Biafra’s Secessionist Movement

B Biafra’s Secessionist Movement Introduction John Sunday Ojo1 and Kazeem Oyedele Lamidi2 1 School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia International University, Fairfax, VA, USA 2 Department of Local Government Studies, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria On 30 May 1967, the Federal Military Government [FMG] in the Eastern Region, headed by late Lt. Col Odumegwu Ojukwu, broadcasted the secession of Biafra from the Nigerian federation and its independence as a sovereign State. He acted so as a result of mammoth massacres of more than 30,000 Igbos in the northern Nigeria in September 1966 (Smith 2014), which led to Nigeria-Biafra civil war, characterized as a “Holocaust dramaturgy” (Heerten and Moses 2014), shrewdly to eliminate the Igbos from the surface of Nigeria’s vista, considered as one of the most deadly conflict before the episodic tumult of Rwanda genocide. The phenomenological reminiscence of devastation and self-acclaimed genocide of Igbo nation triggered by expulsion synchronized in the northern region and relinquish proclamation from Nigerian federation which ultimately convoyed through 1967 civil war to the current secessionist uprising led by Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB], becomes a substantial concern for global political debate. While the origin of the crisis is traced to leadership struggle among Nigerian political elites, as put by Kirk-Greene (1975), the genesis of this political upheaval had its roots in general disillusionment within the then Nigerian ruling political class. Although, countless reservations have been made on this issue by participants and observers as well as post-hoc public affair analysts. The Synonyms Genocide; Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB]; Nigeria-Biafra civil war; Secession; Western power Definition of Terms Secession Biafra’s Secessionist Movement IPOB A political withdrawal from an independent nation to form a separate political entity – a state This refers to a political struggle championed by late Lt. Col Odumegwu Ojukwu in 1967 to form an independent nation of Biafra. The secessionist movement led to Nigeria-Biafra civil war that lasted between 1967 and 1970. It is an ellipsis for Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB], a new separatist movement championed by Nnamdi Kanu in the Eastern part of Nigeria. # Springer International Publishing AG 2018 A. Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3495-1 2 central theme of this war appeared not only to be indigenous, as accounts could be referenced on the significant role played by both western and eastern powers. The former, namely Soviet Union and Britain, as documented by Ogunbadejo (1980), wanted to establish its foothold and further extend their influences, while the eastern powers, China and France, embraced the biafran cause. The Nigerian security challenges, although, had before the civil uproar, thus serving as a major setback in driving the course of a neocolonialist state. This was evident in 1962 crisis on political census among other civic anomalies. The Nigerian sovereignty became scattered at the eve of this civil unrest in 1967. This position seems susceptible because the challenges posed by this civil explosion between 1967 and 1970 still linger in the security tensions of the Nigerian nation-state. From this subjective position, it may therefore be possible to understand the fundamental and formative set of coinciding forces and circumstances whose applicability, as argued by Kirk-Greene (1975), have a more general validity for wider issues on continental security in the new states of independent Africa. The Northerners and Easterners took the confrontational stage during the civil war, as the latter assumed the position of minorities, encapsulated with the motive of seceeding from the geographical area known as Nigeria – which still constitutes, among others, the bane of Nigerian democracy. Secessionist movements present themselves to the global public as analogues of colonial liberation movements: long-established identities are denied rights of self-determination by quasi-imperial authorities (Federal Military Government). Secession is, by definition, spatial. That is, the exiting group must inhabit contiguous territories that can form a unity distinct from the existing political entity. In the normal case in which the richer part of the national population is geographically dispersed – for example, living in the better suburbs of each city. The Northerners seemed to take a posture of dominant ruling group, as most of the ethnic men were at the corridor of power. Often, elements of Biafra’s Secessionist Movement ethnic affinity and prebendalism is, at glaring level, observed in actions and activities of the military junta. Intertwining issues therefore emanates from the different ethno-political positions of the military leaders. In this regard, the interethnic conflicts pose to be inimical to the democratic sustenance in the polity. For instance, whenever a Northerner emerges as the leader of the country, governance impeding crises, most times, upsurge in the eastern part of the country, vice versa. This milieu, which has its roots in the Nigeria-biafra war, provides a flashlight to most crises, which although takes different dimensions, specifically on religion as well as regional disadvantages, but mostly hinges on personal disillusionments of the ruling class. Fifty years (50 years) of Nigeria-Biafra civil war – 1967–2017, the Eastern Nigeria could not move away from the deplorable memories the war entrenched in the psychological, sociological, economical, and political landscape of the region. The resurgence of Biafra agitation for statehood under the civilian regime of President Muhammadu Buhari raises a fundamental question in Nigerian political discourse, with reference to the emergence of Nnamdi Kanu, a leader of IPOB, and the political and security implication that surrounds the agitation. In this entry, an attempt is made to investigate the posthumous waves of Biafra’s secessionist movement that metamorphosed into Nigeria-Biafra civil war in 1967 and political impasse that circumvents its resurgence in 2017. The memories of the war have recently gained momentum in the Easter region, as underscored by the formation of the Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB]. This entry provides alternative political solution, channeling through regional autonomy in the country. It further argues that existing 36 states should be jettisoned by conceding autonomy to allow each province valve from their natural resources and reimburse the necessary approved revenue formulae to the national government. The subterfuge behind this proposition is to make the center unappealing to ethnic cronies, political elites, and Biafra secessionists. Biafra’s Secessionist Movement Adapted from Ojo .J.S. & Fagbohun .F.O. (2014) Military Governance and Civil War: Ethnic Hegemony as a constructive Factor in Nigeria; Global Journal of Human Social Science, Volume 14 Issue 4: 17–35. Date 6 July 1967 10 July 1967 15 July 1967 25 July 1967 9 August 1967 10 August 1967 29 August 1967 14 September 1967 4 October 1967 9 October 1967 18 October 1967 January 1968 21 March 1968 5 April 1968 21 April 1968 Late April 1968 6 May 1968 19 May 1968 Combatant advancements Fighting breaks out between the federal and Biafran troops The first division of the Nigerian Army under colonel Mohammed Shuwa captures Ogoja. Biafran aircraft bombs Lagos Shuwa captures Nsukka Third marine commandos division of the Nigerian Army under colonel Benjamen Adekunle captures Bonny The rebels invade mid-west and capture Benin. Later, in a hurried response, a second division of the Nigerian Army under colonel Murtala Mohammed is formed Gowon declares total war. Lagos bombed again Murtala recaptures ore and thus halts Biafran threat to Ibadan and Lagos Murtala recaptures Benin Shuwa captures Enugu Murtala captures Asaba. Subsequent attempts to cross the Niger and capture Onitsha proved abortive Adekunle captures Calabar After the abortive attempts to capture Onitsha from Asaba Murtala moves up the Niger, crosses it at Idah, and advances down to Awka and Onitsha Murtala captures Onitsha Shuwa captures Abakaliki Shuwa captures Afikpo The entire south eastern state liberated by Adekunle Adekunle captures Bonny oil field in rivers state Adekunle captures port Hacourt and thus completes the sealing off of Biafra from the sea (continued) 3 Date 26 May 1968 29 July 1968 4 September 10–11 September 1968 15 September 1968 16 September 1968 30 September 1968 November/ December 1968 21–24 December 1968 22 April 1969 12 May 1969 27 December 1969 7 January 1970 11 January 1970 12 January 1970 13 January 1970 Combatant advancements Colonel I.B.M Haruna replaces Murtala as G.O.C. Second division Adekunle captures Ahoada, last major state in rivers state Adekunle captures Aba Adekunle captures Oguta and advances on the Uli airstrip which was Biafra’s major link with the outside world Biafrans retake Oguta Adekunle captures Owerri Shuwa captures Okigwi Nigerian airforce begins air strikes on Biafran airstrips especially Uli but with little effect Biafran offensive to recapture Owerri and Aba foiled Biafra recaptures Owerri Major reshuffle of Nigerian’s Army commanders. Obasanjo takes over from Adekunle, Jalo from Haruna, and Bisalla from Shuwa Third division links up with the first at Umuahia Third division recaptures Owerri Ojukwu flees Biafra for Ivory Coast Obasanjo captures Uli airstrip. Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Effiong who took over from Ojukwu brocasts surrender over on Radio Biafra Gowon accepts Biafra surrender Source: Adapted from Ojo (2014) The New Waves of Biafra Secessionist Movement In the post-civil war regime, the ever-increasing cadence for statehood has been threatening the political consolidation of Nigerian ethnicized matrimony, marked as second wave of Biafra secessionist movement, muscled by Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB], concocted by Nnamdi Kanu [IPOB], validates the chronological pursuit toward independence of Biafra nation. The former 4 Biafra’s leader Lt. Col Odumegwu Ojukwu was defeated by Nigerian state in his expedition to declare a sovereign State of Biafra in 1967; however, the resurgence of a new movement – [IPOB] – in 2015 triggers the second waves of secessionist impasse that raises a contemporary political discourse in Nigeria. Nnamdi Kanu formed Indigenous People of Biafra [IPOB] while studying at the London Metropolitan University; he pioneered Radio Biafra in London in 2009. The radio station was instrumentalized as a mouthpiece for Biafra secessionist agitation. After his study in the UK, Nnamdi Kanu was arrested in Nigeria and charged with treasonable felony. He was granted bail by the court on certain condition in 2017. The conditions include provision of three sureties with N100 million each, “he must not be seen in a crowd exceeding 10 people; and that the defendant should not grant any interviews, hold or attend any rallies, respectively” (The Punch Newspaper 22 July 2017). The pro-Biafra nationalist accused Nigerian government of political marginalization and underdevelopment in the Eastern Nigeria. The leader of IPOB emphasized the necessity to pull out of Nigerian state; he noted that “nothing seems to be working in Nigeria. There is pain and hardship everywhere. What we’re fighting [for] is not selfdetermination for the sake of it. It's because Nigeria is not functioning and can never function” Biafra’s Secessionist Movement, Fig. 1. Ipob claims these existing states would make up an independent Biafra. Source: BBC News (5 May 2017) Biafra’s Secessionist Movement (Aljazeera 30 May 2017). The form of marginalization of Igbo by Nigerian state includes exclusion from holding prominent political appointment in Nigeria such as Inspector-General of Nigerian Police Force, Chief of Army Staff, and other important positions. It was argued that “more than a dozen officers have held the post of inspector general police. Two of them have been Igbo. In a lineup of almost two-dozen chiefs of army staff, the highest-ranking military officer in the Nigerian army, two have come from southeastern Nigeria. There has only been one Igbo president and one Igbo vice president since Nigerian independence in 1960”. “The southeast feels it has been politically marginalized. There is a point to that. It has been shrunken from being one of the three major regions of the country to now being virtually a minority with the smallest number of states of the six zones in the federation” (Aljazeera 2017). Biafra Claimed Territory See Fig. 1. Nigeria’s Federal Political Structure See Table 1. Biafra’s Secessionist Movement 5 Biafra’s Secessionist Movement, Table 1 Nigeria’s Federal Political Structure and Natural Resources No 1 State Borno 2 Yobe 3 Bauchi 4 Adamawa 4 Taraba 6 Gombe 7 Plateau 8 Kogi 9 Benue 10 11 Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Niger 12 Kwara 13 Nassarawa 14 Jigawa, 15 Kebbi 16 Katsina 17 Kaduna 18 Kano Geopolitical zone Northeast Northeast Northeast Northeast Northeast Northeast Northcentral Northcentral Northcentral Northcentral Northcentral Northcentral Northcentral Northwest Northwest Northwest Northwest Northwest Number of local government area 27 Natural resources Bentonite, clay, diatomite, gypsium, hydro-carbon, kaolin, and limestone Soda ash and Tintomite Population 4,171,104 Number of ethnic groups 21 2,321,339 10 17 Gold, cassiterite (tine ore), columbite, gypsium, Wolfram, coal, limestone, lignite, iron-ore, and clay Bentonite, gypsium, kaolin, and magnesite Lead/zinc 4,653,066 55 20 3,178,950 58 21 2,294,800 52 16 Gemstone and gypsium 2,365,040 21 11 Barite, bauxite, Betonite, bismuth, Cassiterite, clay, coal, Emeral, fluoride, gemstone, granite, iron-ore, kaolin, lead/ zinc, marble, molybdenite, phrochlore, salt, tantalite/columbite, tin, and Wolfram Cole, dolomite, feldspar, gypsium, ironore, kaolin, marble, talc, and tantalite Barite, clay, coal, gemstone, gypsum, iron-ore, lead/zinc, limestone, marble, and salt Cassiterite, clay, dolomite, gold, lead/ zinc, marble, and tantalite 3,206,531 65 17 3,314,043 8 21 4,253,641 6 23 1,406,239 7 6 Gold, lead/zinc, and talc 3,954,772 27 25 Cassiterite, columbite, feldspar, gold, iron-ore, marble, mica, and tantalite Amethyst (topaz garnet), Barytex, barite, cassirite, chalcopyrie, clay, columbite, coking coal, dolomite/marble, feldspar, galena, iron-ore, limestone, mica, salt, sapphire, talc, tantalite, tourmaline quartz, and zireon Butyles 2,365,353 3 16 1,869,377 29 13 4,361,002 6 27 Gold 3,256,541 8 21 Kaolin, marble, and salt 5,801,584 3 34 Amethyst, aqua marine, asbestos, clay, Flosper, gemstone, gold, graphite, kaolin, hyanite, mica, rock crystal, ruby, sapphire, sihnite, superntinite, tentalime, topaz, and tourmaline Gassiterite, copper, gemstone, glass-sand, lead/zinc, pyrochinre, and tantalite 6,113,503 23 23 9,401,288 2 44 (continued) 6 Biafra’s Secessionist Movement Biafra’s Secessionist Movement, Table 1 (continued) Geopolitical zone Northwest No 19 State Sokoto 20 Zamfara 21 Lagos 22 Osun 23 Oyo 24 Ondo Southwest 25 Ekiti 26 Ogun 27 Bayelsa Southwest Southwest Southsouth 28 Delta 29 Rivers 30 32 AkwaIbom CrossRiver Edo 33 Enugu 34 Imo 35 Anambra 36 Abia 37 Ebonyi 31 Northwest Southwest Southwest Southwest Southsouth Southsouth Southsouth Southsouth Southsouth Southeast Southeast Southeast Southeast Southeast Source: Authors Compilation Number of ethnic groups 3 Number of local government area 23 Natural resources Clay, flakes, gold, granite, gypsium, kaolin, laterite, limestone, phosphate, potash, silica sand, and salt Goal, cotton, and gold Population 3,702,676 3,278,873 2 14 Bitumen, clay, and glass-sand 9,113,605 3 20 Columbite, gold, granite, talc, tantalite, and tourmaline Aqua marine, cassiterite, clay, dolomite, gemstone, gold, kaolin, marble, silimonite, talc, and tantalite Bitumen, clay, coal, dimension stones, feldspar, gemstone, glass-sand, granite, gypsium, kaolin, limestone, and oil/gas Feldspar, granite, kaolin, syenite, and tatium Bitumen, clay, feldspar, gemstone, kaolin, limestone, and phosphate Glay, gypsium, lead/zinc, lignite, limestone, manganese, oil/gas, and uranium Clay, glass-sand, gypsium, iron-ore, kaolin, lignite, marble, and oil/gas Clay, glass-sand, lignite, marble, and oil/gas Clay, lead/zinc, lignite, limestone, oil/gas, salt, and uranium Oil/gas, salt and uranium barite, lead/zinc, lignite, limestone, manganese Bitumen, clay dolomite, phosphate, glasssand, gold, gypsium, iron-ore, lignite, limestone, marble, and oil/gas Coal, lead/zinc, and limestone 3,416,959 1 30 5,580,894 1 33 3,460,877 3 18 2,398,957 1 16 3,751,140 3 20 1,704,515 9 8 4,112,445 5 25 5,198,716 9 23 3,902,051 6 31 2,892,988 24 18 3,233,366 7 14 3,267,837 1 17 Gypsium, lead/zinc, lignite, limestone, marcasite, oil/gas, phosphate, and salt Clay, glass-sand, gypsium, iron-ore, lead/ zinc, lignite, limestone, phosphate, and salt Gold, lead/zinc, limestone, oil/gas, and salt Gold, lead/zinc, and salt 3,927,563 1 27 4,177,828 2 21 2,845,380 1 17 2,176,947 14 13 Biafra’s Secessionist Movement Political Restructuring as an Antidote for Secession The cacophony for political restructuring has circumscribed Nigerian polity since the resurgence of Biafra separatist movement in Nigeria. The divergence ethnic groups have pushed for devolution of power to the constituent authorities as against the current political arrangement. The existing lopsided political amalgam, which foster imbalance in political appointment and resource allocation, has been reprimanded by the Nigerian populace. According to Nwabueze “the country should be restructured into six more or less selfgoverning zones or regions, with the powers of the central government drastically reduced, so as to minimize the fierce contest for its control” (quoted in Vanguard Newspaper 7 June 2017). Regionalism has played a prominent role in resolving conflict in multi-ethnic political community all over the world (Spolaore 2008). Ability to self-determination encourages optimal performance of federating units in a federal political structure; as Diamond (2004) bolsters this argument that if different ethnic and regional minorities have some autonomy, some ability to determine their own local affairs with respect to education, culture, and economic development, they will feel more secure and be more willing to accept the authority and legitimacy of the larger national state. Federalism presupposes that the national and states/or regional governments should stand to each other in a relation of meaningful autonomy resting upon a balanced division of powers and resources. Each regional government is obliged to have political capacity and resources adequate to sustain the structure of a functioning government, competent to compete on its own. In today’s Nigeria, inter-ethnic intolerance has reached its pinnacle and become prevalent. Consequently, the nationalities within the Nigerian state are mutually distrustful of each other, and there are many evidences from such festering issues as the violence in the Niger Delta areas, the ethnic clashes in many of the northern and Middle-Belt states, and insecurity allover the country, the unresolved debate over the Sharia question, and the call for resources 7 control by the southern states. In light of all these crises and mutual distrust among Nigerians, there is a definitely a need for the Nigerian nationalities to enjoy relative regional autonomy which is the basic pillar of true federalism (Abegunrin Undated). Therefore, true federalism implies a compromise between the extreme concentration of power (the current case in Nigeria) and a loose confederation of independent states, for governing people usually in a large expanse of territory. Under this form of government, local pride, traditions, and power are retained by the constituent units, while the central government is given the task of handling common problems like currency, international relations, among others. The current campaigns for regional autonomy in Nigeria intends to augment regional development as well as providing opportunity for each region to valve from the existing endowed natural resources within its jurisdiction. Nigeria has practiced regionalism in colonial and postcolonial regimes. The each region was able to develop their agricultural produce such as cocoa in south west, groundnut pyramid in the North, as well as palm oil in the Eastern Nigeria. During this political epoch, oil has not been discovered in the southern Nigeria; therefore, this generates regional competition in developmental processes which has been a major benefit of true federal system. Adopting regionalism will quench the current glow of ethno-religion politics that lengthening insecurity in Nigerian political environment. The regions should be self-reliant in sustaining their economy and also providing opportunity for other regional entity to benefit from its economic surplus through the exchange of goods and services in differing ethno-religious climates. The logic of regional autonomy is to make the center unappetizing to the political elites while strengthening regional political structure as well as plummeting ethnic tension that marinated Nigerian political system. Therefore, the current six geo-political zones should be retained to form regional governments; these include South-South, South-East, South-West, North-East, NorthCentral, and North-West, while scrapping all the 36 state in the country. Hence, each regional government should be allowed to control its resources 8 Biafra’s Secessionist Movement at the same time allocating an agreed revenue formula to the central government in order to perform its statutory functions. The diagram below illustrates a proposed facade of regional government for the country: R4 : South Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF ¼ R5 : South A Designed Model for Regionalism Figure 2 illustration explicates structural framework for true federalism in Nigeria. The proposed political framework called for abolition of 36 states with its replacement with existing six geo-political zones which shall form regional governments. Therefore, the regional government shall be allowed to control its resource; each region is expected to allocate agreed formula from revenue generated to the central government. Assuming one quarter of the Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) of each regional government is proposed to be remitted to the central government, where N is the IGR, and AF represents the Allocated Fund. The below statistical illustration follows using this sharing formula: ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF Ri : North Eastern Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF Eastern Region Southern Region Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF ¼ R6 : South Western Region Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF ¼ At the end, the summation of the Allocated Funds (i.e., AF) becomes the remittance to the central government so as to carry out the national assignments as specified by the governing rules and regulations. However, the “truthfulness” of this type of federalism relies on the regional government, by ensuring immediate and accurate disbursement of the agreed sharing formula without recourse to the inequality of revenue generated by various regions. ¼ R2 : North Central Region Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF ¼ R3 : North Western Region Internally Generated Revenue  100 4 ¼ ¼ðNÞ ¼ AF ¼ Conclusion It is important to note that ethnicity, identity politics, and the problem of marginalization are the major issues that circumvent Biafra secessionist movement in Nigeria. The absence of mutual trust in the political settings of the country has necessitated the incessant agitation of the Pro-Biafra nationalists. To ease ethnic edginess and lengthening political turmoil, this entry advocates for regional autonomy as a panacea for Nigerian lopsided federal political structure; regionalizing the political composition is tantamount to efficient allocation of resources to provide infrastructural facilities which will allow regional competition Biafra’s Secessionist Movement NORTH EASTERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 9 NORTH WESTERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 4 1/ 1/4 (N) LET N = IGR ET N ET )L (N (N )L 4 1/ = = R IG IG R N 1/4 (N) LET N = IGR IG = N ET (N )L 4 SOUTH-SOUTHERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 1/ (N N 4 T )L E 1/ R IG SOUTH-EASTERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT = R FEDERAL GOVERNEMENT SOUTH-WESTERN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT Biafra’s Secessionist Movement, Fig. 2. A proposed structure for true federalism for development in Nigeria. Under the new arrangement, each regional government or geopolitical zone should be allowed to manage its resources to foster development for the benefit of the people. In order to achieve sustainable regional political edifice, a new peoples’ oriented constitution needs to be enacted by the existing regions which shall provide prospect for ethnic dialogue and mutual cohabitation for the sustenance and demonstration of true federal political assemblage in Nigeria. References Abegunrin L (Undated) How to sustain Nigerian federalism. Department of Political Science, Howard University Aljazeera (2017) 50 years on: Nigeria’s Biafra secessionist movement. Aljazeera News, 30 May BBC News (2017) Biafran leader Nnamdi Kanu: the man behind Nigeria’s separatists. BBC News, 5 May Diamond L (2004) Why decentralize power in a democracy? Presented to the conference on Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization, Baghdad, 12 Feb 2004 Heerten L, Moses D (2014) The Nigeria–Biafra war: postcolonial conflict and the question of genocide. J Genocide Res 16:2–3, 169–203 Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (1975) The genesis of the Nigerian civil war and the theory of fear. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Research report - Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; 27 Ogunbadejo O (1980) Nigeria’s foreign policy under military rule 1966–79. Int J 35(4):748–765 Ojo .J.S. & Fagbohun .F.O. (2014) Military Governance and Civil War: Ethnic Hegemony as a constructive Factor in Nigeria; Global Journal of Human Social Science, Volume 14 Issue 4: 17–35. Smith KE (2014) The UK and ‘genocide’ in Biafra. J Genocide Res 16(2–3):247–262 Spolaore E (2008) Fiscal federalism “Regional fiscal flows, balance-sheet federalism, and the stability of 10 federations,” IEB-IEA. A paper prepared for the 5th symposium on Barcelona, 19–20 June 2008 The Punch Newspaper (2017) Nnamdi Kanu fights bail conditions: I want to attend rallies, grant press interviews, 22 July Biafra’s Secessionist Movement Vanguard Newspaper (2017) Kanu not demanding secession – Nwabueze, 7 June