Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education

Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education Blain Neufeld* Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee Abstract John Rawls claims that the kind of citizenship education required by political liberalism demands ‘far less’ than that required by comprehensive liberalism. Many educational and political theorists who have explored the implications of political liberalism for education policy have disputed Rawls’s claim. Writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, Amy Gutmann contends that the justificatory differences between political and comprehensive liberalism generally have no practical significance for citizenship education. Political liberals such as Stephen Macedo and Victoria Costa maintain that political liberalism requires a form of citizenship education that is far more demanding than that suggested by Rawls. Gordon Davis and Blain Neufeld, in contrast, defend Rawls’s position. These different views have implications for the content of mandatory citizenship education, understanding of the ‘common school ideal,’ and the scope for educational choice within the framework of political liberalism. However, the differences between Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and Neufeld, on the other, might be attributable, at least in part, to their different foci. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa focus on non-ideal theory, specifically the contemporary American context, whereas Davis and Neufeld begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider non-ideal circumstances from that perspective. I. John Rawls claims that his move to political liberalism was motivated by his recognition of the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ and its implications for contemporary political philosophy. By the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism,’ Rawls refers to the diversity of ‘comprehensive doctrines’ inevitably endorsed by reasonable persons in liberal democratic societies – a diversity that would exist even in a fully just society and which can be eliminated only through the exercise of political oppression.1 (‘Comprehensive doctrines,’ broadly speaking, are philosophical, moral, and religious views, such as Buddhism and utilitarianism, that apply to most or all aspects of persons’ lives.) In order to accommodate the reasonable pluralism characteristic of liberal societies, while respecting the equal status of all citizens, Rawls maintains that a conception of justice must be ‘political’ in nature. A political conception of justice satisfies the ‘freestanding condition’ and the ‘basic structure restriction.’ The freestanding condition is satisfied when a conception of justice is formulated exclusively in terms of ‘political’ ideas, such as ‘citizens as free and equal’ and ‘society as a fair system of cooperation.’2 Such ideas are ‘freestanding’ in that they are compatible with the different comprehensive doctrines endorsed by reasonable persons.3 The basic structure restriction is satisfied when a conception of justice is limited in its scope to what Rawls calls the ‘basic structure of society’ (roughly, the main social institutions of society, understood as an overall system of cooperation).4 Since a political conception of justice satisfies the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction, it can accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism, and hence satisfy what Rawls calls the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy.’5 A ‘comprehensive’ conception of justice, in contrast, is justified by a particular © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 782 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education comprehensive doctrine (say, utilitarianism or Kantian moral theory) and/or applies to most or all domains of persons’ lives6; consequently, a comprehensive conception of justice cannot satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. Because of the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction, the requirements of a political liberal ‘citizenship education’7 – the kind of education necessary to prepare students for full citizenship – would seem to be more modest than the requirements of (most forms of) ‘comprehensive liberalism.’ And, indeed, Rawls claims that this is the case. Comprehensive liberal approaches to education, he explains, ‘may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life’; in contrast, ‘political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less’ (Rawls Political Liberalism 199). Rawls continues: [W]e try to answer the question of children’s education entirely within the political conception [of justice]. Society’s concern with their education lies in their role as future citizens, and so in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life, and in their developing the political virtues, all this from within a political point of view. (Political Liberalism 200.) A political liberal education, then, would teach students the skills, concepts, and virtues necessary for them to become free, equal, and responsible citizens. This would involve, inter alia, teaching them about their political rights and liberties, as well cultivating within them a capacity for reasonableness. Teaching students how to be ‘reasonable persons’ would require teaching them to understand and appreciate the fact of reasonable pluralism and the ‘criterion of reciprocity’8 – and, consequently, to employ the terms of ‘public reason’ when deciding fundamental political questions.9 These requirements, though significant, are not as demanding, according to Rawls, as those of comprehensive liberalism.10 Liberal accounts of citizenship education generally include some version of the ‘common school ideal.’11 According to this ideal, schools should help prepare students for democratic citizenship in a pluralist society not simply by teaching them the relevant knowledge and skills, but by providing environments in which they interact with students from different backgrounds. A core function of common schools is to foster a shared sense of citizenship and mutual respect among students from diverse communities. One consequence of the weaker demands of a political liberal citizenship education, it would seem, is that political liberalism’s interpretation of the common school ideal likewise is less demanding than that of comprehensive liberalism. Indeed, it may be that common schools are not always necessary to satisfy the requirements of a political liberal citizenship education. More generally, within a political liberal framework, there would seem to be more ways to satisfy – in terms of pedagogy, curriculum content, and school organization – the requirements of citizenship education than within a comprehensive liberal framework. Moreover, political liberalism’s concern with accommodating the fact of reasonable pluralism, a concern not shared by comprehensive liberalism, suggests at least a prima facie openness to permitting course options and/or schools that accommodate, or even support, the various comprehensive doctrines endorsed by citizens. Thus, political liberalism would seem to allow for greater educational choice, at least ceteris paribus, than would comprehensive liberalism.12 A number of educational and political theorists who have explored the implications of political liberalism for education policy, however, have disputed Rawls’s claim that a © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 783 political liberal citizenship education requires ‘far less’ than that of comprehensive liberalism. These theorists consequently also deny that political liberalism entails a less demanding conception of the common school ideal and/or justifies greater educational choice for students and families than does comprehensive liberalism. Advocates of (versions of) this position include Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, and Victoria Costa. In contrast, Gordon Davis and I defend Rawls’s position. This paper will survey critically these different views concerning the implications of political liberalism for citizenship education. My focus will be on Rawls’s version of political liberalism,13 and on those theorists who agree with Rawls that political liberalism constitutes a distinct and plausible philosophical view.14 Toward the end of my discussion, I will suggest that the differences between the political liberals Macedo and Costa on the one hand, and Davis and myself on the other, might not be as great as initially appear. Macedo’s and Costa’s discussions of education focus on non-ideal theory, and specifically the contemporary American context. Davis and I, in contrast, begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider non-ideal circumstances from that perspective. Within the non-ideal contemporary American context, it may be that political liberals should insist on a more demanding form of citizenship education, including a commitment to a robust form of the common school ideal, than would be appropriate in a ‘well-ordered society.’15 Likewise, Gutmann’s claim that comprehensive and political liberals would endorse the same (or very similar) education policies may be true of the contemporary United States, but not of other liberal democratic societies, or a well-ordered society. II. Rawls claims that ‘political autonomy’ and ‘ethical autonomy’ are philosophically distinct ideas.16 According to political liberalism, citizens in a well-ordered society enjoy ‘full political autonomy.’ This form of autonomy, Rawls explains, “is realized in public life by affirming the political principles of justice and enjoying the protections of the basic rights and liberties; it is also realized by participating in society’s public affairs and sharing in its collective selfdetermination over time” (Political Liberalism 77–78). Political autonomy, so understood, must be distinguished from the ethical values of autonomy and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life, both social and individual, as expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill. So, while political liberalism ‘affirms political autonomy for all,’ Rawls claims that it ‘leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens severally in light of their comprehensive doctrines’ (Political Liberalism 78). Political autonomy can be distinguished from ethical autonomy by its compliance with the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction. Despite accepting the theoretical soundness of Rawls’s distinction between political and ethical autonomy, Amy Gutmann proposes that there is no practical difference between them, at least when it comes to citizenship education.17 This is because “most (if not all) of the same skills and virtues that are necessary and sufficient for educating children for citizenship in a liberal democracy are those that are also necessary and sufficient for educating children to deliberate about their way of life, more generally (and less politically) speaking” (“Civic Education and Social Diversity” 573). Teaching students to become politically autonomous, according to Gutmann, amounts to teaching them to be ethically autonomous. Political liberals do not deny that the skills and knowledge imparted to students in the classes and other school activities that are part of their overall citizenship education may ‘spill over’ into other aspects of their lives. And such ‘spill over effects’ may lead certain students to reflect critically upon their families’ and communities’ comprehensive doctrines and © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 784 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education conceptions of the good, and thereby come to exercise, and perhaps even come to value throughout the rest of their lives, a form of ethical autonomy. Rawls explicitly notes this possibility (Political Liberalism 199–200). Nonetheless, following Rawls, Davis and I hold that such unintentional spill over effects, even if they should prove to be quite common, fail to demonstrate that teaching political autonomy and teaching ethical autonomy are indistinguishable in practice. Such a convergence, we maintain, is neither conceptually nor practically inevitable – there exists a ‘gap,’ in both theory and practice, between teaching students the political ideas necessary for free and equal citizenship, and teaching students a form of ethical autonomy (Davis and Neufeld 60 n. 41). Classes that aim to teach students how to be politically autonomous, roughly, teach them about their rights and liberties as citizens, the political virtues, and how to participate in the political decision-making processes of their society. Such classes differ from those that aim to teach students to be ethically autonomous. The latter kind of classes encourage students, inter alia, to reflect critically on their ‘comprehensive’ beliefs and values, including their religious ones, as well as the broader beliefs and values of other students.18 Gutmann advances a second argument in support of her ‘convergence thesis,’ one that rests upon the importance of teaching students the civic virtue of mutual respect. Political and comprehensive liberals, she maintains, are both committed to teaching mutual respect as a principal substantive aim of citizenship education. Political liberals promote mutual respect as a ‘prerequisite for nondiscriminatory employment practices’ – presumably along with other forms of (publicly relevant) nondiscrimination (Gutmann “Civic Education and Social Diversity” 565). Comprehensive liberals, in contrast, tie the imperative of mutual respect to the value of a general openness to other ways of life, an openness that is to be valued for its own sake and that requires interaction with, and a robust understanding of, different comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good. But because political and comprehensive liberals ‘agree that publicly controlled schools can teach mutual respect,’ Gutmann concludes that they share ‘the same demanding conception of civic education’ (564). Davis and I criticize Gutmann for not considering adequately whether the distinctive features of political liberalism have any bearing on which conception of mutual respect would be acceptable to political liberals. Even if there is a single ‘concept’ of mutual respect, we claim that there are a number of different ‘conceptions’ (Davis and Neufeld 53–58).19 Although Gutmann does not address this question, it is not because she assumes that there is only one standard conception of mutual respect at work in contemporary educational and political theory.20 Rather, she seems to assume that comprehensive and political liberals, including both the early and late Rawls, share the same demanding conception of mutual respect. This assumption, Davis and I suggest, is a consequence of Gutmann’s overemphasis on political liberalism’s freestanding condition. The ‘distinctive and defining feature of political liberalism,’ as Gutmann sees it, is a ‘refusal to invoke any particular conception of the good life . . . to justify any law or public policy.’ Indeed, she claims that ‘the only discernible difference . . . [between comprehensive and political liberals] . . . turns out to be different theoretical rationales for denying parents’ claims’ in educational disputes (“Civic Education and Social Diversity” 560, 573). While the freestanding condition, of course, is a constitutive feature of political liberalism, so is the basic structure restriction. Political liberalism differs from comprehensive liberalism not only with respect to its mode of justification, but also with respect to its scope of application. Taking the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction together, Davis and I contend that Gutmann’s assumption that political and comprehensive liberals would converge on the same demanding conception of mutual respect and regard that conception as the appropriate aim of citizenship education is unjustified (Davis and Neufeld 53–56). © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 785 A defender of Gutmann’s position might point out that her assumption that Rawls’s conception of mutual respect in his later writings remains the same as that in A Theory of Justice (presented at 94–95, 297, 447) is justified by Rawls’s own comments. In the Introduction to Political Liberalism, Rawls writes, ‘the structure and content of [Theory] remain[s] substantially the same’ despite the transition to political liberalism (Political Liberalism xvi). And for the most part in his writings on political liberalism, Rawls does not discuss the idea of mutual respect. Gutmann’s argument presupposes, then, that Rawls’s earlier conception of mutual respect is part of the ‘content’ of his account of justice that remains ‘substantially the same’ following his move to political liberalism. (This matter is discussed further in section V.) Thus, Gutmann’s ‘convergence thesis’ holds that comprehensive and political liberals endorse the same demanding conception of citizenship education, albeit for different reasons. All students in a liberal democratic society should be required to take classes that cultivate in them a robust sense of mutual respect, understood as ‘a reciprocal positive regard’ (Gutmann “Civic Education and Social Diversity” 561). Moreover, students must be taught the skills and knowledge necessary for them to become politically autonomous. And since ‘[t]he skills of political reflection cannot be neatly differentiated from the skills of evaluating one’s own way of life’ (578), students, in practice, must be taught to become ethically autonomous. Gutmann concludes, ‘Most features of human life are properly considered politically relevant for the purposes of educating children’ (574). In order to foster in students a sense of mutual respect and a capacity for autonomy, then, citizenship education must be expansive in scope: it must explore most dimensions of social life, as well as the various comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good endorsed by citizens. III. Gutmann’s convergence thesis appears to find support in the account of citizenship education advanced by the political liberal Stephen Macedo. Macedo labels his version of political liberalism ‘civic liberalism’ and argues that it is committed to a ‘transformative project,’ according to which liberal institutions must ‘mold people in a manner that ensures that liberal freedom is what they want’ (Macedo 15, his italics). Furthermore, Macedo defends what he calls ‘civic autonomy,’ according to which students are ‘provided with the intellectual tools necessary to . . . formulate their own convictions, and make their own way in life’ (238). ‘[P]romoting . . . core liberal values,’ Macedo writes, ‘will probably have the effect of encouraging critical thinking in general.’ Consequently, ‘Liberal civic virtues and attitudes will spill over into other spheres of life’ (179). And like Gutmann, Macedo sees public schools as playing a vital role in promoting mutual respect among future citizens (231–236). Given the propensity of civic liberal virtues and modes of deliberation, including civic autonomy, to seep into the other dimensions of persons’ lives, Macedo notes the following worry: ‘Is there not a danger of our broadly civic ideals becoming a form of comprehensive liberalism?’ (239). In answering this question, he denies that civic liberalism ultimately is a form of comprehensive liberalism. The reason for this is that civic liberalism satisfies the freestanding condition: it formulates and promotes liberal principles and virtues on purely ‘civic’ grounds, without presupposing the truth of any particular comprehensive doctrine. ‘The crucial point,’ Macedo contends, ‘is to celebrate critical thinking and autonomy for broadly civic purposes, not to advance particular religious or comprehensive philosophical convictions’ (240). Nonetheless, given the scope and demands of Macedo’s conception of civic autonomy, we might wonder whether, as Rob Reich comments, Macedo is ‘making © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 786 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education a distinction without a difference’ (Reich Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education 233 n.26). As just noted, civic liberalism satisfies the freestanding condition. Indeed, Macedo defines his version of political liberalism primarily in terms of this condition (Macedo 166–174). The basic structure restriction, however, does not seem to be part of civic liberalism. Rather, Macedo claims that the liberal distinction between public and private life is, upon closer examination, only ‘superficial’ in nature. ‘In a deeper sense,’ he asserts, ‘liberal institutions and practices shape all of our deepest moral commitments’ (164). Consequently, while ‘[p]ublic educational institutions should not promote comprehensive ideals of life as a whole . . . that does not mean that public schools are limited to a narrowly political agenda.’ This is because, according to civic liberalism, ‘Our civic ideals are not narrowly political’ (239). Macedo’s view, then, is that the requirements of a civic liberal citizenship education include encouraging in students a capacity for civic autonomy and a willingness to exercise that capacity in most or all domains of social life. Thus, Macedo seems to endorse Gutmann’s thesis that, contra Rawls, political and comprehensive liberals converge (for the most part) on the same demanding account of citizenship education, differing only as to their respective rationales for that account. A Rawlsian political liberal, however, likely would object to Macedo’s account of the legitimate aims of educational institutions – at least as an account of what can be required of all such institutions. Simply fulfilling the freestanding condition is not enough for a conception of justice to satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. In order for reasonable persons to support freely a political conception of justice, they must be able to live their lives – within their communities, families, and associations – in accordance with their respective comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good. And this requirement, according to Rawlsian political liberalism, necessarily limits the scope of political justice and its demands upon citizens. A political conception of justice that does not satisfy the basic structure restriction cannot satisfy Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy. Of course, civic liberalism’s failure to satisfy the basic structure restriction simply may reflect a difference, albeit a significant one, between Macedo’s and Rawls’s versions of political liberalism. ‘In no small measure,’ Macedo writes, ‘we must maintain political institutions and practices that work to transform the whole of the moral world in the image of our most basic political values’ (151, my italics). Given the scope and aims of civic liberalism, however, Rawlsian political liberals may be among those that Macedo worries will judge his account of citizenship education ‘as anything but liberal’ (274). IV. Victoria Costa’s account of citizenship education is based explicitly on Rawls’s political philosophy. She offers ‘an interpretation of . . . Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and the role that educational institutions have – or should have – in the theory’ (Costa 125). Costa contends that all students in a liberal democratic society should receive an education that will foster in them a capacity for reasonableness, enable them to exercise effectively the two ‘moral powers’ (a sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good), and ensure that they are capable of participating as free and equal citizens within the basic structure of their society. These aims follow straightforwardly from Rawls’s writings.21 Costa also identifies in Rawls’s theory a form of ‘republican’ liberty, according to which, roughly, a free citizen is someone who is not subject to domination, whether by the state or some non-state agent.22 She identifies republican freedom as a political liberal ideal, one that, unlike ethical autonomy, can be endorsed by reasonable persons irrespective of their © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 787 comprehensive doctrines. Thus, future citizens should be educated against domination: “freedom as non-domination is an attractive political ideal – political in Rawls’s sense of being capable of political justification – and . . . should shape our educational practices in a distinctive and desirable way”. Such an education, inter alia, would encourage all students ‘to think of themselves as equals, and as entitled to their own plans [for life] and to pursue them’ (90). According to Costa, then, a political liberal citizenship education should be a ‘republican’ education. Cultivating in students the capacities necessary for free and equal citizenship, including the capacity to oppose domination, requires, Costa maintains, a robust form of citizenship education. She criticizes Rawls for describing ‘the education that derives from political liberalism in . . . minimalist terms,’ and proposes that his primary motivation for doing so is to highlight the differences between comprehensive and political liberalism (60). ‘Unfortunately for Rawls,’ she writes, “these claims about the education of future citizens do not serve to mark a particularly sharp contrast between his political theory of justice as fairness and more comprehensive liberal theories” (64). Costa’s view, then, resembles that advanced by Gutmann. The requirements of a political liberal citizenship education will not differ in practice, for the most part, from a comprehensive liberal one (64–65). And like Gutmann and Macedo, she identifies the essential difference between political and comprehensive liberals as lying in the different kinds of justifications that they advance for their shared educational requirements (65, 136 n.19). While Costa notes that the basic structure is the subject to which Rawls’s political conception of justice applies, she does not seem to think that the basic structure restriction constrains the kinds of education policies that political liberalism can impose on all members of society. Indeed, she finds Rawls’s attempt to distinguish between comprehensive and political liberal approaches to education in terms of their differences in scope to be ‘not a good defense’ (64). Instead, Costa maintains that a political liberal citizenship education requires that students be exposed to, and come to understand, a variety of different comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good (65–67). More generally, Costa shares Macedo’s view that education must play a ‘transformative’ role in pluralist societies (60). Thus, Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa agree that Rawls is incorrect in asserting that a political liberal citizenship education requires ‘far less’ than a comprehensive liberal education; the difference between comprehensive and political liberals lies in the justifications that they give for the same set (or very similar sets) of robust educational requirements. V. Gordon Davis and I defend Rawls’s conjecture that a political liberal citizenship education would be more modest than a comprehensive liberal one. We agree with Gutmann that teaching the political virtue of mutual respect is a central aim of citizenship education. But we contend that the conception of mutual respect presented by Rawls in A Theory of Justice is incompatible with core features of political liberalism (Neufeld and Davis 97). This is because that conception violates the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction; it does so by being formulated as a ‘natural duty’ that is part of a ‘complete conception of right’, and that extends into many dimensions of persons’ lives (Rawls A Theory of Justice 94–95, 297, 447). In place of this ‘comprehensive’ conception of mutual respect, we formulate a ‘political’ conception, which we term ‘civic respect.’ Civic respect, we propose, can serve as the basis of cooperation among free and equal citizens in pluralist societies. Civic respect has four features (Neufeld and Davis 97–98). It is a condition of civic respect, first, that citizens acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism. Second, civic respect is a kind © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 788 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education of ‘recognition respect.’ Recognition respect, roughly, is a form of respect that is owed to persons in virtue of some characteristic that they possess; this characteristic grants such persons a certain standing in their relations with others. Civic respect is a form of recognition respect that is owed to persons in virtue of their standing as free and equal citizens. One expresses such respect by taking this standing into account when deciding fundamental political questions in concert with one’s fellow citizens.23 Third, because civic respect is owed to persons qua citizens, it is limited in its scope to relations among citizens within the basic structure of society.24 The fourth feature of civic respect requires that citizens decide fundamental political questions in a way that satisfies the criterion of reciprocity, that is (given the first feature of civic respect), in accordance with the idea of public reason.25 A political liberal citizenship education, then, would teach students (inter alia) the skills and concepts necessary for them to interact with others on the basis of civic respect. One possible strategy for teaching students adequate civic respect for others involves requiring them to participate in class debates concerning a range of politically divisive issues (99). These issues could be both historical, concerning pivotal issues in the political history of their society, and contemporary in nature. With respect to the latter, students might debate the political justifications in support of and against, say, capital punishment, the right to abortion, the legal recognition of same-sex marriages, the provision of a basic income for all citizens, the financing of political campaigns, the right of voluntary euthanasia, and so forth. After explaining to students that they live in a society characterized by persistent disagreement over a wide range of religious and moral questions,26 the rules of the debate would be introduced. The key rule would be that students formulate any argument concerning a fundamental political issue in a manner that respects the limits of public reason by not relying on any particular comprehensive doctrine. Arguments that violate the limits of public reason, by violating either the freestanding condition or the basic structure restriction, would be ruled inadmissible. Indeed, students would be encouraged to rise on ‘points of order’ in order to help them identify such arguments and learn to explain to others why they are inadmissible. Through participation in such debates, Davis and I suggest that students would learn how to employ public reason when deciding fundamental political questions.27 Moreover, such debates are one way to teach the skills and virtues associated with political autonomy that do not entail promoting a comprehensive form of ethical autonomy (at least not necessarily; some students, of course, may choose to exercise and value ethical autonomy as a result of their participation in such debates). Costa criticizes this kind of pedagogic strategy for citizenship education. ‘[T]he ideal of public reason,’ she writes, ‘is not an ideal that makes sense to apply to . . . class debates’ (Costa 126–127). This is because such debates simply do not decide the kinds of fundamental political questions to which Rawls’s idea of public reason applies. This position is somewhat puzzling, though, as students will become the citizens – and, in some cases, the public officials – who will be responsible for deciding such fundamental political questions. The purpose of activities like the practice debates that Davis and I describe is to ensure that all students eventually can come to exercise political autonomy as adults, that is, become citizens capable of participating effectively, as reasonable persons, in the collective self-determination of their society.28 Perhaps Costa’s worry is that such pedagogic strategies would enable, or even encourage, schools to avoid exploring the different conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines that exist in their society. A focus on teaching students how to employ public reason may be compatible with what Costa calls a policy of ‘liberal silence,’ according to which schools refrain from exploring controversial religious, moral, or philosophical views.29 A policy of liberal silence, she maintains, prevents educational institutions from pursuing the ‘transformative goals’ to which she thinks Rawlsian political justice must be committed © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 789 (66–71). Instead of practice debates that aim simply at imparting the ‘rules’ of public reason to students, she recommends that schools ‘make room for respectful exploration of a variety of conceptions of the good, since this is part of what is needed to cultivate reasonability and mutual understanding’ (127). Requiring that students participate in practice debates that employ public reason as part of their citizenship education, of course, does not preclude them from also exploring different conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines within certain classes and other school activities. But while Davis and I think that such classes and related school activities should be available to students, we also hold that they should not be required of all students – at least not if the exercise of political power is to comply with the basic structure restriction of political liberalism, and thereby satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. VI. As the previous paragraph indicates, one policy area with respect to which the authors discussed in this paper differ concerns the content of the citizenship education that should be mandatory for all students. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa broadly agree that future citizens must be exposed to, and acquire an extensive and critical understanding of, the different conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines that are endorsed in their society. This understanding is a precondition for them to develop adequate mutual respect for other citizens and, thus, to become reasonable persons. Moreover, according to Gutmann and Macedo, such understanding is also necessary for the development of students’ capacity for (political or civic) autonomy. An implication of the overall view shared by Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa is that political liberalism is committed to an understanding of the common school ideal that is not less demanding than that to which comprehensive liberalism is committed. The common school ideal, broadly speaking, consists of two of the core elements of citizenship education discussed in the previous sections. These elements are, first, that citizenship education should foster in students a sense of mutual respect for others and, second, that students should be taught the knowledge and skills necessary for them to become autonomous citizens.30 The common school ideal asserts, moreover, that these educational goals can be realized adequately only in common schools, that is, educational environments in which students interact with others from backgrounds different than their own (including communities that endorse different comprehensive doctrines).31 Davis and I formulate a political liberal conception of mutual respect, civic respect, that we claim can serve as the basis for fair social cooperation among citizens in a society characterized by reasonable pluralism. Because of the limited scope of civic respect – it satisfies political liberalism’s basic structure restriction – we hold that fostering in students an adequate sense of civic respect does not require that students acquire a deep understanding of, and appreciation for, other citizens’ conceptions of the good and comprehensive doctrines (though students should be free to select classes and school activities that explore in depth such conceptions and doctrines). An implication of our political liberal account of citizenship education is that political liberalism is committed to a less demanding version of the common school ideal than is comprehensive liberalism. Indeed, we consider the possibility that the goals of citizenship education might be realized, at least within certain social contexts, by a common citizenship curriculum within different kinds of schools, rather than within common schools (Davis and Neufeld 72). This difference concerning the nature of political liberalism’s commitment to the common school ideal is related to a policy question on which the authors differ, namely, the extent to © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 790 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education which political liberalism can justify certain school choice policies, specifically, those that aim at accommodating the plurality of different comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good held by citizens.32 Roughly, the range of the kinds of schools permissible according to the account of citizenship education advanced by Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa is more restricted than that advanced by Davis and myself (and, based upon his brief comments, Rawls). Gutmann argues that the demanding conception of citizenship education that is shared by comprehensive and political liberals gives both kinds of liberals sufficient reason normally to deny families’ requests for educational options (“Civic Education and Social Diversity” 573), including access to (publicly subsidized) schools that reflect their respective comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good. Indeed, inculcating adequate mutual respect within students requires an educational experience in which cultural and doctrinal diversity is contained within common schools, for shared mutual understanding and appreciation, rather than dispersed across culturally or doctrinally defined schools or school systems. The importance of such integration for the fostering of mutual respect is the basis of Gutmann’s rejection of proposals for an ‘unregulated voucher system’ in education provision (572).33 According to Davis and I, though, while it certainly is true that political liberals would oppose an unregulated voucher system, the actual focus of the policy debate between political and comprehensive liberals more plausibly concerns proposals for the partial deregulation and/or decentralization of educational authority (Davis and Neufeld 71 n. 60).34 Macedo discusses a number of school choice proposals that are less radical than an unregulated voucher system (Macedo ch. 11). He expresses qualified support for the introduction of certain kinds of charter schools.35 And he discusses, albeit with greater ambivalence, certain proposals for publicly regulated voucher systems.36 Both kinds of school choice proposals are considered by Macedo primarily as potential solutions to the problem of poor urban schools within the contemporary United States, not as full-blown alternatives to the existing system of public schools. He writes: ‘School choice can and should be designed in such a way as to help us overcome the grossly disparate opportunities provided to inner-city and suburban children’ (271). Both kinds of school choice proposals, moreover, are evaluated with reference to Macedo’s conception of citizenship education. No significant weight is given to the capacity of school choice policies to accommodate the diverse comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good endorsed by students, families, and communities within a pluralist society. Indeed, Macedo is quite wary of school choice policies that aim ‘to shift control of schools to private communities,’ such as communities committed to particular comprehensive doctrines (e.g., religious communities), as such a move would represent a ‘fundamental turning away from the common school idea’ (268). Consequently, overall, ‘public schools have an important moral advantage with respect to civic education: they pursue our deepest civic purposes openly’ (279, Macedo’s italics). In short, Macedo holds that school choice policies should be considered only in those places where public schools clearly are not performing well (such as impoverished urban districts within the United States), and the criterion for evaluating such policies is how well they promote the robust civic aims, including citizenship education, to which Macedo’s civic liberalism is committed. Costa does not address any specific proposals for greater school choice (e.g., unregulated voucher systems, publicly regulated voucher systems, charter schools, or different kinds of schools within public school systems) as part of her discussion of citizenship education. She does recommend, though, that education policy support the ‘voluntary integration’ of minority communities through common schools; thus, she generally opposes separate schools for distinct cultural communities within liberal societies (Costa ch. 8). Unfortunately, Costa does not indicate what kinds of policies might promote such voluntary integration, or what kinds of policies © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 791 would be appropriate for those communities that resist integration. Given the kind of citizenship education that Costa thinks should be required of all future citizens, though, it seems likely that her account would not permit significantly greater educational choice to accommodate social diversity than the accounts advanced by Gutmann and Macedo. Since Davis and I, like Rawls, hold that political liberalism has fewer citizenship educational requirements than comprehensive liberalism, we also contend that there will be more ways to satisfy political liberalism’s educational requirements than those of comprehensive liberalism. Consequently, political liberalism affords greater scope for variation in the pedagogy, curriculum content, and forms of governance of different schools. However, at least one aspect of curriculum design will remain centralized under either form of liberalism – namely, broad objectives in citizenship education (which can be assumed to structure course content).37 Even so, we propose that political liberals would be open to proposals in which students would be able to switch to schools (while retaining the public subsidy) in which families and communities design alternative approaches to pedagogy, governance, and other aspects of curriculum (Davis and Neufeld 71–72).38 This is because teaching students civic respect and how to be politically autonomous would not impose the same kind of educational and institutional constraints that would be teaching students a comprehensive liberal form of mutual respect (such as that posited by Gutmann) and how to become ethically autonomous. We conclude that the prospects for student, parental, and community choice, ceteris paribus, will extend further under political liberalism than under comprehensive liberalism. But we also concede that realizing the educational goals of political liberalism, and especially fostering in students adequate civic respect for others, very well could require common schools at certain stages of primary or (more likely) secondary education, or at least could require shared citizenship classes (Davis and Neufeld 72–73). VII. Despite the points made in the previous sections, it may be that the differences between the views of Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and I, on the other, are not as great as they initially appear. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa are interested in identifying the kind of citizenship education appropriate for promoting justice and stability in contemporary ‘non-ideal’ circumstances, specifically the United States; their focus, then, is on what Rawls calls ‘non-ideal’ or ‘partial compliance’ theory. In contrast, Davis and I, following Rawls, develop our position at the level of ‘ideal’ theory; we focus on the kind of citizenship education appropriate for a ‘well-ordered society,’ and consider non-ideal circumstances from that vantage point.39 Rawls’s idea of a well-ordered society, as just indicated, is part of ideal theory. A wellordered society, roughly, is one with a basic structure that is supported freely by reasonable persons. Reasonable persons ‘fully comply’ with the demands of the institutions of their basic structure because, first, they have an effective sense of justice; second, the political conception of justice that organizes that structure is acceptable to them; and third, they know that their fellow citizens also find that conception acceptable (Justice as Fairness 8–9, 199). Consequently, a well-ordered society is ‘stable for the right reasons.’ The idea of a well-ordered society is meant to serve as an ideal toward which citizens in existing political societies should strive in reforming their basic structures. Rawls writes: “[T]he idea of a well-ordered society should . . . provide some guidance in thinking about non-ideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to deal with existing injustices. It should also help clarify the goal of reform and to identify which wrongs are more grievous and hence more urgent to correct” (Justice as Fairness 13).40 In ascertaining what kind of citizenship education is appropriate for existing, non-well-ordered societies, then, the Rawlsian © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 792 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education view is that it may be helpful first to apprehend what kind of citizenship education would be necessary in a well-ordered society. The institutions and practices of a well-ordered society, including its educational institutions and practices, comprise a just ‘end-state’ toward which our reforms ultimately should aim (see Simmons, and Valentini 660–662).41 Rawls’s discussion of citizenship education should be understood to reflect what he thinks such an education would look like in a well-ordered society. The just institutions and public political culture of that society would play a significant role in educating young people about their rights and duties as citizens. Rawls states: “Those who grow up in . . . a [well-ordered] society will in good part form their conception of themselves as citizens from the public political culture and from the conceptions of person and society implicit in it” (Justice as Fairness 146). Consequently, the burden carried by formal educational institutions in preparing students for full citizenship will be relatively modest. The education system of a well-ordered society therefore can honor “the claim of those who wish to withdraw from the modern world in accordance with the injunctions of their religion, provided only that they acknowledge the principles of the political conception of justice and appreciate its political ideals of person and society” (Political Liberalism 200). It is primarily at the level of ideal theory, within the context of a well-ordered society, that Davis and I defend Rawls’s claim that a political liberal citizenship education would be less demanding than a comprehensive liberal one.42 We concede that in non-ideal contexts, educational institutions may face a far more daunting role with respect to preparing students for full citizenship and, more generally, in promoting justice and social stability. Indeed, we acknowledge that close state control of education may sometimes be necessary (Davis and Neufeld 70–71). In contrast, the accounts of citizenship education advanced by Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa all concern non-ideal circumstances, specifically, those found in the contemporary United States. The ‘defining difference between political and comprehensive liberalism,’ Gutmann writes, ‘does not make as much of a difference for the practice of civic education in the United States today as political liberals suggest’ (Gutmann “Civic Education and Social Diversity” 560, my italics).43 Costa explicitly notes that while Rawls’s account of citizenship education may be appropriate for a well-ordered society, she is concerned primarily with the role educational institutions should play in promoting justice in non-ideal circumstances (Costa 56–60). Macedo does not discuss the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory with respect to education; his discussion simply focuses on the contemporary United States. Thus, it may be that with respect to citizenship education within the non-ideal contemporary American context – a society in which, inter alia, large numbers of citizens are not reasonable persons (in Rawls’s sense44) and the basic structure is not organized in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice – the authors discussed in this paper do not disagree as deeply as might at first seem to be the case. (It should be noted, furthermore, that to the extent that Davis and I discuss education systems in existing liberal democracies, we consider only briefly the United States.) Finally, it is important to keep in mind the overall requirements of liberal justice with respect to education policy. Not only must all students be provided with an adequate citizenship education, but education must be distributed so as to realize, broadly speaking, the principle of fair equality of opportunity, and to promote the life prospects of those students drawn from the least advantaged segments of society.45 Davis and I consider the scope for school choice within an adequately just well-ordered society and acknowledge that this scope may be more restricted in non-well-ordered societies. If the specific kinds of school choice policies that have been implemented within the United States in recent decades have had generally inegalitarian, and thus unjust, consequences (see Howe), then liberal theorists have good reason to worry about such policies at the level of non-ideal theory, irrespective of their commitment to political or comprehensive liberalism.46 © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 793 Acknowledgments I would like to thank Jean Coleno, Anthony Laden, Jo-Anne McLeod, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also am grateful to the Fellows in the Center for 21st Century Studies (2012-2013 academic year) at the University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee for their feedback on an earlier draft. Finally, I would like to thank the Spencer Foundation’s Initiative on Philosophy in Educational Policy and Practice for their financial support during part of the time during which this article was written. Short Biography Blain Neufeld is an assistant professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. His research focuses on various aspects of political liberalism, including its justification, its account of international justice, and its application to citizenship education. Notes * Correspondence: Philosophy, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, 53201, USA. Email: neufeld@uwm.edu. 1 Rawls calls this the ‘fact of oppression’ (Justice as Fairness 34). On the role of these ideas in Rawls’s conception of justice, ‘justice as fairness,’ see Justice as Fairness, part I, especially }2. 3 While particular comprehensive doctrines might affirm these ideas as true, the ideas themselves do not presuppose the truth of any particular doctrine. 4 The institutions that comprise the basic structure include, ‘The political constitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of property, and the structure of the economy . . . as well as the family in some form.’ The place of families within the basic structure is somewhat unclear in Rawls’s writings. This is because, unlike the other institutions identified by Rawls, political principles of justice ‘do not apply directly to . . . the family’ (Justice as Fairness 10). (For further discussion, see Neufeld.) Irrespective of the question of how best to understand the place and role of families within political liberalism, I assume that primary and secondary educational institutions are part of the basic structure, given their essential role in ensuring the free and equal status of future citizens. This view seems justified by Rawls’s brief comments on the importance of education for democratic government (Political Liberalism 166, 449). 5 The liberal principle of legitimacy states, 2 our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason (Rawls Political Liberalism 137). 6 In Part III of A Theory of Justice, Rawls assumes that the members of a ‘well-ordered society’ share the same comprehensive doctrine (Rawls makes this point in Justice as Fairness 186–187). 7 I generally refer to ‘citizenship education’ instead of ‘civic education.’ ‘Civic education’ often is understood to refer narrowly to the teaching of how the political institutions of society work, as well as citizens’ rights and duties with respect to those institutions. ‘Citizenship education,’ as I use the term here, includes not only civic education so understood, but also the teaching of the skills and knowledge necessary for students to participate as free and equal citizens in all aspects of their society’s basic structure, including its economic structure, as well as the various political virtues necessary for democratic citizenship.Whether citizenship education also should promote a form of patriotism in students is a question that has been debated in recent years (e.g., Brighouse “Should We Teach Patriotic History?”; Callan Creating Citizens, “Democratic Patriotism and Multicultural Education,” “Love, Idolatry, and Patriotism”; Costa ch.7; Gutmann Democratic Education 309–316; Kymlicka; Tamir). I will not discuss this debate here. 8 The idea of citizens as ‘reasonable persons’ plays a key role in political liberalism. Two features characterize reasonable persons: (1) acknowledgement of the fact of reasonable pluralism and (2) endorsement of the ‘criterion of reciprocity.’ Acknowledgement of the fact of reasonable pluralism involves a ‘willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime’ (Political Liberalism 54). The criterion of reciprocity is political liberalism’s ‘intrinsic (moral) political ideal’ – indeed, it underpins the liberal principle of legitimacy (Political Liberalism xliv-xlv). Reasonable persons satisfy the criterion of reciprocity by offering terms of social cooperation, principles of justice for the regulation of their society’s basic structure, that they think other reasonable persons can accept. © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 794 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 9 Public reason endeavors to operate independently of particular comprehensive doctrines, relying exclusively upon the ideas found in the political conceptions of justice endorsed by reasonable persons. Decisions made by means of public reason thereby satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy (see note 5). 10 Or at least most liberal egalitarian comprehensive conceptions of justice. 11 For a classic statement of the common school ideal in the American context, see Dewey. For recent discussions, see Reich “Common Schooling and Educational Choice as a Response to Pluralism,” and Callan Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy ch. 7. (See also notes 30 and 31.) 12 This is not to suggest, though, that comprehensive liberals invariably are opposed to policies that allow for greater educational choice. Harry Brighouse, for instance, advances a comprehensive liberal justification for certain kinds of school choice policies in School Choice and Social Justice (see also Reich “Common Schooling and Educational Choice as a Response to Pluralism”). The suggestion is only that a tendency in favor of greater educational choice seems intrinsic to political liberalism, whereas such a tendency is not found in most forms of comprehensive liberalism. 13 John Tomasi is another political liberal who has written on education (Tomasi ch. 5). Yet Tomasi’s account of political justice is quite different from Rawls’s account, or, indeed, liberal egalitarian accounts more generally (ch. 6). (This difference is noted by Costa (129 n.8).) Thus, I will not discuss Tomasi’s views here. My discussion will be limited to broadly ‘liberal egalitarian’ or ‘high liberal’ views (Freeman). (But for a criticism of Tomasi’s account of citizenship education, see Strike “Is Liberal Education Illiberal?”) 14 In contrast to the authors discussed in this paper, some critics of political liberalism claim that it either is ultimately a form of comprehensive liberalism, or does not constitute a viable alternative to comprehensive liberalism. (See Callan “Political Liberalism and Political Education,” and Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy; Brighouse “Is There Any Such Thing As Political Liberalism?”; and Levinson.) My discussion in this paper focuses on those theorists who broadly accept Rawls’s distinction between comprehensive and political forms of liberalism, and think that political liberalism is (at least) a plausible view. (For a broader survey of recent accounts of liberalism and citizenship education, see Fernández and Sundström.) 15 The idea of a ‘well-ordered society’ is part of what Rawls calls ‘ideal theory’ (see Section VII). 16 In this paper, I use the term ‘ethical autonomy’ to refer to any conception of autonomy that presupposes the truth of a particular comprehensive doctrine, applies to all or most aspects of a person’s life, and/or constitutes (or is part of) a particular conception of the good. 17 A broadly similar view can be found in Kymlicka, and Reich Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in American Education ch.2. 18 It ultimately is an empirical question, of course, whether Gutmann’s claim regarding the inseparability of teaching political autonomy and ethical autonomy is correct. Davis and I concede this point (59 n. 37). Unfortunately, there are no empirical studies of which I am aware that investigate this question. 19 Here, we draw upon Rawls’s distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions.’ Conceptions, roughly, are detailed ‘content-rich’ articulations of abstract concepts. (See Rawls A Theory of Justice 5.) 20 In Democratic Education, Gutmann indicates that her account of mutual respect differs from that of advocates of ‘values clarification’ in moral education (56 f). 21 On the idea of ‘reasonable persons’ see note 8. On citizens’ two moral powers see: Rawls Political Liberalism 103–104; Justice as Fairness 6–7, 81–82, 191, 196. 22 An agent dominates another agent to the extent that the former can interfere effectively and at will in the choices that the latter can make. Actual interference is not necessary for domination to exist. The most extreme form of domination is the master–slave relationship; however, most relations of domination are restricted in degree and/or scope. Domination can be exercised by the state or by ‘private’ agents (e.g., husbands in patriarchal marriages, or employers in nonunionized workplaces). Agents are free in the ‘republican’ sense – they enjoy freedom as ‘non-domination’ – insofar as they possess and can exercise institutional protections against such arbitrary interference. Non-arbitrary interferences in agents’ choices, such as those imposed by legitimate laws, are not restrictions on republican freedom. (See Pettit.) Drawing on recent defenses of the compatibility of Rawls’s view with republicanism (e.g., Laden, and Larmore), Costa maintains that Rawls’s political conception of justice is best understood as positing an ideal of freedom as non-domination (Costa 72–85). 23 The idea of ‘recognition respect’ is taken from Stephen Darwall (“Two Kinds of Respect,” and The Second-Person Standpoint ch.6.). A different kind of respect, ‘appraisal respect,’ ‘consists in a positive appraisal of a person or his qualities . . . Appraisal respect is the positive appraisal itself’ (“Two Forms of Respect” 184). Appraisal respect can be distinguished from recognition respect in that we might think that equal recognition respect is owed to persons for whom we have varying degrees of appraisal respect.According to the account of mutual respect endorsed by Gutmann, ‘[m]utual respect entails a reciprocal positive regard among people’ (“Civic Education and Social Diversity” 578); or, more precisely, ‘mutual respect . . . expresses a positive appraisal of a person for manifesting some excellence of character’ (Gutmann and Thompson 76 n.16). Davis and I claim that this account of mutual respect is a form of appraisal respect, not recognition respect, and thus would not be shared by political liberals (Davis and Neufeld 58). © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education 795 24 Roughly, for every person within society, her life qua citizen is delimited by her participation within the basic structure; consequently, civic respect concerns the relations of persons within the basic structure, which just are their relations qua citizens. Civic respect, then, does not violate the basic structure restriction, and thus can be distinguished from other, more ‘comprehensive’ forms of recognition respect, such as that required by Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity’ (Kant 36–43). 25 On the idea of public reason see note 9. 26 Such lessons could draw upon the idea of the burdens of judgment (see note 8). 27 Davis and I also discuss how a curriculum that explores the history of religious conflict in various societies might help teach students the importance of civic respect (Neufeld and Davis 99–100). 28 Costa’s opposition to using class debates to teach students about public reason is especially puzzling given her view that a political liberal education should promote the republican ideal of non-domination. Elsewhere, she notes that public reason can support that ideal (Costa 138 n. 22). 29 Costa takes the term ‘liberal silence’ from Strike “Ethical Discourse and Pluralism.” 30 Callan discusses both aspects of the common school ideal in Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy ch. 7. Reich focuses on autonomy in “Common Schooling and Educational Choice as a Response to Pluralism.” 31 Common schools need not be state-run schools (see Reich “Common Schooling and Educational Choice as a Response to Pluralism”). Satisfying the common school ideal requires primarily that schools be open to students from diverse backgrounds, including disadvantaged ones, and satisfy certain general educational requirements (inter alia, fostering a sense of mutual respect and a capacity for autonomy in their students). These features could be realized in non-state schools. (My thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.) 32 This justification in support of certain kinds of school choice policies must be distinguished from another, politically more common (at least within the United States), justification, namely, that allowing families to choose schools will lead to better school performance overall and, hence, better-educated citizens. By breaking up the ‘state monopoly’ on public schools and allowing market forces to operate within the educational sphere, according to this argument, the quality of schools will improve over time. (For the classic statement of this argument, specifically in support of voucher systems, see Friedman. A ‘contracting model’ for charter schools is advocated by Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie (see note 35 below). A variety of ‘choice’ policies are discussed in Hill (ed.). For critical discussion and analyses of these policies (specifically, recent implementations of voucher systems and charter schools), see Buckley and Schneider, Feinberg and Lubienski (eds.), Lubienski, Fiske and Ladd, and Witte. A recent study from Stanford University’s Center for Research on Education Outcomes concludes, ‘On average, charter school students can expect to see their academic growth be somewhat lower than their traditional public school peers, though the absolute differences are small’ (CREDO 45). Finally, a number of other justifications for school choice policies are outlined in Feinberg and Lubienski.) Another point that must be emphasized is that almost all liberal democratic societies today possess some form of school choice, whether this is acknowledged explicitly or not. As Harry Brighouse points out, in the contemporary United States, ‘choice’ is exercised by well-off families in their decisions about which neighborhoods in which to live, or whether to send their children to private schools. Thus, he proposes that it is accurate to think of the American educational system, ‘as a crude and highly regulated regressive voucher system’ (Brighouse “Educational Equality and Varieties of School Choice” 48). Moreover, most educational theorists and policy makers presently are not willing to consider prohibiting selective private schools altogether, thereby eliminating one important form of choice for wealthier families (for an exception, though, see Swift). Consequently, Brighouse argues, ‘The issue is not . . . whether choice compromises equity, but rather which feasible system of choice does best with respect to equity’ (“Educational Equality and Varieties of School Choice” 49). I think that such considerations of educational equity, though, can be addressed separately from the question of whether accommodating social diversity justifies certain kinds of school choice policies. This is because, very roughly, we can envision education systems that allow for choice and accommodate or limit diversity to different degrees, whilst doing equally well with respect to equity. In other words, education policies may improve equity while providing students and families with some measure of choice (say, by means of what Brighouse calls ‘progressive’ and ‘targeted’ voucher systems), but not in ways that accommodate social diversity (e.g., by allowing schools based upon different comprehensive doctrines). 33 In an unregulated voucher system, families would be free to use their vouchers at any school. Schools would not need to conform to or satisfy any state-set curricular, administrative, or pedagogical requirements. 34 Gutmann does favor greater choice for students within public education systems (Democratic Education 300–301), but not in order to accommodate social diversity. 35 More specifically, Macedo discusses (at 264–65) the contracting model of charter schools advocated by Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie. According to this model, roughly, schools would not be run directly by school districts, but instead would be authorized by contracts with school districts. School districts would set standards and general regulations for the contracting schools (including regulations concerning selection criteria and curriculum content). Contracting schools would enjoy a degree of autonomy with respect to determining their missions and the compositions of their faculties, and thus (purportedly) © 2013 The Author Philosophy Compass © 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Philosophy Compass 8/9 (2013): 781–797, 10.1111/phc3.12064 796 Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education would be better able to foster a sense of community and shared ethos than most existing U.S. public schools. Nonetheless, contracting schools ultimately would be subject to public control. (See Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie.) 36 One of the ‘controlled choice’ voucher systems that Macedo considers is the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (270–272). (For discussion of this program, see Brighouse “Educational Equality and Varieties of School Choice,” and Witte.) 37 Davis and I do not claim, of course, that the objectives themselves will be the same for political and comprehensive liberals. We assert only that the role of centralized state control will be roughly the same. 38 Davis and I consider a number of policy options less radical than that of an unregulated voucher system. Among such options is a system that imposes tight curricular constraints while decentralizing school governance (e.g., the British approach). Another option is one that maintains centralized administrative control over schools with different curricular and pedagogical orientations (an option advocated in Gardner). Loosening curricular constraints while standardizing some aspects of pedagogy in citizenship education is yet another option (see Coleman). And charter school proposals, as well as public school systems, can involve varying degrees of decentralization with respect to curriculum, administration, and pedagogy. (See Davis and Neufeld 71–73, 71 n. 60, 72 n. 63.) 39 For further explanation of the distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ theory, ‘partial compliance’ and ‘full compliance’ theory, the idea of a ‘well-ordered society,’ and the idea of a ‘realistic utopia,’ see Rawls A Theory of Justice 7–8, 215–216, 308–309; Justice as Fairness 4–5, 13, 65–66. For a critical survey of the distinctions within, and reactions to, Rawls’s account of ideal theory, see Valentini. 40 For a recent defense of Rawlsian ideal theory, see Simmons. 41 Rawls also describes a well-ordered society as a ‘realistic utopia’ – it is ‘realistic’ in taking certain natural, social, historical, and psychological facts as given, but ‘utopian’ in imagining what, given these facts, a fully legitimate and just society would look like (Rawls Justice as Fairness 4–5, 13). A central purpose of the idea of a realistic utopia is to explore the limits of what is ‘politically possible’ with respect to justice. 42 Unfortunately, this is not as clear as it should be in our articles. 43 Much of Gutmann’s discussion focuses on the details of two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins County. 44 See note 8. (Of course, large numbers of citizens in most contemporary liberal democratic societies, not simply the United States, are not ‘reasonable’ in Rawls’s sense.) 45 These are, I propose, the main educational requirements that follow from the second principle of Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness.’ Broadly similar requirements, I think, would be part of any liberal egalitarian conception of justice. 46 It should be noted that the primary justification for the school choice policies that have been implemented within the United States over the past two decades has not been that of accommodating reasonable pluralism (see note 32). 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