Politics and Governance (ISSN:
–
)
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
DOI: .
/pag.v i .
Article
Decentralised Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in PostEthiopia: A Political Economy Study
Yeshtila Wondemeneh Bekele * and Darley Jose Kjosavik
Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway;
E-Mails: yeshitila.bekele@nmbu.no (Y.W.B.), darley.kjosavik@nmbu.no (D.J.K.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: February
| Accepted:
June
| Published:
October
Abstract
After
, Ethiopia has introduced an ethnic federal governance system constituting nine regional states and two autonomous city administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The restructuring of the state seemingly led to the decentralisation of power to the regions and Woreda (district authority) levels local governance structure in
and
respectively. The purpose of this article is to examine the practices of decentralised local governance in Ethiopia in general
and the local governance performance at the level of peasant association (Kebele) in particular. The article also analyses
the link between the local governance and poverty based on three indicators: decentralisation and self-rule (DSR), local
capacity for planning (LCP), and effectiveness of local governance system (ELGS). Data was collected from eight selected
Kebeles of three different regional states through household survey, qualitative interviews and focus group discussions.
The study shows that while the power and control of the central government is well established, the Kebeles lack the
capacity and resources to deliver development. The LCP at Kebele level is weak because of organisational incapacity and
institutional constraints related to DSR. The ELGS is also poor since Kebeles do not have any fiscal rights and administrative
power for the reasons associated with DSR and LCP. The government has been implementing poverty reduction strategies
using productive safety net programmes and farmer training centres. These, however, have not had the desired outcome
due to organisational and institutional incapacitation of Kebele administrations.
Keywords
decentralised governance; FTC; Kebele; poverty reduction; PSNP
Issue
This article is part of a multidisciplinary issue of Politics and Governance, edited by Andrej J. Zwitter (University of Groningen, The Netherlands) and Amelia Hadfield (Canterbury Christ Church University, UK)
©
by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution . International License (CC BY).
. Introduction
In
, The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) established an ethnic federal governance system, which constitutes nine regional states
and two autonomous city administrations (Addis Ababa,
the capital of Ethiopia and Dire Dawa). Furthermore, the
government implemented a third restructuring of the
State in
under the new Constitution, which is based
on the principle of ethnic federalism that divides power
between federal and ethnic-centred territorial Regional
States (RS). As a result, power has been shared with
the Regions that led to the emergence of a new power
structure at the centre and peripheries. The decentralisation process was further extended to Woreda (district)
in
, based on the devolution of finance, human resources and political power from regions to the fourth
tier of local governance structure at the Woreda level .
Woreda is an Amharic term that refers to the next administrative tier after the regional level of government (similar to a district in many other countries).
It is managed by an elected council of members and a strong executive that is derived from the council.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
The purpose of this article is to examine the practices
of decentralised local governance in Ethiopia in general
and the local governance performance at selected Peasant Associations (PA) or Kebele, the lowest level local
administration . It also elucidates the governance principles and practices based on primary empirical data gathered through household survey, interviews and focus
group discussions. Primary data sources at the national
level include Government Institutions’ White Papers supplemented with key informant interviews.
The link between local governance and poverty is
analysed based on indicators developed for the purpose, such as decentralisation and self-rule (DSR), local capacity for planning (LCP), and effectiveness of local governance system (ELGS). In order to attain this
objective, the article addresses the following research
questions: What are the emerging governing practices
in post? Is poverty being adequately addressed
through decentralised local governance structures in
postEthiopia?
The following section (i.e. Section two), discusses the
decentralised local governance framework of poverty
analysis which is developed based on review of relevant
literature. Section three explicates the methodology and
study context. Section four discusses an emergent postlocal governance practice in Ethiopia based on review of relevant literature and data from the field study.
Section five presents the local governance system and
institutional structure based on empirical data and relevant literature reviews. Section six analyses the decentralised local governance practice and poverty reduction
experience at Kebele level administration. A brief conclusion, stitching together the main elements of the overall
argument is delineated in section seven.
. Decentralised Local Governance: A Conceptual
Framework
Governance is an elusive term (Meuleman,
). In
academia, there are controversies about governance as a
concept. Some scholars consider governance as an ideological imposition against developing countries to reconstruct the state structure in accordance with neo-liberal
orientation (Harrison,
). In fact, governance is different from government in the sense that government is the
structure and function of public institutions, while governance is the way government gets its job done in cooperation with other stakeholders (Kettl,
). In other
words, it implies a process.
The term governance denotes different meanings for
different people. For some scholars, it refers to a mechanism of creating a newly ordered rule and collective action (Stoker,
). For others, it implies a new pattern
of decision-making and platform for participation (Chhotray & Stoker,
). For others, it still signifies a new
technique and mode of governing practice (Dean,
;
Miller & Rose,
). Some consider it as the totality of
relations among actors in addressing societal problems
(Meuleman,
).
Decentralized and strong local governance system
is considered as a prerequisite for sustainable development and poverty reduction. Decentralised local governance is a system of decision-making or a framework
for participatory resource and political management at
a subnational level of administration (Ali Khan,
).
It constitutes two major elements: decentralisation and
local governance. Local governance is a set of institutions, actors, mechanisms and processes created by the
constitution through which local people articulate their
interest, negotiate their difference, exercise their right
and make decisions (Shah,
). Whereas, decentralisation denotes the transfer of power from national to subnational structures of government, assigning resources
to local authorities through de-concentration, delegation, or devolution. The decentralisation process constitutes four major interrelated components, namely political, administrative, fiscal and economic (Boko,
;
Schneider,
).
Political decentralisation marks the transfer of political power to the subnational echelon of administration.
The decentralisation of power gives autonomy to local
authorities to make independent planning and decisions
on important local matters (Schneider,
; Treisman,
). The fiscal decentralisation devolves resources to
local authorities to carry out their activities, and coordinate and lead local economic development initiatives
(Boko,
; Davoodi & Zou,
; Schneider,
).
Economic decentralisation expedites liberalisation of the
economy by transferring public sector services to private or voluntary associations, allowing the market to
take a leading role in resource generation and allocations. Moreover, most of the service provisions are privatised; a significant degree of deregulation under market
(the private sector) system coordinates basic services including health, education, water, electricity and others
(Schneider,
; Treisman,
). For the purpose of
this article we combined and adopted perspectives illustrated by both Shah (
) and Ali Khan (
). We define decentralized local governance as the institution, or
structures, which exercise self -rule right, participatory
planning process and delivering capacity of social service
at the local level to meet or satisfy the need of local people. This definition captures the indicators we developed
in the framework of analysis in Figure .
In retrospect, in this framework of analysis, poverty
reduction efforts at localities require Decentralization
and self-rule right (DSR) rights. DSR consolidates Local Capacity for Planning (LCP), which is a pivotal instrument
in local economic development and mobilisation of resources. The local actors in pursuit of their interests are
motivated to take part in local governance processes in
order to get access to and control over resources. The in-
Kebele is an Amharic word which means neighbourhood referring to the lowest grassroots administrative unit after the Woreda, recognized by both
federal and regional constitutions as lower echelon of local administration in both urban and rural areas.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
Decentralizaon and local self-rule
(DSR)
Local capacity for planning
(LCP)
Effecve local governance system
(ELGS)
Economic growth
Parcipaon
Decreased income poverty
Accountability
Service delivery
Decreased relave deprivaon
Proverty reducon
Figure . Framework for decentralised governance. Source: Adapted and modified from Ali Khan (
teraction of these actors prompts local economic development, which is key in the reduction of income poverty
at localities as illustrated in Figure .
In addition to LCP, as depicted in Figure , DSR is
assigned the role of building an effective local governance system (ELGS), a vital instrument for addressing
poverty-reduction, relative deprivation and social exclusion at localities. ELGS improves the service delivery capacity of local governance systems. Because the transfer of power, resources, and responsibilities encourages
representation, accountability together with participation, inclusive development, and empowerment to make
collective decisions based on local people’s interest. It
also motivates local entrepreneurial capacities in the
provision of improved service delivery. However, decentralised governance is not always successful. At times it
may result in unexpected indirect consequences, particularly in multi-ethnic societies. It is therefore, not heretic
to propose that, if a dominant ethnic group controls financial, human resources, and political power, the subsequent struggle for resources may spark resource-based
ethnic conflicts.
. Methodological Considerations
A mixed methodology research approach is adopted,
combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Purposive sampling was employed to select multi-layered
study areas from region, zone, district, and Kebele; while,
systematic random sampling method was used to frame
sample size, select households and to draw their views
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
).
from local areas. Data was collected from three purposefully selected regions, which represent different agroclimatic zones, livelihood patterns, ethnicity, and historical traditions. Gamo highlands represents the ‘Enset’
(false banana)-based livelihood, highland agro-climatic
zone, minority ethnic group from southern Ethiopia.
Jimma represents the cash crop-based livelihood, mid
land agro-climatic zone, Muslim and majority Oromo
ethnic groups. Deberberhan area represents grain cropbased livelihood, low and high land agro-climatic zones,
and majority Amhara ethnic group. Accordingly, the
quantitative data was collected from a total of
households in eight rural Kebeles.
For data collection, we used both structured and
semi -structured questionnaires. Likert scale questions
were used for the survey, and a series of interviews and
focus group discussions were held with key informants
of the study and local peasants. The respondents for the
questionnaire survey were farmer households who were
randomly chosen from the selected Kebeles. The key informants included Kebele administrators, development
agents, peasants, and scholars who are informed of the
setting. The socio-economic background of the respondents of the household survey are given in Table .
Table depicts that the majority of respondents
are male ( . %, N =
), and their main occupation
(livelihood) is agriculture ( . %, n =
). In terms
of education, most of the respondents are primary
school dropouts ( . %, n =
) and others are illiterate ( . %, N =
). About a third ( . %, n =
)
of the households earn a monthly income below
Table . Socio-economic background of respondents (N =
Background
Category
Occupation
Farmer
Others
). Source: Survey data (
N
Gender
Male
Female
.
.
.
.
ETB
Ethiopian Birr (USD . ). Nearly % of the respondents
described their income as less than USD (which is below the USD . per day poverty line).
Local Governance Practice in Ethiopia
The ethnic federal system that was established in postEthiopia constitutes nine regional states and two
autonomous administrative cities. The decentralized
power of the state is divided between the Federal and National Regional States in conformity with the
Constitution. Each region has been awarded a quasi-sovereign
status and self-rule authority, enshrined in separate autonomous Constitutions. Regions have also assumed the
power and right to prepare their own socio-economic development plan, to mobilise resources and to allocate
and utilise regional budgets. Both federal and regional
constitutions have ensured authority for self-rule and
share-rule at all levels of administration (Abbink,
;
Fiseha,
).
Articles
and
of the
Constitution enlist
the powers and responsibilities of both Federal and Regional states. The decentralisation of power from centre to regions is carried out in terms of ethnic representations, ethnic geography and historical role of ethnic groups. The system developed is akin to neopatrimonialism but has a character of consensual democracy
(Chanie,
; Mengisteab,
). The decentralisation
has created a different locus of power in the regions by incorporating emerging ethno-elites. It has also introduced
a kind of participatory and accommodative governance
structure both in the region and at the centre (Fiseha,
). Apart from political and economic decentralisation, an emerging new governing practice of the postperiod manifests multiculturalism, developmentalism, socio-cybernetics and statistical-based governance
as major characteristics of governance.
Multiculturalism is the widely applied governance approach in the postperiod. It is used as a means
of engendering legitimacy and constructing governable
Politics and Governance,
.
.
ETB
Total
. Post-
.
.
.
–
–
>
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
%
.
Illiterate
Primary
Secondary and above
<
).
.
Education
Household income (in ETB)
/
N=
%
subjects under a plea for ethnic equalities. It is rationalised on the tenet of national operation and implies
that the fundamental problem of the Ethiopian state
emanates from ‘unequal ethnic relations’. The rationale
further asserts that political engineering under broader
framework of ‘Andet Ethiopia’ (a unitary State or one
Ethiopia), adhering to the Pan-Ethiopia project, did not
succeed because of assimilation policy by previous governments. The core governance problem was articulated
as a lack of political settlement and an inclusive governance structure to accommodate the competing interests of ethnic groups. Therefore, promotion of cultural pluralism in the new multiculturalist governance is
seen as an indispensable means to avoid ethnic rifts and
to emancipate the masses from abject poverty (Fiseha,
; Turton,
).
The ethnic federalism can be viewed as a pioneering
effort similar to Haile Selassie’s modernisation endeavour of the mids. Many scholars argue that the approach is not optimal. Nevertheless, it has brought significant dynamics to the political, economic and social settings of the country. Politically, revolutionary democracy
and ethnic federalism have emerged as leading agencies;
economically, a free market economy with a bigger role
for the state has been introduced, and socially, cultural
pluralism, with Amharic notion of ‘BehereBehereseboch’
that refers to nation and nationality, became a catchphrase of daily life and a powerful discursive narrative
of political mobilisation.
Multiculturalism prompts the rise of ethno-elites in
the regions with strong sentiments of ethnic identity (Abbink,
). The central government has crafted a controlling mechanism against these ‘unruly’ elites, based
on the principle of democratic centralisation. However,
the growing patronage practice has been posing a threat
to democratic transition and consolidation. The ethnic
politics prompts recruitment to political offices and access to jobs to be along ethnic lines. To this end, the rising ethno elites have organised a complex informal network both in their respective regions and national gov-
ernment to control, survive and dominate the politics
(Abbink,
; Chanie,
).
Developmentalism is another governing approach
that has emerged since
following the split in leadership of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and
intensified by the election crisis of
. The government has apparently been articulating that achieving an
accelerated development was indispensable for the survival of the nation (Gebresenbet,
). Consequently,
it claims a dominantly leading role in both the economy and politics. It has been justifying the rationale
to do so grounded on narratives of poverty reduction
and sustainable development. The trend ushers in a new
economic and political governance approach with the
main objective of mainstreaming national politics. For
example, the controversial large-scale agricultural investments which some scholars and rights groups identified
as ‘land grabbing’ has been introduced (Lavers,
;
Makki & Geisler,
). The new large-scale agricultural
investment projects dispossess properties, particularly
land from smallholding farmers and the urban poor who
are considered unproductive. Land is subsequently transferred to an emerging national private sector and international investors.
Access to land has given way for a new rising ethnoelite class. Hence, families and close allies of these rising
ethno-elites have accumulated enormous wealth from
a heavily regulated land market supervised and operated by Federal and Regional governments (Lavers,
;
Makki & Geisler,
; Pausewang,
). They have
emerged as politically and economically powerful family
elites with strong bases in the regions. The trend marks
the new economic governance features that emerged
from the reconfiguration of political structures and consolidation of ethno-elite powers.
Socio-cybernetics is another emerging governance
instrument, widely applied in the postperiod. It
refers to communication and controlling methods in the
governing process that rely on information processing capacities (Pierre & Peters,
). One of the remarkable
features of this period is the massive capacity for steering, which is supported by the application of information
and communications technology (ICT). The government
has introduced and expanded ICT into districts and remote rural areas through the so-called WAN (wide area
network) and various nets such as School-Net, WoredaNet, Agri-Net, HER-Net, Revenue-Net and Health-Net
programmes (Lessa, Belachew, & Anteneh,
).
The new ICT-driven governance has increased the
penetration and information-gathering capacity of the
state by penetrating into remote rural areas. The massive
broadband internet connection installations, the expansion of community radio, improvement of telecommunication (free-call service, teleconferencing and other methods, particularly mobile phones) all over the country have,
therefore, significantly improved the controlling and communication capacity of the state (Belachew,
).
Interview with a scholar in February
Politics and Governance,
, Addis Ababa.
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
Apart from ICT, the government has created a complex and sophisticated network of political control of all
rural households, which is nicknamed ‘one to five’. It has
created a multiple but hierarchical layer of organisation
that encompasses the various segments of the society including the youth and women. These networks comprise
the popular wing, ‘Hezibawi Kenefe’, together with the
government wing, ‘Mengestawi Kenefe’, and the political
wing, ‘Derjitawi Kenefe’. The Government has assigned
each household to at least one of these organisational
structures. It has also devised a mechanism to tie one to
the other and to intertwine all of them together under
one locus of control. These complex threads of organisations and networking give the government absolute
social and political control over the respective localities
(Snyder et al.,
).
Likewise, the incorporation of peasants into a complex web of political control, one to five and other networking, is also used as a means of infusing ideology.
The farmers have been ensnared by the reigning ideology
of the government. The ideology is inculcated through
a series of meetings, indoctrination and in public discussions. Peasants also receive formal ideological training through farmer training centres (FTCs). Therefore,
the government is rather successful in turning peasants
into subjects. In all study areas, the majority of farmers
seemed to be strong supporters of the government and
displayed a rather uniform character and thinking, regardless of geographic and other considerations. The operations of modern government, according to Miller and
Rose (
), advance through the accumulation and tabulation of facts about the governed subjects. Hence, the
government employs organised statistical techniques to
calculate tax returns, adopt social reforms and compute the gross national product, growth rates of different economies, rates of inflation and the money supply.
From these calculations and tabulations emerge written
reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts and graphs,
for use as a means of governing citizens.
In postEthiopia, the government has intensified the application of advanced statistical methods
to analyse and depict the economic, social and political status of the country. It also consolidated and expanded the capacity of the Central Statistical Authority (CSA)—a government agency responsible for collecting and disseminating statistical data. This agency generates statistical data of various development indicators
under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED). According to a scholar we interviewed,
‘EPRDF employed statistical techniques to convince first
single-digit and then double-digit economic growth and
miracles of economic growth since the mids to
the people at large and the international community,
in particular’ . The statistics-based governance applications have greatly helped the government to disclose its
performance and engender legitimacy as developmental
state. In the next section, we briefly discuss the evolu-
tion of local governance institutions, the practice of decentralized local governance in postand the performance of selected local governance institutions based on
three indicators (DSR, LCP and ELGS).
. Local Governance and Local Institutions in PostEthiopia
The local governance system constitutes integrated institutions of production and governance that surround
and connect local communities. It incorporates different kinds of social, economic and political organizations
and functions. Some notable examples of local level
governance systems are community resource mobilization orders, social engagement and reciprocity instruments, security arrangements, asset management, conflict resolution mechanisms, infrastructure and sector
services development apparatus (Bardhan,
; Saito,
). In Ethiopia’s case, local governance is organised
under Kebeles.
. . The Local Governance Structure: A Historical
Perspective
Historically, the local administration institutions were
evolved during the reign of Menlik II (
–
), as
garrison towns known as ‘Ketamas’ or district towns. Because of the limited penetration capacity, the state could
not establish local administration at all rural localities. It
was operating from garrison towns. During the reign of
Haile Selassie, the local governance restructuring was initiated under
and
proclamations, but could not
establish administrative units in the local realm (Ayele,
; Zewde & Pausewang,
). The state, using the
district towns as a springboard, had been transferring investible surplus of product from the rural areas through
tax, compulsory contribution and other mechanisms. No
meaningful public investments were made in rural areas.
The ‘Derg’ or the military regime had established
the grassroots local governance structures (Kebeles) under proclamations and of
(Engdawork,
;
Mammo,
). The role of the Kebeles was limited to
land redistribution, local policing and coordinating social
services. They were not given or allowed any mandate
to plan and execute local development activities. In fact,
the creation of the local administration structure had reduced routine local governance service provision.
Like its predecessor, the ‘Derg’ Government did not
make significant public investments in the rural sector.
Rather, it forced the rural people to become organised
under cooperative groups, which were modelled after
the former Soviet Union and imposed a compulsory grain
quota delivery. The grain quota delivery system was
aimed at ensuring sustainable and cheap supply of basic food commodities to the growing numbers of urban
people, to quell any possible political opposition from
the critical urban mass. The rural Kebeles have therefore been used as means for appropriating surplus product and transferring surplus to urban areas where the
government sought to establish a political base (Abegaz,
; Pausewang,
). Eventually, political engineering brought neither economic development nor agrarian
transformation to rural areas.
In sum, in postEthiopia, the EPRDF has continued to use the Kebele as local structure without making any significant structural changes. The legal structure
of the local governance was based on Article ( ) and
( ) of the
Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) constitution. The local authorities (Kebeles)
have not been assigned any specific powers, except the
Woreda or district authorities, which are authorised to
initiate, plan and execute development activities. Hence,
the power of the local authority is confined to the delivery of basic services as before (Assefe & Gebre-Egziabher,
; Ayele,
).
. . The Local Governing System and Leadership
The administration structure of the current Kebele institutions comprises of an elected council of
members
known as ‘Yemeto Shengo’, an executive committee of
five to seven members ‘Kebele Cabinet’, a social court
known as ‘Frede Shengo’ and a local militia force which
is known as ‘Tataeki’. A diagrammatic representation of
the institutional structure of Kebele is given in Figure
below.
Social court
Kebele Chairperson
Local security
(Tataeki)
Local Council
(Yemeto Shengo)
Kebele Manager
Sector coordinaon (schools,
health centre and development
assistance (DA))
Figure . The institutional structure of Kebele. Source: Sketched by the authors based on the information from local
authorities.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
The main responsibilities of the Kebele council and
executive committee are endorsing the development
plan, which is prepared by and directed from Woreda
authorities, ensuring the collection of land and agricultural income tax, organising local labour and in-kind contributions to development initiatives, and mitigating local conflicts within the jurisdiction of local community social courts. Kebeles also steer the delivery of basic social
services such as education and health in their respective
localities in consultation with the Woreda and coordinators of the services at Kebele level such as school and
health centre heads (Snyder et al.,
).
Regarding local leadership, Kebele authorities are led
by an executive body of five to seven cabinet members including chairman, three council members, a Kebele manager assigned by a Woreda, development agent, health
extension officer and school director. The manager, who
is reasonably educated, salaried and appointed by a
Woreda, recently emerged as the most influential actor
in the local affairs. In addition to the Kebele manager, development agents also play an important role in issues related to agricultural production and coordinating farmer
training centres (FTCs) (Lefort,
).
. . Decentralisation and Local Governance
Performance in PostEthiopia
Decentralisation of power to sub-national administration
is considered as an essential instrument for augmenting local economic development. It promotes empowerment to encourage different actors (state and non-state)
to take part in coordinated development activities of localities (Bardhan & Mookherjee,
; Saito,
). It
also helps to enhance service delivery and inclusive development. According to Grindle (
), decentralisation
may not necessarily result in faster, inclusive and sustainable development. We identify three major indicators:
DSR, LCP and ELGS as indicators to measure local governance performance at Kebele level.
. . . Decentralisation and Self-Rule (DSR)
The EPRDF-led government has applied decentralisation
as a key means of political settlement and engendering
legitimacy. The decentralisation process was undertaken
in two phases: to the regions in
and to the Woredas
in
(Assefa & Gebre-Egziabher,
). The decentralisation of power to the regions primarily gave selfgovernance right but has also substantially furthered the
shared-rule right to fair and equitable representation in
the federal state (Abbink,
; Turton,
).
The first phase of decentralisation was implemented
between
and
. It was aimed at creating and
consolidating regional national government’s capacity
for self-rule and was designated as mid-level decentralisation. The legality of the decentralisation process was
stipulated in the transitional charter (
) and the FedInterview with local official in February
Politics and Governance,
, Jimma area.
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
eral Constitution (
). In this phase of decentralisation,
political, fiscal and administrative powers were transferred to the regional states. National regional governments have been entrusted with all legislative, executive
and judicial powers in respect of all matters within their
jurisdiction, except those that fell under the federal–
state domain such as defence, foreign affairs, and economic policy (Assefe & Gebre-Egziabher,
).
The second phase of decentralisation, involving district level decentralisation programmes (DLDP) and urban
management programmes, took place in
. This phase
resulted in the restructuring of institutions at Woreda
level administrations, together with devolution of political and fiscal power from regions to Woredas. DLDP devolved a considerable portion of human and financial resources in the form of a block grant to Woreda by rolling
down power and resources from zones (the third tier
of administration above Woreda) to Woreda level. The
Woredas were also given autonomous right to plan and
implement development activities within the bounds of
resources available to them (Snyder et al.,
).
Rural Kebeles have not experienced any significant change in its nature nor in its structural dimension. Though the government claims that implementing
agriculture-led industrialisation will place the rural people at the centre of the policy locus, there is no elaborate
institutional framework, which is capable of transforming the fragmented smallholding agriculture and the subsistence livelihood of the rural people at grassroots level.
The decentralisation process floated in the regional and
to some extent at Woreda levels. As one local official of
the rural Kebele of Jimma area noted:
“We have neither full power to make decision on our
local matters nor resources to stimulate local based
development activities. We simply wait for order from
Woreda officials. If the government devolves the full
power to make decisions based on our people’s interest and even to collect or develop limited resources in
order to speed up local development, we can make a
big difference. Lack of power has really constrained us
not to fully commit to community development. Take
a watershed management programme. It is a good example. It is quite essential for local people but most
local people are against it. They do not feel a sense of
ownership.”
As noted by this local official, Kebeles have neither fiscal
power with relevant resources nor are they allowed to
generate local finances. The mandates of tax and other
collections are given to the Woreda authorities. The Kebele officials are not allowed to engage in any financerelated matters (Yilmaz & Venugopal,
). This has implications for the effective functioning of the local institutions. The powerlessness of Kebele was reinforced in
the view of local farmers in the Azo and Dorze areas of
the Gamo highlands. They preferred the manager to the
Kebele chair. As one farmer in Azo Gule noted:
“The Kebele leaders do not have the real power to
make decisions. The political power is vested on the
Woreda leaders. Therefore, they are simply carrying
out orders given from the Woreda. The Woreda propose, develop and simply request the local people
to approve their decision. What we do is simply approving their decision through the council and Kebele
administration.”
During the household survey, the respondents were
asked about their opinion on decentralised governance.
Table presents the findings of the household survey
about decentralisation of power and resources at Kebele
level.
As depicted in Table below, regarding decentralisation and local self-rule in the respective local communities, the respondent view indicates that . % (N =
)
disagreed and . (N =
) were undecided about
the questions. The mean value is . . The majority
of the local people seem not to agree with decentralisation of power and self-rule practices in their local
arena. The result of the survey is also consistent with
what we observed in the field. The Kebeles lack substantive power and they are under the shadow of the
district (Woreda) administrations. They do not exercise
autonomous political, fiscal and administrative responsibilities, although they do exercise limited administrative prerogatives. They are, nevertheless, under strict
Woreda dominance.
scribes institutional capacity as ‘the competency of individuals, public sector institutions, private sector entities,
civil society organisations, and local communities to engage in activities in a sustainable manner that permit the
achievement of beneficial goals’.
LCP gives local people the opportunity to develop
a feasible development plan responding to the prevailing local social problems and available resources. It enhances local people’s capacity to efficiently utilise available resources by prioritising their pressing social problems according to the available resources. Moreover, it
helps to synergise the local plan with national, indigenous knowledge, cultural context and agro-ecology settings of the society. Furthermore, it also gave a sense of
ownership and an opportunity to the local people to decide on their own matters (Saito,
).
Articles ( ) and ( ) of the Federal and Regional
Constitutions of Ethiopia confer power on local authorities to make a local development plan and coordinate
development initiatives. Although the power to prepare
development plan is given to the Kebele authorities, they
do not fully exercise this power. In fact, they provide input for an annual development plan which is prepared
by Woreda authorities (Snyder et al.,
). This trend
affects the LCP and institutional capacity of the local
authorities to coordinate development efforts. Table
presents the household survey results concerning local
capacity for planning in selected Kebeles. A farmer in
Goshe Bado Deberberhan area stated:
“Comparing to the Derg regime, the current Kebele
administration is better. The chairperson and other
committee members were more accessible to the local people. They listen to the people. However, they
had had a big problem regarding planning and coordinating activities. The problem is attributed to skill gap
and lack of power. They do not have sufficient capacity so that the Woreda officials did the planning task.
Go and ask our officials who has prepared this year local plan? They would tell you the Woreda did that.”
. . . Local Capacity for Planning (LCP)
LCP is one of the major aspects of decentralised local governance processes. It refers to the institutional and policy capacity of local actors in performing their respective
responsibilities. The policy capacity refers to the ability
of local actors to contextualise the policy direction and
allocate scarce resources to implement policy (Painter &
Pierre,
). Local institutional capacity denotes specified rules, procedures, and norms that govern interactions of local institutions by delineating their role and
responsibilities with adequate conflict mitigation mechanisms (Peters & Pierre,
). Hope (
, p.
) de-
The farmer’s remark echoed in a similar conversation
with local officials. Snyder and others who researched
on local planning practice (see Snyder et al.,
) found
that Kebeles were involved in the initial planning process
Interview with local farmer in Azo Gule in January
, Gamo highland.
Interview with local farmer in Goshebado in December
.
Table . Response to the statement ‘local governance is decentralised and all-inclusive’. Source: Survey data (
Indicators
.
SD
.
DK
SD
( . )
( . )
DA
UD
(
. )
AG
(
. )
SA
(
. )
Total
( . )
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
Politics and Governance,
).
Household ratings (%)
Mean
Local authorities are
decentralised and
all inclusive
/
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
(
)
(giving input) but Woreda authorities made the final decision regarding the plan. The respondents’ views regarding Kebele’s capacity to make and implement local plans
are presented in Table .
Table reveals that the majority of respondents
(around . %, N =
) were undecided and a significant number of respondents ( . %, N =
) do not
believe in local authorities independent capacity to plan
and implement. Poor organisational capacity in terms of
physical facilities, human and financial resources were
also observed during field visits. Although the population
and territorial size of the Kebeles have been changed; neither new institutional innovations nor improved organisational structures have developed to accommodate the
dynamism. Hence, the Kebeles’ local capacity to make
plans remains limited. The findings of the survey also confirm this fact.
erment that marks ‘increasing the capacity of individuals and groups to make choices and to transform these
choices into desired actions and outcomes’ has had a significant impact on transforming the dependent poor into
productive citizens.
Though the rural Kebeles represent the wider and
larger segment of the society ( % of the Ethiopian population), they exercise very limited administrative power
which is delegated by Woreda authorities. Their accountability is upward and not to the local people (Ayele,
). Their ability to deliver adequate and fast local
services is severely constrained by resource problems.
As one farmer noted in focus group discussion in Dawa,
Jimma area: “The Kebele authorities try to give us a swift
response to most of our questions at their best. However,
because of resource problems, we were not getting adequate services” .
As we witnessed in the fieldwork, most of Kebele administration runs with a shortage of resources. They did
not even have a well-organised archive and record system, let alone necessary services. It is very difficult to get
basic information about the Kebele.
Regarding participation, the current Kebele structures were much appreciated by local people in most of
the study areas. Most of the farmers interviewed were
involved in Kebele activities in one way or another.
Table presents the views of local people from the
study areas about local governance effectiveness in their
respective localities.
The first statement addressed local service delivery.
As we can see from the result, the overwhelming majority of respondents (mean value . , supposing
amounted to agreement) were not satisfied and .
per cent (N =
) agreed with statement, % (N = )
strongly agreed and . % (N =
) were ‘undecided’.
The second statement was ‘the local governance system
is all-inclusive and participatory’. The overall mean value
obtained from the respondents on this was . . This
means most of the respondents seemed to agree that
the existing local system is participatory and all-inclusive.
Accordingly,
. % (N =
) and
. % (N = ) of
the respondents ‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ with the
statement respectively. The third statement was about
accountability of local authority to local people. Again,
. . . Effective Local Governance System (ELGS)
An ELGS comprises local institutional capacity for service
delivery, accountability and responsiveness of local authorities, and participation and inclusion of the local people in the local governance system. All these dimensions
of ELGS indicate the level and scope of local governance
effectiveness and efficiency under decentralised governance notions. Effective service delivery to the poor is
an integral aspect of poverty reduction efforts (Bonfiglioli,
; Grindle,
). The basic social services allow
poor people to be productive members of the society.
Therefore, the provision of services including education,
health, family planning, road, electricity, water, agricultural support and security are essential in poverty reduction effort.
Ideally, accountability and responsiveness allow the
local people to call officials and to hold them accountable to their performance. It is also an effective means
to control corruption and embezzlement of meagre resources at localities (Rao & Berg,
). Participation
and empowerment in the local governance practice is
another major aspect of local governance effectiveness
(Bonfiglioli,
). As Alsop (
) and Green (
)
note, poverty, power and right are inexorably interconnected. According to Alsop (
, p. ), political empowFocus group discussion in February
, Dawa, Jimma area.
Table . Response to the statement ‘local authority has the capacity to make and implement local plan’. Source: Survey
data (
/
).
Indicators
Household ratings (%)
Mean
Local authorities have
independent capacity to
make local development
plan and implement them
.
SD
.
DK
( . )
SD
( . )
DA
UD
(
. )
AG
(
. )
SA
(
. )
Total
( . )
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
(
)
Table . Response to the statements regarding local government effectiveness (service delivery, accountability, participation). Source: Survey data (
/
).
Indicators
Household ratings (%)
Mean
SD
DK
SD
DA
UD
AG
SA
Total
Local service delivery
is not adequate
.
.
( . )
( . )
(
. )
(
. )
(
. )
(
)
(
)
The local governance is
inclusive and participatory
.
.
( . )
( . )
(
. )
(
. )
(
. )
(
)
(
)
Local authorities are
accountable to
the local people
.
.
( . )
( . )
(
. )
(
. )
(
)
(
. )
Notes: DK= don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
as evident in the results, the overwhelming majority
of respondents believed that local officials are accountable to the local people. The mean value is . (almost
agreement) and . % (N =
) and . % (N =
)
‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ to the question respectively. However, as we witnessed in the field work and
evidences gathered during key informant interviews, the
accountability of the Kebele authorities is upward to the
Woreda level administration.
. The Practice of Decentralised Governance and
Poverty Reduction at Kebele Localities
Participatory decentralised local governance is generally
better informed about the needs and preference of local community than central government, which has limited opportunities to access the reality from a distance.
In decentralised governance, monitoring and controlling
of local agents is easier (Bonfiglioli,
). Local people
hold the elected officials accountable, and poor people
get the opportunity to voice their interest in the political decision-making process. Moreover, the devolution
of power gives more responsibility, ownership and incentives to the local people (Green,
; Saito,
).
The effectiveness of decentralised governance depends on the institutional capacity of local authorities
and policy implementation capacity (poverty reduction
strategies) by the state. Likewise, poverty needs to be
addressed through effective policy instruments that are
supported by workable institutions at all level of administration (Treisman,
). Institutional capacity has several dimensions such as human capital, infrastructure
(physical capital) and capacity to deliver services. Institutional capacity is critical in implementing decentralised
governance. Poor quality of institutions may cause resource embezzlement, delay or denial of service delivery
to the local people, and in the worst case, sluggish local
economic performance. Institutions, therefore, are quite
essential to fight against poverty (Painter & Pierre,
;
Treisman,
).
The policy capacity (for developing poverty reduction strategies) is another major factor in decentralised
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
governance. It guides the process of decentralised governance towards mitigating poverty challenges. As decentralised governance transfers power and resources to
lower echelons of administration, it allows participation,
fair resource distribution, empowerment and responsiveness. Decentralised governance thus creates a conducive
ground for policy implementation (Painter & Pierre,
).
As we noted earlier, the decentralisation of power
to local governance institutions drifted at Woreda level
administration. Although the majority of the people live
in rural localities, decentralisation of power and devolution of resources has not extended to the grassroots administration (Zewde & Pausewang,
). The poverty
reduction efforts coordinated from Woredas have been
implemented through three major approaches, namely
enhancing agricultural productivity through improved
technology, developing resilience to vulnerability and
food insecurity through a Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which aims to build assets and livelihoods of vulnerable households, and resettling farmers
from drought-prone areas into fertile but less inhabitable
locations in selected lowland areas of the country. For example, Woreda Agriculture and Rural Development Bureau (WORAD) coordinates the PSNP. The main responsibility of governing the PSNP is vested in specifically established Woreda Food Security Task Forces (WFSTFs). Figure below describes the implementation of the PSNP at
Kebele level administration. The Woreda task force coordinated by WORAD consists of WFSTFs, the Woreda Food
Security Desk (WFSD) and the Woreda Office of Finance
and Economic Development (WOFED).
At the Kebele level, the FSTF comprises of the selected council members, the chair of the Kebele, development agents and the Kebele manager. The role of the
Kebele in the implementation of PSNP is limited to the
selection of eligible households to the programme, collecting complaints from the beneficiaries and organising
public meetings for the Woreda officials. Woreda, however, carries out the overall programme. Even the decision whether the household is to remain part of the programme or not is made by Woreda. Figure presents the
governing process of PSNP.
Regional State Board
FSCO
WoredaFSTF
• Resolve any major problems or issues arising
• out of the selecon process.
• Undertake spot checks on Kebeles
• Submit the list of parcipants to the Woreda
• Council for final approval.
• Review, compile and approve Kebele
• parcipant lists
• Compare planning figures from the region
• to the actual requested number of
• parcipants from the Kebeles, and take
• appropriate acon.
• Propose allocaon of parcipant numbers
• for each PA or Kebele.
• Set local criteria for beneficiary selecon.
Woreda Council
KebeleFSTF
• Collect and compile parcipant lists from
• the different villages (including PW/DS
• allocaon) and submit these to the WFSTF
• for verificaon, consent, and/or adjustment.
• Familiarize the CFSTF with beneficiary
• selecon procedures.
Kebele Council
Household/Community
Figure . PSNP governance framework at Kebele level. Source: Sketched by the authors.
Taking this figure into consideration, the role of the
Kebele in poverty reduction is trivial. Most of the Kebele
administrations could not provide accurate information
about the magnitude and depth of poverty in their localities. They do not have information systems about basic
data on demography or economic matters (such as land
size, productivity, income, non-farm income, type of crop
production), agro-ecology, vulnerability, types and level
of technology, social service provision, or rural infrastructure coverage (electricity, road, telephone, water).
In the areas where this research was conducted—Azo
Gule, Chano Mile, Amaraena Bodo, Gerema, Merewa,
Alyu Amba, and Goshe Bado—the researchers witnessed
this fact. However, it should be noted that Alyu Amba,
Chano Mile and Goshe Bado were relatively in a better
condition compared to others as they did store some basic information about the area.
Another poverty mitigation mechanism at Kebele
level is FTC. The FTC is considered a cornerstone to support small-scale agriculture in rural Ethiopia, and was introduced in
in each rural Kebele. Three development agents are assigned to each FTC. They are trained
in crop science, livestock, and natural resource man-
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
agement. There are nearly ,
such centres throughout the country. The government’s plan is to establish
about ,
centres in the near future. About seven to
ten committee members including development agents
and selected model farmers manage the centre. The Kebele Chairperson is in charge of coordinating the FTC.
The Committee’s responsibility includes planning, examining the training and demonstration activities offered
by the FTC. It also organises and maintains a demonstration field. The FTC provides training and technical assistance in the application of improved technology, production systems, market-orientated information, seed and
seedlings of new crops, vegetables, fruit and forage varieties. FTC is part of the initiative to modernise and improve the agricultural system production in each Kebele.
FTC and PSNP are the two institutional (infrastructural) settings to address poverty at Kebele level. FTC
aims to reduce poverty through intensification and diversification of agricultural products. It also provides assistance on market-related information and non-farm
work opportunities to diversify the income of the farmers. The PSNP is the social protection programme for
ensuring food security for vulnerable and food-insecure
poor households through direct assistance (cash or food)
and food-for-work arrangements. The implementation
of both modalities have been limited by lack of fiscal and
political power in Kebele administration.
The role of the Kebele in the PSNP is to identify and
select beneficiaries for the Woreda authorities. Kebeles
did not assume power and necessary resources to implement both PSNP and FTC initiatives because the government has not been providing substantial public investment in rural Kebeles. It seems to adhere to the same
policy as the Derg governments. Therefore, lack of incremental rural public investment has remained the major
challenge in tackling rural poverty. The resource transfers from rural areas to the centre have consolidated the
power structure of the state, but prevent trickle-down
to the poor, reinforcing dependency and systematically
perpetuating poverty.
Some scholars criticise the poverty reduction scheme
as top-down in that it conceives of the poor as subjects
ultimately dependent on the state for their well-being.
This understanding of the poor as subject involves a policy implication and consequence. Rather than ensuring
the well-being of citizens, the government seems to be
concerned with guaranteeing its own survival by amassing support from the poor subjects. Poverty reduction
efforts are political in that poor households are allowed
support on condition that they fully support the regime.
For instance, in the case of the PSNP, poor households
are identified and selected by WFSTF at Kebeles chaired
by the Kebele chairperson. In most cases, the Kebele authority handpicks farmers who are loyal to the regime as
a reward.
In our study, we also asked the peasants whether the
PSNP was politically tied. The following tables present
the results.
Tables and portray that majority of the respondents tend to believe that the PSNP is tied to political mo-
tives. A total of . % (N =
) of the respondents were
‘undecided’ on the issue while . % (N =
) and . %
(N = ) of respondents ‘agreed’ and ‘strongly agreed’ respectively. Majority of the respondents in Dawa ( . %,
N = ; %, N = ) agreed and strongly agreed respectively and in Azo Gule Kebele ( . %, N = ; . %,
N = ) ‘agreed’, and ‘strongly agreed’, respectively that
the PSNP is tied to political motives.
The goal of the state, therefore, appears to be consolidating its control over the society rather than reducing poverty. Consequently, poor people get less consideration for empowerment and participation. Moreover,
the practice maintains a dependency syndrome on aid
among a wide spectrum of rural people who believe they
are eligible for aid in response to their loyalty and support of the government (Dercon, Gilligan, Hoddinott, &
Woldehanna,
).
. Conclusion
In postEthiopia, an ethnic federal governance system was established, comprising Regional Governments
and a Federal State, apportioning the state power between the two according to the
Constitution, which
is based on ethnic geography and identity. Each Region
has been accorded a quasi-sovereign status and has
awarded a self-rule right with the autonomy to have separate regional constitutions. In addition to an ethnic federal governance system, the state introduced decentralisation of power to local governance structure in
. Accordingly, the Woreda level of administration gave some
political, fiscal, and administrative power to the Woreda
authorities. They also assumed a mandate to plan and
coordinate development activities at Kebele and Woreda
administration level. However, Kebeles, as the lower echelon of local administration, have not experienced any
significant change.
Table . Response to the statement whether PSNP is a political tool of Government. Source: Survey data (
Indicators
/
).
Household ratings (%)
Mean
The PSNP is politically tied
SD
.
DK
.
SD
( . )
DA
( . )
UD
(
. )
AG
(
. )
SA
(
. )
Total
( . )
(
)
Notes: DK = don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
Table . Respondents’ view about PSNP connection to political motives based on beneficiary Kebeles. Source: Survey data
(
/
).
Indicators
The PSNP is tied to political agenda
DK
Kebele
Dawa
Azo Gule
AlyuAmbaZuria
%(N)
%(N)
%(N)
( )
( )
( )
SD
. ( )
( )
. ( )
DA
. ( )
( )
. ( )
UD
. (
. (
. (
AG
)
)
)
. ( )
. ( )
. ( )
SA
. (
. (
( )
Total
)
)
%( )
( )
( )
Notes: DK= don’t know, SD = strongly disagree, DA = Disagree, UD = Undecided, AG = Agree, and SA = Strongly Agree; figures in
parentheses are percentages.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
The skills, knowledge and experiences of the Kebele administrations are inadequate in terms of organisational and institutional capacities, nor are they entitled to
exercising any significant political, fiscal and administrative power. They simply serve as agents of district authorities. They are neither budgeted nor allowed to generate
any local finances. Their role in local development activities and poverty reduction, therefore, is limited institutionally. In this study, three indicators were used to examine the role of Kebeles in local development activities,
delivery of services to the local people and poverty reduction efforts. Based on the indicators DSR, LCP and ELGS as
elucidated in this study, the role and performance of the
Kebeles seem to be unsatisfactory.
DSR was not implemented at the Kebele level, and
the findings indicate that the Kebeles lack the capacity
and resources to deliver development. A system of upward accountability of the local officials to Woreda was
established rather than downwards to the local people.
The LCP is weak at Kebele level because of weak organisational capacity and institutional constraints related to
DSR. The ELGS is poor since Kebeles did not assume any
fiscal right and administrative power for the reasons associated with DSR and LCP.
The government enacted three major policy strategies to address rural poverty. These are: a) enhancing
agricultural productivity through improved technology,
b) developing resilience to vulnerability and food insecurity through PSNPs, which aim to build assets and c)
improve livelihoods of vulnerable households, and resettlement of farmers from drought-prone areas to fertile but less inhabitable locations in selected lowland areas of the country. However, all these efforts are coordinated and managed by the Woreda administration. For
example, two major poverty alleviation programmes operate at Kebele level, these being the PSNP and FTC. The
first programme aims to support food-insecure and vulnerable households and the second is intended to increase the productivity of local households through the
application of improved inputs for agricultural production via training and field demonstrations. However, as
noted in this article, neither programme is fully functional because of lack of resources and power. Therefore, the absence of effective decentralised governance
practice at local level in fact gravely constrains the performance of poverty reduction efforts and curtail local
development initiatives.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Abbink, J. (
). Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia. Journal of African Law, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/S
Abbink, J. (
). The Ethiopian Second Republic and
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
the fragile “social contract”. Africa Spectrum, ( ),
– .
Abegaz, B. (
). Escaping Ethiopia’s poverty trap:
The case for a second agrarian reform. The Journal
of Modern African Studies, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/S
X
Ali Khan, S. (
). Decentralization and poverty reduction: A theoretical framework for exploring the
linkages. International Review of Public Administration,
( ),
–
. doi: .
/
.
.
Alsop, R. (
). Power, rights and poverty reduction. In
R. Alsop, (Ed.), Power, rights and poverty: Concepts
and connections. Washington DC: World Bank.
Assefe, T., & Gebre-Egziabher, T. (
). Decentralization
in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies.
Ayele, Z. (
). Local government in Ethiopia: Still an apparatus of control? Law, Democracy & Development,
( ). doi: .
/ldd.v i .
Bardhan, P. (
). The economic theory of agrarian institutions. Oxford University Press.
Bardhan, P. K., & Mookherjee, D. (
). Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: A
comparative perspective (Vol. ). Massachusetts: The
MIT Press.
Belachew, M. (
). E-government initiatives in Ethiopia.
Paper presented at the th International Conference
on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance, Beijing, China. doi: .
/
.
Boko, S. H. (
). Decentralization and reform in
Africa. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
doi: .
/
- Bonfiglioli, A. M. (
). Empowering the poor: Local governance for poverty reduction. New York: United Nations Publications.
Chanie, P. (
). Clientelism and Ethiopia’s postdecentralisation. The Journal of Modern African Studies,
( ),
– . doi: .
/S
X
Davoodi, H., & Zou, H. (
). Fiscal decentralization
and economic growth: A cross-country study. Journal
of Urban Economics, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/
juec.
.
Dean, M. (
). Governmentality: Power and rule in
modern society ( nd ed.). London: Sage.
Dercon, S., Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J., & Woldehanna,
T. (
). The impact of agricultural extension and
roads on poverty and consumption growth in fifteen
Ethiopian villages. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics,
( ),
–
. doi: .
/j.
.
.
.x
Engdawork, D. (
). Agricultural producer cooperatives: Some lessons of experience from Ethiopia. GeoJournal, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/BF
Fiseha, A. (
). Federalism and the accommodation of
diversity in Ethiopia: A comparative study. Oisterwijk:
Wolf Legal.
Gebresenbet, F. (
). Securitisation of development in
Ethiopia: The discourse and politics of developmen-
talism. Review of African Political Economy, (sup ),
S –S . doi: .
/
.
.
Green, D. (
). From poverty to power: How active citizens and effective states can change the world. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing.
Grindle, M. S. (
). Going local: Decentralization, democratization, and the promise of good governance.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Harrison, G. (
). The World Bank and Africa: The construction of governance states. London: Routledge.
Hope, K. R. (
). Poverty, livelihoods, and governance
in Africa: Fulfilling the development promise. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kettl, D. F. (
). The transformation of governance:
Public administration for the twenty-first century. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Lavers, T. (
). ‘Land grab’as development strategy?
The political economy of agricultural investment in
Ethiopia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/
.
.
Lefort, R. (
). Powers–mengist–and peasants in rural Ethiopia: The postinterlude. The Journal
of Modern African Studies, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/S
X
Lessa, L. F., Belachew, M., & Anteneh, S. (
). Sustainability of E-Government project success: Cases from
Ethiopia. Paper presented at the AMCIS, Detroit, MI.
Makki, F., & Geisler, C. (
). Development by dispossession: Land grabbing as new enclosures in contemporary Ethiopia. Paper presented at the International
Conference on Global Land Grabbing, Sussex, UK.
Mammo, T. (
). The paradox of Africa’s poverty:
The role of indigenous knowledge, traditional practices and local institutions. The case of Ethiopia.
Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press.
Mengisteab, K. (
). Identity politics, democratisation
and state building in Ethiopia’s federal arrangement.
African Journal on Conflict Resolution, ( ), – .
doi: .
/ajcr.v i .
Meuleman, L. (
). Public management and the
metagovernance of hierarchies, networks and markets: The feasibility of designing and managing governance style combinations. Berlin: Springer Science
& Business Media.
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (
). Governing the present: Administering economic, social and personal life. Cambridge: Polity.
Painter, M., & Pierre, J. (
). Challenges to state pol-
icy capacity: Global trends and comparative perspectives. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: .
/
Pausewang, S. (
). The need for a third alternative:
The amputated debate on land tenure in Ethiopia. Paper presented at the XI World Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim, Norway.
Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (
). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. Journal
of Public Administration: Research and Theory, ( ),
–
. doi: .
/oxfordjournals.jpart.a
Pierre, J., & Peters, G. B. (
). Governance, politics and
the state. London: Palgrave Macmilan.
Rao, N., & Berg, R. (
). Transforming local political
leadership. New York: Palgrave.
Saito, F. (
). Foundations for local governance: Decentralization in comparative perspective. Heidelberg: Springer Science & Business Media. doi: .
/
- Schneider, A. (
). Decentralization: Conceptualization and measurement. Studies in Comparative International Development, ( ), – . doi: .
/
BF
Shah, A. (
). Local governance in developing countries. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. doi:
.
/
- Snyder, K. A., Ludi, E., Cullen, B., Tucker, J., Zeleke, A.
B., & Duncan, A. (
). Participation and performance: Decentralised planning and implementation
in Ethiopia. Public Administration and Development,
( ), – . doi: .
/pad.
Stoker, G. (
). Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social Science Journal, (
),
– . doi: .
/
.
Treisman, D. (
). The architecture of government:
Rethinking political decentralization. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. doi: .
/CBO
Turton, D. (
). Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective. Oxford: James
Currey.
Yilmaz, S., & Venugopal, V. (
). Local government discretion and accountability in Ethiopia (International
Studies Program Working Paper, – ). Washington
DC: World Bank.
Zewde, B., & Pausewang, S. (Eds.). (
). Ethiopia: The
challenge of democracy from below. Uppsala and Addis Ababa: Nordic Africa Institute.
About the Authors
Yeshtila Wondemeneh Bekele is currently finalizing his PhD in Development Studies at the Norwegian
University of Life Sciences. Yeshtila has substantial experience in research activities working as senior
security and counter-terrorism analyst at the Ministry of Ethiopian National Defense and working as
faculty member in different capacities at both Bahir Dar and Hawassa Universities. He serves at the
Center for Policy and Development Research, Hawasa University, as Governance and Policy Cluster
leader and senior researcher. He is also coordinating NORHED-DEG project funded by NORAD.
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –
Darley Jose Kjosavik is Associate Professor of International Development Studies at the Norwegian
University of Life Sciences. She has a PhD in Development Studies from the same University. Her academic interests include political economy of development, decentralized governance, conflict and development, environment-development nexus, climate change adaptation and mitigation, gender and
development and political economy of marginalization. Her latest book (co-authored with N. Shanmugaratnam) is titled Political Economy of Development in India: Indigeneity in Transition in the State of
Kerala (Routledge London,
).
Politics and Governance,
, Volume , Issue , Pages –