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PART II
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6
Mechanisms of Governmentality and
Constructing Hollow Citizenship
Arab Palestinians in Israel
amal jamal
Israel has managed to fragment the Palestinian people and to convince
most countries involved in promoting Israeli–Palestinian peace that a
comprehensive solution of the Palestinian problem is neither feasible nor
appropriate. The various Palestinian communities, which were dispersed
and forced to live in various localities, due to Israel’s creation and ongoing
policies, are asked to accept different solutions, including partial statehood in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, settling some of the refugees in these areas,
and maintaining the current marginalized status of Palestinian citizens who
live in Israel. Despite various forms of Palestinian resistance to such
a strategy, it seems that the political developments of the last two decades
demonstrate that Israel has managed to impose this approach as the most
“realistic” one for the near future. Israel has used various means to achieve
this state of affairs. Part of its effort was directed toward convincing the
Palestinians that they have no choice but to accept what is offered to them by
the Jewish state. Within this effort, Israel has sought to alter the geography,
topography, and demography of Palestine. In areas under its sovereignty,
whether recognized or not, the Israeli state has sought to reshape the
consciousness of the Palestinian inhabitants. This process started before
1948 and took new forms after the establishment of the state.
This chapter explores Israel’s efforts to contain and subjugate those
Palestinians who remained within its borders. Although this topic has
already been addressed by several scholars, this chapter claims that it is
necessary to analyze this question anew and explore a longer period of time
in state–minority relations in order to identify particular state practices that
reflect the complexity of Israeli mentalities of rule (Zureik 1979). In this
chapter, I claim that understanding recent programmatic, legal, and judicial
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policies and practices of the state toward the indigenous Arab minority
necessitates examining the initial framing of the relationship between the
state and the minority. The chapter aims to demonstrate that the Israeli state
manifests itself not only through repressive forms, but also through other
means of power practices and procedures in order to penetrate, contain, and
control the Palestinian community residing within its borders and to transform this community from an indigenous people that can collectively assert
the Palestinian national claim of injustice into a marginal social group that
enjoys ineffective civic rights that obscure continuous efforts to construct
inferior subjectivities through “modernizing” “democratic” means.
The chapter explores the forms of power practices that facilitate political
surveillance and social engineering on the cultural and sociological levels and
thereby bypass the classical form of repression. This effort may help us clarify
how Israel manages to pass as a “vibrant democracy” in the world order,
despite its internal physical and cultural colonization policies. The chapter
shows how the Israeli state becomes what it is through what it does, rather
than the other way around. In other words, the practices of the state are what
construct its identity, without entirely ignoring its vigorous characteristics.
It incorporates the indigenous Palestinian community into democratic
practices, but then commits itself to rules of conduct that legitimize the
hollowing out of the substantial dimensions of their citizenship.
In order to explain this process, it is vital to import the concept of
governmentality, as introduced by Michel Foucault and later developed
by other scholars (Foucault 2003a; Garland 1997; Jessop 2007; Lemke
2001; Mckee 2009; O’Malley, Weir, and Shearing 1997; Scott 1995). This
conceptualization demonstrates that power relations are sometimes
more clearly examined beyond the narrow meaning of repressive
forms. It is helpful to illustrate how power is introduced without being
fierce in the physical sense. Power relations cannot sometimes be reduced
to mere repression of the subjugated (Jessop 2007). They could be
established through incorporating social groups in a system of
representation that renders their presence a mechanism of surveillance
and supervision, through soft forms of subjugation (Nye 2004). In this
sense, power manifests itself as the management of consciousness, especially of those that their mere practicing of themselves, as such counter
the wished for identity of the powerful.
The state as practices of mentalities of rule could be manifested in
various ways; the chapter follows only three areas of state–minority
relations in Israel. I chose to focus on these three areas because they
help illustrate the special characteristics of state power as it operates
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through discursive practices and control over actions that represent
the exercise of freedom, such as electoral participation and
engagement in public discourse. The first area is the mental framing
of minority political consciousness through expectations, the
re-engineering of societal structures via the proletarianization of
the agrarian family structure, and the inscription of a new
authoritative “justice” system. The second area deals with
subjugation through soft power mechanisms, aiming at the domestication and taming of the Palestinian subject in the new Jewish
space. The third area is legal discourse, where the law forms an
effective tool of disciplining and imposes clear boundaries of
political and cultural legitimacy.
Before delving into these three areas, the chapter opens with a brief
theoretical framing of power relations, as disciplining discursive practices,
seeking subjugation and the way they are relevant to the understanding of
state–minority relations. The chapter then goes on to address the three areas
outlined earlier. In the second part, the chapter addresses the cultural and
material practices of Israeli citizenship vis-à-vis the Arab-Palestinian minority. The chapter then explores one of the most understudied areas of
state–minority relations in Israel, namely the role of the media in promoting
the construction of “quiescent Arabs,” which did not succeed very much.
Finally, the chapter addresses Israeli legal practices, exploring how they are
used as a means of delegitimization of Arabs and as a mechanism that
renders Arab representation in state institutions not only ineffective, but
actually counter-representational. Exploring the three areas helps to
elucidate practices of subjugation that, I argue, have led to the construction
of a kind of hollow citizenship for Arabs in Israel, a citizenship that runs
counter to the common ethical understanding of the term as it is used in
political science and democratic theory. Such an analysis points to the
existence of a huge gap between the formal manifestations of citizenship
and its substantial representational meaning for Arabs who are citizens of
Israel. This citizenship and its practices legitimate the representational
system of the state without having any chance to impact its policies.
Theoretical Framing
Studies of the state have usually focused on its repressing power and
dominating mechanisms. This chapter departs from that approach by
reducing attention on the repressive dimensions of power and instead
emphasizing the disciplining and subjugating practices of the state.
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The chapter follows the lead of Foucault’s understanding of power. In his
view:
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but
say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes
power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t
only weigh on us a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things,
it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be
considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social
body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is
repression.
(Foucault 2003c:307)
Accordingly, one ought to pay attention to the ways in which states
wield power without their subjects’ awareness of their subjugation.
The chapter reiterates Jessop’s note that “[o]ne should study power
where it is exercised over individuals rather than legitimated at the
center; explore the actual practices of subjugation rather than the intentions that guide attempts at domination; and recognize that power
circulates through networks rather than being applied at particular
points” (Jessop 2010:16).
Accordingly the state is an emergent player rather than a foundational,
universal subject with an operational apparatus. As Foucault (1979:92)
claims:
An analysis in terms of power must not assume that state sovereignty, the
form of the law, or the overall unity of domination, is given at the outset;
rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes … power must be
understood in the first instance as a multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and that constitute their own
organizations.
This understanding highlights the importance of the rationalization of
government practices in the exercise of political sovereignty, especially
where specific governmental practices and regimes are articulated into
broader economic and political projects. This understanding renders the
coherence of power relations unthinkable, since power is practiced at
various levels that do not always seem to have clear relations. The state’s
shaping of public consciousness and construction of historical imagination do not easily lend themselves to a legalistic and formalistic political
understanding of power relations. On the other hand, the former cannot
be disconnected from legal and judicial measures made to render cultural
and symbolic policies possible.
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Mckee’s (2009) suggestion to combine discursive and realist forms of
governmentality is a constructive way to understand power relations.
This means that discursive analysis alone cannot demonstrate how power
relations operate and reveal the centrality of the state, on the one hand,
and resistance to top-down politics, on the other. An empirical dimension has to be added in order to overcome the reification of discursive
power. The examination of specific government actions and policies
could help us understand how power can be subtly or invisibly exercised
in a context that is ostensibly “free,” thus achieving surveillance and
control that are ultimately far more effective than restrictive, openly
repressive policies. One has to attend to the empirical concerns of state
policy by examining particular mentalities of governance in its context; in
this way, it becomes possible to render visible the actual effects of
governing practices, and from that to divine their true intent. In this
regard, Mckee (2009) and Lemke (2001) draw our attention to the
importance of the discursive field in which the exercise of power is
rationalized and actual intervention practices are promoted through
their translation into actual programs and techniques by which
individuals and groups are governed. This means that power is also
about “the management of possibilities.” It is about the ability to influence subjects’ actions in a way that presupposes their freedom and ability
to act and resist (Foucault 2003b:138). This form of power is reflected
through disciplinarity, which emphasizes the taming of bodies and souls
in order to subjugate them to acquiesce to a dominant political order.
It refers to explicit programs for reorganizing institutions, rearranging
spaces, and regulating behavior (Foucault 1980:9). Invoking this
understanding of power, this chapter follows Mckee’s (2009) suggestion
and applies an analytical approach that combines these two forms of
governmentality throughout the examination of this case. The chapter
aims to demonstrate that through changing strategies of structuring and
deploying power relations, states seek control and domination. State
power is asserted through combining thought and modes of governing.
This understanding of power looks at government as “the effect, the
profile, the mobile shape of incessant transactions which modify, or
move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance,
modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of
control, relationships between local powers, the central authority and
so on” (Foucault 2008:77). In the context of Israel, this understanding
helps delineate the sophisticated state–minority dynamics that was
constructed upon the establishment of the state and remains powerfully
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entrenched to this very day. The three different interrelated areas
mentioned earlier are only some of many such areas; they demonstrate
how each of the governing techniques promotes a sophisticated system of
surveillance and domination, leading to broader and more persistent
societal and political configurations.
Disciplining through the Politics of Expectations
Expectations play a major role in politics (Brady, Lehman-Schlozman,
and Verba 1993). Recruiting people through “rational prospecting” is
a well-known phenomenon that renders acquiescence possible (ibid.).
This pattern of expectations politics is well-known in political economy
also (Ladner and Wlezien 2007). Political preferences are deeply related
to economic expectation, reflecting the basic urge for security and
well-being (Borup, Brown, Konrad, and Van Lente 2006; Ladner
and Wlezien 2007). Having said that, one could argue that the strategic
nourishing of expectations for a better life through economic incentives
in time of insecurity and need is a strong disciplinary mechanism in the
hands of state agencies. Israeli policies of expectations shed light on state
mechanisms of governing the Palestinian homeland minority after
the Nakba.
The breakdown and shattering of Palestinian society as a result of the
Nakba have left those Palestinians who remained in Israel full of mistrust
and lacking in self-confidence (Sa’di 2003). Most Palestinians who stayed
did not believe that the state would allow them to remain in their own
residences, after they had seen hundreds of thousands of their brethren
either expelled or fled to safe areas (Jamal 2010). This mindset was fully
evident to the leaders of the Israeli security forces and to the state
establishment. It was also fully exploited in order to ensure the total
submission of the Palestinian community to Israeli priorities (OzackyLazar 2002). In a situation of total defeat and shocking loss, most
Palestinians who remained in the state submitted to the prevailing reality
for a long time (Lustick 1980; Rouhana 2007). State agencies propagated
expectations that ought to be followed and respected, as a guarantor for
the safety of the remaining Palestinians (Cohen 2010). These
expectations were not always formalized, but were very effective at
establishing a collective wariness, supported by practices and rules that
all Palestinian citizens were to follow. The educational system played
a major role in propagating this atmosphere (al-Haj 1995; Mari 1978).
In other words, the main message was that Arab citizens have to not only
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fear the state, but also trust its potential capability to benefit them if they
demonstrate their loyalty to it. Although no communal trust was
expected and therefore no identification with state symbols was expected,
calculus-based trust was encouraged, especially among the young generation (Rousseau 1998).
As the Israeli declaration of independence demonstrates, state
representatives expected the remaining Palestinian minority to accept
the political realities resulting from the 1948 war and gradually detach
from their national past (Ozacky-Lazar 2002). The state began
constructing political, educational, and disciplinary policies that
aimed at creating a new minority collective imagination, as “Israeli
Arabs” (Rabinowitz 1993). Israeli citizenship was introduced as
a safety net, protecting from tragic and ambiguous future (Leibler
and Breslau 2005). It marked the rebirth of those Palestinians who
remained under Israeli jurisdiction, especially after the signing of
ceasefire agreements with all Arab states that had fought against the
newly established Jewish state. History then started anew for Israel’s
Palestinian citizens, whose collective past had to be remolded to match
the new reality (Bishara 1993). The politics of fear became
a disciplining mechanism to facilitate the resocialization process taking
place in the official educational system, which was fully under the
control of Jewish educators (Abu-Asbeh 2007; al-Haj 1995; Bäuml
2007).
Citizenship became a “control mechanism” through exchanging safety
and survival in the homeland for ceremonial loyalty and political patriotism (Ben Amos and Bar-Tal 2004). Sentiments toward the Palestinian
past or sympathy with the Palestinian cause, especially concerning the
historical injustice and the miserable reality of the refugees, were recast
by state authorities as a serious security threat and betrayal of
the commitments entailed within citizenship. State agents constructed
the Israeli–Arab identity as a clear possessive affiliation framework,
where the legal affiliation to the Israeli state was to determine not only
the priorities but also the worldview of the Palestinian minority. In this
atmosphere, Arab calls were expressed to draft Arab citizens to army
service in the mid-1950s (Cohen 2010; Jiryis 1976). Although citizenship
did not ultimately protect the minority from severe state interference and
penetrations of state agencies into its material and symbolic resources, it
managed to marginalize the political and sentimental identification with
Palestinian nationality and facilitate the rise of a broader identitarian
consciousness, affiliated with Arab culture (Yiftachel 2006).
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The Arab-Palestinian minority was expected to adapt to the priorities
set by the state concerning the absorption of a growing number of Jewish
immigrants and the discriminatory allocation of resources in the areas of
housing, settlement, development, education, and so on. The state viewed
these priorities as both natural and necessary in order to realize its
character as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The Arab-Palestinian
minority, who are the indigenous inhabitants of the land, was expected to
accept the official material and symbolic priorities and act accordingly, as
“good Arabs,” “positive Arabs,” and “quiet Arabs” (Cohen 2010; Jamal
2010; Lustick 1980; Rouhana 2007).
The Arab-Palestinian minority was expected to play according to the
rules of the democratic process and accept policies based on majority
rule. The fact that the majority was ethnically based and preserved
through demographic engineering went unmentioned in the political
agenda. As expected in deeply divided societies, the democratic processes
of majority decisions have been translated into ethnic majoritarian
despotism, instead of grand coalition politics, leading to the minority´s
loss of tangible influence on policy making, especially in matters related
to its well-being and interests (Jamal 2009; Lijphart 1977; Mill 2003). This
pattern of politics in Israel has intensified in the last decade, contrary to
claims of liberalization and democratization, leading to the hollowing out
of Arab-Palestinian citizenship from any substantive meaning (Jamal
2007; Navot and Peled 2009). The ethos of defensive democracy –
protecting democracy from its “internal enemies” – has been utilized in
order to justify such politics, despite the fact that the Jewish majority in
Israel has absolute power over state mechanisms and an automatic
majority that is able to pass any decision it wishes (Pedazor 2004).
The mechanism of facilitating the political interests of the Jewish majority through the discourse of defensive democracy remains one of the
characteristics of governmentality, utilizing the majoritarian system to
exclude the Arab-Palestinian community from policy making and equal
share in public resources.
Another major component of disciplining of the subjects to fulfill
expectations is to lead its Arab-Palestinian citizens to accept their
Israeli citizenship as the major determinant legal and cultural frame of
their political behavior in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, in an attempt to
minimize or eradicate the perception that they, as Palestinian nationals,
were victims of state policies. Expecting them to take a minor and neutral
position vis-à-vis the national aspirations of the Palestinian people has
been an important official Israeli position. Any counter-position was
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propagated as betrayal of the political order that guaranteed Palestinian
citizens’ safety in the first place (Reiter 2009; Shiftan 2011). Another
important expectation has been accepting their secondary civil status in
the Jewish state as the upper limit of their political ambitions. This
expectation has frequently been expressed by Israeli leaders, who have
claimed that the national rights of all Palestinians are to be fulfilled in
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, once it is established
(Levy 2011). Arab-Palestinian citizens are expected to sever their national
political bonds with their brethren and localize their political aspirations
in a time when Israel, by contrast, seeks to deepen the relationship
between the Jewish majority in Israel and the rest of the Jewish people
in the entire world (Lainer-Vos 2011). Major efforts and material
resources are invested to host Jewish Americans and Europeans for
lengthy visits to Israel, aiming to tie them to the Zionist ideology and
goals, as the Taglit venture and the Masa program demonstrate, at a time
when Palestinian citizens are denied even the right of family unification if
they are married to another Palestinian in the occupied territories
(Adalah 2012).
The system of expectations developed by the state was translated into
policy outlines, aiming at turning the abovementioned expectations into
realities. The policy outlines were developed in various fields and were
coordinated either by the Prime Minister’s Office through the advisor on
Arab affairs or, later, by the Israeli minister of Arab affairs. Many studies
of state–minority relations in Israel have focused attention on the politics
of control of the minority. These studies have made an enormous contribution to our understanding of the micro-politics of control perfected
by the Israeli state, and the mechanisms used to penetrate this society and
its social formations. It is important to demonstrate, along the theoretical
lines of this chapter, as depicted earlier, that the policies of control were
complemented by policies of neglect, which are best manifested through
the politics of de-development and underdevelopment of Arab regions in
the name of the development of Israeli society (Brzezinski 1956; Smith
2003). For the sake of developing the Galilee and the Naqab (Negev), for
instance, Arab lands were expropriated under the cover of public interest,
although the services and infrastructures built by state agencies served
mostly, if not exclusively, Jewish immigrants. New settlements and roads
were established, leaving Arab villages and towns outside the development plans (Forman 2006). Housing projects and building spaces in Arab
areas were dragged out for years, falling short of the demand in rural
villages and towns (Yaakoby and Cohen 2007).
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One of the most important policy outlines has been establishing the
economic dependence of the Arab-Palestinian minority on state institutions and on Jewish markets, while constructing a Jewish national
material and symbolic space manifested in the land regime of the
state and the exclusion of Arabs from it (Haidar 1995; Levin-Epstein
and Semyonov 1993; Yashiv 2012; Yiftachel 2006). This policy was
translated into expropriating Arab agricultural private lands, which
were the main source of income for most Arab families, and establishing the exclusive Israeli Jewish land regime with its material and
symbolic dimensions (Benziman and Mantzur 1992; Holzman-Gazit
2007). This has been the main policy pursued by various legal and
administrative means and until today it remains the dominant policy,
as manifested in the recent legal changes in the laws that regulate new
membership in community housing and the enactment of the
Admission Committees Law (ACRI 2011). This law enables residents
of Jewish community settlements to reject candidates who wish to live
there for “lack of suitability to the sociocultural makeup” of the
settlement (Adalah 2012; Friedman 2011).
The governmental investment in the development of Arab society has
been minimal (Hasson and Karayanni 2006). The government utilized
the official allocation of resources to nourish loyalty and patronage
relations with local political forces (Cohen 2010). No industrial infrastructures were developed in Arab towns and villages, something that
aimed at intensifying the proletarianization of Arab society and its
dependence on Jewish economic infrastructures (Levin-Epstein and
Semyonov 1993; Yashiv 2012). This policy, still in effect today, has turned
most Arab workers into a cheap labor force, serving the priorities and
interests that are set by Jewish entrepreneurs. The rise of a new Arab
middle class and the development of local Arab business market in Arab
towns and cities in the last three decades have been taking place despite
state policies rather than as a result of them. The Arab economy in Israel
suffers from strong structural impediments that are mostly caused by
official policies (Gharrah 2012). There is hardly any governmental investment in the Arab economy or in developing industrial zones in Arab
localities (ibid.). The number of Arab families living under poverty line is
much higher than in Jewish society. In 2011 there were 442,200 families
(1,838,600 persons) living under poverty line in Israel (Andbald, Berkley,
Gotleb, and Froman 2012). When we look at poverty based on national
affiliation we find that whereas 14% of Jewish families live under poverty
line (18.1% of children), we see that 46.5% of Arab families (55% of
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children) live under poverty line (Andbald, Heler, Gotleb, and Berkley
2013).
In addition to the elimination of agricultural infrastructure in Arab
society, the land expropriation policy aimed at narrowing the geographic
spaces under Arab control. The territories under the jurisdiction of Arab
municipalities were limited to a minimum, thereby restricting
development and leading to the ghettoization of Arab towns and cities
(Jamal 2008; Khamaisi 2002). National planning and zoning policies and
intensive Jewish-only settlement development have turned most Arab
towns and cities into islands within geographical spaces controlled by
Jewish cities or Jewish-dominated regional councils. Two major aims
were pursued by these planning, zoning, and settlement policies: First,
Judaizing the land, by facilitating the migration of Jewish citizens from
the center of the country to the Galilee and Negev areas in the North and
South, and the establishment of Jewish cities and communal settlements
with high standards of living (Falah 1989). The “national priority plan”
promoted by the government illustrates its intentions, insofar as Arab
towns were hardly included (Adalah 2012). These plans include massive
governmental investment in infrastructure to facilitate purchase of lands
for housing, reduction of taxes that reach 68% on purchase of lands, and
reduction in income and other taxes (ibid.). The second aim has been to
secure Jewish control over all routes that connect Arab towns and cities
and fragment the areas in which Arabs have a demographic majority.
When looking at the settlement and road map in the Galilee, for instance,
it becomes more than clear that roads cut between Arab towns and
bypass them, leaving them as islands in a sophisticated network of highways (Rabinowitz and Vardi 2010; Yaakoby and Cohen 2007). When
looking at the settlement plans and at the fact that Jewish settlements not
only control huge swathes of land for future development, but they are
also built mostly atop hills and mountains, especially in Arab areas, one
cannot but think that there must be a master plan behind this pattern.
From a security perspective, one can assume that the aim is to segregate
and fragment areas of dense Arab population, such as in the Galilee, and
to take over areas in which Arabs have a so-called “distorting” presence,
such as in the Naqab area, as the Prawer Plan clearly demonstrates (ACRI
2011).
The state established a tradition of discriminatory allocation of
resources to Arab municipalities and educational and welfare institutions
(Ghanem and Azaizi 2008). Most prime ministers in the last two decades
have admitted that the state has discriminated against Arab citizens in its
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allocation of resources. The Israeli Supreme Court has admitted that state
policies of allocation have marginalized Arab needs and diverted unequal
resources to the Arab municipalities and other institutions (Saban 2005).
The Official Or Commission appointed by the Barak government
after October 2000 events outlined the well-institutionalized discrimination against Arab citizens in the allocation of resources (Or et al. 2003).
Although none of the above has admitted that such discrimination was
based on racial grounds, one cannot ignore the fact, admitted by the Or
Commission report, that such a structured discrimination was the
consistent default policy. The discrimination in the allocation of state
resources is a well-established and intended policy until this very day
(ACRI 2011). It cannot be explained as a result of an administrative
miscalculation or technical deviation from the formal policy.
Discrimination against Arab institutions has been a well-established
policy that aims to maintain the gaps between a modern Jewish society
and an underdeveloped and neglected Arab society.
Another major policy outline the state pursued toward the
Arab-Palestinian minority is suppressing attempts to establish an
effective national Arab leadership and delegitimizing Arab efforts to
challenge state policies by popular means. The state invested major
efforts and resources in order to co-opt leaders of the Arab minority
and fragment Arab political forces in order to prevent coordinated
national political mobilization by the Arab minority (Jamal 2006;
Lustick 1980). The state has never recognized the Arab Higher
Follow-Up Committee, despite the fact that it is a coordinated political
body that includes all political parties and representatives from all major
Arab institutions and movements. Political and religious leaders who
“diverted” from expected and accepted behavior were tamed by various
means, especially legal and judicial. Although a majority of the
Arab-Palestinian population still participates in Knesset elections and
views the participation of political parties in parliamentary politics as
normal, the dominant Jewish Zionist political parties have steadily
reduced the spaces Arab parties have to maneuver and set new restrictive
limits on their political participation (Jamal 2012a).
In Israel, majoritarian rule has become an effective instrument to
impose laws that counter the basic rights of the minority to influence
decisions related to its own basic rights. Thus, majority decisions
have been translated into a tyranny of the majority. The fact that the
Arab-Palestinian parties have never been integrated in any of the
governmental coalitions and their participation in crucial national
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decisions has come to be viewed as illegitimate, and even aligned with
betrayal – as happened, for example, in the confirmation of the Oslo
Accords in 1994 – is a major indication that Arab participation in the
Israeli political system has been turned into a “fig-leaf” (Ghanem and
Mustafa 2009).
These expectations and policies outlined briefly thus far demonstrate
some of the disciplining practices that have fundamentally shaped
state–minority relations in Israel. The state manifested itself through
practices that render the Arab-Palestinian minority subject to rules of
behavior set almost fully by the Jewish majority. Spaces of freedom are
defined in order to promote surveillance and control rather than
to empower the Arab-Palestinian community and transform its
representative bodies into legitimate players that can influence official
policies. When zooming in on one of the central areas used to discipline
the Arab population, such as the media, one can begin to elucidate the
efforts the state has made to construct a new collective consciousness in
the Arab-Palestinian community that serves the expectations and
priorities of state agents.
Manufacturing “Quiet Arab Citizens”
The disciplining policies as discursive power manifesting the complexity
of state formation are a long-dated phenomenon. Despite the fact that the
state did not manage to fully subjugate the Arab-Palestinian minority, its
power was manifested through soft practices. As argued elsewhere, the
state is manifested through material as well as cultural practices.
The following section concentrates on cultural practices.
Previous studies have examined the cooperation between Israeli intelligence organizations and local Arab collaborators, who were nicknamed
“good Arabs” (Cohen 2010). These were Arab residents or citizens who
assisted the Israeli intelligence services in return for benefits such as
permission for one’s family, who had become refugees during the 1948
war, to remain in the country, or for significant monetary remuneration,
enabling them to support their families.
The importance of the aforementioned research studies is that they
revealed patterns of activity the state used to control and supervise its
internal homeland minority, which authorities persistently defined as
a “security threat.” However, these studies were limited, because they
involve only a small group of collaborators, and therefore could
potentially be misleading. The state invested considerable effort to
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achieve control of the entire Arab-Palestinian community by “soft”
means in order to pacify its presence in the physical as well as mental
environment of the community. Because these state-framing policies
have not been thoroughly studied in the past, their examination provides
access to the symbolic and cultural dimension of state disciplining power.
During the first decades of its existence, the state of Israel, like
other hegemonic regimes, turned the mass media into a central
mechanism, second only to the educational system, of resocialization,
acting to promote consent and to form a collective common imagination
among citizens (Negbi 1999; Yu and Cohen 2009). In practice, the
Hebrew press, both party-controlled and private newspapers, and the
national radio station, Kol Yisrael (The Voice of Israel), were strongly
linked to information organs operating from the Office of the Prime
Minister, from the Foreign Ministry, and from the Israeli Army (Frenkel
1994; Lebel 2005). Thus, even if there were differences among them, most
Hebrew media organizations were mobilized concerning anything to do
with security or foreign policy, a tendency which has traditionally
continued with varying levels of intensity until the present day (Caspi
and Limor 1999; Cohen and Wolfsfeld 1993; Elbaz 2013; Liebes 1997).
A policy of manufacturing consent by means of stringent submission,
discipline, and policing was quickly imposed on Palestinian citizens who
had remained within the state following the Nakba (Bäuml 2007; Gopher
and Ben Porat 2013; Jamal 2009; Peled 1992; Reiter 2009). One of these,
whose central objective was to achieve a monopoly over consciousness
formation in Arab society, was the media, manifested in establishing
a number of newspapers in Arabic (Jamal 2005a). These newspapers,
which were controlled by the Histadrut, the second-largest employer and
simultaneously the main workers’ union in Israel at the time, and by the
Zionist parties Mapai and Mapam, were directed toward the Arabeducated elite and aspired to become the primary source of information
and commentary in Arab society, seeking to establish a majority of “quiet
Arabs.” The goal was to reframe Arab consciousness to enable the
normalized recognition of Israel as the Jewish state in the region, so
Arabs would accept Israel’s existence as an accomplished fact, as a
permanent part of the natural order of their environment (Jamal 2012b).
The policy of information and consciousness disciplining toward the
Arab-Palestinian community during the state’s early decades was led by
“Arab-Jews” (Meir-Glitzenstein 2004; Shohat 1988; Wurmser 2005).
Many educated Middle Eastern Jews (Mizrahim), whose cultural
background was Arab and who spoke Arabic with authentic imagery,
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chose to join the Information Office and other media institutions as they
were established, thus supplying a new type of service to the state that no
other group of elite Jewish Israelis could supply. These Jews behaved as
though their main goal was “to serve” the needs of the Arab community,
but they actually constituted part of the disciplinary power system of the
state, both for the Arab population and for other Mizrahi Jews who were
exposed to the literary and media products of this elite (Jamal 2012a).
An instructive example of state-controlled media was the daily
newspaper al-Yom (Today), which was first issued in 1948 by the Arab
unit of the Histadrut from the former offices of Filasteen, a Palestinian
newspaper that had appeared in Jaffa in 1920s–1940s and had
ceased publication as a result of the 1948 war. Al-Yom was later integrated into the Arab Publishing House of the Histadrut, which published
a number of journals, including the biweekly al-Yom for children, the
biweekly Sada al-Tarbiya (Educational Echo), the monthly al-Hadaf
(The Objective), and the quarterly Leka’a (Meeting). Some of these are
still being published today. In addition, the publishing house was
responsible for production of textbooks for Arab schools and, thus,
controlled the income from these books and, in cooperation with the
Ministry of Education, determined their content, which was responsible
for the socialization of Arab youth (Bäuml 2007).
Al-Yom employed Jewish-Arabs whose mother tongue was Arabic,
who were known for their attraction to and affection for the
Arabic language and literature, and who had some kind of journalistic
experience. Among the key personalities in this group were Menachem
Zarur (who was known by his nickname, Abu Ibrahim), who had served
as the editor of the newspaper al-Balad (The Homeland) in Baghdad
before his immigration to Israel; Meir Jarakh, an Iraqi who worked in the
Information Center of the Prime Minister’s Office and was a connecting
link between the Information Center and the prime minister’s advisor on
Arab affairs, and at the same time, a member of the newspaper editorial
staff; and Nissim Rejwan, a noted author whose books were published in
English and in Arabic, and who wrote a weekly column in al-Yom and
later became its editor. Rejwan, who had worked as a journalist for
The Baghdad Times during the 1940s, used this experience to advance
the influence of al-Yom in Arab society, and actually became a leading
figure in the Israeli information machine. Tuvia Shamush, of Syrian
extraction, was the editor of al-Yom for 20 years and also translated
fine literature from Arabic to Hebrew – for example, Season of
Migration to the North by al-Tayyib Salih and Eight Eyes by Sufi
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Abdallah – and was one of the leading figures in determining the editorial
policy of the newspaper and giving it a more “authentic” tone in language
and content for the average Arab reader (Eitan 2013; Jamal 2012b).
The content of the newspapers tried to disseminate a cognitive
framework wherein Israel was to be accepted as an immutable fact, and
Arabs were subtly warned that if the state were forced to adopt a harsh
policy, they would be sorry. At a meeting of the newspaper’s Advisory
Committee on April 1, 1963, it was noted:
The newspaper would penetrate into the readers’ consciousness that the
State of Israel was an established fact by focusing on how it was becoming
stronger culturally, economically, politically and militarily.
(ISA, 3551/5, N.d.)
In addition, al-Yom published ideas and opinions whose objective was to
create the sense that Israel was a permanent fixture and to recommend
integration of the Arab community in the country. In a summary of the
newspaper’s Board of Directors’ meeting with the representative of the
Prime Minister’s Office on September 5, 1962, it was suggested that:
The newspaper should provide its readers with values of good citizenship,
and general and Israeli culture, while safeguarding and respecting the
religious heritage, the ethnicity and the national feelings (but not negative
nationalism) of the reader. Thus, the newspaper should encourage integration of Arab citizens in the State of Israel and to contribute to the
understanding and to the good relations among all of the sectors.
(ISA, 3551/5, N.d.)
Opening the newspaper to Arab voices reflected attempts by the state
to create the impression that it was making every effort to improve the
living conditions of Arab citizens. The responsibility for the defeat of
1948 and for the unfortunate situation of the Arab citizens was placed on
the “irresponsible” Arab and Palestinian leadership who were concerned
with their own narrow interests, while the Arab public was forced to pay
a heavy price. The newspaper presented its worldview in a sophisticated
manner and in accessible language to the average Arab reader, taking care
not to arouse antagonism among the Arab public. Accordingly,
the newspaper editors invested great care in giving the impression that
the newspaper intended to serve the basic interests of the Arab community. The objective was to appeal to Arab citizens and to manipulate Arab
public opinion in Israel, as a component of the aspiration to control the
Arab self. This can be understood from the words of Shmuel Toledano,
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a former advisor on Arab affairs, which imply the aim of the daily
newspaper:
In contrast to the prevailing opinion, I don’t see a problem or implications, even from the viewpoint of the Arab reader, in the fact that this was
a government newspaper. It’s illogical to attempt to conceal the link
between the newspaper and the government … The orientation of the
newspaper should … like the broadcasts of the Arab Israeli radio programs, relate to foreign policy and attitudes towards Israel. Special
emphasis should be focused on information about Arabs in the country
and how their special needs are handled.
(ISA, 5948/12C, N.d.)
Al-Yom was distributed in all areas with a large Arab population, both
in cities and in villages. The attempt to organize a permanent readership
among Arab citizens led those who were responsible for the newspaper to
utilize a number of channels: First, they took advantage of contacts that
newspaper staff had with officials in various government offices to pressure Palestinians, who needed government permits, to subscribe. Second,
they requested that government officials provide financial support for
sectors of Arab society, to encourage them to subscribe. There were also
attempts to identify potential readers from among the Arab educated
elite. This included a request from the newspaper director to the Hebrew
University to receive a list of names of Arab students in order to
encourage them to read the newspaper (ISA, 3551/10, N.d.).
Despite the considerable efforts undertaken to enable al-Yom to
continue publishing, it ceased publication immediately after the 1967
war (Yu and Cohen 2009). The decision to close the newspaper and to
establish an alternative was made by a committee of Information
Directors. The principal reason was al-Yom’s lack of success in drawing
a large reading public, which would justify the economic investment by
the Histadrut and the Prime Minister’s Office. The demographic change
following the 1967 war and the addition of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians to Israeli control in the West Bank and Gaza required
a significant change in the Israeli information dissemination policy.
Those responsible for Israeli information provision decided to
reorganize, including closing down al-Yom and, a year after the end of
the war, establishing the newspaper al-Anba’a (The News), which had
a new orientation and reputation (Jamal 2012a).
Al-Anba’a continued the policy guidelines of al-Yom, but in a more
sophisticated way, with the aim of making much more meaningful
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inroads into Arab society and taking responsibility for determining its
public agenda. The staff of the new newspaper defined al-Anba’a as an
official newspaper “which would represent the official position of the
state” and would be directed to Arabs “in Israel, on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip and the Arab states,” while, according to the founding
staff, the target audience would dictate the newspaper’s content and the
editorial policy (Eitan 2013:76–77). Most of the editorial staff and reporters who had worked for al-Yom continued to operate at al-Anba’a, but
they were faced with new challenges in 1967 after the occupation of
Palestinian territories, where hundreds of thousands Palestinians live
that are antagonistic to Israel’s presence in the region. In practice, the
editors of al-Anba’a tried to create the impression among the Palestinians
that the newspaper was a spokesman for the common people, and
was established to serve its readers and to relate to their problems
(Eitan 2013).
Like al-Yom, al-Anba’a made great efforts to widen its circulation and
to exploit personal connections between its directors and official bodies
so as to create pressure on Arab citizens associated with the ruling party
and governmental offices to read the newspaper (Jamal 2012b).
The newspaper directors even tried to win the trust of the leaders of the
Palestinian community in East Jerusalem and to turn them into regular
readers of al-Anba’a. To this end, they initiated meetings with key figures,
such as Anwar Nusseibeh, in order to penetrate Arab society and to
improve their competitive position against local newspapers, especially
the daily al-Quds, the pro-Jordanian newspaper which was most widely
disseminated in the West Bank and which was later known for its
national Palestinian stance from the early 1970s (Jamal 2005b).
The objectives of al-Anba’a can be summarized as follows: to establish
the image of an open public sphere to which a variety of Arab voices were
invited to participate in discussion regarding the relations between the
state and the Arab minority who resided in the state, and with its Arab
neighbors; second, to advance the acceptance of Israel as an established
fact, which should be respected. Those in charge of the newspaper wished
to present the state as aspiring to integrate the Arab-Palestinian population within the state structure, in the spirit of the Israeli Declaration of
Independence. The newspaper propagated the idea that Israel was a state,
one of many, which had won its independence in the late 1940s and thus
it should be seen as a part of the wave of international decolonialization
after World War II. This was meant to distract readers from the
dominant Arab position during this period, in which Israel was viewed
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as a colonial occupying power. Regarding internal affairs, the newspaper
emphasized public works efforts undertaken for “loyal” Palestinians, like
connecting to the electricity network, paving of roads, and similar works
while simultaneously blatantly neglecting to report about policies of land
expropriation, arrests of national activists, and other harsh measures
levied against “disloyal” Palestinians. Furthermore, the newspaper
encouraged Palestinians with opinions supportive of to write articles
that emphasized the advances in Jewish–Arab relations; special emphasis
was placed on the praiseworthy attempt of official state bodies to solve
local problems in Arab villages. The directors of the newspaper stated:
the newspaper will serve as an open platform for expressing opinions even
if they are not in line with official opinions, but will make sure that “the
last word” will be in the spirit of government policies … but [the newspaper] would emphasize how Israel solves its internal problems (social,
economic, scientific and others).
(ISA, 17084/13, N.d.)
In order to strengthen the pretensions of the newspaper to reflect
Israeli pluralism and liberalism, the newspaper directors decided to
publish a weekly column written by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who
was a prominent Egyptian columnist close to Jamal Abdel Nasser in their
Sunday edition, but maintained the right to react “from time to time to
these articles and to refute what could be refuted.” The newspaper
targeted efforts at encouraging Arab citizens to adopt an appeasing
attitude when dealing with their problems with the state. Or, as expressed
by Shmuel Toledano, one of those responsible for publishing the
newspaper, the paper’s objective was to assist in developing “quiet
Arabs” (ISA, 304/63, N.d.).
With the wane of the Histadrut and the beginning of privatization and
liberalization of the Israeli economy initiated by Menachem Begin’s first
and second governments (1977–1981), and the withdrawal of the Prime
Minister’s Office from subsidizing the newspaper, al-Anba’a was beset by
severe financial difficulties. Finally, the end of official support for the
newspaper led it to cease publication in 1984. However, even before its
closure, in practice, its existence had become superfluous. This was due to
its very small number of readers, but mostly because a large number of
Palestinian citizens had already internalized the political rationale which
the newspaper had been trying to advance, and particularly its basic
assumption, that the Palestinians were a minority completely dependent
on the state. Although one cannot claim that the newspaper alone was
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behind this “success,” it helped in establishing the public atmosphere and
collective mindset that supported it.
In summary, through the years, the existence of an Israeli
state-sponsored media system in Arabic contributed to the illusion
of a well-developed and liberal public sphere. An additional contribution was provided by the voices of loyal Arabs who emphasized
the efforts of the state to aid in solving the problems of the
Palestinian minority regarding road construction, water and electricity infrastructure, the educational system, and health and welfare
facilities. Arab officials working in state bodies, especially school
principals and Histadrut officials, were placed as leaders of public
opinion, active in advancing governmental programs designed to
penetrate and influence Arab society through its cultural gateways
(Bäuml 2007). These constituted the dependable stratum of propagandists who provided the state with the internal legitimizing voice
that it needed. However, the 1980s witnessed the rise of a new
generation of Arab leaders who began changing the entire nature
of the relationship between the Israeli state and its native national
minority, a process that led to the development of new forms
of subjugation, which will be addressed in the following section
(Jamal 2006).
Hollow Citizenship, Majoritarian Despotism,
and Ineffective Political Participation
In his treatment of technologies of contemporary government, Nikolas
Rose argues that the creation of freedom, where subjects are obliged to be
free and are required to conduct themselves responsibly, to account for
their own freedom is a central strategy of governing (Rose 1999).
According to this understanding, the freedom ethic is a part of
a particular formula of governing society (Rose, O’Malley, and
Valverde 2006). Taking responsibility for freedom becomes an important
form of disciplining the conduct of the individual and of society. As Rose
et al claim “the very ethic of freedom [is] itself part of a particular formula
for governing free societies” (ibid.:91). This is true in the political and
social fields.
A major question that comes to mind when discussing state–minority
relations in Israel is, who is the sovereign of the Israeli state? Defining the
sovereign is of crucial importance, since it reveals central characteristics
of the political game. Answering this question could shed light on the
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complexity of the political reality of the Palestinian community in Israel
and the complexities of Israeli politics. Since it is not possible to
understand technologies of power without an analysis of the political
rationality underpinning them, this section follows formal dimensions of
the political practices, aiming at defining the tools of legitimization and
spaces of political behavior allotted to the various political players,
especially the Arab-Palestinian minority in the state.
The definition of the sovereign in the Israeli state is not a one-time act.
It takes place every day, as manifested by various political and legal
philosophers (Rousseau 1988). The first discursive act to externalize the
Israeli sovereign was the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which
became a central constitutional document in the Israeli political and
legal culture (Barak 2006). This founding document states: “The Land
of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual,
religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to
statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance
and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.” The declaration
indicates the exact sovereign in the newly established state asserting:
On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly
passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in EretzIsrael; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to
take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of
that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the
Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable. This right is the
natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all
other nations, in their own sovereign State. Accordingly we, members of
the peoples council, representatives of the Jewish community of EretzIsrael and of the Zionist Movement, are here assembled on the day of the
termination of the British Mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our
natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the
United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of
a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel.
It is made clear that the declaration speaks of a historical sovereign in
a specific territory that has been restored after a long period of forced
absence. The absence of the sovereign does not and should not have
reduced or abolished the right over the land on which sovereignty is
reasserted. The sovereignty of the Jewish people over the land – Palestine
in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live – is asserted as
a continuous transhistorical power that is not affected by historical and
demographic realities on the ground. The historical, spiritual, symbolic,
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and constitutional status of the declaration leaves no doubt as to the
exclusive character of the Israeli sovereign, especially when considering
the fact that part of the indigenous population of Palestine lives within
the borders of the Israeli state. The Jewish people have been constructed
as the eternal and exclusive sovereign, and the Zionist narrative becomes
the ultimate truth in state ideology and practices. This narrative renders
the Palestinians occasional visitors in their own homeland. The recent
engagement with the declaration and the emphasis put by Israeli leaders
on the Jewish character of the state make clear that the Israeli sovereign is
best articulated in ethno-national terms (Yiftachel 2006).
The second element to manifest the Israeli sovereign is through
decision-making that has to do with determining the strategic character
of the Israeli state. There is a prevalent consensus among Israeli Jews that
the state should invest all resources possible to preserve the hegemony of
Jewish culture in the public sphere, even if this means the exclusion of
non-Jews (Democracy Index 2012). Only Jews are viewed as fully
legitimate participants in determining the character of the state and its
major policies. A majority of the Israeli Jewish public would prefer if
Arabs were excluded from involvement in crucial decision-making
processes (ibid.). Anti-liberal tendencies among major proportions of
the Israeli Jewish public have been found in public opinion surveys that
demonstrated the narrow ethnic political culture and the lack of
tolerance toward the Arab population and the unwillingness to justify
their equal participation in the representative organs of the state (ibid.).
Recent developments in Israeli politics clearly demonstrate that the
Jewish majority in Israel seeks to delegitimize Arab representation in the
Israeli parliament, redefine the political field in which Arabs can play,
and redefine the meaning of their citizenship (Navot and Peled 2009).
This can be best demonstrated by law-making processes in which basic
and regular laws were amended twice in order to exclude or even render
illegal any attempt to challenge – legally – the Jewish character of the
state. The first time took place in the first Sharon government 2001–2003,
and the second during the second Netanyahu government, 2009–2012.
On May 15, 2002, the Israeli Knesset changed article 7(a) of the Basic
Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 35) – 2002, Political Parties Law
(Amendment No. 13) – 2002, Knesset and Prime Minister Elections Law
(Amendment No. 46) – 2002 (Jamal 2011). These changes have led to
continuous attempts by the Jewish national parties to block the participation of national and religious Arab parties from participating in the
elections through constitutional and legal disqualification charges, the
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last of which took place against The United Arab List and the National
Democratic Assembly toward the January 2013 elections. These attempts,
which have not succeeded so far as a result of the intervention of the
Israeli High Court, mark the efforts made by the Jewish majority in
the Knesset to set the boundaries of the legitimate participation in the
political game in Israel.
To this, one should add the 2003 “amendment” of the Citizenship and
Entry into Israel Law, which made it almost impossible for Palestinian
citizens of Israel to get permits for their Palestinian spouses and children
from the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to enter and reside
in Israel for purposes of family unification (Adalah 2012). In 2007, the
law was amended again to prohibit spouses from “enemy states” – Syria,
Lebanon, Iran, and Iraq – to enter Israel as part of family unification, in
order to avoid charges that the law was racist since it is directed solely and
specifically against Palestinians (ibid.). These amendments, which were
declared by the Israeli High Court as constitutional, stand in sharp
contrast with the laws providing for any person of Jewish descent to
obtain automatic and rapid citizenship. In thousands of cases, people
with loose and unproven Jewish ancestry received automatic citizenship
in Israel, reflecting the racial discrimination embedded in the Israeli
citizenship law, aiming to cope with what has become known in Israel
as the “demographic threat.”
The “war” waged against the Arab-Palestinian presence in Israel does
not stop at the gates of demography. It has always involved the cultural
and symbolic existence of Palestinians in the Jewish state. These efforts
have taken many avenues, one of which could be demonstrated through
what has become to be known as the “Nakba law,” which allows the
minister of education to withhold funds from official organizations that
commemorate the Palestinian tragedy of 1948 (ACRI 2011). This law is
a part and parcel of the grand policy of “epistemic violence” against
Palestinian history, memory, and consciousness, as manifested in
formal school books, literary and art policies, and even gastronomy
(Bar Tal 2013).
Constitutional and legal instruments are utilized to narrow spaces of
freedom for Arab-Palestinians. Israeli state institutions and policies are
not “color-blind” when it comes to issues of civil justice as well
as citizenship. Israel is a nationalizing state. It creates a range of burdens,
barriers, stigmatizations, and exclusions against the Arab indigenous
minority for being Palestinian. It is true that the Arab participation in
the Knesset creates the impression that Arabs are genuine participants in
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the Israeli moral community and participants in the definition of the
moral order that dominates Israeli public culture. This participation is
part of a concealed coercion in which Arab participation is marginal, if
not devoid of any meaning, especially when it comes to defining the
moral order in Israel or the rules according to which the deliberations
about such an order take place. The best example to illustrate this point is
the recent law proposal made by right-wing politicians, aiming at guaranteeing a Jewish majority in any decision made in the Knesset concerning territorial compromises (Lis 2013).
Israeli representative politics are based on ethnic majoritarianism that
translates into automatic Jewish majority for important decisions or
disputes. Most of the crucial decisions are made in institutions,
representative or administrative, in which there is Jewish hegemony.
As a result, Arabs are excluded from real and effective participation in
determining the political agenda and from defining the possible choices
within it. Arab participation in the Israeli Knesset obscures deep moral
and ideological disagreements that do not always find their way into the
public sphere for serious discussion and determination. To the contrary,
the majority tacitly presents Arab participation in electoral politics as an
acceptance of the structure of the public order and the ideological ethos
that legitimizes it. The presence of Arabs in the Israeli Knesset obscures
the deep moral disagreements between Arabs and Jews in regard to the
conception of justice that stands behind the whole Israeli system.
The representative institutions of the Israeli political system view
themselves as major mechanisms in promoting the interests of the
Jewish majority in the state. This fact is the thousands of laws enacted
by the Knesset. The latter’s sovereignty does not derive from its
representing the Israeli public only. There is a widely accepted
underlying assumption among the Jewish majority that the Knesset
is an articulation of the sovereignty of the entire Jewish people
worldwide. It therefore expresses the aspirations of Jews living in
the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia, France, the United
Kingdom, and so on. This concept deprives the meaning of civic
sovereignty of any meaning and replaces it with an ethnic sovereignty
that extends far beyond state borders. This transethnic sovereignty
renders the meaning of citizenship empty and replaces it with kinship
as the main logic of sovereign power. No wonder that Jewish
communities, especially wealthy Jews, feel that they can intervene
and influence policies of the Israeli government, as if the state belongs
to them, as much as – and even more than – some of its citizens.
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The deep ethnic majoritarian character of the Israeli political system
and its promotion of Jewish hegemony, while setting limitations on its
representativeness in regard to the Arab-Palestinian citizens,
demonstrate an intrinsically embedded Zionist bias and the need for an
alternative rights system other than the one manifested in the current
electoral system. Jews have an automatic majority in all fields of policy,
while Arab-Palestinians are subordinated to priorities that view them as
threat. As a result, their well-being is jeopardized by their mere participation in a system that undermines their presence instead of empowering
them as integral and equal partners. Israeli officials have utilized Arab
participation in Knesset elections for propaganda purposes. Netanyahu
spoke recently of the freedom of the Arab community in comparison to
all other Arabs in the region in his speech to the U.S. congress, aiming to
praise the Israeli democracy.
This short depiction of the creation of freedom as one of the
technologies of government shows that the Israeli state should not be
understood in foundational terms. Government is achieved through
asymmetrical relationships of power when the subordinate party has
little room to maneuver because their margin of freedom is extremely
limited. The mere participation of Arab citizens in the Israeli democratic
game – the mere practice of freedom – renders them subjugated to
a mechanism that renders their presence devoid of substantive meaning.
The practice of freedom becomes imprisonment in a system of power
that hollows out their citizenship and delegitimizes any attempt to
exercise their power.
Conclusion
The three parts of this chapter explore the theoretical argument that rules of
governments are various and not necessarily coherent. In the Israeli case, we
have shown that the politics of expectations, the manufacturing of consent,
and the hollowing out of citizenship run on various levels and comprise
complementary mechanisms of governmentality. The disciplining of
subjects and subjugation of citizens are achieved through the production
of discourse. Power is practiced as a productive network that runs through
the whole social body, as actual practices of subjugation. Nonetheless and in
contrast to Foucault’s point of view, one cannot ignore the intentions that
underlie attempts at domination. It is true that power circulates through
networks rather than being applied at particular points. But when viewed
from the perspective of state–minority relations, the end result is
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a combination of control and neglect that serves and preserves the sovereign
power. Although one cannot view the state or the sovereign in foundational
terms, nevertheless it makes sense to speak about statecraft, without falling
into “the assumption that the state is always-already there as some sort of
master subject or super-machine” (Jessop 2010:67).
The Arab-Palestinian community in Israel faces various mechanisms
of power, including social engineering, disciplining, taming, and delegitimization. Epistemic violence is utilized in order to define the Arab
minority and delimit its maneuvering space. When mechanisms of
discourse production are conceived to be inefficient, legal means are
introduced in order to subjugate the Arab minority and compel it to
submit to rules set by the hegemonic Jewish majority. This is done
through “democratic” means, turning majority decision into
majoritarian despotism. The political and legal developments of the last
decade demonstrate that this mechanism is turned into a major component of the hegemonic political culture, rendering democratic procedures
a mask for promoting anti-democratic substance that reach a peak with
the hollowing out of citizenship from any substantive meaning and
converting it into an efficient control mechanism. It seems that the efforts
made by the Arab-Palestinian community to counter these efforts fall
within the frames provided by the same governing rules that render these
efforts ineffective, if not void. However, the internal fragmentation of the
Palestinian community and the weakening of the broader Palestinian
national movement open the way for continuation of the same Israeli
disciplining policies under the cover of modernization, democratization,
and development.
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