Methods of Analysis
Perceptual History
Stephen Petrina (2017)
Perceptual history commonly refers to events recently witnessed and memories (explicit,
implicit, conscious, unconscious) formed to help anticipate or establish object recognition,
sensitivity, or permanence. In this sense, perceptual history is microhistory and challenges us to
account for minute timescales and encounters with minutiae of experience. Perceptual history
acknowledges that “each brain has uniquely marked in it the consequences of a developmental
history and an experiential history” (Edelman, 1998, p. 42).
As the history of perception, perceptual history is often used interchangeably with the history of
body, consciousness, emotion, experience, and the senses (Carp, 1997). Subjective experiences
of qualia or the sensational qualities of hearing, olfaction, sight, taste, and touch animate actors
and have histories. These sensory modalities, along with extrasensoriality, intersensoriality,
kinesthesia, proprioception, and synesthesia, give a phenomenal character to experience. In a
sense, perceptual history is existential history— “the history of intentional life encompasses
more than just personal matters” (e.g., autobiography) (Farin, 2012, p. 22). Emotions, feelings,
and moods, pain and pleasure, colour everyday life and challenge historians to find traces of
expression. First-person and third-person phenomenological records intended to explicitly
document perceptual or preconceptual experience are few and far between. Similarly, client and
patient therapeutic records are not readily archived. This not to say that historians are merely left
with records of perspectives on emotional or perceptual experience rather than actual experiences
of feeling and perception (Stearns & Stearns, 1985). And this is not to say that the focus of
perceptual history is “the mystery of the inner sanctuary of private awareness,” as communal or
shared sensations are common (perhaps more common pre-capitalism) (Herrick, 1945, p. 69).
Nor is perceptual history’s purpose to discriminate illusion from fact. John (ca. 90 CE, 7.24)
writes, “judge not according to the appearance” (nolite judicare secundum faciem [ὄψιν]) but for
perceptual historians this does not necessarily mean that beneath the surface of percept, ideology,
impression, or subjective meaning, lies actuality or reality. This does not necessarily mean that
behind a percept is a concept, behind the somatic is intellect, or behind feeling is being. Here,
perceptual history is a history of misperceptions (e.g., critique of doxasticism, “perceiving is
believing”). On the other hand, perceptual history may focus on how concepts, mentalities, and
being are coloured by perception. Or the focus may be on perception management, which filters
or shapes how things are perceived over time. What did people expect to hear or see in a specific
garden, home, landscape, market, person, sacred space, school, or setting for instance? How did
expectations colour perceptions (Hyde, 1993)? How did expectations shape impressions of
others? How are perceptions and impressions ordered over time into experiences? In Jung’s
terms for example, how is a momentary stereotype interdependent with a timeless archetype?
If conceptual history is a study of “conceptual change,” then perceptual history is a study of
“perceptual change” or how and why phenomena are encountered, entangled, and experienced
differently (Taylor, 1979, p. 18). The challenge is to explore the past of perceptual worlds
assembled, composed, and shared. The challenge is to perceptualize history.
1. Definitions and Scope of Perceptual History
a. Taylor (1979): Intellectual history has always been characterized by its
preoccupation with thought at the point of origin: it tends to be thinker-bound and
idea-centered to the point of becoming a history of intellectuals. (p. 17)
i. It may be presumptuous that it is perception we must now try to
historicize, but the suggestion seems warranted by what has just been said.
Perception has the virtue of referring to a whole range of environmental
responses, of thinking, feeling, seeing. While it can be precise and probing
in its examination of the formulation of ideas, it is too often vague and, in
its generalizations, over arching in its ascription of historical
consequences. The new work, therefore, differs in both scale and in
preoccupation. It also ranges beyond thinking to touch upon a whole
spectrum of human response, of sensory, passional experience. (p. 17)
ii. Some new term seems to be needed that stresses, among other things, the
functional, day-to-day character of human responses as a dimension of
historical change. (p. 18)
b. Cassirer, “Language and Art,” (1942/1979): In art we do not conceptualize the
world, we perceptualize it. But the percepts to which we are led by art are by no
means those perceptions which in the traditional language of the systems of
sensationalism are described as the copies, the faint images of sense-perception.
The imagery of art is of quite a different, nay of the opposite character. Art is not
reproduction of impressions; it is creation of forms. These forms are not abstract,
but sensuous. They would immediately lose their ground, they would evaporate as
soon as we abandon the sphere of our sense experience. (p. 186)
c. Carp (1997): Historical artifacts and texts give evidence of bygone perceptual
reality, but what people said about their perceptions, and our interpretations of the
material culture that engendered and reflected those perceptions, are equivocal
evidence as to how they actually perceived…. If perception is culturally variable,
it is historically variable as well. (p. 270)
i. Our perception is global (pertaining to the whole, rather than its parts),
synaesthetic (involving all the senses at once), and somatic (incorporating
perceptions of my body, its feelings and capacities with perceptions of the
world in which my body finds itself). Perception is also to a large degree
learned. Through our developing perception of the world, including our
own being in the world, we acquire the rich subtlety of adult experience.
(p. 275)
d. Sullivan (2013): scholars are becoming increasingly enthusiastic about exploring
cultural history ‘from the inside out’, in finding new colours in the ‘conditions of
existence’ that inflect the history of everything else. (p. 101)
e.
2. Definition and Scope of the History of Consciousness
a. Collins & Savage (1983): An investigation of the relationship between
consciousness, order and social reality, then, requires that we study consciousness
in history— or, the history of consciousness— which may be formulated along
the lines of T. Kuhn's “paradigms” or M. Foucault's “epistemes,” as the prevalent
time bound “mentality” or “attitude" which shapes and orders private and public
perceptions of social reality. Consciousness, then, appears as the quality of
perceiving order in things. And the history of consciousness is concomitantly a
2
history of changes in modes of perception and modes of communication; it is thus
a history of different “orders.” As Jaynes (1976:66) says, “conscious mind is a
spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts.”
Consciousness creates an analogous world which it bases upon and represents by
language. (p. 92)
3. Definition and Scope of the History of Emotions
a. Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882/2001): So far, all that has given colour to
existence still lacks a history: where could you find a history of love, of avarice,
of envy, of conscience, of piety, of cruelty? (p. 34) (J. Nauckhauff, Trans.)
b. Febvre (1941/1973): Sensibilité (sensibility, sensitivity) is a fairly ancient word. It
appeared in language at least as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century;
the adjective sensibile (sensible, sensitive) had preceded it by a short interval, as
is often the case. During the course of its existence, moreover, as often happens,
sensibilité has taken on various meanings. Some of these are narrow, some are
broad, and they can to a certain extent be situated in time. Thus in the seventeenth
century the word appears above all to refer to a certain responsiveness of the
human being to impressions of a moral nature — there is at that time frequent
mention of sensibilité to the truth, to goodness, to pleasure, etc. In the eighteenth
century the word refers to a particular way of experiencing human feelings —
feelings of pity, sadness, etc. (pp. 12-13)
i. But the word has other meanings. There are semi-scientific and
semiphilosophical meanings which the culture that is handed out in our
schools is tending gradually to uphold. ‘Sensibilité’, Littré began by
saying, ‘is a property of certain parts of the nervous system by means of
which men and animals receive impressions either from external objects or
from within themselves.’ (p. 13)
ii. sensibilité implies… the emotional life of [hu]man[s] and all its
manifestations (‘la vie affective et ses manifestations’)… the role of
emotional activity in the history of huhmanity compared to the role of
intellectual activity. (pp. 13, 25)
iii. if from the outset we lean firmly on the latest critical and positive
achievements of our neighbours the psychologists, then we might, I feel,
be able to undertake a whole series of studies none of which have yet been
done, and as long as they have not been done there will be no real history
possible. No history of love, just remember that. We have no history of
death. We have no history of pity, or of cruelty. We have no history of
joy…. When I say that we have no history of love, no history of joy, you
must realize that I am not asking for a study of love or of joy throughout
all periods, ages and civilizations, I am indicating lines of research. And I
am not doing so with isolated individuals in mind. Or pure physiologists.
Or pure moralists. Or pure psychologists in the usually accepted sense of
the word. Far from that. I am asking for a vast collective investigation to
be opened on the fundamental sentiments of man and the forms they take.
(p. 24)
4. Definitions and Scope of Existential History
a. Simth (1964, pp. 202, 205, 216): There are in fact two distinguishable classes of
historical phenomena: the first we shall call existential history, and the second,
symbolic history. Existential history is the history of the most dramatic and
3
sharply defined episodes of the past…. "Definitive'' existential history may be
written very soon after the termination of the event, and will perhaps be better the
closer it is to the events themselves, allowing always for a "cooling-off" period-a
time long enough for the participant- historian to have second thoughts, to see ~he
dimensions of the conflict which extend beyond his own partisan involvements. It
may also be written some years after the event…. The events of existential history
have the character of dramatic art-the capacity to recover their original form even
after they have been hacked to pieces by the busy analyzer.
b. Bentz & Kenny (1997, p. 94): The existential essence of the world may be
characterized as the phenomenology of the body…. The body and the world come
to us in existential history, and they continue into existential futures.
c. Farin (2012, p. 22): Compared with autobiographical history and its narrow focus
on the person’s particular life story, the history of intentional life encompasses
more than just personal matters. As the center point of intentionality, the
intentional self encompasses or integrates the entire history of (i) all involvements
with the world it has performed in sole responsibility, and (ii) all affects that this
has had on it itself. The history of the self ’s investment in its acts and its
responsibility (acknowledged or unacknowledged) for these acts lie on a different
plane altogether than the account of outward personal accomplishments, the trials
and tribulations, the victories and defeats in life, which make up the stuff of
autobiographies.
i. (p. 23): However, the two sides that we have distinguished here, the
personal and the intentional history, exist only together in the concreteness
of a human being. In fact, what early Heidegger calls Dasein or existence
always refers to this unity of an intentional and personal or
autobiographical self. Accordingly, we shall call the “history” that pertains
to this existing self, “existential history.”
ii. (pp. 23-24): Heidegger then claims that existential history captures, or at
least, comes closest to the original meaning of history, relative to which
the other concepts of history are “derivative” (GA 59: 75). They are real,
but non-original “descendants” of the original meaning and original
experience of existential history. The crucial step for making this claim is
Heidegger’s stipulation of a specific criterion of originality.
d. Heidegger (1920/2010, pp. 45, 46): The `having one’s own past' is based in the
innermost self-worldly directed tendencies and aims at the past as what was
earlier, as the yet still vital part of one's own self-proper [selbsteigentlichen]
tendencies at the time…. History as ownmost past in the correlate of a `having'
that is motivated in only self-worldly directed tendencies.
5. Definition and Scope of Experiential History
a. Dewey, Experience and Nature (1929): It is not experience which is experienced,
but nature— stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and
so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is
experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object— the
human organism— they are how things are experienced as well. Experience thus
reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely
elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference. (pp. 4a-1)
i. Colapietro (2008): In our time, the meaning of experience is inextricably
intertwined with the question of otherness, in its multiple senses, so much
4
so that arguably the question of experience, in our time (as distinct from
when Peirce, James, and Dewey were writing), has for most practical
purposes been transformed into questions concerning alterity. The history
of experience— both what philosophers have tried to identify by this term
and the vagaries to which the word itself has been subjected— is one in
which not only the meaning of this word but also its retention as a pivotal
term of philosophical discourse are called into question, time and again.
(p. 125)
b. Herrick, “The Natural History of Experience” (1945): There is, first, extrospective
experience consciously directed outward toward objects sensed, either within the
body or outside of it, and toward appropriate response to the sensory data…. This
awareness, is subjective, but since it is directed outward toward the objects by
which it is excited it may be termed objective…. In sharp opposition to this is that
subjective [introspective] experience which has no external reference. Here the
knower is set over against the known. These experiences may, apparently, be
emancipated from the limitations of space and time as these are recognized in the
external world. The there may be here in thought, the past in memory and the
future in anticipatory imagination may be tied in with the now of present
experience. (p. 65)
i. The engineer says that a cantilever bridge experiences certain measurable
stresses when a train of cars passes over it, and it reacts to this strain in
measurable ways. The bridge experiences the strain but, so far as we can
tell, it has no scientific knowledge about it… An ameba experiences the
satisfaction of hunger when it devours a smaller animalcule. (p. 59)
c. Eckert & Jones (2002): In recent decades various historiographical activities and
trends have centred on concept of everyday life. The phrase itself is fairly old: la
vie quotidienne was the title a series launched by the French publisher Hachette in
the 1930s. In France the concept social history designed by the Annales school
incorporated from early on a focus upon everyday life…. recently, the debate has
broadened considerably, so that it now includes, for example, history of
experience(s) ('Erfahrungsgeschichte') and micro-history. Finally, concept has
become part of a more general debate about cultural history. There were
numerous reasons for this shift, which reflects trends within historiography as
well general social experience. The approach to everyday life can be seen as a
politically motivated movement in opposition to the 'reigning authorities', the
academic establishment of historians. The political aspect has been expressed,
among other things, through the perspective 'from below', that is the effort to
analyse ‘the experiences of mass of the people’. (p. 6)
d. Synonymous with an individual’s perceptual history, “experiential history is the
full set of adaptive problems that an individual has faced” (Terzis, 2011, p. 388).
6. Scope of perception, experience, etc. (see also Perceptual Analysis)
a. MacDougall (1906): The perceptual world as it is presented in consciousness any
moment is thus a complex product which can only from the manifold and
repeated experiences of moments in which the sensory content has been subjected
experimental variation and associated with specific self-activity and its objective
limitations. The more we have reacted upon the physical world the more full of
meaning is the system of sensory stimulations which it affords, more extensive
and exact our discrimination of its characteristics and relations. To a being
5
sensorially perfect but incapable of reaction upon its environment, the world in
which we live must remain a pure phantasmagory of shifting sensations, a dream
not of things but of impalpable subjective visions [e.g., Plato’s cave]. The world
becomes real to us only in so far as we are active in relation to it. (p. 239)
6