International Studies Quarterly (2018) 0, 1–11 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? THEORY NOTE JOSEPH MACKAY Australian National University AND C H R I S T O P H E R D AV I D L A R O C H E University of Toronto Why is there no reactionary international theory? International relations has long drawn on a range of traditions in political thought. However, no current, or even recent, major school of international-relations theory embraces reactionary doctrine. This is more surprising than some might assume. Reaction was once common in the field and is now increasingly common in world politics. In this note, we define reaction and show that no active and influential school of international-relations theory falls within its ideological domain. Nonetheless, reactionary ideas once deeply shaped the field. We identify two distinct kinds of reactionary international politics and illustrate them empirically. We argue that the current lack of reactionary international relations undermines the field’s ability to make sense both of its own history and of reactionary practice. Finally, we offer some preliminary thoughts about why reactionary ideas hold little sway in contemporary international-relations theory. Why is there no reactionary international theory?1 Contemporary international-relations scholarship draws on multiple intellectual traditions: liberal, status-quo realist, radical, and critical, to name only a few. However, the discipline lacks an explicitly reactionary school—one that rejects the present in favor of the past. The systematic and sometimes radical nostalgia of reactionary politics is almost entirely absent from the contemporary field. This absence is striking because reaction itself has a long history in political thought and practice. Indeed, as recent historiography of the field implies, reaction played an important part in academic international relations at its inception.2 We call on scholars to re-examine reactionary politics—both in the discipline and in history more broadly—and thereby better understand and address these persistent and consequential phenomena. We write not as reactionaries ourselves but as concerned members of the discipline. We do not claim understanding reactionary world politics requires expressly reactionary international theory. Instead, we contend that the absence of reactionary theory has likely shaped the field’s inattention to political reaction as such. While current international theory may overlook political reaction, it is all around us in contemporary politics. We see it in Western nativist Joseph MacKay is a research fellow in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University. Christopher David LaRoche is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and a fellow at the Trudeau Centre for Peace, Conflict and Justice at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. Authors’ Note: The authors would like to thank Kiran Banerjee, Scott Dodds, Alena Drieschova, Michael Millerman, and David Polansky, who (along with considered disagreements) offered a range of helpful comments. We also thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of International Studies Quarterly. 1 We allude to Wight (1966), whose own political orientation we review below. 2 That research challenges international-relations theory’s once-canonical origin story as a battle between liberal progressives and realist critics, pointing to heterodox and sometimes problematic beginnings (Schmidt 2012; Guilhot 2013; Vitalis 2015). While some scholars assess expressly conservative international thought (Hall and Rengger 2005; Hall 2015), few treat reaction rigorously and specifically as an analytical category. movements that, reacting to globalism, defend putatively “purer” racially or culturally homogenous societies and call for closed borders. We find it in the Islamist radicalism that those nativists condemn, which itself recalls an idealized Pax Islamica of more than a millennium ago. These ideas shape world politics and share a common attitude toward historical change—yet current internationalrelations theory provides little systematic insight into, or understanding of, them. By reactionary, we mean a specific political attitude toward long-run historical change. The word is more commonly used as a term of abuse than one of self-attribution—a pejorative description for those who “unthinkingly” reject the fruits of progress. In contrast, we find a potentially systematic, influential, and important tradition, predicated on a distinctive attitude toward history. Liberal progressives and radicals alike view change, explicitly or tacitly, as both possible and often desirable. Realists emphasize fundamental continuities in politics and tend to discount the significance of apparent changes in world politics. In contrast, reactionaries neither embrace historical change nor discount its importance. Instead, they understand deep historical transformations as both real and catastrophic. For reactionaries, the world was once better: a past political order, now lost, shows us retrospectively how things should be but no longer are. Fixated on this prelapsarian world, reaction is a doctrine of political nostalgia. It imagines a past it hopes to recreate.3 We offer an exploratory account of reactionary international politics. We proceed in four sections. First, we define political reaction. Second, we show its nearly complete absence from contemporary international-relations theory. We also explore the field’s reactionary early history and find scattered and incomplete reaction in more recent scholarship. Third, for context, we offer a brief history of Western 3 On how theories or philosophies of history shape international relations, see MacKay and LaRoche (2017). MacKay, Joseph, and Christopher David LaRoche. (2018) Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1093/isq/sqx083 © The Author(s) (2018). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 2 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? reactionary political thought. Fourth, we illustrate its importance in world politics, identifying two reactionary strategies in world politics—revisionism and restructuring—with respective historical examples: Nazi Germany and the Concert of Europe’s counter-revolutionary “Metternich system.” A conclusion rethinks reaction’s place in the field. What is Political Reaction? We understand reaction as the claim that a past political order is preferable to the present. It is often accompanied by attempts to restore that past order.4 Like liberal progressivism or Marxian radicalism, reaction focuses on the processes, particularly with respect to modernity, of historical transformation. Its distinguishing feature is a belief in the fundamentally destructive character of reformist or progressive change. However, where progressives imagine a better world that does not yet exist, reactionaries refer to one they understand as already behind us.5 Reactionary politics have historically appealed to wide and diverse groups and may be as, or more, convincing to audiences as these other traditions. As Lilla (2016, xiv) notes, “Hope can be disappointed. Nostalgia is irrefutable.”6 Reactionaries believe in a lost prior order that is constitutive of the good life or conditions for human flourishing, recognize a specific event or process that destroyed it, and blame some actor, group, or event for that destructive change. Reactionary international theory, in turn, imagines a past in which either a given national political order (now lost) was secure within the larger world order, or the world order itself was both different and preferable.7 This understanding constitutes an ideal type—an analytically simplified account that, while precisely describing few cases, nonetheless captures core features held in common across most instances.8 We now explore it in greater detail. First, reactionaries imagine a past preferable to the present or expected future. They posit a long-run historical trajectory, over which change is linear and systematically knowable. Thus, religious radicals, nativists, and other kinds of reactionaries begin by describing an idealized past. This serves as a baseline against which to judge the present and future. This history need not be complete—or even accurate. Catholic reactionaries may excoriate the Reformation as dogmatic, blaming it for later events such as the French Revolution, but also deemphasize Medieval Christendom’s less attractive doctrinal practices, such as the Inquisition.9 Violent reactionaries in the west today, such as 4 We draw here on Lilla’s (2016, ix–xxi) recent concise theoretical work. So defined, reaction is distinct from such related concepts as conservatism, nostalgia, romanticism, populism, nationalism, and others. We thus adopt a more specific definition than Robin (2011, 34), who uses “the words conservative, reactionary, and counterrevolutionary interchangeably”—treating conservative “philosophers, statesmen, slaveholders, scribblers, Catholics, fascists, evangelicals, businessmen, racists, and hacks” as belonging to the same core political experience: “a meditation on—and theoretical rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back” (Robin 2011, 4, see also 28). Such elite impulses may animate reaction as we define it, but need not. Nor, we argue below, need reaction be strictly rightwing. Eliding distinctions between these terms makes for less precise and useful analysis. 5 Bauman (2017, 5, 8) terms this imagined past “retrotopia.” 6 The word was coined in 1688, by a Swiss medical student, from the Greek nostos (return or homecoming) and algos (pain). It originally described a psychiatric diagnosis: a malignant and destructive homesickness and, more broadly, a “refusal to consider any but a world lost to the past as the habitable world” (Roth 1991, 15). It is linked to longing for one’s homeland and thus nationalism. 7 Thus, for example, the “fascist internationalism” of the interwar period (Steffek 2015, 3–4). 8 On ideal-types in international relations, see Jackson (2011, 37, 142–46). 9 See, for example, Kuehnelt-Leddihn (1952, 179–87); More recently, Gregory (2012) locates modern disillusionment in the Reformation. Theodore Kaczynski or Anders Breivik, imagine technologically or racially different pasts, with dubious historical accuracy. Islamic radicals likewise are sometimes silent on the violence, slavery, and eventual corruption of the early Caliphates. However, reactionaries may internationally emphasize these features, or argue they are the acceptable costs of an overall better society. In some instances, reactionaries may simply mythologize the past. What matters is that the putative status quo ante represents a condition of greater moral-political wellbeing than the present. Second, reactionaries imagine an event or process that destroyed that order. Reactionaries understand “progressive” political change as destructive, whether in the form of cataclysm or of gradual decay. The signal event for nineteenth-century reactionaries was the French Revolution, which they saw as catalyzed by the Enlightenment’s disenchantment of traditionally religious authority (Maistre 1994, for example, 41–48). Late twentieth-century American reactionaries often blamed societal instability on “social engineers” disrupting traditional ways of life (Buckley 1955). To treat the past as prelapsarian, reactionaries must identify the Fall that destroyed it. Third, reactionaries generally blame some actor or group for that destructive change. Islamic radicals have often blamed European imperialism, and Islamic modernization attempts, for the nineteenth and twentieth century moral and political nadir of the Islamic world (Euben 1999, 93– 94). The Nazis blamed the Jews for the decadence, moral disorder, international capitalism, and destruction of national culture they claimed to see in modern Europe. As these examples suggest, this component may have some basis in fact or none at all. Nor need the disruption be intentional. Reactionaries need not claim that Enlightenment philosophers meant to destroy medieval European civilization—disillusionment was merely a by-product of their intellectual flourishing. We stress the ideal-typical character of the preceding description. Actual cases of reactionary thought and practice will fit imperfectly; many combine elements with other ideologies and even represent “borderline” cases. Degrees of reaction vary, both in the remoteness of the past recalled and the means mobilized to recapture it. Whereas Metternich wanted only a restored prerevolutionary monarchical Europe, Hitler aimed at an imagined premodern utopia. What matters is not our ability to neatly and unproblematically categorize theorists, movements, and regimes. Instead, we trace reaction, by degrees, across cases and contexts. Moreover, while we focus on conservative reactionaries, reaction is not coextensive with the right (Lilla 2016, xii).10 The British Luddites recalled a past before machines replaced their labor (Randall 1986, 8–9). Some deep ecologists today imagine restoring a closer, preindustrial link between humanity and nature (Devall and Sessions 1985). Contemporary opponents of modern medicine (e.g., vaccine sceptics) sometimes idealize, tacitly or explicitly, a more “natural” human past reliant on folk remedies instead of modern pharmacology (for example, Kata 2010, 171–14). Inversely, many conservatives have scant reactionary beliefs. Burke (2014) grounded his impassioned criticism of the French Revolution in a defense of gradual and local change, not of wholesale return to the past (see Welsh 1995). More 10 Our account nonetheless resonates with Mannheim’s (1936, 207) conception of a conservative “counter-utopia which serves as a means of self-orientation and defence” against progressive and revolutionary ideologies. For Mannheim, conservatives do not resist reform first in principle. Instead, they do so in practice and acquire ideological frameworks only in response to insurrection. We distinguish reaction as a systematic ideational appeal to the past, as against the status quo. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 JOSEPH MACKAY AND C H R I S T O P H E R D AV I D L A R O C H E recent free-market conservatives or right-libertarians need not be explicitly nostalgic at all (Friedman 1962, 7–21).11 Finally, we focus on reaction primarily as a modern and Western phenomenon. Accelerated change linked to intellectual, political, and industrial modernity—perhaps first and most acutely experienced in the West—provide conditions in which reactionary thinking became commonplace. Non-European peoples often first experienced modernity as colonial domination. Responses to it were consequently different and varied widely across contexts.12 In principle, some political reaction may have no connection with modernity—Confucius and Homer both recalled golden ages prior to their own. Nor is all criticism of modernity reactionary. Those who link declining attention spans to social media or question the uneven effects of globalization on traditional ways of life are not necessarily reactionary. Reactionaries go beyond criticism, instead idealizing a past social order and endorsing it over the present. Criticism aims to understand modernity; reaction sets out to replace it.13 Nonetheless, modernity presents distinctive conditions of persistent transformation that have permitted antimodern nostalgia to proliferate (Lilla 2016, xiv).14 3 On this definition, no major contemporary school in international relations theory is meaningfully reactionary. This should be obvious in the cases of classical and neoliberal progressivism and historical materialist radicalism.15 In their canonical forms, all of these schools imagined better futures that differ from the past, whether achieved through gradual evolution or revolutionary struggle.16 However, those schools sometimes called conservative are not usually reactionary, at least in their more recent formulations. Realism, the school most commonly linked to conservatism, describes no corrosive historical change. Instead, realists question whether fundamental international change is possible at all. Waltz (1979, 66) is perhaps clearest: “The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. The relations that prevail internationally seldom shift rapidly in type or in quality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence.” Mearsheimer (2003, 2) concurs: “international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way.” This vision has little transformation of any kind—good or ill. While many classical realists had reactionary sentiments, these did not amount to wholly reactionary theory. Morgenthau, Kennan, and Kissinger all expressed nostalgia for a nineteenth-century diplomatic order that predated democratized foreign policy.17 But Morgenthau, like Niebuhr, emphasized unchanging, “perennial” political problems that impede progress and cannot be permanently solved.18 Kennan’s views on social hierarchy and race led him to simultaneously condemn South African apartheid and discourage America from attempting to end it.19 Indeed, recent scholarship finds that many classical realists had critical, liberal, or progressive elements, including Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Carr, Wolfers, and Herz (Williams 2005a, 82–127; Neacsu 2010; Scheuerman 2011; Levine 2012, 120–35).20 Raymond Aron’s defense of liberalism is well known.21 Kissinger has cautiously embraced elements of progressive liberal internationalism over time.22 Whatever their differences, classical and neorealists alike do not view historical transformation as destructive. Instead, they view it as impossible or misguided, at least on liberal terms.23 So understood, realist values are not strictly reactionary. The English School is sometimes identified as conservative (Buzan 2014, 89 passim) and thus might be thought of as reactionary. Most English School conservatism is either broadly Burkean or gradualist, or is the status-quo conservatism of realism. However, as Hall (2011, 48–55) has shown, many first generation English School scholars, including Butterfield and Wight, expressed a strident nostalgia for empire and imperial-era international society. Early English School theorists claimed this period was more socially “thick” and pacific. They linked colonial notions of civilizational superiority to a stable and peaceful international order. Hedley Bull was relatively isolated among them in accepting decolonization.24 However, second generation English School accounts locate conservative tendencies within the school’s larger pluralism (Little 2000; Buzan 2004). Third generation English School work can be more or less explicitly anticolonial (Suzuki 2009). Other exceptions are rare and mostly partial, proving the rule. While power transition theories claim rising powers are more risk acceptant than declining ones (Gilpin 1983), some versions argue declining states too are risk acceptant (Levy 1987). Here though, states in decline aim to prevent later, more destructive wars—not recover lost power and standing. Elsewhere, Schweller (2014) describes an entropic process whereby the modern world’s increasing complexity 11 Nor is reaction equivalent to populism, which may be a doctrine of the left or right and says nothing systematic about the past (Müller 2016, 21–22; see also Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, and Batayneh 2017). Nor is reaction inherently populist—it may be a doctrine of return to traditional social hierarchy. 12 Anticolonial reaction contrasts with more common progressive or radical anticolonialism (for example, Fanon 1965). Elsewhere, quasi-modernities may have emerged independently of the West (Woodside 2009, 1, 10). 13 Similarly, not all theoretical critics of modernity, such as Leo Strauss and others, propose a reactionary political program (Zuckert 2011). Some may even aim to ameliorate modern politics (Arendt 1998; 2006) or defend some elements of modernity while criticizing others (Manent 2006; Elshtain 1993, 2008; Thompson 2008; Delsol 2010). Other schools, such as postmodernism, are hostile to modernity without nostalgia of any kind. See note 42 for two liminal cases, Martin Heidegger and Carl Schmitt. 14 Reaction as we define it may presuppose modernity, insofar as reactionary political beliefs require a historicist conception of political life. Such understandings became available only through Rousseau, Hegel, and other modern European theorists. 15 International relations scholars tend to have left-liberal political views (Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012). 16 Early liberal internationalists were progressive, and sometimes antiimperialist, as was Angell, but also paternalistic and Eurocentric—and thus at least potentially reactionary (Hobson 2012, 40–45). On Angell generally, see Ceadel (2009). 17 See the review in Bessner and Guilhot (2015, 85–98); for Morgenthau specifically, see Neacsu (2010, chaps. 4 and 5). 18 See Morgenthau (1948, 13; 2004, 15–16) and Niebuhr (2008, chap. 7). While they differ from Waltzian structuralism, both see violence as persistent and international progress tenuous at best. 19 See Gaddis (2011, 603–5), who notes Kennan “long believed that race shaped culture.” Kennan’s (2014, 46–47) diaries suggest a generalized nostalgia: “I cannot help but regret I did not live fifty or a hundred years sooner. . . . I should have lived in those days when . . . foreign countries were still foreign, when a vast part of the world always bore the glamour of the great unknown, when there were still wars worth fighting and gods worth worshipping.” 20 The later Morgenthau, for example, endorsed world federalism (Scheuerman 2011, 117–58). 21 For an overview, see Anderson (1997). 22 See Kissinger (1994, 804–12, 832–36; 2014, 371–74, 372): “A world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But progress toward it will need to be sustained through intermediary stages.” In his first book Kissinger (2013) expressed admiration for Metternich’s post-Napoleonic restoration (see below). 23 Carr (2001, 113) had an exceptional, quasi-Hegelian view of progress, seeing it as possible but aimed toward goals revealed only as they were realized (MacKay and LaRoche 2017, 226). 24 See, for example, Bull (1959); discussion in Hall (2011, 51–52). Reactionary International Relations Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 4 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? drives disorder and chaos. However, he does not describe a specific Fall from a clearly delineated better past. Nor does he hold anyone responsible—the effect is structural. Elsewhere still, neoconservatives have deep ties to some forms of liberalism.25 An exception in recent decades is Huntington’s (1997) overtly reactionary Clash of Civilizations. Huntington locates group identity and fellow feeling in large, historically rooted silos—prone, he believed, to conflict with one another. Huntington’s subsequent account of American national identity, Who We Are (2004), argued that America should return to the cultural homogeneity of its “founding” white Anglo-Saxon protestant values to renew its national strength. Taken together, Clash and Who We Are propose a narrative of decline in which Western nationalism is under attack by both expanding liberal multiculturalism and undifferentiated foreign civilizations; America can be rescued by ethnonational homogeneity at home and antagonism abroad. Hassner (1996, 65, 69) usefully summarizes: Huntington’s civilizational emphasis on “tradition and religion cannot be understood except as a reaction to modernization and its discontents.” The rise of civilizational international politics makes sense only if construed as reactionary. As Welch (2013) notes, the account was neither predictive nor explanatory—instead, “it was a wish.” Although Huntington’s work is often discussed in nonacademic settings, international relations scholars remain consistently critical of it, suggesting he led no larger trend in the field.26 Absent a reactionary school, we might look for scholars who take reaction as an object of study. Constructivism, which focuses on ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 393), could in principle take reaction seriously. However, constructivists have not in practice documented the social construction of international reaction. While some emphasize the divisive, realist, power-politics of ideas (Mitzen 2006; Barkin 2010), they do not pay much attention to narratives of historical decline.27 Psychological accounts of identity emphasize in-group/out-group dynamics (Mercer 1995) but not over time.28 Postcolonial international-relations theory finds imperial nostalgia in contemporary world politics (for example, Seth 2013, 152–53) but does not offer a systematic treatment of reaction as such. Strikingly, however, this absence itself elides early international relations’ history of reactionary and quasi-reactionary tendencies.29 The field’s early history includes many forms of imperial, geopolitical, or racialized nostalgia. As Hobson (2012, chaps. 5 and 7) has pointed out, early twentiethcentury classical geopolitics had pronounced reactionary strains, including geographic ethnonationalism and imperial nostalgia. Halford Mackinder hoped much of his work, including his now-famous “geographical pivot” theory, would renew British seafaring imperialism against competition from land empires. In the United States, Alfred Mahan 25 Neoconservatism lacks standard formulations in international relations theory—the field usually relies on outside analytical reconstructions (for example, Williams 2005b; Drolet 2011). 26 Huntington’s thesis has been repeatedly disproven empirically (Chiozza 2002; Fox 2002; survey in Musgrave 2017). His account is distinct from constructivist accounts of grand cultural or civilizational difference (for example, Katzenstein 2009; Acharya 2014). 27 See Adamson (2005, 547) on the “liberal bias” of constructivism, exemplified by its blindness to political Islam. 28 Exceptionally, Freedman (2016) emphasizes lost perceived status and attempts to regain it. 29 Although reflexive international relations scholars such as Hobson have recently (re-)connected classical geopolitics to early international relations, this critique was first made by critical geographers vis-à-vis their own discipline: see Tuathail (1996); Tuathail, Dalby, and Routledge (2006). advocated a geopolitical worldview and American naval militarism (Tuathail 1996, chaps. 1, 3; Black 2016, 126–41). Both addressed the “closing of the world”: the increasing proximity of once isolated societies to the United States, especially an encroaching “Asiatic” world (Hobson 2012, 123–30). Reacting to Germany’s post-1919 crises, German geographers also attempted to revive German expansion with geopolitical theory. After World War 2, classical geopolitics fell out of academic favor because of its associations with Nazism (Tuathail 1996, chap. 4; Black 2016, chap. 7; cf. Hobson 2012, 158–65). When Kissinger and others revived the term “geopolitics” during the Cold War, they used it and related terms as “casual synonyms for realist views of international strategic rivalry and interaction” (Deudney 2000, 79), eliding their reactionary linkages.30 Apart from geopolitics, early international-relations, including early liberalism, was deeply tied up with the linked tasks of administering empires and maintaining white supremacy.31 As European imperialism declined, post-war British liberal imperialists in international studies became tacitly reactionary: nostalgic adherents of an older order (Hall 2011, 44–47). The narrative of “great debates” between liberals and realists, from which the discipline putatively emerged, concealed this history. Imperial nostalgia was erased from international relations’ origin story.32 No contemporary international relations scholar is systematically reactionary. However, disciplinary international relations elides a significant portion of its own history. Indeed, reaction has deeply shaped both modern political theory (in its many antimodern forms) and the modern practice of world politics. We address these in the next two sections. A Brief History of Political Reaction Modern political reaction initially responded to the French Revolution, in which the term réaction referred to anyone who opposed the Jacobins (Lilla 2016, xi). Some early modern thinkers opposed large-scale change—Thomas More’s campaign against the Reformation is exemplary. However, reactionary thought in the sense we mean emerged from the Revolutionary period. Its canonical statement was and remains Joseph de Maistre’s (1994) Considérations sur la France. 30 Recent geopolitics revivals acknowledge critical geography’s critique while disagreeing with its poststructuralism (for example, Deudney 2000; Kelly 2016, 45–69; Black 2016, 202–4, 229–39). 31 For example, Foreign Affairs was founded as the Journal of Race Development (Vitalis 2015, ix–x). The elision of such episodes from standard histories of the field is a double injustice, obscuring both the field’s imperial origins and the early scholars who resisted it. Henderson (2017) documents the contributions of the “Howard School” (the term is Vitalis’s) to international relations theory. Some early American political scientists, such as Paul Reinsch, advocated a more “benign” imperialism (Schmidt 2008; Hobson 2012, 121–23). This broader racialized history of the early field overlaps only partially with political reaction as we define it. Rather than being reactionary or nostalgic at the time, racism was all too normal. Thus, for example, Vucetic (2011) traces the emergence of the “Anglosphere” to racializing processes distinguishing the English-speaking peoples from others. See also Thakur, Davis, and Vale (2017) on the South African origins of the field. On empire and liberalism in international relations, see Jahn (2005a; 2005b; 2013, 17–19); on empire and political theory more broadly, see Pitts (2005; 2010). 32 Indeed, tropes now thought of as typifying the period had roots in geopolitical forerunners. For example, Mackinder’s (1919, 10–16) reference to “democratic idealism” and “reality” prefigures Carr’s utopian vs. realist formulation. For Mackinder, however, reality and idealism can be synthetized in modernist efficiency, the excesses of which may be destructive—his diagnostic case is the French Revolution’s Terror. The modern realist critique of idealism goes back at least to Machiavelli (Pangle and Ahrensdorf 1999, chaps. 4 and 5; Zuckert 2017) but is distinct from reactionary politics as defined here. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 JOSEPH MACKAY AND C H R I S T O P H E R D AV I D L A R O C H E 5 Maistre advanced a providential, theocratic understanding of politics, blamed the revolution on Enlightenment philosophy, and advocated a Bourbon restoration.33 As Pierre Manent writes in his introduction to Maistre (2006, vii), “instead of critiquing the Revolution for this or that measure, or for its excesses in general, [Considérations] rejects it entirely, in its essence, as contrary to the very nature of social and moral man.” By defending hierarchical political tradition against abstract and destructive Enlightenment rationalism, Maistre helped establish and spread an intellectual tradition dedicated to restoring and defending an idealized past.34 The revolution also implicated two figures who, though not reactionaries themselves, shaped later reaction. The first was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose arguments inspired both the revolution itself and later forms of political antimodernism. For Rousseau (1997, Note IX, 197), humanity was originally “naturally good,” and human ills were social creations—epitomized in eighteenth-century Europe’s corrupt, “bourgeois” society. Revolutionaries (both left and right) drew radical conclusions from this: if all problems were social, then society itself could and should be transformed and the human condition perfected. In the reactionary version, this meant recreating an earlier, purer society not yet corrupted by bourgeois culture.35 The second was Edmund Burke, who founded modern conservatism. Like Maistre, Burke saw the Revolution as imposing a radically abstract, inhuman modernity on the tradition-dependent, complex reality of human life.36 However, neither Rousseau nor Burke was strictly reactionary. Burke represented a “progressive” conservative aspect of the Enlightenment, intended to temper change and curtail universalism.37 Rousseau questioned the Enlightenment’s transformative premises but aimed to reform them in his later work.38 Modern political reaction is descended from these events and theorists, in more and less radical forms. Later writers expanded, modified, and transformed its core ideas— appeal to tradition and religion against revolutionary modernism. They influenced many of the statesmen responsible for the 1815 post-Napoleonic restoration, as well as later reactionaries, including Louis de Bonald and Donoso Cortés. For example, the French romantic writer Chateaubriand was a staunch royalist decades after the revolution and a defender of Catholicism against secularizing Enlightenment critique.39 Later, Nietzsche’s radical critique of Western philosophy often implied extreme antimodernism—although he never expressly advocated a premodern politics.40 In twentieth-century America, reaction referred to those who would, in William F. Buckley’s (1955) phrase, “stand athwart history, yelling Stop”—in opposition to “Social Engineers” who would undermine “the organic moral order.” Across the Atlantic, the influence of Maistre and Cortés was most visible in the decisionism of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt (2003) expressed nostalgia for the pre-Wilsonian Jus Publicum Europaeum era of international public law, condemned the corroding effects of liberal “Atlanticist” commercialism, and advocated supranational “Großraüme” that could counter-balance Atlantist imperialism.41 Schmitt’s antiliberalism has had a wide impact: apart from his revival on the critical left, Schmitt influenced Morgenthau’s realism, “new right” writers in Europe such as Alain de Benoist (Hooker 2009, 204–13), and the international thought of Russian Alexander Dugin.42 By degrees, all of these accounts participate in political reaction: they view social change or reform itself as destructive, with some aiming to recreate a traditional social and political order in response. In the twentieth century, a second strain of reaction emerged, often linked to mass ideological movements. Influenced by Nietzsche and more distantly by Rousseau, writers such as Julius Evola lent it intellectual ammunition. This mass reactionary politics sought a more radicalized and uncompromising reversion to an original, mythical past, one since degraded by modernity, capitalism, or bourgeois society. It was most visible in National Socialism and other fascist movements, peaking in the 1930s and 1940s. While defeated in WWII, this more radical reaction persists today. Current European far-right intellectual movements and parties—for example, “Golden Dawn”—also intend to recover a putatively purer past (Charalambous 2015). They deploy modernizing means, including advanced communications and weapons technologies, to antimodern ends: the aggressive or radical transformation of the world around them. Global 33 See Maistre (1994, 62–76, 84–85; emphases original): “It will be in the name of the VERY GOOD AND VERY GREAT GOD . . . that you will return to your old constitution and that a king will give you the only thing that you ought wisely to desire—liberty through the monarchy.” 34 For the historical reception of Maistre, see Armenteros and Lebrun (2011). 35 Rousseau did not describe, or necessarily intend, a program of reaction. Many of his intellectual descendants were leftist radicals, including Robespierre and Marx. On Rousseau and the French Revolution, see Furet (1997); on his practical politics, see Kelly’s introduction to Rousseau (2005, xiii–xxiii). 36 For example, Burke (2014, 17–36). Both excoriate modern theory or what Burke (see 2014, 8, 22, 59–62, 185–88, 224–27) labels “metaphysical” abstractions and Maistre (1994, 41, 45, 47, 57) “philosophy” and “philosophism.” Burke advocated armed intervention against the French Revolution, but also the progressive gradualism of British constitutionalism, defending the 1688 and 1776 revolutions (Welsh 1995). Maistre (1994, 60–61, 104–21) disliked all three but was nonetheless a “liberal” or (we prefer) moderate reactionary: he admired Britain’s constitutional monarchy and although he wanted “a restoration of the old order . . . he ha[d] a fairly liberal understanding of what defined the old order” (Beiner 2011, 350; cf. Garrard 2001, 162–63). For Maistre’s relationship with Burke, see Lebrun (2001). 37 For example: “A state without the means of some change is a state without the means of its conservation”; “by preserving the method of nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new; in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete” (Burke 2014, 23, 35). 38 Although considered an Enlightenment thinker, Rousseau challenged prevailing narratives of scientific and social progress. He argued that they undermined political and social life. See Garrard (2003) and Pangle and Ahrensdorf (1999, 185–90). 39 Not all reactionaries of the period agreed unproblematically with one another in practice. Chateaubriand, for example, advocated unilateral French revision of the Vienna settlement status quo maintained by Metternich’s congress system (Schroeder 1962, 210, 229–36). 40 Likewise, Spengler (1991) elaborated a nostalgic philosophy of history in which the West was in decline—but did not advocate any return to the past; see Dannhauser (1995). 41 Despite his Nazism, Schmitt more closely resembled the moderate (if theocratic) reaction of Maistre (Garrard 2001; cf. Meier 2011; Mouffe 1999; 2007). His core intellectual commitments did not include reversion to an antimodern social order and, thus, were not wholly consistent with Nazism. On this basis many contemporary theorists on the left (for example Mouffe 1993; 2005), have used Schmittian concepts to critique modern democratic practice from a critical standpoint. In contrast, Heidegger (the other academic theorist most closely linked to Nazism) had vague but extreme political views. While thinly articulated, his reaction was likely more radical. Schmitt’s international thought has attracted attention from critical international-relations scholars and others (Odysseos and Petito 2007; Hooker 2009). 42 Dugin’s published works in English are mostly concerned with domestic politics. His account of international relations advocates an expressly reactionary formulation of Russia’s place in the world (Astrov and Morozova 2012, 209–15; Schouten 2014). His theory of multipolarity focuses on regional-civilizational poles he claims can collectively counter the United States–backed Atlanticist hegemony—an account indebted to Schmitt and classical geopolitics. Despite his public profile however, Dugin is influential neither in mainstream Western international theory nor in Russian foreign policy practice (Laruelle 2015). Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 6 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? jihadist movements, too, combine reactionary politics with the techniques of modern politics.43 Moderate and radical political reactionaries alike accept the premises of modern thought and politics but do so in opposed ways. Moderate reaction aims to slow or pause modernity’s progressive march by defending traditional institutions against progressive undermining or attack. Radical reaction takes the modern premise that human society is malleable as an opportunity to reconstruct or approximate a pre-modern society. It leverages modern ideologies and technologies to antimodern ends. Nonetheless, the two lie on a continuum, and actual instances may fall between them. The most radical extreme may take on the historical unreality of, for example, core Nazi ideology. Moderate reaction may shade into gradual acceptance of modernity itself. Reactionary World Politics If reaction is an important feature of modern political thought, it has also recurred as a central feature of modern international political practice. We distinguish two ideal-type varieties of reactionary action—revisionism and restructuring—and show briefly how each plays out historically. The two correspond to the radical and moderate modes of reaction above. Revision, the most direct approach, corresponds to radical or militant reactionary antimodernism. Faced with the perceived loss of a morally superior past, revisionist reactionaries aim to restore the status quo ante, often in direct and uncompromising ways. The diagnostic case is Nazi Germany.44 Believing in a premodern better world and armed with the military capacity of a modern great power, Nazi elites set out to reconfigure Europe on the model of an imagined past by sheer force of arms. More moderate reactionaries may aim to restructure, restoring past political order by building institutions and coordinating international order. Restructuring requires less coercion and instead emphasizes cooperation and multilateralism. New international institutional frameworks become the vessels for restored past political orders.45 The diagnostic case is the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe and specifically its “Metternich system” of counterrevolutionary management. Here, a coalition of European great powers partially restored and maintained the monarchical order that preceded the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars 43 As Ahmad (2017, 16) writes, a key aspect of today’s “reactionary yet hypermodern” Islamist groups lies in their promise to recreate “a romanticized golden age that predates the miseries of the colonial era and draws on an imagined conception of an Islamic nation that transcends all other loyalties.” Some, such as Daesh and the Islamic Courts Union, also employ modern state-building techniques, co-opt and tax local businesspeople, and recruit new followers using modern communications technology. A key early intellectual here is Qutb (2006), whose antimodernism is expressly reactionary—as distinct from progressive anticolonialisms. On parallels between Qutb and Maistre, see Euben (1999, 199, n181). On Islamist politics generally, see Ismail (2003), Shapiro and Fair (2010), Raqib and Barreto (2014), and Ahmad (2015; 2016). On Islamism and political violence, see Greenberg (2005), Toft (2007), Farrall (2011), and Hamid and Farrall (2015). 44 An alternate example, the Khmer Rouge, blended left and right. They sought to recreate the Khmer empire and “restored” Cambodian society to a putative “year zero.” They did this by emptying urban centers, murdering educated and foreign-influenced elites, and instituting a closed agrarian society (Kiernan 2008, chapter 15). 45 This “reactionary institutionalism” differs in goals, if not means, from the institutionalism of neoliberals (Keohane and Martin 1995) or neofunctionalists (Haas 1964). The contrast suggests little about institutionalism is inherently liberal or progressive (Steffek 2015). (Kissinger 2013).46 Below, these two examples illustrate the role of reaction in world politics.47 Revisionism and the Third Reich, 1933–45 Nazi Germany was perhaps the most extreme reactionary state on record. While Nazi ideology was often vague and inconsistent (Mann 2004, 140–43), it aimed consistently “to restore to the German people an ethnic purity that was imagined to have existed in the past” (Turner 1972, 551). It recalled the “First Reich” of Charlemagne, a loosely Germanic medieval empire. This provided “a powerful symbolic link to the imagined greatness of the past” (Evans 2005, 460), tied to the idea of a premodern Volk. Imperial Germany echoed this ancestral Germanic utopia after 1870 as the “Second Reich,” but it was destroyed by World War I, the punitive Versailles peace treaty, and Weimar-era economic disaster. Consistent with the view that “Fascists need a demonized enemy against which to mobilize followers” (Paxton 2007, 37), the Nazis blamed the Jews for these circumstances. German Jews were a largely assimilated minority and made up less than one percent of the interwar German population. The Nazis nonetheless cast them as an inassimilable other—a stateless, landless, internationalized people—and linked them to the vicissitudes of international finance, which the Nazis also blamed for German hardship (Snyder 2015, 42–44).48 The Nazis were not merely reactionary; they were revisionist. Their goals conflicted acutely with the existing world order.49 A rapidly rearmed Germany set out to expand its borders and turn Europe into a premodern, racially stratified world: “they sought to transcend existing reality at one blow and substitute for it a radically different social order” (Turner 1972, 552). To do this the Nazis used modern technologies and institutions to antimodern ends. Nazi revisionism proceeded by war, structural reconfiguration, and genocide.50 Germany conquered most European states west of the rapidly receding Soviet frontier or turned them into satellite regimes. The Nazis aimed to transform the European state system into a hierarchy, with the Third Reich at its apex. They then set out to erase the Jews, whom they blamed for pre-war Germany’s ruin, from the face of the earth.51 Did reactionary Nazi ideology drive German actions? Even structuralist accounts of WWII suggest a linkage. Schweller (1998, 5) allows that “Hitler’s ideas distinguished him from prior German leaders.” While ideology did not cause the war, German reactionary revisionism helped create 46 Reactionary states with neither coercive capacity nor multilateral linkages may adopt a third strategy: withdrawal. Franco’s Spain, for example, lacked both great power status and ideological allies after 1945. Instead of seeking to overturn other parts of Europe, it isolated itself from the post-war international order. 47 Our cases are illustrations, not empirical tests. We select diagnostic cases, not ambiguous ones. This approach is akin to a “plausibility probe” (George and Bennett 2005, 75). 48 On the “Nazi conscience” generally, see Koonz (2003). 49 Reactionary revisionist states differ from other revisionists in their goals— the early Soviet Union aimed at world transformation but was in no sense reactionary. 50 The relationship between the Holocaust and modernity is contested. For Bauman (2001), the Holocaust is part of modernity itself, bound up with modern nationalism, technologically implemented mass murder, and the depersonalizing effects of modernity itself. We emphasize additionally the Nazis’ expressed antimodernism. Herf (1986, 1–4) terms Nazism a form of “reactionary modernism,” a term since taken up by Mirowski (2013, 212–17) to describe early international relations theory. 51 While the Nazis targeted and murdered multiple groups, they focused on Europe’s Jews as those primarily responsible for putative German civilizational decline. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 JOSEPH MACKAY AND C H R I S T O P H E R D AV I D L A R O C H E its conditions of possibility.52 The ideological idiosyncrasies of Nazism may not have been necessary, but a will to overthrow the status quo and recreate a mythical past was.53 Restructuring and the Metternich System, 1815–1848 A prominent example of reactionary restructuring occurred during the great power management of post-Napoleonic Europe, sometimes labelled the “Congress system” or Concert of Europe.54 Recent international-relations analyses have focused either on the Concert’s progressive institutionalism or its material balance of power (Finnemore 2004, 108– 124; Mitzen 2013, 2015; Kagan 1997; Slantchev 2005; cf. Weber 1995, 40–60). Both understate the Concert’s central repressive apparatus, sometimes called the “Metternich System” after Austrian foreign minister Prince Klemenz von Metternich.55 Although Metternich represented the weakest of Europe’s five great powers, along with the Burkean Lord Castlereagh, he played a central role in managing the post-Napoleonic restoration, such that Kissinger (2013, 11) termed him “Prime Minister of Europe.” The Metternich system grew out of treaties signed by Europe’s powers, particularly the four allied powers that contributed most to defeating Napoleon—Prussia, Russia, Britain, and Austria. Gathering in Vienna in 1814–15, the allies redrew the European map and restored many pre-Revolutionary monarchies. The “Vienna settlement” created a territorial balance of power that hemmed in France and satisfied Europe’s other powers (Kissinger 2013, 41–190; Jarrett 2013, 43–205; Slantchev 2005). Worried revolution could spread throughout Europe and upset the Vienna settlement, Metternich spent three decades coordinating the allies—and, after 1818, France—to repress Jacobinism, uphold monarchical legitimacy, and strengthen Great Power cooperation. Concerns about international stability and regime type were thus deeply intertwined. For Metternich, constitutionalist and liberal regimes threatened the hard-won Vienna equilibrium.56 Agreements at Troppau (1820) and Münchengrätz (1833) secured Prussian and Russian cooperation in Metternich’s antirevolutionary interventions, which suppressed revolts in Italy and Poland. Aided by French disorganization and the Burkean tenor of British politics, Metternich also largely succeeded in preventing Western cabinets from upsetting the Vienna restoration. As Alan Sked (2008, 105) summarizes, “fear of revolution” was the “bottom line in international affairs” for Europe’s powers. In short, reactionary institution building was, for decades, the basis of European order.57 52 Moreover, as Goddard (2015) shows, Nazi claims of legitimacy for German revanchism helped secure British and Allied appeasement, prior to Munich. 53 The memory of fascism and antifascism in Europe remains contested between the political center and left (see for example Grunenberg 1997; Mammone 2006; Prezioso 2008; García, Yusta, Tabet, and Clímaco 2016). 54 Labels for the post-Napoleonic order vary widely; see Schroeder (1962, 4– 5); Jarrett (2013, 347–69). We focus on what has been labelled the “Metternich system,” the part of the order committed to repressing constitutionalist rebellions and which ended in 1848. 55 While realists downplay ideas (Kagan 1997; Slantchev 2005), constructivists acknowledge its illiberalism without focusing on it (Mitzen 2013). Earlier international relations analyses sometimes feature the repressive apparatus (for example, Morgenthau 1948, 481–90); see also Vick (2014) for a criticism. 56 Finnemore (2004, 108–24). Like Maistre, Metternich respected British constitutionalism but did not think it was transferable to the continent. As the top minister in the multinational Austrian Empire, he had a material interest in maintaining monarchical absolutism and suppressing nationalist revolt. See Sked (2008, esp. 1–25, 64–106, 244–46). 57 See Jarrett (2013, esp. 72–84, 231–77); Schroeder (1962, 235–66; 1994, 583– 804); and Sked (2008). 7 Conclusion Reaction, we have argued, is almost completely absent from contemporary international-relations theory. However, we can find fragmentary traces of reaction in the field’s history and an extensive presence in the history of political thought. Reactionary beliefs and dispositions play a significant role in modern international political practice. This raises the question: why is there now no reactionary international theory? Here, we can only offer some conjectures. We suspect that its absence is linked to the field’s putatively ameliorative orientation—that is, the way the field often locates its roots in liberal idealism and the decidedly nonreactionary challenge posed by realists. Such a narrative, and particularly the part played by liberalism, suggests notions of “the good” in world politics incompatible with reactionary ideas.58 This narrative renders past international-relations reactionaries invisible by obscuring connections between canonical international-relations schools and reactionary ideas. Early realists are read as emphasizing the permanent limits of political change. Early geopolitical reactionaries have, until recently, been read out of the discipline entirely. Liberal linkages to empire were elided as embarrassing. Later critical theorists rejected liberals and realists alike as unreflexive and presentist—as too focused on the status quo and blind to the possibilities of emancipatory politics. However, they did so in the name of “a critique of domination” that would explore means of resistance available to “those systematically or casually subjected to sustained forms of suffering, denigration, and/or exclusion” (Weber 2014, 532).59 Such criticisms may reject reaction generally but do little to distinguish it from the joint liberal-realist project of internationalrelations theory as such. Why then does reaction matter? The practice of reactionary international politics appears more widespread at present than at any time in the post-war period. At the time of writing, far-right parties are active—though not quite ascendant—across Europe; the politics of reaction appears increasingly normalized (Cole 2005; Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012). British voters, led by activists chiefly from the right, narrowly chose to leave the European Union. This “Brexit” was partially motivated by “cultural backlash” (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 29–31) or racially tinged (RajanRankin 2017, 2) nostalgia. The stated positions of the new American president, who campaigned on a promise to “Make America Great Again,” often upend the traditional party system and deride liberal international order (Patrick 2017). The so-called Islamic State has declared a Caliphate, putatively modeled on a premodern Islamic world order (Ahmad 2017, 12). Elsewhere in the West, individual reactionary radicals like Kaczynski and Breivik no longer seem isolated, as evidenced by the rise of the alt-right and its selfstyled ideologues, such as Richard Spencer (Wood 2017). Once-solid bulwarks between the mainstream right and extremists no longer seem secure.60 Reactionary politics are on the march and are reshaping the world political future. 58 When, for example, Angell (1972, 59) insisted war “belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed,” he implied progress was both possible and desirable. 59 See similarly feminist IR scholars, who assert the power of critical scholarship to produce desirable change in the world (Tickner 2006 386–87; Sjoberg 2006, 233–34; Eschle and Maiguashca 2007; Ackerly and True 2008; Wibben 2011, 111–12). For a similar ethos in postcolonial critique, see chapters in Chowdhry and Nair (2004), Jabri (2005), and Agathangelou and Ling (2009). 60 Kaczynski’s ideological predilections have been linked to his upbringing and education (Chase 2003), and Breivik’s racist terrorism radicalized ideas normal on the European far right (Berntzen and Sandberg 2014). These beliefs were likely never truly marginal. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/isq/sqx083/4951415 by Australian National University user on 25 March 2018 8 Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory? However concerning this may be, though, the account above reminds us these circumstances are not new: reaction is a recurring feature of international politics.61 If we are correct, then the contemporary discipline, scrupulously forgetful of its reactionary past, is shorn of intellectual history that might clarify present circumstances. A field that ignores reaction as such may be blind to reactionary political practice. This blindness in turn weakens the responses scholars can offer. Indeed, contemporary reaction might have been anticipated. A quarter century ago, in framing his otherwise ultra-liberal “end of history” thesis, Francis Fukuyama noted a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed: Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again. (Fukuyama 1989, 18) That nostalgia now appears present in force in world politics.62 In the years ahead, a central task for internationalrelations theory will be to take reaction seriously, as both an intellectual tradition and a form of practical politics. 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