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International Journal for the Psychology
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Religious Concepts as Structured
Imagination
Helen De Cruz
a
a
Facult y of Philosophy, Universit y of Oxford, Unit ed Kingdom
b
Cent re for Logic and Analyt ic Philosophy, Cat holic Universit y of
Leuven, Belgium
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The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 23:63–74, 2013
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ISSN: 1050-8619 print/1532-7582 online
DOI: 10.1080/10508619.2013.735495
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Religious Concepts as Structured Imagination
Helen De Cruz
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Oxford, United Kingdom
Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
What cognitive processes underlie the generation of religious concepts? This study investigates
the creative processes involved in religious concept formation from the perspective of structured
imagination. It examines whether the generation of novel religious entities is structured by universal
features of human cognition that are hypothesized in the cognitive science of religion literature, in
particular regarding the degree to which religious beings are anthropomorphic, their level of counterintuitiveness, and their moral character. In this study, participants freely imagined and described
aliens and alien religious beings. Results suggest that spontaneously imagined religious beings are
perceived as less anthropomorphic than aliens, that aliens are conveyed in more counterintuitive
terms than religious beings, and that religious beings are described more frequently in terms of
moral properties than aliens.
IMAGINING RELIGIOUS BEINGS
Theories about the nature of religious imagination have an ancient history. The Greek preSocratic philosopher Xenophanes (6th century BC) famously speculated that religious imagination is structured by the way we conceptualize human beings:
If cattle or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do,
they would paint their gods and give them bodies in form like their own—horses like horses, cattle
like cattle.
To date, the question of religious creativity remains largely unexplored in the cognitive science
of religion (CSR). Most research on religious concepts has focused on the transmission of
Correspondence should be sent to Helen De Cruz, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Woodstock Road,
OX2 6GG Oxford, United Kingdom. E-mail: helen.decruz@hiw.kuleuven.be
63
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religious ideas (e.g., Boyer & Ramble, 2001) rather than on their generation; Guthrie’s (1993)
theoretical work on the role of anthropomorphism in religion is a notable exception. Such
studies explore why religious concepts are culturally successful in terms of their memorability.
However, cultural transmission is constrained not only by the recall of ideas but also by
their emergence. A better understanding of the cognitive constraints that underlie religious
imagination may promote new insights into religious cognition. This article aims to examine
cognitive processes that underlie the imagination of novel religious concepts.
Because “imagination” is a term with a wide range of common and scientific meanings,
I use this term in the restrictive sense of Ward (1994), namely as “the deliberate mental
generation of some novel entity” (p. 2). The experimental design and theoretical background
of this study is inspired by Ward’s theoretical and experimental work on structured imagination
(e.g., Ward, 1994; Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, Dodds, & Saunders, 2002; Ward & Sifonis, 1997).
These studies indicate that when participants create a new member of a known category, their
imagination is structured by properties that are characteristic for this category. In a series of
experiments, Ward (1994) showed that when people have to imagine alien creatures, they draw
beings that resemble vertebrate animals on Earth, with bilateral symmetry, sense organs such
as eyes and ears, and animal-like body parts such as arms or legs. This was even the case
when they were explicitly instructed to invent creatures that were widely different from Earth
animals (Ward & Sifonis, 1997). Structured imagination was also found in other categories
of objects, such as tools or fruits (Ward et al., 2002). These experiments indicate that human
creativity is constrained by prior conceptual knowledge.
The present study examines whether structured imagination is also at work in religious
concept formation, through a comparison of imagined aliens and alien religious beings. Because
this is as yet a poorly researched domain, the study is exploratory in nature. To make informed
predictions on how structured imagination influences the generation of religious concepts, I
draw on theoretical and empirical work in CSR.
HOW IS RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION STRUCTURED?
CSR examines religious beliefs and behaviors in terms of ordinary thoughts about natural entities. According to scholars working in CSR (e.g., Barrett, 2004), the generation and transmission
of religious beliefs is not solely a product of cultural factors but is also influenced by cognitive
biases that are cross-culturally present. If this is the case, we can expect the imagination of
religious entities to be constrained by these cognitive biases. Indeed, although the diversity of
religious concepts across cultures is considerable, some religious ideas are more widespread
than others. For example, Boyer (2001) remarked that zombies are less culturally prevalent than
ghosts and that no one has come up with gods that exist only on Wednesdays. In what follows, I
briefly review CSR theories on the formation of religious concepts to derive testable predictions
on the role of stable human cognitive biases in the imagination of religious concepts.
Features of Religious Beings
What do religious entities look like? According to Guthrie (1993), religious beliefs are a byproduct of our ability to detect agents, an ability we share with other animals. Because our
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RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AS STRUCTURED IMAGINATION
65
agency detection may be hypersensitive, we sometimes may erroneously infer the presence of
agents, giving rise to supernatural concepts like ghosts. Guthrie specified that the most important
agents in our evolutionary history are other humans. Consequently, he thinks that mental
constructions of religious beings are to some extent likely to be anthropomorphic. By contrast,
Bloom (2004) argued that humans are intuitive dualists. He contended that humans, from
infancy onward, make a distinction between minds and bodies: We reason about other people’s
actions not in terms of their bodily properties but in terms of invisible mental states, such as
beliefs, desires, and intentions. As a result, we can easily imagine disembodied minds. Bloom
regards the belief in spirits, gods, and other religious beings as by-products of this intuitive
dualism. Hodge (2012) outlined a third position. He claimed that we do not spontaneously
imagine religious beings as entirely disembodied or entirely embodied. Rather, because we are
more interested in another agent’s intentions, desires, and goals than we are in their mundane
biological functions, we tend to focus on only those body parts that are relevant for social
interactions, such as the face. These three models lead to differing predictions of the features
that would be present in spontaneously imagined religious beings. They could be to some extent
anthropomorphic (Guthrie), be disembodied minds (Bloom), or have anthropomorphic features
that are relevant for social interaction (Hodge). To assess these competing claims, I examine
whether imagined religious beings have body parts and sense organs similar to humans, and I
compare this with the features of imagined space aliens.
Counterintuitiveness
An influential theory in CSR (e.g., Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2001) proposes that religious ideas
are minimally counterintuitive (MCI). “Counterintuitive” is used in the restrictive sense of
“violation of ontological expectations.” According to Boyer (2001), humans have cognitive
mechanisms that allow them to make inferences about broad categories of objects in the world
(ontological categories), such as inanimate objects, plants, animals, and persons. MCI concepts
violate these ontological expectations, for example, a chair that walks violates our expectations
about inanimate objects. Boyer (2001) argued that such concepts enjoy a high cultural success
because they balance on a cognitive optimum: they arouse our attention but still mostly adhere
to our category-based expectations. Is MCIness also specific to religious concepts? This seems
doubtful, because not all MCI concepts are religious. For example, several studies indicate
that the most successful (secular) stories and folktales have MCI elements, such as talking
animals or pumpkins turning into carriages (Barrett, Burdett, & Porter, 2009; Norenzayan,
Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2006).
Still, MCIness is regarded as a central property of religious concepts. Pyysiäinen, Lindeman, and Honkela (2003) presented Finnish participants with imaginary beliefs with varying
levels of counterintuitiveness. They showed that counterintuitive representations in general, and
counterintuitive representations involving conscious agents in particular, are more likely to be
considered religious. Thus, counterintuitiveness may be an important—if only tacit—part of
our folk concept of religion. However, it remains unclear whether religious concepts are MCI
when they are first imagined, or whether MCIness is perhaps a result of memory distortion
during cultural transmission. Barrett and Nyhof (2001), using a design that simulated cultural
transmission, found that people frequently distorted concepts to the effect that they became
MCI (e.g., a significant number of participants remembered a bright pink newspaper blown by
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the wind as walking or running). This article examines to what extent religious beings exhibit
MCIness when they are spontaneously imagined. I also test whether there is a difference in
MCIness between spontaneously imagined religious beings and aliens.
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Moral Properties
Several theories in CSR (see Schloss & Murray, 2011, for an overview) have argued that religious beings with moral properties are widespread across cultures, because such entities—who
can punish or reward behavior—successfully enhance cooperation and altruism within human
groups. Adaptationist accounts of religion regard its policing role as psychologically central
(e.g., Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). If religious imagination is indeed structured by stable
human intuitions regarding moral, supernatural agents, one can predict that imagining religious
beings elicits a higher percentage of moral terms compared to nonreligious entities. I examine
whether imagining religious beings elicits more descriptions involving moral properties, such
as ethical good and evil, norm violations, and punishments and rewards, than imagining aliens.
To summarize, the present study sought to explore three questions. First, are spontaneously
imagined religious beings best characterized as anthropomorphic (Guthrie, 1993), disembodied
(Bloom, 2004) or in between, with an emphasis on social interaction (Hodge, 2012)? Second,
how counterintuitive are imagined novel “gods”? Finally, is some connection to moral or
normative concerns a common feature of imagined supernatural beings?
METHOD
Participants
Undergraduate philosophy students at a Belgian university (N D 88, M age D 22.6 years,
percentage of women D 45.9%) were recruited from several introductory classes in philosophy
and participated on a voluntary basis.
Materials and Procedure
Each participant received a questionnaire in Dutch, with two questions, each printed on a
separate page. They completed the questionnaire individually in a lecture room. The procedure
followed Ward’s experiments on structured imagination (e.g., Ward, 1994; Ward et al., 2002)
but required written responses instead of drawings. Participants were asked to imagine (a) an
alien being that is very different from life-forms on Earth, and (b) a religious, supernatural
being in which aliens that are very different from life-forms on Earth believe. The participants
were encouraged to be creative but were not informed that the study probed religious concept
formation. The order of the tasks was reversed in half of the questionnaires to control for
possible order effects.
The term “being” (in Dutch wezen, literally, “something that is”) was used rather than
“agent” or “life-form” because the former is neutral with respect to category membership. As
the task aimed to probe religious imagination in an unconstrained manner, no limits on word
RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AS STRUCTURED IMAGINATION
67
count were imposed—participants were asked to use as much space as they needed to provide
a detailed description of their imagined entities.
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Coding
Two independent coders with no prior knowledge of theories in structured imagination or CSR
coded the responses for the following items: (a) body parts and sense organs, (b) resemblance
between space aliens and religious beings, (c) counterintuitiveness, and (d) presence of terms
denoting ethical norms. The coders were instructed not to code the descriptions if they thought
the information was insufficient or ambiguous. Disagreements were resolved during intercoder
discussion. Where disagreements remained, the items were excluded from the analysis.
1. Body parts and sense organs. This coding followed the procedure in Ward (1994). The
coders rated each written response for presence of standard Earth animal senses (eyes,
ears, nose, and mouth) and appendages (head, hands, arms, feet, legs, tail, wings, fins).
Only body parts that were explicitly mentioned were included.
2. Resemblance between aliens and religious beings. Coders were asked to check whether
a description of an alien religious being explicitly mentioned that the religious beings
were similar to the aliens; they categorically coded this as either “yes” or “no.”
3. Counterintuitiveness. Barrett’s (2008) coding scheme was used to assess counterintuitiveness of religious and nonreligious imagined items. Briefly stated, the first step of
the coding scheme is to assign the item to a basic category (e.g., CHAIR, CLOUD, DOG).
On the basis of this, it is placed in one of five high-level ontological categories: spatial
entity (entities that are not solid with a particular location in space, such as clouds,
gasses, light sources), solid object (artifacts such as chairs, and natural objects such as
stones), living thing that is not self-propelled (e.g., plants, lichen, fungi), self-propelled
living thing (animals), and person (entities with intelligence, complex mental states, a
personality). Each of these ontological categories is associated with a set of ontological
expectations. For example, a person has internal mental states, desires, and intentions,
but a living thing that is not self-propelled or a solid object lack these. Next, violations
or transfers of ontological expectations are recorded. An example of a transfer is a
HAPPY CHAIR, which is a solid object with mentality transferred. An example of a
violation is an INVISIBLE CHAIR, a solid object that has a violation in expectations
about physicality (we expect solid objects to be visible). Adding the total number of
violations and transfers gives a counterintuitiveness score. In the case of a HAPPY,
INVISIBLE CHAIR, the counterintuitiveness score is 2. Objects with a counterintuitiveness
score of 1 are regarded as cognitively optimal for recollection and transmission (Barrett
et al., 2009).
4. Moral properties. Both coders examined the descriptions for terms indicating moral
properties (e.g., “evil,” “good,” “wrong,” “sinful,” “virtuous”) and punishment or reward
(e.g., “penance,” “retribution,” “reward”). They were instructed to code the descriptions
categorically as either “absent” or “present.” Given that the moral character of some
words (e.g., “good”) depends on the context, coders were encouraged to carefully look
at the context to decide whether the description contained moral terms.
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RESULTS
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Participants produced written descriptions of aliens and alien religious beings in Dutch. The
order of tasks (i.e., religious being first or alien first) did not significantly influence the
dependent variables being tested. Because of the openness of the design, the descriptions
were of variable length. For the aliens, the mean word count was 82.4 (range D 3–445, SD D
67.3); for the religious beings, the count was 65.7 (range D 12–354, SD D 51.9).
Presence of Body Parts
Kendall’s Tau-b was used to calculate consistency among coders; concordance between the
two coders was high ( D 0.914). To compare the number of body parts and sense organs,
a Wilcoxon signed rank test for related measures was conducted. Participants mentioned
significantly more senses and appendages for the aliens (M D 1.52, range D 0–17, SD D
2.73) than for the alien religious beings (M D 0.35, range D 0–8, SD D 1.22), n D 73, z D
4.139, p < .001. Type of being significantly predicted the number of appendages and sense
organs controlling for narrative length (ˇ D .208), t(157) D 2.889, p D .004. Example
1 (see the appendix) shows the description of an alien and a religious being by the same
participant.
Although body parts and sense organs were not entirely absent from descriptions of the
religious beings (Table 1), they were fewer in number than those of the aliens. There was
a significantly smaller percentage of descriptions of religious beings (12.9%) that mentioned
body parts compared to the aliens (54.3%), 2 (1, 160) D 2.02, p < .001. A post hoc test was
conducted to examine to what extent descriptions of beings were explicitly anthropomorphic
(i.e., where participants either explicitly mentioned that the beings looked like humans or
gave a description of an upright being with a head and eyes at the top). This percentage was
relatively low: 11% of the alien religious beings and 19% of the aliens were described as
anthropomorphic; this difference was not significant.
TABLE 1
Frequencies of Common Appendages and Sense Organs
for the Two Types of Imagined Beings
Appendages and Sense Organs
Arms
Legs
Hands
Feet
Eyes
Ears
Nose
Head
Mouth
Hair, feathers, fur, scales
Aliens
Alien Religious
Beings
3
9
5
3
14
2
5
17
9
7
0
0
0
0
7
3
1
5
1
2
RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AS STRUCTURED IMAGINATION
69
Resemblance Between Aliens and Religious Beings
Coders looked for explicit reference to a resemblance between the aliens and their religious
beings. Intercoder agreement was high at D 0.905. Of the 88 descriptions of religious
beings, 21 (i.e., 23.9%) explicitly mentioned that the religious beings resembled the aliens (see
Example 2, appendix).
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Counterintuitiveness
Coders first assigned each item to a basic category (e.g., INSECT) and subsequently to a higher
level ontological category (e.g., animal). Intercoder agreement about ontological categories
was good ( D 0.865). There was a significant difference in category membership between
the aliens and the alien religious beings, 2 (4, 140) D 2.81, p < .001. Post hoc tests revealed
which differences were driving these effects: Religious beings were significantly more often
categorized as spatial entities (50%), such as clouds, flames, and shadows compared to aliens
(21.1%), 2 (1, 140) D 11.67, p D .001. Aliens, on the other hand, were more categorized as
self-propelled living things (26.3%) compared to the religious beings (6.2%), 2 (1, 140) D
8.4, p D .004 (see Figure 1).
Coders registered violations and transfers of ontological expectations. Intercoder agreement
was satisfactory at 74.2% (Kendall tau-b D 0.715). Cases in which there was disagreement
about ontological category membership were excluded from the analysis; the remaining cases
were solved by discussion. In this way, 58 valid pairs of aliens and alien religious beings
remained for the analysis. As an illustration of the kinds of items that were generated and their
coding, see Examples 3 to 5 (appendix) for beings with differing levels of counterintuitiveness.
None of the participants came up with items that had a counterintuitiveness score higher
than 3. The aliens had a significantly higher level of counterintuitiveness (M D 1.1, range D
FIGURE 1 Percentages of ontological category use for aliens and alien religious beings (Color figure
available online).
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0–3, SD D 0.99) compared to the alien religious beings (M D 0.6, range D 0–3, SD D
0.89), Wilcoxon signed rank test for related measures, two-tailed (n D 59, z D 2.593, p D
.01). This difference remained significant when controlling for narrative length. Type of being
significantly predicted counterintuitiveness when controlling for narrative length (ˇ D .199),
t(137) D 2.422, p D .017. Although religious beings had a lower MCI score, this result was
still significantly above a test score of 0 (one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < .01).
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Moral Properties
Coders examined the descriptions for terms indicating moral properties. Intercoder agreement
was excellent at D 0.960. A significantly higher number of descriptions of religious entities
(11, 12.5%) mentioned ethical terms compared to those of alien beings (2, 2.27%), p D .047,
Fisher’s exact test, two-tailed. Example 6 (see appendix) provides a description with moral
properties.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to gain new insights into religious imagination. The first question
focused on the spontaneously imagined religious beings. Were their depictions anthropomorphic
(Guthrie, 1993), disembodied (Bloom, 2004), or in between (i.e., with an emphasis on social
interaction; Hodge, 2012)? The results do not fall clearly in line with either Guthrie’s or Bloom’s
position: Alien religious beings had fewer body parts than the aliens, but body parts were not
entirely absent in the religious beings. Similar to earlier studies (e.g., Ward, 1994), aliens
were conceptualized in terms of the properties commonly attributed to Earth creatures, having
Earth-like senses and appendages. Aliens were significantly more likely to be conceptualized as
animals than the religious beings. On the other hand, the alien “gods” had fewer body parts, and
they were more frequently conceptualized as spatial entities such as clouds or flames compared
to the aliens (50% of participants saw the alien religious beings as spatial entities, and 32.8%
described them as persons, see Figure 1). As Table 1 indicates, eyes were the most commonly
mentioned body parts for religious beings and the second most common characteristic for
aliens. Guthrie (2002) argued that sensitivity to the presence of eyes, which is present in a
wide variety of vertebrates, is central to our recognition of living things. The presence of eyes
also corresponds with Boyer’s (2001) proposal that the most culturally successful supernatural
agents are not just MCI but also have strategic information (i.e., special access to information
relevant to social relationships). The following excerpt from a long description (354 words,
written by a 20-year-old male student) of an alien religious being provides an illustration of
this: “This God would be big and sovereign. He would possess some sort of all-seeing, allhearing, etc. senses in order to follow everything that goes on.” The relatively high degree of
abstractness of the imagined religious beings, combined with the overwhelming predominance
of facial features (head, eyes) in the religious beings lends tentative support for a more qualified
position (as outlined by Hodge, 2012), where the body parts of religious beings are mainly
imagined to the extent to which they are relevant to social interactions (the exceptions are
two cases where hair is mentioned; in both the hair is a long, gray beard, in line with some
popular conceptions of the Christian God). Some participants (23.9%) explicitly wrote that
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RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AS STRUCTURED IMAGINATION
71
the alien religious being resembles the alien, indicating that high-level expectations about the
resemblance between aliens and religious beings played a role.
The second research question concerned the counterintuitiveness of religious concepts. In
agreement with theories in CSR (e.g., Boyer, 2001), religious beings were MCI. However,
surprisingly, they were less counterintuitive than the aliens. The latter were in fact closer to the
cognitive optimum of 1 (Barrett et al., 2009) than the former. The greater counterintuitiveness of
aliens may be due to the fact that in popular culture (e.g., movies, comics) aliens are conceived
of as outlandish and remote. Due to their prior exposure to various media, participants may
have been more at home with aliens than with alien religious beings, which may have prompted
them to make move vivid, counterintuitive descriptions.
The finding that the generated items had a low counterintuitiveness score is an interesting
one. It suggests that high levels of counterintuitiveness may not only be demanding when
subjects recall MCI concepts but also when they generate them. The descriptions were in
principle long enough to allow for highly counterintuitive items. The description of “A cat that
can never die, has wings, is made of steel, experiences time backwards, lives underwater, and
speaks Russian” (from Barrett & Nyhof, 2001, p. 93) requires 20 words, only about one fourth
of the average word count for the alien descriptions, yet has a total counterintuitiveness score
of 6. As Barrett and Nyhof (2001) rightly observed, high counterintuitiveness undermines
conceptual structure—the creature they mention is hardly a cat. Thus, human conceptual
cognition may pose intrinsic limitations on the level of counterintuitiveness of spontaneously
generated items. Nevertheless, the results indicate that participants could spontaneously imagine
MCI concepts and that they took relatively little time in doing so: Most participants completed
this task in about 20 min. Therefore, it would seem that MCI concepts, despite their violations
of ontological expectations, are not particularly difficult to generate.
Finally, this study indicates that a significantly higher percentage of descriptions of religious
beings mention moral terms. This suggests that people are more likely to spontaneously come up
with moral properties when inventing religious beings than when they invent aliens. Although
this finding is in line with adaptationist theories in CSR that propose that morality is an
important feature of religious concepts, the percentage was still not very high (12.5%), and
much lower than one would expect if the primary adaptive (biological or cultural) function of
belief in supernatural beings was social regulation. Boyer (2001) argued that being morally
interested (an agent who has access to “strategic information” on our morally relevant actions)
is not a central property of supernatural beings, but rather an additional selection factor that
may further the cultural success of particular agent concepts. The results are thus more in line
with Boyer’s by-product account than with adaptationist explanations.
CONCLUSION
Religious imagination is largely unchartered territory in CSR and the rest of the psychology of
religion. This study has explored to what extent religious imagination is structured according
to features predicted by some of the CSR literature. In a sample of western participants,
religious beings are imagined as abstract (but not entirely disembodied) entities. Religious
beings are MCI, but they are less counterintuitive than imagined aliens. Also, religious beings
are more often described in moral terms compared to aliens. The results indicate that features
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that are commonly associated with religious beings in the CSR literature, such as minimal
counterintuitiveness and moral properties, are not just the result of modifications during cultural transmission but are already present in spontaneously imagined religious beings. An
interesting future extension of this research would be to replicate it with participants from
different religious traditions to control for the effects of preexisting religious concepts on
imagination. For example, one could predict that participants who have more anthropomorphic
god concepts, such as Hindus, would mention more body parts when generating novel religious
concepts.
The design of this study involved an off-line creative task, in which participants had to
explicitly imagine religious concepts. How far can the conclusions drawn from this task be
extrapolated to the online reasoning that is characteristic of actual religious concept formation?
Quasi-experimental investigations in the domain of engineering (e.g., Jansson, Condoor, &
Brock, 1993) and historical case studies of scientific creativity (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2010)
show that structured imagination is a pervasive force in creativity under natural conditions as
well as in experimental conditions. This study has provided tentative support for the role of
structured imagination in religious concept formation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was supported by a grant provided by the Cognition, Religion and Theology Project
at the University of Oxford, funded by the John Templeton Foundation. The views expressed
here are not necessarily those of the funding institution or the University of Oxford. I gratefully
acknowledge support from the organizers of the CRT project in help with designing the study,
especially Justin Barrett, Miguel Farias, Tenelle Porter, Emily Burdett, and Emma Cohen.
Thanks to Stewart Guthrie and Johan De Smedt for their suggestions on an earlier draft and
to three anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.
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DE CRUZ
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APPENDIX
Example Descriptions
Example 1, written by a 24-year-old male student:
Alien: torso C head and four legs with duck feet. Body with scales and cold-blooded. Very intelligent. Writes by
means of protrusions on its head.
Alien religious being: The “upper spirit” elicits visions through shrieks it emits. The aliens write down these
visions in clay tablets using the protrusions on their heads.
Example 2, written by an 18-year-old female student:
Alien religious being: Often one imagines a supernatural being as a reflection of oneself, so the way the
supernatural being looks like is an image of he/she/it.
Example 3, written by an 18-year-old female student:
Alien religious being: The aliens worship a kind of stone with a special shape and made out of a very special sort
of material. This material is deep red in colour and has sparkles.
The coders interpreted this as a STONE (corresponding to the ontological category of solid object) with no
counterintuitiveness, so its counterintuitiveness score was 0.
Example 4, written by an 18-year-old male student:
Alien: The being consists entirely of water. It gets its energy through the sun. It needs the energy to harden and
not to be blown away by the strong winds. Because it is made of water, it can take on several shapes. But this
requires a lot of energy so it only takes on the shapes for a short while. It is neither hungry nor thirsty. It
doesn’t die either since water evaporates. It is a peaceable people, since fighting and murder are pointless.
Usually they live by themselves, but sometimes also in groups.
The coders interpreted this as a spatial entity with a transfer of animacy (a), because it seems to be able to move by
itself (take on different shapes, live in groups). So it was coded a WATER , with a counterintuitiveness score of 1.
Example 5, written by a 39-year-old male student:
Alien religious being: The supernatural beings can take the form of mist or fluid. They can time-travel and take on
any shape they want, but preferably they remain in their natural state (fluid or mist). They can also be at two
places at the same time and only interfere with other beings when their existence is at stake. Although they have
been repeatedly observed, their appearance has been misinterpreted as a natural phenomenon.
The coders interpreted this as a spatial entity with a transfer of animacy (a), and two violations: a violation of
spatiality (s) in the ability to be at two places at once, and a violation of universality (u) in the ability for time
travel, so it was coded a MISTsCu, with a counterintuitiveness score of 3.
Example 6, written by an 18-year-old female student:
Alien religious being: the source of all wisdom and knowledge. Goodness where there is no place for evil.
Note. All examples are translated from Dutch by the author.