Final-Version-BALIWAG-eBOOK-Vol2.pdf

To All The People, In Some Ways Or The Other Whose Lives Have Been Connected To Our Town Baliwag, This History Compilation Book Is For You….. Baliwag late 1800’s Volume 2 is Dedicated to the Heroes of Baliwag… FELIPE SALVADOR: SALVADOR DEL MUNDO. Felipe Salvador, "Apo Ipe", the Supremo of Santa Iglesia, a religious/revolutionary cult group which had its base at the foothills of Mt. Arayat and which wielded influence over the Central Luzon area. From El Renacimiento Filipino. During the years of the Philippine Revolution, a man who spent much of his time communing with God in the slopes of mystical Mount Arayat, organized a controversial religious movement that led armed campaigns against Spaniards and the succeeding colonial masters, the Americans, but remained alienated from the Katipunan. Dismissed as a dangerous ‘bandolero’ by Americans, Felipe Salvador, founder of the cult group Sta. Iglesia, would eventually be executed for his perpetrations in Pampanga, Bulacan, Nujeva Ecija and Tarlac. Felipe Salvador (“Apo Ipe”) was born on 26 May 1870 in Baliwag, Bulacan, the child of a well-off family. His father, Prudencio had been an official in the Spanish government. The Salvadors had many relatives in nearby Pampanga province and it is even possible that Felipe was born there as his name is not recorded in the canonical books of Baliwag. “ I think he is an authentic hero who paid the supreme sacrifice for our country’s freedom. Remember, he relentlessly fought against both the Spaniards and the Americans without compromising his principles in life”. Words quoted from Baliwag Former Mayor Rolando Salvador ( Grandson of Apo Ipe, from Felipe Salvadors first cousin, Teofilo Salvador ) FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS: From the The Life and Times of "EL CAPITAN”, Written by Mario Vergel De Dios, Jr.also kanown as Sonny V Goodie. The Commonwealth Directory of the Philippines (1939 Encyclopedic edition by Cornejo), which was the "Who's Who" source of information at the time, described Lolo Fernando as; "Don Fernando, one of the wealthiest proprietors of Baliwag, was born in San Rafael, Bulacan, on November 25, 1864. He was educated in the private schools of his home town and in the city of Manila, and was Cabeza de Barangay for twelve years; then Teniente Mayor for three years during the Spanish government and, lastly, Capitan Municipal, in 1897. He was made a political prisoner during the revolution against Spain. He served the Philippine Army under General Aguinaldo and, when the war with the United States was over, he engaged himself in farming, and had since been one of the biggest rice producers of Bulacan. He is married and has several children, who are now prominent in their chosen business and professional careers. A Roman Catholic." El Capitan, is the father of the late Baliwag Mayor Florentino Vergel De Dios There are more heroes in Baliwag that needs to be uncovered, written accounts of their heroism, not yet discovered…but rest assured, we have more Patriots and Heroes in Baliwag. We welcome our Fellow Baliwageños to contribute their records and pictures, so future generation of Baliwageños can find their roots and remember our proud heritage. April 15, 2013 was the day we started putting together the gathered History Records and Information. Collection of the History Records and Information began in the year 2000. We believe that we don’t write history, but rather put together Information and Records, compile them to make a History Book. The very people in the History Compilation wrote the history. Anak ni Ben Radyo ( Son of Ben Radio ) dslauchang@yahoo.com Publisher: Baliwag Society International https://www.facebook.com/groups/125738407618421/ Table of Contents Volume 2 of 5 1. Preface 447 2. The First Town Election in Asia 450 3. The New York Times Coverage of the War 456 4. The United States Indemnify Spain for $20 million 476 5. The Philippines an Integral part of the United States of America 508 6. Why we fight the Filipinos 524 7. Americas First Vietnam- The Philippine Insurrection 552 8. The Transport Ships 595 9. Collection Pictures from the War Front 663 10. Baliwag’s Unsung Hero 686 11. Bustos and San Rafael 688 12. Young’s Scouts in Baliwag 708 13. The American Period 744 14. Notes 835 Appendix- New York Times 1898-1899 News Clippings Preface Baliwag Año 1733 Hello, You have started to turn the pages of our e-Book, Volume 2. The book is a compilation of Historical Records and Pictures, that revolves around our Hometown of Baliwag. Collection of World History Records are also included to give light as to how Baliwag played a part in World History We have thought of working on the book as our dedication to our fellow Kababayan’s who are always in constant search of their roots. And people around the world whose families were touched and played a role in shaping Baliwag as it is now and what the future may hold. The new generation of Baliwageños will have an available Historical Records of our hometown that is dynamically upgradeable as the years go by, let us hope no records will be left untouched, or unrecorded. Please continue to contribute your records and pictures. The book is subdivided into Años or Years, in clusters of a 50 year span for each chapter, actual written records started from the year or Año 1733, the founding year for our town. You can actually view the references and footnotes by placing your mouse cursor at the blue highlighted references and footnotes, press Ctrl, then left click on your mouse, that will bring you to the actual reference or articles pertaining to that topic. The very last part of the book, is actually a repository of your Family Heritage Records….that can also be constantly upgraded as the years go by. Enjoy as you turn the pages of our e-book, THE e-BOOK IS FREE FOR PERSONAL and PUBLIC VIEWING.…..not to be sold in any manner or form. 447 BALIWAG SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL A Non-Profit Organization Baliwag having an elevation of 78 feet above sea level where the St. Augustine Church and Glorietta stands, and an average of 70 feet above sea level within the towns territory, holds the highest ground among the surrounding municipalities. Source: http://maps.google.com/maps?oe=utf-8&rls=org.mozilla:enUS:official&client=firefox-a&q=baliuag+bulacan+map 448 &um=1&ie=UTF8&hq=&hnear=0x339700001fd7ca4b:0x48933424030540dd,Baliuag,+Philippines&gl=u s&sa=X&ei=GYt9UYWCD5CWjAL294CADg&ved=0CDEQ8gEwAA 14°35′N 121°0′E http://onlyinthephilippines.com/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines The Ohio & Kentucky Train Line Schedule Book 1890-1920s, the train line that ferries most of the soldiers to the war front during the Spanish-American War...on to Baliwag, Bulacan Philippines. 449 The First Town Election in Asia held in Baliwag After The First Philippine Republic was Inaugurated, The Philippine-American War started some months later. 450 Pvt. William Grayson standing on the very spot where he fired the first that started the Philippine-American War. Pvt. William Grayson standing on the very spot where he fired the first shot that started the Philippine-American War. 451 Baliwag Market and Plaza Mid to Late 1800’s - this rare picture is courtesy of Derrick Sarmiento Dimapilis 452 The river taxi is how the Baliwageños conduct their daily business. Lawtons Bull Train with provisions and halted on the road for rest 453 General Henry Lawton, Scott’s Battery Baliwag May 2 1899 454 455 The Bustos- Baliwag River along Sabang that separates the Pilipinos and the Americans The New York Times actual newspaper releases of those historic events US Troops entering Baliwag (William Dinwiddie/Hulton Archive — Getty Images ) 456 This could how it looks like when Katipuneros in Baliwag, by the Baliwag Church Convent waiting to engage Lawton’s army. 457 The Gattling gun that drove the Katipuneros to the North and suffered heavy losses. 458 459 Published: May 3, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times *Note Baliwag was spelled Balinag…. 460 American Catholic Soldiers praying infront of the battered church Baliwag St Augustine Church used by soldiers May 1899 as their garrison. 461 Col. Owen Summers, 2nd OR, leaving Baliwag with 6th Bns May 4, 1899 462 The Gonzalez Home ( currently The Baliwag Museum ) used by Lawton as his headquarters, along the then Rizal Street, now the Cagayan Valley Highway. 463 American soldiers getting some rest before pursuing the retreating Katipuneros 464 465 Gregorio Del Pilar ready to defend Baliwag Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times *The Bolo chief believed to be Capitan Fernando Vergel De Dios serving as town official under the First Philippine Republic. The First Democratically Exercised Election in Asia Took Place at Baliwag After Fernando Vergel De Dios ( Serving as the Gobernadorcillo at the time under General Emilo Aguinaldos First Philippine Republic )was Captured on May 5, 1899 in Baliwag. ( See Volume 1, page 94 under Fernando Vergel De Dios, written by Mario Vergel De Dios Jr. ) 466 The newspaper that announced the first election with Francisco Guerrero serving as the first Mayor of Baliwag under the American Government. Note Baliwag is still surrounded by nipa huts at the time around the church. 467 468 Published: May 10, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times The gallant Katipuneros ready to protect Baliwag 469 Young’s Scouts Baliwag May 11, 1899 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 American troops marching to the North of Baliwag 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 Katipuneros ready to defend the motherland 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 The Philippines Made An Integral Part of The United States of America 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 The First Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899 by Luzviminda Francisco (1973) *With apologies to Mexicans, American Indians and other early victims of American imperialism. Introduction One of the most startling phenomena of recent Philippine history has been the development of a popular movement calling for the relinquishing of Philippine sovereignty and for political re-union with the U.S. as the 51st state. Although the "statehood movement" was understandably treated as something of a joke when it first surfaced several years ago, its popular reception and rapid growth, especially in the face of surging Philippine nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments, demands that the movement and the ideology which it represents be carefully analyzed. It may well be that the statehood movement is a curio, a quirk in the Philippine body politic, a nostalgic last remembrance of colonialism, emerging now only to be inevitably and inexorably swept away by the tide of history. These are comforting thoughts, but there remain some nagging doubts. Philippine nationalism has, historically, been poorly defined. For a myriad of reasons, American colonialism as perceived by Filipinos has been qualitatively different from, say, Vietnamese perception of their relationship with the French. One must reluctantly conclude that perhaps the most serious cancer of twentiethcentury Philippine society has been the traumatizing effect of mystification and false consciousness regarding the American colonial period. For the student of Philippine history, such a state of affairs is not merely discouraging or upsetting, it is tragic. This is true for many reasons, but it is especially true for one reason in particular. The degree to which Filipino false consciousness exists is the measure of American success in obliterating from popular consciousness knowledge of what American historians have chosen to call (when they refer to it at all, which is seldom) the "Philippine Insurrection." 1 One prize of victory is that the winners get to write the history books. This was never so true as it has been about the Philippine-American War, and this fact, more than any other, has denied to Filipinos all but the merest scraps of 552 distorted information about one of the most heroic struggles ever waged in modern times; a struggle waged against implacable odds and at terrible cost. The Philippine-American War, by which name it should properly be known, is one of those bits of historiography which-like the American Indian Wars-seems to have sunk beneath the surface of popular awareness. 2 Most Americans have never heard of it, most Filipinos understand it only through the prism of the victors' own account of how the war was waged and won. And yet the Philippine-American War was one of those illuminating moments of history which threw a shaft of light on an era. As far as Filipinos are concerned, an understanding of our liberation struggle at the turn of the century is without question or doubt the prerequisite, the starting point for a genuine understanding of modern Philippine society. It is ironic that it has taken half a century and the remarkably similar situation in Indochina to re-focus attention on the Philippine struggle for national liberation against the forces of American imperial aggression. In all, save the ultimate outcome, history has uncannily repeated itself in Vietnam, a fact which should be driven home to American apologists who hold that Vietnam is an "aberration" of U.S. policy, unrepresentative of American foreign policy in general, but simply a situation brought about by a series of mistakes and miscalculations. Leaving aside the obvious fact that "mistake" is equated with being beaten, and the curious frequency with which imperialist "aberrations" seem to crop up, it is important for Filipinos to recognize that we must vindicate ourselves by comprehending our own history. With such a view in mind and within the limits of this essay, attention will be focused on the three aspects of the war which are the most critical and yet, for reasons which are perhaps obvious, have attracted the least amount of attention, let alone analysis. Therefore, attention will not be focused so much on the war against Spain, which preceded the Philippine-American War, nor will it deal with the political infighting in the Malolos Government or General Emilio Aguinaldo's surrenderist prevarications. Attention will be focused on the nature of America's policy of aggression, the depth of popular mass resistance to the American forces and the duration of the struggle in what became, ultimately, suicidal refusal to capitulate to imperialism. Spain never had an easy time in pacifying its Philippine colony and in the course of over three centuries of colonial rule, scarcely a year went by which did not witness rebellion in one form or another somewhere in the archipelago. The fragmented, insular nature of the country and the separate regional, ethnic and language groupings made it difficult to coordinate a nationwide antiSpanish struggle, but at times the Filipinos came close to achieving a broad united front against the foreign foe. As early as 1587, for example, a secret 553 society was formed in Manila by Magat Salamat which spread throughout Central Luzon to the Visayas and as far south as Borneo. This early movement was not typical, however, and it was to be more than 300 years before such unity of action was again achieved. Subsequent rebellions were commonly local or regional affairs, sparked by local conditions and grievances. Sometimes they lasted for a surprisingly long period of time, as in Bohol, where Spanish authority was denied for over eighty years. The Islamic areas of Mindanao and Sulu were never really conquered. Spain was always able to exploit divisions in Philippine society in such a way as to prevent a coordinated national struggle and this situation was maintained until the last decades of the nineteenth century. The rise of a native moneyed class, consisting mainly of Chinese-native (or Indio) mestizo elements, gave rise to a liberal reformist movement anxious to win greater political and economic concessions from Spain. The Propaganda Movement, as it came to be called, was essentially an assimilationist effort. Its leaders aimed, ultimately, at closer ties with Spain. (It was during this time that the hispanized Chinesemestizos began referring to themselves as Filipinos, a term previously reserved for Spaniards born in the colony.) But the Propagandists made little headway against entrenched and often reactionary Spanish authority. The failure of the Propagandist efforts spurred the formation in 1892 of the Katipunan, a secret society which, after some initial indecision, began to recognize the futility of the earlier reformist efforts. By 1895 independence became an increasingly realistic prospect. Spain was having a difficult time suppressing the Cubans, who were then in revolt, and her ability to sustain a similar effort in the Philippines was an open question. By 1896 Katipunan ranks had swollen to 30,000 and fighting between the Katipunan forces and the Spanish commenced. The founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, lost control over the organization in March 1897 when Emilio Aguinaldo was elected as the head of a newly formed Revolutionary Central Government. After Aguinaldo's victory the revolutionary forces became increasingly prone to vacillation and compromise as a number of frustrated elitist reformers began to attach themselves to the organization. In June a Provisional Republican Government was established at Biak-NaBato, Bulacan, and this event initiated several months of dilatory negotiation with the Spanish. The older Katipuneros argued for the continuation of the military struggle along guerrilla lines, but the reformist and assimilationist elements began to see the possibility of finally achieving their long-sought-after 554 goals via negotiation. After hesitancy and debate, a compromise treaty was negotiated in November by a wealthy mestizo, Pedro Paterno. Under the terms of the treaty, the Spanish governor general, Primo de Rivera, promised to consider the reformist demands in exchange for the surrender of the rebel army. Satisfied with such weak promises and even more by the promised initial payment of P400,000 to himself and his staff, Aguinaldo and his men voluntarily exiled themselves to Hong Kong, but Spanish refusal to promulgate reforms led to agitation for a renewed military confrontation. Fighting broke out again in February 1898 and by May, when the American Commodore George Dewey steamed into Manila Bay to attack the Spanish fleet, the Spanish Army (the Guardia Civil) had been all but thoroughly beaten. The Spanish, in fact, controlled only the area of the old walled city of Manila. Aguinaldo had, meanwhile, been intermittently negotiating with the Americans in Hong Kong and Singapore, and he returned to the Philippines to resume command of the Filipino forces with Dewey's sanction and with (verbal) assurances that the Americans would aid the Filipinos in securing their independence. A three-way stalemate persisted until August, Dewey in Manila Bay without forces to land, the Spanish holed up in the walled city, and the Filipinos dug in along the perimeter of the city. The Spanish decided they would rather surrender to the Americans than to the Filipinos and in August 1898 a bizarre, tragi-comic "battle" was quite literally staged between the Spanish and the Americans, ostensibly to preserve Spanish "honor"-although six died in the farce. The resulting surrender terminated three centuries of Spanish colonialism and the American forces, newly reinforced, took possession of Manila. By autumn 1898 it was clear that the Americans intended to retain the Philippines as a Pacific colony. American troop strength was increasing and Admiral Dewey showed no sign of weighing anchor. Battle lines around Manila continued to be drawn roughly as they had remained at the end of the mock battle against the Spanish in the previous August. The Americans held the city and had trenches along its perimeter, facing Filipino trenches along a semi-circle of several miles. The Treaty of Paris, designed to end the war with Spain and to cede the Phlippines to the U.S., was signed in December and awaited confirmation in the U.S. Senate, which required a two-thirds majority vote as necessitated by the Constitution. When Congress reconvened in January 1899, the proannexationist faction in the Senate held a clear majority, but were one or two votes shy of the required two-thirds 555 majority they needed to ratify the treaty. Voting on the treaty was scheduled for Monday, February 6, and during the week preceding it seemed fairly clear to most observers that the McKinley Administration was not likely to rally enough support in the Senate to win ratification. By implication, this put American retention of the Philippines in jeopardy. 3 In the Philippines, insults-and occasionally shots-were being traded across the trenches by the two opposing armies throughout the month of January. But war did not come until the evening of February 4, 1899, when general fighting erupted all along the line. The American command in Manila claimed at the time that the Filipinos initiated the fighting, but there seems little doubt that the Americans themselves started the war and as much was later admitted by U.S. commanders. That the outbreak of the war was carefully orchestrated to influence the outcome of the treaty vote in the Senate seems almost beyond question, and although initiating a war to influence the passage of legislation seems a tactic singularly lacking in subtlety, historically it seems to work and in this instance it proved successful. The news of the fighting-and the false information as to its instigation- was wired to Washington and its dramatic effect persuaded the Senate to ratify the treaty by a margin of one vote. The First Battle From the very beginning, superior American firepower had a telling effect, and although the Filipino troops bravely stood their ground, weaponry ensured the one-sidedness of the conflict. Dewey steamed up the Pasig River and fired SOO-pound shells into the Filipino trenches at close range with pulverizing effectiveness. The first battle was so one-sided that the American troops jokingly referred to it as a "quail shoot" and dead Filipinos were piled so high that the Americans used the bodies for breastworks. A British witness to the carnage commented, "This is not war; it is simply massacre and murderous butchery." 4 Although the Americans had been sending reinforcements to the Philippines throughout the fall of 1898 (there were 21,000 U.S. troops in the Islands by the start of the war) they were still outnumbered by the Filipinos. But the Filipino troops were at a dreadful disadvantage owing to their lack of rifles. Only one man in three had a gun; others fought with bolos and spears or simply waited to snatch up a rifle from a fallen comrade. Although some of their weapons were fairly new Remingtons and Mausers captured from the Spanish or smuggled in from abroad, many were rust-eaten museum pieces, more dangerous to the user than to the intended target. Thousands of Filipinos were killed in the first battle, hundreds more died soon after from wounds.5 Few prisoners were taken by the Americans, and Red 556 Cross personnel reported an extremely high ratio of dead to wounded on the battlefield, indicating"... the determination of our soldiers to kill every native in sight ... "6 For the Filipino patriots, the opening battle in what proved to be one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the sorry history of imperial aggression produced two sharp lessons. It was clear that the Filipinos could not hope to survive by fighting on American terms of fixed position, set-piece battles in the classical military tradition. The Philippine Army was quickly forced to resort to mobile warfare where their superior knowledge of the terrain and the universal support they enjoyed among the people could be utilized to their advantage. Although an overt policy of guerrilla war was not specifically enunciated until the following November, guerrilla tactics were employed out of necessity immediately after the initial rout at Manila. The first battle also indicated to the Filipinos that they were faced with a foe which gave no quarter and which was prepared to disregard the fundamental rules of warfare. The Americans were contemptuous of Filipinos generally and they had little respect for the fighting ability of the Philippine Army. They referred to the Filipinos as "niggers," "barbarians," and "savages," reflecting both the racist and imperialist attitudes of American society at large. The Americans were elated by their initial success and their commander, the rather wooden and unimaginative Gen. Elwell Otis, confidently predicted that the war would be ended in a matter of weeks. Otis had convinced himself that the opposition to U.S. rule came only from the Tagalog "tribe," which (it was claimed) was only one of eighty or so "tribes" in the Philippines. This theme, which was trotted out by domestic U.S. annexationists at every opportunity, gave the impression that the war in the Philippines was but a slight variation of the familiar Indian wars of the American West. After the devastating first battle, the Filipino Army retreated into Central Luzon, fighting rear-guard actions as it went. Malolos, capital of the Philippine Republic, quickly fell and within the conventional framework within which he was operating, Otis equated this event with the fall of the Philippine Government, which in turn would mean the surrender of the Philippine Army. Or so he hoped. Confident predictions of imminent victory were forthcoming again and it was with some degree of dismay that the Americans began to realize that Aguinaldo considered his "capital" to be wherever he himself happened to be camped-which was always just out of reach of the slow-moving American columns. It was with a growing sense of uneasiness that the American command began to realize that the further they were drawn into 557 Central Luzon and the more they had to disperse their forces, the more difficult it became to defend themselves against counter-attack, ambush, and harassment by the highly mobile Philippine Army, which was itself free of the need for the ponderous supply chain required by the Americans. The odds, which were so disastrously against the Filipinos in early February, began to even up. There was another-and to the more perceptive American commanders, rather more disturbing-character to the fighting. It gradually dawned on the Americans that the reason the Filipino troops could move around so easily without concern for a supply base, and the reason information and advice were so difficult to elicit from the native population, were due to the fact that the Aguinaldo government and the Philippine nationalist cause had the total support of the Philippine masses. They slowly began to realize that their major foe was not really the formally constituted, but in many ways ineffectual, Philippine Army; rather, it was the Filipino people, who, having finally gotten rid of the Spanish, were unrelentingly and implacably hostile to American imperialist designs. The implications of this understanding were fully realized only later and in the bloodiest manner imaginable. But as early as April 1899, General Shafter gave grisly portent to the future conduct of the war: "It may be necessary to kill half the Filipinos in order that the remaining half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of life than their present semibarbarous state affords."7 558 The American command had presumably been taken in by its own press releases. Gen. Arthur MacArthur 8, Otis's subordinate (and later replacement), commented, "... I believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I did not like to believe that the whole population of Luzon-the native population, that is-was opposed to us..."9 But this he was "reluctantly compelled" to believe because the "unique system of warfare" employed by the Filipino Army" ... depended upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population." 10 With the approach of summer and with victory still beyond their grasp, the War Department began to suggest to Otis that he might need more troops. Embarrassed by his earlier confident predictions and even more so by his growing inability to produce tangible results, he at first declined the offer, but then he reversed himself and surprised the Department by asking for 60,000 more troops. Otis was limited by his textbook approach to war and failed to realize that American "victories" in which the Filipinos were "scattered" or "routed" were next to meaningless. Otis was, in keeping with the time-honored phrase, winning the battles but losing the war. Few of the battles were actually more than skirmishes and hit-and-run affairs, but on June 10, 1899, in Laguna, Filipino Generals Ricarte and Noriel with 3,000 men caught an American division of 4,000 in a cross-fire ambush and cut it to pieces. Battles of this size became increasingly rare, however. By October all the American reinforcements had arrived and it was decided that the best way to terminate the war was to capture Aguinaldo and his staff. An ambitious three-pronged encirclement campaign, encompassing the whole of Central Luzon, was decided upon. One column went north from Manila along the rail line, another went by sea to the Lingayen Gulf port of Dagupan, and a third went north from Manila along the eastern rim of the Central Luzon plain in a giant pincer movement. The idea was to prevent Aguinaldo's escape into the mountains of northern Luzon. Aguinaldo did manage to escape, however, and from his mountain headquarters he issued orders to formally adopt the guerrilla policy. While there was ambivalence about this move from some of the more orthodox members of Aguinaldo's staff, the directive in actuality simply reflected the de facto situation and the hopelessness of engaging in frontal and positional warfare against the vastly strengthened U.S. forces. Political circumstances also dictated a policy of protracted warfare. The Filipinos began to realize that although outright military victory was unlikely at best, simply by keeping their forces intact they preserved the possibility of an ultimate political victory. 559 The Filipinos had some knowledge of the divisions being created in American society by the McKinley Administration's imperialist policy. The AntiImperialist League was strongly condemning the war and the opposition Democrats were taking a position against the retention of the Philippines. It appeared likely, even a year before the event, that the November 1900 presidential election would be fought on the issue of McKinley's colonial policy. This held out some hope at least for a political settlement of the war favorable to the Philippines. The war took on a somewhat new character after the completion of the Central Luzon campaign. From November 1899, the U.S. considered the entire Philippines to be occupied territory-as indeed it was-and the American command set about establishing garrisons throughout Luzon and the rest of the country. Filipino guerrillas were no longer treated as soldiers of an opposing army but were considered to be bandits and common criminals (ladrones). When captured they were treated as such. With the break-up of the Philippine Army, Otis once again felt he had victory within his grasp . Even MacArthur, usually more realistic about such matters, announced, "The so-called Filipino Republic is destroyed."11 But two developments forced them to once again regret their sanguine reports to the War Department. First, the fighting simply continued. Chasing Aguinaldo into the mountains had made no difference, breaking up the Filipino Army made no difference, and garrisoning the archipelago simply invited guerrilla attacks on isolated outposts. Secondly, as the Americans spread their forces and their garrisons to other areas of Luzon and to other islands, they found they were confronted with exactly the same kind of public hostility and guerrilla opposition which characterized the situation in Central Luzon. The notion that opposition to the U.S. was confined to. the Tagalogs was simply wrong. The Americans were at war with seven million Filipino people and wherever they went in the Islands they took the war with them-a disconcerting state of affairs and one to which Otis could never reconcile himself. Settling in for a Long War The war, far from being over, had entered a new and far more difficult phase for the Americans. The enemy was now no longer simply the Philippine Army, the remnants of which had been scattered over the whole of Luzon in any case. Now the Americans found themselves harassed and attacked throughout the Islands by poorly trained and poorly organized but fanatically determined peasant irregulars. MacArthur observed: " ... all regular and systematic tactical operations ceased; but as hostile contact was established throughout the entire zone of activity an infinite number of minor affairs resulted, some of which reached the dignity of combats."12 560 A major problem for the Americans resulted from their inability to penetrate the guerrilla infrastructure. They soon began to realize, to their dismay, that a whole underground network of dual government loyal to the guerrillas existed, even in areas considered thoroughly "pacified." When a town was occupied the stars and stripes flew, and gratifying expressions of loyalty and support for the American cause were publicly proclaimed by town officials. But reliable information about the guerrillas was almost never forthcoming, supplies and equipment were forever disappearing, and occasionally an American soldier would stray too far from camp and be found the next day hacked to pieces by bolo. Albert Robinson, one of a handful of American newsmen covering the war (and the most ingenious when it came to circumventing Otis's strict censorship), wrote that unqualified U.S. control in the Islands extended "about as far as a Krag-Jorgensen could throw a bullet."13 By early 1900 U.S. outposts were being established everywhere.14 As a rule the Filipinos allowed the Americans to capture and occupy any town they wished without opposition. Otis was so deceived by this that he once again declared flatly that the war was over, hoping perhaps that repetition of the statement would make it so. But the garrison network 561 seriously thinned the U.S. troop strength and the Americans were continually being counterattacked and ambushed. It was becoming clear that the entire Islands would have to be "pacified." Moreover, guerrilla activity was both increasing and becoming increasingly effective. Being incessantly ambushed, boloed and betrayed was nerve-wracking and the Americans began to exercise their mounting frustration on the population at large. All the "niggers" were enemies, whether or not they bore arms. Patrols sent to fight the guerrillas usually had difficulty locating the enemy and often simply resorted to burning barrios in their path. Village officials were often forced at bayonet point to lead American patrols, and non-combatants began to be held responsible for the actions of the guerrillas. Any form of resistance to American objectives subjected the perpetrator to a charge of treason. Press censorship was so effective that few Americans actually knew the difficulties being experienced in the Philippines-or, in fact, that there were 70,000 U.S. troops in the Islands. In early 1900 the first whiff of scandal reached American shores when it was disclosed that the American forces had been issued expanding "dum-dum" bullets, in contravention of the 1899 Hague Convention concerning humane warfare (which the U.S. had conveniently neglected to ratify). Reports of the burning of villages, the killing of noncombatants and the application of the "water cure" to elicit information began to filter back to the U.S. Often this information was contained in letters written by U.S. soldiers to their families which found their way into local newspapers. A typical example: "On Thursday, March 29th [19001 ... eighteen of my company killed seventy-five nigger bolomen and ten of the nigger gunners .... When we find one who is not dead, we have bayonets ..."15 Such atrocities were systematically denied by the War Department. When the evidence was irrefutable, they were minimized and countered with examples of Filipino "barbarity." A standard response was that "harsh" methods had to be employed against "savages." As the war progressed and as American atrocities became routinized, so did platitudinous defenses of American action. MacArthur called it "the most legitimate and humane war ever conducted on the face of the earth." Senator Foraker, a staunch defender of annexation, announced solemnly (and with a touch of unintended irony), "Our army has shown in this work a surprising degree of humanity." General Shafter, who, it will be recalled, was not averse to killing half of the Filipino people in the name of this mission civilisatrice, was becoming preoccupied with the idea and had worked out a new reason to wipe out half .of the Island population. "My plan," he disclosed in January 1900, "would be to 562 disarm the natives of the Philippine Islands, even if we have to kill half of them to do it."16 Lack of firearms indeed continued to be perhaps the single most pressing problem for the Filipinos. By mid-1900 they had at most 20,000 rifles, meaning that only one partisan in four was actually armed. The American naval blockade made it all but impossible to obtain arms and supplies from abroad and although efforts were made to manufacture gunpowder locally, cartridge shells had to be used over and over to the point of uselessness. The Filipinos had to adapt to their limitations as best they could. They stood up to the heavily armed Americans with spears, darts, the ubiquitous bolo, and even stones, prompting General Lawton to remark, " ... they are the bravest men I have ever seen."17 The Filipinos used conditions to their advantage; they laid booby traps, they attacked at night and during driving tropical rainstorms, and they ambushed the Americans by getting as close as possible by stealth and employing their bolos at close quarters, thus neutralizing the disparity in firepower. The American troops, who depended so heavily on their weapons, were frightened by the ferocity of such attacks, especially as the Filipinos often made up in numbers what they lacked in firepower. But such tactics were difficult to maintain as the Filipinos almost invariably took heavy losses even in victory. In bolo fights the American dead were inevitably mutilated in the course of the fighting, a situation which the War Department was quick to capitalize on as evidence of the "savagery" of the Filipino guerrillas, thus justifying, to themselves at least, all manner of retaliatory slaughter. Otis was clearly unsuited for his job. His frequent pronouncements of victory and his incompetent handling of the war were proving to be an embarrassment to the McKinley Administration, which was nervously anticipating the forthcoming presidential election. Accordingly, Otis resigned "for pressing personal reasons" and was replaced by General MacArthur. MacArthur had had experience in the American Indian wars and he, more than anyone on Otis's staff, understood the wide-ranging implications of the problems then confronting the American expeditionary force in the Philippines. A convinced imperialist, he was also a realist. He openly admitted that the Filipinos hated the Americans and he did not flinch from estimating that it would take "ten years of bayonet treatment" to subdue the Filipino people-a prescient ( showing knowledge of events before they take place ) observation, as it turned out. Heavy fighting coincided with the change in command and it was remarked that when he left, Otis " ... had the situation so little in hand that to go six miles 563 out of Manila without a company furnished plenty of wholesome excitement,"18 With one eye on the upcoming November election, McKinley also sent a federal judge, William Howard Taft, to Manila with instructions to establish a "civilian" government in the Islands no later than September 1, 1900. The move was purely a public relations venture designed to trick the American voters into thinking all was progressing smoothly in the Philippines. Taft was densely ignorant about the Philippines19 but he knew enough about class society to detect a certain amount of pliability in the upper-class elements in the country. This group, composed largely of mestizo landlords and export agriculture interests, had been largely ignored by the U.S. military command, but Taft set out to woo them, appealing to their economic interests by offering protected markets for their agricultural products in the U.S. The effort bore fruit insofar as Taft was able-on cue-to establish his Civil Government on September 1. Laced as it was with quislings and traitors-Buencamino, Legarda, Luzuriaga and, inevitably, Pedro Paterno notable among them-the Taft regime was a useful propaganda weapon and it provided the Americans with another excuse to prosecute the war. Having created puppets, the continuation of the war and the retention of the Philippines were necessary to protect those who "loyally sided with the Americans" against potential and future revenge at the hands of the guerrillas. With, one presumes, appropriate sarcasm, one American Congressman commented, " ... and so it appears that in order to keep them 564 from shooting each other down we have got to go in and shoot them down first."20 With the nomination of William Jennings Bryan as the Democratic presidential candidate, the question of American colonialism and continued military intervention appeared likely to become a major issue in the 1900 campaign. The Filipinos hoped to topple the "imperialist party" of McKinley by launching an offensive just before the election, and September and October saw some of the sharpest fighting of the war. In spite of these efforts the question of the Philippines never became the issue it might have been. Aided by heavy press censorship and the inability to obtain independent information on the Philippine situation, McKinley predictably pointed to the Taft Government as proof that all was going well in the Islands. Bryan, moreover, was a rank political opportunist. By his own admission he had supported ratification of the Paris treaty simply in order to provide himself with what he thought would be a good issue with which to attack the Republicans. When he began to see that his anticolonial-position was hurting his campaign rather than helping, he backpedaled furiously and quickly compromised himself, arguing now for a vaguely defined American "protectorate" for the Philippines. In any event, both McKinley and Bryan perceived that the electorate was bored by the Philippine issue and by the end of the campaign it had been quietly dropped by both candidates. Predictably perhaps, McKinley was an easy victor. The result was a crushing blow for the Filipino guerrilla leaders who had counted heavily-too heavily-on a Bryan victory. Indeed, the guerrilla leadership began to falter badly after November and the surrender of several commanders (with men and guns) was a sharp blow to the Filipino cause. The theory of protracted war was, of course, only imperfectly understood, and with U.S. strength at its peak of 75,000 men the struggle began to take on suicidal overtones.21 The class divisions within the Filipino forces began now to emerge. The officers, like Aguinaldo himself, were usually fairly well educated and came largely from middle-class backgrounds; the ranks were invariably filled by men of peasant origins. The American command played upon these class divisions and treated surrendering commanders with the respect due to fellow "officers and gentlemen," sometimes dangling choice civil service positions as inducement for officers to defect. Despite MacArthur's claim, American conduct of the war heretofore had not been the "most humane" in human history, as attested by the countless and documented examples of callous and brutal conduct which were already being recorded. But in the autumn of 1900 there was a perceptible alteration in American tactics. Tired of being chronically harassed and boloed by the 565 Filipinos and finding it difficult to pin the guerrillas down in the kind of conventional firefight they so urgently desired, the Americans began to resort to revanchist attitudes and policies. If the American command had ever believed they enjoyed any popular support in the Philippines (apart from the handful of wealthy puppets serving in the Taft regime), a year and a half of war certainly dispelled any continued illusions on the matter. If the people supported the guerrillas then the people must also be classified as the enemy. The grim implications of such an evaluation were beginning to emerge, although the fiction that widespread public support for the U.S. existed in the Islands was maintained for domestic U.S. consumption. Terrorism, it was explained, was the only reason Filipinos gave any support at all to their guerrilla brethren, the only reason people did not welcome the foreign occupying force with open arms. "Without this system of terrorism," Taft allowed, "the guerrilla campaign would have ended very quickly."22 MacArthur was not deluded by such fantasies: the success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; ... fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One traitor in each town would effectively destroy such a complex organization.23 "Pacification" Begins in Earnest In December 1900, with the election safely out of the way, martial law was declared and the pretense of civil government was scrapped. American operations were extended to southern Luzon and to the Visayan islands of Leyte, Samar, Panay, Negros and Cebu. As far as the American command was concerned there were no longer any neutrals. Everyone was now considered an active guerrilla or a guerrilla supporter. Thus in the Visayas campaign the Navy felt free to shell the coastal villages with its gunboats prior to invasion. In January and February 1901, the entire population of Marinduque Island (pop. 51,000) was ordered into five concentration camps set up by the Americans. All those who did not comply with the order" ... would be considered as acting in sympathy with the insurgent forces and treated accordingly."24 This was to be the first of many instances of the application of the reconcentrado policy in the Philippines. Ironically, it was the abhorrence of just this sort of policy-when it was practiced by the Spanish General "Butcher" Weyler in Cuba-which so exercised American public opinion against Spain prior to the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.25 In April 1901 major operations began in northern Luzon. The frequent examples of Ascetica terror tactics which had heretofore occurred were, 566 arguably, the acts of individual units in at least technical violation of overall U.S. policy. With the advent of the northern Luzon campaign such pretensions and qualifications could no longer be maintained. If the people sympathized with and supported the guerrillas, and if, indeed, this was a "people's war," then the only solution was war against the people. The American Governor of Abra Province described the "depopulation campaign" in the following terms: "Whole villages had been burned, storehouses and crops had been destroyed and the entire province was as devoid of food products as was the valley of Shenandoah after Sheridan's raid during the Civil War."26 An American congressman who visited the Philippines, and who preferred to remain anonymous, spoke frankly about the results of the campaign: "You never hear of any disturbances in Northern Luzon," he reported, "because there isn't anybody there to rebel. . . . The good Lord in heaven only knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground. Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they simply swept the country and wherever and whenever they could get hold of a Filipino they killed him."27 567 The observation that no records were kept of operations of this kind later became a point of contention as news of the atrocities began to leak out. A case in point was the murder of approximately 1,000 Filipino prisoners of war in Sorsogon. Eyewitnesses (U.S. soldiers) testified that the prisoners were forced to dig their own graves in groups of twenty and that each then received one bullet in the temple. When confronted with this evidence the War Department dismissed it out of hand: "No report has been received at the War Department in respect of or referring to the alleged incident."28 This became standard government response to such charges, even when the orders themselves necessarily implied butchery, as when Gen. "Howlin' Jake" Smith ordered his men to kill "everything over ten" in the notorious Samar campaign. (In that particular instance the War Department rather feebly declared that their records "did not indicate" that the order-which was admitted-was ever carried out, eyewitness testimony of American soldiers engaged in the campaign notwithstanding.) Also in April 1901, Aguinaldo was finally captured. The Americans had been so unsuccessful at trying to catch him that for a long period they simply gave up the effort. But an intercepted message resulted in a daring raid led by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston29 and Aguinaldo's capture. The Americans were delighted with the news, which made banner headlines in the U.S. Taft felt the war was as good as over, especially after he persuaded Aguinaldo to sign an oath of allegiance and a proclamation calling upon his erstwhile comrades to give up the struggle. Aguinaldo did ignore damage to his place in the history books than he did to the Filipino cause, however, and the Americans were dismayed to discover that his capture and surrender appeal made no perceptible difference in the fighting, which continued unabated. This was too much for MacArthur, who resigned and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee. By mid-summer 1901, the focus of the war started to shift south of Manila. Some of the guerrilla leaders of Northern and Central Luzon who were close to Aguinaldo began to surrender. Others held out, however, and Gen. Miguel Malvar, operating in Batangas, was proving to be every bit as difficult for the Americans as Aguinaldo had been. In August, General Smith invaded Panay Island and repeated the scorchedearth tactics employed in Abra. "The 18th regulars marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz [now Roxas] ... in the north under orders to burn every town from which they were attacked. The result was they left a strip of land 60 miles wide from one end of the island to the other, over which the traditional crow could not have flown without provision."30 568 On the eve of the Samar campaign, the war was clearly degenerating into mass slaughter. It was hardly precise to call it "war" any longer. The Americans were simply chasing ragged, poorly armed bands of guerrillas and, failing to catch them, were inflicting the severest punishment on those they could catch-the people of the villages and barrios of the theater of operation. U.S. commanders were becoming increasingly outspoken about the true nature of their policy. Chaffee wrote in September, " ... we are dealing with a class of people whose character is deceitful, who are absolutely hostile to the white race and who regard life as of little value and, finally, who will not submit to our control until absolutely defeated and whipped into such condition."31 The American command even developed a new term for the kind of warfare they were engaged in, calling it "protective retribution." Semantic nonsense, perhaps, but its meaning was not lost on the intended victims. In late September, in the town of Balangiga, Samar, American troops had for some time been abusing the townspeople by packing them into open wooden pens at night where they were forced to sleep standing in the rain. Several score of guerrilla Gen. Vicente Lukban's bolomen infiltrated the town and on the morning of September 28, while the Americans were eating their breakfast, Lukban's men suddenly fell upon them. Heads dropped into breakfast dishes. Fifty-four Americans were boloed to death, and few of the eighteen survivors escaped serious injury.32 The Balangiga massacre initiated a reign of terror the likes of which had not yet been seen in this war. General Smith, fresh from his "victories" in northern Luzon and Panay, was chosen to lead the American mission of revenge. Smith's orders to his men embarking upon the Samar campaign could not have been more explicit: "Kill and burn, kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the more you please me." It was, said Smith, "no time to take prisoners." War was to be waged "in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible." When asked to define the age limit for killing, Smith gave his infamous reply: "Everything over ten." Smith ordered Samar to be turned into a "howling wilderness' so that "even the birds could not live there." It was boasted that" ... what fire and water [i.e., water torture] ... had done in Panay, water and fire would do in Samar."33The now-familiar pattern of operations began once again. All inhabitants of the island (pop. 266,000) were ordered to present themselves to detention camps in several of the larger coastal towns. Those who did not (or those who did not make it their business to learn of the existence of the order), and were found outside the detention camp perimeter, would be shot "and no questions asked." Few reporters covered the carnage; one who did noted:"During my stay in Samar the only prisoners that were made ... were taken by Waller's command;34 and I heard this act criticized by the highest 569 officers as a mistake .... The truth is, the struggle in Samar is one of extermination."35 When Smith's barbaric and outrageous orders gained him public notoriety, the War Department attempted to portray his Samar campaign as an aberration of standard practices. Samar was a deviation from a war which (according to one typically gushing statement from the Secretary of War) " ... has been conducted by the Army with scrupulous regard for the rules of civilized warfare with careful and genuine consideration for the prisoner and non-combatant, with self-restraint and with humanity never surpassed if ever equalled in any conflict, worthy only of praise, and reflecting 'credit upon the American people."36 In actuality the Samar campaign was simply a stronger dose of the same kind of extermination policy previously conducted in northern Luzon and in Panay. Nor did the Samar campaign mark the end of this kind of practice, despite the heavy criticism it provoked. If anything, the Batangas campaign which followed Samar by a few months was even more "pinching"-to use the then-current euphemism for such pogroms. Indeed, General Smith could legitimately defend himself the way Waller had done. He was, in fact, simply following orders. His superior and the overall U.S. commander in the Philippines, General Chaffee, was as explicit as Smith, although he expressed himself somewhat less flamboyantly when he wrote on the eve of the Samar campaign: ... it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible; and both officers and men must be cordially supported in this duty in this regard. There is one thing necessary; and that is the wholesome fear by these people of the Army, and that every hostile motion of any inhabitants toward the troops will be quickly and severely punished. . .. It is to our interest to disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and any means to that end is advisable.37[emphasis added] Even if the American commanders issued inhuman and draconian orders, the War Department argued that of course the men would not actually obey them. In Senate hearings, the obsequious Beveridge was at pains to make this point: Sen. Beveridge: The general conduct of our soldiers and officers there, irrespective of orders from headquarters, was in the direction of kindness, mercy and humanity, was it? [emphasis added] Gen. MacArthur: Absolutely, Sir. 38 But in spite of MacArthur's implicit faith in the propensity of his men to disobey orders (one imagines it would have been interesting to hear from Major Waller on this score), information about the true nature of the conduct of the war came, as usual, from the soldiers themselves. 39 One letter, which was later republished in the New York World, gives an indication of what the Filipinos were up against. It bears reproduction in its entirety: 570 It was on the 27th of December, the anniversary of my birth, and I shall never forget the scenes I witnessed that day. As we approached the town the word passed along the line that there would be no prisoners taken. It meant we were to shoot every living thing in sight-man woman or child. The first shot was fired by the then 1st Sergeant of our company. His target was a mere boy, who was coming down the mountain path into town astride of a carabao. The boy was not struck by the bullet, but that was not the Sergeant's fault. The little Filipino boy slid from the back of his carabao and fled in terror up the mountain side. Half a dozen shots were fired after him. The shooting now had attracted the villagers, who came out of their homes in alarm, wondering what it all meant. They offered no offense, did not display a weapon, made no hostile movement whatsoever, but they were ruthlessly shot down in cold blood, men, women and children. The poor natives huddled together or fled in terror. Many were pursued and killed on the spot. Two old men, bearing a white flag and clasping hands like two brothers, approached the lines. Their hair was white. They fairly tottered, they were so feeble under the weight of years. To my horror and that of the other men in the command, the order was given to fire and the two old men were shot down in their tracks. We entered the village. A man who had been on a sickbed appeared at the doorway of his home. He received a bullet in the abdomen and fell dead in the doorway. Dum dum bullets were used in the massacre, but we were not told the name of the bullets. We didn't have to be told. We knew what they were. In another part of the village a mother with a babe at her breast and two young children at her side pleaded for mercy. She feared to leave her home which had just been firedaccidentally, I believe. She faced the flames with her children, and not a hand was raised to save her or the little ones. They perished miserably. It was sure death if she left the house-it was sure death if she remained. She feared the American soldiers, however, worse than the devouring flames. 40 In the face of mounting and irrefutable evidence of the true conduct of the war, the War Department resorted to by-now-standard procedure-deny, minimize, obliterate charges and criticism with a blizzard of rhetorical overkill. Secretary Root: "... the warfare has been conducted with marked humanity and magnanimity on the part of the U.S."41 Major General Wheaton: "Unexampled patience was exercised throughout the department in the treatment of these savages [sic]."42General Hughes: "The policy as practiced in the Philippines has no element of cruelty in it."43 Governor Taft: " ... it is my deliberate judgment that there never was a war conducted, whether against inferior races or not, in which there were more compassion and more restraint and more generosity ..."44 Furthermore, were it not for the bleeding hearts and handwringers back home who, by criticizing the army, were encouraging the enemy 571 to resist, "the insurrection would have been suppressed finally in January 1900," according to General Funston.45 The Batangas Campaign As Smith ravaged Samar, General Malvar and his men carried on the guerrilla struggle in Batangas, Tayabas, Laguna and Cavite. With General Smith already occupied, command of the Batangas campaign was given to Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell. By word and by deed, Bell made it clear that he was not going to be put in the shade by his brother officer when it came to slaughtering Filipinos. Even before he took command, Bell made his feelings known in unmistakable terms. "All consideration and regard for the inhabitants of this place cease from the day I become commander," he said. "I have the force and authority to do whatever seems to me good and especially to humiliate all those in this Province who have any pride...."46 Beginning in early December 1901 and continuing for the rest of the month, Bell issued a frightening series of orders. On December 8 he began setting up his concentration camps. The people of Batangas had two weeks in which to move into the garrisons. Everything lying outside the perimeter of the camps was subject to confiscation or destruction. Anyone found there would automatically be considered an "insurgent." Neutrality was not to be entertained. Everyone "should either be an active friend or classified as an enemy." How did one become an "active friend"? "The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either individuals or town councils should be such acts publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent element." How did one arouse the animosity and opposition of the "insurgent element"? By guiding troops to the camps of the enemy, by publicly identifying "insurgents," by accompanying troops in operations against the guerrillas, by denouncing the "enemy" publicly, and by identifying secret guerrilla supporters. Suspicion of aiding the guerrillas in any way was sufficient 572 cause for arrest without charge and incarceration for an indefinite period of time. "It is not necessary to wait for sufficient evidence to lead to a conviction by a court. "47 Bell's subordinates were given the widest latitude: "Commanding officers are urged to use their discretion freely in adopting any or all measures of warfare...." The people of Batangas were to be made to "want peace and want it badly." On December 13, Bell announced that the killing of American troops would be paid back in kind. Whenever such an event occurred, Bell proposed to select a prisoner "by lot from among the officers or prominent citizens" and have him executed. On December 15, Bell announced that "acts of hostility or sabotage" would result in the "starving of unarmed hostile belligerents."48 The warning to Malvar was clear: he either had to give up the struggle or the "detainees" would face mass starvation. To show that he meant it, on December 20 Bell ordered all rice and other food lying outside the camps to be confiscated or destroyed. Wells were poisoned and all farm animals were slaughtered.49 January 1, it was announced, was the deadline for rendering "valuable service" to the Americans, and "those who have not fully complied with their duty" by that date were subject to prison. On the 24th, Bell admitted that the only course open to the Americans was"... to adopt a policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for the war to cease-a desire or longing so intense, so personal ... and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to bringing about a real state of peace, that will impel them to join hands with the Americans..."50 "These people need a thrashing," Bell announced on the day after Christmas. " ... I have become convinced that within two months at the outside there will be no more insurrection in this brigade, and nothing for conspirators to negotiate about." Since " ... practically the entire population has been hostile to us at heart ... it is necessary to make the state of war as insupportable as possible, and there is no more efficacious way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such conditions will soon become unbearable." Batangas, Bell concluded, will "be thoroughly sear~hed and devastated."51 Beginning January 1, 1901, as promised, Batangas was indeed thoroughly searched and devastated, as were the neighboring provinces. Bell assembled 2,500 men in columns of 50 and the hunt for Malvar was on. Expecting to destroy everything, Bell was at least as ruthless as Smith had been in the preceding extermination campaigns. The details of the concentration camp policy were, by now, depressingly familiar. Filipinos were rounded up and 573 herded into detention camps where overcrowded conditions and lack of proper food and clothing resulted in the predictable spread of infectious diseases. Malaria, beriberi and dengue fever took their toll. One correspondent described the prisoners as " a miserable-looking lot of little brown rats ... utterly spiritless."52 In the "zone of death" outside the camp "dead line," "all rendered themselves liable," according to Bell.53 All property was destroyed, all houses put to the torch and the country was made a "desert waste ... of death and desolation." 54 According to statistics compiled by U.S. Government officials, by the time Bell was finished at least 100,000 people had been killed or had died in Batangas alone as a direct result of the scorched-earth policies, and the enormous dent in the population of the province (which was reduced by a third) is reflected in the census figures.55 American policy was so brutal that even some of the U.S. government personnel became apprehensive. The American civil governor of Tayabas noted in his official report that killing, burning, torture and other harsh treatment was . . . sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution. If these things need be done, they had best be done by native troops so that the people of the u.S. will not be credited therewith.56 With Malvar's surrender in April 1902, the Americans at long last felt the war was finally over, and Taft dutifully intoned this fact once again. The Washington Post editorialized in response: We have learned to repose the utmost confidence in Judge Taft's opinions and predictions relative to affairs in the Philippines. Ever since he solemnly announced the fourth and final termination of hostilities two years ago, we have refused to accept any view of the situation in our new islands which did not have his sanction and endorsement. The fact that it has been brought to an end on six different occasions since the Governor's original proclamation serves only to confirm our estimation of his wisdom. A bad thing cannot be killed too often.57 The surrender of Malvar completed the capture or surrender of what the Americans considered to be the "respectable military element." The only people left in the hills, it was thought, were ignorant ladrones (bandits), but they were, it was said, a traditional feature of rural life in the Philippines and were not to be taken seriously as a threat to American hegemony. Just to make sure, President Roosevelt proclaimed the war to be over on July 4, 1902. Bands played, soldiers marched in parade, speeches were read, and just the tiniest flaw marred an otherwise grand occasion. The fighting did not stop. The war would not admit to so tidy a solution. Declaring it over did not make it so. A sullen, 574 hostile people, the victims of three and a half years of the most savage aggression, simply refused to give up. Malvar may have surrendered, but many of his men had not, and fighting in Batangas continued. Elsewhere, new leaders such as Sakay, Ricarte, Ola and Bulan emerged to carry on the struggle in places previously considered pacified. Others, such as Felipe Salvador and "Papa" Isio, both of whom had been fighting the Spanish for many years prior to 1898, simply kept on fighting. Not all of them were principled men; many were without ideology and fought simply out of fanatical hatred of the occupying power; some interjected a confusing welter of reactionary religious dogma to their often ill-defined and unsophisticated response to (ill-defined and unsophisticated) colonialism. Moreover, there were depressing tendencies toward blind revanchism, dead-end milennarism, and the development of personality cults58 which paralleled similar "primitive rebellions"59 in other areas of the world at the time. Having noted this, the point cannot be overemphasized that these movements represented the collective will of the vast majority of the Filipino people who— however imperfectly they understood the phenomenon— 575 simply refused to submit to imperial aggession. The "Post-War" War "Post-war" fighting flared up in Albay in October 1902, when approximately 1,500 guerrillas led by Simeon Ola refused to surrender. This was politically embarrassing to the Americans, and to Roosevelt and Taft in particular. This war was supposed to be over! Although there were still upwards of 20,000 U.S. troops garrisoned on the Islands, it was thought the better part of wisdom to deploy Filipino puppet troops (led by American officers) against the Albay guerrillas. In November, the Brigandage Act was passed, authorizing the death penalty for membership in a guerrilla organization. The new law simply gave legal sanction to what had become common practice and it had little appreciable effect on the situation in Albay, which continued to deteriorate for the Americans. In March 1903, the situation had reached a point where reconcentrado tactics had to be once again employed-this time on a wider scale than anything heretofore attempted. Three hundred thousand Filipinos were herded into concentration camps at gunpoint. Ola finally surrendered in October 1903, but this event did not end the fighting there by any means. 60 Fighting also continued in Cavite, where a new Katipunan was formed by a former Aguinaldo aide, Gen. Luciano San Miguel; in Nueva Ecija and Tarlac, led by Felipe Salvador; in Rizal and Bulacan, led by Montalon, Felizardo and others; in Tayabas, led by Saria and Roldon-the list indeed could go on and on. In the year after the war had been declared officially at an end, 357 separate engagements with the guerrillas were recorded by the U.S. military command. The inability to stamp out the fighting induced the Americans to adopt more sophisticated techniques, some of which have become familiar features of more recent counterinsurgency efforts. The 1903 census of the Philippines was a determined effort to enumerate not only people, but to also record the presence of cattle, hogs, chickens and so forth in hopes of tracing guerrilla sources of supply and to intimidate people into denying provisions to the guerrillas for fear of being discovered. Such techniques proved to be of limited value and, at times, counterproductive. Attempts to conduct such a survey in Misamis Province sparked off an uprising there.61 In the following year an identification card system was inaugurated and a "registration tax" was imposed on all male residents of the Philippines between 18 and 60 years of age. These Cedulas Personates, as they were called, " ... also serve the purpose of a domestic passport ..." (their obvious intended purpose), according to the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 62 576 The Americans were hoping that by imposing such restrictions they would hamper efforts at unifying the various resistance organizations. The activity of Artemio Ricarte, a case in point, illustrates the kind of organizational work the Americans feared. Ricarte, formerly a member of Aguinaldo's staff, was captured early in the war and, because he refused to take an oath of allegiance to the U.S., was deported to Guam. Upon being returned to Manila, he once again refused to take an oath and was sent to Hong Kong and exile, where he began to correspond and coordinate with other guerrilla leaders in the Philippines. He secretly returned to Manila in December 1903 and embarked upon a clandestine tour of northern and Central Luzon, where he engaged in organizing, unifying and recruiting activities. For months he eluded capture, much to the consternation of the Americans. In July 1904, fighting broke out in Samar, where Bulan and Juliano Caducoy led several hundred men. Coastal villages were attacked and Philippine Constabulary (puppet) troops and pro-U.S. municipal officials were killed. One U.S.-appointed teniente (mayor) had a kerosene-soaked U.S. flag tied around his head and ignited, which Caducoy said was "a lesson to those serving that flag."63 By August, the governor of Samar was frantically demanding more. troops from Manila because guerrillas "are boldly roaming the country."64 "Thousands joined in the movement," according to the local commander, Gen. William H. Carter, and the guerrillas took control of large areas of coastal territory in northeastern Samar. Constabulary patrols, led by American officers and sent out to engage the guerrillas, came in for some hard fighting. At Oras, Bulan's men, armed only with bolos, engaged the Constabulary troops in hand-to-hand combat and secured 65 guns. At Dolores, 38 Constabulary troops fell, prompting the American commander to plead for the reintroduction of American troops. The problem, he said, was ". . not solely one of killing and capturing the leaders or great numbers of their followers, for there are others ready to rise in their places."65 By April 1905, U.S. reinforcements had to be sent to Samar and fighting there continued for two more years. Elsewhere, in late 1904 and early 1905, guerrilla activity reached a "post-war" peak, with fighting erupting in Rizal, where Felizardo successfully attacked a number of Constabulary garrisons, and in Taal, where Montalon and De Vega marched up the main street of town and people "openly fraternized with the bandits." In Malabon, which "was a hotbed of disloyal citizens and sympathizers with the outlaw element," Montalon and others disguised in Constabulary uniforms seized the garrison and very nearly kidnapped the provincial governor. 577 In January 1905 the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended and a state of insurrection was declared. "It is hoped the result will be the effectual cleaning out of these bands and that the people will be so inconvenienced that instead of sympathizing with and aiding the outlaw bands an effort will be made to aid the authorities ,"66 reported the district commander. Familiar tactics these, but by March conditions had deteriorated so badly in Batangas and Cavite and in some parts of Laguna and Rizal that reconcentrado had to be employed there for five months-three years after Malvar's surrender and General Bell's boast that within two months of January 1902 there would be no more insurrection in Batangas. In Pangasinan, where Sakay was active, the American military commander wrote plaintively, "This Province seems to be the rendezvous of disturbers ... and we scarcely get one broken up until another is started. We have had ... various classes of Katipunan organizations, seditions and efforts at organization for insurrection .. and the province in consequence has furnished its quota to swell the population of Bilibid [prison] ... "67 In Albay, "conditions were in a rather disturbed state." Agustin Saria had taken up where Ola left off and it was noted that his" ... principal aim was to levy tribute on the people and to maintain an independent insurgent government."68 In Ambos, Camarines, " ... practically open 578 insurrection existed due to the influence of Jose Roldon.... He reorganized his forces in the most impoverished sections of Ambos, Camarines, and had remarkable success in securing municipal officials and prominent individuals to assist him."69 Roldon and Saria were killed in September and October 1905 respectively, but others picked up the cudgels. In Tayabas it was reported that "the inhabitants of certain localities are exceedingly inflammable and easily influenced by the oratorical flights and acrobatic gyrations of demagogic outlaws or fanatical propagandists."70 Whatever the cause, the "demagogic outlaws" were becoming increasingly effective. One American officer described the nature of the attack employed against constabulary compounds: The attempts are always preceded by a thorough spying out of the surroundings, strength and habits of the intended victims, a careful weighing of chances and a deliberate planning. Consequently, an enterprise once undertaken seldom fails. Frequently they try to minimize the risk of jumping a police station or looting a municipal treasury by establishing relations with and winning confederates on the inside.71 The guerrillas were also learning how to utilize their solidarity with the people to advantage and they began to shun the uniforms they previously wore in order to facilitate intermingling with the general population. Funds were often extorted from wealthy landowners (who hoped thereby to purchase immunity from more permanent depredations) and used to purchase food and provisions from peasants. An underground communication system was established in the various areas of guerrilla operation, but interregional communication and coordination was all but totally lacking and this proved to be a fatal handicap when, as occurred in 1904-06, the resistance was progressing well in other respects. In Central Luzon, Sakay continued to elude the Constabulary. In June 1905 the American commanding officer wrote that previous indications were " ... that we were making material progress against them [Sakay and his men) ... but that like 'Brer Rabbit' they were not exterminated but were simply lying low ..."72 Almost all of the guerrilla leaders active in 1905 had, of course, been deeply involved in the 1899-1902 struggle. As fighting flared up the class contradictions in the old Philippine Army leadership began to emerge once again. The members of Aguinaldo's staff and the various commanders of the earlier period who had surrendered or been captured had, for the most part, been well treated by the Americans and were content to make their peace with American colonial rule. (Aguinaldo himself settled down on 500 hectares of land near Imus, Cavite, and reaped the benefits of one or two profitable arrangements with the Colonial Government.73 Many of the 1899-1902 leaders disparaged the later efforts and echoed the American position that such 579 guerrilla bands were simply ladrones, and that there was no real political significance attached to the various movements. This was sad commentary on the ideological pliability of the early leaders, and such statements had a measurable propaganda effect. But the damaging influence of such men was offset somewhat because almost all of the new guerrilla leadership had emerged at one point or another from the ranks. Moreover, with men like Ricarte, Montalon, Felizardo, and especially Sakay still alive, a direct link was maintained with the highest leadership circles of the 1899-1902 period. The Americans understood this, of course, and the hunt for Sakay in particular became an obsession with them. Sakay was considered by many to be Aguinaldo's heir and was referred to by the forces in his command and by the people in the districts in which he operated as the President of the Republic. Filipino morale received a tremendous (albeit unwarranted) boost with the Japanese success in the Russo-Japanese War.74News of the war-and cheap color prints of little brown men slaying big white men-filtered into the most remote and backward corners of the Philippines and generated tremendous interest "even among the ignorant taos( people ) ... who otherwise are uniformly impervious to the progress of the outside world ... " 75 Things were not going too well for the Americans in spite of uniformly glowing reports of success heaped upon success (such propaganda as was being churned out had long since become an endemic feature of America's Philippine adventure and was, unfortunately, usually accepted at face value in the U.S.and by later historians). Occasionally, information would filter through the official veil and chip away, if only ever so slightly, at the orthodox, roseate view. An Englishwoman wrote from Iloilo in 1905: The Americans give out and write in their papers that the Philippine Islands are completely pacified and that the Filipinos love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless with good motives, is complete and utter humbug, for the country is honeycombed with insurrection and plots, the fighting has never ceased, and the natives loathe the Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their native press and showing their dislike in every possible fashion. Their one idea is to be rid of the U.S.A . ...76 By 1906 the ultimate futility of engaging in continued resistance without regional coordination, without agreed-upon aims, without more than the most rudimentary ideological overview, and without any hope-or thought-of international support for their movement took its predictable toll. By mid-year, Sakay, Montalon and De Vega had surrendered and this ended whatever flickering hopes might have remained for the re-establishment of the Philippine Republic. 580 Yet, incredibly, the war was still not over, nor would it be for several years to come, and fighting continued in a number of areas. In Mindanao, Moslem resistance to American efforts at subjugation continued unabated and led to the adoption of the standard extermination policies. Moslem resistance differed from that which typified other areas in that it was largely unconnected with questions of Philippine independence or anti-colonialism, but was rather predicated an the desire to maintain Islamic communal laws and customs free from interference from the "conquered North." (It should be noted that the Spanish never actually subjugated the Moslem areas.) Guerrilla tactics adopted in other areas were not typical in the Moslem regions, where the practice was for whole communities to band together and retreat to a fortified position (usually a hilltop) in the face of an attack. For American troops grown callous by years of fighting against non-combatants, attacking such communities necessitated no departure from previously established norms. The resultant slaughter from such wanton tactics, however, was fearful. In March 1906, American troops killed over 600 men, women and children in an assault on the Mount Dajo community. Photographs of the raped bodies of women and children 581 created a sensation in the U.S., but this did not reflect itself in any alteration of American policy. Sporadic fighting continued to flare up in Mindanao as late as 1916, and martial law was not lifted until December 1906. Even then, the preparedness of the Moslem community to lay down their arms was due simply to the recognition that superior force of arms had been brought to bear against them, nothing more. Negros was another area where fighting continued beyond 1906, led by the intrepid "Papa" Isio. Isio's movement was unique in its longevity; by the time of the arrival of the Americans, Isio had been in the hills for nearly twenty years against the Spanish. In 1880, the 39-year-old farm laborer Isio (then Dionisio Magbueles) quarreled with a Spaniard, wounded him, and fled to the mountains of Negros, where he joined with and eventually became the leader of a rebel group known variously as Babaylanes ("priests") and Pulahanes ("red trousers"). Negros, especially the fertile northwest crescent of the island, presented unusual economic conditions inasmuch as the sugar plantations there represented the most commercially advanced agricultural area to be found in the Philippines. Because of this, class contradictions reached their most advanced level and chronic labor unrest characterized conditions in the Negros canefields in the late 19th century. Disaffected sacadas (canefield workers) provided a steady stream of men to Isio's mountain band prior to 1898. The founding of the Malolos Republic and the arrival of the Americans further sharpened the divisions between the plantation and mill owners and the sacadas. Dewey's arrival in Manila Bay and the resultant crisis led to the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Negros and in the power vacuum Isio and his men declared allegiance to the Republic and marched into the capital of Bacolod. Isio's army by this time numbered between five and six thousand and he enjoyed almost total support among the sacadas and peasant farmers. Landlords and mill owners on Negros, who had previously co-existed peacefully and profitably with the Spanish authorities (and with whom they identified socially) viewed developments with consternation. Their major fear was that the Malolos Government would sanction and solidify the Isio regime. To checkmate Isio, the Negros hacienderos tried to prevent him from getting arms and from establishing direct contact with Malolos. In the autumn of 1898 some of the planters sent a delegation to the captain of a U.S. man-of-war then at anchor in Iloilo harbor to ask him for U.S. protection and armed intervention against Isio. The Americans refused the request because at this point they were not yet at war with the Filipinos. They did not want to trigger the fighting before the arrival of needed reinforcements and the signing of the Paris Treaty. The hacienderos then established an "independent" Republic of Negros, 582 adopting an American-style Constitution which defined the new power configurations. For several months until the outbreak of fighting on February 4, 1899, two regimes vied in Negros, the Republican (Malolos) Government, supported by Isio and his men, and the "independent" Republic of Negros, which existed mostly on paper and in the minds of a few hundred wealthy plantation owners. On February 22, 1899, a delegation of hacenderos went to Manila and again asked for U.S. intervention, reminding the Americans pointedly that "their action would cause much hatred among the insurgents."77 Now that the Philippine-American War had started, the Americans were more than eager to accommodate the hacienderos, and Col. (later Gen.) Smith initiated his career in the Philippines by going to Negros with a battalion of the First California Volunteers. He also tried to organize native troops but abandoned the practice when the men signed up and promptly went over to Isio with their new weapons. For several months after Smith's arrival, class war reigned in Negros. Sacadas flocked to the hills and joined in attacks on plantations. By September 1899, over 100 plantations lay in ruins, expensive sugar-milling machinery had been wrecked, farm animals were lost, and sugar production (the second most valuable Philippine export product at the time) had come to an almost complete standstill.78 Such was Isio's background, and for seven more years the mountainous interior of Negros remained a "liberated zone" despite repeated forays by American and Constabulary troops. By 1905 Isio had become a folk hero, a symbol of continued resistance when all realistic hope of overthrowing the haciendero oligopoly had long since vanished. In January 1905, when it was reported (incorrectly) that Isio had been killed, thousands wore black armbands in mourning. In June of that year, after Isio and his men had taken possession of the town of Isabela, the American commander ruefully hinted at the depth of the popular support Isio stil~ enjoyed when he reported, "It remains to be seen whether or not the people of Isabela will come forward and identify the raiders or aid in their capture. If they do, it will be unprecedented."79 It was not until August 6, 1907, that "Papa" Isio, age 67, finally came down from the mountains. The major guerrilla organization still active after Isio's surrender was the Santa Iglesia led by Felipe Salvador (alias Apong Ipe), one of the most colorful and charismatic leaders in a movement which produced an abundance of such men. Allegedly the son of a friar, Salvador, like Isio, had been active against the Spanish long before Malolos and Manila Bay. The Santa Iglesia, a "fanatical and oath-bound society" (according to the Americans) was founded in 1893 in 583 Pampanga. In 1898 it joined forces with the revolutionary movement and Salvador and his men attacked Spanish garrisons at Dagupan and Lingayen in Pangasinan. Salvador was made a colonel by Aguinaldo, but he never became a part of the Malolos inner circle and his organization always maintained a separate identity, never fully incorporated into the Philippine Army. In 1902 Salvador refused to surrender when many of Aguinaldo's generals were heeding the call of the latter to lay down their arms. Salvador was captured soon after but escaped from jail and resumed his guerrilla activities in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan. It is perhaps the best testimony to Salvador's skill as a leader and organizer that his movement came into full flower only after other organizations and guerrilla movements had been beaten into submission and surrender in the post-1905 period. By 1906 Salvador had begun to roam throughout Central Luzon. He negotiated alliances with other guerrilla organizations and staged spectacular raids, the most notable being the one on the Constabulary barracks at Malolos, the political implications of which escaped no one. The support and respect he and his men commanded from the people of Central Luzon was legendary. Reported one American with finality, "inhabitants ... do not volunteer information of [his] '" presence to the authorities."80 In spite of concentrated efforts to portray members of the Santa Iglesia as "some of the most wicked and desperate men ever at large 584 in the Philippine Islands," Colonel Bandholtz, charged with his capture, admitted, "He treats the barrio people well and it is said he does not rob them of provisions, but prays with the people and asks them for contributions, which they usually give."81 The Americans took pains to portray Salvador as simply a religious sectarian, a polygamist, a wild man. Such an interpretation, of course, was aimed at belittling and dismissing Salvador's political seriousness of purpose which was obviously striking a responsive chord among the peasants of Central Luzon. Salvador's avowed aim was the overthrow of the American Colonial Government. This was the cornerstone of the Santa Iglesia movement. Also of interest was the socially progressive nature of the movement, which indicated a political shift from the vaguely defined post-colonial vision of the Katipuneros. Salvador repeatedly raised the land question and promised his supporters that land redistribution, the breaking up of haciendas, and the abolition of tenancy would swiftly follow his assumption of state power. One aspect of the post-1896 period which has been largely overlooked was the class nature of the Philippine Revolution. That the war represented Filipino resistance to Spanish colonialism and American aggression is obvious. That the period represented class struggle on several levels is not as clearly understood today, probably because it was most imperfectly understood' at the time. Except for the tiny collaborationist elite, whose economic, ethnic and class origins put them in a category quite far removed from the mass of Indio peasants, few understood clearly their economic and class interests and how they were being manipulated by the Americans as part of the imperial design. Within the antiimperialist camp, class antagonisms were muted, both because they were not understood and because of the need to present a united nationalist front. But the latent class contradictions were always present, and they began to surface in the second and third year of the war against the Americans with the defection of a number of army officers. These men came largely from middle-class backgrounds and, with a few notable exceptions, were prone to elitist thinking and surrenderist attitudes. The speed and apparent ease of conscience with which many such men were able to take up posts within the American colonial bureaucracy was to a large degree attributable to their class solidarity which, on the evidence, was stronger than their racial and ethnic ties to the Indio peasants. So it was that the fight was left to be fought by the poor and uneducated, bandits and outlaws, religious screwballs and wild men-or so we are told. And yet, significantly, when the officers and gentlemen had made their peace with imperialism, the only people left defending the honor of Philippine nationalism were now also fighting for primitive social justice as well. The class struggle 585 began to emerge as co-equal to the national struggle-long after any immediate hope of winning either had passed. In 1909, a decade after the first battle on the outskirts of Manila, Felipe Salvador was still fighting. "His influence over the lower class has defied the efforts of the Government to capture him ... " He was not to be captured until the following year, snuffing out the last flickering flame of a fourteen-year struggle against colonial aggression. Salvador, who had been in the hills for seventeen of his forty-one years, was tried for banditry, convicted, and executed in 1912. The Cost of the War How many Filipinos died resisting American aggression? It is doubtful if historians will ever agree on a figure that is anything more than a guess. The figure of 250,000 crops up in various works; one suspects it is chosen and repeated in ignorance and in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary. Records of the killing were not kept and the Americans were anxious to suppress true awareness of the extent of the slaughter in any case, in order to avoid fueling domestic anti-imper!alist protest. How many died of disease and the effects of concentration camp life is even more difficult to assess. General Bell, who, one imagines, might be in as good a position to judge such matters as anyone, estimated in a New York Times interview that over 600,000 people in Luzon alone had been killed or had died of disease as a result of the war. The estimate, given in May 1901, means that Bell did not include the effects of the Panay campaign, the Samar campaign, or his own bloodthirsty Batangas campaign (where at least 100,000 died), all of which occurred after his 1901 interview. Nor could it include the "post-war" period, which saw the confinement of 300,000 people in Albay, wanton slaughter in Mindanao, and astonishing death rates in Bilibid Prison, to name but three instances where killing continued. A million deaths? One does not happily contemplate such carnage of innocent people who fought with extraordinary bravery in a cause which was just but is now all but forgotten. Such an estimate, however, might conceivably err on the side of understatement. To again quote the anonymous U.S. Congressman, "They never rebel in Luzon anymore because there isn't anybody left to rebel." Notes 1. The choice of terms for the Philippine-American War and the corresponding reference to the Filipinos as "insurgents" was not haphazard or accidental, as it 586 gave semantic reinforcement to the. American position that the (Malolos) Philippine Government was illegitimate and that those who took up arms against the Americans were engaged in rebellion against (legitimate) American authority. It is, perhaps, overstating the obvious to make the point that quite a different interpretation is not only possible but, in my view, more accurate, historically speaking. The Malolos Government was, for at least a year after its inception, the only legitimate government in the Philippines insofar as Malolos alone exercised unchallenged legal authority throughout the Islands. That Malolos was not recognized by the U.S. did not, legally speaking, alter this fact. Nor did it make the subsequent war against the U.S. an "insurrection." At no time were Filipinos themselves in revolt against their own government. A more accurate interpretation-and, I believe, the only correct one-is based on the understanding that the Philippine-American War was, both legally and objectively, Filipino resistance to American military aggression against the sovereign Philippine state. The fact that the Americans eventually won the war does not, in my view, alter this basic fact. Accordingly, the terms "insurrection" and "insurgent" will not be employed in this essay except when used in quotation. 2. Literature on the war is woefully skimpy and no adequate political analysis now exists. Little Brown Brother by Leon Wolff (Manila: Erehwon, 1968) is an excellently written popular introduction. Domestic U.S. reaction to the war has received far more attention than the war itself, especially in recent years. Daniel Schirmer's Republic or Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971) is the best recent accountt of the anti-imperialist, or, more accurately, the anticolonialist movement in the U.S. 3. At least insofar as the Treaty of Paris was concerned. Had the treaty not been approved, theoretically the Islands would have been retained by Spain, although as a practical matter the Spanish were hardly in a position to reassert themselves in the Islands. It seems improbable also that the McKinley Administration would have withdrawn U.S. troops simply on the basis of the treaty vote, had it gone against them. 4. Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 226. 5. Forty-five hundred dead bodies were counted by the Americans. Witnesses estimated the total number of dead to be 8-10,000. H. Van Mete~, The Truth About the Philippines from Official Records and Authentic Sources (Chicago: Liberty League, 1900), p. 333. 6. Van Meter, 332. 7. Van Meter, 368. 8. Father of Douglas, World War II commander in the Pacific. 9. Van Meter, 366. 10. Eyot, Canning, ed., The Story of the Lopez Family (Boston: J. H. West Co., 587 1904), 23. 11. MacArthur later admitted, "The Filipino idea behind the dissolution of their field army was not at the time of occurrence well understood in the American camp. As a consequence, misleading conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had been destroyed and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of the rebel army." Renato Constantino, Dissent and Counter-Consciousness (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 80, quoting War Department Annual Reports, 1901, vol. I, part 4,88. 12. Senate Document no. 331, vol. 2; 57:1 (1902), 1926-27. 13. Wolff, 294. Robinson, who reported for the New York Evening Post, was by far the most courageous American newsman in the Philippines. His outspoken reporting won him hasty re-assignment to Africa. 14. Senate Doc. no. 331, vol. 2, 57:1, pp. 1927-28. Report of General MacArthur. There were 53 garrisons in November 1899, over 400 by the following August. 15. Fairfield, Maine Journal, excerpted from a letter from Sgt. Howard McFarlane, 43rd Infantry. Quoted in Wolff, 305. The soldiers who wrote such letters were invariably contacted by military authorities and forced to write retractions, which were then hastily published to refute the original information. Reading the retractions tends to confirm in one's mind the verity of the original statement. Refusal to write a retraction was not kindly looked upon by the military and the kinds of pressure tactics employed by the War Department became something of a scandal after being disclosed in Senate hearings in 1902. Senator McLaurin called it a "remarkable coincidence" that in every case where the soldier was still in the army, 'retractions were forthcoming. But when the soldier had already been discharged and was no longer subject to military discipline, " ... there was not an instance found where there was any modification, qualification or retraction of what had been said ... " Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15,1902, 5480. 16. Quoted in the Boston Transcript, January 12, 1900, cited by Wolff,299. 17. Wolff, 290. 18. Boston Herald, August 25, 1902. Quoted in Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman, Marked Severities in Philippine Warfare: Sec. Root's Record (Boston: George H. Ellis Co., 1902), 115. 19. As was McKinley, who confessed he could not find the Philippines on the map the first time he looked for them. In light of later disclosures, this remark smacks of coyness, but it is true nevertheless that the Americans had the most limited understanding of Philippine society. 20. Statement by Rep. Vandiver, Congressional Record, 57:1, May I5, 1902,5505. 21. At their peak, Spanish forces in the Philippines never numbered more than 588 a few thousand. 22. Taft testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,69. 23. MaCArthur testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,135. 24. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2443. 25. In his first annual message to Congress, McKinley expressed his (evidently feigned) outrage at the concentration camp policy being employed in Cuba. This "cruel policy," he said, "was not civilized warfare; it was extermination." Quoted in Storey and Codman, 94. 26. Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,430. 27. Wolff, 352. 28. Charles E. Magoon, Acting Chief of Division, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2263. 29. Later charged with (and eventually acquitted of) torturing 134 Filipino P.O.W.s to death. 30. Boston Herald , August 25, 1901 (quoting a letter from an American officer). Quoted in Storey and Codman, 116. 31. Chaffee to General Hughes, Manila, September 30, 1901, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, 1592. 32. Testimony of William J. Gibbs, a survivor of the massacre. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2284 et seq. 33. Storey and Codman, 116. Congt'essional Record, 57:1, May 15,1902, 5525. 34. Major Waller was later court martialed for his actions in Samar, one suspects in retaliation for his refusal to engage in the extermination practices of his fellow officers. During the course of his trial he revealed the nature of Smith's orders and the public disclosure created a sensation in the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt (McKinley's successor upon the latter's assassination in 1901), in order to neutralize outraged public opinion, had Smith himself brOUght up on charges. The charges did not stem from any overt act of the Samar campaign (it is recalled that the War Department had "no record" that the orders were actually carried out) but rather because the orders themselves were "unprofessional." Smith was convicted, "admonished" by the tribunal, and sentenced to "early retirement." Smith became something of a cause celebre in jingoist circles, causing Roosevelt to regret his actions: "The court martial of General Smith cost me votes-votes'" (Schirmer, 239 n). 35. Stephen Bonsal, Boston Transcript, quoted in Storey and Codman, 38. 36. Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senate Doc. no. 205, 57:1, part I, pp. 2,3. 37. Chaffee to Gen. Hughes, September 30, 1901, quoted in Storey and Codman, 28. 38. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1,5. 589 39. It should be remarked that not all of the V.S. soldiers reveled in the bloodlust of their commanders. Many were repulsed by what they had witnessed and experienced in the Philippines and were anxious to expose American policy upon their return to the U.S. Others took to drink or went mad. Alcoholism and insanity followed venereal disease as the major cause for the reduction in available V.S. manpower in the Philippines. Desertion was difficult due to geographical factors, but incidences of officers being shot in the back "by snipers" were not unheard of, and a handful of Americans actually joined with and fought with the guerrillas (see Ellwood Bergerey, Why Soldiers Desert from the U.S. Army (Philadelphia: William Fell & Co., 1903), 132. 40. Cpl. Richard O'Brien, New York World, reprinted in the Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902, 5500. 41. Root to Lodge, Army and Navy Journal, AprilS, 1902. Reprinted in Storey and Codman, 88. 42. Senate Doc. no. 205,57:1, part I, p. 50. 43. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57:1, p. 19. 44. Senate Doc. no. 422,57:1, p. 4. 45. Address before the Marquette Club, Chicago, March II, 1902. Quoted in Frederick Chamberlin, The Blow from Behind (Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1903), 109. 46. Eyot, 146-47. 47. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552 et seq. 48. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552. 49. James H. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines (Manila: Malaya Books, 1968), 388. 50. Storey and Codman, 71-72. 51. Storey and Codman, 73. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, pp. 1628,1690-1. 52. Storey and Codman, 91. 53. Senate Doc. no. 331, 57:1, part 2, p. 1632. 54. Storey and Codman, 92-93. 55. Philippine Census, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: V.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), vol. 2, p. 20. Comparing the 1903 figures with the Spanish figures of 1887, Batangas lost 54,000 people in absolute terms, making no allowance for intervening population rise. Estimating on the basis of an annual population increase of 1.5 percent, it is certain that Batangas was depopulated by 100,000 or more. 56. Report of Major Corneliu~ Gardiner, Governor of Tayabas, Congressional Record, 57: I, May 1S, 1902, 5500. By native troops Gardiner was referring to the Macabebes, a tiny, pro-U.S. ethnic sub-group which had played a praetorian role during the Spanish regime and for this reason was well hated by the majority of Filipinos. 590 57. Congressional Record, 57: 1, May 16, 1902, 5542. 58. A current diversion in some areas of the Filipino left of late has been to try to decide which guerrilla leaders were principled revolutionaries and which were opportunist manipulators. Few-if any-of these men can withstand such a rigorous and, ultimately, unfair historical test, precisely because all of them lacked one or more of the following: (a) a revolutionary ideology; (b) a theory of imperialism; (c) anything other than a primitive understanding of the class nature of the struggle in which they were engaged; (d) an understanding of protracted warfare and guerrilla strategy. There was no real experience (except their own) upon which they could draw, nor was there a historical example known to them of the successful prosecution of such a struggle. They fought by their wits and their instincts alone, which led in turn to terrible reversals and, ultimately, .defeat in an uneven, suicidal struggle doomed from the start. So all of them to one degree or another fail the exacting test of their modern critics. Simeon Ola surrendered, betrayed his men, and turned state's witness against them. Macario Sakay was tricked into surrendering for principled (but tactically faulty) reasons and was betrayed and executed by the Americans, who had previously promised amnesty. Artemio Ricarte survives better than most, and for years after 1910 he waged an almost single handed struggle from abroad. But, sadly, in old age he could not see that Japanese and American imperialism were cut from the same cloth. "Papa" Isio finally surrendered, one suspects, because at the age of sixty-seven and after more than twenty-five years in the mountains the rigors of guerrilla life", simply got to be too much. And so it went. To hold such men against a standard which has only slowly evolved in the course of the 20th century seems to miss the point. Given the historical context within which the struggle was enjoined, how can it reasonably be expected that it could have evolved differently? The real heroes were not so much the leaders, who served their people with a greater or lesser degree of fidelity and ability, but the people themselves. A simple point, perhaps, but one which I believe bears making. 59. The struggle in the Philippines never degenerated into social banditry in the strict sense of the term, although in its later stages several of the guerrilla organizations developed into "Robin Hood"-type bands. The fascinating history of such movements as they have occurred historically and in various parts of the world has been largely ignored by orthodox historians, partly, no doubt, because of the inherent difficulties in researching such phenomena. The opportunities for such work in the Philippines are immense. The reader is directed to the pioneering work of E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York: Praeger, 1959) and Bandits (New York, 1971). 60. Report of the Governor of Albay, in Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1905), part 591 1, Appendix H, 144. Blount, 49. 61. Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1903), part 1, p. 30. 62. Report of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1905), part 4, p. 177. 63. Blount, 453. 64. Cable, Governor Feito to Carpenter, August 9,1904. Quoted in Blount, 461. 65. Report of Col. Wallace C. Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission Appendix A, 54. 67. Scott, 55. Conditions in Bilibid were scandalously bad, and in 1903 it became a point of controversy because American prisoners were being kept there as well as Filipinos. American investigators reported, "Considering the appalling mortality in Bilibid and the charac­ter of the diseases with which the prisoners are afflicted, there is no question but that the latter are suffering greatly from the effects of crowd poisoning." In reporting on conditions in late 1904, Secretary of Commerce and Police William Cameron Forbes issued a statement which can only be described as incredible: "In Bilibid Prison discipline has been uniformly good and conditions on the whole satisfactory. On the 7th day of Dec. 1904 a small outbreak occurred among the detention prisoners, in which 200 endeavored to gain their liberty. The prompt use of a gatling gun in the tower and the riot guns with which the guards on the walls were armed ended the trouble in eight minutes. There were 19 killed and 40 wounded, but the work in the shops and other industrial departments of the prison was not interrupted, and in 30 minutes' time there was no evidence except in the hospital that there had been any trouble." The "uniformly good" conditions Forbes spoke of included a death rate of 438 per 1000 by 1905. To be sentenced there was tantamount to a death sentence. 68. Report of H. H. Bandholtz, Commander, Second District Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 69. 69. Ibid., 69. 70. Ibid., 78. 71. Report of D. J. Baker, Provincial District Commander, ibid., part 3, Appendix A, 130. 72. Report of W. S. Scott, 53. 73. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), part 1, pp. 3031. I am not aware of any of the prominent leaders of 1899-1902 going back into the field after a spell of civilian life under American rule, although there may have been isolated cases where this did occur. 74. Euphoria at the outcome of that war was not, of course, confined to Japan and the Philippines. News of the Japanese victory electrified the masses of 592 people in Southeast Asia generally, e.g., Indochina, where guerrilla war was being waged against the French. 75. Report of Maj. Samuel D. Crawford, Commanding Officer, Fourth District, Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 101-2. 76. Blount, 505, quoting Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, An Englishwoman in the Philippines, 88. 77. Which of course it did. Testimony of Frank J. Bourns, First (Schurmann) Report of the Philippine Commission, part 2, p. 356. 78. Ibid., 355-56, 414-16. Eighth Annual Report of the Philippine Commssion, part 2, p. 311. The story of the short-lived Negros Republic and, more importantly, the development of the social forces which led to its founding have not, to my knowledge, been adequately treated by Filipino historians, which points up the sorely felt need for regional histories of the Philippines. 79. Report of Colonel Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 88. 80. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), part 1, p. 142. 81. Report of Colonel Bandholtz, First District, Philippine Constabulary, ibid., part 2, p. 239. Back To History Is A Weapon's Front Page Never wound a snake; kill it. —Harriet Tubman http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/franciscofirstvietnam.html http://www.military-quotes.com/forum/philippines-americas-first-vietnam-iraqt8875.html 593 America's First "Vietnam" – The Philippines Insurrection 1898 Published on May 31, 2012 A Useful Idiot, an avid student of history, makes an argument that America's foreign policy blunders, overestimated military superiority, media collusion public relations wars, policies of torture and brutality, false flag instigations,and liberations that become occupations that become insurrections, all didn't begin with Vietnam in 1964 but rather started with the Spanish American War 66 years earlier in 1898.And those same characteristics from The Phillipines AND Vietnam haunt the US now in Iraq, Afghanistan and possibly more countries to come.All the patterns we see in American foreign policy and military adventures for the rest of the twentieth century were laid out in this war and continue into the twenty-first century.So, as many suggest we didn't learn our lessons from Vietnam, a Useful Idiot suggests that we didn't learn our lessons from the Spanish-American War...which ultimately brings up a question American citizens should ask themselves: What are these wars really about and why don't we seem to learn anything?And for A Useful Idiot, the question becomes how can American citizens be fooled over and over by the very same manipulative political strategies,propaganda,and tactics that stretch back over 100 years? Edison Cuba film propaganda:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OqH2q3... Filipino genocide:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfLJQY... The First war films:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fdnYcZ... US troops landing in Cuba:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jWpOTM... Emilio Aguinaldo - Phillipine leader:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_VPUK... History of 20th century US wars:http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.ph... • Category News & Politics • License Standard YouTube License http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGdIZZQ90xA 594 The Ships That Ferried Soldiers and Prisoners Home | History | Ships | Miscellanea | Search S.S. Mobile Other names: USAT Sherman, Calawaii Sisters: Manitoba, Massachusetts, Mohawk Builder: Harland & Wolff, Belfast, yard number 253 Launched November 17, 1892; delivered July 27, 1893; scrapped in Japan, 1933 Hull: length 445' 6"; beam 50' 2"; 5,780 tons; 1 funnel; 4 masts Power: single screw; triple expansion engines by builder, with cylinders of 22 ½", 36 ½", and 60" diameter, stroke 48"; 499 n.h.p. Steam pressure 165 lbs.; fuel consumption 60 tons per day; 14 knots Registered in London; official number 101966 The Mobile was one of four sisters built as freighter for the African Steamship Company (Elder Dempster & Company). She was first chartered by the Atlantic Transport Line and then purchased by it in October of 1896. A passenger list dating from July 1896 records 595 that the commander of the Mobile was Sydney Layland, and an article in the New York Times notes that her consumption of coal was 60 tons per day. She is recorded in the Morton Allan Directory of European Passenger Steamship Arrivals making 44 voyages to New York for the Atlantic Transport Line between August 1892 and December 1897. 1898 Mobile and her sisters were among the six Atlantic Transport Line ships bought by the U. S. Government for service as transports during the Spanish-American War. This particular vessel was purchased on July 14 for $660,000, converted in New York, and given the number 1, "in accordance with the policy adopted of changing the names of foreign vessels to designated numbers after they come into the possession of the United States." She was not converted in time to serve during the war, but was retained afterwards for the new Army transport service, for which she was renamed Sherman. The Sherman made an excellent transport because she could accommodate 80 officers, 1,000 men and 1,000 horses as well as a high volume of cargo including refrigerated meat. She was allocated to the Pacific fleet and served on its regular San Francisco to Manila service. When the Sherman returned to San Francisco from the Philippines with California's regiment of soldiers she was the cause of the first working wireless signals in America. The city had planned a big celebration for the soldiers upon their return. But nobody knew when the troopship would arrive. George Otis Mitchell, a physics teacher at Girl's High School, had experimented with wireless telegraphy and suggested that if a wireless transmitter were put onboard the lightship San Francisco (which Sherman would have to pass), a lookout could report the sighting to a receiver located in the city who would then pick up the message and relay it via telephone lines. The idea was taken up and it worked extremely well. The Sherman took an active role in the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion, and World War One. She sailed on one voyage to Vladivistok and Trieste in December 1918 to collect Czech prisoners of war who had marched across Russia with the Red army in hot pursuit and in 1920 she carried American athletes from New York to compete in the Olympic Games in Antwerp. In 1922 Sherman was bought by the Los Angeles Steamship Company for $60,000, and rebuilt as a cabin liner for their Los Angeles to Hawaii service by the Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Dry-dock Company at a cost of $300,000. The ship, renamed Calawaii, now had accommodation for 178 first class and 52 third class passengers, and evidently proved to be a popular liner. In 1932 she was laid up and the following year she towed the burned out City of Honolulu to Osaka, where both ships were scrapped in 1933. Sources: The Atlantic Transport Line, 1881-1931; The Ships List; Passenger Ships of the World Past and Present, Eugene W. Smith, Massachusetts, 1977; Merchant Fleets in Profile 2; the Ships of the Cunard, American, Red Star, Inman, Leyland, Dominion, Atlantic Transport and White Star Lines, Duncan Haws, 1979; maritimematters.com; antiqueradio.com; The Transport Service, by Patrick McSherry; The New York Times, December 8, 1897; June 25, 1898; August 5, 1920 596 The passenger list issued by the London office for the voyage of the Mobile commencing July 24, 1896. The recipient added comments about fellow passengers and identified the captain as "Papa." (Kinghorn) Click for PDF file (4,693 KB) 597 598 599 A photo of USAT Sherman in dock, and a photograph of two members of the crew taken in 1906 (Martin Cox collection and eBay) Deck plans of the Sherman (U.S. Army Transport Museum) 600 Sherman's return to San Francisco in 1899 was heralded by wireless (Antique Radio Classified). A photo postcard depicting the Sherman leaving Manila on one of her regular runs (Kinghorn) 601 A photo postcard depicting the Sherman tied up at the U.S. Army pier in Manila (Ian Newson) The Sherman coaling at Nagasaki, from a Japanese tinted photo postcard (Kinghorn) 602 A tinted postcard of the Calawaii (Kinghorn) For more information ... 603 Home | History | Ships | Miscellanea | Search © 2005 - 2011, Jonathan Kinghorn, all rights reserved This Site and all its Contents are intended solely for non-commercial use. You may download or copy the Contents and other downloadable materials displayed on the Site for your personal use only. No right, title or interest in any downloaded materials or software is transferred to you as a result of any such downloading or copying. You may not reproduce (except as noted above), publish, transmit, distribute, display, modify, create derivative works from, sell or participate in any sale of or exploit in any way, in whole or in part, any of the Contents, the Site or any related software. Read more: http://www.atlantictransportline.us/content/21Mobile.htm#ixzz2RsGJz2jO 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 U.S. military government On August 14, 1898, following the August 12 capture of Manila, the U.S. established a military government in the Philippines under General Merritt as Military Governor.[38] During military rule (1898–1901), the U.S. Military commander governed the Philippines under the authority of the U.S. President as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. General Otis succeeded General Merritt as Military Governor, governing from 1898 to 1900. General Otis was succeeded by General MacArthur, who governed from 1900 to 1901.[39] Under the military government, an American-style school system was introduced, initially with soldiers as teachers; civil courts were organized, including a supreme court; and local governments were established in towns and provinces. The first local election was conducted by General Harold W. Lawton on May 7, 1899, in Baliwag, Bulacan.[39] • ^ a b Zaide 1994, p. 279 Ch.21 661 662 http://philippineamericanwar.webs.com/advancetosanisidro.htm Collection of Pictures from Arnaldo Dumindin…PhilippineAmerican War, 1899-1902. Youngs Scout led by 2nd Lt. James E. Thornton ( far right ) 663 The original 26 men of Youngs Scout at Baliwag,Bulacan May 11, 1899 Young’s Scout late May 1899 in Manila 664 American Soldiers Baliwag, Bulacan 1899 665 General Otis knew that rains made the muddy roads virtually impassable for re-supply wagons. He feared that Lawton might get isolated and his forces cut to pieces by the surrounding Filipinos. 666 US infantry and Battery D, 6th Artillery, on outpost duty near San Fernando, Pampanga Province, 1899 667 Lawton's staff relaxing at their headquarters in Baliwag, Bulacan Province, May 1899. 668 Third US Infantry marching on to San Isidro, May 1899; two Chinese litter-bearers employed by the Americans are included in the photo. 669 Scott's Battery on the way to San Isidro, May 1899 670 The Church of San Agustin and plaza at Baliwag. Photo was taken in 1897 671 Red dots marks Lawton’s stops, Blue dots marks Mac Arthur’s. stops…if you can notice from the map, no surface roads links Baliwag to any of the towns. Baliwag is being traveled through a river way network. The soldiers have to swim or wade across the river from Bustos to reach the town proper of Baliwag. 672 The actual map used by the American Forces…captured from the Spaniards. 673 General Lawton's "Bull Train" with provisions halted on the road for rest, 1899 674 Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton is shown here observing the American advance on Baliwag, Bulacan Province, May 2, 1899. 675 Maj. Gen. Henry W. Lawton and staff resting at his headquarters in Baliwag, Bulacan Province, May 1899. 676 Gen. Gregorio del Pilar and other Filipino Peace Commissioners at San Isidro, May 1819, 1899. Source: The Lopez of Balayan History Museum 677 Filipinos captured by General Lawton amusing themselves at Fort Santiago, Manila, 1899 678 679 President Aguinaldo withdrew to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija Province, 18 miles (30 km) to the north. Company I, 3rd Infantry Regiment, at Baliwag, Bulacan Province. Photo was taken on Sept. 5, 1899. Company H, 22nd US Infantry Regiment, in the trenches of the south lines of Manila, April 15, 1899. A week later, the unit was attached to Lawton's expedition to capture San Isidro. 680 Company B, 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiment, 1899 Colonel (later General) Owen Summers, CO of the 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiment, at Baliwag, May 1899. 681 Colonel (later General) Owen Summers, CO of the 2nd Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiment, at Baliwag, May 1899. 682 A barber at Baliwag, Bulacan Province, 1899. 683 Church at Baliwag used for quarters by Lawton's expedition. Photo taken in May 1899. 684 Caption: "The Oregon Boys Wading the Norzagaray River, P.I.", a town just 10 miles North of Baliwag. 685 Felipe Salvador…Baliwag’s Unsung Hero *257. FELIPE SALVADOR: A Rebel Messiah Comes to Pampanga SALVADOR DEL MUNDO. Felipe Salvador, "Apo Ipe", the Supremo of Santa Iglesia, a religious/revolutionary cult group which had its base at the foothills of Mt. Arayat and which wielded influence over the Central Luzon area. From El Renacimiento Filipino. During the years of the Philippine Revolution, a man who spent much of his time communing with God in the slopes of mystical Mount Arayat, organized a controversial religious movement that led armed campaigns against Spaniards and the succeeding colonial masters, the Americans, but remained alienated from the Katipunan. Dismissed as a dangerous ‘bandolero’ by Americans, Felipe Salvador, founder of the cult group Sta. Iglesia, would eventually be executed for his perpetrations in Pampanga, Bulacan, Nujeva Ecija and Tarlac. Felipe Salvador (“Apo Ipe”) was born on 26 May 1870 in Baliwag, Bulacan, the child of a well-off family. His father, Prudencio had been an official in the Spanish government. The Salvadors had many relatives in nearby Pampanga province and it is even possible that Felipe was born there as his name is not recorded in the canonical books of Baliwag. Even as a profoundly religious young man, he had a rebellious streak, defying the parish priest by dissuading a group of vendors from paying dues to the Church. Felipe soon became the head of a cofradia(confraternity) called “Gabinistas”, originally founded by Gabino Cortes of Apalit. Cortes was said to possess supernatural powers, conjuring food, money and male guards to appear using a magic ball. Gabinista members were mostly Kapampangans from Apalit, San Luis, San Simon, Santa Ana, Candaba, Macabebe and Santo Tomas. Upon reorganizing the cofradia and renaming it as Sta. Iglesia in 1894, the self-proclaimed Pope joined the armed struggle by raiding garrisons and joining skirmishes against Spain. In one battle in San Luis, Salvador was wounded and fled to Biak-na-Bato where he consolidated his forces 686 with Aguinaldo’s. Social squabbles between the two factions, however, caused Salvador’s fall from grace. Elitist Kapampangan officers, for instance, did not want an outsider like him to command Kapampangan forces. Gen. Maximino Hizon even ordered the execution of 5 Sta. Iglesia members without proper trial. Two of Salvador’s soldiers also suffered by being falsely accused of committing ‘abuses’; they were later found shot and floating in the river. Meanwhile, in Floridablanca, Sta. Iglesia members were harassed by being forcibly ejected from their lands. Despite these setbacks, Salvador continued his warfare, this time, against the Americans from his command post at Barrio Kamias. Refusing calls to surrender, he was captured in 1900 and dumped in prison. But after swearing allegiance to the United States, Salvador rejoined the resistance and was branded as an outlaw. Captured in Nueva Ecija by the police in 1902, he was charged with sedition. But while being transferred to the Bilibid Prison in Manila, Salvador eluded his guards and escaped to Mount Arayat. There, Salvador revitalized his ‘diocese’ and found wide sympathy from the central Luzon peasantry. He became a sort of a demigod, subsisting on his brotherly relationships with certain people he met on his journey, like Vicente Francia, Epifanio de la Cruz, a certain Juan and Damaso. They not only helped him find sustenance, but also provided security as he worked his way around the area. Ipe was warmly welcomed by people in the community who offered generous gifts, and he used these opportunities to recruit members and generate funds. His modus operandi was simple: he would enter a town with some 20 chosen disciples, plant a cross and exhort people to donate money and join his brotherhood while projecting an image that is at once poor, pitiful and prayerful. As membership grew, so did the number of fanatical attacks launched against the American-run government—with the biggest ones waged in Malolos, San Rafael and Hagonoy in the summer of 1906, led by Capitan Tui. On 17 April 1910, Salvador did the unthinkable—he and his group of about 20 “Salvadoristas” strode to the center of Arayat town to purchase supplies and provisions, knowing full well that they were under tight surveillance. Yet, the police officials and the rest of the populace were too stunned to do anything—with some even spontaneously giving their donations. To cap their visit, Salvador and his group knelt in prayer in front of the church, leaving the residents in complete awe. Shortly after this remarkable event, he was captured just as he prophesied on 24 July 1910—a Sunday. An informer, Eusebio Clarin, motivated by the 5,000 peso reward on the Supremo’s head, led policemen to his lair in Barrio Kamias of San Luis, as he was in prayer with his family members. He was convicted and sentenced to die by hanging on 15 April 1912. Still, his faithful followers were confident that he would work a miracle and escape once more. But this was not to be. Salvador faced death calmly , “in high spirits , without a frown on his forehead”, as Taliba reported. Even in death, his devotees believed he would rise again—after all, he seemed like “he was only asleep, happy, his complexion not darkening as is usually expected of him who has died of unnatural causes”. But his passion has clearly –and finally ended. Apo Ipe—sinner or saint, villain or hero, fanatic or patriot--was laid to rest the next day at the cemetery at Paang Bundok. Posted by alex r. castro at 7:46 AM Labels: American Occupation in Pampanga, Apalit, Arayat, Bulacan,Kapampangan personalities, Pampanga, Philippine Revolution, San Luis, San Simon, Sta. Ana, Sto. Tomas 687 “ I think he is an authentic hero who paid the supreme sacrifice for our country’s freedom. Remember, he relentlessly fought against both the Spaniards and the Americans without compromising his principles in life”. Words quoted from Baliwag Former Mayor Rolando Salvador ( Grandson of Apo Ipe, from Felipe Salvadors first cousin, Teofilo Salvador ) Bustos and San Rafael was once part of Baliwag… Bustos was once a part of its neighboring town, Baliuag during the Spanish and American colonial period.The town was separated from Baliuag by tragic incident when around year 1860 a group of natives with babies in their arms were on their way to a church in Baliuag for baptismal when they accidentally drowned and perished when the raft they were riding capsized while crossing the wild river of Angat. This fateful event led the people of Bustos to request and build their own parish church and decided to chose the Holy Child Jesus as their patron saint in honor of those infants that died in the river. Bustos also gained its independence from Baliwag in 1867 thru the painstaking efforts and sacrifices of its inhabitants. The town got its name from Don Pedro Jose de Busto[s], an aide of a Spanish Gov. General of the Philippines during the late 1700's. But the town became a part of Baliuag again during the American period. Bustos was again separated from Baliuag and became a distinct municipality in 1917. History http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bustos,_Bulacan In 1899, the Americans incorporated the town to Baliwag when Baliwag was intended to be the Provincial Capital of Bulacan. However, due to a number of petitions of the people of San Rafael, especially when the plan to make Baliwag the capital of Bulacan did not materialize, the Americans where convinced to separate San Rafael as an independent town from Baliwag. Mr. Julian V. Valte was appointed to be the first Presidente Municipal of San Rafael, and Mr. Emilio Reyes was the last. In the year 1924 and 1927, with the help of some influential men, the Spaniards were able to get the signatures of the land owners of San Rafael and San Ildefonso to an agreement purporting to show their willingness to donate their lands to the Hospital of San Juan de Dios. Thus the town of San Rafael and San Ildefonso became properties of the hospital and started to be called Hacienda de Buenavista until 1944, when it got back its original name. History http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Rafael,_Bulacan#Spanish_Era 688 Bustos Dam, San Rafael is on the other end of the Dam…. 689 Baywalk San Rafael overlooking Angat River…the mountain in the background is Norzagaray…. Collection of Pictures 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 Young’s Scouts Young’s Scouts routed superior enemy forces time and again early in the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). The unit was originally comprised of just 25 men, and they served together for less than a month, but their exploits captured the imagination and admiration of soldier and civilian alike. Twelve received the Medal of Honor for exceptional valor on the battlefield. Six others were recognized for extraordinary gallantry in the presence of the enemy. No other unit garnered such honors. Ironically, we know little about their eponymic leader, William Henry Young, a civilian.1 Had Young lived, he would surely be more than a footnote in a war that America soon wanted to forget. However, the wound Young suffered at San Miguel de Mayumo on May 13, 1899 proved fatal, and he disappeared from popular history. Young remains a mystery figure, but the legend of Young’s Scouts lives. Their courageous charge across a burning bridge at Tarbon three days after Young was wounded is preserved for future generations in the painting, “Soldiers in the Sun.” Lawton’s First Scouts2 Soon after Major General Henry Ware Lawton arrived in the Philippines in early 1899, he ordered every company in his command, including the Volunteers, to designate five “sharpshooters” as scouts. For his Laguna de Bay Campaign south of Manila (April 8-19), Lawton organized these scouts into a 200-man strike force. Problems in provisioning Driving an entrenched enemy away, Young’s Scouts saved a key bridge from being destroyed by fire on the American campaign to capture San Isidro, the seat of Filipino government. One Scout was killed in the assault. Capturing the bridge saved the Americans two days of marching. The Army National Guard commissioned this painting by Donna Neary. 1 710 Situated just north of the Equator, almost 7,000 miles west of San Francisco, the Philippines archipelago became a bloody and dangerous place to soldier. The U.S. suffered 1,005 deaths from combat, and more than 6,000 deaths from disease and other causes. Most fighting in the first year took place within 50 miles of Manila, on Luzon, the largest island of the former Spanish colony. . 2 711 Young’s Scouts them soon led to dissolution of the unit, and the men returned to their companies. Nonetheless, these “sharpshooters” continued to serve as the advance guard for their regiments. Lawton’s Move North After Lawton’s Laguna de Bay Campaign pushed the enemy back on the southern front, the Americans turned their attention north, to the Filipino seat of government at San Isidro, 50 straight-line miles from Manila. Lawton was to lead the right wing of an American advance to capture that city. The offensive was intended to do major damage to the northern forces of the Filipinos, and hopefully compel them to cease resistance to the American occupation. On the first day of his march north on April 22, Lawton met enemy resistance near Novaliches, but rugged country and heat were his biggest problems. Beyond Novaliches, plodding water buffalo (carabao), the principal beast of burden in the Philippines, struggled to pull cumbersome, woodwheeled carts piled high with the Army’s ammunition and supplies over baking hills and through steaming jungle bot- toms. By the third day, carabao were dropping dead from overwork. Soldiers took the place of animals in the traces. Progress one day was just three miles, and Lawton’s column was strung out for miles. His planned two-day march of about twenty miles to the Angat River took five days. With such cumbersome progress, the general realized that he needed a small scout unit under his direct command that could move fast in rough country with minimal support to keep him informed about the disposition and movements of the enemy. Lawton Meets Young Along the Angat River, Lawton saw an impressive-looking man in civilian clothes sitting on a log. It was Young. “I asked who he was,” Lawton later said: and one of my staff officers replied that he did not know, but he had seen him on the firing line several times, and although he had been ordered frequently to the rear, he had disobeyed the order. The lieutenant said, ‘He has been continuously in front of our lines under fire, but the men can’t keep him away.’3 After seeing action against the Spanish in Cuba in 1898 , Major General Henry Ware Lawton was chafing in a desk job when he asked to be sent to the Philippines. Hostilities with the Filipinos seemed imminent. A man of action, Lawton also chafed under the cautious micro-management of the military governor in the Philippines, Major General Elwell S. Otis, his superior. Lawton confided his unhappiness during the San Isidro campaign to his counterpart in Luzon, Major General Arthur MacArthur: “My movements are dictated in detail, and I have not been advised as to my future disposition; as a result, am not altogether happy.” The farther north Lawton advanced, the worse he found the roads, which heavy rains sometimes made impassable. Bad roads were just one obstacle, and the Americans learned much during the five-week San Isidro campaign. Spanishera maps were unreliable in showing roads and features. Towns often went by two or even three names — Spanish and Tagalog (the regional dialect) and local custom. Few natives in rural areas spoke both Spanish and Tagalog, let alone could translate those languages into English for the Americans. The principal beast of burden, the carabao, proved impractical for hauling the Army’s bulky equipage and field rations. The standard artillery fieldpiece, a 3.2-inch gun, was too heavy and cumbersome for mobile operations. Tropic heat and exhaustion quickly felled the soldiers in combat conditions; one engagement in which the Americans chased fleeing Filipinos for 20 minutes saw 35 soldiers drop out of the pursuit “as if shot,” 8 of them comatose. Lawton was quick to praise and reward good soldiering and courageous acts. He was especially admiring of his Chief of Scouts, William Henry Young, and Young’s hand-picked second in command, Private James Harrington of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Both men would die of wounds suffered on the San Isidro Campaign. Lawton himself would be killed by a Filipino sharpshooter’s bullet before year’s end. His funeral in Washington, D.C. was attended by thousands. Major General Henry Ware Lawton and “General” “...the insurgents began shooting at General Lawton, who in his light-colored clothing and white helmet on a big black horse was a conspicuous target for the enemy sharpshooters…” (from Private John Kinne’s Diary, describing the action near Novaliches). 3 712 Young’s Scouts Civilians often tagged along with the American soldiers early in the PhilippineAmerican war. Some went as reporters, photographers, male Red Cross nurses, and chaplains, some as sightseers, and some like Young carried a rifle and joined in the fighting. Private John Kinne of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers, later a member of Young’s Scouts, described his first view of Young in his Diary.4 As Lawton’s troops were embarking on his Laguna de Bay Campaign, Kinne said: my attention was called to a fine, athletic looking individual in civilian clothes, leaning on his rifle. He was not taking any part in the apparent preparations, but seemed to be an interested spectator. He reminded me of Leatherstocking, the hero of Cooper’s tales. If Leatherstocking was well over six feet tall and built like a brawny logger, then Kinne’s description is apt. During that ten day expedition, Young ate and slept with the soldiers, and helped to capture Santa Cruz. At age 41, he was older than most of the men, and something of a loner, but he quickly gained their admiration. Most had scant combat experience. He put two notches on his rifle on that campaign, during which he spent much of his time with the 1st North Dakota Volunteers, whose officers and enlisted men took notice of the civilian warrior’s coolness under fire. General Lawton would not tolerate foolish civilians playing soldier. When he learned of Private John Baxter Kinne left his senior year of high school in May 1898 to enlist in Fargo’s Company B of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers. An athletic, adventurer, he was assigned to Young’s Scouts on May 14, 1899. After his discharge, Kinne became a physician. In World War I, he left his practice to command an ambulance company in France. Many years later, he expanded the diary he kept as a Volunteer into a 50,000 word typescript. His unpublished narrative is the best account of Young’s Scouts thus far discovered. 4 713 Young’s Scouts Carts piled high with Army rations and equipment await the Philippines’ principal beast of burden, the carabao, a water buffalo. The animal could pull a cart loaded with about 1,000 pounds on a level road, but Lawton drove hundreds to death on his San Isidro Campaign. Replacements were commandeered, leaving many Filipinos without means of working their farms. This photo was taken north of Manila, with the Caloocan church in the background. Young’s behavior on the battlefield, he called the civilian over from his log to dress him down. By that time, according to Kinne, Young had put several more notches on his Mauser, and had saved Kinne’s company commander from ambush by spotting and dispatching two of the enemy. Lawton did not dress Young down. Instead, the general later said that Young’s “appearance and explanation pleased me.” He decided on the spot to test Young’s abilities. He sent him out to bring back a civilian for questioning about the road to San Rafael, Lawton’s next objective. “Five minutes later,” the general said, “[Young] returned with rifle and bag of ammunition, having found enemy’s picket….” Lawton was impressed. Young had discovered a nearby enemy outpost of eight men, fired three shots, killed one, and recovered a rifle and “haversack with 86 rounds of ammunition, dripping with blood.” The general had no idea the enemy was so near. Next day, Lawton had another talk with Young that “satisfied” him as to Young’s qualifications. Like Lawton, Young was an “Indian fighter.” He had served as a scout for General Oliver O. Howard in the Pacific Northwest in the months-long pursuit of Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce. Perhaps Lawton saw something familiar in the powerful-looking civilian. Lawton was also a man of size, standing six feet three inches. As an Army captain, Lawton himself had earned an early reputation for his dogged pursuit in America’s rugged Southwest to capture Geronimo, the Apache warrior. Lawton also learned that, until his appearance in the Philippines, Young had prospected for gold in Montana and California, and served as a soldier-of-fortune and mining superintendent in Korea and China. Like many others, Young saw economic opportunities after the American acquistion of the Philippines, so he made his way to Manila, intending to prospect for gold. After his second interview with Young, Lawton offered him a job as his “scout and guide.” Young could pick 25 men for a unit that he knew were “good, cool-headed men of courage….” Young immediately accepted Lawton’s offer. They sealed their agreement with a handshake. Young’s Scouts The new “Chief of Scouts” wanted all 25 men to come from the 1st North Dakota Volunteers he knew best, but Lawton thought that would cause jealousy among the other units. As a result, the first Scouts included sixteen men from the 1st North Dakota, six from the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, and three 4th U.S. Cavalry men who were operating as infantry.5 Lawton later said the first Scouts were “men who had either lived for years on our Indian frontier, were inured to hardship and danger, and skilled in woodcraft and use of the rifle, or had demonstrated during their service in these islands pe- Volunteer sergeants strike a studio pose with their new 30-caliber Krag-Jorgenson rifles. In March 1899, Volunteer companies each received a dozen of the rifles, standard issue for the Regular Army. The “Krag” compared favorably with the 28-caliber Mauser that many Filipinos used. Note the double-rowed cartridge belts. The Krag belts held 120 rounds. The belt for the 45-70 Springfield rifle held just 50 of that rifle’s larger, heavier cartridges. 5 714 Young’s Scouts culiar fitness for the work contemplated.” Before Young received his first mission, Lawton made clear to the Scouts that they reported to Young as their chief. The new Chief Scout equipped his men from the Volunteer ranks with the U.S. Army’s Krag-Jorgenson rifle, rather than the single-shot, limited range, 45-70 Springfield rifle nearly all Volunteers carried. The “Krag” was a good match against the Mauser rifles of the Filipinos. Its magazine held five .30 caliber shells, and the rifle had an effective range of over a mile. Standard equipment for Young’s Scouts would be a Krag, a full cartridge belt, bayonet, and canteen. Except for personal items, and coffee and hardtack crackers in their pockets, they carried nothing else – no canned rations, no haversacks, blankets, tents, or extra clothing. As his second-in-command, Young chose a 46-year-old private with the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, James Harrington. A former seaman, Harrington was shorter than most Volunteers, but Young had seen intelligence, coolness, and leadership qualities in Harrington, a “sharpshooter” on the Laguna de Bay Campaign. First Action On May 1 (the day after he formed his unit), Young put Harrington in charge of half the Scouts to lead the American advance down the right bank of the Angat River towards San Rafael, the beginning of Lawton’s drive towards Baliuag. Young and the other Scouts followed the left bank. Shortly after, Lawton telegraphed Manila that the Scouts: have done and are doing excellent and effective work. On both sides of river they have advanced half day ahead of the command. Located and developed enemy and sent information to column. Two of them drove back a skirmish line of 200 men and held them until command came up. They have brought in 1 to 4 guns every day. Capturing enemy rifles was important. The U.S. was using diplomatic pressure to prevent or delay shipments of Filipino arms and ammunition from Far East ports, so every rifle the Filipinos lost reduced their military strength. Lacking artillery and sufficient arms and ammunition, the Filipinos had begun avoiding set piece battles, but they tried to frustrate Lawton’s advance by using fight and retreat tactics. With the Americans fighting their way downriver from San Rafael on May 2, Young and the Scouts were first to enter Baliuag (pop. 17,000), the largest city for miles around. In a practice that would become familiar, some Scouts climbed the belfry of the church in Baliuag to take potshots at the retreating Filipinos, and then rang the church bell to signal that the town was theirs. The harsh tropic conditions and Young’s hard driving of the Scouts took a toll. After two days, three Scouts dropped out and were replaced. Next day (May 3), Kinne said: …Young [and the Scouts]…started out on the Maasin Road, and after going about a mile the insurgent outpost opened fire at them about 800 yards ahead. After exchanging a few shots, the Scouts move up about 400 yards, and then they sighted an insurgent officer driving off in a carretta [a two-wheeled passenger cart]. They opened fire on him, and the horse was killed, but the offi- This present-day view of San Agustin Church in Baliuag shows the belfry the Scouts climbed to harass retreating Filipino troops with gunfire. The church was the largest building in every rural community in Catholic Philippines. Belfries offered the best vantage, and the church the best shelter for campaigning troops. cer stepped out and faced them. Harris saw that, and from 300 yards away he and the insurgent officer exchanged four shots apiece, with the result the officer fell with four holes in his body and Harris came out without a scratch. From then on, the insurgents kept on the retreat and the Scouts followed, keeping up a continual fire. Their ammunition was running low. Just about this time, a mounted troop of the 4th Cavalry came up to reinforce them. As it was getting late, they decided to go back to Baliuag. Private Simon Harris was one of the Scouts assigned from the 4th U.S. Cavalry. The 25-year-old cavalryman had enlisted in the patriotic fervor that swept the nation in the early days of the war with Spain. His regiment arrived in the Philippines with the Fourth Expedition (just after the Spanish surrender of Manila), but most of its horses had inadvertently been left in Hawaii. Until enough of their big U.S. Cavalry horses arrived in the Philippines, three troops of the 4th U.S. Cavalry would fight in the Philippine-American War as infantry, while three other troops were mounted on Cavalry or small, “native” horses. Harris and the other two cavalrymen carried the carbine version of the Krag, a somewhat lighter rifle with a shorter barrel. Every Cavalry trooper was also equipped with a .38 caliber sidearm.6 Some Volunteers 6 715 Young’s Scouts The Scouts set out on the rainy afternoon of May 4. Kinne also carried side arms, but they were not standard issue. said they: Search and Destroy went out about 3 miles that evening and camped for the Next for Young’s Scouts was a search-and-destroy misnight in a deserted sugar mill. In this mill, there were two sion. The American Military Governor in the Philippines, Mabaskets of chickens that they appropriated, and after jor General Elwell S. Otis, believed the Filipinos had stockbuilding a big fire in the center of the mill, they dried their piles of supplies hidden in the hills northeast of Baliuag. Actclothes while the chickens cooked and coffee was made. ing on orders from Otis, Lawton instructed Young “to find After supper, a guard was posted on three sides of the and destroy all magazines, storehouses or caches, or subcamp. Shortly after the guards were posted, three nasistence or other supplies belonging to the enemy…[The tives were caught sneaking around and were captured by Scouts were to] depend upon the country for subsistence… one of the guards. Not wishing them to inform the insur[and] conceal yourselves and your movements as much as gents of the camp, they tied the prisoners’ hands and possible.” feet and let them sleep in the mill on the cane. Young Lawton’s instructions to Young were extensive: gave orders that if anyone saw them trying to escape to You will observe carefully any trails or roads and follow shoot them on the spot. tracks of carts or sleds to ascertain if they lead to the At 2 o’clock the next morning, camp was broken and places where stores have been concentrated. All private they started again on their way. Two men were taken individuals and property will be respected. You will keep sick during the night and were sent back to town with the a record of the kind and quantity of stores destroyed and three prisoners. The rest proceeded about a mile down a the place of storage and report same to these headquarroad in Indian fashion about 30 paces apart, keeping well ters. As it will be impracticable to carry sufficient supplies in the shadow of the bamboo, as the moon was shining you must depend upon the country for subsistence. brightly. Young knew of an insurgent outpost on this You are especially charged to bear in mind that the road, and wanted to pass it without an alarm, in which he object of your expedition is not an aggressive one was successful. While passing the insurgent outpost, against the troops of the enemy. You must conceal yourthey could plainly hear the sentries talking and see the selves and your movements as much as possible. After fire of their cigarettes. They went past the outpost about accomplishing the object of your mission, the general does not object to your securing all the guns you can from the enemy on your return. The expedition should cover a period of several days. If practicable, you will communicate progress from time to time. You can arrange certain signals which can be understood. The general commanding relies upon your good judgment, courage, and caution to make the expedition a success, and each and every member of your detachment is relied upon to render faithful and obedient compliance with your orders as chief. He also relies upon your manhood as American soldiers to show due respect and consideration to help- A week-long mission to seek out and destroy enemy stockpiles of food and supplies saw Young’s Scouts less women and chil- traverse many miles of hilly country thick with tropic growth. Young was instructed to live off the land, so dren and noncombat- the Scouts carried little more than their weapons and ammunition. Hard duty and sickness took a toll on the 25 Scouts. One was sent to a Manila hospital. Others became too foot-sore to continue the hard marching. ants generally. 7 716 Young’s Scouts the rice. Leaving four men to watch the burning rice and to keep the natives away and keep up the fire, and also do the cooking, the rest made trips through the surrounding country, burning small storehouses here and there. They kept this up for three days, and on the third day, Young sent a messenger to General Lawton at Baliuag to report what they had been doing. Lawton in turn told Otis that Young’s Scouts had: Destroyed 48,000 bushels rice, 7 tons sugar, large quantities cloth from which uniforms are made, a lot of shoulder straps, gold lace, buttons, etc., for same; a quantity of ammunition, large lot of empty shells, 3 sets of reloading tools. Killed officer mounted on fine horse; got horse. This a.m. destroyed about 20,000 bushels rice…. Kinne’s narrative continued: On the fourth day, they broke camp at 5 p.m. They had two sick men who were unable to walk, but they put them on captured ponies and proceeded over a rough rocky road to the [Angat River], rested there, and reached Angat at 9 p.m., where they found I Troop [a mounted troop of the 4th U.S. Cavalry], and some North Dakotas. One of these sick Scouts, 21-year-old Private William Scott of the 2nd Oregon, was so ill he was sent back to the 1st Reserve Hospital in Manila, where he remained until the end of the month. Lawton meantime had received news from Otis that a large enemy force was reportedly moving north from Manila on Lawton’s right flank. Otis wanted Lawton to seek out this enemy. Lawton telegraphed Young at Angat – find this Filipino force, “and make it as hot as possible for the advance.” Kinne said the Scouts: were up at 4:30 the next morning and started at 5:00, leaving several sick men at Angat. They reached San José del Monte at 11 a.m., but found no signs of the enemy or anything unusual. They had dinner there with I Troop, and took a couple hours of rest, then left there about 2 p.m., going east along the bank of the river while keeping a sharp lookout for a trail going straight toward the mountains. Night overtook them in the foothills, so they camped on the summit of a high hill, posted guards, and had a good night’s sleep without being disturbed. They had no supper or breakfast. The next morning, they struck off in a northeasterly direction and found no trail, but did find one of Aguinaldo’s telegraph lines. While they were discussing how to cut it (having no tools), Young shot the wire in two in a couple places. Telegraph and mounted couriers were the principal means by which both the Americans and Filipinos communicated. As Lawton advanced, the Signal Corps strung telegraph wire to keep his column in touch with Manila and other units. These copper lifelines were so important that their sabotage by Filipinos became a crime punishable by death. Kinne continued regarding the reconnaissance of Young’s Scouts: Then they took a zigzag course covering the country between the trail and mountains to Norzagaray without discovering anything unusual. Rain turned roads to mud, making movement miserable for men and animals alike. “It has rained nearly every day,” Lawton said. Kinne said in Norzagaray that they had “the worst downpour we had ever experienced on the Islands,” with “three of the loudest claps of thunder I have ever heard.” Soldiers pushed and pulled carts and wagons to help them along. Note the size of the small “native” pony the nearest rider is on compared to the large American horse behind. Troops of Cavalry mounted on “native” ponies rode with their feet just inches from the ground. a half mile and left the road. Just before daylight, they came to an old house, searched it, and found an insurgent officer and two privates. They made them take off their uniforms and tear them up, but could find no arms, so passed on and left the three men. Just at dawn, they came to a place where there were five large sheds of rice. There were no houses there, just the sheds, made of bamboo matting and a roof over them. They surrounded the sheds and captured five natives wearing insurgent uniforms. One got away on a horse and informed the neighborhood of the Americans’ presence. As the sun rose, Young’s men could see hundreds of natives going to the hills from every direction. After tearing down the sheds and setting fire to the rice, the Scouts started toward the hills, taking the four prisoners with them. They stopped at a creek at the foot of a long ridge, killed a pig, and made the prisoners roast it, made a pot of coffee, and ate breakfast. After resting about an hour, they divided the party into two squads, and advanced to the ridge expecting to have trouble, but found no armed natives except bolo men. [The bolo is a large, machete-like farm knife; some Filipinos went into battle armed only with bolos.] They found another storehouse with about 10,000 bushels of rice, and about half mile farther on a large hill was another storehouse with about 20,000 bushels of rice, 50 gallons of kerosene, 100 gallons of coconut oil, five tons of sugar, and a large amount of insurgent uniforms, cloth, and sewing machines. There were five sets of reloading tools, powder, lead for making bullets, and quite a quantity of beno [an alcoholic drink made from palm sap]. They made a permanent camp here, as it would take several days to burn 8 717 Young’s Scouts Young’s Scouts posed for a group picture in Baliuag by William Dinwiddie of Harper’s Weekly before setting out for Maasin on May 11. This is the only photo thus far discovered of Chief of Scouts William Henry Young. He stands at the far left in the back row. By this date, at least four of the original Scouts had dropped out because of sickness, exhaustion, or sore feet - Calvin Wilson, Edward McBain, and Neil Christianson of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers, and William Scott of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers. They took a raft and floated down the [Angat River] to Angat, arriving there a very hungry and tired lot of men, having traveled 36 hours through hilly country with nothing to eat. The men who were left at Angat had plenty to eat, and cooked for them. The 4th Cavalry had returned by the trail from San Jose, arriving about an hour ahead of the Scouts. The men had a good night’s rest, and ate enough to make up for what they had missed, and the next day rested most of the day, only making a short trip across the river. On that brief excursion on May 10, the Scout discovered another 1,500 bushels of rice, which Lawton distributed to Filipino civilians filtering back to their homes after the fighting. Lawton also ordered the Scouts back to Baliuag. Under Young’s leadership, the Scouts had set a pattern of considerable independence and much hard soldiering. Lawton Resumes His Campaign Lawton had fretted about his orders to remain at Baliuag- for almost two weeks. Simply holding his own was costly to his force of some 3,500 men. Two hundred sick had been sent back to Manila. Sunstroke, dysentery, and malaria were “very bad,” he said. He was also concerned that the coming rainy season would make movement impossible. “It has rained nearly every day,” he wrote, “and the country off the roads is impracticable for vehicles.” Anticipating that Otis would soon have to loosen his leash a bit, Lawton decided to reconnoiter his next objective. On May 11, after just one day’s rest following the Scouts’ long search and destroy mission, Lawton sent them north to Maasin, where a provisional brigade under Colonel Owen Summers of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers was also marking time. Before setting out, the Scouts posed for a picture by a photographer-journalist with Harper’s Weekly magazine. This blurry photo is the only image of William Henry Young discovered to date. 9 718 Young’s Scouts the road. They were so close they could hear the creak of his saddle as he mounted and rode away, but it was so dark they could not see to shoot, so let him go without making any noise. After proceeding about a mile, the men on the right side of the road got caught in the brush and were separated from the rest of the party, it being very dark and hard to keep together. The rest proceeded some distance without discovering this, and then called a halt and sent two men to find them and guide them back. This caused so much delay they could not get to the insurgent outpost before daylight, as streaks of gray could already be seen in the east. Knowing the outposts would be withdrawn to the main body at daylight, Young decided to gain a position where he could reconnoiter the enemy’s trenches and determine their strength before daylight. The Scouts soon reached a ridge which, from information they received at Maasin, they knew to be about 900 yards from the enemy’s position. They gained the ridge and concealed themselves in the bamboo thickets. From their position, they could see the campfires of the insurgents. As it grew lighter, they could see them moving around. Having sized up [the enemy’s] position and finding it to be a strong one, Young decided to draw their fire to determine their strength. With this in view, he walked out into the road in plain sight and began looking at an outpost with his field glasses. The outpost discovered him at San Ildefonso At Maasin, Lawton wanted Young and the Scouts to: go out very early in the morning, and to operate on the enemy’s left flank and towards San Miguel [de Mayumo], and to find a good route to the trail leading to the rear of the enemy back of Yldefonso [San Ildefonso], and to gather all information possible as to strength and location of enemy, and to inflict as much damage and annoy them as much as possible. In effect, Lawton want Young’s Scouts to find a way for the Americans to circle to the east around the entrenched enemy defending San Ildefonso, a city that sat on a low rise. If the Americans could command the road leading to San Miguel de Mayumo farther north, a flank attack would render the well-prepared defenses of the Filipinos ineffective, as the city would be in danger of being cut off. Kinne said that after the Scouts reached Maasin in late afternoon of May 11, “Young decided to try and capture an outpost on the road before daylight.” He probably wanted to keep the Filipino outpost from sending back word of their reconnaissance. According to Kinne, the Scouts ate breakfast about 2 a.m. [on May 12] and: left the last American outpost behind about 3 a.m. and proceeded cautiously along the road, Young and two men in the road, and the rest in a line of skirmishers on each side of the road. About a half-mile from the American outpost, they heard a mounted insurgent courier in Almost 40 years later, former Scout Frank Anders identified 19 of the 29 men in the Baliuag picture. In a letter to Otto Luther, a fellow Scout, Anders’ identifications included several “replacement” Scouts, indicated here by (r). Anders said the men were: (1) Chief Scout William Henry Young, (2) Frank Ross (r), (3) Richard Longfellow (r), (4) Frank Anders, (5) & (6) UNKNOWN, (7) John Smith, (8) James McIntyre (r), (9) Patrick Hussey, (10) Otto Luther, (11) UNKNOWN, (12) Simon Harris, (13) Eli Watkins, (14) Sterling Galt (r), (15) Peter Quinn, (16) James O’Neil, (17) (18) (19) UNKNOWN, (20) James Harrington, (21) & (22) UNKNOWN, (23) Michael Glassley, (24) Willis Downs (r), (25) UNKNOWN, (26) William Thomas, (27) UKNOWN, (28) John Killian, (29) Edward Lyon. Anders does not identify six of the original 1st North Dakota Scouts who are probably in the picture : Thomas Sletteland, Gotfred Jenson, Charles Davis, Edwin Pannel, John Desmond, and Otto Boehler. Neither does he identify William Truelock of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers, who was wounded with the Scouts next day at San Ildefonso, but who was not listed among the 25 original Scouts. Other “unknowns” from the original Scouts who are probably in the picture are Frank High and Marcus Robertson from the 2nd Oregon Volunteers. 10 719 Young’s Scouts once and shot three shots in rapid succession, none of artillery sites to support Lawton’s advance. which did any damage. There was immediately great The two officers had heard the Scouts’ gunfire all morning, confusion in the enemy camp. The Scouts could hear and reached Young and his men about the time the Filipinos officers giving commands and soldiers running to the were pursuing the Scouts along the parallel ridge. Sizing up trenches. The boys began firing at every enemy soldier the situation, Birkhimer and Case hurried back to Maasin for that came in sight, who evidently thought they were atreinforcements. Why the Scouts did not simply withdraw is tacked by a large force, and returned fire with volleys. unclear. Lawton was adamant that no Americans should be They kept up a hail of bullets for hours. Whenever their taken prisoner, and by Birkhimer’s later estimate, the Scouts fire would slacken, the Scouts would begin firing, and were outnumbered about 8 to 1. they would open up again faster than ever. Young deterWhen Colonel Summers at Maasin telegraphed Lawton mined that the enemy strength was about 400 armed that Young’s Scouts had engaged the enemy at San Ildemen, with 300 Remingtons and 100 Mausers.7 fonso, and that Birkhimer and Case had gone forward with About this time, their ammunition was replenished by a two companies of infantry to lend support, the general exScout who had remained in camp with sore feet. He ploded. Ignoring his own rather ambiguous instruction “to came up the road on horseback in plain view of the eninflict as much damage” as possible, he wired Summers, emy, who poured a perfect hail of bullets at him. He had “neither my scouts nor my staff have instructions to recona sack of ammunition, and reached the Scouts without a noiter the enemy’s front.” He said his orders had been to scratch. avoid contact with the enemy if at all possible, and that he After keeping up the fire about an hour, the Scouts wanted those orders carried out “as far as practicable.” withdrew out of range and proceeded to the left flank Was Lawton making a record to avoid censure by Otis? [east] of the enemy. They reconnoitered there for some One wonders. His instructions to the Scouts had been rather time, but could not gain a position of any advantage, so ambiguous. Moreover, it was fine for Lawton to bluster from retreated from there also. Young then went to the enBaliuag, but no one knew about the wide Filipino front deemy’s right flank [west] across an open field for nearly a mile while the enemy poured a continuous fire at them, but the Scouts did not return it. They finally gained a position of some advantage on a ridge about a mile to the right of the town. Here the enemy, now knowing there was only a small body, seemed to decide to drive them from their position, and, leaving their trenches, they proceeded along the ridge [that ran] parallel to the Scouts. Before starting out that morning, Young may not have known that Lawton was going to dispatch two staff officers to link up with the Scouts – Captain William Birkhimer of the 3rd U.S. Artillery (which was operating as infantry) and Captain James Case of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, Lawton exploded when he learned that Young’s Scouts were directly engaging the enemy at San IldeLawton’s engineer officer. fonso. When he later learned they had captured the town with just one casualty, his anger gave way to The officers were to map gratitude and admiration, because he had anticipated a major battle to take the town. The victory of the the area and locate suitable Scouts led Lawton to believe that he faced a “weakened enemy,” and he wanted to push on. 11 720 Young’s Scouts fending San Ildefonso, or of a knoll on the ridge that overlooked the whole area. In any case, while Birkhimer and Case were absent, Young took matters in his own hands. He and the Scouts charged the knoll occupied by the enemy and panicked some 30 defenders. During this action, Pvt. William Truelock of the 1st North Dakota’s Company C was shot in the knee.8 From atop the captured vantage point, the Americans saw they commanded the entire line defending San Ildefonso. The Filipinos knew this also. When they realized that only a small American force had driven them back, they launched a determined counterattack. The Filipinos had to cross a half mile of mostly open ground, however. Despite the attackers’ efforts to find cover, the Scouts punished them with accurate fire. While this engagement was going on, two companies of reWell-equipped Filipino soldiers stand near a rail of the Philippines’ only railroad, inforcing “blue shirts” from the 2nd Oregon Vol- which ran north from Manila to Dagupan on the Linguyan Gulf. The uniforms and unteers under command of Major Phillip East- accoutrements of the Filipino army were modeled on those of the Spanish. These wick reached the battlefield. When the Volun- soldiers are equipped with the 43-caliber Remington, a single shot rifle with performteers emerged unexpectedly from cover and ance similar to the Volunteers’ 45-70 Springfield. Three asymmetrical ammunition unleashed a couple of volleys, the Filipinos pouches attached to their combination suspenders and belt held 50 rounds. turned and fled. They abandoned their nowWith that insight, and with his concern that the rainy season outflanked, log-reinforced breastworks defending San Ildewould raise havoc with his lengthening supply line, he defonso, and retreated right through the town. The main force cided to prod Otis. He wired Manila early next day: headed northeast towards San Miguel de Mayumo, but scatThe delays in my movements disturb me very much. The tered groups took trails in various other directions. rice fields are now in places covered with water, and The Scouts and the 2nd Oregon Volunteers chased the twenty-four hours’ rain will render travel with transportaenemy some three miles beyond San Ildefonso before tion [wagons] impossible...I am possibly mistaken, but breaking off contact in early afternoon. While the Oregon the enemy has not impressed me as being in very great soldiers returned to occupy the captured city, the Scouts force or as showing much pertinacity. went back to Maasin. Young and the Scouts had been on By then, Otis had ascertained that the other wing of the the move or engaged in battle for fourteen hours. American advance toward San Isidro could resume its move From Maasin, Captain Birkhimer wired Lawton: north. Sickness and re-supply problems had bogged down With scouts and 84 men under Eastwick, flanked and Lawton’s counterpart, Major General Arthur MacArthur.9 Otis drove the enemy out of this place before 1:30 p.m. Purtold Lawton that MacArthur would soon send a column of sued him to near San Miguel...Estimate the enemy’s 1,500 towards San Isidro on the road alongside the broad strength at 200 by actual count...Four enemy killed, six Rio Grande de Pampanga. That column would be accompawounded, including one officer. nied by the gunboat Laguna de Bay and other armed Curiously, Birkhimer did not credit Young and his Scouts launches pulling native lighters (cascos) loaded with supwith taking the important high ground or with leading the plies. How far the gunboats could go upriver was unknown. rout at San Ildefonso. This column would link up with Lawton. Until it got going, Lawton was pleased. Although Otis held him in check, his however, Lawton should stay put. Frustrated by his comScouts had captured his next objective with just one casumanding general’s micro-management, Lawton stayed put. alty. Disregarding his earlier blow-up, and aware that San Miguel de Mayumo Young’s Scouts had given him a significant victory, Lawton The morning of May 13, Young and his Scouts set out wired Birkhimer: “Accept and express to Captain Case, Mafrom Maasin to reconnoiter San Miguel de Mayumo (San jor Eastwick, his men, and Young’s scouts my heartiest Miguel, the American’s called it), one of the largest towns in thanks for the good work today.” He instructed Young to the area. They were following Lawton’s instructions to “keep “keep in touch with enemy.” To Otis, he repeated in touch with the enemy.” San Miguel was said to be Birkhimer’s message, and added: “Had no intention of makstrongly defended with rare Filipino artillery. From the loss of ing attack.” the wounded Truelock and a half dozen other Scouts felled When Lawton mulled over the day’s events, he concluded by sickness, exhaustion, and beat-up feet, Young and his that the rout at San Ildefonso indicated a weakened enemy. 12 721 Young’s Scouts band numbered just eighteen men. Captain Birkhimer accompanied the Scouts, while Captain Case marched with two companies that followed as support – one from the 13th Minnesota Volunteers and one from the 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Taking the road northeast from San Ildefonso, Young and three Scouts were on point when they ran into a Filipino outpost about a mile and a half from San Miguel. After exchanging a few shots, the Filipinos withdrew. Here the road began to parallel the Balaonga River in a northeast direction towards the town, where the waterway made an abrupt 90degree jog before leading northeast again. On that jog, a bridge crossed the Balaonga to the center of the city. Young deployed his Scouts in a wide-spaced skirmish line on either side of the road, and advanced. As they emerged from a thicket that opened onto a rice field, the skirmishers came under fire from a sizable force of Filipinos at their front who were shooting from behind irrigation dikes in the rice field. The Scouts advanced in leapfrog manner. Those not moving stayed concealed and shot at any Filipino that showed himself. This relentless advance and the accurate fire of the Scouts discouraged the Filipinos. Some broke from their cover and retreated across the bridge. As the Fili- pino line began disintegrating, Young and the Scouts charged. Their charge sent the rest of the defenders fleeing across the bridge. Meantime, the Volunteers under Captain Case flanked the enemy farther upstream. Their sudden appearance sowed further confusion and panic among the Filipinos. A running fight ensued through the city’s streets as the Scouts steadily drove the enemy back. So rapidly did the Scouts advance, Captain Case said later, his Volunteers were “not engaged until the enemy was entirely clear of the town.” Meantime, Scouts were able to climb the bell tower of the San Miguel de Arkanghel church. From its height, they harassed the retreating enemy until they were out of sight. By shortly after noon, every Filipino soldier had disappeared from the town. Some headed up the road leading north, others fled toward the mountains to the east. They left three dead, and carried away several wounded, including two officers. Young Wounded Chief Scout Young had been wounded at the bridge by a heavy Remington bullet. The Scouts returned to find him resting against a baluster, his legs sprawled before him amidst a clutter of spent cartridges. He had kept firing so long as the enemy was in sight. Blood seeped through the bandage he had bound around his wounded knee. Captain Birkhimer rushed a message back to San Ildefonso to be telegraphed to Lawton: San Miguel was theirs; Young was wounded. Lawton immediately wired Colonel Summers: “Young...is reported wounded. He is a brave, gallant man, and I want everything possible be done for his welfare and comfort.” Summers hurried a muledrawn ambulance forward to carry Young and a wounded Minnesota infantryman back to Baliuag. Several Scouts volunteered to see Young’s safe return, but he declined their offers. As Young was being loaded into the ambulance, Kinne said, “He handed [Pvt. James] McIntyre his gun and said, ‘Keep it until I Just 11 Scouts and Captain Birkhimer charged and broke the Filipino line defending the bridge that led am out, and if I don’t return, to the heart of San Miguel de Mayumo. Young and the Scouts were told to “keep in touch with the enemy,” you can have it.’” but Young was an aggressive warrior. When the Chief Scout (and probably Harrington also) initiated the Later, Captain Birkhimer charge, Birkhimer probably felt he had no choice but to be in the forefront. Scouts later said Birkhimer criti- telegraphed Lawton: cized Young for attacking San Miguel without orders. 13 722 Young’s Scouts The gallant conduct of Scouts Young and Harrington and about 10 other scouts in charging into the open to-day at least 200 Philippines at 150 yards’ distance in heavy skirmish line and breaking it is above all praise. Some other of the scouts skulked; I know 2 of them. Kinne was not aware of Birkhimer’s complaint about skulking Scouts, but in his Diary he interjected at this point an observation on battlefield bravery. He referred to Young at first, but then extended his observations, and no doubt had his own experience in mind when he said: Everyone admires a brave man, and Young had the admiration of the whole division, officers and men alike, and it was a terrible blow to hear of his being wounded. Ordinarily, a soldier under fire for the first time has a variety of fearful sensations; the misdeeds of his whole past swiftly fly through his mind, and his mental attitude is almost invariably that of fear and dread. The excitement that accompanies the first sing of the bullets is exhilarating, and if he is allowed to return fire his fear gradually diminishes, and he gains in contempt for the enemy’s marksmanship; but to lie inactive and be shot at is a very trying ordeal. I have seen brave men under fire for the first time hug the ground in mortal terror with the bullets flying few and wild. In a critical situation, the example of a brave leader goes a long way towards dispelling the fear from a body of soldiers, and one whose nerve is completely gone will follow the example of a fearless commander, and his pride will carry him on. Lawton’s Admiration The process for getting Young and other wounded and seriously sick soldiers back to Manila from the battlefront was long and hard. Mule-drawn ambulances (which featured springs, unlike regular Army wagons) churned along muddy, rutted roads some 25 miles to reach the railroad at Quingua. Then it was a 15-mile train ride to the railroad station in Manila, and another mule-drawn ambulance ride to the hospital across Manila’s Pasig River. Lawton probably saw Young the morning of May 14 as the ambulance passed through Baliuag on its way south. A flurry of telegrams indicate the general’s concern. He wired Major William D. Crosby, medical officer at 1st Reserve Hospital in Manila: Mr. Young, chief of scouts, my command, seriously wounded yesterday. Send to your hospital this a.m. He is a man of unusual courage and character. He has been very valuable to me, and yesterday successfully led a most desperate charge against odds of more than ten to one. As a personal favor, I ask every possible consideration for him. To his superior, Otis, he wired: Mr. Young, chief of scouts, was seriously wounded while leading his men in a desperate but successful charge against odds of more than 10 to 1. Mr. Young is a man of intelligence, unusual courage and character. He has been valuable to me and his example has been inestimable. As a personal favor, I solicit the general’s interest in his case. His wound will doubtless result in permanent disability. I would be glad if he could be given a commission in the volunteers to date from yesterday. Meanwhile, Lawton’s adjutant, Major Clarence Edwards, wrote a personal note to Major Crosby, which he probably sent with the ambulance carrying Young: We are sending you to-day Mr. W.H. Young, chief of scouts, wounded yesterday in capture San Miguel, one of the bravest and most gallant men soldiers ever knew. General Lawton directed me to write a personal note and beg of you as a personal favor to him that you would show this man every attention that could be given the most deserving of “ours.” We do hope his leg can be saved. Otis was probably willing to consider giving Young an officer’s commission, because his adjutant wired Lawton, asking him to: telegraph fully about Mr. Young - age, nationality, former occupation. How long known to you; where you found him and how you came to hire him. Also what compensation he is receiving and what force of scouts he has charge of and status of scouts. Surprisingly, Lawton had to ask Major Crosby about Young’s “age, nationality, former occupation.” How revealing of Lawton’s character and decision-making that he had made his judgment of Young as a leader and competent soldier without knowing some basic details about the man! In fact, the two had not even settled on Young’s pay, because Young told Lawton that he “would be glad to serve, but did not care particularly for pay.” Thus, Lawton said, they had agreed that Young “was to receive the customary salary, which was unknown to me.” Crosby wired back that Young was 41 years old, an American, and a miner. He said Young “will probably not lose his leg, but have a stiff knee.” When Lawton telegraphed Manila headquarters with the required information about Young, Lawton said he would be: glad to have [Young back] again, and if we have guerrilla warfare he will be very useful, but [because of his stiff Without waiting for support, Chief of Scouts Young and his band of heroes charged the center of the enemy’s line, broke it and sent the enemy flying into and through the town. A more gallant action was never seen on any field, and one fit to go on record as an example of unexcelled coolness, daring, and good judgment...Just at the close of this charge, with the fruits of victory already within his grasp, Chief of Scouts Young received the wound which ultimately caused his death. I wish to pay my tribute to the memory of the bravest man it has ever been my fortune to meet. Combining fearlessness with an unerring judgment, he instinctively inspired the confidence in all minds which he so well deserved. His life was heroic and his death inspiring. Captain James F. Case Brevet Major and Acting Engineer Officer Operations Report, June 1, Manila 14 723 Young’s Scouts Scouts. Now, as their commanding officer, he telegraphed Lawton’s headquarters early on May 15: “Anything this morning? Are ready to feel out toward enemy any direction.” Lawton did not answer. The general was on his way to San Miguel, escorted by a mounted troop of 4th U.S. Cavalry. He arrived about 10 a.m. While Lawton was en route, Birkhimer assembled the Scouts. He did not like their attitude. Corporal Anders said Birkhimer called him to attention and “…gave me a lecture on saluting.” An unpleasant scene followed. Some outspoken privates talked back. That was not unusual among the Volunteers, whose own officers were citizen soldiers like themselves – former neighbors and friends. For many in the enlisted ranks of the Volunteers, their adjustments to military discipline and courtesy were still evolving. Birkhimer’s insistence on the respect due his rank irritated the Scouts. However their blow-up evolved, Lawton was not long in San Miguel before Birkhimer arrived at his headquarters with Corporal Anders and Private Harrington. According to Anders, Birkhimer wanted Harrington arrested for insubordination. He also wanted the Scouts to be forced to conform to military regulations. Lawton was blunt. Anders said the general told Birkhimer to leave the scouts alone. After Lawton’s abrupt statement, Anders said that Birkhimer stood silent for a few moments, and then turned on his heel and walked out “without a further word.” Birkhimer had little to do with the Scouts thereafter. His operations report to Lawton for the period May 12-13 (covering the capture of San Ildefonso and San Miguel de Mayumo) is dated May 15 (the day of the blow-up), but it contains no hint of censure of Young for his bold initiatives. Whether or not Birkhimer actually was in command, he believed he was – of both the Scouts and the supporting companies of Volunteers. His report for that period reflected his belief. He explained the moves and countermoves of his forces and those of the enemy for those two engagements in the familiar, objective language of an operations report. Only at the end did Birkhimer mention Young by name: I desire to call attention in a particular manner to the bravery in all stations where they have come under my eye of Chief Scout Young and Scout James Harrington, Company G, Second Oregon Volunteers. They were always out toward the enemy, setting an example of intrepidity to the others, several of whom closely followed them. The charge of the scouts upon the enemy’s line in front of San Miguel on the 13th instant was one of the rare events in war where true valor asserts itself against overwhelming odds; and seldom, indeed, has valor more triumphantly asserted itself. If Birkhimer was upset by Young and Harrington and other Scouts when they charged the bridge at San Miguel de Mayumo, he did not say so. Indeed, whether he approved of the charge or not, he joined the brave men who charged, and he was decorated for his valor. Kinne Finds the Scouts For a short time that day (May 15), Lawton was undecided knee] will probably be obliged to go mounted. He could undoubtedly enlist company of scouts from mustered-out volunteers. A Transition The success of Young’s Scouts in seizing San Miguel pleased Lawton very much, and in his final report on the campaign he could not resist jabbing Otis for his caution. Rather wordily, Lawton said: The expedition, which was still (May 13) being held at Baliuag, waiting for supplies, re-enforcements, and what had been most frequently requested, and was most desired, viz, orders to advance, thus reached its objective – San Miguel, as a result of two reconnaissances [sic] by less than a score of picked men supported on both occasions by less than a full company of infantry. Birkhimer Assumes Command Earlier that morning, Captain Birkhimer had telegraphed Lawton’s adjutant to ask, “What are the instructions, if any, for scouts this morning? Is it desired to make reconnaissance in force, as yesterday and day before, and push in any direction before General Lawton arrives?” In the absence of Young, Birkhimer had wasted no time in assuming command of the Scouts. The adjutant responded: “Commanding general says, ‘Let things remain in status quo today.” Birkhimer later that day reported that the Scouts were “about out” of ammunition for their Krags, and that five were reduced to using Mausers, presumably with captured ammunition. He asked for more ammunition. “These scouts use up ammunition very fast and do better with it,” he said. In Baliuag, meanwhile, Kinne and four other Volunteers had been picked to join the depleted Scouts. Kinne was not one of Lawton’s original “sharpshooters,” but he already carried a Krag. Although the dozen Krags distributed to each Volunteer company mostly went to sergeants and corporals, Kinne was one of just a few privates to receive the prized weapon. The first time he stood guard with his new rifle, Kinne said he felt “proud as a peacock.” The newly-appointed Scouts agreed to leave for San Miguel before daylight next day, so spies would not notice their departure. Trouble Among the Scouts By then, Captain Birkhimer’s assumption of authority over the Scouts was not sitting well with that close-knit band. Even if Birkhimer had rank and had been in the forefront with Young and Harrington in charging the bridge at San Miguel, the loyalty of the Scouts was to their wounded leader, and not to Birkhimer. Young had handpicked most of them. Their orders were to obey Young, and they did not like Birkhimer’s usurpation of Young’s place, especially with their feelings of loss so raw. According to Corporal Frank Anders, one of the original Scouts, Birkhimer was unhappy with Young, because the Chief Scout “had orders to reconnoiter San Miguel, not capture it.”10 Regardless of that issue, Birkhimer believed all along that as the senior officer present at San Ildefonso and San Miguel, it was actually he and not Young who commanded the 15 724 Young’s Scouts about the future of Young’s Scouts. His adjutant penned a memorandum that disbanded the unit, at least for the time being: The scouts detailed in paragraph No. 2, Special Field Orders, No. 1, current series, these headquarters, will report to their respective company commanders for duty until further orders. Young’s Scouts did not disband, however, even temporarily. According to Kinne, after their 14-mile hike from Baliuag, he and the other new Scouts reached San Miguel in midmorning. They found “the Scouts quarters and had a hearty dinner of hardtack and brown sugar, and later went to the quarters of Company K of the Minnesotas and had some bean soup.” Lawton meanwhile had appointed 28-year-old 2nd Lieutenant James E. Thompson of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers “on special duty in command of the scouts.” Exactly when he made the appointment is unclear. His written order is datelined three days later (May 18) at San Isidro. However, Kinne said when he joined the Scouts in San Miguel, “Lieutenant Thornton of the 2nd Oregon had been put in command….”11 We can assume that Thornton’s appointment was a verbal order. Whether Lawton personally knew Thornton is unknown, but the general was showing increased confidence in the abilities of Colonel Summers of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, and it may have been Summers who recommended the appointment of Thornton. Kinne made no mention of the blow-up between Birkhimer and the Scouts in his Diary, but he would recall a statement he heard that morning while he and the Scouts were “eating our hardtack.” Private James Harrington said in the course of the conversation that “the bullet wasn't made that would get him.” Fight at Salacat Kinne and some of the Scouts were sightseeing in San Miguel later that afternoon when they met “nine other Scouts who were going out to locate an insurgent outpost.” From this point on, Kinne’s eye-witness account of the activities of the Scouts is the most complete and, presumably, the most reliable yet discovered. Kinne said: After making a long detour, two of the fellows, Glassley and Harris, stopped to capture a horse, and were separated from the rest. About this time, we saw a column moving out of [San Miguel] going north. Lawton had split his command. One column would head east to reconnoiter near Biaknabato, a reputed mountain stronghold, where a sizable force of Filipinos had retreated from San Miguel. Meantime, the column that Kinne and the Scouts would join started out mid afternoon on its way to San Isidro under command of Colonel Summers. According to Lawton, the enemy on Summers’ front was reported to be “demoralized, discouraged, and disintegrating, and the opinion was offered that not much force or opposition need be anticipated at San Isidro.” Kinne said: …we hurried and caught [the column] just as their advance guard was fired on…we hurried to the front and joined the skirmish line with the Minnesota 13th and 2nd Oregons and took part in the fight. The engagement Kinne and the Scouts joined just two miles north of San Miguel would be one the costliest yet for Filipinos. The Americans drove the outpost that fired on the column to a town called Salacat, four miles farther north. Just beyond the town, Lawton’s men faced an enemy force estimated at 300, dug in on the opposite bank of a river. A sharp engagement followed, but when the Americans charged with superior numbers, the Filipinos fled, “leaving killed, wounded, and equipments behind.” Lawton reported 16 enemy killed, 5 wounded and taken into custody, and 26 rifles captured. The sole American casualty was a Minnesota Volunteer who suffered a “non-disabling wound of the right wrist.” Kinne said of another Minnesota Volunteer: While we were on the firing line, one of the Scouts by the name of Galt, who was riding a white horse, got somewhat in advance of the line, and a Minnesota man was shooting at him, thinking he was an insurgent. When he was told [Galt] was one of our men…he thanked God he did not know how to shoot. The Americans camped that night in Salacat. They could go no farther. The road was in such bad condition from rain that soldiers helped to pull the baggage carts and wagons into town before dark. Moreover, the Americans knew little about the country that lay ahead. Fight at Tarbon Bridge Tuesday, May 16, 1899 would be one of the most memorable days of Kinne’s life. Under command of Lieutenant Thornton, the Scouts left Salacat before daylight to reconnoiter the route to San Isidro and find the next source of water for the column. Kinne said: …soon after leaving camp [we] passed an insurgent who had been wounded the day before. He waved his hand as we passed down the road and yelled “Hospital.” We told him to crawl to the road and wait for the ambulance, which he did. About a mile farther, they “heard an insurgent bugle in a line of trees ahead.” The Scouts formed a skirmish line and advanced for a couple miles “without seeing any of the insurgents.” Mid morning, an officer on horseback caught up with the Scouts and “gave us orders to go ahead and locate the enemy and then to fall back….” The column had apparently come by information that the enemy was “strongly entrenched across the river, about a half hour's walk ahead.” There, a wood bridge crossed the 40-foot wide, steepbanked Cabon River. Kinne said the Scouts “advanced cautiously, and as we were crossing a rice field the insurgents opened fire on us from about 800 yards ahead.” For whatever reason, the Scouts did not “fall back” as instructed. Instead, Kinne said: We advanced rapidly under heavy fire before we saw the insurgents in their trenches across the river, and a bridge all ablaze. We opened fire on them and advanced to the bank of the river. The native trenches were just on the opposite bank from us about 50 yards away. We got be16 725 Young’s Scouts hind what little protection we could find and began picking off the insurgents as they would show their heads above the trench. There was a Spaniard fighting with the insurgents just about opposite where I was stationed, who was urging the Filipinos to rise up and take aim. I emptied my rifle at the Spaniard, but he seemed to have a charmed life. I could see my bullets hitting the ground in the field beyond. I then called to Harris, who was at my right behind an anthill about 7 feet high, and told him about the Spaniard and about my inability to hit him. Harris told me to load my gun again, keep cool, and take good aim. While [I was] loading my gun, a bullet cut off a dead twig in front of my face, which blinded me for a few seconds, and several went through the bamboo brush behind which I was fighting, so I changed my position and began shooting again at the Spaniard. He soon disappeared. About this time, Lieutenant Thornton, leading two men, crossed the burning bridge on our left. The floor of the bridge was so badly charred that [Corporal William] Thomas, choked by smoke, fell through, but he crawled out of the creek and onto the opposite side and joined in the fight. After crossing, these three had a flanking fire down the insurgents' trenches, and the insurgents began to leave the trenches like a flock of sheep. We sat and shot at them at pointblank range for several minutes. We were so few they could not locate us, and we were so placed they could not tell how much of the firing we were doing. Those on the left of the bridge crossed over first, and we on the right soon after. We followed the insurgents for a half mile across an open field, where they gained a line of trees. We were short of ammunition, and so we did not follow them farther, but returned and put out the fire on the bridge. Going over the field, we found six dead and five wounded Filipinos, and took two prisoners. Fourteen rifles were found – twelve Mausers and two Remingtons. John Kinne Because of his Diary, we know more of Kinne and his dayto-day soldiering than of any other member of Young’s Scouts. His Diary provides a chronicle of his experiences, but it also provides insights into his character. He liked to repeat the wry, humorous comments of his fellow soldiers, and describe their foibles and quirks. Several times, he wrote charming miniessays, like this description of the dawning of a new day while he stood guard duty in Manila in the early days of the occupation: The beautiful early mornings and evenings in the Orient are beyond description. When everything was as still as death, except for the occasional howl of a native cur, the first streaks of gray would signal the approach of dawn. Suddenly, the First Call would sound, usually by an early rising bugler of the 6th Artillery, the tones of whose Kinne was awarded his Congressional Medal of Honor for helping to capture the bridge at Tarbon, just bugle, high-pitched, clear, a couple miles from San Isidro, Lawton’s objective in his long campaign. By capturing the bridge and extin- and distinct, would seem to guishing the fires, Young’s Scouts saved Lawton’s column two days of marching. Although they had orders awake a medley of similar to locate the enemy and fall back, just 21 Scouts drove off ten times that number of “Aguinaldo’s Own” to nd secure the bridge. According to Kinne, Lieutenant Thornton of the 2 Oregon Volunteers, the new Chief of calls throughout the city, as Scouts, was first across the bridge, but he received no official recognition for his valor. At some point in the others here and there action, Private James Harrington was shot in the neck and died. Official citations for those who won the would take up the call. MinMedal of Honor for this victory say there were 600 of the enemy. Kinne later learned there were about 200. gled with the shrill bugle 17 726 Young’s Scouts calls of the insurgent army, the whole world would suddenly seem to arouse from its slumbers. About this time, the natives from the country who had business in the city would begin to appear, and it was the duty of the one on this post to search all entering the city for firearms, knives, bolos, beno, and other intoxicants. It was a very busy spot from daylight till 8 o'clock. Fruit vendors, women with huge baskets balanced on their heads – it was a sight to see them, a string a mile long stretching back into the interior. Milkmen with milk cans made of a joint of bamboo, one of which hung from each end of a pole and was cleverly balanced over their shoulders. Occasionally, a horse and carretta passed by, with some of the higher class natives, men and women alike, leisurely smoking cigarettes. Now and then a water buffalo hauling a cart would amble along, and cause the eager stream of humanity to turn out as they hurried by, each seeming anxious to be the first into the city. Kinne had much admired Young before joining the Scouts, and he was proud to join that band of men. Like a few other Scouts, he was something of a boy among the older and more experienced men. Perhaps his sensitivity was also unusual, as when he described the aftermath of the fight at the burning bridge. The officer he was shooting at: …we found in the trench with his jaw shattered, and he later died. I discovered that there was another member of the Scouts that had been shooting at him as well as myself, and this I was glad to know. As I passed over the field after the engagement, the wounded insurgents were crying for water, and their piteous appeals of tubig, Americano, (agua or tubig meant “water”) caused me to hunt up an earthenware vessel and half a coconut shell as a cup and carry water to them. One poor fellow who wore the chevrons of a 1st sergeant had his ankle badly shattered. I was struck by his manly appearance and his gratitude for the water. He was later sent to our hospital in Manila, where his foot was amputated. Infection took place, and two more operations became necessary to save his life, but his leg had to be sacrificed.11 Harrington About an hour after the Scouts put out the fire, Kinne said: We were lounging around, congratulating ourselves on having had a bloodless victory, when someone inquired of Harrington, and the reply came, “Oh, he's out scouting by himself, as usual.” A little later, one of the men came across the bridge and told us Harrington had been killed. This was a great surprise and shock, and I recalled the remark he had made as we ate our meal the noon before.12 By the time the main body of Colonel Summers’ column reached the bridge, quick repairs had strengthened the firedamaged structure, but a wagon soon broke through. The bridge was critical for reaching San Isidro by the most direct route. Unless the Americans could cross the Cabon River by this bridge, a detour would send them several miles upriver to the next crossing, a detour that would consume two days. An all-out effort by several companies of soldiers to repair the bridge saw them tear down part of a nearby church. One of the injured Filipinos soldiers said the church was in a village called Tarbon. The engagement at the burning bridge came to be known as The Fight at Tarbon Bridge. When Colonel Summers learned of the Scouts’ achievement and of Harrington’s death, he sent word to Lawton at San Miguel: Too much praise cannot be given the scouts for their efficient work. Lieutenant Thornton has proven himself a most capable and efficient officer, and is deserving of every praise possible. Our casualties: Scout James Harrington, private, Company G, Second Oregon, killed. Lawton relayed Summers’ wire to Manila, and added: I also call attention to the fact that my scouts were again commended. Harrington killed, the only casualty, is the man who has several times before been commended for unusual bravery. He was as brave and noble a soldier as I have ever known, and his death and the disabling of Young, who organized the scouts, will be a great loss to us. He immediately wired Young in Manila: Harrington killed today at the head of the scouts, doing his duty like the brave and noble soldier he was. I hope you are getting along well. General Antonio Luna commanded Filipino troops opposing the American push to San Isidro. A strict disciplinarian and hard-liner, Luna made many enemies in the military. He was assassinated on June 5, 1899 after being summoned to Cabanatuan by Aguinaldo. Whether Aguinaldo ordered his death is a matter of controversy. 18 727 Young’s Scouts When Lawton arrived on scene later that day, he ordered Harrington’s body to be covered with the American flag. The repaired bridge was to be called “Harrington Bridge.” That was probably about the time when Young died. Next day, Lawton received word from Major Crosby in Manila: W.H. Young, chief of scouts, died 5:57 p.m., May 16. The news was a shock. Just two days earlier at Salacat, Kinne said they learned that Young was going “to lose his leg,” which indicates that matters had turned worse. No one had expected his death. San Isidro The culmination of Lawton’s long march from Manila was the capture of San Isidro. The Americans fought one more battle on its outskirts on May 17 and inflicted heavy casualties, before several hundred of the enemy broke from their lines and disappeared, and the Americans occupied the city. Kinne said: I shot at a mounted officer but did not succeed in stopping him. Soon the whole line opened fire, and the insurgents could be seen running into the woods at the right. They opened with volleys at us from a wall surrounding a cemetery to our left, but soon we dislodged them, as the Krag bullets penetrated the wall. Some of us on the extreme right of the Scouts got in front of the 3rd Infantry, who began shooting at us. We hurried to the front, and advanced right through the town to the church, where we rang the bell as a signal that the Americans were in possession. Aguinaldo had decamped well before the American approach, of course. He established a new seat of government a dozen miles farther north on the Rio Grande de Pampanga, in Cabanatuan.13 Lawton was tempted to pursue the Filipino leader, but the Americans had reached the limits of their supply line. Besides, Lawton knew that the farther he advanced, the farther Aguinaldo would withdraw into the mountainous north. The only way to wage this war, he believed, was to clear and hold, not clear and move on. The general had already opined to the U.S. press that the U.S. would need 100,000 troops to win in the Philippines, a statement that set him sharply at odds with Otis. The Military Governor stubbornly refused to admit that he needed more than the 30,000 troops already in country. To Otis, victory always seemed to lie just around the corner, just as soon as the Filipinos came to their senses. Meantime, clamor was growing in the U.S. to bring the Volunteers home from a war that threatened to drag on far longer and at much greater cost than anyone ever expected. The Americans were not alone in having conflicts about policies in the Philippines. The Filipinos also had their conflicts, and one would come to a head in a few weeks with the assassination of the commanding general in the area, Antonio Luna. Unlike Aguinaldo, who sought a negotiated peace with the U.S. that would see some degree of Filipino self-government, Luna was a hard-liner who sought military defeat of the Americans. Luna was a near mirror image of Otis in this regard, who also refused to consider any terms except unconditional surrender. Soon after the Americans took control of San Isidro, Kinne said a deputation of Spanish soldiers approached the Scouts with information about some American prisoners of war. Whether the Spanish soldiers were themselves escaped prisoners of war is not clear. Aguinaldo held several thousand Spanish soldiers as prisoners, which he hoped to use as a bargaining chip in negotiating self-government. Periodically, some escaped and sought the protection of the Americans. Others joined the Filipinos to fight the Americans. Still others were so intertwined with Filipinos through long-time residence, marriage, and community affiliations, they were tolerated and even protected from more militant Filipinos. Whatever the case with the Spanish soldiers that approached the Scouts, they led the Americans to a jail where the prisoners had used charcoal to scrawl their names and dates of capture on a wall. Aware of the significance of this scene, Kinne wrote the names and dates in his notebook. Meanwhile, a Spanish priest delivered three letters from the American prisoners to Lawton. There were fourteen men in all, and Aguinaldo had taken them to Cabanatuan.14 Harrington Buried After the Americans occupied San Isidro, Harrington was buried in the city’s “Spanish cemetery.” Quick burials were necessary in the tropical Philippines, and especially when getting a body back to Manila required several days. Lawton was chagrined that he missed the ceremony. His adjutant sent a letter to Colonel Summers: Young’s unexpected death was from “lockjaw” or tetanus, caused by a soil-dwelling bacteria called Clostridium tetani. The bacteria produces a toxin that attacks the nerves that control the muscles, causing muscle spasms. The first painful stiffness and spasms usually occur in the jaw and neck (hence the name “lockjaw”). Untreated, the spasms spread throughout the body, and ultimately cause death by suffocation. Young’s death just four days after his wound was an unusually rapid advance of the disease. Perhaps he was already infected, as any puncture wound, even minor, can result in tetanus. Early 19th Century painting below shows a patient suffering the full-body muscle spasms of advanced “lockjaw.” 19 728 Young’s Scouts Sir: The commanding general has just learned with deep regret that the burial of Private Harrington, Company G, of your regiment, occurred at an early hour this afternoon. It was his intention to be present with his staff at the funeral of this brave man. The General congratulates you and the members of your regiment, both commissioned and enlisted, on having had among you so gallant a soldier as James Harrington, for whom he entertained a great respect and liking as for any soldier of his acquaintance. Kinne did not mention attending the burial in his Diary, but he did tell how the Scouts enjoyed the spoils of victory. Kinne said they: scattered about the town and finally gathered at a deserted house, which we chose for our barracks. Some had chickens, others had ducks and turkeys, which we prepared for cooking at once. At the beginning of his San Isidro campaign, Lawton had issued an injunction against “straggling, looting, pillaging, burning…or any unlawful excesses,” but his injunction against looting was honored mostly in the breech when it came to food, whether by Scouts or other soldiers. When they were hungry, the Americans took what they wanted where they found it, and with little apparent consequence. A Reconnaissance With San Isidro in hand, Lawton prepared to send part of his column south along the Rio Grande de Pampanga to meet MacArthur’s column moving north. The rest of his force would retrace their route back to Baliuag. Lawton knew that chances were almost nil of trapping the main force of the enemy between him and MacArthur. The Filipinos lacked both numbers and firepower to stand up to the Americans, but if they had the chance they would attack or spring an ambush, and then withdraw from battle to fight another day. Even so, U.S. battlefield successes were taking a toll on Filipino morale and cohesion. The American juggernaut seemed unstoppable. By year’s end, Aguinaldo would announce that Filipino resistance was shifting to guerilla warfare. By prolonging the conflict at the cost of American blood and treasure, he hoped the Americans would elect a U.S. president in 1900 who would change the McKinley Administration’s policy of conquest and occupation, a policy that McKinley characterized for the American people as “benevolent assimilation.” Meantime, Filipinos across the Rio Grande de Pampanga from San Isidro were taking pot shots at Lawton’s outposts, so he sent the Scouts over to chase them off. Kinne said: Under Lieutenant Thornton, 23 of us crossed and went up into the brush, where we killed a hooded cobra which crossed our path. It was about 6 feet long. A little farther on, an insurgent with a gun was seen running from us. One of the boys shot at him. When we arrived at the place he was last seen, his gun lay on the ground, but he had vamoosed. We proceeded inland about a mile. At one place, as one of the boys came through a hedge onto an opening, he saw a number of insurgents in the yard with some women and children. He called to the insurgents to surrender, but they bolted for the woods, and he shot. Unfortunately, a woman holding a baby was shot through the chest and died instantly. None of the insurgents were hit. This was the saddest thing that occurred to us for some time.15 While the Scouts were across the river, the two regiments marching downriver to link up with MacArthur had suffered one killed and several wounded. The advance guard had taken a wrong road and become separated, and the main column walked right into a well-placed ambush. The Americans fought an inconclusive battle until dark against Filipinos entrenched across the Rio Grande de Pampanga. Kinne said that next day the Scouts were “detailed to escort Captain Case of the 22nd Infantry” to join his regiment.” Actually, Captain Case was with the 2nd Oregon Volunteers, and he once again was accompanying the Scouts as Lawton’s staff to find a place to ford the river. Kinne said, “When we arrived at the place where the 22nd had been shot into the day before, we stopped and lay in the brush for some time and watched the insurgents across the river, but we had orders not to shoot.” On May 20, the remainder of Lawton’s command prepared to leave San Isidro. As the troops assembled very early that morning, Kinne said, “a few volleys were shot into General Lawton’s headquarters from across the river.” The Scouts were again sent over to drive the enemy out. Kinne said: We crossed the river in about 4 feet of water. There was a dense fog and the insurgents could not see us. We had orders to proceed down the opposite side of the river and meet the troops at the ford we had located the day before. As we went through the marsh opposite the city of Santa Isidro, we did not meet with any resistance, but there were a great many amigos with their household goods hiding in the marsh. They were very much surprised when we walked in on them from out of the dense fog, and they disappeared hurriedly in the opposite direction. Kinne’s use of amigos was ironic. The Americans by then were suspicious of any Filipino male dressed in the traditional white shirt and trousers of the working class – even a youth – because he might be an insurrecto, a term the Americans borrowed from the Spanish to describe someone rebelling against government authority. U.S. troops often found these white, so-called “peace suits” in the packs of dead and wounded Filipino soldiers on the battlefield. The Americans knew that whenever a file of soldiers passed an assembly of civilians who stood with their hats doffed and their heads bowed in a show of deference, there might be one or two or a half dozen insurrectos among them. Filipino males were no longer “natives.” They were “goo-goo’s” and “niggers,” and the Americans no longer hired them as cooks, laborers, porters, and litter bearers. They did not trust Filipinos. They instead hired resident Chinese. The Fight at San Antonio Several towns lay along the Rio Grande de Pampanga 20 729 Young’s Scouts between Lawton and MacArthur. Lawton needed to drive Aguinaldo’s troops from those towns, but he knew the gesture was meaningless. As soon as the Americans moved out, the Filipino soldiers moved back in. Nonetheless, the next town that needed clearing was San Antonio, just a few miles from San Isidro. After the Scouts surprised the amigos in the marsh, they proceed downriver until they reached a road that led to the ford they had located the previous day. From here, Kinne said: we proceeded in single file. There were very few natives in sight, but the few we did see acted very suspiciously, and as we drew in The Laguna de Bay in action. Gunboats like this were converted from shallow-draft sight of the church tower [of San Antonio], Spanish launches to provide fire support along Luzon’s numerous waterways. Prowe saw a long line of insurgents to our left tected with boilerplate and armed with Army field and Gatling guns, the “mosquito peeping through the bushes at the Ameri- fleet” was crewed by soldiers, and usually included a complement of infantry. The can soldiers who were already fording the Laguna de Bay and other gunboats towed cascos loaded with troops and supplies up river. They were waiting to catch the sol- the Rio Grande de Pampanga to meet Lawton. diers in the water, but we got there just in time to spoil their fun. very exciting moments. I was making some unsuccessful While we stood in the road watching these Filipinos, not attempts to get a Filipino who was shooting from around daring to shoot (as they were between us and our sola corner of the church, when Lyons of the 2nd Oregon diers), other insurgents to our right and toward the village came up and asked what I was shooting at. I pointed out opened fire at us with a volley. This volley came so sudthe Filipino, and Lyons got him through the hatband the denly that it took us by complete surprise. I cleared a 5first shot, and wounded another who tried to get his gun foot fence at one bound and got behind a tree. I believe before he could get away. Seven were killed, and one this was a record on the Islands for the high jump. We wounded in this fight, and we had no casualties. then ran across a clearing and got between the Filipinos Whether the Scouts alone inflicted those Filipino casualties and our troops, and followed the natives into the town of is unclear. Kinne said, “the 2nd Oregons had crossed the San Antonio nearby. We had a street fight and some river by this time and followed us into town….” He said the Scouts: found some fine horses [hidden] in the church, and I tried to lead one with me when we went, but in my attempt to make him lead I got far behind the others, and the niggers began following us and shooting, so I had to leave the horse. Farther downriver, at the site of the earlier Filipino ambush, they found three fresh graves near the Filipino lines, and “one dead insurgent on the ground, and another floating in the river.” That afternoon, the Scouts crossed over the river and re-joined Lawton’s column in Cabiao. End of the San Isidro Campaign The engagement at San Antonio would be the last of any significance for Lawton’s column. As the Americans moved in caterpillar fashion down the Rio Grande de Pampanga, the long campaign was ending. The 22nd U.S. Infantry and the 1st North Dakota Volunteers were a day ahead, followed a day later by the 2nd Oregon and 13th Minnesota Volunteers, and Lawton’s support, including Young’s Scouts. Soldiers cross the Rio Grande de Pampanga on their way back to Manila Next day, the tail of the column marched some seven from San Isidro. Several regiments claim this photo depicts their troops. The miles downriver to a difficult ford. Stripped naked, the lead soldier’s cartridge belt indicates they are Volunteers armed with 45-70 soldiers would take most of the following day getting Springfield, single-shot rifles. the carts and wagons and artillery across the river. 21 730 Young’s Scouts Returning to Manila after Lawton’s San Isidro Campaign, Kinne said Young’s Scouts went to a “photo gallery” and had this picture taken “just as we were.” Several days later, Kinne went to the 4th U.S. Cavalry barracks to get a copy of the photo from Private Simon Harris. Kinne later framed the photo, along with the obverse side of his Medal of Honor, engraved with the date and place of his valor. The inscription reads: “The Congress to Private John B. Kinne, Co B, 1st N.D. Vols. Inf. Near San Isidro, P.I. May 16, 1899” However, Kinne said the Scouts “managed to get across early, and went into the town of Arayat,” where the North Dakotas and the 22nd U.S. Infantry had linked up with the advance of MacArthur’s column. On May 22, Kinne said the Scouts were ordered to stay in Arayat as the rearguard and: not leave town until all the soldiers had left, and to see that no intoxicated soldiers were left in the town. We scouted around a little before we left, and an engineer by the name of Murphy, of the transport Grant, who was among the Scouts, swiped a sack of pesos from a Chinaman and divided the “swag” among the boys when we assembled at the edge of town. Kinne’s Diary is evidence that Young’s Scouts stole horses to ride, stole livestock and garden produce to eat, and apparently had no compunctions about sharing stolen “swag.” After leaving Arayat and catching up with the column, the Scouts marched into Candaba. Here they found the gunboats that had pulled cascos up the river. “We secured good quarters and rested that afternoon,” Kinne said. Later in the day, the 2nd Oregon Volunteers learned they were being returned to Manila, presumably to board a ship that would take them home. Kinne said, “a happier crowd could not be found.” Next day (May 23), the Scouts from the 2nd Oregon Volunteers were ordered to rejoin their regiment. Kinne said: Lieutenant Thornton, the leader of the Scouts, and Robertson, Lyons, Huntley, High, and O’Neil left us… [and] the three 4th Calvary men were assigned to Company H of the North Dakotas for rations. While at headquarters, they were told by Major Edwards of General Lawton’s staff that the organization of Scouts would be 22 731 Young’s Scouts Only two Scouts have been positively identified in this photo. John Kinne (#10) kneels at the extreme left. He has a Spanish-style cartridge pouch attached to his cartridge belt, probably taken from a Filipino battle casualty. Perhaps in that pouch Kinne carried the notebook that provides so much of what is known of Young’s Scouts. Marcus Robertson of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers has been identified as #16. The identities of the remaining Scouts have yet to be confirmed, but several clues suggest identities. #1 may be Frank Ross of the 1st North Dakota regiment, the tallest of the Scouts at 6 feet 1 inch. The man next to him (#2) appears to be taller, but he is actually standing on the curb. The three Scouts from the 4th U.S. Cavalry are #4, #5, and #11, identifiable by their carbine version of the Krag. Of these, Eli Watkins is probably #4, the tallest of the three. Peter Quinn is probably #5, and Simon Harris is #11. William Thomas may be #6, because the only other corporal, Frank Anders, appears to have left the Scouts soon after the fight at Tarbon Bridge. John Killian, who joined the 1st North Dakota in San Francisco and was one of the older Scouts, may be #12. Note the unsoldier-like appearance of #13, who is wearing a torn tee shirt and has a big toe sticking out of his boot. That is probably Edward Lyon, whose appearance and pose is similar to that of #29 in the Baliuag photo, identified as Lyon. John Smith may be #14, one of the few Scouts with a “dark complexion.” He was killed in action in the Philippines after the Scouts were disbanded, as were two other Scouts. continued and that each man would get special mention to the Secretary of War.16 Kinne’s last mission as a Scout occurred when: there was heavy firing south of [Candaba], and General Lawton sent ten of us across the river to the church tower to see what it was, and from there we could see San Alfonso ablaze. The 3rd infantry and three troops of cavalry with some artillery were on the road going north, and must have met the enemy there. We later heard there were two Americans killed, 16 wounded, and 22 niggers killed. Next day, Lawton’s column, now combined, marched downriver to Apalit, where Kinne said most of the men spent the night in “a very fine church.” Just three miles from Apalit was Calumpit, the northernmost reach of the railroad line from Manila under American control. At Calumpit, the Filipinos had disabled the railroad bridge across the wide expanse of the Rio Grand de Pampanga.17 Now, everything coming downriver from Lawton’s San Isidro campaign had to be carried or ferried across the river to the rail yard, where troops were assembling to be taken by train to Manila. That is where Kinne and the rest of the Scouts found the 2nd Oregon Volunteers waiting to board a train that was shuttling back and forth to Manila. Kinne said: we secured Colonel Summers’ permission to ride on the train, and later Colonel Treumann [of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers] also gave his consent for us to go. We crawled up on top of the boxcar, and it was a merry bunch of Scouts that left Calumpit for Manila some 45 miles away. We saw some pretty country on the way, and along the track a vast system of trenches that had 23 732 Young’s Scouts been constructed by the insurgents. Militarily, Lawton’s 35-day San Isidro campaign accomplished little. Filipino battle casualties were significant, but not severe. Perhaps more important were lessons the Americans learned about campaigning in the Philippines: - the enemy was elusive - Spanish-era maps were unreliable - artillery needed to be small and mobile - supplying large forces by land was impractical - sickness and tropical heat and rain were constant problems - territory not occupied soon reverted to Filipino control Manila On reaching Manila in mid afternoon, Kinne said the Scouts “went directly to a picture gallery and had a group picture taken just as we were.” The photo of Young’s Scouts taken in Manila on May 25 at the end of Lawton’s San Isidro Campaign includes just 17 of that tight-knit band. They are a rough-looking bunch, and only a few in the picture have been identified. Two rifles are leaned America’s first Decoration Day in Manila in 1899 saw the Scouts asin the window frame behind the men. They doubt- semble at the cemetery on Battery Knoll to pay tribute to Chief Scout less represent the two Scouts killed in action – Wil- William Henry Young. In charge of “floral arrangements” for the event, Kinne is placing flowers on Young’s grave. Battery Knoll was the site of a liam Henry Young and James Harrington. Kinne provided another peek at the way the large American military cemetery, but civilian Young could not be buried Scouts operated when he said: “The next day, the in the military area. Some 300 graves of American soldiers were laid out Scouts, with three pony carts they had captured, on Battery Knoll. Soldiers were also buried in other military and civilian went into the city and sold the ponies and carts for cemeteries around Manila. The Army did not return soldier remains to the U.S. until 1900. $250 and divided it among the members.” Decoration Day Scouts at Young’s grave on Decoration Day, 1899. A couple days later, the Scouts had a meeting and “made - The soldiers are wearing the new khaki uniforms they arrangements for floral decorations for Young's grave for received two days after they returned to Manila. Decoration Day.” Originally, Decoration Day honored Union - The grave marker is large and square-topped and stands soldiers who had lost their lives in the Civil War, when their alone. Military grave markers at Battery Knoll were smaller graves were decorated with flowers and flags. By the time of and round-topped and in rows. the Philippine-American War, Decoration Day honored - There is a large floral arrangement leaning against the America’s dead of all wars, and was sometimes called Megrave marker morial Day. Kinne said: - The soldier bending over the grave has a mop of dark Decoration Day seemed the most like Sunday of any day hair, like Kinne’s hair in the Manila photo of the Scouts. we had spent on the Islands. Being on the floral commitThat afternoon, Kinne said: tee to decorate the graves, I was busy early in the morn…Corporal Thomas was summoned to brigade heading, and after getting bouquets from the natives, who quarters and was told by Major Edwards that General made up the floral monument for Young's grave, I went Lawton had decided to recommend to the War Departto the bamboo barracks, where the Scouts assembled to ment that each man who took part in the battles of San march to Battery Knoll where Young was buried. Chapnd Miguel and Tarbon Bridge be given a Congressional lain Stull of the 2 Oregons read some Scripture and Medal. Major Edwards asked Thomas who was the first spoke a few words, and we put our decorations on the man to cross the burning bridge, and he replied, “I am grave, after which a picture was taken of it with the boys 18 sorry to say I was not. I fell into the river.” around. Kinne said that Lieutenant Thornton and Corporal Thomas The photo of Kinne bending over Young’s grave to were two of the first three to cross the Tarbon Bridge. Thostraighten the flowers is probably not the photo taken “with mas received a Certificate of Merit for his valor. Thornton the boys around,” which most likely was a more formal received nothing. The third man has not been identified.19 pose. That photo has yet to be discovered.20 The photo End of Young’s Scouts shown is from a stereograph that does not identify the Contrary to what the three Scouts from the 4th U.S. Cavscene, but several clues point to this photo as showing the 24 733 Young’s Scouts alry were told at Candaba, Young’s Scouts were not continued. Lawton had no Young or Harrington to lead them, and both the 1st North Dakota and the 2nd Oregon regiments whose men largely made up the Scouts - were due to go home. But not just yet. Otis wanted to mount another expedition before he allowed the Volunteers to leave the Philippines. Lawton saw that Otis’s plan had the earmarks of another wasted effort. His commanding officer wanted to sweep the mountainous Morong peninsula east of Manila to trap and destroy Aguinaldo’s forces that were harassing the city and its suburbs Just a few days after they returned from Lawton’s long San Isidro Campaign, both the 1st North Dakota and the 2nd Oregon Volunteers went into battle again on the Morong peninsula, and the Oregon regiment lost several killed and wounded. On that expedition, Kinne and others from the 1st North Dakota regiment who were Young’s Scouts became scouts for their regiment. The size of the unit is not known, but Colonel Treumann selected Private John Killian as his “chief scout.” An older man, Killian was one of Young’s original Scouts. Kinne also mentions Glassley and McIntyre as being in the new scout unit. A few days later, Killian was killed on patrol near Morong. The 1st North Dakota Volunteers occupied Morong for a month, which Kinne called “a fierce place.” Scouts sent out on patrol often got into firefights. For a time, the troops went hungry because of supply problems. Sickness was rampant. A case of cholera saw the Americans burn down half the town as a preventative. As debilities saw more and more troops sent back to Manila, the effective strength of regiment shrank. One night, Kinne had to stand his post the entire night, alone. At last, his regiment was relieved and returned to Manila, where Kinne records just two more events related to his service with Young’s Scouts. One was on July 4, a day celebrated in Manila with music, fireworks, and much revelry, but only during daytime hours. Even in Manila, Americans were not safe in the Philippine-American War, and the city lived under a strict curfew. That afternoon, Kinne went to the “4th cavalry quarters to get a picture of the Scouts from Harris, which we had taken when we returned from the north trip.” Kinne last mentioned the Scouts on July 24, when he “was summoned to headquarters…to get dates from my diary of certain fights that the Scouts had.” He returned to the States with his regiment, and reached home in early October. “I was the first to leave the train,” he said, and “on the 14th I entered Fargo College as a freshman, where I had left off 18 months before, and my experiences as a soldier were over.” Afterword In the Civil War, a Union soldier just 20 years old named Henry Harrison Young, wrote to his mother after his first action: The fact is, no one knows what fighting is till they have seen it; and they that have, after it is over and they think about it, would like to see it over again. There is an excitement about it, there is a longing for it again that no one knows who has not experienced it.20 Before long, Young was leading a select band of men behind Confederate lines that became a storied unit called “Young’s Scouts.” In the Philippines some 40 years later, several of this second band of extraordinary men called “Young’s Scouts” also seemed to crave battlefield excitement. A number of them re-enlisted in the Regular Army to continue fighting in the Philippines. Two who re-enlisted were killed in action within a year. Another would die on the battlefields of France in World War I. Like their chief, William Henry Young, they were warriors. Of the rest, much remains to be discovered.21 Lawton’s San Isidro Campaign lasted 35 days and involved some 3,500 troops. His opposite to the west, General Arthur MacArthur, commanded a force somewhat larger. The San Isidro Campaign saw many “victories,” but those victories did little to change the tactical situation. With insufficient troops to occupy captured territory, the Americans saw Aguinaldo’s soldiers reassert control as soon as the Army moved out. Before the end of the year, Lawton would undertake a second San Isidro campaign, this time with enough troops to occupy captured territory and begin installing an American-style government. As the Philippine-American War dragged on, the conflict threatened to became a major issue in the 1900 presidential election. The administration of President William McKinley had to balance public demands to bring the Volunteers home with the need for more troops to fight what was called the Filipino “insurgency.” For political reasons, the Administration did not want to ask for new regiments. Instead, it increased the size of Regular Army companies by 20% and fed new recruits into existing regiments. It also created two new regiments to recruit Volunteers already in the Philippines, men whose enlistments were expiring. Nine members of Young’s Scouts stayed in the Philippines to join the new 36th U.S. Volunteer regiment or other Regular Army units. 25 734 Young’s Scouts Congressional Medal of Honor The U.S. Congress first established “medals of honor” during the Civil War to recognize non-commissioned Navy personnel who distinguished themselves “by their gallantry in action.” Shortly after, the Congress also approved “medals of honor” for non-commissioned Army personnel. The Medal of Honor was the only official decoration for valor at the time. An act of valor not rising to the level deserving of a Medal of Honor was recognized by a Certificate of Merit. For the four-day battle at Gettysburg, fifty-eight Medals of Honor were awarded. After the Civil War, several different designs of the Medal of Honor were struck by both the Navy and the Army, but all retained the five-point star of the originals. In 1904, Congress approved a new design for the Army Medal of Honor, a creation of General George Gillespie. “Gillespie” Medal of Honor The Gillespie design added a green laurel wreath and the word “VALOR,” and also introduced a blue neck ribbon featuring 13 white stars. A medallion in the five-point star features Minerva, a Roman goddess associated with war. A circle of text reads “United States of America.” Members of Young’s Scouts awarded the Medal of Honor received the “Gillespie” medal. In 1927, Scouts Frank Anders and Peter Quinn posed at the monument to the 5th NY Light Artillery at Gettysburg National Cemetery. Each wears the badge version of his Medal of Honor. Anders (left) also appears to be wearing two medals that Volunteers in the Philippines received, the Spanish Campaign medal and a Philippine Campaign medal, and two others that relate to his military service in WW I. In 1915, Congress authorized awarding of the Medal of Honor to all military personnel, both commissioned or noncommissioned. In 1918, the criteria for awarding an Army Medal of Honor stated that a person had to conspicuously distinguish himself, in action involving actual conflict with an enemy, by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty. Several lesser but significant awards were also created then, including the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Silver Star. As the awarding of a Medal of Honor became more rare, Congress approved additional benefits and honors for recipients. Most Medals of Honor today are posthumous awards, and are personally presented by the President of the United States. In 1937, three of Young’s Scouts who were awarded the Medal of Honor posed with MOH holder Major General Smedley Butler in Aberdeen, Washington, where John Kinne lived. L to R are John Kinne, Richard Longfellow, General Butler, and Gotfred Jenson. 26 735 Scouts Roster, Enlistment Records, Decorations Not all rosters of Young’s Scouts are in agreement. Research indicates that 36 enlisted men served as Scouts before the unit was disbanded about May 26, 1899. In addition to civilian Chief of Scouts William Henry Young, two Army staff officers shared combat with the Scouts: Captain William Birkhimer, 3rd U.S. Artillery, and 2nd Lieutenant James Thornton, Co. B, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Sometimes, Captain James Case of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers joined them. A civilian named Murphy appears to have traveled with the Scouts as well. The Congressional Medal of Honor was the only official military medal during the conflict in the Philippines. It was awarded for exceptional battlefield valor. Nomination for a Medal of Honor sometimes resulted in a lesser honor, a Certificate of Merit, for which an official medal was authorized in 1905. Today’s equivalent of a Certificate of Merit is the Distinguished Service Cross. Posthumous awards were not made. Medal of Honor recommended Certificate of Merit awarded Medal of Honor awarded Died a combatrelated death Original Scouts (appointed April 30, 1899) William Henry Young, Chief of Scouts, a civilian, born in Vermont about 1858. Wounded May 13, 1899 in the right knee at San Miguel de Mayumo. Died May 16, 1899 at 1st Reserve Hospital in Manila from “lockjaw” (tetanus) (according to 2nd Oregon Volunteers official history). Young was buried in the civilian area of the Battery Knoll cemetery in Paco, near Manila. 1. Michael Glassley, Private, Co. A, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 20; 5’ 6¾” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; light brown hair; born in Iowa; rancher. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. Glassley was discharged by orders on July 12, 1899, and re-enlisted in 36th U.S.V. Infantry. 2. Calvin B. Wilson, Private, Co. A, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 40; 5’ 10” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; light brown hair; born in Iowa; farmer. According to Kinne, Wilson dropped out of the Scouts after the capture of Baliuag. Kinne said that Glassley took his place, but Glassley was one of the original 25 Scouts. 3. Frank Lafayette Anders, Corporal, Co. B, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 22; 5’ 9½’ tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in North Dakota; machinist. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; awarded March 3, 1906. 4. Otto M. Luther, Private, Co. B, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 21; 5’ 7¾” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; born in Wisconsin; clerk. 5. Edward McBain, Private, Co. B, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 21; 5’ 4½” tall; dark complexion; blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in North Dakota; farmer. According to Kinne, McBain dropped out of the Scouts after the capture of Baliuag and was replaced by James McIntyre. 6. Thomas Sletteland, Corporal, Co. C, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 27; 5’ 8½” tall; dark complexion; hazel eyes; dark brown hair; born in Norway; laborer. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on April 12, 1899 at Paete; awarded March 11, 1902. 7. Gotfred Jenson, Private, Co. D, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 25; 5’ 7¼” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; flax hair; born in Denmark; farmer. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded June 6, 1906 for gallantry at San Miguel de Mayumo; discharged by orders, July 19, 1899; re-enlisted 36th U.S.V. (Grave marker erroneously indicates 35th U.S.V.) 27 736 Young’s Scouts 8. Neal Christianson, Private, Co. G, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 29; 5’ 9½ tall; sandy complexion; hazel eyes; light hair; born in Wisconsin; baker. According to Kinne, Christianson dropped out after Baliuag, and was replaced by Richard Longfellow. 9. Charles P. Davis, Private, Co. G, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 24; 5’ 8” tall; fair complexion; light brown eyes; light brown hair; born in Minnesota; cook. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded April 26, 1906. 10. Edwin J. Pannell, Private, Co. H., 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 25; 5’ 5⅛’ tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; flax hair; born in Minnesota; farmer. Supposedly wounded in left side on April 12, 1899 at Paete (before the Scouts were formed), but his wound is not reported in casualty records; killed in France in World War I. 11. John H. Killian, Private, Co. H, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at San Francisco. No muster details. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; killed in action at Morong, June 9, 1899. Received Certificate of Merit. 12. John E. Desmond, Private, Co. I, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered into service at age 32; 5’ 8” tall; medium complexion; blue eyes; dark hair; born in Massachusetts; woodworker. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. Received Certificate of Merit. 13. Otto A. Boehler, Private, Co. I, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered into service at age 24; 5’ 6¼” tall; fair complexion; light brown eyes, light brown hair; born in Norway; farmer. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded May 17, 1906. 14. William F. Thomas, Corporal, Co. K, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 27; 5’ 9½” tall; fair complexion; light blue eyes; light brown hair; born in Germany; acrobat. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge. Received Certificate of Merit. Discharged by orders, July 31, 1899; re-enlisted 36th U.S.V. 15. John C. Smith, Private, Co. K, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 29; 5’ 6⅞” tall; dark complexion; slate eyes; dark brown hair; born in Massachusetts; molder. Re-enlisted 36th U.S.V. Kinne said that while the regiment was mustering out in San Francisco “word was received that Smith of Company K, one of Young’s Scouts, who had been discharged in Manila and joined Bell’s Regulars, had been killed at San Fernando.” Smith’s name does not appear on lists of casualties in Official Correspondence, Vol. 2. 16. Patrick Hussey, Private, Co. K, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 29; 5’ 10¾’ tall; medium dark complexion; brown hair; brown eyes; born in Pennsylvania; laborer. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge. Received Certificate of Merit for both. Re-enlisted 36th U.S.V. 17. James Harrington, Private, Co. G, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 45; 5’ 6” tall; light complexion; hazel eyes; dark brown hair; born in Massachusetts; seaman. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; killed in action on May 16, 1899 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. Tarbon Bridge renamed Harrington Bridge in his honor, according to 2nd Oregon Volunteers official history. 18. Frank Charles High, Private, Co. G, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at Ashland, Oregon at age 23; 5’ 10” tall’ fair complexion; blue eyes; light brown hair; born in California; farmer. Relieved by verbal order of General Lawton, May 25; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded March 16, 1911. 28 737 19. William B. Scott, Private, Co. K, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 21; 5’ 5½” tall; fair complexion; dark blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in Oregon; student. Relieved by verbal order of General Lawton, May 5, 1899. In 1st Reserve Hospital in Manila May 6 – 30. 20. James B. O’Neil, Private, Co. L, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Age unknown in Muster Roll; 5’ 7¾” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; born in Pennsylvania; mechanic. Returned to regular duty by verbal order, May 22, 1899. 21. Edward Eugene Lyon, Private, Co. B, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 26; 5’ 11¾’ tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; born in Wisconsin; logger. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded January 24, 1906 for gallantry at San Miguel de Mayumo. 22. Marcus William Robertson, Private, Co. B, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 28; 5’ 6½” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; born in Wisconsin; millworker. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded April 28, 1906. 23. Eli L. Watkins, Private, Troop C, 4th U.S. Cavalry. Enlisted Sept. 30, 1896 in San Diego at age 29; 5’ 8¾” tall, ruddy complexion, blue eyes, brown hair, born in Decorah, Iowa; a soldier (this was his second enlistment). Discharged March 25, 1900 in Panay, Philippines. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge. Received Certificate of Merit for both. 24. Simon Harris, Private, Troop G, 4th U.S. Cavalry. Enlisted May 2, 1898 in Seattle, Washington at age 24; 5’ 7½” tall, fair complexion, blue eyes, brown hair, born in Cassey, Illinois; laborer. Discharged August 16, 1899 at Manila, Philippines. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. 25. Peter H. Quinn, Private, Troop L, 4th U.S. Cavalry. Enlisted June 2, 1898 at the Presidio, San Francisco at age 25; 5’ 8” tall, dark complexion, blue eyes, brown hair; clerk. Discharged August 17, 1899 in Manila. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded June 6, 1906 for gallantry at San Miguel de Mayumo. Later Scouts st 26. James W. McIntyre, Private, Co. B, 1 North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 23; 5’ 10” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; born in Minnesota; waiter. Kinne said McIntyre replaced McBaine after Baliuag, i.e. May 4, 1899. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge. Received Certificate of Merit for both. Re-enlisted 36th U.S.V. 27. Richard Moses Longfellow, Private, Co. A, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 31; 5’ 7¼” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in Illinois; boilermaker. According to Kinne, he replaced Christianson after Baliuag; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; received June 1911. 28. Thomas M. Sweeney, Private, Co. K, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 22; 5’ 9½” tall; sandy complexion; light blue eyes; light brown hair; born in Maryland; miner. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. Reenlisted 17th U.S. Infantry, Co. A; killed on October 24, 1900 at San Isidro. 29 738 Young’s Scouts 29. Frank W. Summerfield, Private, Co. K, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Enlisted in Manila in March 1899 after arriving as a crew member on the USS Oregon. No muster details. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded. Re-enlisted 36th U.S.V, Co. F; killed January 20, 1900 between Tanauan and Lipa. John Kinne said he knew Summerfield as a boy in Lisbon, North Dakota, and that Summerfield ran away from home as a youth. 30. Frank Fulton Ross, Private, Co. H, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 30; 6’ 1” tall; fair complexion; light blue eyes; light brown hair; born in Avon, Illinois; machinist. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded June 6, 1906. 31. Willis H. Downs, Private, Co. H, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 32; 5’ 7¼’ tall; dark complexion; slate eyes; black hair; born in Connecticut; farmer. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 13 at San Miguel de Mayumo; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded February 16, 1906 for gallantry at San Miguel de Mayumo. 32. Sterling Archibald Galt, Private, Co. G, 1st North Dakota Volunteers: Mustered in at age 21; 5’ 7” tall; fair complexion; slate eyes; light brown hair; born in Maryland; painter. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; not awarded; re-enlisted 36th U.S.V.; recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on November 9, 1899 at Bamban, Luzon; awarded April 30, 1902. 33. John Baxter Kinne, Private, Co. B, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 20; 5’ 6⅞” tall; dark complexion; hazel eyes; dark brown hair; born in Wisconsin; student. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry on May 16 at Tarbon Bridge; awarded May 17, 1906. 34. Forest D. Warren, Private, Co. C, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 18; 5’ 5¾” tall; fair complexion; light brown eyes; brown hair; born in North Dakota; farmer. 35. William R. Truelock, Private, Co. C, 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Mustered in at age 38; 5’ 8¾” tall; dark complexion; blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in Indiana; laborer. Wounded on May 12, 1899 in left knee at San Ildefonso. It is unclear when Truelock joined the Scouts. His wound at San Ildefonso is the first mention so far discovered of his being with Young’s Scouts. 36. Merritt B. Huntley, Private, Co. L, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 24; 5’ 7½” tall; fair complexion; blue eyes; dark brown hair; born in Oregon; laborer. Returned to regiment on May 13 from hospital stay, and joined the Scouts on May 14 with Kinne. According to the official history of the 2nd Oregon regiment, Captain Birkhimer recommended Huntley for a Medal of Honor for battlefield gallantry at the Tarbon Bridge. James E. Thornton, 2nd Lieutenant, Co. B, 2nd Oregon Volunteers. Mustered in at age 27; 5’ 8” tall; dark complexion; blue eyes; brown hair; millworker. After Young was wounded, Lawton assigned Thornton as Chief of Scouts. Kinne said Lt. Thornton was first to cross the burning bridge at Tarbon. William Edward Birkhimer, Captain, 3rd U.S. Artillery (acting as infantry). Birkhimer accompanied the Scouts at least twice after Baliuag. Some accounts indicate that he led the Scouts. Lawton intended for Young to lead and for the Scouts to report to Young. Recommended for Medal of Honor for gallantry at San Miguel de Mayumo; awarded July 15, 1902. UNK Murphy, a civilian. Kinne said Murphy was an “engineer” from the Army Transport Grant who saw action with the original Scouts. He appears to have been among the Scouts from beginning to end, as Kinne mentions him as being with the Scouts on May 22. 30 739 Endnotes 1 Another unit known as Young’s Scouts operated on the Union side in the Civil War under command of Major Henry Harrison Young. 2 This history incorporates material from the author’s The Boys: 1st North Dakota Volunteers in the Philippines, Puzzlebox Press, 2010. 3 All quoted messages are taken from U.S. Serial Set, No. 3903, pp. 149-285. 4 Private John Baxter Kinne’s manuscript Diary provides the most complete information we have about William Henry Young and the operations of the Scouts. Kinne did not join the Scouts until May 14, but he interviewed some of the original Scouts to reconstruct their early service. An unidentified civilian who knew Young and shared some of Young’s experiences before the two civilians came to the Philippines also provided Kinne with background information. Some of that information is corroborated in Lawton’s communications with Manila regarding Young. Quotations from Kinne are from the author’s edited typescript of Kinne’s Diary. 5 Kinne said there were “17 North Dakota men” in the original Scouts, but the official record shows just 16. Names are garbled in several communications, e.g. Pannel is “Powell” and Sletteland is “Shetland.” Kinne also said that a civilian named Murphy was with the Scouts from the beginning. According to Kinne, Murphy was “an engineer on the Grant,” the Army transport that brought Lawton to the Philippines. Coincidentally, Lawton was serving in the 4th U.S. Cavalry when he pursued Geronimo and took him into custody. 6 Harris may have been one of Kinne’s informants when Kinne reconstructed the history of the Scouts. The shorter barrel of the Krag carbine helps to identify the three Scouts from the 4th U.S. Cavalry in the photo taken in Manila on May 25, 1899. 7 The .43 caliber Remington Model 1889 was a single-shot rifle. Filipinos who were members of the militia under Spanish rule carried this rifle. In performance, the Remington was similar to the 4570 Springfield. Spanish soldiers carried the Mauser rifle. Filipinos acquired most of their Mausers from Spanish soldiers they defeated in battle, from defectors, and from raids on Spanish garrisons. 8 In his first report of this engagement, Birkhimer mistakenly identifies Truelock as “Private William A. Lockwood.” 9 Arthur MacArthur was the father of Douglas MacArthur of WW II fame in the Pacific Theatre. The younger MacArthur was a West Point cadet at this time. 10 Reportage of Birkhimer’s conflicts with the Scouts is from Jerry Cooper and Glenn Smith’s Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard, 1986. 11 The official history of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers (The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection) says Thornton was on “special duty as chief of scouts May 13-22,’99, inc., per field S.O. No. 4 hdqrs. 1st div., 8th A.C., dated May 13, ‘99” This entry is in error, as the dateline for that field order is “In the Field, San Isidro, Luzon, May 18, 1899.” 12 Kinne’s Diary adds this formation about the wounded sergeant: This man’s cousin was General Gregorio Del Pilar’s orderly at the same engagement. Five years later, while I was a medical student at Chicago University, I had an interesting meeting with him. I was headwaiter at the Men's Commons, and one day a Filipino by the name of Sarabia asked for a position as a student waiter. This was given to him, and, in the course of a conversation, I asked him if he had been a soldado. He said he was, and belonged to Aguinaldo’s Own, or the 1st Manila Regulars. I asked him what engagements he had taken part in, and he told me of several, and among others mentioned the engagement at Tarbon bridge in which his father fought and his cousin was wounded. He informed me there were 200 in the trenches that day, and that he was General Del Pilar’s orderly. When I told him that there were but 23 Americans in the fight, he was greatly surprised and inclined to doubt me. He asked how I knew, and I said I was also a soldier and one of the 23, and related the details of his cousin's unfortunate experience as I knew them. He was then convinced that I must be telling the truth. Sarabia and I became fast friends. He was a bright, intelligent fellow and had come to the States to act as interpreter at the St. Louis Exposition. He later took up ophthalmology and returned to Manila, where he established himself in business and is now the leading optician of that city. 13 From Kinne’s description of carrying water to the wounded, we can assume the Scouts were gathered on the north side of the bridge when the Scout came across the bridge to announce that Harrington was killed. Harrington was thus probably killed before the charge. 14 In World War II, Cabanatuan was the site of a large Japanese prisoner-of-war camp. In January 1945, more than 500 mostly American prisoners were liberated in a commando raid by American Army and Filipino guerilla soldiers. That dramatic feat is the subject of several books and films. 15 The fourteen included two civilians, four U.S. Army, and eight U.S. Navy. The Navy men were from the USS Yorktown, who were captured ashore while endeavoring to reach a Spanish garrison at Baler, on the east coast of Luzon. The garrison refused to believe the Spanish-American conflict had ended. When the Spanish soldiers finally surrendered and returned to Manila, they had held out for 337 days, and their numbers had been diminished by death from 57 to 33. 16 Just who the 23 Scouts were at this time is somewhat ambiguous. A letter from Lieutenant Thornton to Lawton’s adjutant dated May 18, 1899 asked for the following men to be assigned “to serve with my command as scouts….” He named Sweeney, Galt, Ross, McIntyre, Judd, Huntley, and Longfellow, and said that Corp. Anders was to be relieved. All these men except Pvt. Orval O. Judd of the 1st North Dakota’s Co. D were previous members of Young’s Scouts. This letter is the only mention of Judd as a Scout. Another letter from Thornton dated the same day reports that “Private Scott of Company K, Second Oregon U.S. Volunteers, has failed to report to me in compliance with Special Field Orders No. 4.” Scott was one of the original Young’s Scouts who became ill on their search-and-destroy mission, and was sent to the hospital in Manila about May 5, where his regimental record indicates he remained until May 26. 17 Special Mention in Orders singled out individuals for meritorious deeds, not necessarily on the battlefield. 18 When MacArthur occupied Malolos two months earlier, he wanted to push on to Calumpit, just five miles farther. There he could protect the railroad bridge and to use the Rio Grande de Pampanga as a defensive barrier. Otis ordered him not to advance beyond Malolos. 19 The “bamboo barracks” were former Spanish infantry barracks in the Manila suburb of Malate, and were the “home” of the 1st North Dakota Volunteers. Kinne’s Company B was quartered a few blocks away in a large house. Chaplain George C. Stull was actually with the 1st Washington Volunteers. Battery Knoll was an American artillery site on the outskirts of Manila, used at the time of the February 4 outbreak of Filipino-American hostilities. 31 740 Young’s Scouts 20 After the Scouts returned to Manila, Kinne said, “The photographer for Harper’s Weekly came out to the quarters and took pictures of a number of the Scouts.” These photos have not yet been discovered. 21 Beymer, William Gilmore, Scouts and Spies of the Civil War, p. 83. 22 Little is known about the later lives of most members of Young’s Scouts. In 1953, not long before he died, John Kinne attended an event in New York City that honored the nation’s Medal of Honor winners. Whether other Scouts were there who received the Medal of Honor has yet to be discovered. The Boys is a complete telling of one Volunteer regiment’s experience in the Philippines. Enlisting to fight Spain in Cuba, the Volunteers found themselves fighting the Filipinos they had gone to liberate from Spain’s oppressive rule in the Philippines. Reviewers call The Boys “a magnificent piece of history“ “a fascinating account” “a marvelous job” “a remarkable task” Image Credits 6 x 9 paperback 422 pages maps photos index ©2010 Read the full story! Order direct: www.puzzleboxpress.com $17.95 & shipping Include code YS11X and receive 20% discount -Cover painting and page 1, “Soldiers in the Sun,” with permission of the National Guard Bureau -Map of Philippines, Rand McNally, 1898. -Lawton and “General,” Arnaldo Dumindin, www.freewebs.com/ philippineamericanwar, hereafter Dumindin -John Kinne, Rush Medical College, author’s collection -Route of Lawton’s San Isidro Campaign, adapted by author from “Gunner in Luzon,” The Field Artillery Journal, 1939-40 -Carabao carts, adapted by author from image in Neely’s Photographs: Fighting in the Philippines, 1899 -Sergeants with Krags, author’s collection -Baliuag church, www.flickr.com -Search and destroy graphic, by author -Muddy road, Dumindin -Scouts at Baliuag, Institute for Regional Studies, North Dakota State Univ., Fargo, ND (477.ll.1) -Scouts at Baliuag with numbers, by author -San Ildefonso graphic, by author -Filipino soldiers, Dumindin -San Miguel graphic, by author -Tarbon graphic, by author -General Antonio Luna, Dumindin -Lockjaw painting, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetanus -Laguna de Bay, Dumindin -Soldiers in river, author’s collection -Scouts in Manila, author’s collection, courtesy of Kinne relative Jerry Schaaf -Scouts in Manila with numbers, by author -Decoration Day, adapted by author from stereograph at www.mahablog.com -Gillespie medal, www.luc.edu/militaryscience -Anders and Quinn, www.arlingtoncemetery.net/pquinn.htm Also by John Durand The Taos Massacres is a gripping, historically accurate novel bringing to life the bloody 1847 rebellion in New Mexico against American rule. “a masterful combination of historical fact and irresistible suspense” Behind Enemy Lines: A Memoir probes a growing boy’s polio and its effects on his life - physical, emotional, and psychological. “I commend your courage in being so forthright” [Also on Amazon Kindle] The Odyssey of Mary B tells the story of a young convict sent to the new penal colony in Australia who escaped and returned to England. Faithful to the historical figures, rich in Australia’s colonial history, a meaty, fun read. “Couldn’t wait to get to the end, and then was sad because it was finished” Principal Sources Cooper, Jerry, and Glenn Smith. Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard. Fargo: North Dakota State University, 1986 Durand, John. The Boys: 1st North Dakota Volunteers in the Philippines. Puzzlebox Press, 2010. Gratenbein, C.U. Ed. The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and the Philippine Insurrection, 2nd ed. J.R. Whitney, 1980 Kinne, John B. Diary. Author’s typescript from typescript by Major Dana Wright, Chester Fritz Library, U of ND, Grand Forks, ND United States Serial Set, No. 3903 Copyright 2011 by John Durand All rights reserved ISBN 0974378348 LCCN 2010934410 Puzzlebox Press, PO Box 765, Elkhorn, WI 53121 www.puzzleboxpress.com Order direct: www.puzzleboxpress.com 32 741 742 $9.95 U.S. 743 American Period The Americans established а local Philippine government іn the Philippines when they held the fіrst election іn the country іn the town оf Baliuag, Bulacan оn May 6, 1899. In book, The Philippines аnd Round Аbоut George John Younghusband described the town оf Malolos during the height оf the Philippine-American War: In Malolos, we saw considerable numbers оf Spanish prisoners, bare-headed, bare-footed, аnd іn rags, performing аll the mоst menial offices аs domestic servants tо individual natives оr аs public scavengers. Every railway station wаs guarded by insurgent troops, аnd every train аt each station wаs carefully examined by them. Nоt even аn American cаn travel without а passport, аnd the оnly safe аnd convenient nationality tо assume іs thаt оf а British subject.Maj. George John Younghusband. The Philippines аnd Round About, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1899, p.p.77 A list of Spanish American War Veterans buried in Kentucky This list is just starting and needs your help! If you know of more Spanish American War Veterans buried in Kentucky, please email us the information from their stone, and the location of the cemetery by clicking here. 744 ABRAMS, TABER 16th U.S. Infantry (December 26 1873 - December 6 1945)(Rosehill Cemetery,Owensboro, Daviess Co, KY) ACKLEY, VICTOR G., Pvt., U.S. Army (September 25, 1879 - August 14, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ACKLIN, JOHN R., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died December 18, 1933) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** AEBERSOLD, ERNEST 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Died October 2, 1928)(Cave Hill National Cemetery, Plot: E 5154,Louisville, Jeffereson Co., KY) AHLER, ROBERT, Cpl., U.S. Army (October 26, 1878 - March 1, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ALLEN, JOHN H., Pvt., Infantry (March 30, 1877 - May 5, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ARRASMITH, ALPHA A., Artificer, U.S. Army (December 8, 1861 - February 13, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ARTMAN, WILLIAM, Pvt., U.S. Army (October 18, 1870 - May 22, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ASHBY, WILLIAM H., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died November 12, 1940) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ATCHER, JOHN C., Pvt., U.S. Army (September 25, 1878 - February 16, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** AUSTIN, CLARENCE V., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died March 13, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 745 BAGHOTT, KENNARD, Cpl., U.S. Army (October 12, 1874 - January 28, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BAILEY, A. P. 8th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ BAILEY, CHARLES, Wagoner, 2nd Georgia Volunteer Infantry (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ BAILEY, RICHARD, Pvt., Cavalry (Died May 29, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BAIRD, CLAUDE, Pvt., U.S. Army (May 28, 1877 - February 19, 1955) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** BALLARD, KELVEY, Pvt., U.S. Army (January 2, 1879 - December 29, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BALLARD, WILSON, 1st Lt., U.S. Army (Died December 15, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BANDETT, A. A. 12th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ BARBEE, JOSEPH R., Pvt., U.S. Army (December 15, 1874 - May 22, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** BARNES, ETHELBERT, Sgt., U. S. Army (September 17, 1874 - November 8, 1965) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** BATES, ALEXANDER, Sgt., 24th (U.S.?) Infantry (April 3, 1874 - February 13, 1965) (Mt. Olive Cemetery, East of Oak Hill, Pulaski Co., KY)*** 746 BEARDSLEY, STEVEN A., Pvt., U. S. Army (Died September 11, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** BEASLEY, HARVEY ALLEN, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Lawrenceburg Cemetery, Lawrenceburg, Anderson County, KY)* BEATTIE, ETHER, 1st Lt., Cavalry (December 31, 1876 - October 23, 1964) (Mt. Olive Cemetery, East of Oak Hill, Pulaski Co., KY)*** BEELER, GEORGE, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died February 13, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BELL, JOHN ED, Hospital Steward U. S. Navy (January 6, 1874 - December 30, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BENEDICT, HARRY A., Pvt., U.S. Army (July 18, 1881 - August 12, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BENTLEY, ISAAC, Pvt., U. S. Army (Died June 2, 1914) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** BENTLEY, ROBERT L. 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (Section 9, Lawrenceburg Cemetery, Lawrenceburg, Anderson County, KY)* BETSCH, JOSEPH, Musician, 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Band (Died April 5, 1901) (St. Francis of Assissi Roman Catholic Cemetery, Dayton, Campbell Co., KY)*** BILLINGS, HENRY C., Pvt. 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (2 March 1868-17 Sept. 1929)(Cave Hill Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) BINGHAM, JOSEPH, Pvt., U.S. Army (January 8, 1879 - September 4, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 747 BLISS, CYRUS HERBERT, Wagoner, U.S. Army (September 12, 1876 - February 20, 1963) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BOHLEN, PETER T., Cpl., U.S. Army (August 20, 1878 - November 11, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BONN, WILLIAM F., Sgt., U.S. Army (March 12, 1871 - November 28, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BOYATT, GEORGE N. 4th Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (1874 - 1941) (George N. Boyatt Cemetery, Bell Farm, McCreary Co., KY)*** BRADFORD, JESSIE, Chief Water Tender U. S. Navy (October 27, 1880 - April 26, 1966) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** BREMER, HENRY C., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died August 20, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BROADDUS, HUSTON, Cpl., U.S. Army (March 12, 1866 - February 25, 1947) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BROOKER, WILLIAM B., Pvt., U.S. Army (June 17, 1874 - February 7, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BROOKS, WARNER, Trumpeter, U.S. Army (March 3, 1877 - December 8, 1952) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** BROWN, ALFRED C., Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died September 20, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** BROWN, ISSAC, Pvt., U.S. Army (January 28, 1873 - June 1, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 748 BROWN, RENUS, Pvt., 6th U.S. Cavalry, Troop I (May 15, 1874 –June 30, 1930)(Pittsburg Cemetery, Pittsburg, Laurel Co., KY)** BROWN, ROBERT, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died November 10, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BROWN, ROBERT C., JR., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died May 6, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** BROWN, SAMUEL VANCE, Pvt., 2nd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (October 8, 1877 - May 3, 1958)(Old Columbus Cemetery, Columbus, Hickman Co., KY) BROWNING, NOAH M. (1882 - 1959) (Brownsville Church Cemetery, Rhoda, Edmonson Co., KY)*** BUCKNER, GEORGE U. S. Infantry, Co. L (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** BURGIN, GEORGE ELMER (August 14, 1879 - November 17, 1961) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** BURKHART, NOBLE, Pvt., 4th Infantry, Co. C (Pittsburg Cemetery, Pittsburg, Laurel Co., KY)** BURKS, JOHN, Pvt., (April 5, 1877 - April 15, 1951)(Couch Cemetery, Couch Fork, Leslie Co., KY) BURNETT, WAT R., Cpl., 17th U.S. Infantry, Co. G (Campground Cemetery, Boreing, Laurel Co., KY)** BUSH, JAMES U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (September 7, 1880 - September 1, 1952) (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** CAMPBELL, HARRY J., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died March 28, 1955) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 749 CARFIELD, HENRY A., Pvt., U.S. Army (April 13, 1878 - March 25, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CARMODY, THOMAS, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Cavalry (possibly the 2nd Company, Kentucky, Volunteer Cavalry?), Casual Detachment, (Died February 3, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CARNELL, W. H. , (March 10, 1883 – October 21, 1905)(Pittsburg Cemetery, Pittsburg, Laurel Co., KY)** CARROLL, WILLIAM, Pvt., U.S. Army (January 24, 1877 - February 14, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** CARTER, WINFORT, Pvt., U.S. Army (February 25, 1880 - August 24, 1957) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** CHAPEL, WILLIAM CLAUDE, Pvt., 8th U.S. Cavalry, Troop D (October 12, 1876 - June 12, 1857)(Cranor Cemetery near St. Charles, Hopkins Co, KY) CHAPMAN, CECIL T., Pvt., U.S. Army (April 22, 1877 - October 7, 1952) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** CHAPPELL, THOMAS 6th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (Ephesus Baptist Church Cemetery, Crab Orchard, Lincoln Co., KY)*** CHESTNUT, W., 22nd U.S. Infantry, Co. C. (Old Salem Cemetery, Maplesville, Laurel Co., KY)** CHENEY, CHARLES C., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died January 2, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CHURCHILL, RICHARD, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died January 24, 1935) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CLARK, BENJAMINE, Bugler 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co.. G (September 16,. 1879 - December 19, 1967) (Lebanon Junction City Cemetery, Lebanon Junction, Bullitt Co., KY) 750 CLARK, E. NORTON U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (Tilghman Cemetery, Iola, Marshall Co., KY) CLARK, FRANK BERNARD, 6th U.S. Infantry, Co. H (Oct 16, 1875 - Sept. 22, 1960) (Locust Grove Cemetery, Dover Co., Mason, KY) CLARK, ROBERT P., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died July 17, 1947) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CLEGG, WILFRID F., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died October 16, 1950) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** CLEPHAS, PETER, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died July 11, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CLOYD, JAMES C., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (March 16, 1868 - December 23, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COBB, R., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died February 1, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** COCHRAN, MINOR L., PVT 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died December 18, 1917) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COFFEE, PEARSON, Sgt., U.S. Army (August 6, 1879 - June 16, 1964) (Mt. Olive Cemetery, East of Oak Hill, Pulaski Co., KY)*** COLEMAN, BERT, Cpl., 8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Co., E (March 16, 1877 - January 22, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COLLINS, BENJAMIN F., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (Died January 8, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CONN, FREDERICK, 1st Sgt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (May 4, 1868 - February 6, 1961) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 751 COOK, JAMES T., Pvt., U.S. Army (August 6, 1878 - February 15, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COOK, ROBERT, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died February 15, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COOK, SIDNEY, Pvt., U.S. Army (July 24, 1868 - January 7, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CORDELL, WILLIAM H. 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (Silerville Cemetery, Strunk, McCreary Co., KY) COSBY, ALFRED D., (February 18, 1880 - October 21, 1968)(Old Columbus Cemetery, Columbus, Hickman Co., KY) COUCH, SOLOMON (?) (1872-1904)(ABE Couch Cemetery, Hyden, Leslie Co., KY) COUCH, WILLIAM, Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (August 4, 1876 - October 19, 1933)(ABE Couch Cemetery, Hyden, Leslie Co., KY) COURSON, CULVER L., Pvt., U.S. Army (December 14, 1877 - December 1, 1960) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** COURTNEY, CHARLES, Pvt., 25th U.S. Infantry, Co. F (Died March 14, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COURTNEY, CHARLES, Pvt., 25th U.S. Infantry, Co. K (July 28, 1877 - January 30, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COVELL, GUY, Cpl., 16th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (July 10, 1879 - November 5, 1959) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** COX, THOMAS E., Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died August 9, 1941) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 752 COX, WILLIAM CLIFFORD, Maj., U. S. Army (January 28, 1876 - June 9, 1961) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** CREEKBAUM, ANGUS JASPER, Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Died September 2, 1931) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** CRUTCHFIELD, ED M., Pvt., U. S. Army (Died August 15, 1901) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** CUNNAGIN, LEWIS, Sgt. 6th U.S. Cavalry, K Troop (September 8, 1878 - July 28, 1934)(York Cemetery, Annville, Jackson Co., KY) CURTSINGER, WILLIAM, Pvt., 10th (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. D (November 28, 1877 - March 12, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** CUTSINGER, ANDERSON C., Pvt., U.S. Army (September 15, 1871 - March 25, 1953) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** DABMEY, WILLIAM S. 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co.I (Gap Creek Cemetery, Monticello, Wayne Co., KY) DAMERON, JOSEPH, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (1874-1946)(Section 61, Lot 7, Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Campbell Co., KY) DAVENPORT, CLARENCE M., (September 29, 1872 - June 15, 1965)(Red Hill Cemetery, Hodgenville, Larue Co., KY) DAVIS, CHARLES W., Cpl., 1st Texas Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (June 27, 1876 - July 8, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DAVIS, COLUMBUS JACKSON, Cpl., Field Artillery, 19th Battery (August 27, 1879 - July 24, 1965)(Burnside Cemetery, Burnside, Pulaski Co., KY) DAVIS, NICHOLAS, Pvt., U.S. Army (June 7, 1877 - April 9, 1956) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 753 DAWSON, PETER L., Musician, 3rd Wyoming Volunteer Infantry (3rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry?) Band (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DAY, JOHN WILLIAM, (1882-1971) (Munfordville Municipal Cemetery, Munfordville, Hart Co., KY) DECKER, THOMAS P., 1st Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (April 30, 1875 - October 21,1902)(Rogers Grove Cemetery, Monticello, Wayne Co., KY) DEHAVEN, JOHN W., Cpl., 9th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Died October 22, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DELUS, PETER N., Pvt., 1st Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (July 23, 1876 - April 7, 1940) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DENUMZIO, NICHOLAS, Musician, 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry Band (December 6, 1878 - August 3, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DICK, BENJAMIN, Pvt., 7th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Died November 11, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** DIERKING, LOUIS H., Pvt., 7th U.S. Cavalry, Troop K (July 18, 1878 - October 11, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DIETRICH, JOHN R., Pvt., U.S. Army (June 4, 1873 - October 10, 1953) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** DILLS, EDWARD, Cpl., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (1877-1959)(Ashland Cemetery, Ashland, Boyd Co., KY) DINKLER, WILLIAM J., Pvt., 14th (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. A (July 17, 1869 - April 14, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DOBSON, ANDREW, Pvt., 161st Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (April 1, 1865 - May 30, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 754 DOHERTY, THOMAS M., Drum Maj., Medal of Honor. 21st U.S. Infantry, Co H; 4th U.S. Infantry, Co. H (May 11, 1869 - September 21, 1906) (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Campbell Co., KY) DORSEL, LOUIS, Pvt., U.S. Army (September 23, 1879 - June 20, 1965) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** DOUGLASS, EDWARD R., Pvt., 161st Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Co. I (January 30, 1877 - July 24, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** DUFF, JOSEPH C., Cpl., 23rd U.S. Infantry (May. 21, 1875 - Ocober. 21, 1921)(Red Hill Cemetery, Krypton, Perry Co., KY) DURHAM, GOVERNOR, Pvt., U.S. Army (January 25, 1874 - August 21, 1944) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** DUSCH, JOSEPH, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (November 26, 1876 - March 15, 1959) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** EAVES, BRYANT, Sgt., 3rd North Carolina Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (Died March 5, 1947) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** EDELEN, JAMES M., Pvt., U. S. Army (February 9, 1877 - October 24, 1960) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** EDELEN, LEO, Pvt., 1st U. S. Infantry (Died October 17, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ELBLE, FRED W., Pvt., 12th Infantry, Co. G (June 12, 1879 - March 10, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ELBLE, HENRY, Pvt., 12th Infantry, Co. G (June 23, 1881 - February 17, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 755 ELDER, ROBERT O. 3rd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (Carter's Mill (or Concrete) Cemetery, Symsonia, Graves Co., KY)*** ELLIOTT, ASAEL 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (December 11, 1852 - January 15, 1945) (Elliott Cemetery, Barbourville, Knox Co., KY)*** ERNST, ROBERT H., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died March 9, 1953) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** ESKRIDGE, PEYTON, Pvt., 12th Infantry, Casual Detachment (August 15, 1878 - September 25, 1961) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** EVANS, DAVID, Pvt., U. S. Army (Died September 26, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** EVANS, OTIS, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died September 23, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** FARLEY, GEORGE M., Sgt., Kentucky Volunteer Cavalry (April 24, 1871 - February 13, 1951) (Concord Baptist Church Cemetery, Flat Lick, Knox Co., KY)*** FARMER, LINVILLE, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (October 17, 1880 – January 9, 1938)(Hopewell Cemetery, Dorethea, Laurel Co., KY)** FERNOW, FREDERICK F., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (Died July 26, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FINN, MICHAEL J., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died may 5, 1940) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FOMAN, WALTER C., Pvt., U. S. Army (October 15, 1872 - November 1, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 756 FORBES, JOHN W., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died November 15, 1939) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** FORCHT, MAHLON T., Cpl., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (Died February 18, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FORD, HARRY, Pvt., 24th (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. K (March 1, 1876 - September 14, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FOSS, AXEL, Boatswain, U. S. Coast Guard (U.S. Revenue Cutter Service) (May 17, 1873 - October 6, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** FOSTER, LEE R., Pvt., 2nd Cavalry, Troop D (May 13, 1875 - November 4, 1959) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FOX, OLIVER EDWIN, Capt., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (August 31, 1866 - December 25, 1954)(Paris Cemetery, Paris, Bourbon Co., KY) FOX, ORVILLE 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (September 12, 1879 - January 19, 1950) (Steele Cemetery, McKee, Jackson Co., KY)*** FRANK, GEORGE J., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died April 7, 1912) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) *** FRASIER, BURTON, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died May 27, 1946) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** FRIEDENHEIMER, T. CAREY, 1st Lt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (September 15, 1875 - January 7, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** FULKERSON, JAMES D., Musician, 4th Infantry, Co. C (August 15, 1878 - March 6, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 757 GAINES, GEORGE S., Cpl., 12th U.S. Infantry, Co. F (1877 – 1906)(Salt River Church, Lawrenceburg, Anderson Co, KY)* GAINES, ROBERT, Pvt., 25th Infantry, Co. E (December 25, 1876 - April 23, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** GALIMORE ANDREW, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (April 17, 1876 - October 9, 1966)(Section V, Pine Knot Cemetery, Pine Knot, McCreary Co., KY) GARRING, C. L., Teamster, 3rd Mississippi Volunteer Infantry (Died November 7, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** GATEWOOD, GEORGE F., Pvt., 9th U. S. Cavalry, Troop L (Died December 7, 1935) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** GIBBS, SLATHE C., Cook 18th U.S. Infantry (1874 - 1971) (Lawrenceburg Cemetery, Lawrenceburg, Anderson Co., KY)* GIBSON, WILLIAM J., Pvt., U.S. Army (May 23, 1873 - August 2, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** GILBERT, WILLIAM. A., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died April 15, 1928) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) *** GILL, STEPHEN H., Pvt., 4th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Died September 12, 1926) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) *** GILMORE, JOHN L., Sgt., 3rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry (Died May 9, 1940) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** GLENN, CLARENCE, Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (July 27, 1877 - April 18, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 758 GODDARD, WILLIAM N., Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (June 23, 1878 - April 21, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** GRAVES, LOUIS, Pvt., Infantry, (Died September 19, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** GRAY, JEROME M. 19th U.S. Infantry, Co. G (Born circa 1872) (Pigeon Fork Baptist Church Cemetery, GPS Lat 38.09694 / Lon -85.04731, Harrisonville, Anderson Co., KY) GRUBBS, VIRGIL D. 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (Johnson Cemetery, Brownsville, Edmonson Co. KY)*** HALL, DAVID, Pvt., U. S. Army (Died October 12, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** HALL, JOHN M., Pvt., U. S. Army (Died September 11, 1938) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** HAMMONS, AUGUSTUS P., Pvt., 16th U.S. Infantry, Co. M (January 23, 1877 - September 13, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HARDIN, FRANK E., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died January 19, 1908) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) *** HARDING, WILLIAM P., Cpl., 3rd U.S. Cavalry, Troop K (October 11, 1875 - August 11, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HARKINS, ROBERT, Pvt., U.S. Army (June 11, 1879 - October 2, 1950) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** HARRIS, GEORGE L., SR., Pvt., U.S. Army (December 9, 1880 - August 31, 1959) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 759 HARVEY, EDWARD E. 1st Infantry, Co. A (July 5, 1874 – February 4, 1955)(Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Campbell Co., KY)+ HEATH, JOHN S. (September 12, 1875 - May 17, 1959) (May Family Cemetery, Johns Creek, Pike Co., KY)*** HEITLAUF, FRED K., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (Died December 13, 1904) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) *** HELTON, JOHN E. 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (1877 - 1956)(Justice Riley Cemetery, Longs Creek, Breathitt Co., KY) HENDRICKSON, JOHN L., Cpl., 3rd Texas Volunteer Infantry, Co. C (Died January 13, 1899) (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Campbell Co., KY)*** HENRY, DANIEL B., Pvt., U.S. Army (October 14, 1874 - March 14, 1955) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** HENRY, FRANK, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. M (Died April 23, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HENSLEY, CHARLES H., Cpl., U.S. Army (Died March 18, 1932) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** HICKERSON, LAWRENCE, Sgt., 16th U.S. Infantry, Co. G (August 6, 1883 - December 16, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HIGDON, WIRT J., Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (January 12, 1874 - October 30, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HOOD, JOHN J., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died August 13, 1900) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 760 HOOD, PERRY 9th U. S. Cavalry, Troop D (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** HORSTMAN, WILLIAM, Pvt., 22nd Infantry, Co. H (March 3, 1880 - December 15, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HOTTEL, ROY, Pvt., 13th Infantry, Co. C (December 2, 1870 - July 24, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HOUCHIN, WARD 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (Fairview Baptist Church Cemetery, Brownsville, Edmonson Co. KY)*** HOWARD, HENRY (Mosley Cemetery, Hyden, Leslie Co., KY) HOWARD, JAMES MORT Casual Detail, 3rd Infantry (?) (March 16, 1879 - August 11, 1962) (Mt. Pisgah Cemetery, Graves Co., KY)*** HUDSON, JOHN C., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (Died November 1, 1910) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** HUESMAN, WILLIAM Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (Jul7 30, 1898)(St. Francis of Assisi Roman Catholic Cemetery, Dayton, Campbell Co., KY)*** HUNT, CHARLES, Pvt., U.S. Army (April 22, 1871 - June 24, 1952) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** HURSE, JOSEPH W. Indiana Infantry, Co. B (October 14, 1881 - October 14, 1957) (Stanford Pike Cemetery, Somerset, Pulaski Co., KY)*** HURST, JOHN, Musician, 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (October 17, 1879 - June 20, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ISAACS, GEORGE, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died March 7, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 761 ELIJAH JACKSON Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (J.O.U.A.M. & Eagle Cemetery, Olive Hill, Carter Co., KY) JACKSON, FRANK, Pvt., 10th U.S Cavalry, Troop B (April 25, 1874 - June 7, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** JACKSON, HARTIE S., Pvt., U.S. Army (April 7, 1875 - July 19, 1955) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** JACKSON, WILLIAM RILEY, Cpl., (March 18, 1871 - October 12, 1951)(Rock Lick Baptist Church Cemetery, Somerset, Pulaski Co., KY) JANUARY, WILLIAM 8th U. S. Colored (8th U.S. Volunteer?) Infantry, Co. K (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** JOHNSON, ENOS MOSES, Artificer 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (October 18, 1857 - December 30, 1942)(ShoemakerJohnson Cemetery, Baxter, Harlan Co., KY) JOHNSON, JOHN R, Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (July 16, 1877 - March 13, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** JOHNSON, MONTIE, Cpl., U.S. Army (May 11, 1881 - December 18, 1948) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** JOHNSON, SAMUEL M., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died October 11, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** JOHNSTON, MARY, Nurse, Army Nurse Corps (Died November 19, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** JONES, CHARLES 6th U.S. Cavalry, Troop M (Harts Branch Cemetery, Beech Creek, Clay Co., KY)*** JONES, JAMES R., Pvt., Infantry (Died November 7, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 762 JONES, JOHN W., 3rd U.S. Artillery, Battery I? (Died 1937) (New Columbus Cemetery, Corinth, Grant Co., KY) JONES, NEVIL, Pvt., U. S. Army (December 10, 1879 - November 10, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KEENE, ENOCH H., Pvt., U.S. Army (July 4, 1876 - April 9, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** KEENE, JESSE, 1st Sgt., 6th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. I (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** KELLEY, GEORGE B., Sgt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (January 5, 1879 - November 24, 1942)(Pine Hill Cemetery, Corbin, Knox Co., KY) KELLY, JOSEPH F., Pvt., 2nd Cavalry, Troop I (June 23, 1879 - March 29, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KELSEY, HIRAM E., Pvt., U.S. Army (November 7, 1867 - May 23, 1958) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** KELTING, HENRY, Pvt., 158th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (May 2, 1874 - June 24, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KENT, WILLIAM W., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died September 4, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KING, EDWARD, Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (November 1, 1874 - November 6, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KIRK, ELIJAH K., 2nd U.S. Infantry, Co. C (04/16/1852 - 09/13/1938)(Kirk Family Cemetery, Bear Creek, Boyd County, KY) 763 KLEINJOHN, CHARLES H., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co., A (February 7, 1875 - February 1, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KNOWLES, CHARLES, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died April 8, 1930) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** KNOX, JAMES H., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died June 26, 1949) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** KOCH, CONRAD, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. A (Died December 26, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KRAMER, FREDERICK W., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died December 7, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KRAUSE, FREDERICK, Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (Died July 31, 1909) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KRIM, JOSEPH H., Farrier, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, Troop H (Died July 20, 1940) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** KURZ, GUS, Sgt., 13th U.S. Infantry, Co. G (January 1, 1881 - June 14, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LAIL, WILLIAM G., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died May 12, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** LAMPTON, BENJAMIN L., SR., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (October 31, 1877 - February 13, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LANHAM, GREEN A. (March 9, 1880 - September 9, 1963) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 764 LAWRENCE, EDWARD, Cpl., U.S. Army (Died December 28, 1930) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** LEASOR, ROBERT D., Pvt., 2nd Infantry Casual Detail (June 16, 1879 - May 22, 1966) (Portland Cemetery, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LEE, CHARLES, Pvt., U.S. Army (November 14, 1876 - December 11, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LEE, COLEMAN R., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (April 26, 1876 – February 14, 1936)(Old Union Cemetery, Old Union, Laurel Co., KY)** LEE, W. I., Musician, 2nd Georgia Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ LEWIS, GRADY, Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (January 10, 1877 - March 16, 1966)(Junction City Cemetery, Junction City, Boyle County, KY) LEYMANN, CHARLES, PVT., U.S. Army (Died January 8, 1945) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** LINDEMEYER, J. HENRY, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (May 20, 1879 - January 11, 1960) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LOUDEN, SANTFRED, Cpl., Volunteer Engineers, Co. C (September 3, 1871 - April 30, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** LUCAS, PHILLIP A., CPL., U.S. Army (Died August 11, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** LUMPKINS, CHARLES, Col., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (1879 - 1949) (Martin Town Cemetery, a.k.a C & O Cemetery, Martin, Floyd Co., KY)*** 765 LUNSFORD, LENARD, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died October 15, 1918) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** LYMAN, FREDERIC T., Cpl., 22nd U.S. Infantry (Died October 4, 1936) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** MAGNUSSEN, MAGNUS M., Artificer, 3rd Infantry (Died March 17, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MALONE, WILLIAM CHARLES, U.S. Navy (April 20, 1883 - June 11, 1964)(Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine County, Kentucky) MANBY, THOMAS, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died August 23, 1939) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MARTIN, FRANK, Pvt., 24th [U.S.?] Infantry, Co. B (February 12, 1875 - October 29, 1960) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MARTIN, KIRBY E., Pvt., U.S. Army (October 28, 1878 - November 15, 1952) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MARTINDALE, RANSON D., Pvt., U.S. Army (October 11, 1873 - July 8, 1956) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MASON, ANTONIO J., Pvt., 10th U.S. Cavalry, Troop M (October 23, 1878 - May 9, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MASON, GEORGE W., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Cavalry, Troop A (Southard Cemetery, Route 3 London, Laurel Co., KY)** MATTINGLY, CHARLES J., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (January 1, 1873 - December 6, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 766 MAYDWELL, CHARLES P., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (Died December 30, 1945)(Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** McCAMMON, MONTA, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died January 13, 1957) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** McDONALD, ARCHIE 3rd Alabama Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (Teague Cemetery, Madisonville, Hopkins Co., KY) McELROY, GEORGE W., Artificer, U.S. Army (Died June 2, 1942) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** McGINTY, ROBERT, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (November 4, 1879 - November 4, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** McHUGH, JOSEPH T., musican 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (1882-1946) Evergreen Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co. KY) McMEANS, EDWARD 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Davis Cemetery, near Truitt, Greenup Co., KY) McNAY, ANDREW J., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (March 29, 1876 - March 18, 1935)(Short Creek Cemetery, Pendleton Co., KY) MILLER, CHARLES J., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died June 25, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MILLER, RUDOLPH H., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (January 29, 1881 - March 4, 1959)(Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MILLER, WILLIAM FRANK, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. A (October 10, 1872 - January 6, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** MITCHELL, GEORGE 8th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ 767 MITCHELL, HARVEY, Cook., 4th U.S. Cavalry, Troop E (February 28, 1878 –February 12, 1929)(Early Cemetery, Route 1 London, Laurel Co., KY)** MOON, NATHANIEL B., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died December 7, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MOORE, ARTHUR D., Pvt., U.S. Army (April 25, 1879 - August 31, 1949) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MOORE, GEORGE H., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died July 24, 1941) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MOORE, JAMES L., Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (February 23, 1876 – June 5, 1928)(Pittsburg Cemetery, Pittsburg, Laurel Co., KY)** MOORE, RICHARD D., Cpl., U.S. Army (February 4, 1876 - July 10, 1956) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MOORE, SAMPSON (December 10, 1877 - April 29, 1957)(Moore Cemetery, Whick, Breathitt Co., KY) MURPHY, CHARLES, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died February 22, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** MYNHEIR, ALLIE, Pvt., 22nd (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. B (June 22, 1874 - March 14, 1966) (Jones Cemetery, Midland, Bath Co., KY)*** NEAL, JOHN A., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (August 3, 1875 - March 13, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** NEEL, WILLIAM, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (August 28, 1878 - November 20, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** NEW, THOMAS, Pvt., 24th (U.S.?) Infantry (August 12, 1868 - November 17, 1948) (Elkton Cemetery, Elkton, Todd Co., KY)*** 768 NOLAN, PAUL, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died May 18, 1942) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** NOLEN, JOHN H., Lt.,. 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Nolan Chapel Cemetery, Chad, Harlan Co., KY) PADGETT, SAMUEL A., Pvt., 6th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (July 31, 1879 - January 9, 1957) (Double Springs Cemetery, Waynesburg, Lincoln Co., KY)*** PAPE, JOHN STUART, 1st Lt., (May 15, 1874 - September 22, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PARSONS, JAMES M., Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died July 28, 1943) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PAYTON, ROY H., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (September 30, 1877 - December 20, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PECK, CHARLES WILLIAM, Pvt., 3rd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. C (January 19, 1876 - May 31, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PERRY, WILLIAM, Sgt., 10th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Died September 30, 1934) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PETE, SAMUEL, Pvt., 16th Infantry (Died August 18, 1932) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PETERS, WILLIAM F., Pvt., Infantry (October 2, 1874 - November 21, 1956) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PENNY, WILLIAM B., Capt., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (May 1862 - March 19, 1924) (Stanford Cemetery, Stanford, Stanford?, Lincoln Co., KY) 769 PHILLIPS, J. D. 2nd Georgia Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ PIERCE, EDWARD P., Pvt., 10th U.S. Cavalry, Troop L (August 31, 1869 - December 20, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PIERCE, WILLIAM 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. C (February 2, 1879 - August 16, 1966) (Long Run Cemetery, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PIERSON, SAMUEL F., Cpl., U.S. Army (Died June 9, 1940) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** PITTMAN, PAT (Poplar Hill Cemetery a.k.a. Rich Hill Cemetery, Yosemite, Casey Co., KY)*** PORTER, WILLIAM M., Pvt., 2nd Infantry, Casual Detail (November 8, 1873 - February 28, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** POSEY, THOMAS 10th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ PROSSER, CALVIN, Cpl., 8th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (Died December 3, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** PUCKETT, JAMES E., Pvt., 3rd U.S. Infantry, Co. E (Lawrenceburg Cemetery, Lawrenceburg, Anderson Co., KY)* RALEY, JEFFERSON C. 16th U. S. Infantry, Co. M (1875 - 1937) (Memory Gardens Cemetery, Hawesville, Hancock Co., KY)*** RAMSEY, DAVIS C., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died October 30, 1939) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** RAWLINGS, JOHN W., Sgt., 2nd Cavalry (Died August 13, 1941) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 770 RAY, GEORGE N., Pvt., 23rd Kansas Volunteer Infantry (Died March 10, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** RAY, JOHN, Pvt., 24th (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. B (November 29, 1872 - March 1, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** RAY, ROBERT W., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died January 24, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** REISTER, JESSE CHARLES, Cpl., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (February 14, 1850 - June 22, 1918)(Section 10, Evergreen Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) REISTER, JAMES GARFIELD 4th kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. I (June 21, 1881 - June 9, 1936)(Section 10, Evergreen Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) RICE, WILLIAM, Pvt., 3rd Volunteer Infantry (Died November 8, 1934) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** RICKETTS, RICHARD, Pvt., 2nd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (August 23, 1876 - April 7, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** RIDDICK, HARRY T., 1st Sgt., 4th Virginia Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (Died April 29, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** RISK, EARNEST I., Cpl., 22nd (U.S.?) Infantry, Co. L (May 9, 1875 - July 13, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ROBERTS, OLLIE A., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died January 1, 1948) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** ROBERTSON, JAMES O., 6th U.S. Cavalry, Troop K, (Jackson Cemetery, Jackson, Breathitt Co., KY) ROWLEY, ARTHUR WALLACE, 1st Sgt., U.S. Army (July 25, 1872 - February 13, 1959) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 771 RYBA, CHARLES 9th (New York Volunteer?) Infantry, Co. L (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ SALE, GEORGE, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (Died September 30, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SAUFLEY, JAMES MARSHALL, 2nd Lt., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (March 17, 1880-July 3, 1955) (Buffalo Springs Cemetery, Stanford, Lincoln Co., KY) SAUNDERS, WHEELER, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. I (December 8, 1874 - April 10, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SAVAGE, ANDREW 10th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. I (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ SCANNELL, TIM, Pvt., 2nd Infantry, (Died January 22, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SCOTT, GUY BRADDOCK, Coal Passer, U.S. Navy (Died November 4, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SCOTT, JAMES M. 2nd Texas Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (Garnett Cemetery, Hwy 55 Outside of Columbia, Adair Co., KY) SEARS, RICHARD, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. B (March 16, 1872 - August 18, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SEDER, LOUIS Sgt., 22nd (U.S.?) Infantry (Died January 25, 1914)(Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell Co., KY)+ SETTERS, JOHN, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died April 2, 1946) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 772 SETTLE, GREEN, 1st Sgt., 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry ("Rough Riders"), Troop H (May 14, 1859-1946) (Pine Grove Cemetery, London, Laurel Co., KY) SETTLES, WINFIELD, Pvt., 2nd U.S. Infantry, Co. D (Carter Cemetery, Victory, Laurel Co., KY)** SHARP, GORDON (1879 – March 13, 1910)(Pittsburg, Pittsburg, Laurel Co., KY)** SHEEHAN, JOHN, Sgt., U.S. Army (December 23, 1868 - February 21, 1945) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** SHELBY, CHARLES, Pvt., Co. A (February 22, 1872 - January 28, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SHOUSE, HAMILTON L., Pvt., 3rd U.S. Cavalry (August 21, 1882 – October 17, 1962)(Fox Creek Cemetery Lawrenceburg, Anderson Co., KY)* SILER, WILLIAM, Pvt., 2nd Infantry (January 8, 1874 - September 8, 1960) (Rest Haven Cemetery, Corbin, Knox Co., KY)*** SIMBRITZKE, RUDOLPH, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (September 4, 1876 - June 29, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SIMONS, WILLIAM A., Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died September 25, 1941) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SINCLAIR, CHARLES B., Pvt., 3rd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died August 1, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SKAGGS, LORANZA D., Pvt., 22nd U.S. Infantry, Co. F (December 6, 1872 - March 7, 1903)(Prince Cemetery, north of Adams, Lawrence Co., KY) SLAUGHTER, CLARENCE, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. H (January 1, 1879 - October 5, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 773 SLOSS, EUGENE, Pvt., 25th U.S. Infantry, Co. M (Died February 24, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SMILEY, EVERT FRANKLIN, Pvt., U. S. Army (May 10, 1882 - July 23, 1965) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** SMITH, ALEX, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. L (September 17, 1878 - December 16, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SMITH, ELIGH, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. H (December 14, 1880 - November 26, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SMITH, GEORGE, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. D (September 10, 1877 - November 27, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SMITH, JAMES WALLACE, Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. C (January 2, 1869 – March 5, 1948)(Section I, Lot 19, Lexington City Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY) SMITH, OSBORN W., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (March 19, 1876 - July 30, 1955) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SMITH, RICHARD, Pvt., U.S. Army (September 2, 1880 - February 5, 1960) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** SMITH, WALTER, Pvt., 2nd Cavalry, Troop H (August 30, 1875 - February 28, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SOETE, HARRY N., Pvt., 159th Indiana Volunteer Infantry (Died June 18, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SOPER, GEORGE W., Sgt., U.S. Army (Died August 24, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** 774 SPALDING, BRUCE, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. F (Died July 18, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SPANGLER, HARRY G., Cpl., 1st West Virginia Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (Jeffersontown Cemetery, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SPARROW, WILLIAM E., Cpl., U. S. Army (September 30, 1875 - March 4, 1965) (Lebanon National Cemetery, Lebanon, Marion Co., KY)*** SPEARS, CLINTON, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. I (December 1, 1870 - March 5, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SPENCER, EDWARD, Pvt., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (December 11, 1877 - July 25, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** STAGGS, ABRAHAM T. 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (Jones Cemetery, Midland, Bath Co., KY)*** STASEL, CHRISTOPHER A., Pvt., 2nd West Virginia Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (October 11, 1868 - August 14, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** STEBLE, HENRY W., PVT., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died February 18, 1913) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** STEIER, FRANK, Pvt., 2nd U. S. Cavalry (?) (Died January 10, 1939) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** STEIN, HENRY, Pvt., U.S. Army (April 22, 1877 - February 23, 1953) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** STENSON, DAVID, Col., 25th U. S. Infantry (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemetery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** STOKES, E. A. 1st Florida Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (Evergreen Cemetery, Southgate, Kentucky, Campbell, Co., KY)+ 775 STOTTS, FRANK, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died December 11, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** STRAWN, WILLIAM J., Pvt. 6th Infantry, Co. M (1866-1935) (Alexandria Cemetery, Alexandria, Campbell Co., KY) STUDER, ALBERT, PVT., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died November 10, 1914) (Cave Hill National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** SWEENEY, NEWTON 6th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. B (Pleasant Point Baptist Church Cemetery, Kings Mountain, Lincoln Co., KY)*** TANNIAN, JAMES M., Sgt., U.S. Army (Died July 13, 1943) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** TARLTON, MARION, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died March 6, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** TAYLOR,ROBERT L., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died July 22, 1945) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** THOMAS, GEORGE W., JR., Pvt., U.S. Army (August 9, 1876 - November 1, 1954) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** THOMAS, JOSEPH, Pvt., 10th U.S. Cavalry, Troop H (Died September 14, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** THOMAS, ROY, Musician, 8th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Died July 15, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** THOMAS, WILLIAM, Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. G (December 14, 1880 – May 4, 1938)(Carter, Victory, Laurel Co., KY)** THOMPSON, GEORGE, Pvt., 8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Died February 18, 1933) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 776 THOMPSON, JAMES W., Pvt., U.S. Army (March 1, 1872 - January 1, 1953) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** TINKER, JOHN S., Bandsman, 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (February 8, 1878 - March 3, 1946) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** TOBERT, WILLIAM. H., Sgt., 8th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Daniel Groves Memorial Cemtery, Winchester, Clark Co., KY)*** TRENCH, JAMES, Cpl., U.S. Army (Died March 14, 1949) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** TURNER, B. L., Pvt., U. S. Army (September 3, 1879 - December 12, 1965) (Neave Methodist Church Cemetery, Bracken Co., KY)*** TURNER, WILLIAM H., Cpl., U.S. Army (Died July 9, 1930) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** TUTT, BENJAMIN W., Pvt., 25th U.S. Infantry (Died December 4, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** TWOHIG, WILLIAM J., Cpl., U.S. Army (Died October 17, 1918) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** UMENSETTER, GEORGE T., Pvt., 2nd West Virginia Infantry, Co. D (March 24, 1876 - October 24, 1953) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** UTTERBACK, BENJAMIN D., Cpl., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (Died June 10, 1947) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** VANHOOSE, JOHN B. U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. M (April 27, 1877 - September 10, 1922) (Vanhoose Cemetery, Patrick, Lawrence Co., KY)*** 777 VAN WINKLE, BASIL, Pvt., U.S. Army (June 30, 1880 - December 31, 1932) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** VEZOLLES, ALFRED, 8th U.S.Cavalry, Troop M (March 5, 1869 - March 25, 1954)(Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY) VICTOR, FRED, Cook, U.S. Army (July 25, 1871 - August 17, 1946) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** VONTRESS, JESS, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. G (August 10, 1877 - May 20, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WAGNER, JAMES R., Pvt., U.S. Army (March 11, 1876 - January 12, 1951) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** WAKEFIELD, MOSES, Cpl., 8th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Died May 31, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WALTERS, FRANK W., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (April 13, 1879 - March 24, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WALTERS, WILLIS N., Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. D (Died July 12, 1941) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WARD, EDWARD, Pvt., 10th U.S. Cavalry (Died July 23, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WATSON, CHARLES C., Sgt., 3rd U.S. Infantry, Co. E (June 9, 1876 – 1961) (Lawrenceburg Cemetery, Lawrenceburg, Anderson Co., KY)* WEBER, BENJAMIN, Pvt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry (Died January 11, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 778 WEIBEL, CHARLES E., Pvt., 3rd Infantry, Co. A (August 26, 1875 - September 28, 1952) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WELLS, GEORGE, Pvt., U.S. Army (Died October 13, 1940) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** WHEELER, CORLTON L., Pvt., Hospital Corps (May 1, 1874 - April 21, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WHITE, BROWN, Pvt., U.S. Army (December 18, 1873 - April 27, 1952) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** WHITNEY, GARFIELD, Pvt., 24th U.S. Infantry, Co. D (Died November 4, 1945) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WILLIAM EDWARD TURPIN, Pvt., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (September 7, 1879 - November 10, 1960)(Mill Springs National Cemetery, Nancy, Pulaski Co., KY) WILLIAMS, FORNEY, Pvt., 9th U.S. Cavalry, Troop G (August 1, 1881 - July 27, 1954) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WILLIAMS, FREDERICK, Pvt., 7th U. S. Volunteer Infantry (Died October 19, 1898) (Lexington National Cemetery, Lexington, Fayette Co., KY)*** WILLIAMS, HARRY E., Pvt., U.S. Army (April 14, 1875 - October 31, 1957) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** WILLIAMSON, THOMAS J., Pvt., U.S. Hospital Corps (Died November 9, 1938) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WILSON, DAVID M., 2nd Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co K (Old Union Cemetery, Old Union, Laurel Co., KY)** 779 WILSON, THOMAS, Sgt., 10th U.S. Cavalry, Troop H (September 12, 1872 - January 27, 1948) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WITHERS, HAYES B., Sgt., 8th U. S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (December 3, 1876 - July 1, 1957) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WOOD, JOHN H., Cpl., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. L (Died May 15, 1950) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WOODMAN, FREDERICK W., 1st Sgt., 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. A (Died May 19, 1944) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WOODS, JOHN H., Pvt., Infantry (Died August 10, 1942) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WOOLEY, FRANK R., Pvt., U.S. Army (Died September 3, 1940) (Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Jessamine Co., KY)*** WOOTON, MALCOLM B., Cpl., 2nd Infantry, Casual Detail (January 12, 1879 - April 6, 1951) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** WRIGHT, EDMOND B, Sgt.,. 6th Battery, Field Artillery (March 25,1880-February 9 1962) (Fernwood Cemetery, Henderson, Henderson Co., KY) YOCHIM, ADAM F., Pvt., 13th U.S. Infantry, Co. D (June 25, 1878 - March 5, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** YORK, MARCUS, Pvt., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. A (January 12, 1879 - November 23, 1945)(Sergeant York Cemetery, highway 930 on Himar Road, Artemus, Knox Co., KY) YOUNG, CHARLES, Pvt., 10th U.S. Cavalry, Troop C (Died January 2, 1937) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** 780 YOUNG, JAMES K., Cpl., 4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. K (Born 1877)(Smith Cemetery, Rockhouse, Pike Co., KY) YOUNG, JOHN M., Wagoner, 1st Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Co. E (December 24, 1874 - May 21, 1949) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** YOUNG, PHILIP, Pvt., 6th (U.S.Volunteer?) Infantry (Died February 27, 1941) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** ZUND, JACOB, Pvt., 6th U.S. Volunteer Infantry, Co. H (November 18, 1866 - August 7, 1958) (Zachary Taylor National Cemetery, Louisville, Jefferson Co., KY)*** Thanks to the following people for contributing information to the page! Peggy Ashabranner (Grady Lewis) Russel Ballard (William Chapel and photo) Jeff Berry (Oliver Edwin Fox, William B. Penny, James Marshall Saufley) Ronald Billings (Henry Billings) Ruth Blevins (Elijah Jackson, Loranza D. Skaggs) Beulah Ward Bloomfield (Andrew J. McNay) Freda Bolin (Samuel Brown, Alfred Cosby) Ruth E. Bottorff (William Charles Malone) Herschel Brown (Taber Abrams) Teresa Napier Carlton (Henry Howard) Charlotte Clark (Benjamine Clark) Clyde & Patricia (Edward McMeans) Ken Cunnagin (Lewis Cunnagin) L. A. Davenport (Names followed by an asterisk - * -) Miranda Davis (Archie McDonald) Angel Dixon (William Cordell) Roberta J Dooley (James Scott) Sherida Dougherty (Thomas Doherty) Janie Griffith (Sampson Moore) Mary H. Decker Harriett (Thomas Decker) Lyvonne Helton (John E. Helton) Gaye Johnson Hill (Jesse Charles Reister, James Garfield Reister) Michael Holverstott (Ernest Aebersold) John H. Huffman (Alfred Vezolles) Kennecou@aol.com (Solomon Couch, William Couch) Gene Kirk (Elijah Kirk) KYCatfish2 (George B. Kelley) Lynn Koehler (Frank Clark) Mike Lawler (John Day) Vada Linville (Edward Dills) Maureen Marella (via find-a-grave.com)(Columbus Jackson Davis) McHugh1203@aol.com (Joseph McHugh) Mitch McKinley (William S. Dabney) 781 Anne Montague (William Strawn) John R. Moore (John Burks) Johannah Moran (Names followed by a cross - + -) William Joseph Edward (Turpin) Muse (William Edward Turpin) Harold Peach (Jerome M. Gray) Wanda Mae Jones Reed (John W. Jones) Diane Renfrow (Names followed by a triple asterisk - *** -) James Roberts (James O. Robertson) Eddie Runyon (James K. Young) Albert & Pamela Scott (Clarence M. Davenport) Ben Settle (Green Settle) Steve Simpson (Edmond Wright) Andrew M. Smith (John H. Nolen) Dwayne Allen Smith (James Wallace Smith) Vicki Tynes (E Norton Clark) R. Venable (Joseph Dameron) Peggy Wilson (Andrew Galimore) Kathy York (Marcus York) Terry Young (William Jackson) **Branches of Laurel, Vol. III, July, 1988; published by the Laurel County Historical Society. Info. not reviewed in field; Contributed by John R. Moore Click here to visit the website bibliography Support this Site by Visiting the Website Store! (help us defray costs!) We are providing the following service for our readers. If you are interested in books, videos, CD's etc. related to the Spanish American War, simply type in "Spanish American War" (or whatever you are interested in) as the keyword and click on "go" to get a list of titles available through Amazon.com. Search: Keywords: Visit Main Page for copyright data Return to Researching a Spanish American War Veteran Return to Spanish American War Veterans Grave Recording Project Page Return to Main Page 782 Christian County and The Spanish-American War In the early spring of 1898, the battleship Maine was torpedoes while anchored in the bay at Havana, Cuba. A revolution was in progress, the island at the time being a Spanish possession. The disaster resulted in a terrible loss of life and although it was never satisfactorily explained, Spain was held responsible for it and without much delay war was declared against Spain on both sides of the world. It was realized that the navy was to do the fighting and the superiority of the American navy left no doubt of the ultimate outcome of the contest. Spain's war vessels quickly sought security in fortified ports and were 'bottled up', while the United States organized an army to take possession of Cuba a and Porto Rico. This war was of a short duration. In a few months the Spanish fleet in the Philippines was destroyed by Admiral Dewey and the Philippine archipelago seized by the United States and has since been an American possession. Not long afterwards, the Spanish fleet sought to escape from the harbor at Santiago, Cuba, after a land force had attacked the city and the American fleet under the temporary command of Commodore Schley during the absence of Admiral Sampson, pursued and destroyed or 783 captured the vessels, one by one, bringing the war on sea to a conclusion. The Kentucky troops, including the Hopkinsville Company, were sent, some of them to Cuba and others to Porto Rico, which was occupied without resistance and is still an American territory. In the Philippines, the natives indulged the hope that they would be freed of Spanish rule and left to themselves, but Spain had no way to pay the war indemnity except with provinces and ceded the Philippines and Porto Rico when peace was concluded. Resistance developed among the native of the Philippines, and it was necessary to send an army of occupation to suppress the revolt and restore order. This gave an opportunity for service in the Orient by a considerable number of Christian County soldiers. ""Latham Light Guards" Company D, Third Kentucky Regiment In the Spanish-American War there were four classes of service men, those in the navy, those in the Cuban campaign, those in Porto Rican invasion and those in the Philippine conquest. The county was well represented in all of these contingents. The Hopkinsville Company had become Company D, Third Kentucky Regiment, known as the Latham Light Guards. It was notified to be in readiness to move and the war fever was high. The company included in its ranks many sons of both Federals and Confederates and one Federal soldier, Gus Breathitt, volunteered and was admitted. On April 29th, a vast crowd assembled on the campus of the Clay Street School for the presentation of a flag by the children. Sadie Cohen, a little girl, presented the flag and read an original poem. 784 The soldiers responded with their company hell. On May 10th, moving orders came and the Company left for Lexington with the following roster: • • • • • • • • • • • • • John Feland - Captain E.B. Bassett - Lieutenant R. C. Payne - First Lieutenant George W. Phelps - First Sergeant C.O. Prose - Second Sergeant Harry Anderson - Third Sergeant Gano Bullard - Fourth Sergeant Leslie Waller - Fifth Sergeant R.C. West - Commissary Sergeant Jesup Tandy - First Corporal William Wiley - Second Corporal W.H. Hester - Third Corporal J.M. Coleman - Fourth Corporal PRIVATES Trabue Anderson A.B. Boulware L.D. Brown C.O. Brown E.H. Brown M.K. Bullard J.M. Breathitt Gus Breathitt Weber Breathitt R.H. Buckner J.W. Ballard J.E. Buchanan C.E. Barnes C.A. Brumfield R.H. Claggett J.B. Clark J. Miller Clark W.J. Couch, Jr. W.J. Cornelius Ed Claxton Will Collins J.G. Daniel J.R. Dickerson Henry Foster Will Foster W. N. Gaither F.W. Gilbert C.E.Graves A.M. Hedges W.T. Hardwick Will Hayes E.H. Hester Henry Holeman C.W. Johnson C.E. Jackson W.H. Jenkins Stanley Long J.G. McRae R.F. McDaniel Edgar Morris Henry Merritt E.P. Morgan George Mills William Mills A.E. Mills Robert Morefield R.H. Nixon Perry Newman T.E. Overshiner Frank O. Prowse E.R. Powers F.J. Pattin Felix Robinson S.O. Rutherford 785 E.W. Starling G. Dennis Shaw Everett Tandy Jack Terry Gano Terry H.P. Thomas Hugh Thompson T.C. Van Cleve Otho Vaughan William r. Wicks Louis Waller C.S. Waller John Winfree W.P. Winfree Jr. Henry Wood Edgar Wilkes Robert Wilkes W.B. Witty Tom Witty J.A. Young, Elon B. Jr., Zimmer James Garity On May 10, 1898, Company D., with a roster of eighty-nine officers and men, was ordered to Lexington, Kentucky. Of these, eighty-two reported under command of Captain John Feland. Eleven of them failed to pass the required examination. Captain John Feland was not accepted as Captain and the company was merged with one commanded by Captain Noel Gaines. Second Lieutenant R. C. Payne undertook to recruit the company to eighty-two men, and in the end less than onethird were local men. The names of those finally mustered in from Christian County were: o o o o o o Robert C. Payne - Second Lieutenant Hiram P. Thomas - First Sergeant J.H. Wick - Second Sergeant E.P. Zimmer - Sergeant E.W. Starling - Sergeant M.J. Coleman - Sergeant C.E. Jackson Corporal F.J. PattinCorporal Gus Breathitt Corporal J.E. Buchanan Corporal Felix Robinson Corporal W.P. Winfree, Jr. _ Musician James Wootton Wagoner James M. Breathitt E.H. Brown R.H. Bush C.A. Brumfield W.M. Cornelius Walter Couch Harry L. Girard Robert F. William C. E.P. Morgan McDaniel Mills Otho Vaughn William B. Witty C.S. Waller Mayfield Hugh G. Thompson Cadiz F.O. Prowse Thomas J. Williams Trenton Black Troops In War of 1898 786 The following named black men were enlisted in august, 1898, for Tenth U.S. Cavalry, stationed at Santiago, Cuba: Will Major William Richardson Edward Ducker Clarence O'Neal John T. Thompson Richard Hardin Alex Sivells Matt Campbell Edward Wallace Luther Drake Albert Dade Saint Leavell George McReynolds James Ricketts Alphonso Alexander George Dabney John Norman Forrest Hampton Frank Mayes, Will Haughton Jr. Gardner Coleman They were sent to Fort McPherson, Georgia, in charge of Clarence O'Neal. The company of State Guards from Christian County became part of the Kentucky forces mobilized at Lexington and was later sent to Southern camps. A part of them eventually were sent to Cuba and some were in the expedition that seized the island of Porto Rico. Among those sent to Cuba was Lieutenant Robert C. Payne, who was at Matanzas April 4, 1899, and wrote to a Hopkinsville paper: "I have been commander of the Spanish fort, San Severino, for nine weeks, in fact, ever since my arrival in Cuba. Have charge of 86 prisoners. I am going to Manila if I can get with some other regiment when this one is mustered out." This happened a few months later and Lieutenant Payne returned home and was commissioned to recruit a company to go to Manila to take part in the occupation of the archipelago, the natives having put up armed opposition to the acquirement of the Philippines under the terms of peace with Spain. the following Hopkinsville men, most of whom re-enlisted, were recruited in Christian County: 787 o o o o o o Frank P. Cook J. Ed. Buchanan Jacob Myers Volney Seay John Keller John McDaniel These men were sent to McPherson, Georgia, for training August 12, 1899, where they were assigned to Company K, U.S. Volunteer Infantry. After being there several weeks they were sent to San Francisco and sailed on the City of Para four days later. They were twenty-eight days enroute, with a stop of two days at Honolulu. They landed at Manila, November 3, 1899, and were sent to Laloma Church on the island of Luzon the next day. Dr. Thornton W. Perkins, of Hopkinsville, was with them as company doctor. Other local men who were there with different detachments were: o o o o o o Byron Jones - Pembroke George H. Almy - Hopkinsville Lannes H. Huggins - Casky Sergeant Jesup S. Tandy Corporal Edgar Morris Corporal Ed L. Weathers Some of these, particularly Weathers and Huggins, had enlisted at Nashville and got over in a Tennessee outfit. These arrived earlier and some of them were mustered out and came home in December, 1899, about the time the men under Lieutenant Payne arrived. The last one to return was Frank P. Cook, who furnishes the following somewhat detailed account of his experiences of five years: "Soon after my arrival, I was detailed as a clerk in the office of General E. E. Otis and remained at his headquarters for fourteen months. I then received my military discharge and was given civil employment by the Government. I was sent to General J. Franklin Bell, of Lebanon, Kentucky, who detailed me as a clerk under P.C. Marsh, in charge of the main prison in Manila. I was made chief clerk and among the prisoners I had to deal with was General Aguinaldo, the native who led the insurrection. I remained there six or eight months until Governor-General W. H. Taft, afterwards President, came over. I was then transferred to the Chief Quartermaster's department in Manila and was money clerk at the time General J. P. Sanger took the first census of the islands. I was assistant paymaster for one year in the Chief Commissary office under General L. W. V. Kennon, engineer in charge of road construction, building a road to the summer capital in the mountains. While at this, I got a vacation of three months and went to China, visited Hong Kong, Canton, Amory, Hankow, Nagasaki and Vladivostock, Russia. I was on full pay and returning to Manila I was next with the department of coast 788 guard transportation, handling twenty vessels. While I was doing office work an incident occurred that left an impression on my mind. I got leave of absence and went to visit my company and found the boys getting ready to go on a hunt for General Cailles. I got a uniform and a gun and went along. We found Cailles fortified across the Mariquina River and opened fire. General Lawton was leading the charge and I was within fifty yards of him when he was killed by a sharpshooter. Lieut. Col. Sargent took command and we charged, backed by artillery firing over our heads and took the fort with the loss of seventy of our men killed and wounded. We found 252 dead Filipinos in the fort. General Cailles' army surrendered to General Sumner and I was present and received their guns, paying $15 apiece for them. After my services with the civil government as above stated, I returned home October 5, 1905, having been over there five years." SOME OF THOSE WHO FIRST WENT OVER Lannes H. Huggins, who went over in 1898, enlisted in May at Nashville, Tennessee, and went to San Francisco where there was a wait of five months. Ed L. Weathers, a sixteen-year-old boy, had succeeded ing etting into this regiment, although under weight, by the help of a friend, and during the long wait Weathers was promoed to corporal. Army food became very poor and very scarce under the contract system and finally the young corporal went to an officer above him and demanded food for his men. The officer laughed and told him where the food was stored. That night the boys broke in and helped themselves to one good meal. A commotion was made and the men were finally identified when Corp. Weathers went to the Captain and assumed responsibility for the raid. He was frowned upon and given a severe curtain lecture with a wink of the eye and left in suspense as to what else would be done. In a few days sailing orders came and the matter was dropped. These young men and their companions landed at Manila and spent three months doing guard duty, watching the prison containing 400 soldiers and 1600 natives. They were sent to Iloilo February 11, 1899, and bombarded the town, landing while it was in flames. They were on active duty later on Panay and Cebu islands, being sent wherever needed until the insurrection was over and the islands pacified. The bands who fled to the interior and gave trouble for a year or two more were finally brought under control. Jesup S. Tandy did not return with his companions in 1899, but like Frank P. Cook, remained in the Philippines after the fighting was over. Only one of the young men from Christian County failed to return. John McDaniel died of disease while in the service and his body was brought home and interred in Riverside Cemetery in Hopkinsville. THE NEW COMPANY D 789 The original Company D, organized in 1882, lost its identity in the war of 1898 and in October 1899, a new Company D, Third Infantry, Kentucky State Guards, was organized with forty-five men and mustered into service with the following commissioned and non-commissioned officers: o o o o o o o o o o o o C.H. Tandy, - Captain Gano Bullard - First Lieutenant Hiram P. Thomas - Second Lieutenant George W. Phelps - First Sergeant Perry Newman - Second Sergeant Robert D. Bellamy - Third Sergeant S. Upshaw Wooldridge - Fourth Sergeant Otho Vaughan - Fifth Sergeant M.A. Littlefield - Commissary Sergeant C.R. Brumfield - First Corporal Trabue Anderson - Second Corporal William Collins - Third Corporal The Company maintained its organization without interruption for eighteen years, with a personnel that changed from time to time. It saw active service for a year or more during the "Night Rider" troubles of 1907 and 1908 during which State Guards were used to maintain order in the western counties of the State. Its organization was continued, its equipment improved and its efficiency increased following this service and in 1916 it again was called into the national service and was sent to the Mexican border for several months. The World War was then raging fiercely in Europe and the following year the United States was drawn into it and the part of Company D took in that greatest of all wears belongs to the history of that struggle. Return to the Christian County KY Home Page 790 The Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912, by James H. Blount This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 Author: James H. Blount Release Date: June 28, 2011 [EBook #36542] Language: English Character set encoding: ASCII *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES *** Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia Center, Michigan State University Libraries.) 791 [Contents] The capture of Aguinaldo, March 22, 1901. The central fact of the American military occupation. [Contents] 792 The American Occupation of the Philippines 793 1898–1912 By James H. Blount Officer of United States Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899–1901 United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901–1905 With a Map G. P. Putnam’s Sons New York and London The Knickerbocker Press 1912 [Contents] COPYRIGHT, 1912 By James H. Blount The Knickerbocker Press, New York [Contents] To JOHN DOWNEY WORKS OF CALIFORNIA AS FINE A TYPE OF CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN AS EVER GRACED A SEAT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 794 WHO BELIEVING, WITH THE WRITER, AS TO THE PHILIPPINES, THAT INDEFINITE RETENTION WITH UNDECLARED INTENTION IS INDEFINITE DRIFTING HAS READ THE MANUSCRIPT OF THIS WORK AS IT PROGRESSED LENDING TO ITS PREPARATION THE AID AND COUNSEL OF AN OLDER AND A WISER MAN AND THE CONTAGIOUS SERENITY OF CONFIDENCE THAT RIGHT WILL PREVAIL THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED BY THE AUTHOR[v] [Contents] Preface Pardon, gentles all, The flat unraised spirit that hath dared On this unworthy scaffold to bring forth So great an object. Henry V. To have gone out to the other side of the world with an army of invasion, and had a part, however small, in the subjugation of a strange people, and then to see a new government set up, and, as an official of that government, watch it work out through a number of years, is an unusual and interesting experience, especially to a lawyer. What seem to me the most valuable things I learned in the course of that experience are herein submitted to my fellow-countrymen, in connection with a narrative covering the whole of the American occupation of the Philippines to date. 795 This book is an attempt, by one whose intimate acquaintance with two remotely separated peoples will be denied in no quarter, to interpret each to the other. How intelligent that acquaintance is, is of course altogether another matter, which the reader will determine for himself. The task here undertaken is to make audible to a great free nation the voice of a weaker subject people who passionately and rightly long to be also free, but whose longings have been systematically denied for the last fourteen years, sometimes ignorantly, sometimes viciously, and always cruelly, on the wholly erroneous [vi]idea that where the end is benevolent, it justifies the means, regardless of the means necessary to the end. At a time when all our military and fiscal experts agree that having the Philippines on our hands is a grave strategic and economic mistake, fraught with peril to the nation’s prestige in the early stages of our next great war, we are keeping the Filipinos in industrial bondage through unrighteous Congressional legislation for which special interests in America are responsible, in bald repudiation of the Open Door policy, and against their helpless but universal protest, a wholly unprotected and easy prey to the first first-class Power with which we become involved in war. Yet all the while the very highest considerations of national honor require us to choose between making the Filipino people free and independent without unnecessary delay, as they of right ought to be, or else imperilling the perpetuity of our own institutions by the creation and maintenance of a great standing army, sufficient properly to guard overseas possessions. A cheerful blindness to the inevitable worthy of Mark Tapley himself, the stale Micawberism that “something is bound to turn up,” and a Mrs. Jellyby philanthropy hopelessly callous to domestic duties, expenses, and distresses, have hitherto successfully united to prevent the one simple and supreme need of the situation—a frank, formal, and definite declaration, by the law-making power of the government, of the nation’s purpose in the premises. What is needed is a formal legislative announcement that the governing of a remote and alien people is to 796 have no permanent place in the purposes of our national life, and that we do bona fide intend, just as soon as a stable government, republican in form, can be established by the people of the Philippine Islands, to turn over, upon terms which [vii]shall be reasonable and just, the government and control of the islands to the people thereof. The essentials of the problem, being at least as immutable as human nature and geography, will not change much with time. And whenever the American people are ready to abandon the strange gods whose guidance has necessitated a new definition of Liberty consistent with taxation without representation and unanimous protest by the governed, they will at once set about to secure to a people who have proven themselves brave and self-sacrificing in war, and gentle, generous, and tractable in peace, the right to pursue happiness in their own way, in lieu of somebody else’s way, as the spirit of our Constitution, and the teachings of our God, Who is also theirs, alike demand. After seven years spent at the storm-centre of so-called “Expansion,” the first of the seven as a volunteer officer in Cuba during and after the Spanish War, the next two in a like capacity in the Philippines, and the remainder as a United States judge in the last-named country, the writer was finally invalided home in 1905, sustained in spirit, at parting, by cordial farewells, oral and written, personal and official, but convinced that foreign kindness will not cure the desire of a people, once awakened, for what used to be known as Freedom before we freed Cuba and then subjugated the Philippines; and that to permanently eradicate sedition from the Philippine Islands, the American courts there must be given jurisdiction over thought as well as over overt act, and must learn the method of drawing an indictment against a whole people. Seven other years of interested observation from the Western Hemisphere end of the line have confirmed and fortified the convictions above set forth. 797 If we give the Filipinos this independence they so [viii]ardently desire and ever clamor for until made to shut up, “the holy cause,” as their brilliant young representative in the American House of Representatives, Mr. Quezon, always calls it, will not be at once spoiled, as the American hemp and other special interests so contemptuously insist, by the gentleman named, and his compatriot, Señor Osmeña, the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, and the rest of the leaders of the patriot cause, in a general mutual throat-cutting incidental to a scramble for the offices. This sort of contention is merely the hiss of the same old serpent of tyranny which has always beset the pathway of man’s struggle for free institutions. When first the talk in America, after the battle of Manila Bay, about keeping the Philippines, reached the islands, one of the Filipino leaders wrote to another during the negotiations between their commanding general and our own looking to preservation of the peace until the results of the Paris Peace Conference which settled the fate of the islands should be known, in effect, thus: “The Filipinos will not be fit for independence in ten, twenty, or a hundred years if it be left to American colonial office-holders drawing good salaries to determine the question.” Is there not some human nature in that remark? Suppose, reader, you were in the enjoyment of a salary of five, ten, or twenty thousand dollars a year as a government official in the Philippines, how precipitately would you hasten to recommend yourself out of office, and evict yourself into this cold Western world with which you had meantime lost all touch? The Filipinos can run a far better government than the Cubans. In 1898, when Admiral Dewey read in the papers that we were going to give Cuba independence, he wired home from Manila:[ix] These people are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of selfgovernment than the people of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. After a year in Cuba and nearly six in the Philippines, two as an officer of the army that subjugated the Filipinos, and the remainder as a judge over them, I cordially concur in the opinion of Admiral Dewey, but 798 with this addition, viz., that the people of those islands, whatever of conscious political unity they may have lacked in 1898, were welded into absolute oneness as a people by their original struggle for independence against us, and will remain forever so welded by their incurable aspirations for a national life of their own under a republic framed in imitation of ours. Furthermore, the one great difference between Cuba and the Philippines is that the latter country has no race cancer forever menacing its peace, and sapping its self-reliance. The Philippine people are absolutely one people, as to race, color, and previous condition. Again, American sugar and tobacco interests will never permit the competitive Philippine sugar and tobacco industries to grow as Nature and Nature’s God intended; and the American importers of Manila hemp—which is to the Philippines what cotton is to the South—have, through special Congressional legislation still standing on our statute books—to the shame of the nation—so depressed the hemp industry of the islands that the market price it brings to-day is just one half what it brought ten years ago. If three strong and able Americans, familiar with insular conditions and still young enough to undertake the task, were told by a President of the United States, by authority of Congress, “Go out there and set up a [x]stable native government by July 4, 1921,1 and then come away,” they could and would do it; and that government would be a success; and one of the greatest moral victories in the annals of free government would have been written by the gentlemen concerned upon the pages of their country’s history. We ought to give the Filipinos their independence, even if we have to guarantee it to them. But, by neutralization treaties with the other great Powers similar to those which safeguard the integrity and independence of Switzerland to-day, whereby the other Powers would agree not to seize the islands after we give them their independence, the Philippines can be made as permanently neutral territory in Asiatic politics as Switzerland is to-day in European politics. JAMES H. BLOUNT. 799 1406 G Street, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4, 1912. P.S.—The preparation of this book has entailed examination of a vast mass of official documents, as will appear from the foot-note citations to the page and volume from which quotations have been made. The object has been to place all material statements of fact beyond question. For the purpose of this research work, Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, was kind enough to extend me the privileges of the national library, and it would be most ungracious to fail to acknowledge the obligation I am under, in this regard, to one whom the country is indeed fortunate [xi]in having at the head of that great institution. I should also make acknowledgment of the obligation I am under to Mr. W. W. Bishop, the able superintendent of the readingroom, for aid rendered whenever asked, and to my life-long friends, John and Hugh Morrison, the most valuable men, to the general public, except the two gentlemen above named, on the whole great roll of employees of the Library of Congress. J. H. B.[xiii] 1The date contemplated by the pending Philippine Independence Bill, introduced in the House of Representatives in March, 1912, by Hon. W. A. Jones, Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs. [Contents] Contents Pages Chapter I MR. PRATT’S SERENADE 1–15 800 Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at Singapore, in the British Straits Settlements, finding Aguinaldo a political refugee at that place at the outbreak of our war with Spain, April 21, 1898, arranges by cable with Admiral Dewey, then at Hong Kong with his squadron, for Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong and thence to Manila, to co-operate by land with Admiral Dewey against the Spaniards, Pratt promising Aguinaldo independence, without authority. Mr. Pratt is later quietly separated from the consular service. Chapter II DEWEY AND AGUINALDO 16–45 After the battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey brings Aguinaldo down from Hong Kong, whither he had proceeded from Singapore, lands him at Cavite, and chaperones his insurrection against the Spaniards until the American troops arrive, June 30th. Chapter III ANDERSON AND AGUINALDO 46–66 General Anderson’s official dealings with Aguinaldo from June 30, 1898, until General Merritt’s arrival, July 25th, Chapter IV MERRITT AND AGUINALDO 67–87 General Merritt’s five weeks’ sojourn in the Islands, from July 25, 1898, to the end of August, including fall of Manila, August 13th, and our relations with Aguinaldo during period indicated.[xiv] Chapter V 801 OTIS AND AGUINALDO 88–106 Dealings and relations between, September–December, 1898. Chapter VI THE WILCOX-SARGENT TRIP 107–120 Two American naval officers make an extended tour through the interior of Luzon by permission of Admiral Dewey and with Aguinaldo’s consent, in October– November, 1898, while the Paris peace negotiations were in progress. What they saw and learned. Chapter VII THE TREATY OF PARIS 121–138 An account of the negotiations, October-December, 1898. How we came to pay Spain $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 insurrection. Treaty signed December 10, 1898. Chapter VIII THE BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION PROCLAMATION 139–151 President McKinley’s celebrated proclamation of December 21, 1898, cabled out to the Islands, December 27, 1898, after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on the 10th, and intended as a fire-extinguisher, in fact acted merely as a firebrand, the Filipinos perceiving that Benevolent Assimilation meant such measure of slaughter as might be necessary to “spare them from the dangers of” the independence on which they were bent. Chapter IX 802 THE ILOILO FIASCO 152–163 By order of President McKinley, General Otis abstains from hostilities to await Senate action on Treaty of Paris. Chapter X OTIS AND AGUINALDO (Continued) 164–185 Still waiting for the Senate to act.[xv] Chapter XI OTIS AND THE WAR 186–223 Covering the period from the outbreak of February 4, 1899, until the fall of that year. Chapter XII OTIS AND THE WAR (Continued) 224–269 From the fall of 1899 to the spring of 1900. Chapter XIII MACARTHUR AND THE WAR 270–281 Carries the story up to the date of the arrival of the Taft Commission, sent out in the spring of 1900, to help General MacArthur run the war. Chapter XIV THE TAFT COMMISSION 282–344 803 Shows how the Taft Commission, born of the McKinley Benevolent Assimilation theory that there was no real fundamental opposition to American rule, lived up to that theory, in their telegrams sent home during the presidential campaign of 1900, and in 1901 set up a civil government predicated upon their obstinate but opportune delusions of the previous year. “The papers ’id it ’andsome But you bet the army knows.” Chapter XV GOVERNOR TAFT—1901–2 345–402 Shows the prematurity of a civil government set up under pressure of political expediency, and the disorders which followed. Chapter XVI GOVERNOR TAFT—1903 403–436 Shows divers serious insurrections in various provinces amounting to what the Commission itself termed, in one [xvi]instance, “a reign of terror”—situations so endangering the public safety that to fail to order out the army to quell the disturbances was neglect of plain duty, such neglect being due to a set policy of preserving the official fiction that peace prevailed, and that Benevolent Assimilation was a success. Chapter XVII GOVERNOR TAFT—1903 (Continued) 437–445 Shows the essentially despotic, though theoretically benevolent, character of the Taft civil government of the 804 Philippines, and its attitude toward the American business community in the Islands. Chapter XVIII GOVERNOR WRIGHT—1904 446–498 Shows the change of the tone of the government under Governor Taft’s successor, his consequent popularity with his fellow-country men in the Islands, and his corresponding unpopularity with the Filipinos. Shows also a long series of massacres of pacificos by enemies of the American government between July and November, 1904, permitted out of super-solicitude lest ordering out the army and summarily putting a stop to said massacres might affect the presidential election in the United States unfavorably to Mr. Roosevelt, by reviving the notion that neither the Roosevelt Administration nor its predecessor had ever been frank with the country concerning the state of public order in the Islands. Chapter XIX GOVERNOR WRIGHT—1905 499–514 Shows the prompt ordering of the army to the scene of the disturbances after the presidential election of 1904 was safely over, and the nature and extent of the insurrections of 1905. Chapter XX GOVERNOR IDE—1906 515–523 Describes the last outbreak prior to the final establishment of a state of general and complete peace.[xvii] Chapter XXI 805 GOVERNOR SMITH—1907–9 524–557 Describes divers matters, including a certificate made March 28, 1907, declaring that a state of general and complete peace had prevailed for the two years immediately the preceding. Describes also the formal opening of First Philippine Assembly by Secretary of War Taft in October, 1907, and his final announcement to them that he had no authority to end the uncertainty concerning their future which is the corner-stone of the Taft policy of Indefinite Tutelage, and that Congress only could end that uncertainty. Chapter XXII GOVERNOR FORBES—1909–12 558–570 Suggests the hypocrisy of boasting about “the good we are doing” the Filipinos when predatory special interests are all the while preying upon the Philippine people even more shamelessly than they do upon the American people, and by the same methods, viz.: legislation placed or kept on the statute-books of the United States for their special benefit, the difference being that the American people can help themselves if they will, but the Philippine people cannot. Chapter XXIII “NON-CHRISTIAN” WORCESTER 571–586 Professor Worcester, the P. T. Barnum of the “nonChristian tribe” industry, and his menagerie of certain rare and interesting wild tribes still extant in the Islands, specimens of which you saw at the St. Louis Exposition of 1903–4; by which device the American people have been led to believe the Igorrotes, Negritos, etc., to be samples of the Filipino people. Chapter XXIV 806 THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL SERVICE 587–594 Showing how imperatively simple justice demands that Americans, who go out to enter the Philippine Civil Service should, after a tour of duty out there, be entitled, [xviii]as matter of right, to be transferred back to the Civil Service in the United States, instead of being left wholly dependent on political influence to “place” them after their final return home. Chapter XXV COST OF THE PHILIPPINES 595–603 In life, and money, together with certain consolatory reflections thereon. Chapter XXVI CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 604–622 Showing how a small group of American importers of Manila hemp—hemp being to the Philippines what cotton is to the South—have so manipulated the Philippine hemp industry as to depress the market price of the main source of wealth of the Islands below the cost of production; also other evils of taxation without representation. Chapter XXVII THE RIGHTS OF MAN 623–632 Industrial slavery to predatory interests and physical slavery compared. Chapter XXVIII THE ROAD TO AUTONOMY 633–646 807 Shows how entirely easy would be the task of evolving the American Ireland we have laid up for ourselves in the Philippines into complete Home Rule by 1921, the date proposed for Philippine independence in the pending Jones bill, introduced in the House of Representatives in March, 1912. Chapter XXIX THE WAY OUT 647–655 Shows how, by neutralization treaties with the other powers, as proposed in many different resolutions, of both [xix]Republican and Democratic origin, now pending in Congress, whereby the other powers should agree not to annex the Islands after we give them their independence, the Philippines can be made permanently neutral territory in Asiatic politics exactly as both Switzerland and Belgium have been for nearly a hundred years in European politics. INDEX 657[xxi] [Contents] Illustrations Page THE CAPTURE OF AGUINALDO, MARCH 23, 1901—THE CENTRAL FACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY OCCUPATION Frontispiece 808 From the Drawing by F. C. Yohn Copyright by Charles Scribner’s Sons BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, SHOWING PREPONDERATING IMPORTANCE OF LUZON 228 OUTLINE SKETCH OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS IN LUZON, 1899 232 SKETCH MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES At End[1] [Contents] 809 810 811 Colophon Availability 812 This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. This eBook is produced by the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at www.pgdp.net. James Henderson Blount (1869–1918) was a US judge who went in to the Philippines as a volunteer shortly after the US took over this colony from Spain. After his experiences, he became critical of the US policy in the Philippines, and urged for an early independence of the country. The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1912 (first published in 1912) is a critical work on the American rule in the Philippines. This work is much criticized by Dean Worchester in his book, The Philippines, Past and Present (1914), also present in Project Gutenberg. The latter was only returning the favor, as Dean Worcester receives in this work a full chapter of harsh criticism. This book is prepared from scans of the first edition, available at the Internet Archive: 1, 2, 3. However, the illustrations, including the scan of the title page have been taken from scans of the second edition from 1913: 1. Encoding Revision History • 2011-06-10 Started. External References This Project Gutenberg eBook contains external references. These links may not work for you. Corrections 813 The following corrections have been applied to the text: Page Source 9 d’ état 55 infering 59 recognise 63 similiar 97 insistance 104 broad-guaged 112 she 229 substanially 246 pt. 267 jursidiction 295, 343,610, 658 [Not in source] 334 quitely 339 , 340, 481 Malacanan 394 insurgent 414 become 426 [Not in source] 488 presidental 495 analagous 521 wholely 530 insursurrection 551 in dependence 583 civilised 596 Filipino 604 225 615 That 621 Sante 629 probaby 657, 661,661, 661,661 ; 658, 658,658, 659,662, 664 [Not in source] Correction d’état inferring recognize similar insistence broad-gauged the substantially pp. jurisdiction . quietly [Deleted] Malacañan insurgents becoming ] presidential analogous wholly insurrection independence civilized Filipinos 2.25 that Santa probably , , 814 End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912, by James H. 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Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: http://www.gutenberg.net This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/36542/36542-h/36542-h.htm 825 The Maria Clara Terno, formal Pilipina dress of the time…. 826 A typical town activities during those times… Philippines Late 1800’s http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9VUBAgXlbqo . 827 A Nipa Hut in the middle of the farm in a rural setting…. 828 The Calesa, a horse drawn carriage is what moves people around…. 829 Typical scenery still can be seen in the vintage cities of Vigan and Laog in Ilocos, where much of the old communities were restored to its old grandeur and relived everyday. Camp John Hay Baguio City 1910 830 Philippine Normal College 1900 831 Paco Station Luneta Promenade 1900 Legislative Building Panorama 1945 832 Gabaldon School Building 1900 833 De Dions on Kennon Road http://www.americanassociationphilippines.org/amer_histcoll_main.htm 834 Notes 835 Published: May 1, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 1, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 1, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 1, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 1, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 7, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 11, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 11, 1899 Copyright © The 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25, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 25, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 25, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 24, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 25, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 26, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 28, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 29, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 29, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 28, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 28, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 30, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 30, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 30, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 3, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 5, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 5, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 5, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 4, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 5, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 7, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 8, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 7, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 8, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 8, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 10, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 10, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 10, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 10, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 16, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 17, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 19, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 19, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 3, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 26, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 2, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 5, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 6, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 8, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times Published: May 9, 1899 Copyright © The New York Times The Philippine-American War PREVIEW COPY INCLUDING THE COMPLETE FIRST LESSON Prepared for: America’s History in the Making Oregon Public Broadcasting This lesson may not be resold or redistributed. Organization of American Historians and the National Center for History in the Schoo ls, UCLA Schools, Series: Conflicts and Foreign Policy INTRODUCTION APPROACH AND RATIONALE T he National Center for History in the Schools at UCLA (NCHS) and the Organization of American Historians (OAH) have developed the following lessons for teaching with primary sources. This unit, like others copublished by NCHS and OAH, is the fruit of a collaboration between an academic historian and an experienced teacher of United States history. These units represent specific “dramatic episodes” in history at which you and your students can pause to delve into the deeper meanings of these selected landmark events and explore their wider context in the greater historical narrative. By studying a crucial turning point in history, the student becomes aware that choices had to be made by real human beings, that those decisions were the result of specific factors, and that they set in motion a series of historical consequences. We have selected dramatic episodes that bring alive this decision-making process. We hope that through this approach, your students will realize that history is an ongoing, open-ended process, and that the decisions they make today create the conditions for tomorrow’s history. Our teaching units are based on primary sources, taken from government documents, artifacts, magazines, newspapers, films, and literature contemporary to the period under study. What we hope you achieve by using primary source documents in these lessons is to have your students connect more intimately with the past. In this way, we hope to recreate for your students a sense of “being there,” a sense of seeing history through the eyes of the very people who were making decisions. This will help your students develop historical empathy, to realize that history is not an impersonal process divorced from real people like themselves. At the same time, by analyzing primary sources, students will actually practice the historian’s craft, discovering for themselves how to analyze evidence, establish a valid interpretation, and construct a coherent narrative in which all the relevant factors play a part. CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION W ithin this unit, you will find: 1) Unit Objectives, 2) Correlation to the National History Standards, 3) Teacher’s Background Materials, 4) Lesson Plans, and 5) Student Resources. This unit, as we have said above, focuses on certain key moments in time and should be used to supplement your customary course materials. Although these lessons are recommended for grades 7–12, they can be adapted for other grade levels. The teacher’s background section should provide you with a good overview of the entire unit and with the historical information and context necessary to link the specific “dramatic moment” to the larger historical narrative. You may consult it for your use, and you may choose to share it with students if they are of sufficient grade level. The lesson plans include a variety of ideas and approaches for the teacher which can be elaborated upon or cut as you see the need. These lesson plans contain student resources which accompany each lesson. The resources consist of primary sources of the lessons offered on any given topic, or you can select and adapt the ones that best support your particular The Philippine-American War 1 Introduction course needs. We have not attempted to be comprehensive or prescriptive in our offerings but rather give you an array of enticing possibilities for in-depth study, at varying grade levels. We hope that you will find the lesson plans exciting and stimulating for your classes. We also hope that your students will never again see history as a boring sweep of inevitable facts and meaningless dates, but rather as an endless treasure of real-life stories, and an exercise in analysis and reconstruction. Philippine Islands Caloocan Manila LUZON Man Manila Bay ila Cavi te Batangas VISAYAN Islands CEBU PALAWAN MINDANAO Sulu Archipelago 2 The Philippine-American War TEACHER BACKGROUND MATERIALS I. UNIT OVERVIEW T he sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor in April, 1898, caused outrage in the United States and precipitated the war between the United States and Spain. This armed conflict lasted only four months and resulted in few American casualties from military engagements. This brief, “splendid little war,” as diplomat John Hay called it, ended with a peace treaty that transferred the Spanish overseas empire in the Caribbean and in the Pacific to the United States. Cuba received independence but was forced to agree to accept America’s rights to intervene in its affairs. The United States government quietly annexed Puerto Rico and Guam. However, in the Philippine Islands, a bloody conflict broke out between Filipino forces battling for independence and American troops sent there to quell what they and many other American citizens viewed as a rebellion. This war lasted far longer than the Spanish-American conflict and resulted in many more deaths. Most secondary school textbooks devote considerable space to the four-month war between Spain and the United States. Few such books, however, focus on the long and brutal conflict that followed in the Philippines. The Philippine-American War deserves the attention of both students and teachers for several reasons. First, it was a longer and more costly conflict than the previous war with Spain. Second, the Philippine-American War illustrates the conflicting views that Americans had about their goals in foreign policy, including questions of strategic national interest and the role and place of American cultural values abroad. It elicited a thorough debate on the merits of the policies of the United States. Third, depending on one’s perspective, the war forecasts or does not forecast many of the problems that the United States faced in the later military entanglements in Korea and Vietnam. Fourth, this conflict marks the beginning of a long-term commitment to an American presence in Asia and global involvement outside the Western Hemisphere. Fifth, the resulting occupation has had profound effects on the Filipino government and society. This unit will examine the causes of the conflict between the American government and the Filipino independence fighters, the arguments for and against annexation of the Philippines, and the nature and impact of the resulting military conflict. II. UNIT CONTEXT T he Philippine-American War should be taught as part of a larger unit on United States imperialism in the period from 1890 to 1914. In a typical United States history course, the activities in this unit would be preceded by study of American industrialization in the nineteenth century, the politics of the Gilded Age, the causes of American expansionism, and the events of the Spanish-American War. The unit should prepare students for examination of American foreign policy during the Progressive Era and World War One. The Philippine-American War 3 Teacher Background Materials III. CORRELATION WITH THE NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR UNITED STATES HISTORY T he Philippine-American War addresses elements of the National Standards for United States History, Basic Edition (Los Angeles: National Center for History in the Schools, 1996), Era 6: “The Development of the Industrial United States (1870–1900).” The unit lessons address objective 4B: “The students understand the roots and development of American expansionism and the causes and outcomes of the Spanish-American War.” IV. V. UNIT OBJECTIVES
Students will explain the causes of American imperialist policies and values in the 1890s.
Students will identify key events that led to armed conflict between Filipino and American military units.
Students will evaluate the arguments for and against U.S. annexation and subjugation of the Philippine Islands and their people.
Students will examine the nature of the military conflict between Filipinos and Americans and analyze the consequences and impact of the war. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902 Teddy Roosevelt, the Rough Riders, and the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine are but a few of the images people have about the United States’ 123-day war with Spain, in 1898. What they may not remember is that this was the war that launched the United States as a world power. Victorious over Imperial Spain in both Cuba and the Philippines in the span of months, the United States became the “New Spain” by taking over Spanish territorial holdings in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and in Asia. At the same time that the U.S. acquired overseas possessions in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, it began a century-long debate over its newly assumed role as empire builder. The Spanish-American War may have catalyzed the debate, but the ensuing Philippine-American War—a long, bloody, and costly affair—truly crystallized the argument over America’s new international role. Pro-imperialist arguments held sway until the high costs of war triggered an anti-imperialist backlash, caused an agonizing reappraisal of the assumed benefits of empire-building, and contributed to a long-term amnesia regarding America’s first overseas imperial war. Nineteenth-Century Background The American people’s belief that they had a sacred obligation to spread their institutions and way of life (“manifest destiny”) shaped the westward expansion in the 1840s into Texas and the Southwest, Utah and the Great Basin, and California, Oregon, and the Pacific Northwest. The process of empire building resumed soon after the Civil War. In 1867, Secretary of State William 4 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials Seward acquired Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million, and, in the early 1870s, the United States debated the annexation of the island of Santo Domingo in the Caribbean. Although the Senate refused to ratify the Santo Domingo treaty, American activity overseas continued with economic interventions in Latin America and with growing interest in gaining islands in the Pacific and a share of the Asian market. Washington negotiated a treaty in 1878 to gain a naval station in Samoa. In July 1898, Congress approved the annexation of Hawaii; and in 1899 Secretary of State John Hay issued his first Open Door note to lay claim to trading rights in China equal to those already enjoyed by other European occupying powers. 1898: America’s War with Spain and the Race for Empire No step in American empire-building was as significant as Washington’s war with Spain in 1898 and the resulting global territorial expansion involving Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, and the islands of the Philippines archipelago. America’s war with Spain exploded within a larger wave of European and Japanese global expansion, sometimes called the “new imperialism.” What became a rush for territorial acquisition sprang from many different motivations, ranging from economic, missionary, and moral imperatives to a policy of Gun crew, USS Maine pure “realpolitik”—a raw, competitive (BB-2/c) 1897 drive for national power and prestige. Courtesy of the Hampton Roads Naval Museum The assumption that white, AngloSaxon, western nations were superior to the “inferior” peoples of the world and therefore had the right to spread their principles, institutions, and religion around the globe was inherent in the missionary rhetoric of European and American imperialism. Many considered this a God-given responsibility (and “burden”) to advance the progress of the world. For the United States, this Great Power race for empire coincided with Spanish mismanagement of colonial Cuba, an island only 90 miles from the U.S. shores. News reports of Spanish atrocities created American sympathy for the Cubans. When the Cuban insurrection escalated in early 1898, President William McKinley sent the battleship U.S.S. Maine into Havana Harbor, ostensibly to protect U.S. citizens. In an atmosphere of heightened tension, the Maine mysteriously blew up, and American newspapers fanned the angry reaction at home, accusing Spain of treachery. Domestic pressure, therefore, contributed to McKinley’s declaration of war on Spain in April. American victory after only four months left the United States in control of the former Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and Guam and the Philippines in the Pacific. The Philippine-American War 5 Teacher Background Materials Groups of Filipinos in the Market at Cavite In José de Olivares, Our Islands and Their People as Seen with Camera and Pencil (St. Louis: N. D. Thompson, 1899). Available: http://xirs.library.wisc.edu/etext/seait/index.html 1898: The Filipino Independence Movement at a Crossroads The year 1898 was a major turning point in Philippines history. From the time of the first settlers, dating back to land bridge crossings during the late glacial period, until the Spanish arrived in the early 1500s, separate and interconnected Filipino communities, ruled over by chieftains, developed across the islands. The Spanish period began when Ferdinand Magellan landed on Cebu on 16 March 1521 and claimed the archipelago for Spain. In 1542 the islandchain was named Islas Filipinas in honor of Prince Felipe (later Philip II) of Spain. The first permanent Spanish settlement was a fort and church on Cebu in 1565. While over a thousand islands were inhabited, the capital of Manila increasingly dominated culture and commerce in the course of the next 350 years. Sugar, hemp, and tobacco left Manila Harbor to the markets of China and beyond. Unlike Cuba, however, whose sugar industry generated tremendous wealth for Spain, the Philippines sugar economy yielded little profit. Meanwhile, the Filipino population itself remained mostly rural. Few islanders benefited from the Spanish shipping trade. Filipino men built the ships and served as sailors, but the pay was poor. For those outside of the galleon trade, their economic and social circumstances were even worse. In addition, Spanish missionaries forced the Filipinos to convert to Catholicism and collected taxes on their best land. Filipinos who challenged their oppressive conditions typically ended up in jail or faced execution. Finally, in the late 19th century, a new group of Filipino activists began to emerge following an 1872 incident. Filipino workers and troops at the Cavite arsenal mutinied against the Spanish for better pay and work conditions. While the uprising was quickly squelched, three local priests who sought equality with Spanish priests were arrested and then executed near Manila Bay. They became the first modern martyrs in the Filipino movement for national independence. The independence struggle blossomed around a group of Filipino doctors, lawyers, and other professionals educated in Europe and the United States. These Western-trained leaders were called “ilustrados”—the enlightened ones. 6 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials The Filipino Revolution, therefore, began in 1896 when, under the flag of the Katipunan, or “Society of the Sons of the People,” some 20,000 Filipinos staged an uprising against their Spanish overlords. Twenty-seven-year-old Emilio Aguinaldo, the son of a wealthy aristocrat, rose quickly to the top of the revolutionary movement, and became president of the Katipunan in the spring of 1897. “Filipino citizens!” he declared. “Let us follow the example of European and American nations. Let us march under the Flag of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity!” With 200,000 Spanish troops tied down in Cuba, Madrid could ill afford a war in the Philippines. Spanish authorities offered Aguinaldo a declaration of peace in exchange for his promise to move the revolutionary leadership to Hong Kong. The Spanish sweetened the peace overture Emilio Aguinaldo with an undisclosed amount of cash and a commitment to Courtesy Dover Publications grant certain reforms to the Filipinos. Though Aguinaldo did Dictionary of American Portraits, 1967 not believe the Spanish would deliver on their guarantees of political, land, and economic reforms, he desperately needed the money for food and supplies. Aguinaldo thus agreed to resettle in Hong Kong, where he could then buy guns to smuggle back to freedom fighters in the Philippines. 1898–1902: The Collision of Cultures—U.S. Empire Building and the Filipino Drive for Independence The Spanish-American battle over Cuba in 1898 soon entangled Washington and Madrid in the Philippine Revolution and the larger struggle over Spain’s colonial possessions in East Asia. The U.S. contest for the Philippine Islands, in particular, turned on the actions of McKinley’s Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt ordered Commodore George Dewey to move the American fleet from Hong Kong to Manila to keep the Spanish navy from leaving the Philippines for Cuba. Whether Roosevelt’s order was accidental, instinctive, or prescient, it enabled subsequent military steps to be that much more effective. Therefore, following President McKinley’s April 22 order to blockade Havana, Cuba, Spain’s decAssistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt laration of war response on the U.S. in Cuba, and Naval Surface Warfare Center Division Congress’s own war declaration against Spain, the Available: <http://www.ih.navy.mil/images/asntr.jpg> American Navy was prepared to act half a world away in the Philippines. The Philippine-American War 7 Teacher Background Materials Battle of Manila Harbor, 1898 Copy of lithograph (Butler, Thomas & Co.) Marine Corps, National Archives 127-N-302104 The Americans easily won a showdown against the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor on May 1, 1898. On that date, Commodore George Dewey directed an American fleet into the Harbor, where he faced the Spanish naval presence. Just after midnight, Dewey’s nine modernized ships made five devastating passes at the Spanish fleet. Twelve hours later, the Spanish surrendered their naval base in Manila, as ten of their ships lay ruined. Only one U.S. sailor was killed. That American forces could rout a European power thousands of miles from home made Dewey’s victory all the more compelling. Overnight, Dewey became the most famous man in the United States. Filipino nationalists were ecstatic. Led by General Aguinaldo, and, following years of fighting for independence, they hoped for the honor of liberating Manila and declaring the birth of their sovereign nation. Meanwhile, Dewey—now promoted to rear admiral—waited in Manila for the U.S. Army to arrive. Intent on securing support from Filipino fighters, he sent a ship to Hong Kong to retrieve Aguinaldo. Dewey welcomed the revolutionary leader as a co-equal. By the time of his arrival back in Manila, Aguinaldo had developed the idea that while the Filipinos desired immediate and complete independence, they also needed the protection of the United States because of threats posed by the German, French, and British navies in the South Pacific. Later, Aguinaldo wrote in his memoirs that Dewey promised to support the revolution. He recorded Dewey saying, “My word is stronger than the most strongly written statement there is.” Unfortunately for him, and for the chroniclers of history, the rear admiral provided no such written promise. 8 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials Aguinaldo now returned to his family’s mansion in Kawite [Cavite], just southwest of Manila, to plot a strategy to defeat a Spanish force that found itself bottled up inside the walled-in district of Intramuros. As Aguinaldo announced, Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach. The Americans have extended their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have severed relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny that nation is exercising in Cuba. The American fleet will prevent any reinforcements coming from Spain. There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers. Philippine Insurgent Troops in the Suburbs of Manila Francis Davis Millet, The Expedition to the Philippines (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1899),161. Available: Library of Congress, The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898> Independence fighters attacked the Spanish position for nearly two months, and had cut off water and food supplies, when Aguinaldo sought his enemy’s surrender of Manila. The Spaniards balked, however, out of pride and out of fear that they would face murder and humiliation. Hoping for the additional leverage of American naval firepower to force a Spanish surrender to the Filipinos, Aguinaldo was disappointed. Instead of backing the Filipino assault on the Spaniards, Dewey directed newly arriving U.S. soldiers to occupy positions along the outskirts of Manila, adjacent to the revolutionary army. Facing the prospect of defeat to a Great Power or to an upstart Filipino military, the Spanish proposed surrender terms to the United States that involved a mock battle for Manila, and the exclusion of Filipino insurgents. A staged battle would cause harm to few soldiers while enabling the Spanish to maintain a higher sense of national honor. After agreeing with the Americans to such conditions, the Spaniards raised the white flag to the U.S. “conquerors.” American military units obliged by charging the city as the Filipinos watched helplessly. On The Philippine-American War 9 Teacher Background Materials August 14 in the church of San Augustine, the Spanish formally yielded control of Manila to the Americans. Blocked from entering the city, Aguinaldo and his followers rendezvoused in a monastery north of Manila to establish a sovereign government, independent of the United States. It was there that Aguinaldo wrote, “The people struggle for their independence, absolutely convinced that the time has come when they can and should govern themselves.” While Aguinaldo wrestled with the fate of the movement he led, United States-Spanish peace talks began in Paris on October 1, 1898. No Filipinos or Cubans attended the deliberations, nor were any invited. McKinley clearly wanted Cuba from the Spanish, but he was not yet sure about the Philippines. Ultimately, he decided that he needed the port of Manila in the Philippines in order to have a naval base in the Western Pacific. After considerable debate and reflection, McKinley also recommended annexing the Philippines rather than giving the Filipinos outright independence. Undeterred by American actions in Paris and the White House, as well as the upcoming treaty debate in the United States Senate, the Filipinos approved a constitution in January 1899 based on the republican representative principles embodied in the United States Constitution. The Honorable John Hay, Secretary of State Handing to Jules Cambon, the French ambassador, the $20,000 due to Spain under the Treaty of Peace. At the State Department, May 1, 1899. Harper’s Pictorial History of the War with Spain (New York: Harper and bros, 1899), 434. Available: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/hay.html> The 1898 election kept the Republicans in control of Congress. Five days later, President McKinley’s cabled his terms to U.S. treaty negotiators in Paris. Secretary of State John Hay then sent a follow up wire to the representatives: “Insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines. If necessary, pay to Spain twenty million dollars.” Spain accepted the amended terms and relinquished the Philippines, Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico. The 400-year-old, global Spanish Empire had now vanished. But had the United States also become the “New Spanish Empire” with the transfer of territories? Empire or No Empire? The Treaty of Paris, agreed to on December 10, 1898, required U.S. Senate ratification, with approval of at least two-thirds of its members. Despite all that had come before—in newspapers, on 10 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials battlefields, and through election rhetoric—was the fundamental question of whether the United States should become an imperial power? Two days prior to the climactic Senate vote of February 6, 1899, the unofficial headcount showed the treaty opponents two votes ahead. Meanwhile, in Manila, as American and Filipino sentries kept close watch on one another across a neutral divide, a U.S. Army private saw two Filipino soldiers crossing the San Juan Bridge into American-controlled ground. The private called out for the Filipinos to “halt” immediately. One Filipino soldier either did not comprehend “halt” or he chose to ignore the command. Whereupon, as he proceeded onto American ground, U.S. soldiers opened fire and Filipinos forces replied in kind. Sixty U.S. soldiers and 700 Filipinos died in the shootout. When the story reached the U.S. Senate, an emotional wave to “support our boys in the Philippines” caused the defection of two Democrats, and the body narrowly ratified the treaty. The United States had officially acquired its first colonies—and also its first colonial rebellion. As a result of McKinley’s decision and the Senate’s action, the U.S. Army battled Filipino nationalist insurgents for four years, from 1898 to 1902. This was a timetable ten times longer than the war with Spain. In sum, the American-Philippine war was a drawn-out series of encounters that caused the deaths of over 4,000 Americans (compared to 385 in Cuba) and at least 50,000 Filipinos, many of whom were civilians dislocated by American policies. (It should be pointed out that fighting did not completely cease in 1902, as occasional skirmishes flared up until Philippine independence in 1946.) In early 1899, as Rear Admiral Dewey doubled his order of ammunition to deal with the Filipino insurrection, the U.S. public and press rallied to the effort. As the New York Times wrote in February 1899: The insane attack of these people upon their liberators! It is not likely that Aguinaldo himself will exhibit much staying power. After one or two collisions, the insurgent army will break up. Rear Admiral George Dewey Henry Neil, Exciting Experiences in Our Wars with Spain and the Filipinos. (Chicago: Book Pub. Union, 1899), 234. Available: Library of Congress, The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898> The Philippine-American War To avoid a similar revolt in Cuba, U.S. officials appealed to rebel leaders to demobilize their troops, based on the hope that the United States would follow through on the proposed Teller Amendment (Henry Teller, D, CO), which promised eventual independence for Cuba. The Teller Amendment did pass in 1902. For Filipinos in 1899; however, they received no assurances of long-term independence, no Teller Amendment. Instead, they continued to resist. Within two months, they had killed or wounded 500 U.S. soldiers. By August, the U.S. government met Dewey’s request for 60,000 more troops. Aguinaldo responded, in kind, with an open call for guerilla warfare. 11 Teacher Background Materials Anti-Imperialism At the same time, the Anti-Imperialist League that had begun only months before grew in mem- bership. Among the most vocal of anti-imperialists were members of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). As Bessie Scovel of the WCTU put it: Again and again has my blood boiled at the hundreds of American saloons being established throughout our new possessions. And, shame of shames, our military authorities in the Philippines have introduced the open and official sanction of prostitution! What particularly unsettled Temperance Union members were the repeated stories of sexually transmitted diseases coming out of South Asia. They were appalled to discover that their “pure boys” had left behind their loving mothers and strong values, gone to the Philippines, and returned home sick, wounded, or dead. The founder of the Anti-Imperialist League, Edward Atkinson, also published pamphlets on venereal disease and sent them to troops in the Philippines. In part, Atkinson wanted to prove that empire building would undermine traditional American principles, such as free speech. When the Postmaster General had the pamphlets confiscated en route to the Philippines, Atkinson publicly proclaimed, “You see? This is what happens. If we seize the Philippines to go and become an imperialist power, we’ll no longer have our freedoms.” Cover of meeting held in Chicago by the American Anti-Imperialist League. Chicago Liberty, cover. <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898> Costs of Empire Building By late summer 1899, when stepped-up American troop reinforcements faced Aguinaldo’s equally serious pledge to wage guerrilla-style war, the price tag for empire-building shot up. Casualty figures in the Philippines also worried President McKinley. Three thousand Americans and 15,000 Filipinos had been killed. U.S. generals in Manila were ordered to censor reporters’ dispatches that contained any unfavorable news. Yet, American reporters in the Philippines blamed the generals and not the President for this censorship. At the same time, Filipino fighters wore common dress, blended into the larger population, and engaged in nighttime raids, sniper assaults, and setting booby-traps. Stunned American soldiers reacted in a variety of ways. A. A. Barnes of the Third U.S. Artillery reported: 12 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials Last night one of our boys was found shot and his stomach cut open. Immediately orders were received to burn the town and kill every native in sight. I am probably growing hard-hearted for I am in my glory when I can sight my gun on some dark skin and pull the trigger. An anonymous soldier wrote: I don’t believe the people in the United States understand the condition of things here. Even the Spanish are shocked. I have seen enough to almost make me ashamed to call myself an American. Theodore Conley of the Kansas Regiment commented: Talk about dead Indians! Why they are lying everywhere. The trenches are full of them. In June 1900, the Republicans gathered in Philadelphia for their national convention. President McKinley was easily re-nominated, largely because the nation prospered after a devastating depression in the 1890s. Teddy Roosevelt was selected as his running mate, not because he was Governor of New York State, but because he was a war hero and could add excitement to the Republican ticket. The election of 1900, a rematch of the 1896 race between McKinley and his Democratic rival, William Jennings Bryan, revolved as much around the question of economy as the on-going war in the Philippines. Bryan, in fact, hoped to defeat the incumbent president by repeatedly raising the war and turning the election into a referendum on McKinley’s foreign policy. McKinley won in a landslide on the basis of returning America to prosperity following a brief depression while Bryan’s strategy of attacking U.S. imperialism—and the Philippines War in particular— backfired. The Republicans could now argue that McKinley’s reelection signaled not only popular approval for the president’s handling of the economy but also resounding support for the empire-building campaign in the Philippines and elsewhere. Shortly after his second inaugural address, in March 1901, President McKinley offered Cuba limited self-government under the terms of the Platt Amendment, a congressional document that previously made Cuba a U.S. protectorate. However, the grant of Cuban autonomy was quite restricted, as the United States retained the right to intervene in Cuba’s affairs, at any point, and to establish an indefinite naval presence at Guantánamo Bay. The Cubans ultimately acceded to American pressure and barely voted the Platt Amendment into their constitution. During precisely the same time frame, in the Philippines, U.S. soldiers infiltrated rebel headquarters outside of Manila and captured Emilio Aguinaldo, the military and spiritual leader of the Filipino independence movement. While the war against American troops continued in the southern Philippines, the battle around Manila died down considerably in the summer of 1901. In tapping William Howard Taft as the first civilian governor of the Philippines, President McKinley defined “Big Bill” Taft’s purpose in terms of “benevolent assimilation.” Taft referred The Philippine-American War 13 Teacher Background Materials to the Filipinos as his “little brown brothers.” Treating the Philippines as a quasi-laboratory for Progressive Era reforms, Taft’s colonial government set up American-style schools and American education methods, including English language emphasis. In order to reinforce the process of Americanization, Taft adopted a draconian law that banned any form of anti-American behavior, whether written, spoken, or represented in art, music, or Philippine flag-waving. Still, Filipinos continued to struggle for independence at all levels. In September 1901 President McKinley, when visiting the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York, spoke about the nation’s new role and position in the world. We have a vast and intricate business built up through years of toil and struggle, in which every part of this country has its stake. Isolation is no longer possible or desirable. McKinley was the first president to tell Americans they had global responsibilities as well as global economic opportunities. The next afternoon while at a public reception, the anarchistassassin, Leon Czolgosz, fired his concealed gun into the president’s stomach. Unable to recover from the severe laceration, William McKinley died eight days later, to be replaced by Vice President Theodore Roosevelt. Ten days into the Roosevelt presidency, Americans stationed in Balangiga, 400 miles southeast of Manila, came under attack. As Yankee troops sat to breakfast that morning, armed Filipinos emerged from hiding places and hacked forty-eight soldiers to death. While most Filipinos viewed the event as a blow for independence, the twenty-four American survivors—and a horrified U.S. public—interpreted the daylight raid as an unprovoked atrocity. In direct response, General Jacob Smith commanded U.S. forces to pursue revenge across the larger island of Samar. “I want no prisoners,” ordered Smith. “I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms against the United States.” “I’d like to know the limit of age to respect, sir,” requested his subordinate, Littleton Waller. “Ten years,” replied General Smith. American troops, therefore, set about to torch villages, destroy property, and slaughter men, women, and children. South of Manila, in the province of Batangas, the Americans assembled all non-insurgents into military zones of protection. The similarities to Spanish methods in Cuba were unmistakable, as anyone found outside of these zones was assumed to be hostile, and were killed or imprisoned. A leader of the anti-imperialist faction in the U.S. Senate, George Hoar, pushed for a thorough investigation into the American reprisals. In the process, three Army officers, including General Jacob Smith, found themselves court-martialed. From Surrender to Independence In April 1902, following more than three years of warfare, Filipino leaders conceded defeat to the United States. For their part, the exhausted Americans had lost most of the zeal that had led to late nineteenth-century imperialism. Even President Roosevelt, once a champion of U.S. empire-building, admitted that his nation was ill-suited for imperialism. On reflection, he opined that the Philippines had become America’s Achilles heel. While the United States would use military force, time and again, across Latin America, and in portions of Asia, the Pacific, and elsewhere, it did so primarily for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a largely informal, 14 The Philippine-American War Teacher Background Materials economic empire. The Spanish-American War (1898) and the Philippine-American War (1899– 1902) from which it sprang are among the exceptions that prove the rule of U.S. empire-building, at least in the early twentieth century. Given the unexpected difficulties of the Philippines conflict, the United States assiduously avoided open-ended military campaigns until the Second World War. During World War II, Japan conquered the Philippines. Sixty-thousand Americans and more than a million Filipinos died while driving the Japanese from the islands. Soon after, on July 4, 1946, the United States granted the Filipinos their independence. VI. UNIT LESSONS Lesson 1: Causes of the Philippine-American War Lesson 2: The United States Senate Debates the Annexation of the Philippines Lesson 3: Warfare in the Philippines Lesson 4: The Impact of the War The Philippine-American War 15 TIME LINE Date Event February 15, 1898 Explosion sinks the battleship USS Maine in Havana Harbor, Cuba April 25, 1898 United States declares war on Spain May 1, 1898 Commodore George Dewey’s United States naval forces defeated the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay May 24, 1898 General Emilio Aguinaldo establishes a provisional government in the Philippines June 12, 1898 Philippines proclaims independence. June 30, 1898 United States volunteer troops arrive in the Philippines. August 12–13, 1898 Spain and the United States sign a Protocol of Peace establishing terms for a peace treaty. Spanish forces in Manila surrender to American military units. December 10, 1898 United States and Spain sign the Treaty of Paris, ending the war and transferring the Philippines to the United States. February 4, 1899 Fighting begins between United States forces and Filipino Nationalists. February 6, 1899 United States Senate ratifies the Treaty of Paris. November 12, 1899 General Aguinaldo dissolves the Filipino army and commences guerilla warfare against the American forces. March 13, 1901 American forces capture General Aguinaldo. July 4, 1901 United States establishes an American civilian government in the Philippines. July 4, 1902 President Theodore Roosevelt issues a proclamation ending the Philippine-American War. 16 The Philippine-American War D RAMA T IC MOME NT AMAT OMEN The following narrative describes the opening shots fired in the Philippine-American War. American Troops on Ramparts at Manila Edward H. Hart, ca. 1898–1901 Library of Congress, LC-D4-21488 “About eight o’clock, Miller and I were cautiously pacing our district. We came to a fence and were trying to see what the Filipinos were up to. Suddenly, near at hand, on our left, was a low but unmistakable Filipino outpost signal whistle. It was immediately answered by a similar whistle about twenty-five yards to the right. Then a red lantern flashed a signal from blockhouse number seven. We have never seen such a sign used before. In a moment, something rose up slowly in front of us. It was a Filipino. I yelled, “Halt!” and made it pretty loud, for I was accustomed to challenging the officer of the guard in approved military style. I challenged him with another loud “Halt!” Then he shouted “Halto!” to me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. If I didn’t kill him, I guess he died of fright. Two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called, “Halt!” and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time.” Private William Grayson, in Edwin Wildman, Aguinaldo: A Narrative of Filipino Ambitions (Norwood, MA, Norwood Press, 1901). The Philippine-American War Pasig River Suspension Bridge, from north side Manila, Philippine Islands Underwood & Underwood (New York, 1899) The Bancroft Library Pictorial Collection, Stereographs of the West Available: <http://www.oac.cdlib.org> 17 LESSON ONE CAUSES OF THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR A. B. OBJECTIVES
To examine the causes of the conflict between the United States government and Philippine citizens during the period 1899–1902.
To evaluate the relative importance of factors causing the conflict.
To analyze primary source documents to determine their main ideas and points of view. ACTIVITIES (Suggested Time: 60–90 minutes) Activity One: Discussion of Causes 1. Distribute copies of the Causes of the Philippine-American War (Student Handout 1). Explain that the items listed are different reasons that historians use to explain this conflict. Ask the students to read the items on the list. 2. Discuss the meaning of each cause listed on the handout. Ask students to cite examples from other periods in American history when the causes of conflict were evident. Activity Two: Primary Source Interpretation 1. Distribute Documents Related to the Causes of the Conflict (Student Handout 2). Explain to students that they will work in cooperative groups to examine these documents to determine which causes were evident in the conflict over the Philippines. Following that, they will determine, from the documents, which cause seemed to be most important. 2. Distribute Comparison Chart: Causes of the Conflict (Student Handout 3). Explain that students will review the documents and determine in which categories of causes they best fit. Documents may fit in more than one category. They are to place the name of the document in the appropriate block on the chart, giving the author and a phrase explaining how it relates to the overall cause. 3. When students have completed the chart, have them consider the question: Which factor, in your view, was most important in causing the conflict? Ask them to explain their reasons. 18 The Philippine-American War Lesson One Activity Three: Discussion of Work Completed 1. When the cooperative groups have completed the tasks noted above, ask students to provide oral examples of documents that fit the categories on the comparison chart. What documents could be put in more than one category? Why? 2. Discuss the evaluative question at the bottom of the comparison chart. Which factor was most important in causing the conflict? C. EVALUATION Evaluate student work and understanding of the lesson by utilizing either or both of the following methods: 1. Listening to student responses in oral discussion. 2. Collecting and evaluating the comparison chart and the answer to the summary question. The Philippine-American War 19 Lesson One Student Handout 1 Causes of the Philippine-American War Geopolitical Nations exhibit a desire for national power and/or they fear that their nation’s security is threatened by a foreign power. This may be manifested by calls for larger or more modern armed forces, the establishment of overseas bases, or the need to build political support for a future military conflict. Economic Nations enunciate policies that seek to increase the economic prosperity of their country and its citizens. This may include demands for access to additional products and/or raw materials from foreign nations or the increased development of markets for their nation’s goods in foreign lands. Racial Ideology Nations express the belief that certain cultural, ethnic or race-based societies are superior to others. National leaders may then argue that their own civilization exhibits better government, superior cultural values, a more enlightened economic system, and/or a higher religious order. Missionary Zeal Nations may offer humanitarian assistance to those societies that they perceive as less fortunate. This desire to help may be mixed with a belief in the superiority of one’s government, cultural values, economy or religious views. As a price for accepting aid from the powerful missionary nation, the recipient nation may be “convinced “ to adopt certain values and practices characteristic of the dominant power. Nationalism Nations strive to be free of foreign influence and interference. They desire to be recognized by other countries as an independent state, based upon the nation’s defining qualities—its particular blend of government, culture, economy and/or religion. Once national sovereignty has been achieved, it then follows that “nationalistic” nations act to increase their prestige through the fulfillment of expansive political, territorial, economic and/or cultural objectives. More often than not, the effort to impose the “idea” or ideology of one nation upon another is an exercise in self-righteousness. Militarism Nations may see warfare as an end in itself to develop manly character and patriotism. Once war has been initiated, the honor of the nation must be upheld and citizens should “rally around the flag” to maintain national unity against foreign foes. Attacks upon a nation’s troops must, in this view, be avenged by further military action. NOTE: The above categories represent viewpoints held by political leaders, social leaders, media centers, and common citizens. These interest groups often held more than one of the above perspectives simultaneously. Also, disagreements existed between members of those same groups. 20 The Philippine-American War Lesson One Student Handout 2 Documents Related to the Causes of the Conflict NOTE: Filipino sources are noted with an asterisk (*) at the end of each bibliographic reference. The Filipino is the true child of the East. His moral fiber is as the web of the pineapple gauze of which the women make their dresses. He will cheat, steal, and lie beyond the orthodox limit of the Anglo-Saxon. His unreliability and the persistence with which he disobeys orders are irritating beyond description; besides this, his small stature and color invite abuse. —John Bass, “Dispatch,” Harper’s Weekly 42 (October 15, 1898), 1008. I am reliably informed that the natives of these islands are no farther advanced in civilization than they were 300 years ago. —A. J. Luther, Letter of July 27, 1898, in Trumbull White, Pictorial History of Our War With Spain for Cuba’s Freedom (Freedom Publishing Company, 1898), 546. Escolta Street, Manila, 1899 Library of Congress, LC-USZ61-57 Available: University of Wisconsin-Madison, South East Asian Image and Text Project <http://xirs.library.wisc.edu/etext/seait.search/PH00069.html> The natural resources of the Philippines are very good, and under a civilized administration, these islands would be rich and prosperous. But the mildew of Spanish administration is upon everything. —Trumbull White, Pictorial History of Our War With Spain for Cuba’s Freedom (Freedom Publishing Company, 1898), 399. In the West Indies and the Philippines alike we are confronted by most difficult problems. It is cowardly to shrink from solving them in a proper way; for solved they must be, if not by us, by some stronger and more manful race. A Country House in Luzon Margherita Arlina Hamm, Manila and the Philippines (New York: F.T. Neely), 1898. —Theodore Roosevelt, “ The Strenuous Life,” The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses (New York: Century, 1900), 115. Available: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/luzon.html> The Philippine-American War 21 Lesson One Student Handout 2 I want to get this country out of war and back to peace. . . . I want to enter upon a policy which shall enable us to give peace and self-government to the natives of these islands. —Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., in Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (New York: Riverside Press, 1931), 400. Damn, damn the Filipinos! Cut-throat Khadiac ladrones! (thieves) Underneath the starry flag Civilize them with a Krag (rifle) And return us to our beloved home! —[Popular U.S. Military Marching Song] Available: Philippine-American War Centennial Initiative, Their Own Ruin”: The Story of the 1898 U.S. Philippine Annexation & Philippine-American Wars “Voices of Imperialism and War” 1998. <http://www.phil-am-war.org/voices.html> It is as a base for commercial operations that the islands seem to possess the greatest importance. They occupy a favored location, not with reference to one part of any particular country of the Orient, but to all part. . . . Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, the Philippines are the pickets of the Pacific, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of China and Korea, French IndoChina, the Malay Peninsula, and the Islands of Indonesia to the South. —Frank A. Vanderlip “Facts About the Philippines,” The Century: A Popular Quarterly, 56 (August 1898): 555. Available: Cornell University Library, Making of America <http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgibin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABP2287-0056-118> Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more, Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies and the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumer of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer . . . the Philippines gives us a base at the door of all the East. . . . No land in America surpasses in fertility the plains and valleys of Luzon [major island in the Philippines]. —Albert Beveridge, Congressional Record, 56th Congress, 1st sess., 1900, 33: 704–12. The closing years of the century seem to be, in all lands save our own, not of war, but of a strenuous making ready for it. Alsace and Lorraine, the Eastern Question in its many varied phases, and the jealous rivalry as to colonies and dependencies, make Continental Europe but a camp, with more than three million men under arms. —Commodore G.W. Melville, “Our Future in the Pacific: What We Have There to Hold and Win,” The North American Review 166 (March 1898): 281. Available: Cornell University Library, Making of America <http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgibin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABQ7578-0166&byte=112663541> 22 The Philippine-American War The World of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars Adapted from world outline map <http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpeditions/atlas> National Geographic Society, 2001 Lesson One Student Handout 2 Since it is their desire, may the responsibility of the war and its consequences fall on the great nation of the United States of America. We have done our duty as patriots and human beings, showing the great powers of the world that the present cabinet has the diplomacy necessary to protect our cause as well as the arms required to defend our rights. Pedro Paterno Available: Philippine National Commission for Culture and the Arts Centennial Traveling Exhibit <http://www.ncca.gov.ph> —Pedro Paterno, “Proclamation of War” ( June 2, 1898). Available: MSC Communications Technologies, The Philippine Centennial Celebration. <http://www.msc.edu.ph/centennial/pa990602.html>* True, we might have thought it hopeless to attempt the improvement of conditions in the Philippines, had not fate placed the power in our hands. Granted, if you will, that we cannot right the wrongs of all oppressed nations, yet we cannot refuse to accept the responsibility which logic of events has thrust upon us. —Dean Worcester, “Knotty Problems in the Philippines,” The Century: A Popular Quarterly, 56 (October 1898), 873. Available: Cornell University Library, Making of America <http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgibin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABP2287-0056&byte=57182538> Merritt’s most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Aquinaldo, who has become aggressive and even threatening toward our army. —Admiral George Dewey, cable to Secretary Long, in David Traxel, 1898: The Birth of the American Century (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998), 244. In the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation, and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people, that we are here as friends of the Filipinos, to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty; that all persons who either by active aid or honest endeavor cooperate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection. —Elwell S. Otis, “Proclamation,” (Manila, P.I.: Office of the Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, January 4, 1899). Available: <http://www.msc.edu.ph/centennial/ot990104.html> 24 The Philippine-American War Lesson One Student Handout 2 In my manifesto of January 8 [1899], first I published the grievances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts, which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and finally, the useless conferences and the contempt shown the Philippine government provide the premeditated transgression of justice and liberty. —Emilio Aguinaldo, “Call to Arms,” 1899, in Thomas Patterson, and Dennis Merrill, eds. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol. I (New York: D.C. Heath, 1995), 422.* Emilio Aguinaldo, Rebel Leader of the Philippine Forces Fremont Rockett, Our Boys in the Philippines: A Pictorial History of the War (San Francisco: P.F. Rockett, 1899), 20. Available: Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/luzon.html> When I realized the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess I did not know what to do with them. . . . And one night late it came to me this way-I don’t know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain-that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) That we could turn them over to France and Germany-our commercial rivals in the Orient— that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) That we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government-and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could do by them. William McKinley National Archives, NWDNS-111-SC-96204 —President William McKinley, 1899, in Thomas Patterson, and Dennis Merrill, eds. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol. I (New York: D.C. Heath, 1995), 424. The Philippine-American War 25 Lesson One Student Handout 3 Comparison Chart: Causes of the Conflict Instructions: Review the documents provided in Student Handouts 1 and 2. Place the authors’ names of those documents in the appropriate categories below, briefly explaining how their views relate to the category. Some documents may be placed in more than one category. Geopolitical Influence Economic Influence Racial Ideology Missionary Zeal Nationalism Militarism After completing the chart above, write a paragraph explaining which factor, in your view, was most important in causing the conflict, and why. 26 The Philippine-American War To purchase t he com plet e unit , see t he Nat ional Cent er for Hist ory in t he Schools cat alog: ht t p: / / nchs.ucla.edu/ cat alog.ht m l < > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0Quest ions? Nat ional Cent er for Hist ory in t he Schools, UCLA Marian McKenna Olivas, Coordinat or Gary B. Nash, Direct or 6265 Bunche Hall Los Angeles, CA 90095- 1473 ( 310) 825- 4702 FAX: ( 310) 267- 2103 ht t p: / / nchs.ucla.edu < > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0-< > -0- To purchase and download a com plet e ebook ( pdf) version of t his unit , go t o Social St udies Services: ht t p: / / www.socialst udies.com ( Use t he “ ebooks” link on t he left side & search for t he t it le)