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Execut ive Summary
The period under review was marked by deep political and social divisions in
Turkey. The failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, and the subsequent state of
emergency has changed the course of Turkish politics and increased
uncertainty. The government’s politically charged allegations, judicial
investigations and dismissal of thousands of civil servants, and the immense
organizational capacity of the Gülenist movement in the public and private
sector brought public trust to rock-bottom levels. Rising popular
authoritarianism has undermined the rule of law, legal certainty and judicial
independence, exacerbated widespread social discrimination, and reinforced
the presidential model and exclusion of the legislature from governmental
processes. The chair of TÜSİAD, Turkey’s leading business association, stated
“Judicial independence and impartiality, freedom of thought and expression, a
free and scientific academic environment, free media and internet, welldefined authorities and responsibilities, and a meritocratic public
administration are important parameters of a country’s competitive political
system, which Turkey currently lacks. Domestic and international challenges
require a new economic, political and social grand strategy for Turkey in order
to raise the level of sustainable governance.”
The war in Syria has had a profound impact on Turkish politics and society.
The terrorist attacks in Suruc, Ankara and Istanbul, the massive inflow of
Syrian refugees, and the emergence of the Islamic State group have fueled
tensions across the country and presented the government with major political
challenges. The government’s extensive military counterinsurgency in
predominantly Kurdish provinces in the southeast of Turkey and attacks by
terrorist-designated groups – such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and
the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks – signified an end to the peace process between
the Turkish state and PKK, which had shown significant promise in recent
years. The government appears to lack a clear strategy for ending the conflict
in Turkey’s southeast region. This not only hampers economic opportunities in
the southeast, but will also undermine democratic governance in the years
ahead. Indeed, throughout the review period, the government continued to
respond to dissent with repressive tactics, including openly threatening
perceived opponents (e.g., activists, academics or journalists). Many
journalists critical of the government now operate under financial threats, selfcensorship and increased job insecurity.
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Although the number of civil society organizations increased during the
review period, their influence in decision-making processes remains limited.
The massive polarization between pro- and anti-government camps is present
across all spheres of political, economic and social life. The negative effects of
this divide were evident in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections on 7
June 2015, which failed to deliver a coalition government in line with the
constitution. This inability and/or unwillingness to engage in a power-sharing
agreement demonstrates a serious crisis of democracy in Turkey. The election
marked the first time in modern Turkish history that civilian politicians
refused to accept a parliamentary election result and reach a cross-party
compromise. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured an absolute
parliamentary majority during the November 2015 parliamentary election,
allowing the AKP to rule alone for the fourth time since 2002.
Electoral fairness, the AKP’s use of state resources and the lack of campaign
finance transparency were major issues in both the June and November 2015
parliamentary elections. Throughout both elections, the AKP failed to fully
implement the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) on campaign and party funding. The use of languages other than
Turkish was permitted in both elections. Despite strengthening antidiscrimination efforts, Alevis and Roma people still lack access to basic public
services. Moreover, anti-Semitism in Turkish politics and society remains
widespread. Authorities have begun to address gender discrimination, but
violence against women persists, and there has been no improvement in the
educational attainment and economic participation gender gaps. The inflow of
Syrian refugees is likely to have serious social, economic and political
implications for Turks and Syrians living in Turkey. At the time of writing,
there are more than three million Syrian refugees in Turkey.
Over the last decade, Turkey has experienced important gains in income and
living standards. Though economic competitiveness has decreased, recently.
While economic growth has returned after the 2016 economic slowdown, such
positive signs are based on the availability of cheap and abundant money,
which increases demand (higher consumption and public expenditure) rather
than efficiency.
Environmental sustainability, energy security, sustainable urban development
and progress toward a high-tech, science-based society are not assured.
However, increased government spending (e.g., on research and development,
education and vocational training, social policy and health care) during the
review period marked a step forward, but so far fails to show sustainable
results.
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Key Challenges
Turkey’s main problems are political and social. Political stability versus
political competition and participation, freedom of religion versus freedom
from religion, majority-minority cleavages versus an integrated state and
society – each issue presents a trade-off with political, social and international
repercussions. The polarization of society has been a key strategy used by the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to secure and hold on to power. Legal
uncertainty, distrust in the judiciary, the deterioration of fundamental rights
and freedoms, and inefficiency in governmental sectors have increased in the
aftermath of the averted military coup of 15 July 2016. Suppression of
opposition has intensified. The parliament has not been willing to reduce the
10% electoral threshold for representation in the parliament. Moreover,
gerrymandering, single-member district plurality and narrow electoral district
boundaries have been used by the AKP to reinforce the party’s parliamentary
majority. However, the establishment of a new party, İYİ Parti (Good Party),
may present a real challenge to the AKP in the next presidential and
parliamentary elections, a reaction to Erdoğan and his alliance with the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
Civil rights shortcomings persist. The incumbent AKP government should
expand minority rights for Kurds, Alevis, Christians and other minorities to
increase the visibility of minority groups within society and foster minority
groups’ identification with the state. This would promote intra-societal peace
and a pluralist, integrated society. The government should enhance the powers
of local and regional authorities, and introduce stronger mechanisms for
democratic participation and political subsidiarity. In addition, the 10%
electoral threshold should be reduced to increase smaller parties’ participation
in national decision-making.
At the same time, the AKP should seriously consider domestic and
international concerns about increasing authoritarianism and exclusivist
conservatism, and declining pluralism and liberalism within society. The
government should contribute to the peaceful inclusion of all social groups,
while continuing to tackle extremism and terrorism. The AKP’s monopoly on
government, and the authoritarian stance of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
against groups and media critical of the regime is a concern for foreign
observers, but even more so for Turkish citizens. Since the Gezi protests, mass
protests have continued against the government and its policies. However,
protests are typically suppressed by the government, using its state of
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emergency powers. A more inclusive, reconciliatory rhetoric and better
communicated policy intentions are urgently needed. Freedom and security
must not be considered zero-sum games. In this respect, international
stakeholders, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe,
repeatedly exercise their influence over the Turkish government.
Despite the global financial crisis, Turkey’s economic performance has been
above average. To sustain this positive trend, the government should introduce
structural reforms and extend the EU-Turkey Customs Union Decision of
1995, which covers industrial commodities, to include agriculture, services,
government procurement and investments. Turkey’s relatively high current
account deficit remains a major challenge, requiring action such as the
adoption of a real exchange rate policy. Turkey and the European Union have
shown a willingness to open a new chapter and conclude the present chapter of
accession talks. However, U-turns and dramatic shifts in Turkey’s foreign
policy may not bring the expected outcomes.
During the review period, Turkey’s gradual demographic shifts and the
country’s economic slowdown have increasingly posed a problem. While a
young and well-educated population is a boon and offers enormous potential,
financial and social provisions for the elderly need to be addressed. The
government should continue reforming the pension system to tackle social
exclusion and poverty. Furthermore, the country’s record on environmental
issues, education and innovation is poor when compared to other OECD
countries. Since these areas are key to supporting Turkey’s growing
population and economy, the government should increase expenditure in these
areas. Illegal immigration and the refugee situation are exacerbating social
tensions and leading to widespread discrimination.
Turkey has become a major emerging economy and a key regional power.
However, it increasingly struggles with the repercussions of internal conflicts
in neighboring and regional countries, and the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.
In order to regain credibility and influence, Turkey should use diplomatic
means to re-establish trust, peace and security in the region, and pursue
dialogue with reliable regional actors and Western partners. Turkey’s
international influence and credibility would further increase if the
government became more involved in and implemented more international
agreements, especially OSCE, Council of Europe and EU agreements. An
active continuation of reform processes in line with the acquis communautaire
and in close cooperation with the European Commission is necessary for
Turkey’s EU accession ambitions and democratization in Turkey.
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Policy Perf ormance
I. Economic Policies
Economy
Economic Policy
Score: 4
The July 2016 failed coup increased political and economic uncertainty within
the country. Since July 2016, a state of emergency has been imposed. A very
substantial number of public employees have been suspended or dismissed,
while many people have been detained and many companies have been taken
over by the state. The government alleges that these extreme measures are
necessary, because these people and companies have links to terrorist
organizations. Consequently, households delayed spending especially on durable
goods and corporations postponed key investment decisions, resulting in lower
consumption and investment. State takeovers of private companies has had
particularly adverse effects on private investment and foreign direct investment.
Furthermore, a series of terrorist attacks have weakened tourism and foreign
investment. Finally, domestic economic actors expect a tightening of global
liquidity to constrain foreign borrowing and in the medium term increase
Turkey’s external requirements. In turn, this will pose downside risks to
economic growth and employment.
Turkish GDP expanded by 3.2% in 2016. According to the IMF, the GDP
growth rate during 2017 will be around 5.1% due to fiscal stimulus and credit
expansion. GDP declined from $934.1 billion in 2014 to $859 billion in 2015,
and increased slightly to $863.4 billion in 2016. On the other hand, Turkey’s
inflation rate, based on the consumer price index, increased slightly from 7.7%
in 2015 to 7.8% in 2016. The country’s annual inflation rate in September 2017
was 11.2%. Thus, the headline inflation rate remains well above the central bank
target of 5%. However, according to Turkey’s hourly labor-cost index, the total
hourly cost of an employee increased by 13.3% in 2015 and 20.1% in 2016.
According to the most recent figures, hourly labor costs increased by 13.7% on a
year-on-year basis during the second quarter of 2017.
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The banking sector has proved resilient to global financial crisis due to robust
capital buffers and a healthy loan portfolio. After the failed coup attempt in July
2016, the government’s overarching goal has been to avoid a substantial
economic slowdown. As a result, the government decided to relax prudential
norms in the banking sector, reduce provisioning requirements for restructured
loans in the tourism and energy sectors, and lower regulatory risk weights on
consumer loans and credit cards. As a result, credit growth has been substantial
and the annual credit growth rate was 23.5% in June 2017. But these measures
have been criticized by the IMF’s latest Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP) report, which advises the Turkish government to strengthen banking
sector supervision and governance, and enhance the regulatory framework for
financial services.
In the field of monetary policy, after the failed coup attempt the central bank
lowered reserve requirements, allowed greater use of gold and foreign currency,
and offered unlimited lira liquidity against foreign exchange collateral. Between
March and September 2016, the central bank gradually lowered the overnight
lending rate by 250 basis points to 8.25%, leading to a substantial decline in the
interbank overnight lending rate. Yet, at the end of November 2016, the central
bank had to raise the one-week repo and overnight lending rates after a steep
depreciation in the lira. Simultaneously, the central bank reversed the process of
simplifying the monetary framework, which was based on the use of policy rate
as the main monetary policy transmission tool. The central bank returned to its
unconventional monetary policy, emphasizing the use of Late Liquidity Window
rather than the use of policy rate.
Turkey’s most significant economic problems continue to be related to external
imbalances. While the current account deficit decreased from $43.6 billion
(4.7% of GDP) in 2014 to $32.1 billion (3.7% of GDP) in 2015, and increased
slightly to $32.6 billion (3.8% of GDP) in 2016, the current account deficit is
still considerable. According to the IMF, the current account deficit is expected
to increase to $39 billion (4.6% of GDP) in 2017.
Turkey’s net international-investment position (NIIP) is defined as the value of
total external assets owned by Turkish residents in the rest of the world minus
the value of total external liabilities of Turkish residents to the rest of the world.
Turkey’s NIIP deficit increased from $395 billion at the end of 2013 to $443
billion in 2014, but declined to $383.6 billion in 2015 and to $363 billion at the
end of 2016. The country’s net foreign debt at the end of August 2017 amounted
to $462.4 billion. Considering Turkey’s net foreign debt and the IMF’s GDP
estimate for 2017, the net-foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio for 2017 is approximately
55%.
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The change in a country’s NIIP over time is determined largely by its current
account balance as a share of GDP. Thus, if Turkey’s current-account deficit-toGDP ratio were to remain at 4.17% of GDP and real GDP were to increase at its
projected average annual growth rate of 3.54%, as predicted by the IMF for the
period 2018 – 2022, then the country’s net-foreign debt-to-GDP ratio would
increase over the long term to an unsustainable 122.1%. Turkey must therefore
reduce its current account deficit. A sustainable current account deficit-to-GDP
ratio is likely around 2% of GDP. Since one of the main determinants of the
current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio is the real exchange rate, achieving a
sustainable current account deficit will require a depreciation in the real
exchange rate.
Citation:
World Bank (2017) World Bank in Turkey – Country Snapshot: The World Bank (October).
Labor Markets
Labor Market
Policy
Score: 6
Turkey’s population and work force are growing significantly. From 2014 to
2017, the country’s population increased by an estimated 2.4 million to 79.8
million people in 2017. The working-age population (those 15 years old and
older) grew from 56.6 million in January 2014 to 59.9 million people in July
2017, while the labor-force participation rate rose from 48.2% in January 2014
to 53.7% in July 2017. A total of 24.5 million people were officially registered
as employed in January 2014, rising to 28.8 million in July 2017.
Employment figures in various sectors point to growing dynamism in Turkey’s
economy and labor market. Recent employment figures for the industrial and
services sectors indicate an increase of 71,000 jobs in industry and 2.4 million
jobs in the services sector between 2014 and July 2017. On the other hand,
agricultural employment increased by 107,000 jobs between 2014 and July
2017.
The official number of unemployed increased from 2.8 million in January 2014
to 3.4 million in July 2017. The increase in unemployment shows that the
number of new entrants to the labor force outnumbered the number of jobs
created, reflecting demographic factors as well as the slowdown of the Turkish
economy. The overall unemployment rate increased slightly from 10.3% in
January 2014 to 10.7% in July 2017. Strikingly, unemployment rose in the nonagricultural sectors from 12.1% in January 2014 to 13% in July 2017. Between
January and July 2017, an additional two million people were employed due to
several governmental incentives. On the other hand, the number of public
employees between 2016 and the second quarter of 2007 remained stable at 3.5
million.
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Informal employment increased 6.8% between July 2016 and July 2017 and was
estimated to account for 35.2% of total employment in July 2017. Displacement
of native workers by refugees who agree to work without job security and for
lower wages is the one of the factors driving this development. On the other
hand, Turkey adopted the International Labor Force Law in July 2016, which
aims to attract high-skilled workers to protect and increase productivity. The
requirement of a “professional competence certificate” is expected to increase
the qualified domestic labor force and increase competition in the job market.
A major medium-term challenge facing the government is the need to create
more and better paying jobs for Turkey’s young and growing population, since
many young people (15 to 24 years old) are not in employment, education or
training. The unemployment rate of young people increased from 17.7% in
January 2014 to 21.1% in July 2017. Another major medium-term challenge for
Turkey is to boost women’s participation rate in the labor force. Despite notable
job-creation successes in recent years, almost half of Turkey’s working-age
population fails to enter the labor market, a problem largely attributable to
women’s low participation rates.
The World Bank (2016) pointed to labor market rigidity and high labor costs as
important constraints to job creation in Turkey. Minimum wages are high and
Turkey has a very generous severance payment system. The government’s
recently approved National Employment Strategy includes measures to reform
the severance payment scheme, unemployment benefits and temporary work
contracts. On the other side, recent research indicates that firms participating in
international markets through exports or multinationals are in general larger,
more productive, more capital intensive, more skill intensive and pay higher
wages than domestic firms within the same industry. Thus, the country by
promoting exports through alternative means (e.g., real exchange rate
devaluations) can create higher paying jobs in export sectors than domestically
oriented firms, which will drive productivity increases in the economy.
Citation:
World Bank (2016) World Bank Group – Turkey Partnership: Country Program Snapshot, Washington D.C.:
The World Bank (April).
World Economic Forum (2017) Global Gender Gap Report 2017, Geneva.
Taxes
Tax Policy
Score: 5
General government revenue increased from 31.9% of GDP in 2014 to 32.6% in
2016. While taxes accounted for 82.9% of central-government revenue in 2014,
the share declined slightly to 82.7% in 2016. As a result, tax revenue totaled
17.7% of GDP in 2016.
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The taxation system can be divided into three categories: direct taxes such as the
individual-income tax and corporate-income tax; indirect taxes such as the value
added tax (VAT), the banking and insurance-transaction tax, the special
consumption tax, and the telecommunications tax; and other government
revenues drawn from factor incomes, social funds and privatization revenues. In
2016, individual-income tax rates varied from 15% to 35%. The standard
corporate tax rate is 20%, while capital gains are usually treated as regular
income and taxed accordingly.
Biased toward indirect taxes, Turkey’s taxation system does not take into
consideration horizontal or vertical equity. This gives the government more
flexibility to react to changes in Turkey’s highly dynamic and volatile economy,
but at the same time decreases fiscal stability and political credibility,
particularly concerning the special consumption tax. In 2016, 69.6% of total tax
revenues were derived from indirect taxes.
Budgets
Budgetary Policy
Score: 8
General government revenue increased from 31.9% of GDP in 2014 to 32.2% of
GDP in 2015 and to 32.6% of GDP in 2016. Total general government
expenditures as a share of GDP increased from 33.3% in 2014 to 33.4% in 2015
and to 34.9% in 2016. After the failed coup attempt the government adopted an
expansionary fiscal policy approach. During 2016 central government
expenditures grew by 15.4% due to increases in wages, transfers, and purchases
of goods and services. Though a fall in capital spending and interest
expenditures as a share of GDP helped to contain the increase in total
expenditures.
During the first three months of 2017, the discretionary funds available to the
prime minister and the president almost doubled. In 2016, the IMF had
emphasized the need to enhance fiscal risk management. Due to the
fragmentation of the legal and oversight framework for public-private
partnerships (PPP), contingent liabilities have increased due to the government’s
continued reliance on PPPs for infrastructure investments.
In August 2016, the Turkey Wealth Fund (Türkiye Varlık Fonu), a sovereign
wealth fund owned by the government, was established by Law 6741. The fund
is operated under the Strategic Investment Plan, which is approved by the
cabinet. The fund was initially allocated TRY 50 million from the reserves of
the Privatization Fund and the Directorate of the Privatization Administration
(Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı). In February 2017, the fund also received all
the state-owned shares of T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş., Boru Hatları ile Petrol
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Taşıma A.Ş. (BOTAŞ), Türkiye Petrolleri A.O. (TPAO), Posta ve Telgraf
Teşkilatı A.Ş. (PTT), Borsa Istanbul A.Ş. (BIST) and Türksat Uydu Haberleşme
Kablo TV ve İşletme A.Ş., as well as the state’s 49.12% share in Türk Hava
Yolları A.O. (Turkish Airlines), 51.11% share in Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş.,
49% share in Türkiye Denizcilik işletmeleri A.Ş. and 6.68% share in Türk
Telekomünikasyon A.Ş. In addition, the fund received the licensing rights of
Milli Piyango Genel Müdürlüğü for games of chance and the licensing rights for
horse races (for 49 years each, starting from 1 January 2018). The fund received
ownership of land in Antalya, Aydın, İstanbul, Isparta, İzmir, Kayseri and
Muğla, which were previously owned by the Treasury of Turkey. By the end of
2017, the fund managed approximately $40 billion in assets.
So far, the transfer of discretionary funds to the presidency and the Turkey
Wealth Fund has not affected the government’s budget. Furthermore, given that
the presidency and Turkey Wealth Fund – despite concerns over
nontransparency and misuse of funds – can contribute to Turkey’s economy by
enhancing budgetary flexibility, the impact of both moves on the economy’s
sustainability remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, as a result of the above developments, the budget-deficit-to-GDP
ratio declined from 1.4% in 2014 to 1.3% in 2015, but jumped to 2.3% in 2016
as a result of fiscal stimulus measures introduced after the failed coup attempt.
At the end of 2014, gross public debt totaled 28.7% of GDP, while the gross
public-debt-to-GDP ratio amounted to 27.5% in 2015 and increased to 28.1% in
2016.
Citation:
International Monetary Fund (2016) ‘Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV Consultation,’ Washington D.C.:
IMF.
Yegin Çiftçi Attorney Partnership (2017) ‘Turkey Joins The Rest Of G20 By Establishing Its Sovereign
Wealth Fund,’ Briefing Note, Istanbul, http://www.yeginciftci.av.tr/content/site-ycap/en/publications/TurkeyJoins-The-Rest-Of-G20-by-establishing-its-sovereing-wealthfund/_jcr_content/parsys_article/download/file.res/TURKEY%20JOINS%20THE%20REST%20OF%20G20
%20BY%20ESTABLISHING%20ITS%20SOVEREIGN%20WEALTH%20FUND.pdf
Research and Innovation
R&I Policy
Score: 4
During the review period, the government continued to strengthen the country’s
research and innovation capacity. The Scientific and Technological Research
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) is the leading agency for management, funding
and conduct of research in Turkey. Yet, within university and private sector-led
R&D, human resources, capacities and qualifications lack the necessary
incentives to grow and develop.
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According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, total R&D spending by the public
and private sectors as a fraction of GDP in 2014 was 1.01% and in 2015 the
share was 1.06%. Commercial enterprises account for the largest share of R&D
expenditures, at 50%. While universities accounted for 39.7% of spending on
R&D, public institutions’ share was 10.3%. In terms of financial contributions
to R&D projects, commercial enterprises have the largest share with 50.6%,
followed by public institutions with 27.9%, universities with 18.3% and other
sources 3.2% of R&D. In terms of full-time employment, 190,784 people
worked in the R&D sector in 2015, an increase of 5.1% compared with the
previous year. The private sector employed 26.8% of R&D personnel, while
69.5% worked at universities and public institutions employed 3.7% of R&D
personnel.
In 2013, Turkey adopted the Tenth Development Plan, covering the period
2014-18, aiming to improve science, technology and innovation, as one of the
building blocks for innovative production and steady growth. In Turkey, the
Supreme Council for Science and Technology (SCST) is the highest-ranking
science and technology policymaking body in Turkey. In the last few SCST
meetings, emphasis was placed on intensifying R&D efforts in the energy,
health and biotechnology sectors, providing subsidies to R&D laboratories of
multinational enterprises.
Global Financial System
Stabilizing
Global Financial
Markets
Score: 7
Turkey has actively contributed to the work of the Group of Twenty (G-20), the
international forum comprising the world’s 20 leading industrialized and
emerging economies. One of Turkey’s key priorities for its presidency of the G20 in 2015 had been to promote inclusive economic growth globally. During
Turkey’s presidency, the G-20 agreed to reduce youth unemployment by 15%
by 2025, adopted a set of policy recommendations to reduce inequality and
established Women-20 (W20) as a stand-alone engagement group to promote
gender-inclusive economic growth. In addition, the G-20 adopted a framework
at the G-20 leaders’ summit in Antalya to strengthen dialogue between the G-20
and low-income developing countries. Turkey’s G-20 presidency also brought
global peace and security issues to the agenda, as these issues are closely related
to sustainable and inclusive economic growth.
Citation:
G20 country report, Turkey 2017, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Downloads/G20Dokumente/Hamburg _Wachstumsstrategien/TUR-Growth-Strategy.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
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II. Social Policies
Education
Education Policy
Score: 3
Over the years, Turkey has made significant progress in increasing access to
education. In the 2014 – 2015 school year, Turkey achieved almost universal
primary school enrollment. Secondary-school enrollment was 79.4% during the
same year. The government is actively seeking to expand secondary-school
enrollment to comply with the new “4+4+4” law on education. The genderbased enrollment gap has nearly disappeared for primary education and has
narrowed significantly for secondary education. However, Turkey ranked 101
out of 144 countries for educational attainment in the 2017 Gender Gap Report.
The report indicated that 92.6% of women and 98.6% of men are literate, the
enrollment rate in primary education is 93.7% for women and 94.6% for men,
the enrollment rate in secondary education is 85.5% for women and 87.2% for
men, and the enrollment rate in tertiary education is 88.3% for women and
101% for men. Furthermore, pre-primary education (i.e., three to five year olds)
and higher education enrollment rates are increasing rapidly
Regarding the quality of education, the Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) 2015 scored Turkey’s performance relatively low. Although
Turkey’s scores have improved significantly over time and inequality in student
performance has declined, the performance of an average 15 year old in Turkey
for reading, mathematics and science is not satisfactory. According to PISA
results, 31.2% of Turkish students underperformed in mathematics, sciences and
reading. Turkey scored 420 points on the math test and ranked 49 out of 72
countries. Turkey ranked 52 in science and 50 in reading out of 72 countries.
PISA 2015 results indicate that a large percentage of students in Turkey cannot
understand what they are reading.
As the government seeks to improve the quality of education, education
spending has become the largest item in the national budget. Expenditure on
education now accounts for nearly a quarter of government revenue. The
proportion of GDP allocated to education from the government budget has
increased significantly, from 2.5% in 2000 to 4.9% in 2014. Also, in the
aftermath of the failed 2016 coup attempt and the subsequent state of emergency
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period, thousands of teachers, especially in Turkey’s southeastern regions have
been dismissed due to alleged links to terrorist organizations. Furthermore,
schools, universities, student dormitories, foundations, centers and nongovernmental organizations have been shut down and assets have been seized.
The government plans to hire new staff to fill the gaps.
Despite announcements on the issue, the government continued to refrain from
strengthening universities’ autonomy, and the universities’ ability to act
autonomously further deteriorated after the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016.
The aftermath of the failed coup attempt had severe impact on academic
freedoms. During this period according to Commissioner for Human Rights of
the Council of Europe a very large number of academics were dismissed
through appended lists in emergency decrees, without any due process and with
no judicial remedy.
Citation:
Commissioner for Human Rights (2017) ‘Human Rights in Turkey – The Urgent Need for a New Beginning’,’
Council of Europe (March 10 2017).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) ‘Turkey’ in Education at a Glance 2017,
OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris: OECD
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) ‘PISA 2015 Key Findings for Turkey,’
Paris: OECD
World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2017, Geneva.
Social Inclusion
Social Inclusion
Policy
Score: 5
Despite a decline in Turkey’s Gini coefficient from 40.3 in 2006 to 39.6 in 2016,
income distribution in Turkey continues to be among the OECD’s most unequal.
According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the fifth income quintile accounted
for 47.2% of income in 2016, while the first income quintile accounted for only
6.2%. According to the World Bank (2017), poverty continues to decrease but at
a slower rate than before the 2009 global economic crisis. The proportion of the
population living below the poverty line (i.e., $5.5 a day in 2011 at purchasing
power parity) fell to a low of 10.5% in 2016 from 27.3% a decade earlier.
Poverty in Turkey is particularly prevalent among people with lower educational
attainment, workers in the informal sector, unpaid family carers and
homemakers, rural populations and the elderly. The World Bank estimated that
the poverty rate will decline to 9.3% in 2017 and to 8.9% in 2018.
The government has developed an integrated social-assistance system geared
toward helping welfare recipients get out of poverty. Since 2011 responsibility
for all central government social-assistance benefits has been combined under
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the new Ministry of Family and Social Policies. This ministry has worked to
strengthen social inclusion. The government has been implementing an
Integrated Social-Assistance Information System, using a single proxy means
test to target benefits more effectively. Links between the social-assistance
system and active labor market policies implemented by ISKUR are being
strengthened. According to the World Bank (2017), poverty reduction has been
driven by the availability of more and better-paid jobs, with social transfers
playing a minor role.
The refugee crisis created an extra burden on the government’s efforts to
improve the quality of social inclusion. Local governments and several civil
society organizations share this burden on ad hoc manner.
Citation:
World Bank (2017) ‘Country Snapshot,’ Washington D.C.
Health
Health Policy
Score: 7
The 2003 Health Transformation Program has produced significant
improvements in Turkey’s health care system in terms of access, insurance
coverage and services. As a result, the health status of Turkey’s population has
improved significantly. In particular, the maternal mortality rate fell from 28.5
deaths per 100,000 live births in 2005 to 16 deaths a decade later. There has also
been a sharp decline in infant mortality from 20.3 deaths per 1,000 live births in
2005 to 11 in 2016. As a result, Turkey has met its Millennium Development
Goal target on both counts.
Recently, new legislation was introduced restructuring the Ministry of Health
and its subordinate units, while enhancing its role in health-system policy
development, planning, monitoring and evaluation. A new public health
institution has been established to support the work of the Ministry of Health in
the area of preventive health care services.
By 2014, Turkey had achieved near-universal health-insurance coverage,
increasing financial security and improving equity in access to health care
nationwide. The scope of the vaccination program has been broadened; the
scope of newborn screening and support programs have been extended;
community-based mental-health services have been created; and cancer
screening centers offering free services have been established in many cities.
The key challenge in health care is to keep costs under control as demand for
health care increases, the population ages and new technologies are introduced.
Total health expenditure as a share of GDP has been increasing steadily since
SGI 2018 | 16
Turkey Report
2003, reaching 5.4% in 2015. In 2015, 78% of this spending was funded by
public sources, as compared to a 62% public share in 2000.
Citation:
Ministry of Health (2016) ‘Sağlık İstatistikleri Yıllığı 2015,’ Ankara
World Health Organization (2017) ‘Turkey: WHO Statistical Profile’, Geneva.
Families
Family Policy
Score: 4
In July 2016, there were 39.8 million women in Turkey. Furthermore, there
were 10.4 million women in the labor force (women 15 years and older),
including 8.9 million employed women and 1.5 million unemployed women.
The labor force participation rate for women was 34.3%, the employment rate
for women was 29.3% and the unemployment rate was 14.6%. The labor force
participation rate of women in Turkey remains low, far below the EU average.
In July 2017, of women in the labor force, 53.4% were employed in the service
sector, 31.5% in agriculture, 14% in industry and 1% in construction sector. Of
working women, 47% were not registered with any social security institution,
with significant sectoral and regional disparities.
Several national and local-level initiatives in recent years have ostensibly been
aimed at helping women become more employable, helping them find more and
higher-quality jobs, and in general helping to remove obstacles to their
participation in the workforce. However, there have been many shortcomings in
the implementation and proper monitoring of these policies.
In general, the government’s conservative stance on women and family affairs
(e.g., concerning the number of children, or women’s roles) has provoked
ongoing public debate on gender equality in the labor market and public life
more generally.
Pensions
Pension Policy
Score: 5
In 2001, Turkey’s pension system was reformed with the enactment of Law
4632. The law allowed insurance companies to offer individual retirement plans.
This transformed the single-component pension system into a two-component
system, with one compulsory component and one optional component. While
the compulsory component consisted of a pay-as-you-go statutory public
pension scheme, the voluntary component consisted of a voluntary funded
individual pension scheme.
The World Bank (2016) noted that pension spending in Turkey, around 7% of
GDP, is modest in comparison to high-income OECD countries. This low
SGI 2018 | 17
Turkey Report
spending reflects Turkey’s relatively young population. Furthermore, due to the
system’s high dependency ratio and generous eligibility rules, more than half the
country’s pension spending is financed through budget transfers. A 2008 reform
adjusted pension parameters, gradually increasing the retirement age and
contribution period, and reducing the accrual rate. Though these adjustments
will be phased in over several decades, too slowly to counter the effects of
expanding coverage and a maturing population. For this reason, pension-system
deficits are expected to remain around 3% of GDP until the middle of the
century.
Law 6327 enacted in June 2012 aimed to encourage more working people to
purchase complementary pension plans. The law stipulated that the state would
match 25% of all contributions (premiums) paid by individuals to governmentrecognized pension schemes, starting in January 2013 (up to the annual pre-tax
monthly minimum wage). The reform aimed at extending coverage and making
the system more progressive, which should make investing in a pension scheme
more attractive to workers.
Most recently, the government introduced Law 6740 to boost total savings in the
economy. The law was enacted in August 2016 and took effect in January 2017.
Under the law, all public and private sector employees under 45 years old will
be automatically assigned to an individual pension plan. Employees will start
making contributions to the plan at the minimum rate of 3% of their taxable
earnings, unless they request to opt out within two months of their automatic
enrollment. The government will match 25% of employees’ contributions to
their private pension fund. In case the employee stays in the plan, another oneoff state subsidy of TYR 1,000 will be provided.
Citation:
World Bank (2016) “World Bank Group – Turkey Partnership – Country Program Snapshot, Washington D.C.
Integration
Integration Policy
Score: 7
Turkey’s new Law on Foreigners and International Protection took effect in
April 2014. On the same date, the General Directorate for Migration
Management officially took on responsibility for implementing the law with a
view to bringing Turkey in line with European Union and international
standards.
Turkey is increasingly becoming a country of destination for regular migration.
At the same time, it also remains a notable transit and destination country for
irregular migration. The civil war in Syria which started in 2011 is placing a
heavy burden on the Turkish economy. It is estimated that about 3.5 million
SGI 2018 | 18
Turkey Report
Syrian refugees, 100,000 Iraqi refugees and more than 50,000 Afghan refugees
are in Turkey. Key development needs for the refugees relate to education,
housing and employment. Turkey hosts a large number of refugees in refugee
camps equipped with schooling, health care and social services, while nearly
60% of refugees live in cities. In February 2017, the Minister of Interior Affairs
stated that Turkey had spent over €22.5 billion since the beginning of the Syrian
civil war on health care, education, nutrition, and social and other services for
refugees.
In an effort to manage the influx of refugees into Europe, the European Union
negotiated a deal with Turkey in November 2015. The European Union offered
Turkey up to €3 billion in aid, and the prospect of easier travel visas and
renewed EU accession talks in return for its support in stemming the flow of
refugees to Europe. As part of European Union’s financial assistance to Turkey
under the “Facility for Refugees in Turkey,” €1.2 billion was contracted to
various U.N. agencies and international organizations – with the participation of
Turkish civil society organizations – to support education, health care,
socioeconomic and municipal infrastructure projects.
Citation:
EU Commission: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the
Council.
Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2017) 470
final, Brussels, 6.9.2017.
Murat Erdoğan, Syrische Flüchtlinge in der Türkei, Juni 2017, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_49510-1522-1-30.pdf?170710142819.
Safe Living
Safe Living
Conditions
Score: 3
In a 2014 OECD survey, 62% of Turkish respondents stated that they felt safe
walking alone at night, slightly lower than the OECD average of 69%.
Furthermore, 76% of respondents to the TUIK 2016 Life Satisfaction Survey
expressed satisfaction with Turkey’s security services. However, the World
Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016 ranked Turkey 98 out of 112 countries
in terms of order and security as a factor of rule of law. The rule of law in
Turkey has deteriorated in recent years due to the increasing threat of terrorism
and extremism, the failed coup attempt and the government’s use of state of
emergency powers. Crime is poorly controlled, and instances of terrorism and
violence, including intimidation and muggings, are increasing.
Since the beginning of 2015, homicides – particularly murders of women (honor
crimes) – have increased. Between January and November 2017 , 365 women
were killed by a man (e.g., a husband or lover).
SGI 2018 | 19
Turkey Report
The General Directorate of Security was allocated €4.8 billion in 2016 of which
80% was spent on personnel. About €4.6 billion was spent on public order and
security. There are approximately 319 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants.
During the review period, 22,987 police officers were dismissed within the
scope of FETO operations. The Turkish National Police (TNP) collaborates
extensively with domestic partners and international organizations, such as
INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SECI, AGIT, BM, CEPOL and FRONTEX.
Moreover, the TNP has introduced an e-government infrastructure in many
divisions and initiated several projects intended to bring operations into
harmony with the EU acquis communautaire. Several projects were also
initiated by the directorate, such as the Security Department Law Enforcement
Services, Missing Person Alarm System, Media Monitoring System and Urban
Security Management System. The failed coup attempt in July 2016 and the lack
of sufficient personnel prevented several departments from achieving their
performance indicators.
In 2010, the Under-Secretariat of Public Order and Safety was established to
develop policies and strategies to combat terrorism, and to coordinate between
relevant institutions and agencies. As of 2015, 97 personnel were employed by
the under-secretariat. The under-secretariat has undertaken several national and
international activities and surveys, and analyzed policy options for resolving
the Kurdish issue. The number of special security service companies reached
1,405 in 2016 and 256,000 people were employed in this sector.
Many observers argue that Turkey needs a holistic, integrated and wellcoordinated and centralized domestic security policy. This need, however, is
challenged by the subsequent state of emergency and dismissal of thousands of
staff in the security apparatus following the July 2016 failed coup attempt.
Citation:
OECD Better Life Index Edition 2015, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=BLI, (accessed 27
October2015)
Yaşam Memnuniyeti Araştırması, 2016, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=24641 (accessed 1
November 2017).
World
Justice
Project,
Rule
of
Law
Index
2016,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital_0.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)
T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü 2016 Mali Yılı Faaliyet Raporu,
https://www.egm.gov.tr/Documents/EGM2016FaaliyetRaporu.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı 2015 Yılı Performans Programı,
http://www.kdgm.gov.tr/snetix/solutions/kdgm/resources/uploads/2015%20PERFORMANS%20PROGRAMI.
pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Şiddetten Ölen Kadınlar İçin Dijital Sayaç, http://www.anitsayac.com/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Bilal Akyüz, Türkiye’de İç Güvenlik Algısının Değiştirilmesi: İç Güvenlik Teşkilatı’na Yönelik Yeni
Yapılanma Modeli, The Journal of Defense Sciences, May 2015, 14 (1): 65-87.
http://www.kho.edu.tr/akademik/enstitu/savben_dergi/141/4.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/365-women-killed-in-turkey-in-first-11-months-of-2017-report-124209
SGI 2018 | 20
Turkey Report
Global Inequalities
Global Social
Policy
Score: 6
During the period under review, Turkey used development assistance to advance
social inclusion and development beyond its borders. The government expanded
its annual official development assistance (ODA) disbursements considerably
from $967 million in 2010 to $6.2 billion in 2016. Turkey, thus, has become one
of the leading countries in humanitarian assistance in the world.
Turkey’s development cooperation is provided in line with the Statutory Decree
on the Organization and Duties of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination
Agency (TIKA). TIKA designs and coordinates Turkey’s bilateral development
cooperation activities and implements projects in collaboration with other
ministries, NGOs and private sector partners. In 2015, Turkey provided the
largest share of its bilateral development cooperation to Syria, Somalia,
Kyrgyzstan, Albania and Afghanistan. The main sectors for Turkey’s bilateral
development cooperation were humanitarian aid and refugee support,
governance and civil society, education, health care and population.
III. Enviroment al Policies
Environment
Environmental
Policy
Score: 4
Sustainable development policies gained in importance in Turkey as part of the
EU accession process, which involved the country taking steps forward in
environmental policy and legislation. The environmental chapter (Chapter 27) of
the EU acquis was opened in 2009. In terms of environmental impact
assessments, Turkey is generally in line with EU environmental legislation. In
recent years, considerable progress has been made toward establishing
emissions controls, the use of renewable energies and promoting energy
efficiency. In the 2016 Environmental Performance Index, Turkey was ranked
99 out of 180 countries. In the 2017 Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI),
Turkey was described as showing “very poor performance” and was ranked 51
out of 61 countries falling one position compared to the previous year.
Turkey adopted the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II) in
December 2015. Thus, budget implementation tasks for IPA funds’
management, including environment and climate action, have been assigned. In
April 2016, Turkey joined the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. However, it has
not yet connected to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism’s common emergency
communication and information system. Court decisions related to the
SGI 2018 | 21
Turkey Report
environment are not in harmony with the Aarhus Convention. Also, the Strategic
Environmental Assessments Directive is still pending. Recently, the government
decided that environmental impact assessments would not be considered for
strategically important investment projects from September 2016. This will have
a negative impact on acquis implementation. Finally, Turkey has signed, ratified
and is fulfilling its commitments under the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change.
Progress has also been made in terms of regulating air quality and industrial
pollution, though it will take time and considerable funding to fully implement
this legislation. On 2 April 2015, the Turkish Ministry of Environment and
Urban Planning adopted a new regulation on waste management based on the
EU Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC).
The framework legislation on nature protection and the national biodiversity
strategy and action plan have not been adopted, and there are legal
shortcomings, not in line with the acquis, in relation to wetlands, forests and
natural sites. Areas such as industrial pollution and risk management, chemicals
and noise need either effective regulation in line with international standards or
effective implementation.
Citation:
European Environment Agency (2017) ‘Turkey Country Briefing – The European Environment – State and
Outlook,’ Kobenhavn.
German Watch and Climate Action Network (2017) ‘Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2017,’
Bonn.
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization (2016) ‘State of Environment Report for Republic of Turkey,’
Ankara.
Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy and Center for International Earth Science Information Network
(Columbia University) Global Metrics for the Environment: 2017 Report, New Haven. CT: Yale University.
New
Global Environment al Protection
Global
Environmental
Policy
Score: 5
As a member of the OECD and the G-20, and as an EU accession candidate,
Turkey has set sustainable-development targets. These are also a main concern
of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Turkey’s Climate Change Action Plan
2011 – 2023 stresses its adherence to international commitments, standards and
measures and foresees increasing cooperation with international actors,
especially in the fields of combating climate change and improving energy
efficiency, along with an active role in international activities more generally.
The Turkish government planned to include climate change in its G-20
SGI 2018 | 22
Turkey Report
presidency agenda and send a strong message from the G-20 Antalya summit to
the Paris summit on climate change. Although this intention was overshadowed
by the Paris terrorist attacks, Turkey was able to push several issues forward
through its G-20 presidency. These include the G-20 Principles on Energy
Collaboration (established in 2012), which recognize the need to support the
global poor through improving access to energy, energy efficiency, renewable
energy, market transparency, and the rationalization and phase-out of inefficient
fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption. As a result, the G-20
Ministers of Energy adopted the G-20 Toolkit of Voluntary Options on
Renewable Energy Deployment and the G-20 Energy Access Action Plan, the
Voluntary Collaboration on Energy Access.
Turkish reservations based on national concerns complicated negotiations of the
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, which entered into force on 4 November
2016 after 55 Parties to the Convention joined the agreement. The Turkish
Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning signed the Paris Agreement in
New York, and the Agreement was ratified by Turkey on 22 April 2016. So far,
policy changes that would implement the necessary reforms and strengthen
environmental sustainability in Turkey remain superficial.
Citation:
Republic
of
Turkey,
Climate
Change
Action
Plan
http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/iklim/editordosya/IDEP_ENG.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
2011-2023,
Ümit Şahin (2016), Warming a Frozen Policy: Challenges to Turkey’s Climate Politics after Paris, Turkish
Policy Quarterly, Volume 15 Number 2, pp. 116-129.
SGI 2018 | 23
Turkey Report
Qualit y of Democracy
Electoral Processes
Candidacy
Procedures
Score: 7
The Turkish constitution, Law 298 on the basic principles of elections and the
electoral registry, Law 2839 on deputies’ elections, and Law 2972 on localadministration elections lay the legal groundwork for fair and orderly elections
and prevent discrimination against any political party or candidate. However,
the relative freedom given to each political party’s central executive committee
in determining party candidates (by Law 2820 on political parties, Article 37)
renders the candidate-nomination process rather centralized, anti-democratic and
exclusionary. The parliament weakened the centralization of political parties’
leadership to some extent in 2014 with the passage of a law permitting coleadership structures. However, administrative courts and the Council of State
stopped these practices.
The nationwide 10% electoral threshold for parliamentary elections (Law 2839
on deputies’ elections, Article 33) is a major obstacle for all small political
parties. In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found the 10%
electoral threshold to be excessive, but not in violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR) Protocol 1 Article 3. As of November
2015, there were 100 registered political parties, although only 20 participated in
the 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections, and 16 in the subsequent 1 November
2015 elections. The share of the representation of valid votes rose to 92% during
the last two parliamentary elections. Parties’ executive boards typically
determine their parties’ candidate lists, with the exception of the Republican
People’s Party, which holds a primary-election vote. An independent candidate
who secures a majority of votes in his or her electoral district is allowed to take
a parliamentary seat without regard to the nationwide threshold.
According to the constitutional amendments of 2017 (Article 101/3), political
parties that either individually or as a coalition gained at least 5% of the total
votes in the last parliamentary election can nominate a presidential candidate. In
addition, independents can run as a presidential candidate if they collect at least
100,000 signatures certified by a public notary, which creates a financial
obstacle for candidates. It is not yet clear whether a notarization for each
signature will be required. However, if a notary is required, the cost of
SGI 2018 | 24
Turkey Report
collecting 100,000 signatures to the candidate is likely to be around TYR 15
million (€3.3 million).
Presidential candidates are not asked to pay a nomination fee; however, political
parties require parliamentary candidates to pay a fee ranging from €185 to
€2,800. Women candidates are generally asked to pay half or less of the fee
required from male candidates. Most political parties do not ask for a
nomination fee from disabled candidates. Independent candidates face greater
obstacles, as they must submit a nomination petition along with a fee of about
€3,279 (TRY 10,167). This fee is held by the revenue department of the
provincial election board where the candidate is standing for election. If the
independent candidate fails to be elected, this fee is registered as revenue by the
Treasury.
Citation:
Gençkaya, Ömer Faruk, Umut Gündüz and Damla Cihangir-Tetik, Political Finance and Transparency
İstanbul:
Transparency
International
Turkey
Chapter,
2016.
http://www.seffaflik.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Siyasetin-Finansman%C4%B1-EN.pdf (accessed 16 January 2016)
Supreme
Board
of
Election,
Decision
3237,
12
July
2014,
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/Kararlar/2014-3237.pdf
(accessed 5 November 2014)
Supreme
Board
of
Election,
Decision
543,
12
November
2013,
http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/Kararlar/2013Pdf/2013-543.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, INTERIM REPORT 28 September – 21 October
2015, 23 October 2015, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/194216?download=true (accessed 27
October 2015)
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 14
– 17 April, 27 April 2015, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/153211?download=true (accessed 27
October 2015)
“100
bin
oyla
adaylık
için
dudak
uçuklatan
noter
faturası,”
23
July
2017,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/787433/100_bin_oyla_adaylik_icin_dudak_ucuklatan_noter_fatur
asi.html
“Danıştay’dan
“eş
başkanlık”
uygulamasının
durdurulmasına
onay,”
23.03.2016,
http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1213998-danistaydan-es-baskanlik-uygulamasinin-durdurulmasinaonay
Media Access
Score: 1
According to Law 3984 on the establishment of radio and television enterprises
and broadcasts, “equality of opportunity shall be established among political
parties and democratic groups; broadcasts shall not be biased or partial;
broadcasts shall not violate the principles of election bans which are determined
at election times.” However, legislation regulating presidential elections and
referendums does not ensure equal access for political parties and candidates to
public and private media. The Supreme Board of Elections’ ability to sanction
electoral violations was repealed using the state of emergency decree issued in
January 2017.
Currently, most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned radio
and television company (TRT), are either directly or indirectly controlled by the
government, or self-censor. Privately owned media outlets face either judicial or
SGI 2018 | 25
Turkey Report
financial investigations, and media freedom is thus being placed at risk in an
unconstitutional manner.
During the April 2017 constitutional referendum, the “yes” campaign dominated
visual media coverage. Government members, and the Justice and Development
Party dominated 70% of all airtime taken by political groups. An independent
observer group reported that the president and government party appeared on
visual media for about 120,000 minutes, while the main opposition party
appeared for about 3,000 minutes. The HDP, pro-Kurdish party, did not appear
on any mainstream media channel. Restrictions on social media, violence
against journalists and media outlets have increased.
After the 15 July coup attempt, government control over “mainstream” media
and media critical of the government further increased. Large-scale lawsuits
were systematically used against media outlets critical of the government. The
visibility of opposition members in the news media gradually deteriorated. This
was felt most dramatically by HDP parliamentarians who faced allegations of
supporting terrorism and whose immunity was suspended in the months
following 15 July.
Citation:
Gençkaya, Ömer Faruk, Umut Gündüz and Damla Cihangir-Tetik, Political Finance and Transparency
İstanbul:
Transparency
International
Turkey
Chapter,
2016.
http://www.seffaflik.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Siyasetin-Finansman%C4%B1-EN.pdf. (accessed 16 January 2016)
Money,
Politics
and
Transparency,
Turkey
Report,
2015,
https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/TR/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
OSCE/ODIHR,Republic of Turkey Constitutional Referendum 16 April 2017, OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Referendum
Observation
Mission
Final
Report,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/324816?download=true (accessed 1 November 2017)
Bianet, “TV’de Referandum Dağılımı: Erdoğan 53 Saat, CHP 17 Saat, HDP 33 Dakika,”
https://bianet.org/bianet/medya/184761-tv-de-referandum-dagilimi-erdogan-53-saat-chp-17-saat-hdp-33dakika (accessed 1 November 2017)
OSCE/ODIHR, Republic of Turkey Presidential Election 10 August 2014 OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment
Mission Report, 7-9 May 2014, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/119439?download=true
Voting and
Registrations
Rights
Score: 6
All Turkish nationals over the age of 18 can exercise the right to vote
(Constitution, Article 67). The Supreme Election Board is the sole authority in
the administration of Turkish elections (Law 298, Article 10). The General
Directorate of the Electoral Registry, a part of the Supreme Election Board,
prepares, maintains and renews the nationwide electoral registry.
The ban on military students and conscripts, and the blanket restriction on
voting rights for prisoners are disproportionate and at odds with Turkey’s
international obligations (e.g., Turkey’s OSCE commitments). About 600,000
citizens were ineligible to vote in the 2017 referendum. Moreover, special
security zones were in place in a few provinces in the southeast of Turkey,
which affected about 700,000 voters.
SGI 2018 | 26
Turkey Report
In 2008, the parliament passed a law facilitating voting for Turkish citizens who
are not living or present in Turkey during elections (Law 5749). In the 2015
parliamentary elections, about 54 million voters were registered domestically,
along with an additional 2.8 million voters living abroad. More than one million
voters cast their votes abroad. The distance of polling stations from residents’
homes and the comparatively short voting period can be considered as
potentially major obstacles to voting.
Turkey has a passive electoral registration system maintained by the Supreme
Election Board. Despite the recent revision of the national electoral registry
based on an address-registration system, critics have noted that the number of
registered voters and the number of eligible citizens registered in the address
system do not match. In autumn 2015, these critics argued that about 672,000
citizens are missing from the electoral rolls. However, OSCE reports have
judged the registration process to be reliable and inclusive.
Parliamentary and local elections are conducted by local election boards under
the supervision of the Supreme Election Board. These local boards verify
election returns and conduct investigations of irregularities, complaints and
objections, with the national board providing a final check. Vote and Beyond
(Oy ve Ötesi), a non-governmental organization, reported no significant
violations of the law at the polling stations in 2015. Whether thousands of
citizens, who were detained following the failed coup attempt or had their
passports confiscated and cannot leave the country, will have their democratic
rights restricted remains to be seen.
Disabled voters sometimes face difficulties if the polling stations lack
appropriate access facilities.
Citation:
OSCE/ODIHR (2017) Republic of Turkey Constitutional Referendum 16 April 2017 OSCE/ODIHR Limited
Referendum
Observation
Mission
Final
Report,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/324816?download=true (accessed 1 November 2017)
OSCE/ODIHR (2015b) Republic of Turkey Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 November 2015. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited
Election
Observation
Mission
Final
Report,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/219201?download=true (accessed 27 October 2015)
OSCE/ODIHR (2015a) Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections, 7 June 2015 Limited Election
Observation Mission
Final Report, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/177926?download=true. (accessed 27 October 2015)
Temiz Seçim Platformu, 2007-2015 Seçim Hileleri Raporu, 1 Mayıs 2015, TUİK ile YSK’nın Türkiye
Listelerinin Karşılaştırılması, temizsecim.org/2007-2014-secim-hileleri-raporu.html (accessed 27 October
2015)
‘672 bin seçmen buharlaştı (672 thousand voters evaporated)’, Cumhuriyet daily newpaper, 3 October 2015,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/380955/672_bin_secmen_buharlasti.html (accessed 27 October
2015)
SGI 2018 | 27
Party Financing
Score: 4
Turkey Report
Article 60 of Law 2820 requires political-party organs at every level to keep a
membership register, a decision book, a register for incoming and outgoing
documents, an income and expenditure book, and an inventory list. According to
Article 73 of Law 2820, political parties must prepare yearly statements of
revenues and expenditures, at both the party-headquarters and provincial levels.
However, Turkish law does not regulate the financing of party or independentcandidate electoral campaigns. Presidential candidates’ campaign finances are
regulated by Law 6271; these candidates can legally accept contributions and
other aid only from natural persons having Turkish nationality. However, the
Supreme Election Board has allowed political parties to organize campaign
activities and purchase advertisements for their candidates in a way unregulated
by law. Thus, the state aid provided to the political parties can be used indirectly
for presidential-campaign activities.
There is no legal ceiling for campaign expenditures. The finances of candidates
in local and parliamentary elections are not regulated by law. There is no
specific reporting obligation for campaign contributors, apart from a general
requirement, based on the Tax Procedure Code, for individuals to declare
expenses (which could include political contributions) to the tax authorities.
Pursuant to Article 69 of the constitution, Article 74 of Law 2820 stipulates that
political-party finances must be audited by the Constitutional Court to verify
whether the parties’ property acquisitions, revenues and expenditures are in
compliance with the law. Auditing decisions by the Constitutional Court are
published in the Official Gazette. The review report of the Supreme Election
Board on presidential candidates’ campaigns must be announced within a month
of the audit’s completion. However, the law does not specify where the audit
result shall be announced.
The Constitutional Court, with the assistance of the Court of Accounts,
examines the accuracy of information contained in a party’s final accounts and
the legality of recorded revenues and expenditures on the basis of information at
hand and documents provided. However, the court’s examination of the main
parties’ accounts is slow and sometimes takes longer than three years. Law 2820
contains criminal, administrative and civil sanctions on political parties’
unlawful income or expenditures, with fines accruing to the state treasury.
Ceilings for donations to political parties by private individuals are evaluated
each year. This level was approximately €10,349 in 2017. However, donations
are often not properly or systematically recorded – for example, cash and inkind contributions or expenditures made in support of parties or candidates
during elections are not recorded. The funds collected and expenditures incurred
by individual elected representatives or candidates during political party
activities, including electoral campaigning, are not included in party accounts.
SGI 2018 | 28
Turkey Report
Party accounts published in the Official Gazette provide only general figures
and potential infringements. The accuracy of the financial reports posted by
political parties online needs to be examined. Critics have argued that
discretionary funds controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the
president were used for the incumbent party’s campaigns.
Citation:
GRECO, Third Evaluation Round Evaluation 3rd Interim Compliance Report on Turkey, 2 December 2016,
https://rm.coe.int/third-evaluation-round-third-interim-compliance-report-on-turkey-incri/168072247a
(accessed 1 November 2017)
Ö. Faruk Gençkaya, Umut Gündüz and Damla Cihangir-Tetik, Political Finance and Transparency İstanbul:
Transparency
International
Turkey
Chapter,
2016.
http://www.seffaflik.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Siyasetin-Finansman%C4%B1-EN.pdf. (accessed 16 January 2016)
Ö. Faruk Gençkaya, “Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Turkey,” S. ASayarı, P. AyanMusil and Ö. Demirkol, Party Politics in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective, Routledge, 2018.
Money,
Politics
and
Transparency,
Turkey
Report,
2015,
https://data.moneypoliticstransparency.org/countries/TR/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
OSCE/ODIHR (2015b) Republic of Turkey Early Parliamentary Elections, 1 November 2015. OSCE/ODIHR
Limited
Election
Observation
Mission
Final
Report,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/219201?download=true
OSCE/ODIHR (2015a) Republic of Turkey Parliamentary Elections, 7 June 2015 Limited Election
Observation Mission
Final Report, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/177926?download=true.
OSCE/ODIHR (2014), Republic of Turkey Presidential Election 10 August 2014 OSCE/ODIHR Needs
Assessment
Mission
Report,
7-9
May
2014,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/119439?download=true.
Popular DecisionMaking
Score: 2
According to Article 67 of the constitution, all citizens over 18 years old have
the right to take part in referendums. Referendums are held in accordance with
the principles of free, equal, secret and direct universal suffrage, with votes
counted publicly. In recent years, referendums were held to amend the 1982
constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 175 of the constitution reads that, if the
parliament adopts a draft constitutional amendment referred by the president by
a two-thirds majority, the president may submit the law to a referendum. Laws
related to constitutional amendments that are the subject of a referendum must
be supported by more than half of the valid votes cast in order to be approved.
If a law on an amendment to the constitution is adopted by at least a three-fifths
majority but less than a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of
the Grand National Assembly, and is not sent back to the Assembly for
reconsideration by the president, it is then published in the Official Gazette and
submitted to a referendum.
A law on a constitutional amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority of the
Assembly directly or upon the return of the law by the president may be
submitted to a referendum by the president.
Popular decision-making is also possible at the local level. Law 5593 on
municipalities (Article 76) enables city councils to implement policies for the
SGI 2018 | 29
Turkey Report
benefit of the public. Yet these units are not wholly effective, as they depend
upon the goodwill of the local mayor, and some councils exist on paper only and
have yet to be established in fact. Law 6360, in effect since 2014, paved the way
for more centralized decision-making processes, including in urban planning
and on local matters. Some municipalities conducted local referendums on
traffic management and environmental planning.
Turkey has not signed the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters (Aarhus Convention).
Citation:
Emine Behiye Karakitapoğlu, Public participation in EIA process of small hydro power plants (HES) in
Turkey, University of Uppsala, 2015.
Huseyin Gul / Hakan M. Kiris (2015), Democratic Governance Reforms in Turkey and Their Implications, in
Alexander R. Dawoody (ed.), Public Administration and Policy in the Middle East, New York, Heilderberg,
Dordrecht and London: Springer.
Semanur Karaman (2013), How do Turkish citizens participate in decision-making? 4 August 2013,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/semanur-karaman/how-do-turkish-citizens-participate-indecision-making
Access to Information
Media Freedom
Score: 1
Although Turkey has a somewhat diversified media structure, the government
places direct and indirect pressure on media owners in order to obtain coverage
favorable to the government party. Most critical private media groups have been
seized or turned into politically friendly trustees. The oligopolistic and progovernment ownership of media outlets, and self-censorship are the main factors
undermining media freedoms.
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of expression
are rarely upheld in practice. The current legal framework and practice are
restrictive and do not meet EU standards. The government appoints the general
director of the country’s public broadcaster, Turkish Radio and Television
(TRT). In doing so, it essentially exercises tutelage over the public-media
organization’s administration. Several TRT channels regularly broadcast progovernment programs, and invite experts allied with the government party to
appear on these programs.
Most concerning for many observers have been the unprecedented expansion in
the range of reasons given for journalists’ arrests, the massive phone-tapping
campaign and the contempt shown for source confidentiality. These factors have
in sum reintroduced a climate of intimidation with regard to the media.
Media freedom deteriorated dramatically in the aftermath of the July 2016 failed
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Turkey Report
coup attempt. The Venice Commission reported that the use of state of
emergency powers had violated media freedom. The Association of
Contemporary Journalists reported that in the year following the state of
emergency declaration on 20 July 2016, 318 members of the press were
detained, 103 members of the press were arrested, 18 journalists were attacked,
one journalist died, two online news sites were banned and 25 online news sites
were suspended. Furthermore, a total of 147 media outlets were closed down,
1,404 members of the press were dismissed, and 32 parliamentary access cards
and 624 yellow press cards were withdrawn. Thus, media pluralism was limited
to a handful of low-circulation publications. Several foreign journalists were
also detained or deported. Turkey ranked 155 out of 180 countries in the World
Press Freedom Index 2017.
Particularly, the aftermath of the 15 July coup attempt saw high numbers of
arrests, hearings, detentions, prosecutions, censorship cases and layoffs. A
number of physical attacks on media outlets and journalists took place. The
closure of media outlets, the appointment of trustees to control media groups,
and the active use of the tax authority, the financial crimes unit and courts
against critical media intensified.
Intimidating statements by politicians and lawsuits launched against journalists
critical of the government, combined with the media sector’s ownership
structure, have led to widespread self-censorship by media owners and
journalists. In some cases, journalists have simply been fired. The politicized
Radio and TV Supreme Council (RTÜK) has issued disproportionate fines to
pro-opposition media; however, after the 2015 parliamentary elections, the
Supreme Election Board asked the RTÜK to issue fines to media companies that
violated the election law.
Citation:
Venice Commission, “Turkey Government Memorandum on the Measures Taken Durıng the State of
Emergency
Relevant
to
the
Freedom
of
the
Media,”
22
February
2017,
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)010-e (accessed 1
November 2017)
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf (accessed 1 November
2016).
Reporters Without Borders, Turkey, https://rsf.org/en/turkey (accessed 1 November 2017)
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press2017 (accessed 1 November 2017)
‘FETÖ’ Gerekçeli OHAL’de Neler Kapatıldı? http://www.cgd.org.tr/index.php?Did=1016 (accessed 1
November 2017)
Bianet, Media Monitoring Report April-May-June 2017, https://bianet.org/english/media/188342-301journalists-face-4-260-years-in-prison-142-aggravated-lifetime (accessed 1 November 2017).
Aslı Tunç, “Media Ownership and Finances in Turkey Increasing Concentration and Clientelism” Accessed
June
15,
2016.
http://mediaobservatory.net/sites/default/files/Media%20Ownership%20and%20Finances%20in%20Turkey.pd
f
SGI 2018 | 31
Turkey Report
Media Pluralism
Score: 2
In addition to the increasing restrictions on media freedom in Turkey (see
“Media Freedom” section), the country’s dominant media structure features
ownership by industrial conglomerates, strong links between political forces and
media organizations, and a lack of unionization in the media (a so-called
Mediterranean or polarized pluralist media model). This undermines pluralism
in the media sector. Adopted in 2011, Law 6112 increased the maximum
allowable foreign-ownership stake in media companies from 25% to 50%, with
the condition that a single foreign investor cannot invest in more than two
enterprises. Foreign companies still cannot be majority stakeholders in domestic
media companies.
Several media outlets were sold to unknown owners, who are assumed to have
close government ties. Bianet Report found that media ownership lacks
transparency and no information is available about the concentration of media
ownership. Political control of the media, media financing and news agencies is
high. In October 2016, the Press Advertising Authority (BIK), which controls
the allocation of state advertising, adopted a new policy under which
newspapers whose ownership, management or employees face terrorism-related
charges cannot benefit from state advertising.
The economic interests of media owners constitutes a key problem for media
freedoms. Although Article 29 of Law 3984 restricts media owners’ shareholder
rights, owners with stakes in other business sectors have still used media
coverage to promote their outside business interests. A significant share of
media owners are industrial conglomerates with interests that conflict with
freedom of the press and opinion, and some have close relationships with the
government. This further undermines media independence, and increases selfcensorship and job insecurity among journalists. The number of outlets
belonging to the so-called pool media (Havuz Medyası) – media owned by
government-allied businesses which the government can use – has expanded.
Media Pluralism Report stated that the preselected media owners serve the
government. The government uses economic tools or seizes media outlets to
reconfigure the media environment. Dissident media outlets and critical
journalists regularly face attacks and sanctions.
Journalists living inside and outside Turkey have found ways to publish on
newly created news websites and portals. However, access to these websites
from within Turkey is censored by the authorities.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf (accessed 1 November
SGI 2018 | 32
Turkey Report
2016).
Media Pluralism Monitor Results 2016, Turkey, http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016results/turkey/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017, Turkey Country report, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedompress/2017/turkey (accessed 1 November 2017)
Bianet, Media Monitoring Report April-May-June 2017, https://bianet.org/konu/bia-media-monitoring-reportapril-may-june-2017 (accessed 1 November 2017).
Aslı Tunç, “Media Ownership and Finances in Turkey Increasing Concentration and Clientelism” Accessed
June 15, 2016. http://mediaobservatory.net/sites/default/files/Media%20Ownership%20and%20Financ
es%20in%20Turkey.pdf
Bianet,
Media
Ownership
Monitor
in
Turkey,
https://turkey.momrsf.org/tr/bulgular/gostergeler/#!255aab01a0f9f22f09246334c9edbfe8 (
Digital Transformations in Turkey: Current Perspectives in Communication Studies, Banu Akdenizli (ed.),
Lexington Books Lantam, Boulder, New York London, 2015.
Sabahattin Önkibar, İmamlar ve Haramiler Medyası, İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2015.
Access to
Government.
Information
Score: 4
According to Law 4982, citizens, noncitizens and foreign corporations have the
right of access to government information. However, many public records are
not included within the scope of the law, as there are exceptions for state secrets,
intelligence information, individual privacy and communication privacy. There
is no legislation on state and trade secrets, preventing effective use of access to
information. Most public offices have a department that deals with access to
information requests. These requests can be made in person or electronically.
Access to information rights and complaint mechanisms are not used effectively.
A total of 1.6 million applications for information based on Law 4982 were
submitted to public institutions in 2016. According to official information, 84%
of requests resulted in the full provision of the requested information, 7.2%
resulted in partial information or a negative response, and 8% were rejected. A
total of 6,924 applications were found to concern state secrets or private issues.
The government’s annual report on access to information requests does not
include details about the subject of the applications.
The Board of Review for Access to Information examines administrative
decisions rendered under articles 16 and 17 of the access to information law.
The board did not publish an annual report for 2015. As with other
administrative decisions, appeals can be made to an administrative court if
information requests are denied. A total of 622 information requests were
appealed in 2015. Although the number of applications decreased radically, the
number of “positive” responses from the relevant public bodies increased in
2015.
In addition to the right to petition (Law 3071), the Prime Minister’s
Communication Center has received public complaints, requests, denunciation
and opinions since 2006. The center received two million submissions in 2016.
Finally, under its state of emergency powers, the government passed laws by
SGI 2018 | 33
Turkey Report
executive decree without the need for parliamentary debate. This sidelining of
parliament and parliamentary deputies by the government exacerbated the
already limited access of citizens to political decision-making processes.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf (accessed 1 November
2016).
World
Justice
Project,
Rule
of
Law
Index
2016,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital _0.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı Basın, Yayın ve Halkla İlişkiler Başkanlığı Bilgi Edinme
Hakkının Kullanılması Bakımından 2016 Yılına İlişkin Değerlendirme,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/bilgiedinme/2016_raporu_baskanlik_aciklamasi.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığı, 2016 Yılı Bilgi Edinme Genel Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/bilgiedinme/2016_yili_degerlendirme_raporu.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017).
The Board of Review for Access to Information, Sample Decisions, http://www.bedk.gov.tr/Kararlar.aspx
Civil Rights and Political Liberties
Civil Rights
Score: 2
While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law, and
Article 12 enshrines fundamental rights and freedoms, concerns over
shortcomings in judicial proceedings remain, including limited access by
defense attorneys to prosecution files, lengthy pretrial detentions, and
excessively long and catch-all indictments. This relates especially to numerous
cases involving Kurdish activists, journalists, union members, students, military
officers, and policy and security personal being tried for alleged violations of the
Anti-Terror Law. Many such cases are considered by domestic and foreign
observers to be partly or even fully politically motivated. Fundamental rights
(e.g., freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and
right to privacy) are severely at danger. Improper influence over regulatory
enforcement is moderately high and respect for due process is declining. The
accessibility, affordability and effective enforcement of civil justice need to be
strengthened.
In the aftermath of the 15 July coup attempt, even more serious violations of
civil rights have occurred. Although the government claims it conducts the rules
of emergency government with utmost care, these practices are based on
executive decrees having the force of law and are not subject to judicial review.
Some decrees affected policy areas outside the scope of the state of emergency.
The institutionalized neglect of civil rights in Turkey are reflected in mass
arrests of alleged coup plotters and sympathizers, confiscation of their
properties, sentences against journalists and opposition politicians, renewed
violence in the southeast, widespread restrictions on freedom of expression,
association and assembly, a deteriorating judicial system, violence against
women and impaired relations with key international actors. In July 2017, the
State of Emergency Procedures Investigation Commission was established to
SGI 2018 | 34
Turkey Report
receive the complaints from people who have been affected by the ongoing state
of emergency. Over 100,000 people have submitted complaints to the
commission to date. It is expected that the commission will make its first
decisions in December 2017.
Political influence and pressure on the judiciary as well as allegations of
conspiring with Gülenist organizations has weakened the independence of the
judiciary as the sole guarantor for civil and political rights and liberties. The
Justice Minister’s right of veto, as ex officio President of the Council of Judges
and Prosecutors (HSK), continued to be a source of major concern. Despite the
reorganization of the judiciary, the court system does not work effectively.
Since September 2012, the Constitutional Court accepts individual petitions if
the right to a fair trial has been violated. Since September 2012, 1,314 violations
of the right to fair trial have been noted by the court. Article 148 of the
constitution states that anyone who believes his or her human or civil rights as
set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have been
infringed upon by a public authority has a right to apply to the Constitutional
Court, after exhausting other administrative and judicial remedies. The cost of
individual application was about €57.22 in 2017. Individual applications must
be filed within 30 days after the notification of the final proceeding that exhausts
other legal remedies. A total of 82 applications were made between January
2016 and November 2017. More than 16,000 applications were received by the
European Court of Human Rights between January and July 2017, and about
13,000 cases remain pending.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf (accessed 1 November
2016).
World
Justice
Project,
Rule
of
Law
Index
2016,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital _0.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)Anayasa Mahkemesi Bireysel Başvuru Kararları, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/icsayfalar/kararlar/kbb.html
(accessed 1 November 2017)
ECtHR, Press Country Profile Turkey,http://echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Turkey_ENG.pdf (accessed 1
November 2017)
T.C. Ministry of Justice (2014), Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR violations,
http://www.inhak.adalet.gov.tr/eng/announced/actionplan.pdf (accessed 10 December 2014)
The Ombudsman Institution (2014) ‘The Chief Ombudsman Annual Press Conference,’
http://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/en/content_detail-322-779-the-chief-ombudsman-annual-press-conference.html
(accessed 10 December 2014)
İnsan Hakları Kurulu Kararı, (Eşit Haklar İçin İzleme Derneği – Yüksek Seçim Kurulu), 25.06.2015,
http://www.tihk.gov.tr/www/files/13-Temmuz-YSK-karari.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
Political Liberties
Score: 3
Whereas the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion are generally
respected, official violations of the freedoms of expression and assembly occur,
particularly when criticism of the ruling government and its policies is involved.
Several key pieces of legislation adopted regarding the rule of law and
SGI 2018 | 35
Turkey Report
fundamental rights were not in line with European standards, such as the law on
data protection. The constitutional amendment to parliamentary immunities
adoption in May 2016 allowed lifting immunity for a large number of deputies,
and resulted in the detentions and arrests of several HDP members of
parliament, including the two co-chairs in November 2016. Following the 2015
parliamentary elections, a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue was replaced
by a “nationalist” anti-terror policy by the government.
A highly controversial Internal Security Law adopted in March 2015 granted the
police the power to detain a person caught in the act of committing a crime. A
person can be kept in custody for 24 hours without seeing a judge, and this
period can be extended to 48 hours if the police deem that a “collective crime”
has been committed. The police forces have been allowed to use firearms
against demonstrators, deepening fears of crackdowns on dissent ahead of
parliamentary elections. This law was considered a threat to the Turkish state’s
conflict-resolution negotiations with the PKK, and a means of attracting
nationalist votes for the AKP.
In the Penal Courts of Peace established in July 2014, single judges have the
authority to issue search warrants and approve detentions and the seizure of
property. Judges have been criticized for undermining the public’s trust in the
judiciary due to the arbitrary nature of their detainments, arrests and judgments.
The European Commission stated during the review period that the freedoms of
expression and assembly have become major shortcomings in Turkey.
Intimidation of journalists, up to and including physical attacks, has taken place.
The Commission advised Turkey to improve monitoring of the implementation
of the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations (adopted in March 2014).
The Commission’s 2016 Progress Report identified several major weaknesses,
including: the intimidation of and denial of accreditation to journalists; the
government’s blocking of websites with or without a court decision; the lack of
editorial independence within the public broadcast system, especially during the
elections; and media ownership transparency more generally. The number of
journalists in prison increased during the review period.
Although bans on social media imposed by the government in early 2014 were
subsequently lifted by the Constitutional Court, legal provisions limiting the free
use of the internet, presented as necessary for “national security and protection
of the public order,” have raised additional concerns. Wikipedia has been
suspended due to its anti-government content.
Human Rights Association of Turkey reported that the state of emergency has
exceeded its initial purpose and become a permanent practice. This violates
SGI 2018 | 36
Turkey Report
Turkey’s constitution (Article 15), the European Convention on Human Rights
(Article 15) and the U.N. Civil Code (Article 4). Laws passed by decree have
been used on almost every subject. In total, about 300 legislative changes have
been passed by decree. In an extensive report on Turkey’s state of emergency,
Common Platform for Human Rights identified 12 constitutional violations
between 21 July 2016 and 9 February 2017. All rules and practices related to
municipal bodies are regulated through Municipal Law 5393 (Articles 38, 39
and 40), which was amended by Decree 674. The number of municipalities to
which a trustee has been assigned has reached 80. A total of 320 refusal
decisions made by Administrative Courts across Turkey. The Constitutional
Court ruled that it is beyond its authority to review state of emergency decrees.
In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the government seized numerous Gülenist
companies and confiscated property worth nearly €10 billion.
The European Court of Human Rights declared 25,000 applications inadmissible
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. However, the European Court of
Human Rights’ decisions contradicted statements made by the Venice
Commission and the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe
concerning Turkey’s state of emergency. The Secretary-General of the Council
of Europe and the Venice Commission proposed creating an independent ad hoc
Turkish body to examine individual dismissed cases, subject to judicial review.
Subsequently, the Turkish government issued Decree 685 on 23 January 2017,
establishing a commission to review its state of emergency procedures. It is
expected that the commission will make its first decisions by the end of 2017.
Citation:
İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu, Fact Sheet State of Emergency Measures In Turkey, 23 February 2017,
https://bianet.org/english/politics/184123-21-statutory-decrees-under-state-of-emergency
World
Justice
Project,
Rule
of
Law
Index
2016,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital _0.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
Freedom
House,
Freedom
of
the
Press
2016,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FTOP_2016Report_Final_04232016.p
df
(accessed
1
November 2016)
Web Index Report 2014-2015, http://webfoundation.org/about/research/the-2014-15-web-index/ (accessed 27
October 2015)
Nondiscrimination
Score: 4
While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law,
irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion or religion, the political
reality in Turkey differs significantly from this constitutional ideal. The
executive’s political discourse discriminates and insults opposition groups,
including the CHP (the main opposition party), the HDP (the pro-Kurdish
party), journalists, academics and LGBT communities. Insulting the president is
a crime in Turkey punishable by up to four years in jail. In 2016, 4,936 cases
against people charged with “insulting” President Erdoğan were opened. The
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Turkey Report
courts convicted 1,080 of the defendants, acquitted 679 individuals and
suspended judgment in 867 other cases.
The Law on the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey provides a
positive development toward non-discrimination. Turkey did not ratify Protocol
12 of the ECHR providing a general prohibition of discrimination. The
definition of hate crime is excessively narrow, while the Criminal Code does not
explicitly provide that racist, homophobic or transphobic motivations constitute
an aggravating circumstance. Core elements of the anti-discrimination law are
not in line with recommendations from the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). Members of the Human Rights and Equality
Institution were selected by the Council of Ministers (eight members) and the
president (three members) in March 2017, only one member of the institution is
female.
The educational needs of refugee children, work permits for refugees and return
of displaced Kurds are major issues affecting the integration of disadvantage
groups. Although Turkey ratified the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,
gender-related violence, hate speech and discrimination against LGBT
communities are serious problems. LGBT communities do not have any legal
protections. The number of female victims of violence increased from 278 in
2016 to 293 in 2017. Physical attacks on non-Muslim residents were reported
during the period under review, and physical and verbal anti-Semitic assaults are
common in public. According to the Anti-Defamation League’s 2015 Global
Anti-Semitism Index, 71% of Turkey’s adult population is estimated to harbor
anti-Semitic attitudes – a slightly higher figure than for the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region overall.
A number of high court rulings remain unimplemented, including the European
Court of Human Rights’ December 2014 decision on cemevi (gathering places
for Alevi Muslims) as a place of worship and February 2015 rejection of
Turkey’s appeal on the issue of compulsory religious-education classes, as well
as the Turkish Court of Cassation’s August 2015 judgment on cemevi as
religious locations within the scope of the ECHR ruling. Some leading
politicians’ “uneven” treatment of the Alevis negatively affects the public
atmosphere.
The use of Kurdish and some other languages in formal education gradually
widened. However, investigations and detentions of Kurdish activists have
undermined efforts to find a workable solution to the Kurdish issue. The
government introduced a National Strategy and Action Plan for Roma people,
yet Roma continued to face discrimination in social and economic life.
SGI 2018 | 38
Turkey Report
Three years ago, the Ministry for Family and Social Policies adopted a national
action plan to combat violence against women. However, despite rising public
awareness, the incidence of violence against women in Turkey has undergone a
dramatic and rapid increase in the last decade. Even though a large number of
cases go officially unreported, women’s rights groups reported that 230 women
had been killed in 2016 as of mid-November. In some cases, courts have ruled
that “extenuating circumstances” existed for perpetrators of so-called honor
crimes. A 2014 Penal Code amendment expanding penalties for violence against
women was considered unsatisfactory by women’s rights associations. A
controversial amendment on victims of sexual abuse was submitted by a group
of AKP deputies in early November 2016, yet withdrawn by the Constitution
Commission following street protests. Gender discrimination and discrimination
against LGBTI in the workplace is widespread.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
Anti-Defamation League, Global 100, 2015 Update, http://global100.adl.org/#map/2015update (accessed 1
November 2016).
“Turkey withdraws child rape bill after strreet protests,” 22 November 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-38061785 (accessed 1 November 2016).
Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim Ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey (application no. 32093/10) ECHR 355 (2014),
02.12.2014,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-49521356065927&filename=003-4952135-6065927.pdf. (accessed 27 October 2015)
2015 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting Warsaw, 21 September – 2 October 2015,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/186991?download=true (accessed 27 October 2015)
Yargıtay’dan
cemevi
kararı,
Hürriyet
daily
newspaper,
17
August
2015,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yargitaydan-cemevi-karari-29834823. (accessed 27 October 2015)
COE
–
ECRI
Report
on
Turkey
(fifth
monitoring
cycle),
4
October
2016,
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/turkey/TUR-CbC-V-2016-037-ENG.pdf
(accessed 1 November 2017)
Şiddetten Ölen Kadınlar İçin Anıt Sayaç, http://anitsayac.com/?year=2017/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Totaliter Politikaları Eleştireyim Derken…,” 4 March 2017, https://m.bianet.org/biamag/toplum/184159totaliter-politikalari-elestireyim-derken (accessed 1 November 2017).
“1,080 convicted in Erdoğan ‘insult’ cases in Turkey last year,” Hürriyet Daily News, 28 June 2017,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/1080-convicted-in-erdogan-insult-cases-in-turkey-last-year-114850
(accessed 1 November 2016).Özgül Kaptan, A Decade of Violence against Women in Turkey, 15 September
2015, http://researchturkey.org/a-decade-of-violence-against-women-in-turkey/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Rule of Law
Legal Certainty
Score: 2
Several articles in the Turkish constitution ensure that the government and
administration act in accordance with legal provisions, and that citizens are
protected from the despotism of the state. Article 36 guarantees citizens the
freedom to claim rights, and Article 37 concedes the guarantee of lawful
judgment. According to Article 125, administrative procedures and actions are
subject to administrative review. In 2016, the Council of State, the country’s
SGI 2018 | 39
Turkey Report
highest administrative court, received more than 272,211 files and reviewed
135,741 cases. There is no available data about the average length of time spent
on each case or how many procedures and actions were annulled by
administrative courts.
The main factors affecting legal certainty in the administration are a lack of
regulations on particular issues, the misinterpretation of regulations by
administrative authorities (mainly on political grounds), and unconstitutional
regulations that are adopted by parliament or issued by the executive. In
addition, the high frequency of amendments to some basic laws under certain
circumstances lead to a lack of consistency. High-profile prosecutions can
follow unpredictable courses. For example, after prisoners associated with the
clandestine Ergenekon network were released, they were called back for a
retrial. Legal as well as judicial instruments are sometimes used against
government opponents, especially those in the media.
The 15 July failed coup attempt caused a major uncertainty in legal and practical
terms. The governmental decrees issued during the state of emergency are not
subject to judicial review. Moreover, at least 110,000 public servants mainly
from the military, judiciary, health sector and universities were dismissed. The
restructuring of the public service will take time and lead to further uncertainty,
especially given the need to harmonize the current legal framework and
constitutional amendments. More importantly, the government regulated some
public matters by the state of emergency decree instead of through legislation, as
is required by the constitution. During the review period, the practice of
detaining and releasing journalists and pro-Kurdish politicians without clear
legal cause became a regularity. The State of Emergency Procedures
Investigation Commission has been established and is expected to publicize its
decisions by the end of 2017.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
Yargı Reformu Strateji Belgesi 2015, http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yargi_reformu_stratejisi.pdf (accessed 27
October 2015)
‘Turksat to remove opposition channels,’ Broadband TV News, 23 October 2015,
http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2015/10/21/turksat-to-remove-opposition-channels/,
(accessed
13
November 2015)
Turkey’s economy tsar warns of deteriorating rule of law, Hürriyet Daily News, 14 May 2015,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-economy-tsar-warns-of-deteriorating-rule-oflaw.aspx?pageID=238&nID=82394&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 27 October 2015)
“1 yıla damga vuran 26 KHK,” 20 July 2017, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2017/07/20/1-yiladamga-vuran-26-khk/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
“TÜSİAD Başkanı Bilecik: OHAL’in mümkün olan en kısa sürede sonlandırılması önemlidir,” 5 February
2017,
https://www.ntv.com.tr/ekonomi/tusiad-baskani-bilecik-ohalin-mumkun-olan-en-kisa-suredesonlandirilmasi-onemli,qgu1SW97uUqtTBH4lthayg (accessed 1 November 2017)
SGI 2018 | 40
Judicial Review
Score: 3
Turkey Report
The constitution (Article 9) emphasizes judicial impartiality and independence.
Moreover, the constitution (Article 125) states that all government
administrative decisions and actions are subject to judicial review.
Developments during the review period demonstrated that the Constitutional
Court plays a vital role in safeguarding judicial review in Turkey.
According to the amended constitution (Article 105), a parliamentary
investigation can be opened against the president if an absolute majority in the
parliament votes that the president likely committed a crime. Criminal
investigations against the general chief of staff and other army commanders can
be initiated with the prime minister’s approval. Moreover, the trial of the undersecretary of the National Intelligence Service (MİT) is subject to the approval of
the president. Acts within the president’s area of competence, decisions of the
Supreme Military Council (excluding acts relating to promotion or retirement)
and decisions of the Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (except for
dismissals of public officials) are open to judicial review.
The Turkish judiciary is currently under severe pressure, given the substantial
increase in cases. The effectiveness of the judiciary in the aftermath of the
attempted coup was further compromised by the dismissal of 4,000 judges,
prosecutors and judicial staff. In order to fill the large number of vacancies in
the judiciary, the government launched 4,000 judges and 2,000 prosecutor
cadres in mid-2017. However, independent observers state that judicial
performance has been slowing down. In January 2017, the Court of Cassation
had 804,344 appeal files to be reviewed, while the Council of State had 32,298
first instance court files and 219,977 appeal files. Since 2015, no data about the
number of files before administrative courts has been available.
Judicial independence and impartiality has been undermined by the
contradictory and unclear court indictments concerning several prisoners. The
Cumhuriyet trial started on 11 September 2017, 300 days after executives and
journalists of the Cumhuriyet daily newspaper were detained. The judiciary
should be fair and neutral in politically oriented cases. However, since 2007,
politicization of the judiciary has been increasing. Criminal investigations are
not conducted effectively. Prosecutors’ indictments do not provide concrete,
reliable and objective documentation. Delays and postponements in trials are
unreasonably widespread. Finally, courts are known to unfairly discriminate.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Turkey Opinion on the
Amendments to the Constitution Adopted By the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to Be
Submitted
to
A
National
Referendum
on
16
April
2017,
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2017)00 5-e (1 November 2017)
SGI 2018 | 41
Turkey Report
World
Justice
Project,
Rule
of
Law
Index
2016,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital _0.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)
WEF, The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, 2017, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR20172018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf (accessed 1 November
2017)
T.C.
Yargıtay
Başkanlığı
2016
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
February
2017,
https://www.yargitay.gov.tr/sayfa/faaliyet-raporu/documents/2016_faaliyet.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
T.C.
Danıştay
Başkanlığı,
2016
Yılı
İdari
Faaliyet
Raporu,
http://www.danistay.gov.tr/upload/17_03_2017_123330.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Askeri Yargıtay ve AYİM kaldırıldı,” Milliyet, 29 April 2017, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/askeri-yargitay-veayim-kaldirildi-gundem-2441186/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
HSYK 5000 hakim ve savcı sınavını incelemeye aldı, 8 November 2015, http://zete.com/hsyk-5000-hakim-vesavci-sinavini-incelemeye-aldi/ (accessed 10 November 2015)
“CHP’den 1. yılında OHAL raporu: 50 bin tutuklu, 111 bin ihraç,” Cumhuriyet, 20 July 2017,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/785737/CHP_den_1._yilinda_OHAL_raporu__50_bin_tutuklu__
111_bin_ihrac.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“2 bin hakim adayı ve 4 bin hakim kadrosu ihdas edildi,” 25 August 2017,
https://www.memurlar.net/haber/690129/2-bin-hakim-adayi-ve-4-bin-hakim-kadrosu-ihdas-edildi.html
(accessed 1 November 2017)
“Journalists Outside Initiative Calls for Solidarity for Next Hearing in Cumhuriyet Trial,” 28 August 2017,
https://bianet.org/english/media/189444-journalists-outside-initiative-calls-for-solidarity-for-next-hearing-incumhuriyet-trial (accessed 1 November 2017)
Appointment of
Justices
Score: 3
The 2015-2019 Judicial Reform Strategy continues to be implemented.
However, no measures were taken to tackle key shortcomings on independence
and impartiality. It is crucial that the strategy is revised to address key
outstanding problems and is implemented with the involvement of all relevant
stakeholders, including civil society.
The structure of the so-called Gülenist parallel state in the judiciary came to
attention beginning in 2013 and has undermined the judiciary’s credibility.
While the number of court cases is increasing – not least after 15 July 2016 and
the dismissal of thousands of judges and prosecutors allegedly linked to Gülenist
networks – the lack of professional judicial personnel creates further deadlocks.
The Constitutional Court has 17 members, as outlined by Article 146 of the
2010 constitutional referendum, whose members are nominated or elected from
other higher courts by the country’s president, the parliament and professional
groups made up of senior administrative officers, lawyers, first-degree judges,
prosecutors or Constitutional Court rapporteurs who have served for at least five
years.
To be appointed to the Constitutional Court, candidates must either be members
of the teaching staff of institutions of higher education, senior administrative
officers or lawyers; be over the age of 45; have completed higher education; and
have worked for at least 20 years. Constitutional Court members serve 12-year
terms and cannot be reelected. The appointment of Constitutional Court judges
does not take place on the basis of general liberal-democratic standards such as
cooperative appointment and special majority regulations. In addition, the armed
SGI 2018 | 42
Turkey Report
forces still wield some civilian judicial influence, as two military judges are
members of the Constitutional Court.
Recruitment patterns in the past have highlighted the politicization of the
judiciary. Following the recently adopted constitutional amendments, four
members of the new Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) were appointed
directly by the president and seven members were elected by parliament. The
HSK does not offer adequate safeguards for the independence of the judiciary
and considerably increases political influence over the judiciary.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
Yargı Reformu Strateji Belgesi 2015, http://www.sgb.adalet.gov.tr/yargi_reformu_stratejisi.pdf (accessed 27
October 2015)
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Turkey Opinion on the
Amendments to the Constitution Adopted By the Grand National Assembly on 21 January 2017 and to Be
Submitted
to
A
Natıonal
Referendum
on
16
April
2017,
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2017)005-e (1 November 2017)
“Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sistemi’nde AYM ve HSK üyeleri nasıl belirleniyor?.,” 17 March 2017,
https://www.ahaber.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/cumhurbaskanligi-sisteminde-aym-ve-hsk-uyeleri-nasil-belirleniyor
(1 November 2017)
Corruption
Prevention
Score: 2
Law 5018 regarding public financial management and oversight also touches on
issues of legality, transparency and predictability. However, these concepts, as
well as instruments such as the formation of strategic plans, performance
budgets and regulatory impact assessments, are not effectively incorporated into
government oversight processes. An amendment to the law on audit court has
limited the degree to which state expenditures can be audited. Publicprocurement safeguards have deteriorated thanks to legislation allowing
municipalities to operate in a less than transparent fashion. There are no codes
of conduct guiding members of the legislature or judiciary in their actions.
Conflicts of interest are not broadly deemed a concern, and there is no effective
asset-declaration system in place for elected and appointed public officials.
The asset-declaration system was established in 1990 by Law 3628 on Asset
Disclosure and Fighting Bribery and Corruption. All public officials (legislative,
executive and judicial, including nationally and locally elected officials) must
disclose their assets within one month of taking office and renew their
declaration every five years. However, these declarations are not made public
unless there is an administrative or judicial investigation. The Regulation on
Procedure and Basis of Application of the Civil Servants Ethical Behavior
Principles defines civil service restrictions, conflicts of interest and
incompatibilities. The Council of Ethics for Public Officials lacks the power to
enforce its decisions through disciplinary measures. Codes of ethics do not exist
for military personnel or academics. Legal loopholes (e.g., regarding disclosure
SGI 2018 | 43
Turkey Report
of gifts, financial interests and holdings, and foreign travel paid for by outside
sources) in the code of ethics for parliamentarians remain in place. In 2016, a
total of 1,792 public civil servants across 26 institutions were provided ethics
training. The European Commission continued to sponsor ethics leadership
training for Turkish civil society groups in 2017.
Political party finances are regulated by Law 2820. Parties that achieve 3% or
more of the val id votes during the general election receive state aid, and those
overcoming the 10% threshold receive higher sums proportionate to the share of
votes received. Parties’ accounts are reviewed annually by the Constitutional
Court, although this process is not timely. In recent years, the court found that
the main parties had received or spent money unlawfully.
In general, corruption remains widespread, and unfair and biased bureaucratic
treatment is common. Especially at the local level, corruption remains a
systemic problem. While municipalities controlled by opposition parties are
closely monitored by law-enforcement authorities and government inspectors,
municipalities controlled by the AKP are shielded from close scrutiny. The
Turkish Court of Accounts reported several improper transactions in the 2016
annual accounts of several metropolitan municipalities, including Ankara,
İstanbul, Gaziantep, Bursa, Ş.Urfa and Kocaeli. However, these reports have not
been discussed by the parliament. Though the reports were published in the
media and online, publicly exposing hidden budget expenditures, housingprocurement abuses and tax compromises. Instead of prosecuting the corrupt
officials, President Erdoğan simply removed them from office.
A 2014 omnibus law amended various aspects of Turkish public-procurement
legislation, introducing restrictive measures that make the previously optional
domestic price advantage of up to 15% compulsory for “medium and hightechnology industrial products.” The law authorizes the Ministry of Science,
Industry and Technology to determine the list of items for which a domestic
price advantage will be compulsory; this gives considerable discretion to the
administration.
During the review period, corruption has deepened due to the rentier economy,
the government’s authoritarian tendencies, weakened parliamentary oversight,
dysfunctional public administration and financial audit institutions, and
impunity. Moreover, the gold trader Reza Zarrab’s testimonies in the U.S.
indicate that Zarrab bribed former AKP ministers with millions of U.S. dollars
between 2011 and 2013. On 17 December 2015, the Bribery and Corruption
Investigation decided not to prosecute four ministers and their relatives. In
January 2015, due to the AKP’s parliamentary majority, the Turkish parliament
voted not to put the ministers on trial. Though these cases can be reopened in
SGI 2018 | 44
Turkey Report
future. The main opposition party leader stated that the President Erdoğan’s
family members transferred millions of U.S. dollars to a company in the Isle of
Man (a tax haven) in 2011 and 2012. In a counter attack, the Minister of Interior
removed the mayor of Ataşehir, a town in İstanbul, from office following
allegations of corruption.
Citation:
European
Commission,
Turkey
2016
Report,
Brussels,
9.11.2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pd f (accessed 1 November
2016).
OECD, Risk Management by State-Owned Enterprises and their Ownership, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016.
World Bank, Turkey Asset Declaration System, https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/turkey-adcountry-profile.pdf (accessed 1 November 2016).
Turkey’s top judicial body suspends graft probe prosecutors: agency, 30 December 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/30/us-turkey-corruption-prosecutorsidUSKBN0K80WC20141230#MAC1r24rc4pB862h.97 (27 October 2015)
Daniel Donbay, Turkish parliament votes against graft trial for former ministers, Financial Times, 21 January
2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f805574-a14a-11e4-8d19-00144feab7de.html#ixzz3rrWV7tpq (27 October
2015)
Çiğdem Toker, Sayıştay yeni soygunu belgeledi, Cumhuryet daily newspaper, 7 October 2015,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/382949/Sayistay_yeni_soygunu_belgeledi.html (27 October 2015)
TBMM Yolsuzluk Soruşturma Komisyonu Raporu’nun tam metni, 12 January 2015, http://odatv.com/tbmmyolsuzluk-sorusturma-komisyonu-raporunun-tam-metni-1201151200.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
Sayıştay’ın yayınladığı rapor AKP’li belediyelerin borçlarını ortaya çıkardı, 10 October 2017,
http://siyasihaber3.org/sayistay-in-yayinladigi-rapor-akp-li-belediyelerin-borclarini-ortaya-cikardi
(1
November 2017)
GRECO, Third Evaluation Round Third Interim Compliance Report on Turkey ”Incriminations (ETS 173 and
191, GPC 2)” ”Transparency of Party Funding,” https://rm.coe.int/third-evaluation-round-third-interimcompliance-report-on-turkey-incri/168072247a (1 November 2017)
T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Görevlileri Etik Kurulu, 2016 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, 2016,
http://etik.gov.tr/Portals/0/faaliyet_raporlari/faaliyetraporu_2016.pdf (1 November 2017)
Ö.Faruk Gençkaya, “New Public Management Approach and Ethical Issues in Local Administrations in
Turkey” Y. Demirkaya, ed., New Public Management in Turkey: Local Government Reform, Routledge, 2016.
Ö. Faruk Gençkaya, “Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns in Turkey,” S. ASayarı, P. AyanMusil and Ö. Demirkol, Party Politics in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective, Routledge, 2018.
Serkan Demirtaş, “The Zarrab case and corruption claims could bring Turkey’s elections forward,” Hürriyet
Daily News, 2 December 2017, (accessed 2 December 2017)
SGI 2018 | 45
Turkey Report
Governance
I. Execut ive Capacit y
Strategic Capacity
Strategic
Planning
Score: 6
All public institutions, including municipalities, special provincial
administrations (laws 5216, 5302 and 5393) and state-owned economic
enterprises (KİTs), but excluding regulatory and supervisory bodies, must
prepare strategic plans according to Law 5018 (2003) on Public Financial
Management and Control and the By-law on Principles and Procedures for
Strategic Planning in Public Administrations (2006).
Ministries have established strategic-planning units, creating the need for innerand interministerial coordination and cooperation on present and future tasks
and problems. In general, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministries of Finance,
Development and Interior, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Turkish
Court of Audit, and the Board of Internal Audit are the primary institutions
involved in the process of strategic planning. The High Planning Board of the
Ministry of Development is in charge of coordinating development plans and
annual programs, and determining investment and export incentives.
Strategic management within the Turkish public administration faces several
challenges. Public institutions in general have insufficient strategic-management
capacity. Strategic plans, performance programs, budgets and activity reports
are prepared with little if any coordination. Although a total of 730 internal
auditors are employed across 207 public institutions, the Turkish public
administration as a whole has failed to develop an effective internal-audit
system. The Court of Audit cannot fulfill its functions and pursue performance
audits. There is no relationship between political strategy documents and lowerlevel policy materials, and little coordination between associated institutions.
Difficulties in gaining access to relevant information within public
administrative bodies and insufficient human resource capacities are additional
major contributors to this failure. There are also no cumulative statistics on the
SGI 2018 | 46
Turkey Report
frequency of meetings between strategic-planning staff members and
government heads. In general, these meetings are held once a year and during
budget negotiations. However, there is no harmony between strategic plans and
governmental decisions.
During the review period, the 2016 – 2019 National e-Government Strategy and
Action Plan was prepared. The plan envisages an integrated, technological,
participatory, innovative and high-quality Effective e-Government Ecosystem,
and takes into account national and international considerations.
Citation:
T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim Çalışma Grubu Raporu, Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (20142018),
2015.
http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/zel%20htisas%20Komisyonu%20Raporlar/Attachments/264/Kamuda%20St
ratejik%20Y%C3%B6netim%20%C3%87al%C4%B1%C5%9Fma%20Grubu%20Raporu.pdf (accessed 7
November 2016)
Kamu İdarelerince Hazırlanacak Stratejik Planlara Dair Tebliğ, Resmi Gazete, 30 April 2015,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/04/20150430-10.htm (accessed 7 November 2017
TC Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2016-2019 Ulusal e-Devlet Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı,
2016
http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPTemelBelge/files/Swkoy+2016-2019-Ulusal-e-Devlet-Stratejisi-veEylem-Plani.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Stratejik
Yönetimde
Kapasite
Geliştirme
Projesi,
http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/html/97/Stratejik+Yonetimde+Kapasite+Gelistirme+Projesi (accessed 1 November
2017)
Yüksek Planlama Kurulu, http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/Yuksek-Planlama-Kurulu.aspx (accessed 1
November 2017)
Scholarly Advice
Score: 4
In former years, the frequency of participation by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and experts in political decision-making processes were
increased. In addition to working with pro-government think tanks, the
government consults with academic experts in the context of projects sponsored
by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union.
However, the spectrum of communication with outside experts is narrowing, as
the government has begun to recruit its own experts to provide alternative but
not critical opinions on relevant issues of public policy. Policymaking is
increasingly biased. As Turkish politics has become increasingly polarized, the
government and the ruling party have seemed to shut themselves off from
broader societal influences, basing decision-making increasingly on information
provided by loyal personal or clientelist networks. Several academics who had
previously worked with the government were recently dismissed from their
university positions due to their associations to Gülenist organizations.
Public institutions’ annual activity reports provide no indication of how often
expert opinions have been requested. Selected groups of scholars participate in
the preparation of special expert reports related to the national development
plans. The Turkish Academy of Sciences has been critical of the lack of
scholarly cooperation with public institutions.
SGI 2018 | 47
Turkey Report
Citation:
Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi, 2014 Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.tuba.gov.tr/upload/tables/2014-tuba-faaliyetraporu.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
Mevzuat
Hazırlama
Usul
ve
Esasları
Hakkında
Yönetmelik,
19.12.2005,
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20059986.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
Interministerial Coordinat ion
GO Expertise
Score: 5
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has established a General Directorate of
Laws and Decrees and a General Directorate of Legislation Development and
Publication. The directorates scrutinize bylaws prepared by ministries and
public agencies, examining their congruity with existing draft bills, decrees,
statutes, regulations and Council of Minister resolutions. The General
Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication also examines the
congruity between existing legislation, development plans and programs, and
the government’s program. The Directorate of Administration Development,
which employs 13 experts and researchers, deals with standardization. These
units are the primary government entities charged with drafting and coordinating
new regulations. However, not all draft bills are the product of expert advice.
Recently, the number of adjustments to draft bills made during the
parliamentary-approval process indicated that standards were only partially
upheld.
During the review period, the PMO had a total of 2,253 employees, a quarter of
whom were experts or advisers, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral
Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established to provide advice to the PMO
in 2011. In May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public
institutions were assigned to this unit. Critics argue that these senior civil
servants lack sufficient resources, as well as incentives for effective action. Until
the “cleansing” activities of the government following the 15 July coup attempt,
the unit was also alleged to be a “detention camp” for bureaucrats supposedly
close to illegal Gülenist organizations.
Citation:
TC
Başbakanlık
2016
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Ra poru.pdf (accessed 1
November 2017)
Cinnah’taki toplama kampı, Taraf daily newspaper, 25 September 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/cinnahtakitoplama-kampi/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Kamuda
Paralel
tasfiyesi,
Akşam
daily
newspaper,
12
September
2015,
http://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/kamuda-paralel-tasfiyesi/haber-442223 (accessed 27 October 2015)
GO Gatekeeping
Score: 9
According to Article 112 of the constitution, the prime minister, as chairman of
the Council of Ministers, is tasked with ensuring cooperation among ministers
and with supervising the implementation of government general policy. The
members of the Council of Ministers are jointly responsible for the
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Turkey Report
implementation of policy. Each minister is responsible to the prime minister and
is responsible for the conduct of affairs under his or her jurisdiction and the acts
and activities of his or her subordinates. The prime minister ensures that the
ministers exercise their functions in accordance with the constitution and the
law, and can take corrective measures. Article 109 of the constitution, which
gives the prime minister the power to appoint ministers, also makes his or her
oversight power over ministerial proposals clear. However, ministries have been
able to exercise greater influence during periods of coalition government. In
those times, to prevent this, a special coordinating body composed of ministers
from coalition parties sets the agenda for cabinet meetings. In contrast to that,
since the presidential election in 2014, and the re-election of the AKP into
power in 2015, the presidency evolved into another strong power center in the
policymaking process, indicated by the regularity with which President Erdogan
has chaired cabinet meetings. During the review period, Erdoğan’s de facto
status as chair of the cabinet became de jure following his election as chair of
the AKP in May 2017. The Presidential Office has assumed primary authority
for coordinating between ministries, with the PMO becoming a secondary
authority.
There is also a hidden (discretionary) budget which is allocated by the prime
minister and the minister of finance. Following the 2014 presidential elections,
an additional presidential discretionary budget was also created. The total
expenditure from these funds reached €471.3 million during the first eight
months of 2017. These funds are not audited.
Citation:
Circular, 2012/15, 16 Haziran 2012, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskil er/2012/06/20120616-6.htm
(accessed 27 October 2015)
Cumhurbaşkanlığı’na örtülü ödenek yetmedi, bütçe 546 milyona çıktı, T24, 16 September 2015,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/cumhurbaskanligina-ortulu-odenek-yetmedi-butce-546-milyona-cikti,309811 (accessed
27 October 2015)
“Erdoğan ve Yıldırım’ın kullandığı 1 yıllık örtülü ödenek 8 ayda bitti,” 16 September 2017,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-ve-yildirimin-kullandigi-1-yillik-ortulu-odenek-8-ayda-bitti,441810 (accessed
1 November 2017)
Line Ministries
Score: 7
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has a twofold role in the preparation of
draft bills. It checks the congruity of laws from a legal point of view, and
collects ministries’ legal and political opinions along with opinions from civil
society, interest and pressure groups, expert groups and institutions. Thus, the
PMO is always directly involved in the preparation of policy proposals at a
relatively early stage.
However, line ministries do not always provide all the information necessary for
draft bills, particularly in the case of information that may cast their ministry in
a bad light. From time to time, policymaking is tarnished by issues of
bureaucratic competition, including among politicians. The PMO’s inability to
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Turkey Report
foster interministerial cooperation has been a serious institutional shortcoming.
A recent reorganization of the PMO and line ministries led to some performance
declines. Conflicting announcements regarding policy proposals made by the
PMO and line ministries have been a sign of weak coordination.
The Ministry of Development was assigned as the primary consultation body in
preparing policies according to the decision on the implementation, coordination
and monitoring of the government’s program. After the parliamentary election
of 1 November 2015, government proposals to restructure the ministries and
increase their number were made. Several new public units such as the National
Mine Institute were additionally established. It remains to be seen whether this
kind of institutional fragmentation of policymaking will hinder or enhance the
effectiveness of policy coordination and accountability.
During the review period, it is assumed that the president worked closely with
the line ministries, although there is little public evidence of this. It is unclear
how the current system will be transformed into a presidential system.
Citation:
TC
Başbakanlık
Kanunlar
ve Kararlar
Genel Müdürlüğü
Performans
Raporu 2014,
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/PerfRapor2014.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
2017 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 19 October
2017,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161019-13.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Cabinet
Committees
Score: 6
The Ministry of Development was designated the primary consultation body for
the preparation, implementation, coordination and monitoring of the
government’s program.
The Better Regulation Group within the PMO ensures coordination among the
related agencies and institutions and improve the process of creating regulations.
In addition, the government has created committees – such as the anti-terror
commission under the Ministry of Interior, which includes officials from the
ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, as well as other security departments.
These are composed of ministers, experts, bureaucrats and representatives of
other bureaucratic bodies (such as those on legislation techniques, legislation
management and administrative simplification, and regulatory impact analysis)
in highly important policy areas or when important or frequently raised issues
were under consideration.
Other such committees include the Economy Coordination Board, the Money
Credit Coordination Council, the Investment Environment Coordination Board,
the Coordination Board for Combating Financial Crimes and the CounterTerrorism Coordination Board.
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Turkey Report
In addition, the Reform Monitoring Group was renamed to Reform Action
Group to coordinate policy measures in line with EU legislation. It has been
extending its predecessor’s tasks and mission. The new body is tasked with
monitoring political reforms, preparing draft reform bills and playing an active
role in securing proposals’ parliamentary passage and in the subsequent
implementation process. However, this body had convened only three times
until December 2015, raising doubts about its impact on policymaking.
Citation:
Ömer Öz, Regulatory Oversight Bodies in Turkey. Better Regulation Group, The Prime Minister’s Office of
Turkey,
31 May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/48710734.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
Çözüm Süreci Kurulu Resmi Gazete’de, 1 October 2014, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/158881-cozumsureci-kurulu-resmi-gazete-de (accessed 5 November 2014).
‘Reform Monitoring Group for EU reforms replayed with Action Group,’ Hürriyet Daily News (7 November
2014)
2015 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 17 October
2014,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141017-11-1.pdf (accessed 27 Octoer 2015)
Daily Sabah, PM asks other parties to support passing EU bills, 11 December 2015,
http://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2015/12/12/pm-asks-other-parties-to-support-passing-eu-bills
Ministerial
Bureaucracy
Score: 5
Ministerial undersecretaries, under the authority of a minister and his or her
aide, executes services on behalf of the ministers. This is a political position that
is achieved through merit and a successful political career. Deputy
undersecretaries in the ministries also help to conduct ministerial affairs.
During the review period there was an increasing tendency to draft and adopt
legislation without appropriate consultation. The creation of new ministries and
agencies and the resulting fragmentation of responsibilities has complicated
ministerial coordination, for example in the areas of budgeting and mediumterm economic policymaking. The oversight bodies under the Prime Minister’s
Office are responsible not only for coordinating and overseeing legal proposals,
but are also tasked with monitoring legislative implementation.
The 2016 Annual Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) stressed
that although the PMO has the authority to coordinate ministries, its powers are
not used effectively. The authority of the PMO over public administration
should be improved and diversified.
Similar observations have been made by the Ministry of Development, the
primary policy-coordination body. Accordingly, a serious problem is inefficient
coordination due to institutional ambiguity and conflicts.
Citation:
Ömer Öz, Regulatory Oversight Bodies in Turkey. Better Regulation Group, The Prime Minister’s Office of
Turkey,
31 May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/48710734.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
TC
Başbakanlık
2016
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
SGI 2018 | 51
Turkey Report
https://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed 1
November 2017)
2015 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 17 October
2014,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141017-11-1.pdf (accessed 27 Octoer 2015)
Informal
Coordination
Score: 6
Informal bodies, which are usually made up of senior party members and their
personal networks, are typically used to sketch the framework of an issue in
consultation with experts, while civil servants develop proposals, and finally the
upper administrative echelons finalize policy. The higher levels of the ruling
party in particular, in cooperation with ministers who have considerable
experience in their fields, continue to form a tight network and contribute
significantly to policy preparation.
However, the recent allegations of and fight against an illegal parallel structure
within existing state structures linked to the network of U.S.-based cleric
Fethullah Gülen placed significant strain on these informal mechanisms. As a
consequence, a new generation of cabinet and administrative staffers with a high
degree of loyalty and commitment to the party-state system is being groomed.
Informal coordination between the PMO and the Presidency has allegedly
become more relevant since President Erdogan took over office, and especially
after Binali Yildirim became prime minister. Erdoğan regularly meets with line
ministers and with the “small cabinet” to coordinate government policies. This
type of informal coordination, however, cannot be considered constructive, but
rather it has the potential to replace formal mechanisms of interministerial
coordination.
Citation:
Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel, AKP Kitabı-Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, İstanbul: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2013.
Evidence-based Inst ruments
RIA Application
Score: 4
In 2007, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a circular that provided guidance on
how to prepare regulatory impact assessments (RIA). Since that time, the
completion of a RIA has been required for all new legislation (laws, decrees and
other regulatory procedures), excluding issues relating to national security, the
draft budget or final accounts (under Article 24 of Regulation 4821 on the
Procedure and Principles of Preparing Legislation, 12 December 2005).
However, despite regulations adopted to encourage administrative simplification
in April 2012, the introduction of RIAs has not improved the quality of
government legislation, and RIA processes are only rarely followed.
During the review period, several chambers of industry conducted EU-funded
RIA projects. The EU Regulation on the Export and Import of Harmful
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Turkey Report
Chemicals Technical Support Project for Implementation was conducted by
several Turkish chambers of industry, including Balıkesir, Kayseri and Kocaeli.
The European Union also funded the Technical Assistance for CapacityBuilding and Support to the Preparation of a Regulatory Impact Assessment
(RIA) for Decoupled Agricultural Support project.
Citation:
Dr. Sibel Güven, Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Etki Analizi (DEA) Uygulamaları Nedenİstenen Düzeyde Değil?
TEPAV,
Ankara, Ocak 2011.
Technical Assistance Service for IPPC – Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control in Turkey, Draft
Regulatory Impact Assessment, June 2013, http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ippceng/webmenu/webmenu9986.pdf
(accessed 5 November 2014).
Zararlı Kimyasalların İhracatı ve İthalatına İlişkin AB Tüzüğü’nün Uygulanması için Teknik Destek Projesi,
http://kosano.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ankt.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Quality of RIA
Process
Score: 3
During the period under review, the regulatory impact assessment (RIAs)
requirement did not help improve the quality of proposed government
legislation. Instead, the government more often than not drafted and adopted
legislation without the appropriate consultation of NGOs or other stakeholders;
not to mention the government’s de facto surpassing of the parliament under its
state of emergency powers.
Citation:
Dr. Sibel Güven, Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Etki Analizi (DEA) Uygulamaları Neden İstenen Düzeyde Değil?
TEPAV,
Ankara, Ocak 2011.
Technical Assistance Service for IPPC – Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control in Turkey, Draft
Regulatory Impact Assessment, June 2013, http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ippceng/webmenu/webmenu9986.pdf
(accessed 5 November 2014).
EKÖK “Entegre KirlilikÖnleme ve Kontrol” Teknik Yardım Hizmeti, Haziran 2013.
http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ipp c/icerikbelge/icerikbelge1631.pdf
Sustainability
Check
Score: 3
The government has conducted several sustainability checks within its
regulatory impact assessment (RIA) framework, for instance for the Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive, the Habitat Directive
and the Discharge Directive.
However, these examples refer to internationally sponsored projects and are not
an indication of a general administrative practice. Politicians and experts widely
use the term “sustainability” in policy slogans, but there is no formally adopted
sustainability strategy in Turkey.
During the review period, the Coordination Board of Internal Audit published
Performance Audit Guidelines for Public Sector Internal Auditors, which
includes sustainability checks as a component in performance auditing.
However, there is no information about RIA sustainability checks.
SGI 2018 | 53
Turkey Report
Citation:
Başbakanlık, Bürokrasinin Azaltılması ve Kamu Hizmet Sunum Esaslarının Geliştirilmesi, DÜZENLEYİCİ
ETKİ ANALİZİ RAPORU, Temmuz 2009, www.riaturkey.org/doc/Burokrasinin_ azaltilmasi.doc (accessed
July 26, 2010)
Yavuz Gazibey, Ahmet Keser, Yunus Gökmen, Türkiye’de İllerin Sürdürülebilirlik Boyutları Açısından
Değerlendirilmesi, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, 2014, 69(3): 511-544. (accessed 27 October 2015)
İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu, Kamu iç Denetçileri İçin Performans Denetimi Rehberi, 2016,
http://www.idkk.gov.tr/SiteDokumanlari/Mevzuat/Ucuncul%20Duzey%20Mevzuat/PerformansDenetimiRehb
eri.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Societ al Consult ation
Negotiating
Public Support
Score: 4
According to the Regulation Concerning the Procedures and Principles of
Preparation of Legislation (Article 6), ministries may announce draft texts that
are of public concern via the internet, press or printed publication before
forwarding it to the Prime Minister’s Office. Consequently, government
decisions are made after the draft text has been publicly debated. In developing
policies on housing, energy and education, among other policy areas, ministries
may convene consultative bodies of major stakeholders, although not all sectors
or organizations are typically included. Turkey’s national development plans
emphasize the importance of cooperation between NGOs and the public sector.
The EU-funded public-civil society dialogue projects promote the participation
of civil society in public decision-making. Government-society and parliamentsociety relations are not based on a systematic, ongoing and structured
consultation mechanism. Political polarization during the review period
increased the government’s restrictions and biases on public access to
policymaking processes and strengthened its preference to consult only with
pro-government actors.
In general, governmental authorities consider this requirement to have a
“slowing” effect on policymaking (e.g., on progressive projects such as urban
renewal or the planning of hydroelectric power plants). Although it is required
by the legal framework, societal consultation has largely been neglected or
rendered ineffective.
TBMM
Başkanlığı
İdari
Teşkilatı
2014
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/faaliyet_raporu_2014.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).
Türkiye’de
Hidroelektrik
Sektöründe
Paydaş
Analizi,
İstanbul:
WWF-Türkiye,
2015,
http://awsassets.wwftr.panda.org/downloads/wwf_paydas_analizi.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).
Civil Society Dialogue, Political Criteria Projects, http://civilsocietydialogue.org/masonry-grid/ (accessed 27
October 2015).
Selami Erdoğan and Eray Acar, “Türkiye’de Yeni Anayasa Yapım Süreci ve TBMM Anayasa Uzlaşma
Komisyonu (2011-2013),” Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, October 2016, 1801-191.
Hakan Yerlikaya, Kamu Politikalarının Oluşturulmasında Katılımcılık ve Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri,
Uzmanlık Tezi, TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015.
Gökçeçiçek Ayata and Ulaş Karan, Sivil Topluma Aktif Katılım: Uluslararası Standartlar, Ulusal Mevzuattaki
Engeller, Öneriler, İstanbul: TÜSEV, 2015.
“Kamu - Sivil Toplum İşbirliği,” https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/kamu-sivil-toplum-isbirligi-37 (accessed 1
November 2017)
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Turkey Report
Policy Communication
Coherent
Communication
Score: 5
In spite of its centralized and hierarchical structure, Turkey’s executive is poorly
coordinated and rarely speaks with a single voice. Contradictory policy
statements on the economy (role of the central bank), security (failure in security
and safety provisions) or education (reform of the examination processes) are
regular.
In addition, under state of emergency powers, the voice of the president is
considered decisive. Yet, a coordinated “division of labor” has not been
achieved. Following the April 2017 constitutional referendum, the government
initiated a project to prevent confusion over overlapping ministerial authority,
reduce the “bureaucratic oligarchy” and improve the effectiveness of
administrative processes.
Citation:
“Yetki karmaşaları mercek altında,” Hürriyet, 3 September 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yetkikarmasalari-mercek-altinda-40568608 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan TEOG ve LYS açıklaması,” Yeni Şafak, 27 September 2017,
http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-teog-ve-lys-aciklamasi-2796903 (accessed 1
November 2017)
“Başbakan Yıldırım’dan TEOG açıklaması,” 3 October 2017, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/basbakanyildirimdan-teog-aciklamasi,gexFodLrykKgWvTypnFNow (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Milli Eğitim Bakanı Yılmaz, TEOG yerine gelecek yeni istemi açıkladı,” 5 November 2017,
http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/milli-egitim-bakani-yilmaz-teog-yerine-gelecek-yeni-istemi-acikladi340141.html (accessed 5 November 2017)
Patates fiyatında bakanlar da anlaşamadı, 8 May 2015, http://www.ohaber.com/patates-fiyatinda-bakanlar-daanlasamadi/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Erdoğan
Merkez
Bankası’nı
eleştirdi,
dolar
rekor
kırdı,
4
February
2015,
http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ekonomi/2015/02/150204_erdogan_dolar_faiz (accessed 27 October 2015)
Implementation
Government
Efficiency
Score: 6
The government’s performance has been mixed during the review period.
Finance Minister Naci Ağbal defined the 2017 budget as “growth friendly,” and
foresaw a TYR 46.9 billion budget deficit and TYR 10.6 billion primary budget
surplus. As of October 2017, the budget deficit had reached TYR 35 billion.
Presidential and prime ministerial discretionary funds increased 73% compared
to 2016.
The economy has weakened over recent years. Meanwhile, Turkey’s onetime
proactive and strategic foreign and security policies have become increasingly
less coherent, particularly with regard to regional conflicts. The AKP’s
credibility was undermined by the party leadership’s unwillingness to accept the
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Turkey Report
results of the June 2015 elections. Contradictions between the goals of political
liberalization and the government’s conservative-religious ambitions have
become increasingly visible. Seeking to consolidate its control over government,
the AKP has instead sought to create a legal framework for its “monopolization”
of power. Opposition forces inside and outside of parliament often play into the
ruling party’s hands.
Governmental inefficiency is widespread, especially in relation to the economy.
The first nine months following the implementation of the government’s annual
economic objectives varied sharply from official budget and 2017 – 2019
medium-term fiscal plan forecasts. The recent devaluation of the Turkish lira
has increased the fiscal burden on macroeconomic variables. In the current and
the next (2018 – 2020) medium-term fiscal plan, greater fiscal discipline is
expected. Unemployment, inflation and the budget deficit will continue to be
major economic weaknesses, which will be exacerbated by population growth,
refugee issues and security concerns. Results were similarly mixed in other
sectors. For instance, the Ministry of Education realized most of its 43
performance objectives, while the Ministry of Health completed most of its 22
objectives for 2016. However, the Ministry of Health failed to realize two key
objectives, namely human resource objectives in the health care sector and
scientific publications.
No significant progress has been made concerning EU accession since 2015,
when economic and financial chapters were opened. Chapters 23 and 24 are
currently under blocked by Cyprus. These chapters regulate Turkey’s
harmonization of fundamental rights and the judiciary with those of the
European Union. Despite some signals to continue negotiations from both sides,
the European Parliament in November 2016 and Germany since September
2017 have opted to suspense, and Austria has demanded a complete stop to
talks.
Citation:
“İşte hükümetin bütçe performansı,” 17 October 2017, http://www.businessht.com.tr/ekonomi/haber/1311270iste-hukumetin-butce-performansi (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Turkey challenges EU to ‘open new chapters,’” Hürriyet Daily News, 10 May 2017,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-challenges-eu-to-open-new-chapters-112952 (accessed 1 November
2017)
“Bütçe
açığı
ve
örtülü
harcamalar
coştu,”
16
November
2017,
Sözcü,
http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/ekonomi/butce-acigi-ve-ortulu-harcamalar-costu-2092299/
(accessed
16
November 2017)
Ministry of Development, 2017-2019 Medium Term Programme in Macro-economic and Fiscal Targets,
http://www.mod.gov.tr/Pages/content.aspx?List=16bb86d7%2Dad48%2D4f23%2Db1e3%2D56bbe5b28aaa&
ID=13&Source=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Emod%2Egov%2Etr%2FPages%2FMediumTermPrograms%2Eas
px&ContentTypeId=0x0100F7A44FBA3ED2844D8825963D0C0BE391 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Sağlık Bakanlığı 2014 Faaliyet Raporu, https://dosyasb.saglik.gov.tr/Eklenti/7585,raporpdf.pdf?0 (accessed 1
November 2017)
Milli
Eğitim
Bakanlığı,
2016
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://sgb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2017_02/28172815_2016_FR_webde_yayYmlanacak_kitap.pdf
SGI 2018 | 56
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(accessed 1 November 2017)
Pelin Ünker, Ekonomide tüm hedefler şaştı, Cumhuriyet daily newspaper, 10 September 2015. (accessed 27
October 2015)
Ministerial
Compliance
Score: 6
The entrenched single-party government, with strong party leadership and high
demand for ministerial positions among party members, provides strong
incentives for the promotion of the government program. Therefore, it is
difficult even for those ministers who are professionals in their fields to come
independently to the forefront. The charisma and standing of the party leader
and the tendency of political parties to leave personnel decisions to the party
leader prevent ministers from pursuing their own interests during their time in
office.
The AKP government under former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has
made it even more difficult for ministers to follow their own agendas, a situation
which has continued under Erdogan’s successors since 2014. A number of key
ministries during the review period were under the leadership of ministers with
substantial professional expertise, but these figures had little support from the
party apparatus, leaving them dependent on the prime minister. This ensures that
the strong leadership of the prime minister and party leader, rather than other
incentives, drives ministers to implement the governmental program. After
Erdoğan was elected to the presidency, additional loyalist ministers were
appointed to the cabinet. Erdoğan rejected claims that the new prime minister
would merely do his bidding; however, he continues to maintain his grip on the
government, stressing his intention to be an active president, and interfering in
virtually every policy field and ministerial portfolio.
Erdoğan also intervenes in the nomination of deputies, appointment of higher
civil servants and the organization of electoral campaigns by taking part actively
in these events. In other words, it is argued that the office of the president, now
entrusted with increasing powers, has replaced those otherwise established by
the constitution. Thus, the current constellation raises the question whether the
effectiveness of the executive in general and the government in particular will
be diminished by the existence of several centers of power and suggests that the
democratic separation of powers as a whole are eroding.
Following the constitutional referendum of April 2017, Erdoğan was
immediately re-elected chair of the AKP, legalizing a previously de facto status.
This contradicted the principle that Turkey’s head of state should be impartial
and not a member of a political party. Second, Erdoğan immediately started to
exercise constitutional powers that were intended to take effect after 2019
presidential elections. In this transition period, the role of the prime minister and
Council of Ministers as the sole authority for governmental actions has been
reduced to a symbolic power vis-a-vis Erdoğan’s full authority as the president
and chair of the ruling party. Ministers can only use their constitutional powers
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Turkey Report
with the approval of the president. Sometimes the president gives direct orders
to ministers for the sake of his own popularity and legitimacy.
Citation:
Erdoğan
says
new
PM
will
not
be
puppet,
Al
Jazeera,
27
August
2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/08/Erdoğan-says-new-pm-will-not-be-puppet2014827133851415267.html (accessed 5 November 2014)
“Constitutional amendments in Turkey: Predictions and implications,” 28 February 2017,
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2017/02/constitutional-amendments-turkey-predictionsimplications-170228092500529.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Stadiums in Turkey to no longer be called ‘arena,’ Erdoğan instructs minister,” Hürriyet Daily News, 26 May
2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/stadiums-in-turkey-to-no-longer-be-called-arena-erdogan-instructsminister-113595 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Daniel Dombey, Turkish president tightens grip on state, The Financial Times, 15 April 2015,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f89a7b74-c747-11e4-8e1f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3rIJjSiYj (accessed 27 October
2015)
Monitoring
Ministries
Score: 7
The Prime Minister’s Office has, among other measures, established the General
Directorate of Laws and Decrees and the General Directorate of Legislation
Development and Publication to examine the congruity with the constitution of
draft bills, decrees, regulations and resolutions of the Council of Ministers, as
well as to review in general laws, plans and the government’s program. These
bodies are the primary government centers for the drafting and coordinating of
regulations.
However, there is no systematic monitoring of the activities of line ministries. In
some cases, the ministerial bureaucracy resists policy handed down by the
government without serious consequences, particularly in issues of
democratization. In general, however, ministries work in cooperation with the
prime minister’s office because the single-party government has staffed leading
ministerial posts with bureaucrats who operate in sync with the ruling party’s
program and ideology.
The PMO has a total of 2,253 employees, a quarter of whom are experts or
advisers, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and
Assessment Unit was established in 2011 to provide the PMO consultation. A
total of 17 full-time officers are employed by the PMO. Beginning in May 2015,
about 266 career employees from various public institutions were also assigned
to this unit.
It remains to be seen how effectively the presidency, with the gradual
dissolution of the PMO following the April 2017 referendum, will fulfill the
PMO’s monitoring responsibilities.
Citation:
TC
Başbakanlık
2016
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed 1
November 2017)
SGI 2018 | 58
Monitoring
Agencies,
Bureaucracies
Score: 7
Turkey Report
Turkey is a unitary state divided into 81 provinces (Article 126 of the
constitution). Power is devolved in such a way as to ensure the efficiency and
coordination of public services from the center. Ministerial agencies are
monitored regularly. The central administration by law holds the power to guide
the activities of local administration, to ensure that local services are delivered
in conformance with the guidelines set down by the central government, as well
as ensuring services are uniform, meeting local needs and in the interest of the
local population (Article 127). The central government has provincial
organizations that differ in size and capacity and are regularly scrutinized by the
central government. Independent administrative authorities such as the
Telecommunications Authority and Energy Market Regulatory Authority are not
monitored, but are subject to judicial review.
Law 5018, adopted in 2004, introduced a strategic-management approach under
which all public agencies must prepare a strategic plan, annual program and
activity reports. The performance of subunits is assessed on the basis of these
documents. However, neither strategic management principles nor internal
oversight mechanisms have been effectively implemented.
The Internal Audit Coordination Board, affiliated with the Ministry of Finance,
was established under Article 66 of the Public Financial Management and
Control Law (Law 5018). The board ensures that administrative bodies
cooperate with public auditing bodies, and recommends measures to eliminate
fraud and other irregularities. According to the 2016 Annual Activity Report,
qualified human resources management, capacity-building, coordination, and
the separation of inspection and internal-audit functions are major issues in this
field.
All public agencies maintain an internal audit body. However, such bodies do
not function effectively or operate to their fullest.
The State Supervision Board, which is subject to the Presidency of the Republic,
provides supervision and prepares in-depth reports upon the request of the
Presidency. These reports were made public until recently; since 2009 only
summaries of the reports are available.
Citation:
İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu 2016 Yılı Kamu İç Denetim Genel Raporu, November 2016,
http://www.idkk.gov.tr/SiteDokumanlari/Faaliyet%20Raporlar%c4%b1/2017KamuicDenetimGenelRaporu.pd
f
SGI 2018 | 59
Task Funding
Score: 6
Turkey Report
Municipal governments depend on financial contributions from the central
government. Many municipalities do not have the sufficient resources to finance
basic duties. Thus, many have declared bankruptcy. Municipal borrowing
constitutes a large share of Turkey’s total medium- and long-term debt.
Financial decentralization and reform of local administration have been major
issues during the review period. The central administration (mainly through the
Bank of Provinces) is still the major funding source for local governments.
During the 2014 – 2015 fiscal year, the government allocated €118 million to a
village infrastructure project (KÖYDES), €189.9 million to the Drinking Water
and Sewer Infrastructure Program (SUKAP), €74 million to the Social Support
Program (SODES).
The previous governments have been frequently accused of taking a partisan
approach toward the distribution of funds. Since 2009, transfers from the central
government to municipalities via the Bank of Provinces have taken into
consideration the number of inhabitants and the locality’s relative position on
development indices. However, the new model has not eased the difficult
financial situation of Turkey’s municipalities, which are seriously indebted to
central-government institutions. According to Audit Court reports, most
metropolitan municipalities have substantial debts. Therefore, most local
projects in major metropolitan municipalities are run by the central government.
The recent change in regulations governing metropolitan municipalities was
designed to generate funds for them. However, this shift is expected in turn to
cause smaller administrative units to be fiscally and administratively dependent
on the metropolitan municipalities. In other words, the authority held by
subunits such as villages and small towns are expected to be undermined in the
long run.
Citation:
TC
Kalkınma
Bakanlığı
KÖYDES
Projesi
2015
Ödeneği,
20
January
2015,
http://www.migm.gov.tr/Dokumanlar/2015_1_KOYDES_YPK_KARARI.pdf. (accessed 27 October 2015)
2015
Yılı
Yatırım
Programı
yayımlandı,
15
January
2015,
http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1702267-2015-yili-yatirim-programi-yayimlandi (accessed 27
October 2015)
TC
Sayıştay
Başkanlığı
Kalkınma
Bakanlığı
2014
Yılı
Sayıştay
Denetim
Raporu,
http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/rapor/kid/2014/Genel_B%C3%BCt%C3%A7e_Kapsam%C4%B1ndaki_%20Kamu
_%C4%B0dareleri/KALKINMA%20BAKANLI%C4%9EI.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
‘Hazine’ye 17 milyar lira borçlu olanların listesi,’ Karar daily newspaper, 23 April 2015,
http://www.karar.com/ekonomi-haberleri/hazineye-17-milyar-lira-borclu-olanlarin-listesi
(accessed
27
October 2015)
“Sayıştay’a göre; İstanbul ve Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyeleri borç ‘batağında,” 19 October 2017,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/sayistaya-gore-istanbul-ve-ankara-buyuksehir-belediyeleri-borc-bataginda,468360
(accessed 1 November 2017)
Constitutional
Discretion
Score: 2
According to Article 127, Paragraph 1 of the constitution, local administrative
bodies are public entities established to meet the common needs of the local
SGI 2018 | 60
Turkey Report
inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose decisionmaking bodies are determined by the electorate as described in law, and whose
structure is also determined by law. However, according to Article 127,
Paragraph 5 of the constitution, the central administration has the power of
administrative trusteeship over local governments, under a framework of legal
principles and procedures designed to ensure the functioning of local services in
conformity with the principle of administrative unity and integrity, to secure
uniform public services, to safeguard the public interest and to meet local needs
in an appropriate manner.
Past reforms driven by the process of alignment with the European charter of
local self-government have changed Turkey’s administrative structure and the
relationship between the center and subnational bodies. In December 2012, the
boundaries of metropolitan municipalities were revised to make public service
provision more effective and productive. The law has been criticized, as it
appears to set aside the principle of subsidiarity despite its “official” goal of
strengthening democracy at the local level. First, the legal status of provincial
administrations, villages and municipalities cannot be changed through a special
law without consultation or referendum; such changes require a constitutional
amendment. Second, the 2012 law essentially violates the principle of selfgovernment. And finally, it is questionable whether the effective delivery of
social services is indeed relevant to strengthening local democracy. In addition,
the Mass Housing Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi, TOKI), a central
administrative body and a patronage tool for the AKP, is empowered to
implement urban renewal projects almost anywhere.
In mid-2014, some mayors in southeast Anatolian provinces called for the
transfer of half of the state’s share yielded from oil drilling to the municipality
of the province in which oil is produced.
Soon after the 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections, two towns and 16
municipalities (14 towns and two neighborhoods in İstanbul) declared selfgovernment. The government took a strong stand against these declarations, and
judicial investigations were initiated against mayors and other people in charge.
Moreover, in the wake of the 15 July coup attempt and the government’s
declared state of emergency, numerous democratically elected mayors and
municipality staff of larger and smaller local administrations in various
provinces have been detained and replaced with trustees by the central
government.
Citation:
Ayşe Güner and Serdar Yılmaz, Son Değişikliklerin Türkiye’de Yerel Yönetimlerin Takdir Hakkı ve Hesap
Verilebilirlik Üzerindeki Etkisi, Marmara İktisat Dergisi, 1,2 Eylül 2017, 229-250.
Mehmet Zahid Sobacı, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Yerel Yönetimler Özerklik Şartı’na Uyumu: Özerklik Miti, 2015,
http://setav.org/tr/turkiyenin-avrupa-yerel-yonetimler-ozerklik-sartina-uyumu-ozerklik-miti/analiz/18570
SGI 2018 | 61
Turkey Report
Öz yönetim ilan edilen merkez sayısı 16’ya yükseldi, 20 August 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/oz-yonetim-ilanedilen-merkez-sayisi-16ya-yukseldi,306949
HDP submits bill for oil revenue sharing with local governments, 3 July 2014,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-submits-bill-for-oil-revenue-sharing-with-localgovernments.aspx?pageID=517&nID=68621&NewsCatID=348
National
Standards
Score: 5
The Regulation Concerning Public Service Standards was issued by the Council
of Ministers in July 2009. According to the regulation, all public entities
including municipalities must prepare service standards tables for the council’s
use.
The Ministry of Interior Affairs closely monitors the structure and quality of
services provided by municipal governments, through its own local agencies and
administrative trusteeship (through internal and external audits, and audits by
civil service inspectors). The Union of Municipalities of Turkey also offers
nationally or EU-funded training and technical support for municipalities in this
respect.
While United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support for the
implementation of local-administration reform in Turkey (LAR Phase 2) has
been concluded, Turkey still aims to fulfill some requirements of the European
Local Self-Government Charter. In this context, municipalities work to establish
departments tasked with monitoring, investment and coordination. The main
duties of these departments are to provide, monitor and coordinate public
institutions and organizations’ investments and services; to provide and
coordinate central-administration investments in the provinces; and to guide and
inspect provincial public institutions and organizations. However, the most
significant outstanding issues with regard to standardizing local public services
are essentially financial, technical and personnel-driven. Within the OECD,
Turkey remains the country with the largest regional disparities.
Citation:
Kamu Hizmetlerinin Sunumunda Uyulacak Usul ve Esaslara İlişkin Yönetmelik, Official Gazette, 31 July
2009,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090731.ht
m&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090731.htm (accessed 1 November 2017)
Ankara
Büyükşehir
Belediyesi
Hizmet
Standartları
Tablosu,
https://www.ankara.bel.tr/files/2913/4727/6681/tablolar_imar_8_1.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Adapt ablility
Domestic
Adaptability
Score: 3
In contrast to former tendencies of adopting international standards and
practices, centralizing power and control have become the major drivers for
restructuring governance during the review period. By a state of emergency
decree, the general chief of staff and head of the National Intelligent Service
SGI 2018 | 62
Turkey Report
(MİT) were affiliated with the presidency, all armed forces were reorganized
under the Ministry of National Defense and the Gendarmerie, and the Turkish
Police was aligned under the Ministry of Interior – in line with EU standards to
place military and defense forces under civilian control. A reorganization of
financial institutions including the Capital Market Board is underway. Despite
heavy pressure, the central bank remains largely independent. The justice
system has again been reorganized following the recent constitutional
amendments. The chairman of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK),
namely the Minister of Justice, appoints four members of the council and seven
members are in-effect elected by the AKP, given the party’s parliamentary
majority.
Turkey is a signatory of several international conventions that include binding
provisions, and the Turkish government has attempted to comply with these
international responsibilities. However, the government has fallen short on many
requirements, either legally or institutionally. On issues such as child labor,
gender issues, general working conditions
Even taking into consideration Turkey’s “trauma” after the failed coup and the
necessary declaration of a state of emergency, the wide-ranging and radical use
of state of emergency powers has diminished Turkey’s ability to meet
established standards of policymaking and the rule of law.
Citation:
Venice Commission, Turkey Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law N° 674 of 1 September
2016 Which Concern The Exercise of Local Democracy in Turkey, 6-7 October 2017,
“http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)021-e (accessed 1
November 2017)
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, “The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey” 8
MArch
2017,
http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/3258251/20170308-TurkeyInstitutionsEN.pdf/bbd65de5-86d4-466f-9bc1-185d5218bce7 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Bakanlar
Kurulu
yeniden
yapılandırılıyor,
Hürriyet,
8
June
2011,
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17982957.asp (accessed 5 November 2014)
Seriye Sezen, International versus Domestic Explanations of Administrative Reforms, Andrew Massey (eds.)
Public Sector Reform, Vol. II, Sage Publications, 2013.
Saray Kendine Hazine Kuruyor, Taraf, 29 January 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/saray-kendine-hazinekuruyor/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Yaşar Aydin, Erdoğan steht vor der Wegscheide, http://www.b-republik.de/aktuelle-ausgabe/erdogan-stehtvor-der-wegscheide (accessed 21 December 2016)
International
Coordination
Score: 5
As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, Turkey has hosted and assisted
more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, with only a limited proportion of
refugees living in state-run refugee camps. The EU-Turkey Statement has
become an important element of the European Union’s comprehensive approach
on migration. While Turkey accuses the European Union of falling behind on its
promises, the European Union claims that €3 billion were allocated through the
EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey in 2016 and 2017.
SGI 2018 | 63
Turkey Report
The U.S.-led coalition campaign to destroy the Islamic State group enters its
fourth year, with authorities declaring concrete improvements. However,
Turkey, a key player in the coalition, has also intensified its own separate efforts
in Syria. The Turkish military established its own mission in Northern Syria in
2016 and 2017. This mission has since developed into a full military
confrontation with the U.S.-backed People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkey
claimed the mission is part of Turkey’s efforts to fight all terrorist organizations,
including ISIL. In December 2016, a total of 3,359 people were taken into
custody for associating with ISIL militants and 1,313 were arrested. Since
November 2017, police officers have conducted almost daily raids on ISIL cells
across Turkey, with increasing intensity in the past few weeks.
In addition to the consultative, coordinative and cooperative structures within
NATO and the European Union, Turkey also participated in the Vienna and
Geneva talks as well as – after overcoming disputes with Russia – bilateral talks
with Russia, Iran and other regional players in search of a diplomatic solution to
the Syrian conflict.
Citation:
“Number of Syrian refugees
in Turkey reaches 3.2 million,” 4 October 2017,
https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2017/10/04/number-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-reaches-32-million
(accessed 1 November 2017)
“EU-Turkey Statement one Year on,” https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf
(accessed 1 November 2017)
“Anti-ISIL operations enter fourth year “, Hürriyet Daily News, 8 August 2017,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/anti-isil-operations-enter-fourth-year——116502 (accessed 1 November
2017)
“Turkey’s Interior Ministry releases report on its operations against ISIL,” 28 December 2016,
https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/turkey-s-interior-ministry-releases-report-on-its-operations-against-isil141132.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
Turkey to contribute more to UN peacekeeping, says PM, 29.09.2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkeyto-contribute-more-to-un-peacekeeping-says-pm/347611 (accessed 27 October 2015).
Murat Yetkin, BM’den Türkiye’ye mülteci uyarısı: Yıl sonuna dek 2,5 milyonu bulur, 27.4.2015,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/bmden-turkiyeye-multeci-uyarisi-yil-sonuna-dek-2-5milyonu-bulur-1344086/ (accessed 27 October 2015).
Turkey
rejects
EU
offer
on
refugee
crisis,
Aljazeera,
15
October
2015,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/turkey-rejects-eu-offer-refugee-crisis-151016194610039.html
(accessed 27 October 2015).
Turkey’s air force hits IS and PKK in Syria and Iraq, 26 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe33663005 (accessed 27 October 2015).
Organizational Reform
Self-monitoring
Score: 7
Several units in the hierarchic Turkish administration contribute to the
monitoring process directly or indirectly. These include the State Supervisory
Council, the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, the Directorate General of
Legislation Development and Publication, the Directorate General of Laws and
Decrees, and the Council of State. Each administrative institution has its own
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Turkey Report
internal control unit for monitoring how financial rules are implemented.
However, these units are not fully effective. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
and individual ministries also occasionally communicate with the parliament’s
general secretariat and other institutions and organizations with the aim of
reforming existing legislation.
Turkey has undergone an organizational change involving the creation of new
institutions, the merging or splitting of ministerial bodies, legal changes and
rapid personnel shifts. These developments make monitoring exceedingly
difficult. The OECD Sigma assessments provide some insight on actual
operations. As stated in the annual report of the PMO and of the Ministry of
Development, coordination and monitoring are major weaknesses in Turkish
public administration.
During the review period, the use of state of emergency powers and the debate
on Turkey’s transition to a presidential political system has intensified. In
January 2017, the State of Emergency Procedures Investigation Commission
was established to evaluate and resolve complaints related to the use of state of
emergency decree laws with the intention of unblocking administrative
objections. The government submitted a large harmonization reform package to
parliament in September 2017. The package contains changes to 132 articles in
16 laws. For the time being, it is unclear how and to what extent self-monitoring
would be considered relevant in the new constitutional framework that President
Erdogan and the AKP have in mind.
Citation:
Belgin Uçar Kocaoğlu and M. Kemal Öktem, “Belediyelerde Yönetsel Kapasite Değerlendirmesi: İç Anadolu
Bölgesi
Örneği,”
http://www.todaie.edu.tr/resimler/ekler/0578eb13c87fc28_ek.pdf?dergi=Cagdas%20Yerel%20Yonetimler%20
Dergisi (accessed 1 November 2017)
“132 maddelik anayasa uyum paketi Başbakanlık’ta,” http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/132-maddelikanayasa-uyum-paketi-basbakanlikta-318675.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“State of Emergency Commission receives nearly 60,000 applications,” Daily Sabah,
https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/08/25/state-of-emergency-commission-receives-nearly-60000applications (accessed 1 November 2017)
TC Maliye Bakanlığı, İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu, Kamu İç Denetim Rehberi,
http://www.idkk.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Mevzuat/Ucuncul%20Duzey%20Mevzuat/KamuIcDenetimRehberi.aspx
(accessed 27 October 2015)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15,
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf (accessed 27 October
2015)
Institutional
Reform
Score: 6
According to Law 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control, all public
institutions, including municipalities and special provincial administrations,
must prepare strategic plans. All public bodies have designated a separate
department for developing strategy and coordination efforts; however, these
departments are not yet completely functional. Maximizing strategic capacity
SGI 2018 | 65
Turkey Report
requires resources, expert knowledge, an adequate budget and a participatory
approach. The government lacks sufficient personnel to meet the requirements
of strategic planning, performance-based programs and activity reports. In this
respect, several training and internship programs have been established.
During the assessment period, Turkey developed sectoral strategies and action
plans for 2015 – 2018 on biotechnology, entrepreneurship, small and medium
scale enterprises, productivity and information society. Several strategy
documents were also prepared such as a National Employment Strategy. Also, a
National Strategy of Regional Development was prepared for the period 2014 –
2023. The central government’s institutions and agencies, local administrations,
universities, and the state economic enterprises (KİTs) also prepared strategic
plans.
Advocates of a presidential system, argue that it will bring greater efficiency and
effectiveness. However, the state of emergency decrees and practices, and the
urgent need to harmonize current legislation with recent constitutional
amendments undermines strategic thinking and improvements in public
administration.
Citation:
Kalkınma Bakanlığı, Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim Çalışma Grubu Raporu, Ankara, 2013.
Neşe Songör, “Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Stratejik Planlama ve Uygulamalara İlişkin Genel Bir
Değerlendirme” Strategic Public Management Journal (SPMJ), Issue No: 1, October 2015, 56-78.
Stratejik Yönetimde Kapasite Geliştirme Teknik Destek Projesi Revize Edilmiş Taslak Boşluk Değerlendirme
Raporu, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/html/54/Stratejik+Yonetimde+Kapasite+Gelistirme+Projesi, (accessed 27
October 2015)
Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/kurum (accessed 27 October 2015)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15,
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf (accessed 27 October
2015)
“Kamu yönetimi sil baştan: Cumhurbaşkanlığına bağlı tarım, çevre ve ekonomi ofisleri kurulacak,” 31 October
2017, http://www.diken.com.tr/kamu-yonetimi-sil-bastan-cumhurbaskanligina-bagli-tarim-cevre-ve-ekonomiofisleri-kurulacak/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
II. Execut ive Account abilit y
Citizens’ Participatory Competence
Policy
Knowledge
Score: 5
Except for the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, the government
generally does not adequately inform citizens about the content and
development of government policy. The head of government, ministers and high
government officials highlight success stories and policies, but do not offer
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Turkey Report
follow-up details. While there are no surveys that review how citizens get
information on government policy, it is evident that policymaking in Turkey is
not transparent or participatory. The government follows a selective and
perception management approach to informing citizens about governmental
processes. Although citizens in Turkey do reflect critically on politics in general,
they often learn of policies only after their implementation has begun. The
public’s level of knowledge about government affairs is low, as is the public’s
level of satisfaction with the government. However, this has not until recently
manifested in public unrest. Even the participatory mechanisms set up to assist
government policymaking do not work effectively. Civil society organizations
are unable to inform members or the public about ongoing developments. Policy
plans are kept largely secret or subject to last-minute changes, and the
parliament’s tendency to pass important measures as a part of an omnibus of
legislative packages has been increasingly criticized, because it confuses the
public.
Social media has become a widespread tool, even for the government in its
public relations. Ministries and municipalities use social media frequently,
though the information shared by executive officers is limited and
propagandistic. Academic studies concluded that people consider social media a
mechanism able to influence views and developments in two directions:
government can inform its citizens and the people can influence government
policies. In other words, social media can facilitate input-output and
implementation and feedback in governmental processes. However, the
accessibility and reliability of social media is a major obstacle. Only 52% of the
population is active on social media. Moreover, the recent restrictions and bans
on social media on the one hand and its limited presence on the other make it
ineffective. Furthermore, as is the case demonstrated in other countries, social
media may inform people, but it also tends to re-affirm biased views and
opinions among the public. As a result, social media may underline or even
exacerbate polarization tendencies in Turkey.
Citation:
“Orta
Vadeli
Program
açıklandı,”
27.09.2017,
http://aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/orta-vadeli-programaciklandi/920725 (accesssed 1 November 2017)
2018 Yılı Para ve Kur Politikası, 5 Aralık 2017, http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/b8c11e58-25df4149-a702-1669b6932a36/2018parakur.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID= (accessed 5 December 2017)
“More renewable investments high on Turkey’s energy agenda,” 1 November 2017,
https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2017/11/02/more-renewable-investments-high-on-turkeys-energy-agenda
(accesssed 1 November 2017)
Volkan Göçoğlu and Mehmet Devrim Aydın, Kamu Politikası ve Sosyal Medya İlişkisinin Toplumsal
Hareketler Bağlamında İncelenmesi, Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 2015, 8(37): 880-901.
“64. hükümetin sosyal medya reytingi yüksek” 9 March 2016, http://www.yenisafak.com/ekonomi/64hukumetin-sosyal-medya-reytingi-yuksek-2430912?p=1 (accesssed 1 November 2017)
Digital in 2017: Global Overview, Ihttps://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2017-global-overview
(accesssed 1 November 2017)
Mahmut Korkmaz, Sosyal Medya-Kamu Politikaları Etkileşimi: Gezi Parkı Olayları Üzerine Bir
Değerlendirme, MA Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2014.
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Turkey Report
Legislative Actors’ Resources
Parliamentary
Resources
Score: 6
The administrative organization of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
(TBMM) consists of departments that support the Speaker’s Office. The
conditions of appointment of the administrators and officers are regulated by
law (Law 6253, 1 December 2011). The administrative organization (including
the research services department and the library and archives services
department) is responsible for providing information as well as bureaucratic and
technical support to the plenary, the bureau, committees, party groups and
deputies; informing committees about bills and other legislative documents and
assisting in the preparation of committee reports; preparing draft bills in
accordance with deputy requests; providing information and documents to
committees and deputies; coordinating relations and legislative information
between the Assembly and the general secretary of the president, the Prime
Minister’s Office and other public institutions; organizing relations with the
media and public; and providing documentation, archive, and publishing
services (Article 3, Law 6253). Although the budget of the Assembly is part of
the annual state budget, it is debated and voted on as a separate spending unit.
The Assembly prepares its own budget without negotiation or consultation with
the government; yet, it does follow the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance.
During the review period, the 550 deputies were provided with 482 primary and
465 secondary advisers and 493 clerks. A total of 29 experts and 93 clerks are
assigned to the various party groups. The Turkish parliament attempted to
improve its human resources, especially for budget and final accounts processes,
and provide greater support for parliamentary members’ work. Within this
scope, the so-called Country Expertise Project covers 44 countries and employ
four experts and 47 officers. However, capacity-building remains a major
problem. The parliamentary library and research unit cannot effectively meet
demands for information. Following the 15 July failed coup, several staff
members were dismissed from the Assembly. In November 2017, the parliament
advertised 192 job vacancies, mainly in logistical services.
Citation:
TBMM
26.
Dönem
1.
Yasama
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/26_1_yd_faaliyet_raporu_20102016.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
“TBMM personel alımı başvuru sonuçları açıklandı!” 15 November 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/tbmmpersonel-alimi-basvuru-sonuclari-aciklandi-40646332 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“İşte karşılaştırmalı TBMM İç Tüzük teklifi,” 10 Temmuz 2017, http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-karsilastirmalitbmm-ic-tuzuk-teklifi,413621 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Nakamura, Robert and Omer Genckaya. 2010.“Assessment for the Turkish Grand National Assembly in
Support of the Implementation of the Public Financial Management Act.” Report to the World Bank.
Turkish Parliament: Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Research Center, Ankara, 2012.
SGI 2018 | 68
Obtaining
Documents
Score: 5
Turkey Report
According to Article 98 of the constitution, the Grand National Assembly of
Turkey exercises its supervisory power over the government by posing written
and oral questions, conducting inquiries, sponsoring general debates, offering
motions of censure or starting parliamentary investigations (Articles 96-113 of
the Rules of Procedure). Parliamentary committees or commissions may ask the
ministries to provide any information relevant to their sphere of duty (Article 41
of the Rules of Procedure). However, in practice some parliamentary inquiry
committees that deal with security, military or corruption issues have not been
able to collect information from the relevant authorities. In fact, several motions
of inquiry on sensitive issues for the government were rejected by parliamentary
the votes dominated by the ruling party. During the review period, an inquiry
into the so-called Paradise Papers affair submitted by the HDP was rejected.
Some invited public officials, mainly military officers, have not attended
parliamentary inquiry committee meetings. General Hulusi Akar, the chief of
the Turkish General Staff, and Hakan Fidan, head of the Turkish Intelligence
Service (MİT), testified before a parliamentary inquiry committee into the 15
July coup, but only by providing a written submission on 29 May 2017.
Citation:
Rules
of
Procedure
of
the
Grand
National
Assembly
of
Turkey,
http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/rules_of_procedure_en.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
“Paradise Papers’ inquiry rejected at Turkish Parliament, CHP to initiate censure motion,” Hürriyet Daily
News, 15 November 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/paradise-papers-inquiry-rejected-at-turkishparliament-chp-to-initiate-censure-motion-122475 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Darbe Komisyonu, Hulusi Akar ve Hakan Fidan’ı dinlemeden kapatıldı,” Cumhuriyet, 3 January 2017,
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/654848/Darbe_Komisyonu__Hulusi_Akar_ve_Hakan_Fidan_i_di
nlemeden_kapatildi.html# (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Hulusi Akar’a sorulan 10 soru ve cevapları,” 30 May 2017, https://www.memurlar.net/haber/671262/hulusiakar-a-sorulan-10-soru-ve-cevaplari.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“İşte
MİT’in
Meclis’e
gönderdiği
15
Temmuz
raporu,”
26
May
2017,
https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201705261028619119-mit-meclis-15temmuz-raporu/
(accessed
1
November 2017)
“Ruling party eventually nominates deputies for corruption commission,” Hürriyet Daily News, 26 June 2014,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ruling-party-eventually-nominates-deputies-for-corruptioncommission.aspx?pageID=449&nID=68329&NewsCatID=338 (accessed 5 November 2014)
Merve Tahiroğlu, Turkey’s Inquiry into Corruption Charges Will Change Little, 12 May 2014,
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/turkeys-inquiry-into-corruption-charges-will-changelittle/#sthash.IY3PjmJl.dpuf (accessed 5 November 2014)
Summoning
Ministers
Score: 5
According to Article 30 of the parliamentary rules of procedure, the prime
minister or ministers can attend committee meetings as a representative of the
government without invitation, and may talk on the subject matter at hand.
However, the prime minister or ministers may also delegate a senior civil
servant to be his or her representative at a committee meeting. If relevant, the
committee may ask a minister to explain a government position, but he or she is
not required to comply with this invitation if there is no legal obligation. While
parliamentary committees are not able to summon ministers for hearings, the
responsible minister may voluntarily decide to participate in a meeting.
Normally, the committees are briefed by high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats.
SGI 2018 | 69
Turkey Report
However, the ministers will always be present at the Planning and Budget
Committee when the previous year’s final accounts and following year’s draft
budget are discussed.
The annual activity reports of the TBMM do not provide any information on
how many ministers were summoned and how many times by which
parliamentary commission.
During the review period, the effects of the state of emergency, corruption
scandals, resignation of metropolitan mayors, economic instability and regional
affairs (e.g., Turkey’s involvement in the war in Syria, the massive movement of
refugees from neighboring countries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments in
and outside of Turkey) are highly visible. None of the government’s senior
executives took responsibility for or allowed an independent parliamentary
investigation into these issues. Instead, the government demonstrated a lack of
accountability vis-à-vis parliament.
Citation:
Rules
of
Procedure
of
the
Grand
National
Assembly
of
Turkey,
http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/rules_of_procedure_en.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
TBMM
26.
Dönem
1.
Yasama
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/26_1_yd_faaliyet_raporu_20102016.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017))
Summoning
Experts
Score: 7
According to Article 30 of the parliamentary rules of procedure, committees are
legally able to summon experts from non-governmental organizations,
universities or the bureaucracy to provide testimony without limitation. During
the review period, parliament made de facto use of this right, for example in
committees to investigate past military coups, the mass killings in Tunceli
(Dersim) in 1937 and 1938, and the Uludere incident of December 2011. The
parliamentary majority of the ruling party and the polarized atmosphere in
Turkish public policy, however, silence critical voices and diminishes the
impact of independent experts in the policymaking process. Some academics
and independent experts were invited to the parliamentary inquiry committee on
the FETO Terror Organization Coup attempt.
Citation:
Rules
of
Procedure
of
the
Grand
National
Assembly
of
Turkey,
http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/rules_of_procedure_en.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
Fethullahçı Terör Örgütünün (Fetö/Pdy) 15 Temmuz 2016 Tarihli Darbe Girişimi İle Bu Terör Örgütünün
Faaliyetlerinin Tüm Yönleriyle Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan
Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu, May 2017.
Task Area
Congruence
Score: 6
There are 18 standing committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey
(TBMM), which are generally established in parallel with structure of the
ministries. The most recent such committee, the Security and Intelligence
Commission, was established in spring 2014. Except for committees established
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Turkey Report
by special laws, the jurisdiction of each committee is not expressly defined by
the rules of procedure. Some committees have overlapping tasks. Committees
do not independently monitor ministry activity but do examine draft bills.
During discussions, committees may also supervise the ministry activity
indirectly. The State Economic Enterprises Commission does not audit
ministries but plays an important role in monitoring developments within their
administration. The distribution of the workload of these committees is uneven.
The Planning and Budget Commission is the most overloaded group, as every
bill possesses some financial aspect. Professionalization among committee
members is low. Neither the Strategic Plan nor the Activity Reports of the
TBMM emphasize the need to implement effective ministerial monitoring.
These committees recently stated their intent to recruit more qualified personnel
in certain areas.
Citation:
Nakamura, Robert and Omer Genckaya. 2010.“Assessment for the Turkish Grand National Assembly in
Support of the Implementation of the Public Financial Management Act.” Report to the World Bank.
TBMM İdari Teşkilatı 2015 Faaliyet Raporu, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/faaliyet_raporu_2015.pdf
(accessed 1 November 2016)
TBMM
26.
Dönem
1.
Yasama
Yılı
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/26_1_yd_faaliyet_raporu_20102016.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Audit Office
Score: 4
According to Article 160 of the constitution, the Court of Accounts is charged
on behalf of the Grand National Assembly with auditing all accounts related to
revenues, expenditures and properties of government departments that are
financed by the general or subsidiary budgets. The Court’s auditing capacity
was limited by the Law 6085 in 2010, but the Constitutional Court annulled
Article 79 regulating the audit of the Audit Court’s accounts in 2013. In
December 2012, the Court also annulled the provision limiting performance
auditing. In December 2013, a new article was added to the Regulation
Concerning the Submission of the Public Institutions’ Accounts to the Audit
Court, which meant that these accounts are to be excluded from the audit of the
Court until the end of 2016. Although the Court completed the reviews of 480
public institutions and 77 public enterprises’ accounts and found several corrupt
transactions in 2014, parliament does not have sufficient capacity to monitor
them effectively. In addition, about 15% of defense expenditures, including
several governmental funds related to defense, are not supervised by parliament.
Audit reports for 2016 on central and local administrations unveiled several
irregularities and illegal financial transactions. The Audit Court found that the
General Directorate of Highways (KGM) did not account for where TYR 6
billion for raising the quality of the roads went.
The parliamentary Final Accounts Committee reviews the TBMM’s accounts
annually. The Court of Accounts reports to parliament but is not accountable to
SGI 2018 | 71
Turkey Report
it. The parliament, from a list compiled by its Plan and Budget Commission,
elects the Court’s president and members. The Council of Ministers, however,
appoints court rapporteurs and prosecutors.
Citation:
“Sayıştay raporu: ‘Yolların kalitesi’ne ayrılan 6 milyarın nereye harcandığı belirsiz,”
http://www.diken.com.tr/sayistay-raporu-yollarin-kalitesi-icin-ayrilan-6-milyarin-nereye-harcandigi-bellidegil/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Sayıştay raporu Topbaş’ı yalanladı: AKP’li belediyeler borç içinde,” http://sendika62.org/2017/10/sayistayraporu-topbasi-yalanladi-akpli-belediyeler-borc-icinde/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
Fikret Bila, Sayıştay’ı daha etkisiz kılacak teklif, Milliyet daily newspaper, 21 April 2013,
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ sayistay-i-daha-etkisiz-kilacak teklif/siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/ 21.04.2013/
1696253/ default.htm, (accessed 5 November 2014)
Transparency International Government Defense Anti Corruption Index, Turkey 2015 Country Summary,
http://government.defenceindex.org/downloads/docs/turkey.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).
TC Sayıştay Başkanlığı 2014 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/tc/faaliyet/faaliyet2014.asp
(accessed 27 October 2015).
Ombuds Office
Score: 4
A law establishing a Turkish ombudsman office, called the Public Monitoring
Institution (KDK), was adopted in June 2012 and went into force in December
2012. The office is located within the Parliamentary Speaker’s Office, and is
accountable to parliament. The ombudsman reviews lawsuits and administrative
appeals (from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law) and ensures
that the public administration is held accountable. In 2014, a total of 5,639
petitions arrived at the Ombudsman and by the end of 2014 it had addressed
6,348 complaints (including the pending cases from 2013). According to the
KDK itself, two main obstacles hamper the efficacy of its work. First, the degree
of compliance with its decisions has been low, with only 20% of its released
decisions having been obeyed by public administrative bodies. Second, under
the current law, the KDK cannot conduct inquiries on its own initiative.
Moreover, the mandate of the office does not cover administrative actions
performed by military personnel.
The Parliamentary Petition Committee reviews citizens’ petitions (a total of
6,055 in 2015) and refers them to the relevant authority, when appropriate. The
Human Rights Investigation Commission has the authority to receive,
investigate and review complaints on human-rights issues. The Commission on
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is entitled to review complaints
regarding violations of gender equality.
Citation:
The Ombudsman Institution (2014) ‘The Chief Ombudsman Annual Press Conference,’
http://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/en/content_detail-322-779-the-chief-ombudsman-annual
-pressconference.html (accessed 10 December 2014)
T.C. Kamu Denetçiliği Kurumu 2016 Yıllık Rapor, https://www.ombudsman.gov.tr/contents/files/KDK-2016YILLIK-RAPORU.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
TBMM
Dilekçe
Komisyonu
24.
Dönem
Faaliyet
Raporu,
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/dilekce/docs/faaliyet_raporlari/24_yd_faaliyet_rapor.pdf (accessed 27
October 2015)
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Turkey Report
Media
Media Reporting
Score: 3
Despite the pluralistic media scene in Turkey, the Turkish media (TV channels,
newspapers, etc.) seems increasingly split between proponents and opponents of
the AKP government. Media freedoms deteriorated significantly after the failed
coup attempt of 15 July 2016. Numerous journalists were imprisoned without
indictment, which had an intimidating effect on other journalists. In
consequence, it is difficult for citizens to find objective or substantive in-depth
information on government policies and government decision-making. A mediaownership structure based on industrial conglomerates (the so-called
Mediterranean or polarized pluralist media model), the government’s clear-cut
differentiation between pro- and anti-government media, and the increasingly
polarized public discourse make it difficult for journalists to provide substantial
information to the public. News coverage and debates are mainly one-sided in
the pro-government media, while self-censorship is common in the mainstream,
neutral media. This is true even of the main news agencies, such as Anadolu,
ANKA, Doğan and Cihan. Superficial reporting, self-censorship and dismissal
of critical journalists from their job are widespread within the major media
outlets. Media ownership, and direct and indirect government intervention in
private media outlets and journalism obscure the objective analyses of
government policies. Thus, few newspapers, radio or TV stations offer in-depth
analysis of government policies or their effects concerning human rights, the
Kurdish issues, economic conditions and so on.
In 2017, internet freedom declined in Turkey and several internet sites were
blocked, including sites managed by journalists in exile. Social media services
and websites (e.g., Wikipedia) were also blocked. The Minister of
Transportation and Communication stated that Turkey is often mentioned
together with terrorist organizations on social media platforms. For example,
Wikipedia articles include content that suggests Turkey supports terrorist
organizations. Turkey is among 30 governments that employs “opinion shapers”
to promote government views and agendas, and counter government critics on
social media.
Citation:
Freedom on the Net 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017 (accessed 1
November 2017)
“Turkey spells out conditions to blocked site Wikipedia,” http://www.euronews.com/2017/05/11/wikipediareste-interdit-en-turquie (accessed 1 November 2017)
Derya Sazak, Batsın Böyle Gazetecilik (İmralı Zabıtları / Gezi / 17 Aralık), İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu,
2014.
Sabahattin Önkibar, İmamlar ve Haramiler Medyası, İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2015.
Basın Konseyi, “Kaygılıyız, Endişeliyiz” 13 Eylül 2015, http://www.basinkonseyi.org.tr/basin-konseyi/basinkonseyi-kaygiliyiz-endiseliyiz (accessed 27 October 2015)
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Turkey Report
Ethical Journalism Network, Censorship in The Park: Turkish Media Trapped by Politics and Corruption,
2014. http://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/assets/docs/021/035/02fc715-bc8d623.pdf (accessed 27 October
2015)
Aslı Tunç, Türkiye’de Medya Sahipliği ve Finansmanı: Artan Yoğunlama ve Müşteri İlişkileri, Paltform
24.org, ttp://platform24.org/projeler/1357/turkiye-de-medya-sahipligi-ve-finansmani (accessed 27 October
2015)
Parties and Interest Associations
Intra-party
Democracy
Score: 2
The centralized structure of the Political Parties Law (Law 2820) and the bylaws
of the major parties does not encourage intra-party democracy. Consequently,
strong party discipline is a common feature of all political parties. Although the
Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) do not discriminate on the basis of
ethnicity or religious orientation with regard to membership, contestation within
the parties is limited, at best. Dissenting voices are generally unable to find an
institutional path by which to engage in effective debate. Competition usually
revolves around party members’ ability to create local power centers through
which they compete for the attention and goodwill of the party leader.
Membership, party congresses and executive boards are not democratically
managed in most political parties. Three deputies were dismissed from the MHP
in March 2017. Several deputies of the AKP allegedly closer to illegal Gülenist
networks either resigned or faced being dismissed, especially in the aftermath of
coup attempt in 2016. On the request of the president and AKP chair, Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan, the mayors of six provinces, including Ankara and Bursa,
resigned in fall 2017. Erdoğan stated that “people do not take these offices as
independent candidates but as candidates shown by parties.”
The AKP determines its candidates through a somewhat complex process
involving a so-called tendency survey, interviews by special commissions and
the supreme board’s final say. However, candidates are ultimately chosen by the
party’s leadership, which consults “significant” public opinion leaders. The CHP
chose 301 out of 550 candidates through primary elections before the 7 June
2015 elections. However, most of the delegates were determined by the
trusteeship of the party’s central executive committee during the provincial and
township congresses.
Citation:
“AKP’de ‘metal fırtına’: Erdoğan, “Gökçek dahil 6 belediye başkanının istifasını istedi” iddiası,” 2 October
2017,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-gokcek-dahil-6-belediye-baskaninin-istifasini-istedi-iddiasi,455251
(accessed 1 November 2017)
“Turkey’s Erdogan Calls on Mayors to Resign, Hurriyet Newspaper Says,” 19 October 2017,
https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-10-19/turkeys-erdogan-calls-on-mayors-to-resign-hurriyetnewspaper-says (accessed 1 November 2017)
Mehmet Akıncı, Özgür Önder and Bilge Kağan Sakacı,”Is Intra-Party Democracy possible in Turkey? An
SGI 2018 | 74
Turkey Report
Analysis of Politcal Parties Act and Party By-Law,” European Scientific Journal, 2013, 9(11): 33-49.
AKP’nin milletvekili adaylarını belirleyecek ‘üst kurulu’nda kimler yer alıyor? 9 March 2015,
http://t24.com.tr/haber/akpnin-milletvekili-adaylarini-belirleyecek-ust-kurulunda-kimler-yer-aliyor,289760
(accessed 27 October 2015)
Ve AK Parti’de 3 dönem kuralı kalktı! 12 September 2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/ve-ak-partide-3donem-kurali-kalkti-1432915/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Tarhan Erdem, Parti içi demokrasi yine ertelendi, 5 October 2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/tarhanerdem/parti-ici-demokrasi-yine-ertelendi-1445250/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Bekir Ağırdır, Fuat Keyman, Tarhan Erdem, Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşmesi İçin Kapsamlı Bir Siyasi Parti ve
Seçim
Sistemi
Reformu
Önerisi,
İstanbul:
IPC,
2015,
http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Turkiyenindemokratiklesmesiicinkapsamli.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
Association
Competence
(Business)
Score: 5
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) is the most
influential business association in Turkey, representing more than 1.2 million
enterprises and members of various industry and business chambers. The
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), affiliated with
TOBB University in Ankara, provides extensive surveys in various fields. The
pro-Western, Istanbul-centric Turkish Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’
Association (TÜSİAD) and the conservative, Anatolian-centric Independent
Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’ Association (MÜSİAD), also have R&D units
and sponsor reports on political reforms, education, health care, security and
migration. The degree of direct impact of such proposals and amendments on
legislation is unknown, but the government regularly claims to take such reports
under consideration.
The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), an
umbrella organization founded in 2005 and representing seven business
federations, 211 business associations and over 55,000 entrepreneurs from
across Turkey, is believed to be close to U.S.-based preacher Fethullah Gülen
and his global network of enterprises and schools. In November 2015, the
Ankara police department launched a raid against the TUSKON headquarters as
part of an investigation into the illegal, allegedly terrorist network, called
“Parallel State Structure Terror Organization/Pro-Fethullah Terror
Organization.” Moves against the confederation and its members intensified
after the July 2016 failed coup.
Among labor unions, the ideological split between secular unions such as the
Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (KESK) and the Confederation of
Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and the more conservativeIslamic Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş) tends to prevent
common action. Moreover, it has become increasingly obvious over the last
decade that religiosity has become a strategic resource in creating solidarity
among union members, and in bolstering loyalty to the government. Turkey’s
oldest trade union, Türk-İş, has for many years prepared monthly surveys on
hunger and poverty thresholds and is included in the collective bargaining
process.
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Turkey Report
TÜSİAD repeatedly calls for an end to the state of emergency to improve
freedom and plurality in Turkey. However, the government argues that the state
of emergency is not a hurdle for business.
Citation:
“State of emergency no hurdle for business in Turkey: Erdoğan,” 18 May 2017,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/state-of-emergency-no-hurdle-for-business-in-turkey-erdogan-113283
(accessed 1 November 2017)
Ayse Bugra and Osman Savaskan, New Capitalism In Turkey The Relationship between Politics, Religion and
Business, Edward Elgar, 2014.
Ankara
police
raid
Gülen-linked
business
group
TUSKON,
6
November
2015.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-police-raid-gulen-linked-business-grouptuskon.aspx?pageID=238&nID=90838&NewsCatID=509 (accessed 7 November 2015)
Türk-İş, Açlık ve yoksulluk, http://www.turkis.org.tr/Aclik-Yoksulluk-catg91-pn1 (accessed 27 October 2015)
Association
Compentence
(Others)
Score: 3
The number of non-economic civil society organizations has increased in the
last decade, indicating a growing degree of public engagement within many
segments of Turkish society. In November 2017, 104,174 associations with
more than 10 million members were active. Most are professional, sport or
religious organizations. A total of 5,054 foundations are active nationwide. Most
foundations are social solidarity organizations, 22 are foreign foundations and
167 are religious organizations. Among others, TESEV, TESAV, TEPAV,
SETA, ASAM can be regarded as semi-professional think-tanks which conduct
research and publish reports on various policy issues. SETA is a very influential
pro-government policy research organization.
Most civil society organizations are not professionally organized, and lack
financial and human resources. The number of pro-government and pseudoCSOs (i.e., GONGOs) benefiting from public and EU funding has increased
recently. Several CSOs lack the staff, resources and visibility to carry out faceto-face fundraising. Turkey ranked 128 out of 135 countries in the World Giving
Index 2014 (WGI), but has not been included in subsequent indexes. The
government has excluded opponents from government decision-making
processes. Instead, the government has created its own loyal civil society
groups, such as TÜRGEV – a foundation led by President Erdoğan’s son, which
has gained political influence in the executive and expanded its financial
resources.
Local and global environmental pressure groups such as Greenpeace have
increasingly demonstrated against dam and hydroelectric-energy projects
throughout Turkey, but their protests are regularly suppressed by the security
forces and subjected to criminal investigations. The Turkish Foundation for
Combating Soil Erosion for Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitat
(TEMA) is the most established environmental organization in Turkey with
500,000 volunteers.
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Turkey Report
The Association for Support of Women Candidates (KA.DER) has for years
promoted the equal representation of women and men in all walks of life.
KA.DER sees equal representation as a condition for democracy and calls for
equal representation in all elected and appointed decision-making positions. It
conducts several EU- and UNDP-sponsored projects and advocate its objectives.
The initiave Oy ve Ötesi Girişimi (Vote and Beyond) in collaboration with the
Unions of Bars of Turkey, several bars and the Checks and Balances Network
monitored the local and presidential elections in 2014 and two parliamentary
elections in 2015 with tens of thousands of volunteers spanning the spectrum of
political affiliations and ideological backgrounds. Upon receiving training, these
volunteers acted as independent election observers and reported the accuracy of
the official election results.
In the wake of the failed coup in July 2016 and the government’s declaration of
the state of emergency, hundreds of foundations and CSOs that were allegedly
part of the Gülenist movement were shut down, their assets confiscated and their
members detained. Arguably, some religious orders and communities have
replaced the Gülenist movement, and extended their own networks under the
name of various solidarity associations. The state of emergency has extremely
diminished the influence of civil society on governmental actions.
Citation:
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olaylarını
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http://www.tema.org.tr/web_149662_1/entitialfocus.aspx?primary_id=1681&target=categorial1&type=2&detail=single (accessed 1 November
2017)
“Türkiye’deki
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http://insamer.com/tr/turkiyedeki-dusunce-kuruluslari_157.htm
(accessed 1 November 2017)
CIVICUS,
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2016,
http://civicus.org/documents/reports-andpublications/SOCS/2016/summaries/SoCS-full-review.pdf (accessed 1 November 2016)
Oy ve Ötesi Derneği, Seçim Sonuçları Değerlendirmesi 2015, http://oyveotesi.org/1-kasim-2015-genelsecimleri/1-kasim-2015-secim-sonuc-degerlendirmeleri/
Doğader,
http://www.dogader.org/index.php/aciklama/72-marpmarmara-vre-platformu-ve-tptke-vreplatformu-sekreteryalari-doder-de
Ka.Der, Projects, http://www.ka-der.org.tr/en-US/Page/Show/665/project.html