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Institutional inertia, adjustment, and change: Japan as a
case of a coordinated market economy
Ling Chen a
a
Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, USA
Online Publication Date: 01 August 2008
To cite this Article: Chen, Ling (2008) 'Institutional inertia, adjustment, and change:
Japan as a case of a coordinated market economy', Review of International
Political Economy, 15:3, 460 — 479
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Review of International Political Economy 15:3 August 2008: 460–479
Institutional inertia, adjustment, and
change: Japan as a case of a coordinated
market economy
Ling Chen
Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, USA
ABSTRACT
This article reviews the contributions of three important books that analyze,
respectively, the sources and patterns of institutional inertial, adjustment,
and change of Japanese economy in response to the country’s prolonged
economic stagnation. Drawing on their scholarship, the article highlights the
dual character of Japanese capitalism – the persistence of core elements of a
coordinated market economy on the one hand, and the incremental revision
of existing practices towards a liberal market model by state agencies and
firms on the other hand. The case of Japan suggests that while coordinated
market economies may face the danger of losing some of their comparative
institutional advantages under rapid technological change and increased
international competition, they may not make an unambiguous switch to
liberal institutions, and may take a variety of reform paths in coping with
internal and external pressures.
KEYWORDS
Japanese capitalism; institutional adaptation; institutional change; variety of
capitalism; coordinated market economy.
Marie Anchordoguy (2005) Reprogramming Japan: The High Tech Crisis under
Communitarian Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Michael Witt (2006) Changing Japanese Capitalism: Societal Coordination and
Institutional Adjustment, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Steven Vogel (2006) Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry are Reforming Japanese Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
INTRODUCTION
Just as the rocketing of Japan’s economy to the global forefront in the postwar period spawned sizable literature on the lessons of its success, the
Review of International Political Economy
C 2008 Taylor & Francis
ISSN 0969-2290 print/ISSN 1466-4526 online
http://www.tandf.co.uk
DOI: 10.1080/09692290801931404
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burst of its economic bubble and its economic slump since the 1980s has
equally intrigued students of Japanese political economy. As Japan went
from boom to bust, talk of ‘Japan as number one’ has been replaced with
debate about the causes of, and cures for, its economic stagnation. These
diagnoses cover a wide array of subjects that range from rigid business
structures to inefficient government policies, from challenges of international environment to growing domestic pressures, and from materialist
accounts to ideational explanations (Endo, 2001; Gao, 2001; Grimes, 2001;
Hall, 2004; Katz, 1998; Pempel, 1998). It is against this background that three
recent volumes have gained scholarly attention. They represent a growing
body of literature that has not only provided the most updated empirical
account of Japan’s industrial malaise based on a vast amount of original
data, but has also advanced sophisticated theories on the etiology and patterns of institutional inertia, adjustment and change in Japan’s capitalism
system.
What has puzzled these three authors is not so much Japan’s dramatic
turn from prosperity to stagnation, but rather, the type of slow response observed in Japan since the 1980s. They find that on the one hand many core
characteristics of Japan’s capitalist system have remained unchanged even
after more than a decade of near-zero growth, and on the other hand, existing institutions, norms and practices are being incrementally contested
and revised. While Marie Anchordoguy and Michael Witt have mainly
examined factors that contribute to high level of institutional inertia and
continuity in the face of crisis, Steven Vogel’s analysis places more emphasis on the pattern of institutional adaptation and change. Despite their
different focuses, these studies collectively suggest that to understand the
behaviors of state agencies and firms in Japan, one has to go beyond the rational choice assumption of utility maximization to examine the concrete
institutional contexts that agents are situated in. Meanwhile, to explore
the patterns in which Japanese capitalism emerge, persist and evolve, one
cannot separate the understanding of institutional continuity from that of
institutional change.
All three works build on the varieties of capitalism (VOC) perspective
and devote considerable attention to the coordinated character of Japan’s
market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Yet they do not simply reiterate the logic of Japan’s divergence from liberal market economies (LMEs).
Rather, they seek to address the issue of how a typical coordinated market economy (CME) such as Japan responds to changing economic conditions over time. As the VOC approach has been previously criticized
for being overly static and inadequate to understand situations other than
settled equilibriums, the three studies have made a particularly useful
contribution by exploring the dynamics (or the lack of) institutional adaptation and change in Japanese economy (Howell, 2003). Furthermore, their
works help to shed light on the prospects of convergence and divergence
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between CMEs and LMEs. Regardless of their different messages about
Japan’s transition to a liberal market model, their analyses of various reforms in Japan have countered the prediction that CMEs are hard to sustain but easy to destroy, and that the forces of globalization and technological progress can be so powerful as to create cross-national convergence
(Goodin, 2003; Thatcher, 2004). By elucidating the ways in which Japan has
partially remodeled itself towards a liberal market system while simultaneously maintaining the core institutional features of CMEs, the three studies
collectively depict a far more sophisticated picture than simple divergence
or convergence, and raise a series of interesting questions that are worth
further investigation.
C OMM U NI TA R I A N C A P I TA L I S M A N D I N S T I T U T I O N A L
I N E RT I A
Of the three authors, Anchordoguy frames her analysis at the broadest
level. Central to her explanation of both Japan’s economic decline and
its subsequent inability to bounce back is the notion of ‘communitarian
capitalism’, which is the set of norms deeply rooted in Japan’s capitalist
system that promote a strong logic of community. These norms guide the
behaviors of the state, firms and individuals and structure their relationship in such a way that privileges the group over the individual, cohesion
over competition, risk-sharing over profit-making, and social stability over
change. She traces the historical roots of communitarian capitalism to the
wartime and the postwar period, when the desire to promote economic
self-sufficiency and national autonomy and practices such as lifetime employment, seniority wages, Keiretsu groups and the yokonarabi competition
began to emerge.1 Moreover, as Japan’s capitalist system coalesced after
the war, such ideas and practices were institutionalized over time and became invisible yet powerful norms that permeated state agencies and firms
and consolidated communitarian institutions and policies.
For Anchordoguy, the entrenchment of these norms constitutes an important explanation for both the rise and the current stagnation of Japan’s
economy. During the period of catch-up under a relatively stable technological trajectory, she argues, communal norms contributed to the formation of broad consensus in favor of industrial development and allowed
the state to manage market for both economic and social goals. The keiretsu
ties reduced transaction costs and concentrated scarce resources, thus helping to nurture the world-class competitors in specific industries. However,
she finds that such risk-sharing and stability-promoting norms also resulted in rigid sets of employees and suppliers and similar firm strategies
and product lines that stifled further innovation. Thus when technological
change became rapid and unpredictable in the 1980s and 1990s, the strength
of communitarian capitalism changed into a hindrance for technological
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progress, insulating Japanese firm from the gales of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. This proposition is supported by her empirical studies
of high technology industries. For example, both her cases of telecommunications and software industries have demonstrated that while the postwar
technonationalism and the MITI-led developmental route contributed to
Japan’s catching up with the world leaders such as AT&T and IBM, the
industries found it hard to forge their own paths when foreign products
could no longer be easily reverse-engineered. By relying on an obsolete
factory approach that emphasized productivity rather than creativity and
by using a set of domestic rather than global product standards, Japan became increasingly out of step with the world’s leading technology since
1980s.
What Anchordoguy seeks to show here is not simply a scenario where
a shift in global context creates a ‘mismatch’ between institutional environment and institutional functions. She also aims to demonstrate how
deep seated norms further exacerbated the problem by preventing institutional adaptation and delaying the actors’ response to global challenges
of rapid technological development. A crucial thread running throughout
the theoretical and empirical chapters is the way in which government
and firms started to contest previous norms and practices but were extremely reluctant to switch their strategies. The results were a series of
foot-dragging processes and incremental reform steps, richly depicted in
Anchordoguy’s detailed analysis of state and business reforms. The viability of lifetime employment was questioned but aversion to firing workers
persisted. Corporate reforms were launched but firms were unwilling to
cut off loyal suppliers. The limitation of using closed standards was recognized but none of the firms wanted to take the risk of switching to new
technology. Introduction of competition was on the agenda but restriction
on the emergence of winners and losers remained strong. Anchordoguy
warns that such sluggish reform steps could only deepen the ‘crisis’ of
communitarian capitalism. As the Japanese are clinging to the current system, she laments, the state, firms, and citizens chose economic decline by
default.
The power of norms
Norms acquire a pivotal role in Anchordoguy’s book. Builiding on a sociological institutionalist perspective, she views norms as ‘routinized, taken
for granted understandings about the way things are done’. By drawing attention to how such understandings heavily influence actors’ choices, she
poses a useful challenge to the rational choice assumption that individuals are autonomous maximizers of self-interest. If an agent’s behavior is
simply determined by carefully weighing economic costs and benefits, she
questions, why should firms be unwilling to introduce merit-based wages,
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fire redundant workers or abandon obsolete suppliers even when such
practices have been hurting economic efficiency for more than 15 years?
Without denying that firms, politicians and bureaucrats do pursue their
self-interest, she contends that norms heavily influence and even fundamentally shape the way in which actors perceive their interests. Her understanding of relations between institutions and individual actions is heavily
influenced by March and Olsen’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the Weberian concerns of legitimacy (March and Olsen, 1989; Weber, 1978). Actors
adhere to ‘normal’ patterns of behavior even when it harms their economic
interest. They prize legitimacy over efficiency because norms profoundly
shape the ways in which society perceives the role of firms, labor and capital in the economy. According to her account, for example, the firm in
Japan is not just viewed as an instrument for pursuing profit, but a social unit upon which every aspect of an employee’s life depends. Labor
is not regarded as merely a variable input, but the most essential part of
the enterprise. Firms followed the ‘logic of the organization’ (soshiki no
ronri) rather than the ‘logic of capital’ (shihon no ronri), and they rejected
the laissez faire competitive model (kyoso hitei shugi) and embraced instead
a model of managed competition (Anchordoguy, 2005: 37, 125). Anchordoguy usefully reminds us that these shared communitarian perceptions
and beliefs, accumulated from historical experiences and taking the form
of intricate social conventions, can often be more useful than formal rules
and laws for understanding Japan. This is embodied in Anchordoguy’s
study of various group behaviors, ranging from the state’s perseverance
to maintain sociopolitical stability, the firms’ adherence to employee-first
management and its aversion to big winners and losers, to citizens’ valuation of egalitarianism and consumers’ support of more expensive domestic
industrial products.
Examining Japan’s political economy through the lens of communitarian norms also helps overcome limitations in previous accounts of Japan’s
success or problems. The developmental state literature, for instance, focused overwhelmingly on the role of the state in promoting industrial
growth without giving adequate attention to firms and citizens as well as
the broad social context (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Wade,
1990). Similar problems can also be observed in literature that attributes
Japan’s economic pathology to macroeconomic errors such as monetary
and fiscal policies. Recognizing these limits, Anchordoguy seeks to bring
society back into the analysis of Japan’s political economy. She shows convincingly that without investigating social norms that govern the economic
system, one could not reach a deeper understanding of the strengths and
the weaknesses of Japan’s capitalism. Moreover, instead of being limited
to separate sets of static factors deriving from different periods of Japan’s
economic development, Anchordoguy draws attention to how largely the
same institutions and norms can produce different results under changing
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economic and technological conditions. This enables her to situate the account in a longer time horizon and brings to the forefront the important
issue of how institutions emerge, persist and adapt over time.
Institutional resilience or institutional immutability?
Anchordoguy’s study highlights a substantial level of institutional inertia rooted in communitarian capitalism. She shows that the set of
norms and institutions established under particular historical circumstances are particularly resistant to change despite the apparent economic inefficiencies they produce. Such a high degree of path dependence and institutional resilience provides a useful example in support
of the historical institutionalists’ critique of functionalist accounts of institutional change, which are typically optimistic about the plasticity
of institutions and the autonomous adaptation or refinement of institutions in response to current needs (Williamson, 1993). While the mechanisms of learning or competition identified by functionalists may sometimes indeed lead to change, Anchordoguy’s case study suggests that
such dynamics may be far easier to be assumed than demonstrated.
The barriers that reformers need to overcome can be substantial particularly when institutions have been in place for a considerable period of
time.
However, there is a risk in viewing her main argument simply as a claim
of institutional immutability. As both Thelen and Pierson have cautioned,
analyses of path dependence and institutional inertia can easily become descriptions rather than explanations, unless one can specify particular mechanisms of institutional reproduction (Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 1999). However, Anchordoguy remains largely vague about the exact mechanisms
that are at work, and fills this lacuna with an account of the persistence
and prevalence of norms. While as mentioned above, norms have certainly
played an important role in shaping actors’ perceptions and behaviors, the
question remains what channels or factors enable norms of communitarian
capitalism to effectively counter and transcend strong pressure for change
and to reproduce or even reinforce previous institutions. In many chapters, communitarian capitalism seems to have become synonymous with
the ‘culture’ of Japanese society as a whole, while in other chapters it is
analytically conflated with actual policies. The brush of norms is too broad
for one to identify the level of causation, and institutional inertia in her
analysis seems to carry the burden of both independent and dependent
variables.
Ambiguity about the mechanisms of institutional reproduction can also
give rise to problems in dealing with the prospects of institutional change.
While throughout the empirical chapters Anchordoguy mentions various
aspects of reforms and changes in state policies and business practices, she
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immediately points out how slow and little these changes are particularly
in comparison to the rapid changes unleashed by market forces in US.
However, precisely because the mechanisms of institutional inertia are
unspecified, one would question to what extent have such changes begun
to combat the forces of institutional inertia and to what extent they have
not. How should one judge whether changes are ‘too’ incremental? Can
incremental steps amount to large departures from past institutions even
without a US style rate of change?
Furthermore, even dealing with rapid and incremental innovation requires very different organizational capacities and social relations, one
would wonder whether Japan is indeed as vulnerable to global changes as
she observes. After all, state agencies and firms in Japan were once praised
for their capacity to tame market forces for developmental goals and harnessing international environment for domestic benefits. Particularly, as
mentioned by Anchordoguy herself as well as shown in other studies,
government agencies and several large firms have taken the leading role
in experimenting with new corporate governance, stock options, and R&D
approaches to encourage creativity and innovation (Vogel, 2006; Weiss,
2000). Thus it is questionable whether agents, although constrained by
norms, are entirely enslaved by them. In addition, one would have a good
reason to expect that different individuals or organizational actors respond
differently to external pressures, and display uneven capacity for adaptation rather than what she describes as a ‘simultaneous and homogeneous’
slow response. In short, more concrete levels of causal mechanisms should
be established to better understand how institutions in Japan’s economy
persist and change, and more empirical examination is needed in order to
assess how agents’ response are affecting Japan’s industrial development.
S OC I A L C O O R D I N AT I O N A N D
I NS T I T U T I O N A L A D J U S T M E N T
Witt also views the world’s entry into the information technology age as a
major challenge and seeks to explain the slow rate of institutional change in
Japan. But Witt addresses a broader concern of the fate of all coordinated
market economies, which have generally lagged behind liberal market
economies in terms of growth rate and per capita GDP from 1993 to 2003.
He approaches the case of Japan by first demonstrating empirically that
Japan’s adaptation to the changing world economy has indeed been slow.
This constitutes a useful effort, given the divided views on the degree of
Japan’s institutional change since the 1980s. Drawing on Redding’s business systems model, Witt examines institutional change at the levels of
culture, business environment, and business system. Both first hand interviews and second hand survey data suggest that although there have been
observable changes in terms of ownership, overall there has been ‘limited
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change in the rules of the game of Japanese business despite its one-and-ahalf decades of economic pain (Witt, 2006: 17). For example, he finds that
Japanese continue to hold the stakeholder view in favor of the shareholder
view, value groups more than individuals, rely predominantly on banks
rather than the markets for corporate funding, and emphasize the importance of employer–employee dependence.2 These findings largely resonate
with Anchordoguy’s observations and provide an empirical foundation for
rest of the analysis.
In his search for factors contributing to Japan’s slow changing steps,
Witt’s findings resonate with previous studies that suggest two important
mechanisms of institutional inertia: the role of vested interests and the lockin effect of present institutions because of institutional complementarities.
However, he raises an interesting question: since these factors exist in almost any institutional structure, why is their influence seeming to be more
salient in Japan? Witt attributes his answers to the high level of societal coordination within the Japanes business system, which influences the type
of institutional adjustment for the national economy. According to him,
CMEs such as Japan and Germany are typically subjected to the processes
of coordinated adjustment, as opposed to autonomous adjustment processes in LMEs. The former involve extensive bargaining and consensusbuilding process among actors at the aggregate level, such as employer
associations, labor unions, interest groups and government, whereas the
latter occur in the form of institutional innovations without involving active consultation with external actors. Compared with the autonomous
adjustment processes, the coordinated adjustment processes leave actors
of vested interests more chance to voice their needs and influence the bargaining processes. Meanwhile, these processes are also more likely to produce complementary institutions as they made it easier for major actors
governed by these institutional structures to cooperate among one another
in designing these institutions. As a result, CMEs were more subject to the
influence of vested interests and institutional complementarities and were
overall less flexible and adaptable.
Moreover, and crucial for Witt’s analysis, these two adjustment processes
incur different degree of risks to the whole system. Not only do actors in
coordinated adjustment processes tend to generate universal, collective
solutions that hardly fit various concrete, ‘on the spot’ needs, but once
they get the initial response wrong, it may be difficult to correct, which
entails negative impact on the entire institutional structure. By contrast, in
the autonomous adjustment processes, individual firms at the micro-level
autonomously search solutions for emerging problems and produce multitude of institutional innovations. While these processes may imply risk
for each actor as a result of partial information and insufficient analytical capabilities, they have relatively little risk for the whole system, making mismatches between institutions and environment easier to correct.
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He further supports his argument through a regression analysis which
shows that from 1993 to 2003, the degree of societal coordination in major economies was negatively linked with growth rates and the amount
of decrease in unemployment rates. This represents a striking departure
from the period examined in Hall and Soskice’s study, when CMEs paired
comparable growth with lower unemployment rates than LMEs (Hall and
Soskice, 2001: 20). Based on the evidence, Witt proposes a ‘social capital as
a public bad’ thesis, arguing that the high level of social coordination and
social capital one found in Japan and other CMEs may do more harm than
good to the economy with the increased uncertainty and competition that
accommodate with the coming of information technology age.
Contributing to Japan’s slow rate of adaptation still further, argues Witt,
is not only the coordinated response at the aggregate level, as other CMEs,
but what he identifies as the relatively limited adjustment pressure from the
micro-level actors such as individuals and firms. Differing from studies that
focus on how micro-level actions influence institutional change through
intentional collective action such as political bargaining, grassroots movements, and demonstrations, Witt draws attention to those autonomous,
unintended and unofficial actions such as tax evasion and capital flight.
These actions are initially only individual responses to institutional misalignment, but they may accumulate and build up pressure for change
over time. However, Witt finds that compared with other CMEs, Japan has
relatively less deviant behaviors of tax evasion and capital flight, indicated
by smaller size and slower growth of shadow economy and outward FDI
stock, respectively.3 The low degree of deviance and pressure for change
paired with a high level of social coordination has contributed to slowing
down the rate of adjustment of the entire economy.
The prevalence of social networks
For Witt, the key mechanism that both facilitates societal coordination and
prevents deviant behaviors at micro-level is the dense social networks permeating the business system in Japan. While the idea of networks is not
new to studies of Japanese political economy, it is more often linked to
the role of creating consensus and harmonizing public–private relations
(Gerlach, 1992; Lincoln and Gerlach, 2004; Okimoto, 1998). By contrast,
Witt draws attention to the possible ways that social networks can influence the rate of institutional adjustment. These networks, he suggests, not
only lubricates coordination, but can also act as conduits of information,
norms and values that transmit the pressure for compliance with existing
institutions and practices. In addition, they also constitute important monitoring and controlling mechanism against deviant behaviors. While Witt
also mentions the sort of communitarian norms emphasized by Anchordoguy, such as the spirit of ‘hammering in the nail that stands out’ and the
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habit of promoting acquiescence against idiosyncrasy and dissension, his
study of various forms of social networks complements Anchordoguy’s
account by clarifying the channels and mechanisms that spread, diffuse
and reinforce the communitarian norms.
In his empirical chapters, Witt examines in detail the operation of several major forms of social networks in Japan’s business system: business
groups, vertical keiretsu, R&D consortia, and the state–associations–firms
nexus. He shows in comparative perspective that Japanese firms rely on
networks much more heavily than those in the US, and at a similar level to
Germany. Moreover, he brings to light a taken-for-granted and previously
under-explored form of business networks, intra-industry loops, which go
beyond formal state organizations to include informal networking within
an industry and the links between certain industry and universities, banks,
and the press (Witt, 2006: 106–46). He illustrates the characters, patterns
and intensity of intra-industry loops through first hand survey data of
three cases, the micromachines, semiconductor equipment, and the apparel industries, representing, respectively, the sunrise, mature, and sunset
industries. He further finds that the perceived importance of network and
frequency of using network ties vary with the life cycle of industries, with
micromachines and apparel industries being higher than the semiconductor industry. While the findings have certainly made important empirical
contributions to our understanding of Japanese capitalism, particularly in
terms of intra-industry networks, they still leave many important questions
unanswered.
As an impediment for institutional adjustment?
Witt and Anchordoguy share a similarly pessimistic view on Japan’s response to increasing uncertainty and competition in the world economy.
For both, this view is derived from the slow pace of institutional adjustment
and adaptation observed in Japan’s business since the 1980s, particularly
when using the US as a reference point. While both of them concede that
there have been certain changes, they emphasize the special characteristics of Japanese capitalism that dampen the flexibility and adaptability of
institutions to a changing environment. Different from Anchordoguy, Witt
demonstrates empirically that there indeed have been limited changes in
Japan’s business system over the past one or two decades. He also specifies the key mechanism for the slow adjustment – the social networks
prevalent among Japanese firms. However, he seems to have made these
networks his final target of investigation, and falls short of providing sufficient evidence in support of the hypothetical effects that networks should
have on institutional adjustment. As he makes clear at the beginning of
the book, ‘What the book does is to provide theoretical argument and empirical evidence suggesting that societal coordination is inimical to quick
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institutional adjustment, with concomitant costs in terms of economic performance’ (Witt, 2006: 16). However, there exists an observable ‘gap’ between his theoretical propositions and his empirical studies.
An original argument of the book mentioned above, for example, is
that social networks and social capital can represent ‘public bad’ and burdensome obligations for involved parties, which forestall micro-level actions even in the face of institutional misalignment, thus ‘there may be
such as a thing as too much social capital’ (Witt, 2006: 15). However, most
of his empirical part focuses on examining the formation, features, contents, and operation of these networks, and to the extent that their effects are mentioned, they always serve beneficial purposes, ranging from
coping with uncertainty, building mutual trust, to sharing information
and technology. If it is indeed, as he suggests, that the type of coordination is beneficial for individual firms but harms the whole business
system, where should we find the evidence for such an argument? Probably the only convincing example that shows the detrimental effects of
networks is the R&D consortium in the micromachine industry, which
spent large funding for research in what in hindsight was an inferior production technology (2006: 145). However, except for this half page long
example, causal relations between societal coordination and institutional
adjustment remain largely hypothetical, and statements of such relations
occur in the form such as the networks ‘may lead the entire industry
down a technological path’, or are ‘likely to deprive the political economy of a potential source of institutional innovation’ (2006: 180). In other
places, we are told that where the coordinative capacity is involved, slow
rates of institutional adjustment is simply known ‘by extension’ (2006:
105).
However, one would question, for example, why coordinated adjustment will necessarily lead to institutional rigidity instead of more flexibility? If social networks, as Witt’s study shows, can serve as a useful
buffer against the external shocks and provide a bridge period for actors
to adjust their paces, and moreover, can provide necessary or even indispensable sources for reducing uncertainty in hard times as Japan now
faces, why should we not expect such a mechanism to facilitate rather than
block institutional adaptation? In other words, the statement that the process of coordinated adjustment is less efficient than that of autonomous
adjustment may not be necessarily held for Japan’s case without further
evidence. Therefore, although Witt provides us with thought-provoking
propositions on the mechanism responsible for Japan’s slow adaptation,
in the absence of clear evaluation of the benefits and costs brought by social coordination and social networks, both his account of the pattern of
institutional adjustment and his prescriptions for faster adaptation are yet
to be justified.
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VA R I E T Y OF R E F OR M S A N D I N S T I T U T I O N A L C H A N G E
In contrast to Anchordoguy’s and Witt’s works, which are mainly concerned with Japan’s institutional inertia and rigidity, Vogel’s work presents
us with a more dynamic picture of institutional adaptation and change under the impetus of economic pressures. In this ambitious study, Vogel provides one of the most comprehensive analyses of current reforms that the
Japanese government and private sectors are undertaking since the 1990s,
ranging from labor relations and financial system to corporate governance
and supply networks. More importantly, he is able to capture and theorize
the actual patterns in which these institutions are evolving, which constitutes a valuable contribution given Japan’s currently complicated situation.
As with Anchordoguy and Witt, Vogel draws attention to the fact that the
essence of Japan’s model has been preserved despite the ongoing reform
process to liberalize the economy. However, he contends that existing institutions do not merely act as an impediment for further reforms, but actively
shape the trajectories of institutional change by enabling institutional innovation. Through empirically rich analysis and sophisticated assessment,
Vogel convincingly demonstrates that government agencies and industries
in Japan have strived to adjust to environmental change as much as possible by maintaining and making new use out of existing institutions.
Vogel’s work not only contributes to the understanding of Japan’s common mode of institutional adaptation, but also elucidates helpfully the
variation of reforms across issue areas and industries. He finds that in areas that are more exposed to US pressures, such as liberalizing stock commissions, and those that are relatively less politicized, such as corporate
law and accounting, reforms have progressed relatively faster. By contrast,
Japan has moved slowly and cautiously in resolving its banking crisis and
combating deflation, the area that has experienced the most severe crisis.
In terms of corporate restructuring, Vogel finds that the pace of reforms
varies depending on corporate performance, ownership, production patterns and age of the industry. Among them, foreign ownership has had a
clear impact on the degree of restructuring, as illustrated in his comparison of Toyota and Nissan. Whereas the former strengthened its ties with
suppliers and refused to convert to a more liberal model, the later started
the radical restructuring under a dramatic ‘revival plan’.
The cross issue and cross industry comparisons depart from Anchordoguy and Witt’s depictions, which took a somewhat monolithic view on
institutional inertia or adjustment across the whole nation. Vogel paints a
more sophisticated picture of how agents respond and adapt to pressure
in different patterns and in various rates. Moreover, as Vogel suggests, this
raises the question to the VOC perspective of ‘how tightly the different
parts of the Japanese system are linked’ (Vogel, 2006: 113). Particularly, variation across issue area implies that institutional complementarities might
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be overstated. The increasing diversity among Japanese corporations questions the monolithic model of capitalism on the national level and suggests
the possibility for different models to coexist within national boundaries.
Patterned innovation
For Vogel (2006: 216), patterned innovation, meaning ‘innovation shaped
by existing institutions’, constitutes the core mode of adjustment in Japan
since the 1990s. This pattern, Vogel suggests, differs from both the fundamental breaks with the past that Japan experienced in the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War or the routine adjustments prevalent in the
1970s. While the existing institutions have left a heavy imprint on various
reform measures and have prevented Japan from converging on the liberal
market model, the prolonged economic crisis and the growing pressures
from global market have propelled actors to go beyond routine adjustments. Thus actors respond by leveraging the benefits of existing institutions
to ride out their problems. For example, Vogel finds that Japanese firms
utilized dense corporate networks to shift lifetime employment guarantee
from the firm to the corporate group or to transfer their excess workers to
subsidiaries so as to cut labor costs without violating their previous commitment. The financial sector has transformed to universal banking, but
firms and banks have not abandoned each other; instead, they have drawn
on their close ties to renegotiate new relations in the face of economic stagnation. MITI (METI since 2001) has maintained the tools of industrial policy
and its close relation with private sectors, but has used them for upgrading
technological capabilities and facilitating corporate restructuring instead
of providing direct guidance. Government and industry have together preserved the essence of Japan’s core institutions yet remodeled the economy
into a more selective, more differentiated and more open system.
Through these empirical examples, Vogel sheds light on the way in which
industries and government actively devise innovative solutions for new
problems instead of being entirely constrained by institutional settings.
Compared with Anchordoguy and Witt, who place emphasis on the negative effects of the strong norms that agents committed to or the dense
social networks that they are enmeshed in, Vogel takes a more optimistic
tone about the useful resources existing institutions can provide and the
capacity of adaptation that agents possess, although within an acceptable
range circumscribed by existing norms and institutions. Given the uneven
pace and the ambivalent results of reforms suggested in the three works,
it would be too early to come to any final judgment about Japan’s overall
institutional adaptability. Yet Vogel’s work usefully reminds us that even
when the main attributes of institutions remain in place, there is the possibility of what Thelen has termed ‘institutional conversion’, the situation
in which actors innovatively use old institutions to serve new purpose
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and drive institutions to gradually evolve in new directions (Thelen,
2004).
Vogel further adds breadth to his study by placing Japan within an
comparative perspective and contrasting its reform and restructuring process with that of Germany and US. Building on the VOC approach, he
finds that different comparative institutional advantage has not only produced different types of economies, but also different styles of reforms
and solutions. For example, since US corporations are less reliant on longterm cooperative relations with workers, banks, and suppliers, they have
pursued liberalization and restructuring much more aggressively than
their Japanese counterparts through policies of deregulation and through
large-scale downsizing of workforce. Germany’s similar institutional contexts with Japan have produced like-minded ambivalence about liberal
reforms. But since German corporate networks are not as dense as Japan’s
keiretsu, they have not used job transfers within corporate groups, but have
chosen to shorten work hours and design early retirement plans. These differences provide good support for Vogel’s ‘patterned innovation’ argument
that actors can both maintain the essence of existing institutions and utilize
them as rich resources in revising the system. Meanwhile it also sheds new
light on the VOC perspective by showing that comparative institutional
advantages do not only produce variety of capitalist systems, but can also
influence the ways in which the national economy gradually evolves and
results in a variety of reforms.
An integrated model of institutional change
Based on the varieties of reform in Japan, Vogel proposes a model of institutional change that is not only helpful in capturing the pattern of reforms in
Japan, but also contributes to the theoretical understanding of institutional
dynamics more broadly. His model first of all provides a complementary
understanding of the diversified logic of institutional analyses. Different
from Anchordoguy’s and Witt’s studies, which tend to emphasize the sociological interpretation of actors’ interests (either shaped by social norms
or influenced by networks), Vogel suggests that it would be more useful to
integrate the simple cost–benefit analysis from economic calculation, the
comparative institutional logic from VOC approach, and the social considerations from the sociological perspective into what he calls ‘three circles
of rationality’. For example, he finds a combination of three logics to various degrees in his detailed case studies of how companies simultaneously
reduce costs to increase efficiency, reorganize to enhance their comparative
institutional advantage, and respond to changing social norms. Instead of
trying to identify which logic trumps another, Vogel sheds light on how
they interact and combine to shape final reform outcomes.
More importantly, Vogel’s model brings to light the crucial role of micro–
macro interaction in shaping the path of institutional evolution. On the one
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hand, he builds on the VOC perspective and emphasizes the micro logic
of macro-level policies. Critical to political economy models that directly
deduce industry policy preferences from actors’ macro position within an
economy, he suggests that firm level preferences, mediated through political institutions, can further shape and modify macro policy preferences.
In the case of Japan, this is reflected in how firm level attitudes towards
reforms were aggregated by industry associations so as to influence the
decision-making process of political parties and government leaders. On
the other hand, Vogel also demonstrates how macro-level policies, such as
government laws and regulations, modify the constraints and opportunities for micro-level actors and shape their possible strategies of responding
to change. This is shown, for example, in ways by which firms and banks
leverage benefits of existing institutions to deal with policies in employment and financial regulations. By exploring the pattern of micro–macro
interactions, Vogel sheds light on how adjustments at one level affect adjustments at the other level and how government and industry interact
repeatedly to produce a transformation in a path-dependent yet creative
way.
C ONC L U S I ON: J A PA NE S E C A P I TA L I S M I N T R A N S I T I O N
The three volumes have collectively highlighted the ways in which
Japanese capitalism is evolving sine the 1980s, focusing, respectively, on
the sources of institutional inertia, the mechanism of institutional adjustment, and the patterns of institutional change. On the one hand, they agree
that Japan has not experienced a fundamental break with the past and has
strived to preserve as much as possible the core elements of its capitalism,
among which are lifetime employment, seniority wages, keiretsu networks,
and bank credit-based financial system. On the other hand, they also find
that existing institutions and practices do not stand still, but are constantly
contested and gradually revised under gaiatsu and naiatsu (foreign and domestic pressures).Their scholarship demonstrates that in the case of Japan,
it is not helpful to separate the understanding of institutional continuity
from that of change, and it is more appropriate to conceive its capitalist system as a set of constantly evolving institutions and norms instead
of a stable equilibrium. Furthermore, their works suggest the importance
of going beyond simple cost–benefit calculation of economic interests in
understanding the behaviors of government and industries. Particularly,
existing institutions and norms have shaped the ways in which actors perceive their interests, define their menu of available strategies, and aggregate
their preferences in particular ways to influence the pattern and pace of
reforms.
Nevertheless, these three studies differ on their observation and theoretical understanding of Japan’s institutional continuity and change.
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Anchordoguy sees changes since the late 1980s or 1990s as overwhelmingly incremental, fundamentally communitarian, and extremely limited.
She gives predominant attention to the overarching norms characterizing
Japan’s capitalism, which penetrate various economic practices, stifle the
emergence of new firms, ideas, and organizational forms, create strong
institutional inertia, and delay the steps of institutional adaptation of the
whole economy. Witt shares a similar view regarding the limitation of
Japan’s change, but concentrates on examining how micro-level business
networks, as an important mechanism for a high level of social coordination and low level of deviant behavior, contribute to the slow rate of
institutional adjustment. By contrast, Vogel sees more variation in reform
pace, and draws attention to how the Japanese model shapes its own path
of transformation at both the macro- and the micro-levels and how government and industries interact with each other in making innovative use
of existing institutions to solve new problems.
How can these three divergent findings be reconciled when they seem
to base their interpretations on largely the same sets of empirical facts?
Do the authors merely see what they look for through their own colored
glasses? Further empirical evidence must be consulted to assess the merits of these different models, given that the current outcome of Japan’s
reform is ambivalent at best. Yet taken together, there is a good reason
to believe that Japanese capitalism has been revising and adapting itself
to the new conditions. First, it is doubtful whether existing institutional
arrangements are as unfavorable for Japan’s adaptation to new environment as Anchorchoduy and Witt suggest, particularly in consideration
of the inadequacies of their works in justifying causal relations between
norms or networks and their actual influence on institutional adjustment.
Meanwhile, the extent to which adjustment and change is thwarted by institutional complementarities may be overstated. For example, both Witt
and Vogel have identified foreign ownership as an important impetus for
more merit-based and shareholder-friendly restructuring and a potential
source to unravel institutional complementarities.
Moreover, the period of economic transition as what Japan and many
other CMEs are now experiencing is particularly characterized by a high
degree of uncertainty and intense debate of norms, ideas and policies,
as shown in all three studies. Under such circumstances, entrepreneurial
agents are expected to play larger roles in articulating and advancing their
interests as opposed to more stable time when they often simply follow
conventional rules, norms and procedures. The three studies show to various degrees that government agencies such as MITI (METI) and several
leading firms such as Nissan have played crucial roles in defying and modifying previous practices, diffusing new ideas, packaging delicate compromises, and making cautious steps towards liberalization. Institutions thus
not only condition and constrain agents’ behaviors as Anchordoguy and
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Witt suggest, but can also become important resources that actors draw
on to search and negotiate for new solutions. This is a perspective embodied in Vogel’s notion of ‘patterned innovation’ and also advocated by
Hall and Thelen’s recent study which uses the ‘institutions as resources’
approach in understanding institutional change in VOC (Hall and Thelen,
2005). This perspective is particularly important for examining institutional
development as in contemporary Japan and Germany, where various institutions, while conditioned by their previous paths, are less likely to evolve
automatically but are typically subjected to the contestation and maneuvering of politicians, bureaucrats and firms. Such contestation and revision
processes, as Vogel illustrates, should not be conceived as only taking place
at the micro-level, but should be better captured by the micro–macro loop
running through the dynamic interactions between government policymakers and business actors.
However, greater tension exists among the messages these works carry
about Japan’s future and the policy implications they contain. While they
all seem to agree that it is unlikely for Japan to completely converge on the
US model, they divide fundamentally on the desirability of transferring to
a US style liberal market model. Anchordoguy expresses the most direct
criticism for Japan’s hesitance in reforming current system, regarding this
as a process in which ‘Japanese are languishing together’ (Anchordoguy,
2005: 234). She argues that Japan needs to redefine its social norms so as to
give greater role for market competition in order to overcome the quandary.
In other words, Japan must negotiate a new ‘social contract’ that would
not only offer a safety net for those who fail but also reward those who
succeed. Witt recommends a more careful weighing of cost and benefits in
transforming to a US style system, but shares the fundamental concern that
‘the stability under which coordinated market economies seem to thrive
may never return’ (Witt, 2006: 189). He sees the least risky approach for
Japan to solve the current problem is not to destroy societal coordination,
but to increase its adaptive responsiveness and to create more room for
autonomous adjustments. Yet he views the adoption of such a change as
a process which is lengthy and arduous, if not impossible. Vogel holds a
more cautious attitude towards liberal market reforms and suggests that
there is no clear evidence whether imitating the US model will indeed
benefit Japan. He implicitly argues against abandoning the old model and
an immediate switch to liberal norms and institutions. Instead, he holds
a more optimistic view than both Anchordoguy’s and Witt’s and sees the
gradual revision of the Japanese model based on learning and innovation
process as a reasonable and plausible response to current problems.
Exploring the essence of this disagreement brings our attention to the
ongoing struggle of two forces at a broader level: the force of globalization,
liberalization and deregulation that propel national economies to converge
on the liberal market models on the one hand, and the force of historically
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evolved national institutional settings that maintain the variety of capitalist systems on the other hand. To be sure, the case of Japan involves
problems accumulated from its specific developmental path and is further
complicated by the bursting of financial bubbles. Nevertheless, it constitutes an important example of how CMEs respond to the tension of these
two forces.
The VOC literature predicts that even under the pressure of liberalization and deregulation, one should still expect to see a bifurcation between
CMEs and LMEs, as firms and government will struggle to maintain their
comparative institutional advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 58). However, a crucial question raised by Anchordoguy and Witt in their volumes
is to what extent such advantages continue to exist for CMEs in general and
for Japan in particular. While CMEs may have sustained the resurgence of
liberal markets since 1970s, it seems more dubitable, as noted by Anchordoguy and Witt, whether they can sustain the gale of ‘creative destruction’
advanced by technological revolution and the overwhelmingly severe international competition since 1980s and 1990s. Such an era of increased
uncertainty and competition may be inherently at odds with stability, social coordination and incremental innovation, the hallmarks of CMEs. In
particular, a series of liberal reforms that Japan and Germany launched in
recent years suggest there may indeed be an asymmetry regarding institutional change leaning towards the direction of LMEs.
On the other hand, however, if we place the current situation into a
longer historical perspective, as some scholars have suggested, the current
turmoil aroused by the technological breakthrough may be followed by a
maturation phase, a period more suitable for Japan and Germany to explore their institutional advantages (Boyer, 2003; Yamamura, 2003). While
it remains to be seen whether this period will eventually come, the case
of Japan shows that even under the current unfavorable circumstances –
the dual pressures of international competition and domestic crisis – the
institutions of CMEs are not as fragile and easy to destroy as some suppose. Other evidence has indicated that the differences between CMEs and
LMEs have even widened rather than narrowed in recent years (Hall and
Soskice, 2003). It is further possible, as suggested in Vogel’s study, for multiple models to coexist within national boundaries instead of having one
coherent model dominating the entire economy. Moreover, even though
CMEs are all transforming into more liberalized and more open economic
systems, the ways in which they reform their economy and the degree
of liberalization they seek to pursue are likely to diverge among various
institutional settings. These observations call for in-depth studies on the
sources, mechanisms and patterns of institutional inertia, adjustment and
change in CMEs represented by the three important works reviewed in
this article.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Mark Blyth, Peter Hall, Kellee Tsai, and Kate Weaver
for their insightful comments. I would also like to thank Hitomi Koyama
for her generous help throughout the writing process.
NOTES
1 Yokonarabi competition literally refers to horizontal competition while lined up
side by side or homogeneous competition (Anchordoguy, 2005: 13–16). The
notion insists on keeping the same pace and quality among competitors rather
than outmaneuvering.
2 In the stakeholder view, according to Witt, the owners and the employees should
both participate in the selection of managers, whereas in the shareholder view,
the owners should run their business or appoint the manager.
3 Witt attributes the causes of this phenomenon to Japan’s insular geography, the
continued legitimacy that current economic institutions enjoy, and the conformity pressures deriving from established norms.
NOT E S O N C O N T R I B U T O R
Ling Chen is a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science, Johns
Hopkins University. Her research interests include political economy of China and
East Asia. In addition to RIPE, her article has also appeared in New Political Economy.
In a forthcoming paper, she examines the changing patterns of political struggle in
China’s market reforms. She is currently also interested in the political economy of
ruinous competition in China’s manufacturing industry.
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