817185 JHPXXX10.1177/0022167818817185Journal of Humanistic PsychologyBeshara research-article2018 Article Decolonizing Everyday Islamophobia Through an Antiterrorist Ethic of Resistance Journal of Humanistic Psychology 1–14 © The Author(s) 2018 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167818817185 DOI: 10.1177/0022167818817185 journals.sagepub.com/home/jhp Robert K. Beshara1 Abstract Decolonizing everyday Islamophobia entails both reflecting on and transforming the epistemology of (structural and interactional) Islamophobia through a radical humanist ontology. A manifestation of this ontology is an antiterrorist ethic of resistance, which involves a nonviolent praxis: a gesture of love. A gesture of love from the oppressed is the transmodern/ decolonial corrective to the (counter)terrorism dispositif. This essay is written for scholar–activists, particularly critical psychologists, who desire working within a radical humanist framework in their struggle against everyday Islamophobia. Keywords Islamophobia, antiterrorism, radical humanism, resistance, praxis This essay is a theoretical reflection on a hegemonic dialectic that has been occupying the Euro-American imaginary for decades: Islamophobia/ Islamophilia-(counter)terrorism (IICT). The aim of my theoretical “reflection” is practical “action” (Freire, 1970/2018, p. 66): decolonizing everyday Islamophobia1 (cf. Essed, 1991). 1Northern New Mexico College, Española, NM, USA Corresponding Author: Robert K. Beshara, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Northern New Mexico College, 921 North Paseo De Oñate, Española, NM 87532, USA. Email: robert.beshara@nnmc.edu 2 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) Additionally, this essay is a contribution to my critical psychological project of “decolonial psychoanalysis” (Beshara, 2018b; Beshara, in press), which is fundamentally informed by Said’s (1978) radical humanism. Radical humanism is critical of “liberal humanism, of which Orientalism has historically been one department” (p. 254). For Said (1978), “no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his [or her] own circumstances” (p. 11). Said’s radical humanism is similar to the Marxist notion of praxis, which Freire (1970/2018) defines as “reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it” (p. 51, Italics added). By claiming to be centrists or nonpolitical, liberal humanists are in fact more ideological than radical humanists. Radical humanists, for instance, will not shy away from acknowledging the political nature of any form of knowledge production as a function of one’s positionality—what Macleod and Bhatia (2008) call “the politics of location” (p. 578). According to Said (1978): [A] humanistic study can responsibly address itself to politics and culture. But this is not to say that such a study establishes a hard-and-fast rule about the relationship between knowledge and politics. My argument is that each humanistic investigation must formulate the nature of that connection in the specific context of the study, the subject matter, and its historical circumstances. (p. 15, Italics in original) Consequently, decolonizing everyday Islamophobia is part of a counterhegemonic project, which entails both reflecting on and transforming the epistemology of (structural and interactional) Islamophobia through a radical humanist ontology. A manifestation of this ontology is an antiterrorist ethic of resistance,2 which involves a nonviolent (but revolutionary) praxis: “a gesture of love” (Freire, 1970/2018, p. 56). A gesture of love from the oppressed is the transmodern/decolonial (Dussel, 2012; Mignolo, 2007) corrective to the IICT dialectic. This essay is written for scholar–activists (be they Muslims or non-Muslim allies), particularly critical psychologists, who desire working within a radical humanist framework in their struggle against everyday Islamophobia, which takes many violent forms as will become clear later. On the relationship between oppression and violence, Freire (1970/2018) writes, “With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has already begun” (p. 55, Italics in original). In what follows, I present my radical humanist critique of everyday Islamophobia through a series of vignettes, which are meant as exercises in “critical border thinking” (Mignolo, 2007). Beshara 3 Reproductive Politics According to a report by Pew Research Center, published in 2015 and titled The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, Islam is the world’s second largest religion after Christianity with “1.6 billion adherents, or 23% of the global population” (p. 7). The report estimates that between 2010 and 2050, “Muslims—a comparatively youthful population with high fertility rates—are projected to increase by 73%” (Pew Research Center, 2015, p. 7, Italics added). The report’s manifest obsession with statistics obscures a latent Orientalist fantasy, which revolves around the world Muslim population’s sexual enjoyment. The report’s quantitative façade (i.e., ‘science’ as ideology) unconsciously sets into motion the indexing of the archive of Orientalism (Said, 1978). This indexing is done discursively via the reproduction of the rhetorical trope of the Muslim other as an exotic “objet a cause of desire” (Lacan, 1973/2004, p. 168, Italics in original). This ideological fantasy figure—which we can label the “conceptual Muslim” (borrowing from Žižek, 1997/2008, p. 10)—involves an imaginary duplet: the Muslim other as repressive of feminine jouissance and the Muslim other as the embodiment of masculine jouissance. From the perspective of the Euro-American imaginary, the former is cathected as the ‘veiled’ other (which must be liberated), while the latter is cathected as the ‘terrorist’ other (which must be terminated). It is true that Muslims around the world collectively share many beliefs and practices; however, as subjects, Muslims are heterogeneous due to imaginary, symbolic, and real (Lacan, 2010) differences among them in terms of culture, language, class, religiosity, and so on. The 2012 Pew Research Center report3 warrants this alterity, but specifically attributes the diversity of “views” held by members of the world Muslim population to regional, generational, gender, and sectarian differences without paying attention to “intersectionality” (Crenshaw, 1991), which is an ontological question (i.e., a diversity of beings). Intersectionality accounts for the double oppression of “gendered Islamophobia” (Zine, 2006) and the triple oppression that a ‘Black’ Muslim Woman may experience—not to mention class as a fundamental layer of oppression in the Marxist sense. Furthermore, Islamophobia is such a complex psychosocial phenomenon that it involves the racialization of even ‘White’ Muslims and the “othering” (Spivak, 1985) of non-Muslim, or “Muslimlooking” (Cashin, 2010), subjects—that is, ‘Brown’ peoples from the Global South, particularly the continents of Africa and Asia. Therefore, we must pay close attention to the subjects and objects of Islam(ophobia), if we are to perform a “critical intervention in reality” (Freire, 1970/2018, p. 52).4 4 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) Given my earlier remark about the quantitative style of these two reports, or ‘science’ as ideology, it is relevant in this context to reread what these texts have to say about the politicization of the world Muslim population in light of Foucault’s (2003) notion of “biopolitics” (p. 243).5 Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and biopower shine a light on the links between: (a) the targeting of the world Muslim population today—hence, rendering them “hypervisible” (Shams, 2018); (b) the oppressive Islamophobia industry (Lean, 2012)— that is, the conscious (or manifest) Islamophobia that fuels unconscious (or latent) Islamophobia; and, finally, (c) the discursive-practices of the ‘war on terror,’ which legitimate (a) and (b). The politicization of the world Muslim population is a question of “reproductive politics” (Johnson-Hanks, 2006, p. 21), which has no empirical basis. Rather, as Johnson-Hanks (2006) argues, “the specter of rapidly reproducing Muslims, whose high fertility encourages fundamentalism and enables terrorism” is an ideological fantasy, which has grave material consequences: “The politics of reproduction include not only the ways in which access to the means of reproduction is stratified but also the political representation of fertility for fear mongering or to force through specific policies” (p. 25). The Binarism of the ‘War on Terror’ The ‘war on terror’ dispositif (Foucault, 1980) gains its State-centric legitimacy in the politico-media complex via a specific costly association (to adapt Freud), the metonymic displacement: terrorists → Muslims (Beshara, 2018a). This dangerous displacement functions like an unconscious mantra, or a “point de capiton” (Lacan, 1966/2006, p. 681, Italics in original), in the symbolic field. The mantra’s racist logic is best captured in the following falsism espoused by many conservatives in the United States: Not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims. The displacement (terrorists → Muslims), and accompanying conflation (Muslims = Arabs), is foundational to the binarism of the ‘war on terror’ discourse, which in turn positions postcolonial subjects in a manifest way as either ‘counterterrorists’ (us) or ‘terrorists’ (them). In Bush II’s (2001) infamous words, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” The rhetoric of ‘us vs. them’ is not a logical paradox, according to Fanon (1961/2004), since for him colonialism “is precisely the organization of a Manichaean world, of a compartmentalized world” (p. 43). Even though the Manichean logic of “just war theory”6 can be easily deconstructed using Greimas and Rastier’s (1968) semiotic square, the painful truth is that binarism,7 in general is a foundational structure in any symbolic universe. Therefore, a substantial segment of the Euro-American public Beshara 5 accepts the implicit Manichaeism of the ‘war on terror’ discourse as a commonsensical support for the “clash of civilizations”8 (Huntington, 1993) myth or grand narrative. When Fanon (1961/2004) writes, “The colonial world is a Manichaean world” (p. 6), he means that even (and especially) scholar–activists who are occupying the ivory towers of academia are not living in a safe postcolonial space, but rather they, too, occupy a position in a neocolonial world. Given the objective reality of coloniality, it is our moral task as radical humanists to decolonize both latent and manifest Islamophobic knowledge (Bazian, 2014) by deconstructing the binarist, orientalist archive at its foundation (Said, 1978). The aim of our decolonization is the transformation of IICT into a counterhegemonic project: a transmodern/decolonial alternative. The logic of Manichaeism is not the logic of différance. Beyond a “play of difference” (Derrida, 1973, p. 133) between signs, the logic of Manichaenism is the logic of racism—“a global hierarchy of human superiority and inferiority” (Grosfoguel, Oso, & Christou, 2015, p. 636). That is why Fanon (1961/2004) argues that its logical conclusion is the dehumanization of the colonized subject (p. 7)—and by extension, the dehumanization of oppressors, too (Freire, 1970/2018). Having said that, let us keep in mind not only the West–East dialectic of knowledge (i.e., Orientalism) but also the North– South dialectic of power (i.e., Capitalism). Since Orientalism is a critical facilitator of a dehumanizing colonial discourse, the explosion of the binarist rhetoric/logic of the ‘war on terror’ discourse (e.g., the metonymic displacement: terrorists → Muslims) is the key to resisting everyday Islamophobia. I must add, however, that resistance to everyday Islamophobia must come from Muslims first and their allies second because “the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed [is] to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well” (Freire, 1970/2018, p. 44).9 Furthermore, there are at least two latent subject-positions that are not accounted for, but which are surprisingly afforded by the ‘war on terror’ discourse: namely, ‘not-counterterrorist’ and ‘not-terrorist.’ These two latent subject-positions are antiterrorist because they question and challenge the State-centric definition of ‘terrorism’ as political violence by nonstate actors against civilians. Antiterrorism expands the definition of terrorism to political violence by nonstate actors or the State against civilians (Jackson, 2007), which by implication allows for the possibility of viewing ‘counterterrorism’ as state terrorism—as Chomsky (1989/2015) has been arguing for years regarding ‘humanitarian’ interventionism. Similarly, Freire (1970/2018) distinguishes between humanitarianism and humanism when he writes: “The pedagogy of the oppressed, animated by authentic, humanist (not humanitarian) generosity, presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind” (p. 54, Italics added). 6 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) The Freedom to Critique Marx (1843/1978) writes, “the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism” (p. 53) and “therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of tears of which religion is the halo” (p. 54, Italics in original). For Marx (1843/1978), religion—which he refers to as “the opium of the people” or “the illusory happiness of men” (p. 54, Italics in original)—is merely an abstract symptom; the real cause being the oppressive material conditions in a given society. When Marx (1843/1978) writes, “Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering” (p. 54, Italics in original), he is arguing that “universal human emancipation” is the material condition for true happiness, which is not a “Utopian dream” but the product of a “radical revolution” (p. 62, Italics in original). If religion is not only “the opium of the people” but also “a universal obsessional neurosis” as Freud (1907) argues, then in order for Muslims and/or non-Muslim allies to free themselves from their sacred illusions or fanatic beliefs they must drop their “theological narratives” in favor of an ideology critique of “political fantasies” (Toscano, 2009, p. 115). For example, Toscano (2009) shows how some Euro-American analysts use psychoanalysis as a tool for converting Muslims to secularism because of their perception of the Muslim subject as having “failed its secularization” in comparison the normative ‘Judeo-Christian’ subject (p. 106). This ‘fanaticism’ on the part of some Euro-American analysts is the result of them confusing “the methodological atheism of psychoanalysis with the normative narrative of secularism” (Toscano, 2009, p. 114). In writing about the false generosity or charity of oppressors, Freire (1970/2018) argues that true solidarity entails not only the oppressor’s conversion from his or her rebirth. In Freire’s (1970/2018) words: “A real [or radical] humanist can be identified more by his [or her] trust in the people, which engages him [or her] in their struggle, than by a thousand actions in their favor without that trust” (p. 60, Italics added). In other words, allies cannot be leaders in the damnés’ struggle toward liberation; they must be trusting followers of the oppressed, while always remaining in dialogue with them to know what is the most appropriate contribution they can make. As complex subjects, Muslims (like other divided subjects) are beyond good and evil, which Mamdani (2004) vigorously demonstrates with his deconstruction of the master-morality prevalent in the Euro-American politico-media complex, “good Muslims are modern, secular, and Westernized, and bad Muslims are doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent” (p. 24). A related problem to Islamophobia then is its inverse, Islamophilia, which is “a generalized affection for Islam and Muslims” (Shryock, 2010, p. 9).10 Therefore, Beshara 7 Euro-American psychoanalysts (or thinkers/practitioners in general) possess both the freedom and the responsibility of not only criticizing Islamic fanaticism but also supporting Islamic humanism (Tibi, 2009). Defining Islamophobia, or Contextualizing It in History The caveat of “especially as a political force” in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of Islamophobia (2006) is quite interesting, and I am not sure as to the reasoning behind adding it. If the logic were in the spirit of the feminist adage the personal is political then surely I would agree that Muslims are a political force by virtue of being subjects, but if the implication was that all Muslims on the globe are in favor of Islamism, or political Islam, then we ought to be very skeptical, if not extremely critical, of such a reductive move, which casts the global Muslim population—or more than 1.6 billion people—as a monolithic group with the same (political) interests.11 How did we get here? The demonization of Muslims in recent history has to do with the displacement12 of the ‘enemy’ from the Cold War to the War on Terror. The ‘enemy’ was not displaced on 9/11; the displacement from the Red Scare (Communism) to the Green Scare (Islamism) took place between 198913 and 1991.14 Furthermore, a radical humanist must reflect on the critical link between the two Gulf Wars15 to map out the negative spaces of decolonial resistance—that is, spaces that transcend the IICT dialectic. The Question of Violence I will end this essay with reflections on the question of violence. Again, if we define terrorism as political violence against civilians, whether by nonstate actors or the State, then antiterrorism is a radical rejection of political violence, and the IICT dialectic by extension. Political violence is akin to Benjamin’s (1978/1986) notion of “mythical violence.” Here, it is appropriate to keep in mind Benjamin’s distinction between the mythical violence “of archaic sovereignty” and “the anarchism of” divine violence (Critchley, 2016).16 Antiterrorism (e.g., Islamic humanism) radically rejects mythical violence, of which terrorism (or political violence) is a manifestation. Political violence is founded on “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1988), which is “foundational to all violence” (Smith, 2014). Ramón Grosfoguel and Mielants (2006) argue from a decolonial perspective that Islamophobia is not only epistemic violence but also “epistemic racism” which they define as “the inferiorization and subalternization of non-Western knowledge” (p. 8). According to them, 8 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) epistemic racism “leads to the Orientalization of Islam,” “allows the West to not have to listen to the critical thinking produced by Islamic thinkers on Western global/imperial designs,” and “allows the West to unilaterally decide what is best for Muslim people today and obstruct any possibility for a serious inter-cultural dialogue” (p. 9). Bourdieu’s (1991) concept of “symbolic violence” is related to Spivak’s (1988) notion of “epistemic violence.” For Bourdieu (1991), [S]ymbolic violence can only be exercised by the person who exercises it, and endured by the person who endures it, in a form which results in its misrecognition as such, in other words, which results in its recognition as legitimate. (p. 140) As ideological power, symbolic violence—for example, Islamophobia/ Islamophilia—is the stuff as political violence—for example, (counter)terrorism—is made on; in other words, symbolic violence is the orthodoxy of both political violence as domination (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 165) and “structural violence as social injustice” (Galtung, 1969, p. 171, Italics in original). In brief, everyday Islamophobia is both symbolic violence and epistemic racism.17 In conclusion, decolonizing everyday Islamophobia, and IICT as a power/ knowledge complex (Foucault, 1980), necessitates that critical psychologists (be they Muslims or non-Muslim allies) consider adopting a radical humanist ontology, an antiterrorist ethic of resistance, and a nonviolent praxis. A radical humanist ontology is inherently political. An antiterrorist ethic of resistance is founded on a negative dialectic. A gesture of love is a nonviolent praxis that reflects on violent discursive-practices (e.g., IICT) to transform them. The function of IICT is the ideological/material othering and oppression of Muslims and ‘Muslim-looking’ subjects. All things considered, a gesture of love transforms IICT and produces decolonial knowledge in its stead (e.g., Islamophobia Studies and Critical Terrorism Studies), which is how resistance (to power) becomes freedom or liberation. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Funding The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. Beshara 9 Notes 1. And by extension: Islamophilia. 2. “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). 3. “While there is broad agreement on the core tenets of Islam [e.g., that there is only one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet], however, Muslims across the 39 countries and territories surveyed differ significantly in their levels of religious commitment, openness to multiple interpretations of their faith and acceptance of various sects and movements” (Pew Research Center, 2012, p. 7). 4. That is, “to perceive reality and understand it in order to transform it” (Freire, 1970/2018, p. 53). 5. It is also worth looking at Foucault’s (2007) definition of governmentality from his February 1st, 1978 lecture at the Collège de France as: “[T]he ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (p. 108, Italics added). 6. Or slave-morality (Good vs. Evil) à la Nietzsche (1886/1989). 7. A function of language and culture as argued by de Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, respectively, and perhaps a feature of our evolution as a human species. 8. The “clash of civilizations” is the ideological fantasy of an endless ‘holy war’ à la the Crusades between the ‘civilized Judeo-Christian West’ (the Occident) and the ‘barbaric and primitive Muslim East’ (the Orient). 9. As a side note, the twins—phobos (fear) and deimos (terror)—are minor gods in ancient Greek mythology. 10. Andrew Shryock (2010) clarifies this counterintuitive notion as follows: “The ‘good Muslim,’ as a stereotype, has common features: he tends to be a Sufi (ideally, one who reads Rumi); he is peaceful (and assures us that jihad is an inner, spiritual contest, not a struggle to ‘enjoin the good and forbid the wrong’ through force of arms); he treats women as equals, and is committed to choice in matters of hijab wearing (and never advocates the covering of a woman’s face); if he is a she, then she is highly educated, works outside the home, is her husband’s only wife, chose her husband freely, and wears hijab (if at all) only because she wants to. The good Muslim is also a pluralist (recalls fondly the ecumenical virtues of medieval Andalusia and is a champion of interfaith activism); he is politically moderate (an advocate of democracy, human rights, and religious freedom, an opponent of armed conflict against the United States and Israel); finally, he is likely to be an African, a South Asian, or, more likely still, an Indonesian or Malaysian; he is less likely to be an Arab, but, as friends of the ‘good Muslim’ will point out, only a small proportion of Muslims are Arab anyway” (p. 10). 11. A quick survey of recent history clearly shows that Socialism was a major anticolonial force in the Arab world until it was crushed during the Cold War by the First World to eventually be replaced by Islamism (Hourani, 1991/2010). Ironically, the United States in the Soviet–Afghan War, or its proxy war with the 10 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) Soviet Union, chose to support the mujahideens—who back then were considered “freedom fighters” and not terrorists—in an effort to undermine the Second World, and the Non-Aligned Movement by extension (for an overview, see Leech, 2016). I say ironically, of course, because Euro-America, as we all know, has been hoisted by its own petard—namely, Islamic terrorism. Although Chomsky (1989/2015) credits Reagan (and not Bush II) for declaring the ‘war on terror’ on entering into office in the early 1980s. The timing of Reagan’s declaration coincides with the rise of neoliberalism, too. 1989 Happens to be when the Ayatollah of Iran issued a fatwa ordering Muslims around the world to kill Salman Rushdie for writing the Satanic Verses—a relevant moment for Islamophobia studies. It is also the year when the Soviet– Afghan War ended. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and the First Gulf War also ended the same year. Waged by the same neoconservative administration of Bush I and Bush II. In his rebuttal to Žižek’s (2007) view of Terror as divine violence, Simon Critchley (2016) claims: “The only thing that can put a halt to the logic of mythic violence . . . is divine violence, which is not law-making, but law-destroying. . . . If mythic violence is extremely bloody, then divine violence is bloodless. . . . If mythic violence is bloody power over human affairs for the sake of state power, then divine violence is the bloodless power over life for the sake of the living, for the sake of life’s sacredness . . . a nonviolent violence.” In the words of Stuart Hall (1996): “Racism, of course, operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the difference between belongingness and otherness. Along this frontier, there arises what Gayatri Spivak calls the ‘epistemic violence’ of the discourses of the Other—of imperialism, the colonized, Orientalism, the exotic, the primitive, the anthropological and the folklore. Consequently, the discourse of antiracism had often been founded on a strategy of reversal and inversion, turning the ‘Manichean aesthetic’ of colonial discourse upside-down. However, as Fanon constantly reminded us, the epistemic violence is both outside and inside, and operates by a process of splitting on both sides of the division— in here as well as out here. That is why it is a question, not only of ‘blackskin’ but of ‘Black Skin, White Masks’—the internalization of the self-as-other. Just as masculinity always constructs feminity [sic] as double—simultaneously Madonna and Whore—so racism contructs [sic] the black subject: noble savage and violent avenger. And in the doubling, fear and desire double for one another and play across the structures of otherness, complicating its politics” (p. 446, Italics in original). ORCID iD Robert K. Beshara https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1190-8201 Beshara 11 References Bazian, H. (2014, April 15). Latent and manifest Islamophobia: An inception of ideas. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04 /latent-manifest-islamophobia-a-2014414124948207223.html Benjamin, W. (1986). Critique of violence. In Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writings (pp. 277-300). New York, NY: Schocken Books. (Original work published 1978) Beshara, R. K. (2018a). A critical discourse analysis of George W. Bush’s “war on terror” speech: The rhetoric of (counter)terrorism and the logic of Islamophobia. Journal of Language and Discrimination, 2, 85-112. Beshara, R. K. (2018b). 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Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/248929877 _Unveiled_Sentiments_Gendered_Islamophobia_and_Experiences_of_Veiling_ among_Muslim_Girls_in_a_Canadian_Islamic_School Žižek, S. (2007). Robespierre or the “divine violence” of terror. Retrieved from http://www.lacan.com/zizrobes.htm Žižek, S. (2008). The plague of fantasies. New York, NY: Verso. (Original work published 1997) 14 Journal of Humanistic Psychology 00(0) Author Biography Robert K. Beshara is a critical psychologist, interested in theorizing subjectivity vis-à-vis ideology through radical qualitative research (e.g., discourse analysis). In addition to being a scholar–activist, he is a fine artist with a background in film, theater, and music. He holds two terminal degrees: a PhD in psychology: consciousness and society from the University of West Georgia and an MFA in independent film and digital imaging from Governors State University. He currently works as an assistant professor of psychology at Northern New Mexico College. For more information, kindly visit: www.robertbeshara.com.