevented this attack by digging an 800ft. trench, measuring at 4 cubits deep,
and 6 cubits wide around the perimeter of the city.95 Due to the physiological limitations of the
elephant’s limbs, Pyrrhus’ animals were not able to cross the trench.96 The modern parallel of
using dry moats in zoos to keep elephants contained within their enclosure provides a useful
parallel. The regulation of Auckland Zoo’s front moat is 1.7 metres.97 Phylarchus’ estimation of
4 cubits equals to 1.83 metres, thus supporting the claim that Pyrrhus’ elephants were not able
to cross the trench. However, whilst elephants are not able to jump, they are good climbers.98
This is important because it means that any leverage in the trench would enable the elephants to
cross. Maintaining the trench, and thereby eliminating the potential for elephants to climb, would
lessen the elephants’ chance of attacking a fortification. This shows that the effectiveness of an
89
Vegetius, De Re Militari, 3.24. Tribulus autem est ex quottuor palis confixum propugnaculum, quod,
quoquomodo abieceris, tribus radiis stat et erecto quarto infestum est.
90
Ringis (1996) 66.
91
Coers (2017); Sikes (1971, 207) encountered a bull elephant with 56 large thorns embedded in the soles of his
left forefoot.
92
Coers (2017).
93
Ibid.
94
When Darius used the tribulus at the Battle of Gaugamela, he marked out each of their position on the
battlefield, so as to prevent his army from stepping on them. Curtius, History of Alexander 4.13.36.
95
Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 27.
96
Ibid., 28.
97
Coers (2017).
98
Ibid.
13
elephant in siege attacks should be measured by the capabilities of the animal as well as its
opponents.
Elephants used as Beasts of Burden
Elephants also play an important role in the logistics of warfare.99 They are particularly useful
for building structures, hauling heavy loads and providing generals with invaluable transport. 100
During the Japanese advancement into Burma in 1939, elephants played a crucial part in
evacuating women and children from the Upper Chindwin into Manipur.101 The Kalewa-Tamu
road in the Kabaw Valley was a strategic route that gave access into Burma.102 Elephants were
employed to build roads in this valley and drag timber to bridges under construction.103 The logs
used in these operations were sometimes 29 feet long weighing at 4 tons.104 In 1944, 240 log
bridges were built in the Kabaw Valley and 500 assault boats were constructed at Kalewa using
the assistance of elephants.105 The trunk, tusks, forehead, and forefeet of the elephants aided
them in these activities (Fig. 5). This use of the elephant is also found in the hybrid military of
the East Indian Company between 1750 and 1849.106 During the First Burma War, elephants
from the Bengal army were each able to carry the baggage of a whole platoon.107 Similarly, the
British in the EIC used their elephants for transportation and were expected to pull siege trains.108
Kaushik argued that it was the hybrid nature of the EIC, which blended Indian and western
European military techniques, that ultimately led to its success.109 The strategic use of elephants
in the EIC undoubtedly played a crucial role in the logistics of warfare.
Lastly, elephants can be used for movement. In the Mughal Empire, mobility was considered an
important political activity for the mansabdars and emperors.110 A text recording Aurangzebs’
advice to Mughal kings informs us that an emperor must always be moving because kingdoms
decline when the control of power is lost due to ease or retirement. 111 Gommons argued that
beasts of burden including elephants, horses, and oxen were “at the root of Mughal power”
Van Creveld (1977, 1) defined logistics as “the art of moving armies and keeping them supplied”. Regarding
elephants, we can add the activity of building structures for military operations.
100
See the foreword from Field-Marshal Sir William Slim in Williams (1954).
101
Williams (1954) 191.
102
Ibid., 194.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid., 294-295.
106
Kaushik (2011) 217.
107
Cole and Priestly (1937) 419.
108
Kaushik (2011) 210.
109
Ibid., 195, 217.
110
Gommans (2002) 99.
111
Ibid., 3.
99
14
because they enabled emperors to maintain political fitness through movement.112 Movement
thus exposed the rulers to inhabitants both familiar and alien to the ruler and functioned as a
means to administer his territory.113 We can see parallels in the expeditions of Alexander the
Great. Although we do not hear about elephants being used in combat, Plutarch’s Alexander does
allude to an elephant corps that travelled with him through India. These were most likely used to
impress his opposition, just as Porus’ elephants did at the Battle of Hydaspes. As beasts of
burden, they would have also helped with the logistics of his travels. Therefore, even in peaceful
circumstances, the strength and appearance of elephants can be used to the advantage of their
exploiters.
112
113
Gommans (2002) 100.
Ibid., 101.
15
Elephants in the Seleucid Kingdom
In wake of the Wars of the Diadochi, the Seleucids began to deploy elephants as instruments of
war and as symbols of their kingdom. The following chapter explores the military role of
elephants in the Seleucid army, and their association with Hellenistic kingship. Here, the
elephant’s psychological and practical value on the battlefield will be discussed with reference
to the scythed chariot, as well as the elephant’s symbolic value within the ideological system of
kingship.
The Seleucid Army
The standard unit of elephants in the Seleucid army was known as an elephantarchia.114 It
comprised 16 animals, which could then be divided into squadrons of eight (ile), and groups of
four (epitherarchia).115 Amongst the individual elephants it was common to deploy an ‘elephantguard’ made up of infantrymen whose duty was to protect the animal during close combat (Fig.
6).116
In Antiochus V’s incursions at Beth-Zacharia (162 B.C.), we are informed by I
Maccabaeus that each of his elephants were assigned 1000 infantry and 500 cavalry, and that
these support troops were stationed with the elephants at all times.117 In more realistic accounts,
elephants are recorded to have a unit (stiphos) of 40-50 men per animal.118 The deployment of
elephants was not restricted to one sector of the battlefield. As shown in Figure 7, elephants
could be placed in between light infantry (C), on the flanks (D), between the phalanx and lightinfantry (E), and behind the phalanx as a reserve force (F).119 These arrangements were largely
influenced by the terrain, deployment of the enemy’s troops, and the leadership of the Seleucid
king. Most often, we find the elephants aligned at the front of the army, either leading the light
infantry or cavalry. In this arrangement, they were particularly useful for charging through the
opposing infantry, thereby causing the enemy’s formation to break up. 120 Interestingly, the
Seleucid’s scythed-chariots operated in a similar manner as the elephants. Their service in the
114
Sekunda (1994) 28.
Ibid., 27-28. For example, in Antiochus I’s victory over the Galatians, he organised his elephants into one ile,
and two epitherarchia, (Lucian, Zeuxis 9).
116
Ibid., 28. Bar-Kochva (1989, 17-18) believed the presence of an elephant guard would have reduced the
elephant’s speed on the battlefield due to the necessity of keeping the stiphos together.
117
I Maccabaeus, 6.36-7.
118
50 at Gaza (Diodorus, 19.82.3), 50 at Ipsus (Diodorus 19.100.5-7; Plutarch, Demetrius 7.2.), 40 Cretan archers
and neo-Cretans would have supported the right wing at Raphia (Polybius 79.10, 82.8-10), and an undefined
number filled the spaces between the elephants at Panion (Polybius 16.18.7) and Magnesia (Livy, 37.40.3-4, 6,
14). Bar-Kochva (1976) 82.
119
Bar-Kochva (1989) 18-21.
120
Ibid., 17.
115
16
military is recorded at the Battle of Ipsus under Seleucus I, in the skirmishes at Cilicia, and later
at Magnesia.121 Although not specified, the 140 chariots at the Daphne parade in 166 B.C. likely
involved some scythed-chariots, which included a rider and four horses (quadrigai) with scythes
attached to the chariot’s wheels (Fig. 8).122 Like the elephant, scythed-chariots were useful against
opponents unfamiliar with this style of warfare, and so their position on the battlefield was at the
front; either leading the cavalry (Fig. 7G), or light infantry (Fig. 7H).123 Similarly, they were used
to disperse light-infantry and skirmishes (promakhoi), which broke up the enemies formations and
exposed the centre.124 The scythed-chariot was thus particularly effective against armies who
deployed large bodies of light-infantry on the battlefield. As with the elephant’s ability to trample,
the combined force of horses and chariot caused considerable damage to troops, who faced the
additional threat of the scythes. At the front of the army, elephants and scythed-chariots also
served a shock-value. Seleucid elephants were often equipped with towers and armour, including
crested frontalia (head-pieces), and royal tapestry.125 Scythed-chariots were visually impressive
on the battlefield; they were often coated in colourful armour, although descriptions of their
design are generally taken from their appearance in ceremonial parades.126 Spectacle was
evidently a key element in the Seleucid army, and both units served as tangible expressions of
the king’s wealth.127 At the front of the army, both the elephant and scythed-chariot thus fulfilled
the psychological role of inspiring terror and awe on the battlefield, as well as being practically
useful as anti-light-infantry weapons.
The Seleucids’ elephants and scythed-chariots also shared similar limitations on the battlefield.
Challenging terrain hindered the mobility of both units. Although elephants are adaptable to
rough terrain, their ability to reach significant speed is restricted to flat land. Scythed-chariots were
considerably less adaptable. On flat land they could gain reasonable momentum; however, the act
of controlling the chariot was exceedingly difficult.128 Moreover, their threat could be easily
neutralised. Either unit could be avoided by organising one’s troops in a flexible formation so as
121
Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3 (Ipsus), 48.2 (Cilicia), Livy, 37.41.6-42 (Magnesia).
Polybius 30.25.11; Diodorus, 17.53; Sekunda (1994, 26).
123
Sekunda (1994) 26; Bar-Kochva (1989) 19.
124
For an example, see Pharnabazus’ use of scythed-chariots against the Spartan king Agesilaus in 395 B.C.
(Xenophon, Hellenica, 5.1.17-19).
125
Livy 37.40.4; Polybius, 5.84.2; I Maccabaeus, 6.37, 43.
126
Given their impracticability on the battlefield, Glover (1950, 7-8) suggested that their main function may have
been to add colour and spectacle to the kings’ ceremonies. Cataphracts were also adorned with royal tapestry,
including purple and gold surcoats (Polybius 30.25.11).
127
For example, see Plutarch’s description of Mithridates’ army against Sulla, (Sulla, 16.2-6)
128
Glover (1950) 6. Manoeuvring turns would have been the hardest challenge for the driver. Bar-Kochva (1976,
83-84) placed little value on I Maccabaeus’ reference to scythed-chariots being used in Antiochus IV’s Egyptian
expedition because the sandy terrain would have been unsuitable for chariots. (I Maccabaeus 1.17).
122
17
to allow the units to charge through without making contact. For example, at the Battle of
Gaugamela in 331 B.C., Alexander’s troops created gaps in between the ranks and extend the wings
in order to avoid contact with Darius’ scythed-chariots.129 When the chariots did pass through,
Alexander’s phalangites frightened the horses, thus undermining their threat. A similar tactic was
used by Scipio Africanus at the Battle of Zama in 202 B.C.130 Accordingly, Scipio organised his
infantry into ten maniples aligned in three rows.131 Intervals were formed between the maniples
which served as lanes for Hannibal’s 80 elephants to charge through. Consequently, the elephants
shared the same fate as Darius’ scythed-chariots. Additionally, an elephant or chariot attack could
be blocked by targeting weak points of the elephant, horse, and rider. For both animals, this
included their eyes and belly, whilst the rider’s eyes and thighs were prime targets.132 If the rider
was injured, the chariot was rendered useless on the battlefield, and the elephant was prone to cause
chaos amongst its own troops in the absence of its mahout. The tribulus was an effective device
used to combat both units.133 As noted in Chapter 1, Polypercon’s deployment of elephants in the
siege of Megalopolis was ineffective due to the presence of tribuli which paralysed the animals.134
When the Romans used it against the Seleucids at Magnesia, the scythed-chariots were defeated
and later demobilised. The Battle of Magnesia was a defining moment where both elephants and
scythed-chariots proved to be of little use to the Seleucid army due to the Romans’ deployment of
anti-elephant devices and tactics. By 190 B.C., the Romans had learned how to neutralise their
threat, and recognised them as an unpredictable weapon that could harm its own force if they were
driven into close combat. The damage they caused at this battle led to the discharge of scythedchariots from the Seleucid ranks, and a treaty was signed to forbid elephants from future Seleucid
warfare.135
This comparison of the elephant and scythed-chariot demonstrates the Seleucid army was capable
of deploying large, heavy contingents that required significant expenditures and that came with
many risks. The logistics of transporting these units to and from the battlefield would have shaped
the way the Seleucids waged war. Given the amount of spare armour and equipment needed, it is
129
Quintus Curtius, 4.15.
Livy 28.40.
131
Hastati, principes, and triarii.
132
Glover (1950) 2. For examples see Vegetius, De Re Militari 3.23.
133
Vegetius (De Re Militari, 3.24) described the tribulus as a weapon of resistance used against both elephants
and scythed-chariots. The fact that Vegetius has categorised them together further supports their likeness to each
other.
134
Diodorus 18.71.
135
Bar-Kochva (1976) 83. The ‘Treaty of Apamea’ is discussed in Polybius 21.42.12. Elephants continued to
make an appearance under Antiochus IV’s reign which suggests the Treaty did not hinder trade relations between
the Seleucids and their suppliers.
130
18
likely that they had their own transport column, which could have congested the roads during their
expeditions.136 Feeding the animals was also included in the administration of the army.137
Elephants and horses were required fodder en route, and the task of collecting these supplies was
likely assigned to the elephant’s stiphos and the chariot’s rider.138 However, it is important to
remember that the surviving sources only appear to illustrate large-set battles. It is possible that
both units were more efficient in smaller tactical settings where their opponents were primarily
light-infantry. In this regard, elephants and scythed chariots were more suited to local warfare in
the Seleucid kingdom. In sum, it is clear that the Seleucids were adaptable to, and familiar with
fighting alongside unpredictable and demanding units in its diverse army. The elephant’s presence
in this military context can thus be seen in light of the army’s heterogeneous nature.
Elephants and the Ideology of Hellenistic Kingship
Out of the three competing kingdoms, the Seleucids controlled the most expansive territory. Until
188 B.C., their control stretched from Anatolia to the Iranian plateau.139 The Seleucid kingdom
included a diversity of cultures, many of whom were familiar with the elephant’s symbolic and
military value. Importantly, the nature of these territories, and the legitimacy of the king, was
founded on military conquests. Because the Hellenistic kingdoms sprung from Alexander’s
campaigns, land was not received by the founder (Seleucus I) through inheritance, but rather
depended on the military ambitions of the king and the ability of future monarchs to hold onto
land.140 Once these territories were conquered, the king had to ensure that his image as a ruler
could be understood by these many cultures, including the Greco-Macedonians who were the
ethnic majority of the royal court and army.141
The elephant provided a useful vehicle for communication between the king and both his GrecoMacedonian and eastern audience. One of the most important forms of media for this interaction
was coinage. Images of royal power depicted on coins often served to legitimise the king’s
imperial space.142 Bulls, lions, and the eagle, all held a prominent place in the “zoological
repertoire”143 of political emblems which rulers used to construct their identity. Given the
136
Glover (1950) 8.
For the dietary requirements of an elephant see Chapter 1, footnote 8.
138
Sekunda (1994) 28. For example, leading up to the Battle of Thermopylae in 191 B.C., Antiochus III placed his
elephants and their stiphos beside the sea which was a likely area for fodder and water supplies.
139
Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993), 53.
140
Kosmin (2014) 3-4. ‘Spear-won-territory’ was perceived as the most vital claim to royal power. Walbank
(2008) 66.
141
Ma (2003) 186.
142
Kosmin (2014) 5.
143
Troncoso (2013) 254-255.
137
19
diplomatic and military efforts of Seleucus I in Babylonia and Central Asia, it is unsurprising
that elephants appeared on Seleucid coinage.144 In this regard, they reflected the king’s dominion
over lands inhabited by elephants. Significantly, coinage circulated in military contexts. Coins
were the primary means of paying soldiers, and so their illustrations naturally reflected aspects
of their paymaster, the king.145 As the king relied on his army for legitimacy and power, these
images likely served to impress the soldiers in order to ensure their loyalty for the king, as well
as to reinforce his royal image.146 However, we cannot ignore the fact that the core of the Seleucid
army was of Greco-Macedonian decent, and therefore, may not have shared in the easterners’
‘familiarity’ of the elephant. The legacy of Alexander the Great can shed light on this
predicament. During his eastern conquests, Alexander allied with and fought against kings such
as Porus, whose elephant corps left a lasting impression on both Alexander and his Macedonian
army.147 Although our sources do not allude to the deployment of elephants in Alexander’s army,
coinage from his reign does suggest that the elephant was intended to be associated with his
military conquests. Its iconography took the form of a headdress that crowned the general,
echoing other animalistic headpieces such as the lion scalp and bull horns (Fig 9.).148 For
Alexander’s Greco-Macedonian army, this image could evoke ideas concerning superiority,
apotheosis or even universal hegemony.149 The elephant gradually became associated with
Dionysos’ eastern conquest, thus taking on a divine significance in both Greek and Indian
contexts.150 Therefore, by the time the Seleucid kings had adopted this iconography for their own
coinage, the elephant was already a familiar icon to the Greco-Macedonians who now served
under the Seleucids. However, because this kingdom was so culturally diverse, the elephant
necessarily took on a different symbolic meaning for the kingdom’s different subjects.151 For the
Greco-Macedonians the elephant may have continued to serve as recognition of Alexander’s
conquests, as well as the military victories of their Seleucid king. For example, after the Battle
of Ipsus, the elephant was presented for the first time under the Successors, standing alone with
horns (Fig. 10g & h), undoubtedly referencing the victory of Seleucus I.152 Troncoso argued that
this was a pivotal moment in the elephant’s history as an emblem of royal and military triumph,
144
Elephants already held an important standing in armies throughout Asia. See chapters 2-4 from Trautmann
(2015).
145
Smith (1988) 13.
146
Austin (1986) 459; Smith (1988) 14.
147
Battle of Hydaspes: Diodorus 17.87-9; Quintus Curtius 8.13-14; Arrian 5.8-18; Plutarch Alexander 60-62.
148
Smith (1988, 41) noted that both the elephant headdress and lion scalp were Hellenistic innovations.
149
Troncoso (2013) 258; Stewart (1993) 236.
150
This is illustrated at Ptolemy II P Philadelphus’s grand procession where Dionysus was presented riding on
elephant (Athenaeus 5.196a-203b).
151
Troncoso (2013) 259; Smith (1988) 41. Its ability to evoke multiple characteristics thus meant it was an easy
symbol to manipulate.
152
Troncoso (2013) 260.
20
and accordingly, numismatic imagery began to spread outside Apamea wherein the elephant
corps was kept.153 On the other hand, the indigenous subjects of the king could also interpret the
elephant’s iconography as a reflection of their military power. Although we can only speculate,
it is likely that these subjects responded positively to the elephant’s association with kingship.
This imagery would have been familiar for subjects whose land was inhabited by elephants,
whilst for others, it may have reminded them of their place within a geographically vast and
powerful kingdom. In this sense, the elephant was a useful iconographic tool that enabled the
Seleucid kings to unite their ethnically diverse subjects. Because their primary audience was the
army, coinage was elementary for communicating and promoting ideas of kingship and personal
royal identity. Importantly, we must remember that it was the army who experienced the physical
and psychological effects of the elephant on the battlefield. The elephant was thus exploited by
the Seleucid kings for political and military purposes whereby it became a familiar symbol of
hegemony.
Royal processions were another medium where elephants were used to legitimise the kings’
royal, military, and economic status, but to a wider audience beyond his army. Importantly, these
processions were not a strictly Seleucid phenomenon. The Ptolemaic kings, such as Ptolemy II
Philadelphus, commissioned royal parades that also featured elephants.154 The grandeur of these
events can be seen as evidence for a shift towards “big-manism”155 that developed in the late
Classical period, and peaked under the Hellenistic rulers.156 Self-validation increasingly became
important for kings who were in constant competition with one another.157 Parades thus provided
a space where individual monarchs could display their wealth and political power to a public
audience that not only consisted of his royal court, but also his foreign subjects.158 Because the
ideology of Seleucid kingship was synonymous with military power, the king’s army naturally
featured at the forefront of these processions. Fortunately, we have elaborate descriptions of
Antiochus IV’s parade at Daphne (166 B.C.) in the works of Polybius, Athenaeus, and
Diodorus.159 Here, the military participants came from all corners of the kingdom, marching in
their thousands for what would have been a visually impressive, and financially exhaustive
153
Troncoso (2013) 261.
Athenaeus 5.196a-203b.
155
Ma (2003) 181.
156
Public spectacles were an important activity for Macedonian kings. The Hellenistic kings continued this
tradition, but on a larger scale. Kuttner (1999) 110.
157
Athenaeus tells us that Ptolemy II’s parade was an attempt to out-do the triumph of the Roman general
Aemilius Paulus (Athenaeus 5.194c). Also see Walbank (1996) 119.
158
Erskine (2013) 37.
159
Polybius, 30.25.3-11; Athenaeus, 5.194c-196a; Diodorus 31.16. Polybius was a contemporary of this parade,
although his predicaments in Rome meant that his description was not an eye-witness account.
154
21
spectacle.160 This included 5000 soldiers dressed in Roman armour, 5000 Mysians, 3000
Cilicians, 3000 Thracians, 5000 Galatians, 20,000 Macedonians, 240 pairs of gladiators, and
various groups of cavalry. Concluding the military spectacle were two chariots: one drawn by
four elephants, another by two, followed by 36 elephants furnished with armour marching in a
single column.161 It is difficult to grasp the reaction of Antiochus IV’s spectators in response to
this display, given that the sources are silent on this topic.162 However, the diversity of the
military nevertheless reflected the king’s ability to unite his subjects in a spectacle which
celebrated and acknowledged their place within the Seleucid kingdom.163 Antiochus IV had
created a display that mixed familiar with foreign elements.164 Elephants could be considered as
both. As with coinage, the elephant’s presence in the parade would have reminded soldiers of
the animal’s military value. This included their strength and ability to psychologically disable
the enemy. For the rest of the participants and crowd unfamiliar with the elephant’s capabilities,
their appearance highlighted the king’s ability to mobilise his power across vast geographical
territory. A Babylonian astronomical diary from the period of the first Syrian war evokes this
idea as it describes the movement of 20 elephants from the satrap of Bactria to Babylonia.165 Ma
believed this text demonstrated the king’s ability to march tangible symbols of wealth and
military might across his kingdom.166 Being ‘seen’ demonstrating power was thus key to the
ideology of Hellenistic kingship.167
Regardless of the elephant’s visual impression, we cannot overlook the fact that elephants were
not a consistently effective weapon on the battlefield. As previously shown, their temperamental
nature meant they often caused more harm to their own side. Interestingly, it was not long before
Antiochus IV’s parade when the Seleucids’ elephants contributed to the fall of Antiochus III’s
army against the Romans at Magnesia. So why did the king display an animal whose history in
the Seleucid army was unsteady? To answer this, we can view the function of Hellenistic
processions in comparison with the Roman triumph. Since Polybius suggested that Antiochus IV
intended to match the magnificence of Aemilius Paulus’ triumph, scholars have been quick to
argue that Antiochus IV’s parade was an imitation of a Roman triumph.168 Erskine argued against
160
Green (1990) 432.
Polybius provides these figures, whilst Athenaeus’ account states an unspecified number pulling the carts.
162
Bell (2004) 117-118.
163
Diodorus 31.16.1.
164
Bell (2004) 144.
165
Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993) 46.
166
Ma (2003) 193.
167
Bell (2004) 144.
168
For example, Walbank (1957) 449.
161
22
this theory, and believed that while a victory was a prerequisite for a Roman triumph, for the
Hellenistic kings a victory was not needed.169 Indeed, Antiochus IV’s Daphne parade was
performed after his campaigns around Egypt, which were to an extent, unsuccessful. 170 The
function of the Hellenistic spectacle was not to commemorate a transitory battle, but rather
celebrate the holistic power of the king.171 In regards to elephants, what was essentially important
was their presence and what they represented, not their limitations on a single battlefield.
Elephants were therefore perfect participants in the king’s parade as they were a tangible
expression of his power.
Finally, the close association between the king’s power and elephants meant that in the context
of the battlefield, their defeat could be seen as a symbolic crushing of the king’s military
authority. This was detrimental to the king’s resources, and was a psychological blow to his
troops’ morale.172 A good example of this can be found in Hoover’s interpretation of the Battle
at Beth Zechariah in 162 B.C. This confrontation is recorded in I Maccabees 6.43-47 and
Josephus’ Bellum Judaicum 1.4-5.173 In both accounts, Eleazar Auaran, brother of Judas
Maccabaeus, is remembered for his tragic death when he was crushed by an elephant in an
attempt to kill the animal along with its rider, whom he mistook to be the king Antiochus V.
Hoover argued that his action was a “symbolic act of resistance”174 rather than an act of heroism.
Given the elephant’s established reputation as a symbol of Seleucid royalty, as well as its
visibility on the battlefield, Eleazar’s actions would have had psychological ramifications for the
king and his army.175 The act of mutilating symbolic representations of an opponent is an ancient
practice that can be traced back to the rituals of Palaeolithic hunters. 176 Execration Texts from
the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, and vandalized statues from Greece also attest to this symbolic
behaviour.177 Hoover, therefore interpreted Eleazar’s action as a visual display of resistance
against Antiochus V’s authority. This further exemplifies how the elephant was intertwined with
conceptions of Seleucid kingship.
169
Erskine (2013) 53-55.
Polybius 29.27.
171
Erskine (2013) 55.
172
Austin (1986) 458.
173
The translations I am following are from Hoover (2005) 35-44.
174
Ibid., 35. Bar-Kochva (1989, 336) believed that Eleazar’s action was potentially aimed at inspiring his Jewish
comrades who were inferior in size and strength compared to the Seleucid army.
175
Hoover (2005) 40. Compare the effect of the elephant’s death in the Seleucid army with the killing of an
elephant in the Carthaginian arena (Pliny, Natural History 8.7). For the Carthaginians, the elephant signified their
military strength, just as it did for the Seleucids.
176
Hoover (2005) 42. Drawings of spears have been identified in paintings of animals which are believed to
signify a ritual ‘killing’ of the creatures.
177
For Egyptian Execration Texts see Grimal (1992) 168-9. For evidence of the dismembered Athenian herms,
see Thucydides 6.27.1-3; Aristophanes, Lysander 1094; Diodorus 13.12.
170
23
This chapter has shown that the elephant was suited to the Seleucid kingdom due to various
military, ideological, and cultural factors. The elephant was an elite commodity that was
associated with the image of the Seleucid king, as well as his heterogenous kingdom. On the
battlefield, as with Hellenistic parades, these animals were used symbolically as vehicles to
communicate messages regarding the king’s wealth and military power. Given that elephants
were, and still are, the largest land-mammals on earth, these messages also translated into the
king’s power over nature. Elephants therefore played a fundamental role in the Seleucid’s society
during the Hellenistic period.
24
Elephants and the Roman Army
The 4th - 3rd centuries B.C. were a period of assimilation, particularly between Rome and the
wider Italian and Hellenistic world. As Roman control expanded southwards, their army
increasingly came into contact with Hellenistic and Punic powers, both of which used elephants
for war. This chapter discusses Rome’s military activity during this period, and explores the
practical and ideological reasons for why the Romans chose not to establish a military herd of
their own, despite their connections with the Hellenistic world. Particular attention is given to
Rome’s contact with elephants from Pyrrhic and Carthaginian armies, the nature of the Roman
manipular legion during the First and Second Punic Wars, their geographical context, and the
ideology of Roman warfare. This chapter will demonstrate why the elephant was not compatible
with the Roman army in the Hellenistic period.
Elephants and Rome in the 3rd century B.C.
The Romans first encountered elephants on the battlefield in 280 B.C. at Heraclea against King
Pyrrhus of Epirus. According to Plutarch, Pyrrhus owed his victory to these animals, as they
created panic amongst the Roman cavalry who had never seen them before.178 Pyrrhus’ elephants
later fought against the Romans at Asculum (279 B.C.), and Beneventum (275 B.C.), where they
failed to achieve a similar result. Interestingly, our literary accounts of the former suggest that
by their second elephant-encounter, the Romans knew how to combat them. The most detailed
descriptions of Asculum come from Diodorus and Zonaras. Accordingly, the Romans arranged
light infantry with 300 wagons in front of their legions.179 Each wagon was designed with
moveable poles that had scythes of iron attached to the ends. Others were equipped with hooks
that were then set alight by the light infantry. These men were also armed with various offensive
weapons including the tribulus. This threatening unit was created to combat Pyrrhus’ unit of 19
elephants. The combination of flammable weapons, slingers, and bowmen effectively threw the
animals into confusion, before the Romans were forced to retreat. It seems extraordinary that the
Romans (allegedly) devised such sophisticated defensive mechanisms against an elephant force
whom they had only encountered once. If we take this account to be true, then it shows that they
had already grasped an understanding of the animal’s weaknesses. However, the narrative is
problematic for several reasons. First, it is notable that Plutarch omits these details in his own
account. The armies engaged in two battles: the first took place beside a river, and the second at
178
179
Plutarch, Pyrrhus 15-17.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus 20.1; Zonaras 8.5.5.
25
the Romans’ camp. According to Dionysius and Zonaras, it was in the first encounter that the
wagons were deployed. Details from the first encounter are completely ignored by Plutarch, with
only a brief comment on the unfavourable conditions and the many wounded.180 This omission
has led scholars such as Lévêque to reject the wagons entirely, and instead label them as an
invention of Roman annalists.181 Scullard, however, gives credibility to the wagons because of
Dionysius’ authentic description of the Romans’ and Greeks’ battle lines.182 He argued that
Plutarch’s omission was justified because he saw it as having no practical value in his
narrative.183
Yet even if the wagons were present, their design raises further questions. The Romans were
capable engineers in the 3rd century B.C. Only 20 years after the battle at Asculum, they had
invented the corvus and successfully used it at Mylae against the Carthaginian navy. 184 However,
these mechanical wagons are suspiciously un-Roman. The combination of flammable grapnels,
mobile poles, and wagons had never before been recorded in a Roman battle. To explain this
phenomenon, it is necessary to consider Rome’s Italian context. In the early 3 rd century B.C.,
Rome had not yet established a professional army. Its military was an amateur force made up of
citizen legionaries, supported by Latin and Greek allies (socii), who formed the majority.185 This
was a period when Roman control was expanding across southern Italy, so many of the allies
who served in the army were drawn from these southern regions.186 At Asculum, Dionysius tells
us there were more than 70,000 foot troops on the Roman side, and only 20,000 derived from
Rome itself.187 It is possible that many of these allied troops had fought as mercenaries in the
Wars of the Diadochi where elephants featured prominently. If this was the case, it is likely that
soldiers within the Roman army at Asculum were familiar with anti-elephant devices. The bizarre
wagons may have been designed and controlled by these soldiers. It would therefore be
misleading to think that the Romans were completely isolated from the phenomenon of war
elephants. The presence of these wagons is important because it shows that Rome was gradually
being integrated into the Hellenistic world in the early 3rd century B.C. Most importantly, it was
180
Plutarch, Pyrrhus 21.
See, Leveque (1957).
182
Scullard (1974, 107) believed that this information likely came from Hieronymus.
183
Ibid., 109.
184
Ibid. The corvus was a platform device used to help Roman mariners board the quinquereme, as well as an
enemy ship. This device is described by Polybius (1.22). Also see, Pitassi (2011, 37-66).
185
Polybius 6.26.5; Livy 31.21.7.
186
Armstrong (2016) 160.
187
The allies placed amongst the Roman legions included the Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians,
Marrucini, Peligni, Ferentani, The dentities of the infantrymen operating the wagons are left unknown.
(Dionysius, 20.1). Neither Zonaras nor Plutarch record the identities of Rome’s allies in their narratives.
181
26
during this period that Rome actively chose to exclude the elephant from its military, despite
their knowledge of these animals.
Rome’s victory against Pyrrhus in 275 B.C. marked a significant moment in the history of
elephant warfare. Hellenistic and Punic armies now recognised Rome as a serious power, and
began to direct their attention and resources (including war elephants) towards the west. 188 For
the rest of the 3rd century B.C., Rome was occupied with the Punic Wars where they fought
numerous battles against Carthage who possessed war elephants. Despite having almost a
century of exposure to these animals, the Romans did not bring them into their army until 200
B.C. during the Second Macedonian War against Philip V.189 Exactly 50 years earlier, the
elephant made its first appearance in the city of Rome. In 250 B.C. the Roman general Metellus
was successful against Hasdrubal’s army of 120 elephants at Panormus, marking the beginning
of the First Punic War.190 After his victory, Metellus brought captured elephants back to Rome
for display where they participated in the general’s triumph.191 Unfortunately, little is known
about the triumph itself, but we can imagine that the animals played a symbolic role, illustrating
the submission of Carthage to Rome. Metellus’ efforts to build boats for the animals’
transportation across the Mediterranean Sea testifies to their novelty. It further suggests that
Metellus had specialist craftsmen with knowledge on how to mobilise elephants. Again, these
craftsmen likely came from the east where they helped transport war elephants for Hellenistic
kings.192 It is possible that Greek mercenaries and Carthaginian captives also assisted Metellus
with this mission. Therefore, with the movement of these people in the 3rd century B.C. came the
movement of ideas. Transporting cargo across large bodies of water came with many risks.
Plutarch tells us that Pyrrhus suffered great losses in a storm when he transported his army of 20
elephants, 3000 horses, and 22,500 soldiers across the Ionian Sea to Italy. 193 Metellus was
undoubtedly aware of these risks when he brought home the captive elephants, but nevertheless
understood their political value. Surprisingly, after his triumph these animals were condemned
to death in the circus rather than sentenced to military service. Using Verrius as a source, Pliny
tells us that the Romans were unsure about what to do with them, since they chose not to feed
188
Armstrong (2016) 158.
Even then, Livy (31.36.4) claims that the Romans only used them because they had a supply of captives from
the Punic Wars.
190
Polybius 1.40; Diodorus 23.21.
191
Pliny, Natural History, 8.16-17. Pliny gives the figures of 142 and 120 elephants, although this seems grossly
exaggerated considering the initial sum of Hasdrubal’s herd at Panormus was (supposedly) 120.
192
Ptolemy had craftsmen design a specialised ‘elephant-carrier’ to transport elephants from his hunting
settlements to his army in Egypt, Casson (1993) 249. This is alluded to in Strabo 16.5.769-770.
193
Plutarch, Pyrrhus 15.
189
27
them or gift them to allied kings.194 Gifting elephants was a common practice between kings and
their allied kingdoms. It is likely that Rome, being a Republic, did not want to associate
themselves with this behaviour. Killing the elephants possibly suggests an unwillingness to
conceptualise them as instruments of war, as their Hellenistic and Punic rivals did.195 The design
of the wagons at Asculum, and their ability to transport a herd across the Mediterranean, both
indicate that the Romans had knowledge on how these animals worked in a military setting. Like
the Hellenistic kings with their parades, the Romans were willing to bring them into the social,
military, and political sphere of the Roman triumph. However, there seems to be a conscious
choice to restrict them from the battlefield itself.
The Manipular Army
The nature of the manipular army in the 3rd century is important to our focus on the elephant’s
relationship with Rome. Polybius is a valuable source for this period as he was a contemporary
of the Macedonian and Spanish Wars when the Romans fought with and against elephants. He
also had personal experience as a cavalry officer during the early 2nd century B.C.196 The sixth
book of his Histories, written in the mid-2nd century, describes the organisation of the Roman
Republican army as it was between 220 and 170 B.C.197 According to Polybius, the Roman army
was organised into maniples that operated as independent cohorts on the battlefield.198 Within
each maniple, soldiers were divided into three lines: the hastati, principes, and triarii. They were
arranged according to their age, armament, and military experience. These units were also
supported by light-armed troops called velites who were the most effective against elephants.
This is because they were equipped with javelins and missiles which could be hurled at the
animals during a charge attack.199 Although Polybius’ description of the maniples suggests that
Rome was fielding a standardised army during the 3rd century B.C., it is more likely that soldiers
continued to fight in a fluid, clan-based style.200 The integration of allied Latins and Greeks
throughout this period also meant that the Roman army developed organically. Each clan (gens)
194
Pliny, Natural History, 8.16-17.
Gowers (1947, 45) believed that this act of killing the elephants was to show the Roman crowd how easy it was
to defeat the enemies formidable weapon.
196
Keppie (1998) 33.
197
Sage (2008) 65; Dobson (2008) 55.
198
Polybius 6.21; Sage (2008) 63. The term manipulos used by Ovid (Fasti 3.115-117) translates as ‘bundles’.
Varro (On the Latin Language 5.88) defines it as the smallest unit in the Roman military. Livy (8.8) also discusses
the maniples’ structure.
199
For an example, see Polybius (11.24.1) on Ilipa, 206 B.C.
200
Armstrong (2016) 150. Polybius was writing for a Greek audience, so he wanted to present the Romans as an
impressive army. His descriptions, like Livy’s, are anachronistic, and likely reflect later features of the Roman
Republican army.
195
28
fought independently in their own style of combat and with their own armament, which enabled
the maniples to be incredibly fluid on the battlefield.201 Thus, soldiers could retreat without
disrupting the formation, and allow fresh troops to continuously be fed into the front row. 202
Importantly, the army in the 3rd century B.C. was, to an extent, self-supported. Each soldier
funded his own equipment, and spoils from the wars functioned as payment for their service. 203
Unlike their Hellenistic and Punic rivals, Rome did not fund mercenaries, but instead, fielded
large numbers of allies who formed the backbone of their army.204 These soldiers were ultimately
amateurs.
In this regard, elephants stand out as an anomaly. They were a high-cost elite commodity that
functioned as a specialised unit on the battlefield. Due to the large expenditures involved in
maintaining elephants, rarely do we find armies with a back-up supply of animals to replace
injured ones on the battlefield (like we find with the maniples). The battle of Asculum illustrates
the strength of the manipular army over Pyrrhus’ specialised army. The latter deployed a
nineteen-strong elephant corps with heavy cavalry and a sarrisa phalanx.205 Its effectiveness lay
in the ability of these units to perform their own duty. 206 Because they were irreplaceable, the
elimination of one had the potential to weaken the whole army. In contrast, the Romans had an
almost inexhaustible supply of Roman and allied troops who were continuously fed into the
battle.207 Scullard argued that a possible reason for why the Romans did not establish a permanent
elephant corps was because they relied on the efficiency of their maniples rather than on
specialised units.208 According to Plutarch, in the battle at Asculum manpower prevailed. Pyrrhus
allegedly claimed afterwards that if they were to win the next battle his army would be ruined.209
The fluid nature of the manipular system also meant that soldiers could fight charging elephants
whilst still maintaining cohesion. The battle at Zama most clearly illustrates this. Polybius tells
us that Scipio positioned his velites within the intervals of the first maniples, thus giving the
impression of a solid body of men.210 The rest of the maniples were arranged directly behind one
201
In saying this, the Romans had similar features (including weapons and fighting-style) to that of the Latins,
Samnites, and Gauls. Armstrong (2016) 151, 157.
202
Koon (2011) 88; Bell (1965) 410; Sage (2008) 64; Livy (8.8) believed that the sight of the Roman army
continuously feeding fresh troops in battle was disheartening to the enemy.
203
Armstrong (2016) 151; Sage (2008) 141.
204
Polybius (6.52) seemed to believe that citizen levies were preferable to mercenaries in regards to Rome’s
superiority over Carthage.
205
Armstrong (2016) 157.
206
Ibid.
207
For an analysis on figures concerning the mobilisation of allied manpower during the Republic, see Figures 1-3
in Rosenstein (2012) 87-90.
208
Scullard (1974) 185.
209
Plutarch, Pyrrhus 21.
210
Polybius 15.9, 12; Erdkamp (2007, 50) argued that Polybius saw the Romans and allies as being synonymous.
29
another instead of in their customary checker-board formation (Fig. 11). The effect of this was
that it created channels for the elephants to run through. This manoeuvre was made possible by
the mobility of the maniples working independently rather than as a single formation. In doing
so, they avoided being trampled by the elephants. From this episode, we can conclude that the
Romans’ fighting style during the 3rd century B.C. was suitable for combatting elephants. This,
however, raises the question of whether the animals themselves were suitable within the Roman
army.
The Practicalities of Elephants in the Roman Army
It is important to consider the practical factors that may have played a part in deciding whether
elephants were suited for the Roman army. As shown in Chapter 1, elephants are incredibly
adaptable creatures. The Italian and Greek climate was not dissimilar to that of the east where
the Seleucids’ elephants were permanently kept. Provided that they had access to shade, water,
and fodder, it was certainly possible for elephants to dwell in this part of the Mediterranean. 211
The Italian and Greek terrain, however, was less favourable than the Seleucids’ geographical
setting. The borders of the Seleucid kingdom stretch out to landscapes that were flat, and were
thus suitable for elephants who depended on even ground to charge through its opponents with
speed. In contrast to this, Rome was occupied with fighting armies in mountainous terrains across
Italy, Cisalpine Gaul, Macedon, and Sicily in the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C.212 The maniples’
fluidity enabled them to wage war in areas that would have otherwise hindered the mobility of a
phalanx. The elephant was similar to the phalanx in this regard. Mobilising both units in the
regions mentioned above would have presented significant problems. One only need recall
Hannibal’s logistical struggles through the formidable Alps to appreciate this mammoth task.213
Nevertheless, Hannibal’s efforts did prove that this activity was manageable, albeit incredibly
harmful to an army’s resources. Livy further draws our attention to the issue of terrain in his
narrative on the battle at Thermopylae in 191 B.C. Upon defeating Antiochus III, the Roman
general Glabrio chose to kill the beasts instead of incorporating them into his army. 214 The
logistical problems involved in mobilising Antiochus III’s herd for the remainder of their
211
For a discussion on adaptability see, Sikes (1971) 249.
Erdkamp (1998) 158.
213
Polybius (3.56.3-4) recorded that Hannibal’s army was reduced to 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry due to
challenging conditions including terrain and starvation. Although elephants can withstand extreme conditions, the
practice of chaining them down in freezing temperatures for prolonged periods likely caused his herd to decline.
Sikes (1971, 118) argued that Hannibal’s elephants likely suffered from pneumonia or tuberculosis as there is no
mention in the primary sources of his men blanketing the elephants when they were kept stationary. For further
discussions on Hannibal’s trek see, Prevas (1998) and Sheldon (1986).
214
Livy, 36.19.
212
30
campaign would have been a significant factor. The Thermopylae pass was characterised by its
formidable cliffs, narrow passages, and swampy marshes. 215 Although elephants are known to
be useful as baggage-animals in these conditions, it is more likely that armies relied on donkeys,
mules, and horses, for the transport of goods in difficult terrain. Undoubtedly, Glabrio was aware
of this predicament when he executed them. Therefore, the nature of terrain could have been a
contributing factor to the elephant’s minimal use in the Roman army.
Food is another factor to consider. By the 2nd century B.C. the Roman army had a flexible system
in place for supplying food. They relied on grazing and the practice of foraging (pabulatio) to
feed their pack animals (including war-horses), while sophisticated supply lines were set up to
feed their soldiers grain.216 Although this system was efficient, the requisition of fodder
(pabulum) was often a dangerous operation.217 Armies that mobilised herds of war elephants
would have required large forging parties. These groups were vulnerable to attacks which could
ultimately debilitate the whole army. For example, in 151 B.C. Lucullus was forced to withdraw
his army from Pallantia due to the consistent harassment of his foragers (sitologoi).218 Supply
was one of the chief problems in Hannibal’s campaign across Italy.219 If the army was stationed
in one place for too long they could exhaust the local fodder.220 The lack of adequate food
supplies forced Hannibal to be constantly on the move, thereby dictating the strategies of his
campaign.221 The larger the army, the more supplies were needed as well as time for the elephants
to forage.222 Moreover, fodder was the most burdensome item in terms of weight.223 This meant
that an elephant’s food supply would have been the first to be depleted when the army faced
problems on the move. It is important to remember that Hannibal’s army was operating in foreign
territory, miles from their home supplies. Although he gained some support from allies
throughout his campaign, he was not successful in establishing, and holding, a sufficient supply
base for his troops.224 Shean believed that the supremacy of Rome’s navy during the Punic Wars
also prevented overseas supplies from reaching Hannibal in Italy.225
215
For an analysis on the topography of the pass see Rapp (2013) 39-59.
Roth (1999) 330.
217
Ibid., 286.
218
Appian. Spanish Wars, 55.
219
Polybius 9.24.4-5.
220
Shean (1996) 168.
221
Ibid., 174.
222
Ibid., 175.
223
Roth (1999) 61.
224
Shean (1996) 180. For example, the local Celts (Polybius, 3.66.7)
225
Ibid., 176.
216
31
Thus, while we can use Hannibal’s campaign as a point of reference, it is difficult to judge
whether the Romans would have faced similar issues if they themselves mobilised a herd across
Italy. Nevertheless, this discussion does show that elephants could be seen as a liability to an
army. It is possible that the Romans did not view elephants as being practically and economically
feasible in the context of warfare. As Glover rightly put it, these animals were an “administrative
headache”.226 The burden of feeding and transporting them across difficult terrain did not warrant
their usage in the army.
Ideology of Roman Warfare in the Republic
Finally, there may have been ideological reasons for why the Romans chose not to adopt
elephants as a permanent fighting unit. In Chapter 2 we found that one of the key reasons why
the elephant was successful in the Seleucid kingdom was because of its long-standing connection
with kingship. On the battlefield it symbolised the king alone, and so its appearance had powerful
connotations of royalty. Soldiers were loyal to the monarch, and the elephant acted as a visual
reminder of their allegiance to the Seleucid kingdom. In this regard, elephants had no place in
the ideology of the Roman battlefield. The Roman army in the 3rd century B.C. was made up of
citizen legionaries and allies, neither of whom came from elephant-dwelling territories. A
soldier’s loyalty rested with his patron and the clan whom he fought alongside within the maniple
structure.227 Six tribunes (χιλίαρχοι) were assigned to each of the four legions, and their duties
likely entailed administering the soldiers and overseeing their wellbeing.228 There was of course
an overarching general (usually a consul), but unlike the Seleucid monarchs, these consuls were
only in the position for one year.229 Elephants were such an expensive commodity that we can
assume that the consuls alone had the means to finance their maintenance. 230 It seems unlikely
that they would have focussed their efforts on establishing a specialised unit (such as the
elephant) that had no connotations of Rome, or links to their clan-based fighting-style.231 This is
not to say that the Romans were not interested in the military value of elephants: generals such
as Metellus and Scipio were prepared to invest significant resources into bringing these animals
226
Glover (1948) 10.
Armstrong (2016) 150.
228
Prior to 218 B.C. Rome fielded 4 legions. Between 200 and 167 B.C. the number of legions increased to an
average of 8.7. See, Rosenstein (2016) 81-82. Polybius 6.19.7; Dobson (2008) 50-51.
229
Rosenstein (2007) 132.
230
This would include funds to buy them off kings, and pay for trainers, transport, food, and general upkeep.
231
A general strove to achieve gloria (glory), laus (praise), and fama (fame), by displaying virtus (courage) on the
battlefield. Arguably, only an elephant victory would benefit him in this regard.
227
32
back to Rome.232 In this context, the elephant served to legitimise the individuals’ military preeminence, just as the elephant in the Seleucids’ parades symbolised the king’s supremacy.233
Generals could use elephants to impress the crowd and gain their political approval.234 However,
on the battlefield, focus was not on the general, but rather the maniples which the soldiers fought
within. Accordingly, there was no single authority or group in the Roman army whom the
elephant could become synonymous with. This suggests that the Romans were using elephants
for a very specific context. Their military and political value was recognised and used in the
triumph, but not on the battlefield itself.
Furthermore, when these animals were used by the Romans on the battlefield, it appears they
were treated and conceptualised as foreign ‘things’.235 We hear about foreign troops (ἀλλόφυλοι)
in Polybius’ description of the Roman camp.236 They did not seem to be incorporated in the
maniple system, but rather functioned as their own separate unit. Client kings and tribes who
were tied to the Romans under treaties, sent these troops to aid them on their campaigns. 237 For
example, in 152 B.C. the tribe of the Nergobridges was required to send 100 cavalry to help
Claudius Marcellus.238 Earlier in 153 B.C., 300 cavalry and 10 elephants were sent by Masinissa
to join Fulvius Nobilior’s army against Celtiberi.239 The number and nature of these troops would
have varied according to the demands of the campaign.240 Rome was not reliant on the kings’
animals, but could request them when the occasion warranted their deployment. 241 Thus even
when elephants were fighting within the Roman army, they were not considered a Roman unit.
Because they were gifted by kings, they this still carried royal overtones on the battlefield. This
suggests that the elephant was not able to be incorporated into the ideological framework of the
Roman army.
232
Evidence of venationes in the Republican period also suggest that officials had the means to transport exotic
animals to Rome. For discussions on animals in the context of spectacles see, Jennison (1937).
233
Bell (2004) 153.
234
Generals hoped for their triumph to be remembered in the memories of the Roman Republicans. Bell (2004)
153-154.
235
Elephants fought alongside the Romans at Athacus, 200 B.C. (Livy, 31.35-36), Cynoscephalae, 197 B.C.
(Polybius, 18.19-26), Numantia, 153 B.C. (Appian Spanish Wars 46), Vindalium, 121 B.C. (Strabo 4.1.11), and
Thapsus, 46 B.C. (Caesar, African War 79-86). Because of their minimal use in the 3rd - 2nd centuries B.C., we
should view these battles as exceptions.
236
Polybius 6.31.9.
237
Dobson (2008) 53.
238
Appian, Spanish Wars, 48.
239
Appian, Spanish Wars, 46.
240
Dobson (2008) 54.
241
It is possible that the Romans requested elephants when they knew their enemy was inexperienced in elephant
combat. For example, in the Second Macedonian War Masinissa sent 10 elephants to aid Flamininus against Philip
V who was unfamiliar with these beasts. See, Livy 31.35-35.
33
Conclusion
This dissertation has illustrated the complexity of elephant warfare in the Mediterranean between
350-150 B.C. Deploying an elephant corps was not simply a matter of setting a herd loose on a
battlefield to wreak havoc. Every army had to factor in the logistics of mobilising the animals,
the battlefield’s topography, and whether the enemy was accustomed to their sight and fighting
style, among other factors. In particular, the nature of the enemy often determined where
elephants were positioned, and what effect the army desired them to achieve, whether physical
or psychological. Political and military ideologies also influenced the use of elephants. How the
elephant was represented within an army could impact whether they were used extensively or
minimally. The Seleucid and Roman armies were chosen as the focus of this study because they
received the elephant differently, despite working within a similar military context. The
Seleucids were shown to be the most proficient exploiters, using them for both military and
political purposes, whilst the Romans avoided their use in war almost entirely. The intention of
this dissertation was thus to explore different aspects of the respective powers, such as their
military and political structures, ideologies, and geographic contexts. I have argued that the
elephant was better suited to the Seleucids’ disposition than that of the Romans due to a variety
of practical and ideological factors.
The elephant itself is and was a complex creature. It was expensive to maintain, challenging to
mobilise, and exhibited temperamental behaviour that was problematic on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, its physical and cognitive capabilities rendered it useful for activities such as
dispersing light infantry, knocking down fortifications, and transporting military supplies like
food and equipment. Elephants were particularly effective against soldiers and horses unfamiliar
with their sight, sound, and smell. The ancient authors who wrote about these animals evidently
recognised their shock-value. Yet the elephant was also a problematic instrument of war.
Offensive devices (like the tribulus) were successfully employed to prevent elephant attacks, and
on numerous occasions elephants caused the downfall of their own army by trampling on them.
Livy understood this when he characterised them as a ‘double-edged sword’ (genus anceps). The
Seleucids, however, looked beyond their unpredictable nature.
Image was important for the Seleucid monarchs. The presence of elephants in battle thus served
to signify the king’s military power, as well as his political and economic relations with
kingdoms in the Near East and Central Asia. Geographically, the Seleucids controlled territory
34
that provided access into elephant-dwelling regions. Provided that Seleucid kings maintained
their authority in these regions, the Asian elephant could continue to serve in their army.
Hellenistic wars were large and expensive in nature. Thus, it is no surprise that the elephant made
its way into an army that was already deploying the cumbersome scythed-chariot. In this sense,
the animal’s impracticality amongst the phalanx was overridden by the Seleucids’ political,
ideological, and economic conceptions of the elephant. Because of this, we find that the number
of elephants in the army diminishes once the kingdom begins to break down. With this
understanding of Seleucid kingship, we are able to justify the elephant’s impressive military
career between 350-150 B.C. For the Seleucid kings, it was rational for them to adopt an animal
that so strongly evoked the power of their rule.
For the Romans, the elephant was not compatible with their army due to various practical and
ideological factors. First and foremost, they were associated with kingship. The first army of
elephants whom they encountered was led by the king Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, although not
a monarchy, seemed to have assimilated the elephant with the power of the Barcid family. On
the other hand, Rome was a Republic led by multiple authorities who did not command the
supreme power as did those of the Hellenistic kings or the Barcids. It is interesting that when the
Romans later adopted an autocratic political system, the elephant continued to be excluded from
military use. Roman military leaders in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. were generally uninterested
in using elephants for war purposes. They were expensive to maintain, and thus were only
available to the most wealthy and powerful officials. Given the consuls’ short time in office, it
was unlikely that they would direct their efforts towards building up a corps of their own. Since
elephants did not evoke the ideals of Roman military leadership, nor the cultural and geographic
identities of the soldiers, the elephant on the battlefield served no symbolic significance. They
did, however, serve a political and symbolic role in the setting of the triumph. Like the Seleucid
kings, Roman generals used the elephant as a means to express their military and political
supremacy over their opponents. Importantly, elephants were killed relatively quickly after the
triumph. Although the Romans recognised the elephant’s military value, they evidently did not
perceive the animal as being valuable for their own purposes. Further analysis of the Roman
army demonstrated that elephants were not compatible with their fighting style. The manipular
army was flexible and could easily move across the rough terrain of Italy and Greece. The
logistics of mobilising a herd of war elephants in this context would have been problematic. In
comparison, the topography of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms was significantly more flat.
35
Moving elephants in this setting was far more feasible. For the Romans, it appears these factors
did not warrant the elephant’s physical and psychological use on the battlefield.
Altogether, this study has shown that elephants were ideologically and physically disconnected
from the Romans, as opposed to the Seleucids. The elephant was not simply an instrument of
war. On the battlefield it carried with it political, military, and economic overtones that were
received by the armies in different ways. Thus, we can argue that it is problematic to generalise
the elephant’s military career in the Mediterranean between 350-150 B.C. The preceding
chapters have also demonstrated the value of the elephant as a platform to discuss cultural,
political, and military developments in Mediterranean societies. Whilst these societies differed
significantly, the elephant’s innate behaviour and characteristics remained constant. Rather, what
differed was the reception of the elephant. By understanding how and why the elephant was used
by the Romans and Seleucids, this study has provided an insight into aspects of their societies,
where we otherwise lack information. Using this methodology, further research on the reception
of other animals, such as horses, could also provide a unique insight into ancient cultures. This
study has therefore demonstrated the importance of bridging zoological studies with ancient
history.
36
Illustrations
Fig. 1
Sensory points on the domesticated Asian elephant.
Source: S. K. Sikes, The Natural History of the African Elephant. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1971. Fig. 28.
Fig. 2
Elephants marching in unison for a battle re-enactment at the Surin Elephant Round-up.
Source: R. Ringis, Elephants of Thailand in Myth, Art, and Reality. Oxford; Singapore; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996. Fig. 25.
37
Fig. 3
Commander-signaller seated on the hauda of a royal Asian war elephant from the Surin Elephant
Round-up. To protect the animal’s legs, soldiers with shields are placed on either side.
Source: R. Ringis, Elephants of Thailand in Myth, Art, and Reality. Oxford; Singapore; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996. Fig. 55.
Fig. 4
Detail of a Mahosadha Jataka mural at Wat Nayrong, Nonthaburi, 19th century. War elephants with
princes besiege a city.
Source: R. Ringis, Elephants of Thailand in Myth, Art, and Reality. Oxford; Singapore; New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996. Fig. 16.
38
Fig. 5
Elephants contribute to the construction of a bridge for the XIVth Army over the Lokechao Creek.
Source: J. H. Williams, Elephant Bill. London: Rupert Hart Davis, 1954.
Fig. 6
The Seleucid elephant and crew (d), with the ‘elephant guard’ (a), Galatian infantryman (b), and an
Idumaean auxiliary (c).
Source: N. Sekunda, Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 B.C. Stockport: Montvert
Publications, 1994. Pl. VII.
39
Fig 7.
Battlefield arrangements of the Seleucid army during the 4th-2nd centuries B.C.
A-B: Deployment without elephants
C-F: Deployment with elephants.
G-H: Deployment with chariots.
Source: B. Bar-Kochva, Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Fig. 8
The Seleucid Four-Horse Scythed-chariot.
Source: N. Sekunda, Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 B.C. Stockport: Montvert
Publications, 1994. Pl. V.
40
Fig 9.
Coinage of Alexander the Great with elephant headdress (1-3), and bull horns (5-7).
Source: R. R. R. Smith, Hellenistic Royal Portraits. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998. Pl. 74.
Fig. 10
Hellenistic Coinage.
c. Alexander the Great in elephant-scalp headdress.
g & h. Elephants on coins from the reign of Seleucus I.
Source: H. H. Scullard, The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World. Cambridge: Thames and
Hudson, 1974. Pl.XIII.
41
Fig. 11
King, Foxhunt. Battle of Zama 202 B.C. Gif.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Zama.gif Accessed 7/8/17.
42
Appendix
Transcript of Interview with Andrew Coers, Elephant Keeper at Auckland Zoo
This interview was carried out on 3/5/2017, 1100-1200 at Auckland Zoo. Due to the
conversational nature of this interview, which sometimes led to tangential topics, I have taken
the liberty of editing the transcript to the most relevant points for the purposes of this dissertation.
The interview involved the researcher (K.M.) describing to Coers (A.C.) a range of battle
scenarios and discussing the natural behaviour of the elephant in a military context.
(K.M.) The Battle of Tunis in 255 B.C. This was between the Carthaginians and the Romans.
The Carthaginians placed their elephants in the front line of their troops and sent them
charging against the Roman centre which was in close formation. Polybius tells us that a
large portion of the Roman infantry was trampled to death by these elephants. The
Romans learned from this battle how dangerous well-trained elephants were to a heavy
infantry in close formation.
(K.M.) This is an example of how elephants were successfully deployed as a formidable frontline force. Their goal, it seems, was to break up the enemy’s infantry and create confusion
amongst the soldiers. Keeping in mind that Polybius was not present at this battle, how
do you think the elephants would have reacted to the intense noise on the battlefield? Do
you think they would have been able to cope with charging against a large body of men
in close formation?
(A.C.) Nowadays there are re-enactments in Thailand where they use big bulls to ‘fight’ against
each other, so yes, they’ve certainly got the capabilities to adapt and withstand fireworks
going off. These noises would have normally upset these guys, or distracted them, but
they would be able to cope with it. I’m assuming in this particular battle you’ve got
Romans that are on foot not on horses?
(K.M.) Yes, but cavalry were also present.
(A.C.) Then, if you had a tight-knit group of bull elephants, and a group of people running at
them, (assuming that they’re running in the opposite direction), and they were asked to
go through them, they would quite easily do so. I could imagine if the elephants felt
barriered in they’re going to do everything they can to get out. That goes into the natural
instinct of fight mode and flee. Once the adrenaline is up, rational thinking goes out the
43
window and it is about throwing people or whatever it might be. I can see the value in it.
I’d also think the Romans had spears?
(K.M.) Yes. Over time they became familiar with elephant combat and learnt about the
elephant’s weak points, such as the trunk’s vulnerability when it was harmed.
Mediterranean armies developed a range of weapons that were most effective against the
elephant from a long distance. This was generally some sort of spear.
(A.C.) That’s going to fuel the fire within, especially in the case of a bull elephant. It’s going to
make him more angry.
(K.M.) When elephants become really aggressive, it seems that they wouldn’t differentiate
between whether someone was a friend and foe. They are like a weapon.
(A.C.) In combat they would use their tusks, trunk, and feet. They have the ability to kick front,
back, and side. When they’re at that high state of adrenaline they’re very fast. The thought
of them being slow and clumsy… throw that out. They can fast walk. They’re going to
throw things left and right to make themselves clear. They would probably intimidate
more than anything. If an army saw a big bull elephant go through 20 men, for arguments
sake, that would be enough to make a lot of people run off in the opposite direction. If
you were to come in on one or a group of elephants at all sides, they would push their
way out. They’re not going to sit there and cave, especially a big bull elephant.
(K.M.) According to our sources, Hannibal could not cross the Trebia River in 218 B.C. without
having the cows lead the herd. Do you think this comment is reliable?
(A.C.) It’s a matriarchal society, but you wouldn’t need that female elephant to cross for a bull
to go, he’s independent. If they had a group of cows (female elephants), they might want
one of the higher or older cows to go first, then the others will follow. I don’t imagine a
bull would require this. From experience, young bull calves are a lot more trainable than
young cows. The young female calves are much more reliant on their mother being there,
whereas it is less like this for young bull calves. The latter will always have a relationship
with their mother, but they’re far more independent, even at a young age. So, I find
Hannibal’s predicament hard to believe.
(K.M.) The Battle of Hydaspes from 326 B.C. is one of many examples where the elephants
turned on their own troops after being injured themselves. The ancient writers, such as
Livy, talked about elephants as being a ‘double-edged sword’. Is what we’re seeing here
a reaction to their natural instincts?
44
(A.C.) Yeah, totally, they’ve had enough. But I don’t know if it’s a conscious decision in that
situation. It’s not, ‘I’m going against the people who keep me safe’. It’s more a state of
adrenaline and a state of survival in their mind. It’s natural. In captivity, you can get
situations where they might be mistreated for some time and an elephant decides to take
an opportunity to have a go at their handler. Or, what generally happens is one of the
other keepers working with it is subordinate so it takes a referred aggression. What it
would perhaps like to do with someone that’s been nastier to it, might do to someone
that’s a lot more nicer because it’s not going to retaliate, like the other person. Referred
aggression can become a problem as well.
(K.M.) At the Battle of Heraclea in 280 B.C., Pyrrhus positioned his army of elephants at the
rear of the army so that the enemy would not see them. Psychological warfare plays a
massive part in elephant combat. Thus, we can assume that Pyrrhus was trying to create
a surprise attack. Previously you said elephants would have been able to cope with
surrounding noises, provided they were trained?
(A.C.) Yes, if they were trained well. They can get conditioned to a lot of different things and
understand that it will be ok at the end of it.
(K.M.) Do you think they would have been able to hold their position at the rear of the army,
even with the chaos unfolding at the front?
(A.C.) Yes, that’s all trainable. You’d probably get some elephants that you would not be able
to get to that level of training. Some would not be able to participate in an activity like
that. They probably wouldn’t make their training because of the force and pressure for
them to stay there. So, they were probably killed by the end of it. However, with what
you’re saying, I could imagine that would be possible.
(K.M.) At the Battle of Trebia in 218 B.C., Hannibal used his elephants as ‘missile platforms’.
He had archers on top of the elephants. There were likely 3-4 archers, including a mahout.
There is reason to believe that they were relatively effective because the archers were
high enough to see the enemy more clearly when aiming. How easy to you think it would
have been to loosen an arrow whilst riding an elephant? Are they relatively stable to ride
on?
(A.C.) Elephants would be more stable than a horse. I don’t know whether they’re moving and
that’s happening or whether it’s a placement thing. But either way it’s do-able.
45
(K.M.) Hannibal also used his elephants as a ‘screen’ for his own cavalry. Elephants were
deployed against the enemy’s cavalry on the left and right wings. What do you think
would have been the natural reaction of a horse in this situation?
(A.C.) I think they would be intimidated. If you had an elephant running towards a horse, I’d say
the horses would go. Elephants have the strength to throw a horse anywhere they want.
To measure the effect, you must look at what’s happening on top of the horse: are they
shooting arrows? Throwing spears? It also depends on what’s happening within the
whole scenario. But, are horses trainable to approach elephants? Yes. Are elephants
trainable to approach horses? Yes, without a doubt.
(K.M.) As elephants became more known throughout the Mediterranean world, armies adopting
different offensive weapons and tactics to counteract and neutralist the elephant’s
effectiveness. One example can be found in Polyperchon’s failed siege at Megapolis. To
combat Polyperchon’s army of elephants, Ptolemy used a ‘spike-studded frame’ called a
tribulus. The modern equivalent of this is the caltrop which was used in the World Wars
against horses. Once stepped on, these weapons would go inside the animal’s hooves,
and thus paralysing them. Regarding elephants, they have sensitive feet due to the soft
tissue around the muscle?
(A.C.) Yes.
(K.M.) How large do you think these tribuli would have had to be in order to do significant harm
to an elephant’s foot? How deep could something go? Importantly, Polyperchon’s
elephants no longer advanced on the enemy, but turned upon their own troops due to this
weapon.
(A.C.) It depends on how strong the weapons are. In a state of high adrenaline, they would
probably go through a lot. Their pain threshold is pretty strong. I would imagine you
would need an inch to a couple of inches plus of 4 spikes in whatever position it was in.
But they could walk through that and then carry on, it’s a case of having multiple of them
to go and think twice about doing something. Our elephants have had some pretty large
cuts, from glass and nails. You can see there’s discomfort there, which is why you get rid
of it.
(K.M.) During Pyrrhus’ failed siege at Sparta in 272 B.C., the Spartans dug a trench around their
city. Plutarch recorded that this trench was 4 cubits deep and 6 cubits wide. This trench
46
prevented the elephants from reaching the city. One of the elephant’s physiological
limitations is that they cannot jump, correct?
(A.C.) Correct, they cannot jump.
(K.M.) How deep do you think this trench would have been to prevent the elephants from
crossing?
(A.C.) Dry motes are sometimes used to in zoos to contain elephants. Our one here at Auckland
Zoo which is required to be 1.7 metres. It’s a solid barrier. However, you have to consider
how that trench is maintained because elephants can dig too. If there was any sort of
leverage in that trench, they would be able to climb out. They’re very good climbers.
(K.M.) What is the ideal age to train an elephant? When are they most responsive?
(A.C.) Here at Auckland Zoo we want to work with them as calves (couple of months old). We
want to form a relationship with them and it’s all based on a trust that we’re the best
person to fulfil that role. More intense training might start when they’re 6 years. For us
it may be 6 months to a year so they are more physically capable come 6 years of age. It
really depends on what you’re expecting and asking for at what age. If you look at the
roles they’ve played in modern times, particularly in Sri Lanka where Anjalee is from,
you’ll see they’ve built many of the reservoirs there. These are massive. To think that
they’ve helped move the rocks, and the time it takes them to make these irrigation
reservoirs… to know they’ve done that, anything is possible really.
47
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