The (Instinctual) Art of Persuasion: A Brief Introduction to Adaptive Rhetoric Alex C. Parrish James Madison University Is, and What Is, Adaptive Rhetoric? If we accept the basic proposition that humans represent a single branch on a great tree of life, then it follows that systems of persuasion existing in other branches will be worthy of our attention if we wish to explore the development of human rhetoric. Likewise, we must also plumb the peculiar features of the human brain that enable the use of symbolic language as our most complex and potent rhetorical tool. These are the primary lines of inquiry shaping the nascent field of Adaptive Rhetoric, a research program that seeks to establish a biocultural basis for the study of rhetorical theory and practice. It operates under the notion that the art of persuasion, like any art, is shaped both by genetic and cultural evolution. Any attempt to analyze rhetorical activity, then, would benefit from a holistic approach that studies it as both cultural practice and an adapted behavior. Since the biocultural approach deviates sharply from contemporary rhetorical theory, its utility must be established. If I want to persuade my audience that the art of rhetoric is in part an evolved behavior, then I need to answer the most basic questions about this trait, which are formulated in classical rhetorical theory as stasis questions – that is, modes of inquiry about the status of an object or idea that provide discussants with a common definition or a distinction between competing claims. They are as follows: An sit (Is it)? Quid sit (What is it)? And Quale sit (What qualities does it have)? The first question is easily dispatched, for we have all seen people and other animals argue, persuade, wheedle, cajole, whine, beg, and bluff. Biologists call it signaling when animals do it, but when humans signal in an attempt to persuade, we call it rhetoric. One or more organisms are rhetors when they seek to persuade other organisms or to alter their states of mind. Employing rhetoric, one can argue for simple desires (like wanting a raise at work) or complex associations of ideas (like a particular religion). But what constitutes rhetorical practice? Moreover, what does it replace that was less effective for the creatures that did not practice rhetoric? There are several possible answers to this question; one of the most important is that some rhetorical moves are less costly than their alternatives. George Kennedy provides an example when he analyzes the stages of a confrontation between two red deer stags in rut.1 When the two males approach, they will first attempt to persuade each other to go away by bugling loudly at one another. After a time, if neither stag is convinced his opponent roared louder or longer than he did, the stags begin to ‘display the goods,’ as it were, by strutting at right angles to one another, demonstrating their physiques. Only when these displays fail (less than a third of the time in red deer conflicts) does fighting occur. These confrontations aim to persuade rather than coerce; they forestall physical conflict, which is not only an important motivating factor of animal rhetorics, but also an important motivating factor in human persuasion according to contemporary rhetorical theorists.2 Although this does not yet tell us what rhetoric is, it at least tells us what rhetoric is not; it is not an escalated fight between two animals of comparable size and abilities. And this is important: fights in nature can be terribly costly to aggressors and defenders alike. Any 2 mechanism that can settle disputes without violence would seem to be of mutual benefit. When considered in human terms, this principle is obvious to the point of absurdity. If a husband and wife disagree about who gets the last bit of tuna casserole at dinner, should the wife bludgeon her husband with a frying pan until he runs away, or should she attempt to persuade him that she needs the casserole more? Or that she did more of the preparation, so she deserves it? Or should she make him feel indebted to her by allowing him to have it this time? In this somewhat comical case (comical only because we do have recourse to persuasion instead of merely physical coercion), we can easily see that persuasion is far less costly than a divorce lawyer and a stint in jail for spousal abuse. Granting this, we can positively define at least one aspect of rhetoric: that it is a behavioral strategy that can allow some individuals to avoid costly physical conflict. But this still leaves the question of how rhetoric is deployed, and whether it is only used to avoid physical conflict in the animal world. Divisions of Rhetoric and Non-Human Rhetors The last of the classical stasis questions, quale sit?, asked to ensure a thing is adequately defined is about the qualities it displays (often whether an action was just or expedient, but here taken more broadly to interrogate genre), and this question will shed light upon the uses of rhetoric shared by humans and other animals. In the human world rhetoric is divided into three genres: forensic, epideictic, and deliberative. These divisions concern time—past, present, and future, respectively. Forensic rhetoric mines details about past actions in order to accuse or defend. Often, as viewers of popular television crime dramas can tell you, forensic arguments are used in the courtroom to aid those seeking justice for past wrongs (hence this division is often 3 referred to as judicial rhetoric, as well). While forensic rhetoric concerns time past, epideictic rhetoric focuses on praise and blame in the present. It is a broad category which includes such diverse genres as the eulogy, the poetry slam, and the congratulatory greeting card. Finally, deliberative rhetoric is what we hope our politicians will practice responsibly (rather than the ‘mere rhetoric’ they often accuse one another of utilizing); it communicates the best future course of action for an individual or group. Importantly, the foundations of these three genres of human rhetoric lie in animal signaling. Using the behavior of bowerbirds as an example that should be familiar to many readers, we may glimpse the practice of deliberative rhetoric in action. Having decorated each bower with colorful leaves, berries, and even the shiny objects humans have discarded nearby, male bowerbirds display their ‘artistic’ prowess through their elaborate construction projects. Females will then flit from bower to bower and select the most attractive one. The females are deliberative, and seldom choose the first bower they inspect. Being particular is adaptive in this regard because in choosing a bower she is accepting the builder as a mate. The male bird thus performs a deliberative rhetorical act, allowing the females to accept or reject his proposal that he is the fittest mate. While examples of animal persuasion abound, it is important to note that rhetoric is not used merely for securing mates or establishing territory. Much human rhetoric seeks to build consensus or reinforce group identity, and other animals do the same. In their synthesis of theories of animal communication, John Maynard Smith and David Harper describe a peculiar event among African wild dogs that constitutes a clear case of epideictic rhetoric in human terms.3 Often referred to as a greeting ceremony, the dogs gather before a hunt to sound off to one another and initiate play fights. These noisy signals may alert larger predators, such as lions, 4 but they foster group cohesion before the hunt and help these dogs perform like a wellcoordinated relay race against their prey. The greeting ceremonies of the wild dogs are perhaps akin to high school pep rallies or battlefield speeches meant to rouse a group into action and reinforce its sense of community. In battle, as well as the hunt, lives are at stake, and in the simulated battles of high school sporting events, teamwork and a sense of unified purpose are necessary precursors to victory. In these cases human rhetoric also involves noisy displays of coordination, be it slapping swords against shields to intimidate the opposing force, or merely reciting sporting cheers that declare symbolic murder, superiority of skill or teamwork, or greater desire for victory. In humans and dogs, these are clear expression of epideictic rhetoric, performed in strikingly similar ways. A final comparison can be made with the forensic rhetorical practices of non-human animals. Conciliation practices among primates are one vivid example. Bonobos in particular maintain tight social bonds with their fellows. Intra-group aggression is relatively rare and occurs most often when fighting over mates or food. During such conflicts one male usually chases off another, only to reconcile later with conciliatory gestures (such as mutual scrotal rubbing).4 Conciliation in this case is an argument that, put in human terms, might signal something to the effect of: “I realize we fought, but I would like to remain friends.” It is an argument based on the circumstances surrounding past activity and how that should (or in this case should not) influence future behavior. Space limits the number of examples provided, but there exist many more similarities between animal rhetorics and the persuasive efforts of the human animal.5 Rhetoric in the Context of Animal Signaling Theory 5 Overlooking research on animal signaling and the evolved mind isolates human communication from its deep historical origins, concentrating solely on the last 2,500 years of mostly Western rhetorical theory and practice. However, our suasory efforts are inextricably bound to the pressures of the Pleistocene era during which our species’ brains made their greatest leaps toward the modern human mind. Our modes of communication are, if not similar to that of other animals, at least analogous to what many non-human animals use as signals. The art of persuasion is in fact not unique to humans; it may just be instinctual. Animal signaling theories during the early years of ethological research relied on a lock and key metaphor for signalers attempting to ‘unlock’ certain stereotyped responses by using ‘keys’ innate to their receivers.6 While this metaphor is appealing in its simplicity, the idea was largely overshadowed by the rise of the computer and the newer metaphors it inspired for understanding communication. Smith (1977) provides but one example of information processing terminology being adopted to describe animal signaling and receiving.7 Signalers transmit information that perceivers actively assess for usefulness and validity, this theory supposed, but this assumes too much honesty in the presentation of signals. Responses to this informer-processor model subsequently developed into two influential (and not necessarily contradictory) ways of thinking about signaling. Zahavi and Zahavi did much to popularize the notion of costly signaling, the idea (roughly) that signaled information is only as accurate or honest as the time and energy it takes to produce that signal.8 An example of this “handicap principle” comes from the stotting (or bouncing walk) of Thomson’s gazelles. Stotting is a costly burst of energy that signals to a predator that the animal in question is in peak physical condition and should not be chased. A weaker animal simply cannot afford the energy to produce the signal. Such fitness indicators 6 make perfect sense when signalers’ and receivers’ interests align. The predator, after all, would benefit equally from the costly signal of gazelle stotting, if it learned through these signals which animals were and were not worth chasing; confusion can result from conflating thus the benefits of both signaler and receiver in a competitive situation.9 Krebs and Dawkins presented a second way of thinking based on the idea that signalers are not just drably communicating information, but are shaping information for purposes of manipulation.10 This is a less cooperative view of communication that emphasizes the signal maker over the receiver. Instead of sharing honest information, the selfish signaler theory (as revised in 1984) posits something of an evolutionary arms race, where signalers must adapt communicative methods to gain an advantage over perceivers, who would then find it beneficial to develop counter-measures to these methods of manipulation.11 It is this second branch of thought that is most intriguing from a rhetorical standpoint. While Krebs and Dawkins argue that signaling often exists for signalers to manipulate perceivers, Owings claims that animal communication exists largely for one animal to manage the behavior of its audience.12 Under this view, communication needn’t be a fitness indicator; signals can be faked, mimicked, dramatized, and exaggerated (and often will be if it is more beneficial for an individual to do so). Along the same vein, Owren asserts that communicating encoded information is not the most accurate way to imagine animal signaling, and suggests instead that we think of these behaviors as a signaler’s attempt to influence the actions of receivers.13 Whether we use the term manipulate, manage, or influence, we are generally suggesting that there is a rhetorical element to the intentional behaviors animals enact to persuade an audience to think or behave in a specific, desired manner. It is this idea of 7 intentional manipulation that demarcates rhetoric and prior views on animal signaling; for persuasion involves much more than the mere transfer of information. When interpreting human behavior, the idea that people supplement costly signals with healthy doses of deception and exaggeration to get their way is so common as to be unremarkable.14 Nicholas Humphrey famously argued that while the purpose of “creative intellect is to hold society together,” much of our social thought runs toward “Machiavellian intelligence,” or how we can manipulate others by predicting their behavior and outmaneuvering them.15 He likened arguments from self-interest to chess matches, where our opponents and we are simultaneously attempting to shape the board to our liking. It is only through the inventiveness and clever strategems of our evolved brains that we achieve each goal on the path to victory. Is Rhetoric Adaptive? As the name Adaptive Rhetoric suggests, persuasive activity is indeed beneficial to the individuals and groups that practice it helps them to live longer and pass on their genes. So far I have drawn parallels between human and animal rhetorics. These similarities are no coincidence. Beyond the mere act of signaling or communicating a need, the intentional, strategic thought behind many persuasive efforts affords multiple potential benefits to individuals and groups. The list below outlines some of the likely fitness benefits of persuasion. It is not exhaustive, and does not present mutually exclusive choices; a persuasion instinct could have developed for all, some, or none of these reasons. (The first three are treated above in more detail.) 8 1) Rhetoric evolved to provide an alternative to physical conflict over resources (cf. the tuna casserole example, or the red deer stags). 2) Rhetoric evolved because it allowed members of various species to form and confirm group identity (wild dogs and pep rallies above). 3) Many animals use a variety of strategies to persuade potential mates to breed with them (and examples could range from bower bird bowers to night club pick-up lines). 4) Persuasion is a means to prestige or power within a group. Just as power in chimpanzee groups does not rely on individual fighting prowess, so much as the ability to form stronger coalitions, human prestige and power are infrequently tied to fighting ability alone.16 Kenneth Burke, the ‘father’ of modern rhetoric, defined rhetorical practice as “the manipulation of men’s beliefs for political ends.”17 Political power can be obtained through various means, and can also be a side effect of possessing some seemingly unrelated trait. Often in hunter-gatherer societies, the most skillful orators occupy the most prestigious political roles. Locke and Bogin (2006) cite numerous examples of this trend, including the Trobriand Islanders, who call their tribal leaders “rhetoric thumpers,” because persuasiveness is such an important component of their rise to chiefdom. 18 Likewise, in several South American cultures studied, people consider speaking a duty one cannot avoid if one wishes to lead.19 Some studies even follow Aristotle’s vision of the magnanimous leader, linking deepness of voice to the effectiveness of males as politicians and potential mates in oral cultures. The idea being that deeper voices indicate higher levels of testosterone, which point to dominance in human males.20 The ability to tell a good tale is not only useful for purpose of entertainment; it can also help transmit important environmental or cultural information to the tribe.21 Being a trusted source of useful information can greatly 9 enhance the prestige of an individual within his or her group, a fact to which much work on the social functions of gossip attests.22 5) To convince an audience of the accuracy of one’s information. Think of the honey bee waggle dance as an analogue to early human rhetorical situations. When a honey bee forager returns with information about a new food source, it initiates a dance in a figure-eight pattern, with the direction of movements in relation to the sun indicating the direction of the food source, and the waggle length indicating the distance to the target. When more than one bee returns with information, it is often the bee that performs the most insistent dance that the other bees decide to follow. This is a rudimentary form of persuasion that relies upon urgency of performance (including factors such as the intensity of waggle and persistence in the face of competition) as an index of quality. Other indices likely prevailed in the early human world, including an individual’s history of presenting accurate information, the quality of the source of information (did the hunter actually see the antelope, or just its tracks?), and the relevance of information presented to the needs of the group (perhaps the tribe is flush with antelope meat but has outgrown its shelter and needs to find a better home). New Modes of Comparison These five explanations point toward future directions for cross-species studies that combine our scientific knowledge of animal signaling and our rich humanistic traditions of rhetorical theory. If we want to understand human persuasion, we must broaden our studies to include our animal cousins, both near and distant, who display many similar behaviors. While no other animals have language, linguistic communication represents a very small portion of our 10 overall rhetorical arsenal. This is important to remember when we consider the relationships between human rhetorics and the rhetorics of other animals. Human examples of non-linguistic rhetoric are ubiquitous.23 A friend might gesture rudely in response to a joke at his or her expense. A colorful dress can catch one’s eye, drawing attention to a woman who wants to persuade you of her beauty. Grandma cools a pie on her windowsill, hoping the smell will beckon her grandchildren in from play. In many Muslim countries, even a color can serve a rhetorical purpose; green represents the Islamic religion itself, and is the color true believers are said to don when they reach paradise. In Uzbek tea ceremonies, guests are only poured half a cup of tea at a time, symbolizing that they are honored guests whose well-being is treasured (half a cup allows the tea to cool faster, and the guest knows he is welcome to more). In the U.S., a two dimensional yellow diamond with an image of a black automobile trailing wavy tire tracks indicates that one should beware of a potentially slippery surface during wet driving conditions. Examples like these demonstrate that human persuasive efforts reach far beyond the constraints of language, despite language being such a wildly successful tool for communication. While the study of visual rhetorics is growing, humanists still generally favor the written word over oral or non-linguistic rhetoric. The Future of Adaptive Rhetoric The history of rhetoric must be expanded to include not just the extant works of literate societies, but to trace the deep history and entire development of human suasion. It is myopic to focus solely on the last 2,500 years of a species that has been recording its rhetoric for at least 32,000 years (in visual forms, such as the cave paintings at Chauvet), and has existed in its 11 present morphology for about 200,000 years. That rhetoricians have all but overlooked preliterate cultures ignores the greater part of human existence. Moreover, to neglect the cultures of our fellow primates – and yes, every known chimpanzee tribe has something of its own distinguishable culture – is to ignore vast pools of evidence about our own communication.24 Originating from a common ancestor, and sharing nearly 99% of our genes, chimps and bonobos represent an argosy of information about complex communication that is closely related to, but does not quite reach, human sophistication. Situating the study of human rhetorics within the ongoing conversations regarding signaling theory will allow us to test the connections between the art of persuasion and such concepts as costly signaling and selfish signaling. If all rhetorical behavior exists on a continuum, then we should be able to identify similar rhetorical deployment strategies among human and animal signalers. That some honest signals will conform to Zahavi and Zahavi’s handicap principle, for instance, in human rhetorical situations seems highly plausible. However, much of human signaling is reactionary, dishonest, or manipulative. One example of the type of study that could lend insight into this problem is Devendra Singh’s cross-cultural work on female attractiveness and its relationship to honest flirting behavior.25 What Singh found was that women who were deemed more attractive by both males and females of their own culture were less likely to engage in dishonest flirting with other men in order to make their partners jealous. Since the respondents of all cultures polled selected women with high waist-to-hip ratios (WHR) as the most beautiful, and a high WHR indicates potential reproductive success, strategic (rather than excessive) flirting in this case could indicate to males that a particular female is a better choice for a mate.2627 One finds that deceit, in this case, is deployed to counteract an undesirable WHR ratio. This one study is far from conclusive, however, and can only hint at the interaction 12 between persuasion-as-manipulation and the handicap principle. We must continue to test human persuasive acts in light of the predominant animal signaling theories. Other avenues are open, as well, for exploring connections between rhetorical theory and current work on costly signaling. as I have argued elsewhere, understanding why humans often subordinate self-interest to their group, kin, or strangers can benefit from insight into appeals made from and for ethos, and for the cultivation of prestige.28 In the case of Cicero’s De Oratore, my hypothesis is that the securing of goodwill (benevolentiam conciliare) Cicero advises the orator to perform is not unlike the intentional manipulation of others that comes of ethosconstructing activities in the animal world. We can test this claim through direct observation of animals that perform other-appraised works or behaviors. Some of this work has already been done by ethologists in the field. Recalling the bowerbird discussion above, we can imagine how the males of this species construct an ethos, or public persona, by erecting an elaborate bower to attract a mate. The bower is decorated with numerous colorful objects arranged to maximize artistic effect. Females judge the desirability of the bowerbirds’ achievements, equating aesthetic beauty with skillfulness of the builder. The ethos presented, then, is one of ‘clever forager’ or ‘inventive architect,’ which indicates good genes that would be passed on to potential offspring. Those birds that present a desirable public image of themselves through their works are those who are seen fit to mate. Once again, this single example cannot prove human reliance on costly signals, but it is suggestive of fruitful research directions for the future. Much effort will be needed to integrate work on animal signaling and the rhetorical tradition, two areas of inquiry that have remained incommunicado despite having various points of contact in subject matter, if not in method. Most important of all, understanding persuasion as an evolved behavior must proceed from both a cross-cultural and a cross-species perspective. 13 Most cross-cultural work in rhetorical theory has occurred in the last two or three decades, and both the methods and the results of comparative rhetoric are hotly debated. To claim a universal rhetoric, we must be able to compare ethnographic information from pre-literate hunter-gatherer tribes with literate cultures world-wide. For scholars of rhetoric and composition, this work is at its earliest stages. Cross-species work is all but unheard of – George Kennedy’s study mentioned above representing the only well-known example. If we truly want to understand rhetoric in both theory and practice, we must extend the scope of our study to include all individuals that seek to persuade, be they from other cultures, or other species. For rhetoricians cannot hope to fully comprehend the particulars of persuasion without also examining the universal. 14 Works Cited Apicella, Coren, and David Feinberg. "Voice Pitch Alters Mate-Choice-Relevant Perception in Hunter-Gatherers." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. Mar2009, Vol. 276 Issue 1659, p1077-1082. Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1969. Cronk, Lee. "The Application of Animal Signaling Theory to Human Phenomena." Social Science Information 44, no. 4 (2005): 603-20. Crowley, Sharon, and Debra Hawhee. Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students. 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999. Dawkins, Richard, and J. R. Krebs. "Animal Signals: Information or Manipulation? ." In Behavioural Ecology : An Evolutionary Approach, edited by J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, 282-309. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific, 1978. Dunbar, R. I. M. Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996. Furnham, A., and E. Reeves. "The Relative Influence of Facial Neoteny and Waist-to-Hip Ratio on Judgements of Female Attractiveness and Fecundity." Psychology, health & medicine 11, no. 2 (2006): 129-41. Grazyna, Jasienska, Ziomkiewicz Anna, T. Ellison Peter, F. Lipson Susan, and Thune Inger. "Large Breasts and Narrow Waists Indicate High Reproductive Potential in Women." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 271, no. 1545 (2004). Humphrey, Nicholas. "The Social Function of Intellect." In Machiavellian Intelligence : Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans, edited by Richard W. Byrne and Andrew Whiten, 13-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Kaplan, H. "Human Communication and Contemporary Evolutionary Theory." Research on Language and Social Interaction 20 (1987): 79-140. Kennedy, George Alexander. Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Kostelnick, Charles, and Michael Hassett. Shaping Information : The Rhetoric of Visual Conventions. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003. Krebs, J. R., and R. Dawkins. "Animal Signals: Mind-Reading and Manipulation." In Behavioural Ecology : An Evolutionary Approach, edited by J. R. Krebs, 380-402. Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, 1984. Locke, John L., and Barry Bogin. "Life History and Language: Selection in Development." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, no. 3 (2006): 301-11. Lycett, Stephen J., Mark Collard, and William C. McGrew. "Phylogenetic Analyses of Behavior Support Existence of Culture among Wild Chimpanzees." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 104, no. 45 (2007): 17588. 15 Maynard Smith, John, and David Harper. Animal Signals. 1st ed, Oxford Series in Ecology and Evolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Owings, Donald H. "How Monkeys Feel About the World: A Review of How Monkeys See the World." Language & Communication 14, no. 1 (1994): 15-30. Owren, Michael, Drew Rendall, and Michael Ryan. "Redefining Animal Signaling: Influence Versus Information in Communication." Biology & Philosophy 25, no. 5 (2010). Parrish, Alex C. "Adaptive Rhetoric: Ethos and Evolved Behavior in Cicero’s De Oratore." In Rhetoric: Concord and Controversy, edited by Melody Lehn and Antonio de Velasco. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2011. Singh, Devendra. "Mating Strategies of Young Women: Role of Physical Attractiveness." Journal of Sex Research (The) 41, no. 1 (2004): 43. Smith, W. J. The Behavior of Communicating : An Ethological Approach. Cambridge - Mass.& London: Harvard University Press, 1977. Sugiyama, Michelle Scalise. "On the Origins of Narrative." Human Nature 7, no. 4 (1996): 40325. Tinbergen, Niko. The Study of Instinct. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. Waal, F. B. M. de. Chimpanzee Politics : Power and Sex among Apes. 25th anniversary ed. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. Waal, F. B. M. de, and Frans Lanting. Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Zahavi, Amotz, and Avishag Zahavi. The Handicap Principle : A Missing Piece of Darwin's Puzzle. New York, NY u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997. Endnotes 1 Kennedy, Comparative Rhetoric, 13-4. 2 Crowley and Hawhee, Ancient Rhetorics, 2. 3 Maynard Smith and Harper, Animal Signals, 127. 4 de Waal and Lanting, Bonobo, 109. 5 Further examples are provided in Kennedy, Comparative Rhetoric. 6 Tinbergen, The Study of Instinct. 7 Smith, The Behavior of Communicating. 8 Zahavi and Zahavi, The Handicap Principle. 9 Kaplan, “Human communication.” 10 Dawkins and Krebs, “Animal signals.” 11 Krebs and Dawkins, “Animal signals.” 12 Owings, “How monkeys feel.” 13 Owren, et al., “Redefining animal signaling.” 14 Cronk, “The application of animal signaling.” 16 15 Humphrey, “The social function.” 16 de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics, 31. 17 Burke, A Rhetoric, 41. 18 Locke and Bogin, “Life history,” 268. 19 Loc. Cit. 20 Apicella and Feinberg, “Voice pitch.” 21 Sugiyama, “On the origins,” 417. 22 Cf., e.g., Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip. 23 For a fuller discussion of visual rhetorics in particular, Kostelnick and Hassett, Shaping Information. 24 On wild chimpanzee culture see, for instance, Lycett, et al., “Phylogenetic analyses of behavior.” 25 Singh, “Mating strategies.” 26 However, there may be better gauges of female human fecundity than high WHR. Cf. Grazyna et al., “Large breasts.” 27 Moreover, male perception of female fecundity may differ from the actual. It may also be influenced by other factors. Cf. Furnham and Reeves, “The relative influence.” 28 Parrish, “Adaptive Rhetoric.” 17