LINKAGES BETWEEN BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND
CORRUPTION ISSUES
QUERY
SUMMARY
Please provide an overview of the linkages between
blockchain technology and corruption issues. Some
trumpet blockchain technology as a potential anticorruption tool while others say that cryptocurrencies
may facilitate money laundering or other corrupt
activities.
Bitcoin and the blockchain technology which drives it
has emerged as one of the most disruptive digital
innovations in recent years.
CONTENT
1.
2.
3.
4.
What are Bitcoin and blockchain?
Misuse of Bitcoin
Potential of blockchain for anti-corruption
References
These technologies are posited as being potential
catalysts of transnational crime on one hand and as
potential tools in the fight against corruption on the
other. Neither perspective is true in the absolute
sense. Bitcoin and other digital currencies can be
used to expedite cross-border crime, tax evasion and
corruption. However, Bitcoin transactions are
meticulously recorded, and digital currencies are
increasingly accepted as a legitimate investment.
Blockchain technology provides huge potential for
more transparent, more accountable and efficient
ways of storing government data and administering
transactions. Yet, there are many challenges to
overcome before the technology can be scaled.
Legal frameworks need reform to regulate digital
currency markets and to harness the full potential of
blockchain technology.
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Author(s)
Niklas Kossow, Hertie School of Governance;
Victoria Dykes, Hertie School of Governance.
tihelpdesk@transparency.org
Reviewer(s)
Matthew Jenkins, Transparency International
Date: 22 January 2018
© 2018 Transparency International. All rights reserved.
This document should not be considered as representative of the Commission or Transparency International’s
official position. Neither the European Commission,Transparency International nor any person acting on
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This Anti-Corruption Helpdesk is operated by Transparency International and funded by the European Union.
Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
1.
WHAT ARE BITCOIN AND
BLOCKCHAIN
The development of Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a decentralised digital currency based on a
peer-to-peer payment system built on cryptographic
principles. It is often also referred to as a
cryptocurrency, as cryptography provides its
technological backbone. Its concept was first
published in a whitepaper by a person or a group of
people under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto
(2008). It was published as a functional open source
code in 2009 and has grown in popularity ever since.
The architecture of Bitcoin relies on a decentralised
computing system of nodes that communicate with
each other to record and verify each Bitcoin
transaction. Rather than data being stored on one
central server, it is simultaneously stored on all full
nodes in the system. A node can technically be any
device with an IP address that is able to become part
of the Bitcoin system; this means that the device is
able to run a programme that validates Bitcoin
transactions.
To turn this into a functional data-storing system,
information is recorded in publicly available ledgers,
which are commonly referred to as blocks. Blocks are
simply collections of data, and can store any type of
data; indeed, data related to Bitcoin transactions is
simply one of the many applications of the technology.
Blocks contain not only data that was recently stored
in them, but all data from previous data points. This
makes it possible to link one block to its previous block
and creates a chain of information and data points; this
is why the underlying technology of the Bitcoin system
is referred to as a blockchain. As a block is a type of
public ledger and operates within a decentralised
system, this type of technology is referred to as
distributed ledger technology (DLT). Different types
and applications of DLT are outlined further below.
In the process of linking new transactions to previous
blocks, the information on the block is time-stamped
and cryptographically sealed. As a result of this
process, no data that was entered in the blockchain
can later be changed or deleted; all data can be traced
back to the exact moment it was added to the
blockchain.
The Bitcoin blockchain uses the SHA256 hash
algorithm to seal the transaction and create a socalled hash, which is effectively a fixed-length string of
text that is uniquely representative of a file or piece of
data in the exact instant the hashing algorithm was
applied. This means that changing the source data
even minutely, and then re-applying the hash
algorithm would generate a completely different hash.
The hash contains information on the data within the
block, and also provides a cryptographic puzzle that
has to be solved to link a new block to the blockchain.
The type of puzzle will stay the same regardless of the
number of transactions or amount of data stored within
a block.
A certain amount of computing power, effort and luck
is required to solve the problem and add data to the
blockchain. Solving this puzzle is thus referred to as
providing a proof-of-work (Nakamoto 2008). This
process of adding new blocks to the blockchain is
called mining in reference to it being a laborious effort
(Kroll et al. 2013).
Bitcoins are created as a reward for this effort and are
distributed to miners, or rather to the computers which
are doing the mining work. Transactions are only
accepted if 51 per cent of the nodes in the blockchain
network verify the transactions and agree that the
correct data was stored and that the proof-of-work was
accurately provided. The difficulty of the proof-of-work
is automatically adjusted to reflect the difficulty of the
blocks to be mined, the number of miners in the
system (which increases the number of blocks that
can be written) and to ensure that enough blocks are
written.
Generally, it is becoming increasingly hard to mine
new bitcoins; the difficulty of the proof-of-work
decreases very rarely. This is another factor which
limits the number of bitcoins which can be in
circulation. This principle which will be further outlined
below.
The entire process behind Bitcoin transactions
provides a solution to the potential problem of dualspending of digital currencies. It ensures that the same
money cannot be spent twice at the same time and it
ensures that ownership of a currency is verified. It thus
establishes trust without an intermediary agent, such
as a bank or a state (Nakamoto 2008).
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
Market size
The difficulty of mining increases over time and thus
requires more and more computing power. To limit the
supply of bitcoins, artificial scarcity is created. This
results in a cap of bitcoins to be created: once there
are 21 million bitcoins in circulation, no more coins will
be added to the market. This principle is enshrined in
the Bitcoin code and cannot be altered; this
functionality helps create the value of bitcoin and
reflects the character of mining a finite resource. It can
currently be divided up to eight decimal places and
thus traded in smaller units (Bitcoin.org 2018b).
Over the past several years, the price of bitcoin has
fluctuated greatly, reaching record highs in 2017 of
almost US$20,000 and a market capitalisation of
US$300 billion (Hackett & Wieczner 2017). The total
market capitalisation of Bitcoin at the time of writing
stood around US$222 billion.
While Bitcoin represents the most important digital
currency, there are many other digital currencies with
different degrees of market capitalisation. The leading
alternative digital currencies are currently Ethereum,
Ripple and Bitcoin Cash (Coinmarketcap 2018). Due
to their attributes, Yermack (2013) argues that digital
currencies behave more like a speculative investment
than like a traditional currency.
Linkages to corruption
Misuse of Bitcoin
Most cryptocurrencies function in a similar way, with
information on them stored using DLT like the Bitcoin
blockchain. They all promise cost-effective, fast and
secure transactions without reliance on an
intermediary agent. As such, digital currencies offer
users the possibility to conduct transactions without
stating their real name as ownership information is
only stored in the form of matching public and private
cryptographic keys (Bitcoin.org 2018). Digital
currencies can thus lend themselves to nonattributable transactions, which provides a potential for
misuse.
Potential of blockchain
While Bitcoin and other digital currencies have soared
in popularity and market capitalisation over the past
several years, many people have also looked at other
uses for the underlying DLT – a term often used
interchangeably with blockchain, the most popular
type of DLT. It essentially provides a decentralised
and efficient way to store most types of data. It offers
the possibility of making data entries more
transparent, to verify the integrity and accuracy of
stored data, and to make previously entered data
immutable. As such, it offers opportunities for public
administration and has the potential to address
corruption problems. For the sake of this paper, DLT
and blockchain are used largely interchangeably.
2.
MISUSE OF BITCOIN
In September 2017, JP Morgan CEO, Jamie Dimon,
stated at a conference that the only people who are
better off using Bitcoin as opposed to official
currencies are murderers, drug dealers, or people
living in places like North Korea (Monaghan 2017).
The extent to which this is true is debatable, but there
is a currently a heated debate about whether Bitcoin is
uniquely situated to promote and support illegal
activities such as money laundering, drug dealing and
computer virus attacks. The salience of these risks
hinges on the (assumed) anonymity Bitcoin provides,
as well as the lack of a central monitoring body that
would otherwise flag or block suspicious transactions.
In discussing the links between Bitcoin, illicit activity
and regulatory efforts, it is helpful to understand two
common types of Bitcoin-related services: exchanges
and wallets. A Bitcoin exchange is an online
marketplace that facilitates the exchange of Bitcoin
into fiat money and vice versa. Today, there are a
variety of exchanges that specialise in different
currencies. Generally, they offer some baseline of
security protections; they also tend to ask for basic
personal information from their users, such as a name
and an e-mail address. A Bitcoin wallet, on the other
hand, is a software service that “stores” a given
person’s Bitcoin (more accurately stated, it stores the
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
Bitcoin’s private key that is shared only with the owner
of the Bitcoin). It is not required to have a wallet to
collect Bitcoin, but having one offers more security and
protection against Bitcoin theft.
Money laundering
There are conflicting perspectives on whether Bitcoin
is more likely than other currencies to be used for
money laundering. Those who argue that Bitcoin has
significant potential to be misused for this purpose
tend to focus on three central qualities of Bitcoin and
many other cryptocurrencies (Choo 2015):
1. Anonymity: although conducting transactions with
Bitcoin via an established online wallet or
exchange service generally does require that the
account is linked to a personal identity, this is not
a requirement to use Bitcoin – it is possible to
bypass exchanges and wallet services and
participate in mining or transactions without ever
having to disclose one’s identity (Ludwin 2015).
Moreover, the lack of a central authority means
that when personal identities are provided, there
is no process of identifying suspicious names, for
example, the names of known criminals.
2. Flexibility: criminals can easily disperse their
bitcoins across multiple accounts to avoid
triggering reporting requirements (if they exist at
all). They can also obfuscate the origins of the
money through layers of multiple transactions that
create a complicated web to unravel.
3. Immediacy: Bitcoin transactions are nearly
instantaneous (although the actual confirmation of
the transaction can take longer). This allows for
rapid shifting of money to different locations, again
making it difficult to track the flow of funds as well
as to stop a transaction if there is suspicion of
illegal activity.
Fears of Bitcoin being used for money laundering are
widely shared by financial regulators across the world,
which is fuelling efforts to extend regulations to
cryptocurrencies (see the section on “attempts to
regulate” below).
Bitcoin transactions are recorded on the blockchain,
and these records are freely available to inspect.
Moreover, although transactions do not record the
personal identity of the persons involved, they do still
log the public keys used by all involved parties (public
keys are unique identifiers and, as the name implies,
they are publicly visible). These public keys and their
associated activities can be tracked, allowing for the
possibility of observing bitcoin flows and identifying
where the money went (for example, if it was
deposited in a specific exchange, or if it is still located
at a user’s personal address) (Meiklejohn et al. 2013).
Users can have multiple addresses from which they
conduct transactions (with an address just being a
similar form of unique identifier like a public key), but
analyses of transaction histories can identify patterns
and attribute these seemingly isolated transactions to
a single user (Ludwin 2015).
Importantly, the findings of Meiklejohn et al. (2013)
suggest that any Bitcoin tied to illicit activity – either
bitcoin acquired as a result of illegal activities or bitcoin
used to fund illegal activities or purchases – will
eventually find its way to one of the mainstream Bitcoin
exchanges. As these exchanges record personal
information about account holders, this opens up the
opportunity for users to be identified if they are
suspected of illegal activity and the exchange in
question is put under pressure to disclose pertinent
information (for example, via a subpoena).
Despite a preponderance of literature and articles that
assert Bitcoin provides full anonymity, this simply is
not true. It is far more accurate to think of Bitcoin as
pseudonymous rather than truly anonymous. Even
Bitcoin.org clearly states on its website that Bitcoin is
not anonymous (2018). Criminals can take steps to
make their paths hard to follow, but ultimately, if the
transactions occur via the blockchain, then they can
be tracked.
Illegal transactions
Black market transactions
However, others argue that claims of the anonymity
Bitcoin provides – and thus its suitability as a means
to conduct illegal transactions – are overstated. In
particular, it is important to remember that while users
can conduct transactions largely anonymously, that
does not mean that their actions are not recorded. All
Bitcoin has gained notoriety for allegedly becoming
the currency of choice for illegal transactions. One of
the most prominent examples of this is the currentlydefunct website Silk Road. This was an online black
market that primarily traded goods like narcotics,
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
prescription drugs and counterfeit documents (by one
account, 70 per cent of the 10,000 products listed on
the marketplace were some sort of drug [Levin at al.
2015]). Importantly, the only currency accepted by the
Silk Road was bitcoin.
A 2013 study estimated that the site saw a monthly
sales volume equivalent to more than US$1.22 million
(Christin 2013). The site has gone through multiple
iterations and was shut down by international
authorities on two different occasions. It also helped
lead to the arrest of Charlie Shrem, generally
considered to be Bitcoin’s “first felon”. Shrem led a
Bitcoin exchange known as BitInstant. He was
arrested in 2014 for violating anti-money laundering
laws through selling bitcoin to users of Silk Road
(Spaven 2015). Today, the Silk Road website appears
to be non-functional.
Authorities in the UK also claim that Bitcoin is making
it easier for drug dealers to hide their actions. In
London, police allege that cryptocurrency ATMs give
dealers an opportunity to quickly convert cash into
bitcoin, providing an alternative to having to make a
large cash deposit into their bank accounts that might
otherwise arouse suspicion (Corcoran 2017).
Ransomware
Bitcoin has also enjoyed increasing popularity in
connection with “ransomware” attacks, whereby
cybercriminals take control of computer and block
access to its files; users must pay a ransom fee to have
the attack lifted. These types of attacks are becoming
increasingly common, and Bitcoin is increasingly
becoming the preferred currency the attackers ask for,
due to its (presumed) anonymity. Some experts even
believe the rise of Bitcoin is increasing the frequency of
these attacks (Palmer 2016).
The lack of a central, sovereign jurisdiction that can
provide information on transactions means traditional
anti-tax evasion strategies, especially those that target
tax havens, will not work for Bitcoin. Since transactions
occur without divulging personal information and the act
of tracing transactions back to individuals is possible but
still potentially extremely laborious, tax authorities are
highly unlikely to know about Bitcoin-related income
unless it is reported (Bal 2015).
It is hard to know just how much potential tax revenue
is going uncollected. A lawsuit filed by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States against
Bitcoin exchange site Coinbase revealed that, in 2015,
just 802 individuals reported a Bitcoin transaction
(Roberts 2017). To try to combat this issue, the IRS
has reportedly purchased specialised software for
tracking Bitcoin transactions (Cox 2017).
Attempts to regulate
The European Union
Increasingly, governments are attempting to regulate
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies as a way to eliminate
the loopholes and grey areas in which it operates.
Most recently, both the United Kingdom and the
European Union have announced their intention to
regulate cryptocurrencies so they adhere to existing
anti-money laundering legislation as well as counterterrorism financial legislation.
A proposed amendment to the EU’s anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing legislation was first
released in July of 2016 and is currently being
discussed by member states (European Commission
2016). It proposes to “designate virtual currency
exchange platforms as obliged entities” to the EU’s
Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4AMLD).
Tax evasion
Bitcoin transactions happen “in the absence of
government, bank, authorised dealer, payment
network, or regulator” (Sapovadia 2015). This means
for those interested in declaring their Bitcoin assets to
the relevant tax authorities, there tends to be
significant confusion about what types of regulations
apply and how to declare properly. But it also means
that for attempting to evade taxes, the use of bitcoin
and other cryptocurrencies presents very real
opportunities.
This means exchange platforms as well as wallet
providers would be subject to the same regulations as
credit and financial institutions. They would be
required to implement preventive measures as well as
to report suspicious transactions. The proposal also
addresses anonymity as one of the problems, stating
that “national financial intelligence units (FIUs) should
be able to associate virtual currency addresses to the
identity of the owner of virtual currencies”; the
proposal also says that the possibility of allowing users
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
of virtual currencies to voluntarily disclose their
identities to authorities should be assessed.
It is unclear, however, how soon any changes might
go into effect. Negotiations have not yet been
completed (which also means it is unclear what, if any,
changes might be made to the proposal from July
2016), and when they are, member states will still have
two years to integrate the directive into their national
laws (Meyer 2017).
Worldwide
Looking beyond the EU, French Finance Minister,
Bruno Le Maire, has said he intends to ask fellow G20
members to contemplate establishing a joint
regulatory framework for Bitcoin, a measure supported
by Germany and Italy (Buergin et al. 2017).
Several prominent Asian countries have already
moved to regulate Bitcoin exchanges or have
expressed intentions to do so.
China was already moving to regulate Bitcoin in some
capacity as early as 2013. Originally, the Chinese
authorities simply banned financial services
companies from working with Bitcoin exchanges,
meaning residents could not use their Chinese bank
accounts to buy bitcoins on Chinese exchanges
(Parker 2017). But in September 2017, China
announced an outright ban on cryptocurrency
exchanges, which has since taken effect.
Singapore announced in 2014 that it will regulate
“virtual currency intermediaries” (for example,
exchanges and bitcoin vending machines) located
within Singapore, requiring them to verify the identity
of customers and to report suspicious transactions to
the responsible body (Monetary Authority of
Singapore 2014). As of 2017, Singapore’s central
bank chief said these requirements will be formalised
in an upcoming payment services regulation law
(Chanjaroen et al. 2017).
In December 2017, the Australian parliament
amended its anti-money laundering and counterterrorism legislation to apply to Bitcoin exchanges.
The law makes it illegal for unregistered persons to
provide exchange services. It also requires exchanges
to maintain anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing programmes and to report
suspicious transactions (Chau 2017).
3.
POTENTIAL OF BLOCKCHAIN IN
ANTI-CORRUPTION
Blockchain and distributed ledger
technology
As highlighted above, blockchain technology must be
looked at somewhat separately from different
applications of Bitcoin and other digital currencies.
Blockchain is the most common type of distributed
ledger technology (DLT) and forms the backbone of
the kinds of cryptocurrencies discussed in section 2.
Yet, it can also be used for other data storage
applications and is increasingly recognised for this
potential. There is a large body of research on feasible
applications of this technology, yet the number of
cases showing its use remains limited (Stinchcombe
2017). Different types of DLT can potentially be used
for such purposes and it is important to understand the
difference between them (BlockchainHub 2017):
Public blockchains are open for everyone to
participate in and to send and verify transactions.
They are open source and no special permissions
are needed. They are based on a proof-of-work
consensus algorithm, offer transparency of
transactions and can be used with pseudonyms.
They form the basis of the most common digital
currencies.
Federated blockchains are run by consortia of
several organisations. Access to them can be
public or restricted to participating organisations.
Their consensus protocol is typically based in preselected nodes. This makes federated blockchain
much faster and cheaper to operate. They are used
by consortia in the banking, insurance or energy
sectors.
Private blockchains are restricted to members of a
specific organisation. The verification process is
restructured to fit the members. Private
blockchains are mainly a different way for an
organisation to store data, to simplify document
handling and introduce a different compliance
mechanism. This can also help to avoid storing the
same data on several devices and potentially
creating conflicting versions of it. They provide
certain advantages and disadvantages with
regards to data security.
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
Alternative types of DLT include the recently
formed IOTA project, which is based on a network
technology titled the tangle. It removes miners from
the DLT system and gives each user equal
responsibility to add and verify data (Popov 2017).
All applications of DLT are used to store different types
of data. As such, they can make data more secure,
make changes transparent, support and verify
transactions. Once implemented, DLT can be easy to
operate and quite efficient, yet not all data storage
situations lend themselves to its use.
DLT anti-corruption attributes
DLT is not typically used as a specific anti-corruption
tool. Yet, its attributes can make DLT applications
more resilient to corruption:
Transparency: DLT-based data systems record all
changes to stored data. Everyone with access to a
blockchain can verify the data stored in this
context. Transactions can thus be made more
transparent.
Immutability: once data is stored on the blockchain,
it cannot be altered. It is thus safe from
manipulation and illegitimate changes.
Security: as data is stored on distributed ledgers, it
is secured against fraud and against attacks on a
single server.
Inclusiveness: public blockchains are open source
and accessible to everyone. DLT systems can thus
be opened to all citizens, democratising data
storage.
Disintermediation: DLT systems cut out a third
party needed to verify transactions. This reduces
transactions costs and makes them potentially less
vulnerable to corruption.
To different degrees, these attributes can be assigned
to all DLT applications. As such, they can safeguard
stored data and transactions administered via DLT
against manipulation through corrupt actors.
Immutability and security features make it harder for
corrupt actors to manipulate data. The removal of third
parties lowers the opportunity for bribery or fraud.
Transparency and inclusiveness establish constraints
on corruption and make corrupt transactions easier to
recognise. Based on these attributes, experts see a lot
of potential for DLT to support anti-corruption efforts.
The following section discusses DLT applications in
government services. There as yet, however, hardly
any successful cases of DLT being used in this
context. Blockchain technology has potential for anticorruption, but is far from being an easily applicable
and transferable anti-corruption instrument (Kim &
Kang 2017).
Securing government data
At its core, DLT provides a different way of storing data
that brings both advantages and disadvantages.
Storing data on the blockchain can have positive
effects for anti-corruption, if safeguards against
corruption are considered in the design process. Data
audits need to be built in.
It must be ensured that transparency of transactions
also leads to more accountability. This needs
consideration in the application design process and in
expectation management. Blockchain has real
potential to improve data management in the public
sector. It might be able to increase trust in
governments in contexts which are affected by
corruption and thus often show low levels of trust. Its
implementation, however, also presents considerable
challenges (Cheng et al. 2017). These challenges are
discussed in the final part of this paper.
Land registries
Some of the most advanced conceptualisations of
using blockchain for storing government data come
from land governance initiatives. DLT can be used to
store land registry entries and land titles on the
blockchain to protect them against fraud and
corruption. Several countries run such pilot projects:
In Honduras, Factom is building a land registry
database on the blockchain to empower citizens to
fight for land titles in court. The project has been in
development since 2015 and has not yet been fully
deployed, but is considered promising (Collindres
et al. 2016)
In Sweden, ChromaWay is developing a similar
concept to test the possibility of running housing
purchases using DLT and smart contracts (see
below). The project is still in its exploratory phase
(ChromaWay 2017).
In Ghana, Bitland aims to protect and secure land
titles by putting them on the OpenLedger
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
blockchain (Bates 2016). It has provided its proofof-concept, but has not yet been fully implemented.
In Georgia, Exonum (2017) is used to transfer the
Georgian land registry onto a blockchain. The
project was launched in 2017 by the Georgian
government together with Bitfury. Having
completed its first phase, Georgian land titles are
currently hashed on the blockchain, securing them
from tampering and providing a time-stamped and
sealed copy of data, akin to Bitcoin transactions
described earlier. Longer term objectives include
running changes to land titles via the blockchain, a
project that remains to be implemented.
Voting
In societies that show high corruption levels, voting
processes are often subject to fraud and corrupt
practices. This seriously undermines the operation of
electoral democracies and citizens’ trust in democratic
systems. Several projects look at using DLT in the
context of voting. They go as far as claiming that
blockchain could revolutionise the way that
democracies operate.
FollowMyVote describes a way that electronic voting
could be secured via a blockchain. Voters install a
digital voting booth, submit their identify information for
verification and get verified with voter registries. They
can then submit their ballot to a blockchain-based
ballot box while remaining anonymous using private
keys. Similarly, an app called Sovereign offers
blockchain-based voting solutions, using tokens that
voters can send as votes via the blockchain. This
enables more complex voting situations with, for
example, separation of votes between different
candidates or voting for or against certain aspects of a
treaty (Leary 2017).
Securing transactions
In its original conception as the underlying technology
of Bitcoin, DLT is used to secure and record
transactions of digital currencies. Increasingly, people
are using the blockchain to store and verify other
transactions as well. This can include international
money flows, the movement of goods and the
implementation of contracts. Blockchain is already
used by several bank consortia and has potential in
cross-border payments as these are often difficult to
process and need third parties to verify transactions.
(Higginson 2016).
In the context of anti-corruption, there are several
applications in which DLT might secure transactions.
Financial transactions
Many international development organisations provide
budget support or financing for specific projects to
recipient countries. These payments are often
vulnerable to corruption. In 2017, German
development bank KfW initiated TruBudget, a pilot
project to provide budget support and project
management based on a private blockchain. All
stakeholders involved in a project can access the
TruBudget. Requests, submissions of documents and
approvals can all be processed in real time through the
platform and by all the stakeholders involved. These
can include a donor organisation, national
governments, local governments, implementing
agencies, banks and others. Basing the platform on
the blockchain can establish trust between the
different partners as data is hosted in a decentralised
manner and secured against subsequent alteration.
TruBudget is currently in development and is
scheduled for testing soon (Aldane 2017).
In 2017, the World Food Programme (WFP) began a
pilot programme to distribute food vouchers in one of
Jordan’s refugee camps using the Ethereum
blockchain. Food vouchers are assigned to refugees,
who can access them in supermarkets in refugee
camps using biometric data. The project uses a private
“fork” of the Ethereum database, so that it does not
need miners to verify transactions and that the data is
not stored openly on all nodes of the Ethereum
network. So far, the WFP has transferred over US$1.4
million in food vouchers to 10,500 Syrian refugees and
it plans to extend the programme to 100,000 refugees
in 2018. The implementation using the blockchain runs
more efficiently and provides better security against
fraud (Wong 2017).
Supply chain management
Global supply chains involve a large number of
transactions and a complex system of documentation
that is vulnerable to corruption due to the myriad of
actors involved. Currently a lot of information in supply
chains is still recorded on paper. It is thus vulnerable
to potential alterations or to information being lost. In
any case, a paper-based system is not the most
efficient solution.
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
Several organisations are thus working to digitalise
supply chains and using blockchain technology in this
context. Storing data on products on a blockchain
makes transaction data instantly available and
traceable in real time. It makes transactions safer and
more transparent as time stamps make it possible to
audit transactions (Heinen 2017).
IBM is running several projects aimed at creating
blockchain-based supply chain management systems.
Everledger is a global registry for diamonds that is run
on the blockchain. It registers a unique ID for each
diamond and traces its ownership, starting in the mine.
This system is meant to combat counterfeiting and,
crucially, the spread of conflict diamonds (Volpicelli
2017).
Smart contracts
One of the most cited blockchain applications are
smart contracts. These are contracts which are written
in code instead of paper. They are signed by digital
signatures and automatically implemented. This
means that conditions that are written in the contract
determine the execution of the contract. If the
conditions are met and verified, the contract will be
executed automatically. This procedure, similar to
other blockchain transaction, cuts out middle men.
Audits and safeguards can be coded into a smart
contract, which could in theory limit the scope for fraud
and corruption. Smart contracts, as they are saved on
the blockchain, are transparent but cannot be altered
without consent. If properly coded, opportunities for
corruption are thus limited. This makes smart
contracts potentially applicable to several areas of
government contracting, especially with regards to the
potential to limit manipulation during public
procurement processes.
One company advancing the idea of smart contracts
is Ethereum, which has made such contracts a major
part of its business model (Buterin 2017). While there
is a lot of enthusiasm behind smart contracts, they are
still far from being practicable due to the reasons
discussed in the final section below.
Challenges and open questions
As many observers hail the advent of the blockchain
revolution, there remain many challenges to the use of
blockchain technology for securing government data,
formulating smart contracts, managing supply chains
or keeping track of cross-border money flows. So far,
there are very few successful cases of DLT being used
in this context (Stinchcombe 2017). While the potential
for using blockchain in this context is significant, it will
probably still take years for the technology to mature
to widespread use (Banker 2017). Several challenges
are still ahead.
Legal questions
DLT is still very new. Many applications are thus still
lacking an appropriate legal and regulatory framework
in which to operate. Public blockchains pose a
particular challenge. Their nodes, and therefore the
data that is stored on the blockchain, can be located
in any country. This poses several legal questions
(McKinley et al. 2017):
Which jurisdiction applies to transactions
conducted using the blockchain?
Who is liable for malfunctions of the distributed
ledger system?
What happens to government data that legally
cannot be taken out of a given country?
Furthermore, privacy legislation can be cause for
concern, notably the “right to be forgotten” which will
be applied as part of the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). As old data on the blockchain
cannot be deleted or altered, a user’s request to erase
personal data could provide a serious challenge
(McKenzie & Taylor 2017).
Smart contracts on their own provide several legal
challenges. Currently it is unclear if and to what extent
they are legally enforceable and if they would be
accepted by contracting authorities (McKinley et al.
2017). Additionally, in some jurisdictions, more
complex smart contracts might need some sort of
verified digital identity to be signed and to be legally
binding.
Infrastructure challenges
Blockchain promises secure, fast and efficient
transactions. However, it is not always the case that
blockchain transactions are fast. Public blockchains in
particular can be slowed down through their proof-ofwork verification mechanism; by design, all nodes are
processing all transactions. Transactions can often not
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Linkages between blockchain technology and corruption
be verified for several minutes, which is much slower
than traditional database solutions.
Fees for performing transactions on the Bitcoin
blockchain have recently also soared, making it less
attractive for smaller transactions (Lee 2017). These
problems can partially be circumvented using private
or federated blockchains, or by other DLT applications
such as IOTA. Yet, they are to be considered when
thinking about the merits of DLT, some of which are
not as pronounced when implemented in the form of a
private blockchain (Buterin 2015). The infrastructure
for a wide use of public blockchains is not fully
implemented, and scalability remains an issue
(McKinlay et al. 2017) – at least, for now.
4.
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“Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answers provide
practitioners around the world with rapid ondemand briefings on corruption. Drawing on publicly
available information, the briefings present an
overview of a particular issue and do not necessarily
reflect
Transparency
International’s
official
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