Emotions and Literature in Musil
Zeynep Talay Turner †
zeynep.turner@bilgi.edu.tr
ABSTRACT
The question of how literature can evoke emotions is a familiar one, as is the
idea that a good work of literature arouses the right emotion in the right place
through our capacity for sympathy. However, there is no consensus on how
this works, partly because there is no agreement on the nature of emotions.
One figure that contributes to both of these topics is Robert Musil. As a
thinker and as a novelist, he had both a theory of emotions and a novelistic
treatment of them. His novels are notable, however, for the way in which they
do not appeal to the reader’s capacity for sympathy, owing partly to the
formlessness of his characters. Yet it is precisely the gap he creates between
fiction and emotional reality that allows for a richer investigation of the
relationship between emotions and literature.
Introduction
There is a story that everyone from my generation probably read or had read to
them when they were children: the story of a lion cub who is much loved and who
happily jumps about in the desert with his beloved father. One day, though, the
father has to go to war and dies there and the cub is thrown out of the desert. The
story alone was traumatic for little kids, but there was also a song to go with it.
Sung by the TRT (Turkish national radio and television) children’s chorus, it
was shown on the TRT channel at the weekends in 1980s Turkey. Sadly, I
recently found out that even the children of today know the story, and when I
checked it, the song had been viewed more than 4 million times on You Tube.
Each time I read this story or when my parents read it to me, I would
burst into tears. I was old enough to know that lions do not go to war and that
they do in fact leave their cubs to fend for themselves when the time comes, and
that this is just nature. But seeing their little girl that upset, my parents
repeatedly had to tell me so. In vain. I knew that it was not real, but this did not
† İstanbul Bilgi University, Turkey.
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019, Vol. 35, 303-324
ISSN: 1972-1293
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staunch the flow of tears; it continued to haunt my dreams, years later. I now
want to ask how it is that when we read fiction, despite knowing that it is just a
fiction, we feel upset, or angry, or fearful. Some thinkers say that the emotions
aroused by reading a novel are essential to a proper understanding of it. So, I
must have understood how a little child can/could feel when he/she is left alone;
how it must have felt like to lose a parent or both of them; what it means to be
happy or unhappy. And the question remains: Does a novel or a story arouse
such emotions (“the paradox of fiction”) or does it draw them out? Or does it do
neither?
Scholars have given various answers: the capacity of identification or
sympathy, similar possibilities, “simulation theory” etc. The answers are varied
partly because there is no agreement on the nature of “real life” emotions. In
other words, the well-established debate between feeling and cognitive
(evaluative judgments) traditions in the literature on emotions has been
repeated in examining how literature arouses emotions. For instance, Martha
Nussbaum, a proponent of the cognitive theory, claims that emotions are
constructed and/or structured by evaluative judgments. In novels, she says, we
recognise similar possibilities between us and the characters, and in doing so we
also recognise our being vulnerable and needy (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 243).
Jennifer Robinson, however, challenges this argument and asks: if I know that it
is just a fiction – which itself is a cognitive activity – how can I still be affected
emotionally? She claims that the theory of pre-cognitive affective appraisals
which “do not discriminate between real and imagined scenarios” (Robinson,
2010, p. 85) solves the paradox.
In the first part, I will give an overview of the affective appraisal theory
and cognitive theory and show various problems in both approaches. In the
second part I will discuss various theories and ideas about how fiction may evoke
emotions. One familiar idea is that a good work of literature arouses the right
emotion in the right place through sympathy, meaning not our capacity to
sympathise with another person, but what Scruton refers to as “responding
sympathetically to an imagined situation” (Scruton, 2010, p. 100). Then I turn
to a particular work of literature, Robert Musil’s novella, The Confusions of
Young Törless (Die Verwirrungen des Zöglings Törless,1906), and suggest
that here and in Musil’s fiction as a whole the capacity we call sympathy can
appear to be blocked or frustrated in significant ways, not least because of the
way Musil sets up his central characters, and because he himself had a theory of
emotions which itself implies a distinctive approach to the relationship between
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reality and fiction. Whether his overtly philosophical novels achieve a kind of
emotional education remains an open question.
2. Feeling Tradition vs. Cognitive Theories
On her affective appraisals model, Robinson argues that emotion is a process
through which an instinctive, automatic and non-cognitive affective appraisal
activates a set of bodily responses. Thus, she says, “the (angry) affective
appraisal OFFENSE! is registered in bodily changes such as increased heart rate,
sweating, fist-clenching, and so on, and these very bodily changes themselves
help to keep attention fixed on the perceived offense” (Robinson, 2010, p. 73).
Only after an affective appraisal of, say, Threat!, a cognitive appraisal confirms
or denies the affective appraisal. If a cognitive appraisal denies the affective
appraisal, then the physiological changes stop or it can give way to a new
affective appraisal, i.e., he is not a threat, on the contrary, he is a friend, and a
new sequence of physiological changes occur (Robinson, 2010, p. 73).
This in fact is a not new model, and it goes all the way back to Aristotle’s
analysis of emotions (passions) which begins with a distinction between pathe
(passions) and praxeis (actions). Actions are things we do, whereas passions are
things that we undergo, that happen to us (1106a4-5). This legacy of
Aristotelianism,1 which can still be seen in many metaphors used such as “falling
in love,” “consumed by envy,” “paralysed by fear,” (Scarantino, 2016, p. 6) and
which Richard Lazarus and Bernice Lazarus call a “myth” (Lazarus and Lazarus,
2014, p. 3) according to which emotions belong to the irrational part of our
psyche and as such are independent of thinking and reasoning (the dichotomy
between being active and passive), inspired early modern accounts of emotions.2
In Descartes’ Passions of the Soul, for instance, while the acts of thinking,
Though Scarantino calls Aristotle the founder of “the feeling tradition” (as opposed to “the
cognitive or evaluative theory” (e.g. Nussbaum and Solomon)), Nicomachean Ethics does not give
us the complete picture of his account of emotions (2016, p. 5). In order to get this, we need to
look elsewhere, namely, his de Anima and Rhetoric. In de Anima, “beliefs, bodily motions, and
physiological changes are inseparable elements of emotion…similarly he avoids treating emotions
as irrational, uncontrolled responses to situations” (Solomon, 2003, p. 5). In Rhetoric Aristotle
says: “passions [are] those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments and that are
also attended by pain and pleasure” (1378a19-21). By saying this in fact he also adopts an
evaluative attitude.
2 For the relationship between language and emotions, see Lakoff, 2016, pp. 269-273 and Lakoff
& Johnson 1980, pp. 453-486.
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willing, imagining etc. are regarded as the actions of the soul, passions
(emotions) are attributed to the body’s acting upon the soul (Descartes, 1989,
pp. 28-30). Later William James, whose account is still widely respected, says:
“the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that
our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (James, 1884, pp.
189-190). This means, emotions are caused by our interpretation of bodily
reactions, and the state of consciousness of, for instance, joy, anger etc. is
nothing but the consciousness of physiological manifestations. In other words,
we do not cry because we feel upset, it is the other way around: we feel upset
because we cry.3
It would be a crude conclusion to say that Robinson is simply repeating
James’ account; not least because there is an alternative interpretation of what
James’ view is anyway.4 That aside, thanks to recent studies in neurobiology,
hormonal, musculoskeletal and neural changes were also added to James’ list of
bodily changes.5 Moreover, in the arousal of emotions we are not that passive,
since after all there is also the cognitive component in the approval or the denial
of the affective appraisal. However, the slogan remains: “emotion precedes
cognition.”
How might all that help us understand what happens to us when we read
a novel? Robinson says: “we respond emotionally to people and events in novels
in just the same way as we respond to people and events in real life” (Robinson,
2010, p. 73). In other words: since emotional responses are bodily responses,
we respond in a bodily way to what is going on in a novel; since emotional
3
Around the same time James was developing his theory on emotions, C. G. Lange, a Danish
psychologist was working on similar ideas, and thus the theory is often referred to as James-Lange
theory. James and Lange published a book called The Emotions in 1885. John Dewey published
his “The Theory of Emotions” in 1894 (See Solomon, 2003, p. 84).
4 See John Deigh, 2009, pp. 17-41.
5 Perhaps James’ main mistake was his identification of emotions with feelings. In his Descartes’
Error the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio claims that emotions and feelings have different
functions: “If an emotion is a collection of changes in body state connected to particular mental
images that have activated a specific brain system, the essence of feeling an emotion is the
experience of such changes in juxtaposition to the mental images that initiated the cycle (Damasio,
1994, p. 145). He also argues that the Cartesian myth of a disembodied cogito ignored the role
of the body which provides a ground reference for the mind. In his Looking for Spinoza (2003)
Damasio has found a precedent (“the protobiologist”) for his ideas: Baruch de Spinoza (Damasio,
2003, p. 14). However, in Damasio’s account we still encounter the idea that “emotion precedes
cognition,” while in Spinoza whatever happens in the body happens in the mind at the same time
(Spinoza, 1996, Book II).
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appraisals are instinctive, automatic, non-cognitive and pre-cognitive, our
responses while reading a novel are also instinctive, automatic, non-cognitive
and pre-cognitive; emotions focus attention in a bodily way, thus bodily changes
help us to concentrate on important events in a novel; emotional situations are
stored in emotional memory, thanks to which the characters and people in a
novel can evoke some bodily responses based on similar events and people.
Then upon the ill-treatment of Oliver Twist I feel upset and compassionate
towards him because my automatic and instinctive bodily responses, which are
non-cognitive or pre-cognitive, cause me to regard his situation as “painful.”
This emotion of mine – compassion – can also be strengthened or at least
supported by the instinctive and automatic affective appraisal of hatred or
disgust I feel towards those, like Mr. Bumble, Noah Claypole, Fagin, and Monks,
who are the sources of Oliver Twist’s suffering and pain. This is also a way of
understanding, or in fact an essential feature of understanding a novel: “if I
laugh and cry, shiver, tense and relax in all the ‘right’ places, then I have in some
sense understood the story” (Robinson, 2010, p. 77).
Robinson argues that if we accept the affective appraisals theory, we
then easily conclude that there is no such thing as the paradox of fiction, because,
as recent studies show, pre-cognitive affective appraisals do not make a
distinction between real and fictive events and people. However, her model does
not give a satisfactory answer to the question of why different people react
differently to the same situation, whether be it in real life or in a novel; or why
the same person reacts differently to the same event or a similar event at different
times; or why a person might react differently to a real situation and to one in a
novel.
Consider now Nussbaum’s Neo-Stoic cognitive or judgmental
approach. In Upheavals of Thought, Nussbaum emphasises the cognitive
aspects of emotions, claiming that emotions are structured and/or constructed
by evaluative judgments. 6 She accepts the Stoic theory, that “behind our
6 The
proponents of cognitive tradition are mostly criticised for neglecting the role of the bodily
reactions in their analysis. Such a critique is raised partly because of the misleading use of the word
“cognitive.” Robert Solomon, another proponent of the cognitive theory, claims that if cognition
here is understood as conscious and articulate thinking, then bodily feelings seem to have been
left out of the cognitive account. But, he adds, “I also believe that ‘cognition’ or ‘judgment’
properly construed captures that missing ingredient. The analogy with kinesthetic judgments
suggests the possibility of bringing feelings of the body back into the analysis of emotion in a
straightforward way” (Solomon, 2004, p. 86). Jesse Prinz, on the other hand, prefers to use
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emotions, there are judgments” while rejecting their normative ethical formula,
apatheia, that is, only an emotionless state brings about happiness. What does
she mean by “emotions are structured by evaluative judgments”?
As we saw earlier, although Aristotle can be said to be the founder of
the feeling tradition, his reflections on these matters have affinities with the
cognitive tradition. For instance, in Rhetoric Aristotle defines pity, or
compassion as “a feeling of pain caused by the sight of some evil, destructive or
painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to
befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon”
(1385b13-15). The cognitive elements involved in Aristotle’s definition are as
follows: First, the pitier believes that the pain that the pitied is suffering from is
not trivial, on the contrary, it is caused by an evil or unfortunate event; second
the pitier believes that the pitied does not deserve such pain, in other words, it
is not his fault; third the pitier believes that the same thing or something similar
may happen to them as well. In a nutshell, Nussbaum claims that the size of the
suffering, the undeservingness of it which appeals to our sense of justice, and an
awareness of similar possibilities (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 306-315) are
necessary reasons to have compassion towards someone.
Now, while outlining her theory of emotions in general, or of
compassion in particular, Nussbaum does not discuss whether the same
mechanism operates while reading a novel, yet from the beginning she assumes
that it does. Following Aristotle’s well-known idea that poetry is more
philosophical than history, Nussbaum claims that if history tells us what has
happened at one time, poetry, or literary works in general, shows us general
patterns of action. By recognising and understanding these patterns, we also
grasp our own possibilities, our being needy and limited creatures (Nussbaum,
2001, p. 243). Perhaps “showing” rather than “saying” is what makes literature,
or at least some literary works, more powerful than philosophical works.
Think of Job in the Old Testament: A righteous, faithful and benevolent
man, he is God’s favourite creature, blessed with wealth, children and a happy
marriage. One day, though, Satan accuses Job before God: behind Job’s so“appraisal,” rather than “cognitive” and amending James-Lange theory, he calls his theory as
“embodied appraisal theory.” In his account emotions are embodied, as James and Lange argued,
but they are also appraisals. He says: “My suggestion is that certain bodily perceptions. . .
represent roughly the same thing that explicit evaluative judgments represent, but they do it by
figuring into the right causal relations, not by deploying concepts or providing descriptions”
(Prinz, 2004, p. 57).
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called uprightness and blamelessness lies not his faith but his fear of losing his
possessions. Satan believes that if Job loses everything, he would surely curse
God and to illustrate this Satan wants permission to test his piety. Satan the
accuser is allowed to do so, and misfortune befalls Job: he loses his wealth, his
happiness, his children. No compassion comes from his once beloved friends
nor from his wife. Why? Because they believe that Job must have sinned, and all
these sufferings must be his punishment. They recognise that it is a big suffering
(size); but Job must have deserved it; something similar would not happen to
them, because they think, whatever Job must have done, what sin he must have
committed cannot be and could not have been performed by these pitiless
friends (similar possibilities). In other words, with all these “wrong” evaluative
judgments it was very easy for Job’s friends not to pity their once beloved friend.
Or a strong belief, such as “you must have done some evil towards God,”
prevents Job’s friends from considering any other possibility for his pains,
despite Job’s insisting on his being innocent. Perhaps Aristotle is right when he
said in Nicomachean Ethics: “Any one can get angry—that is easy—or give or
spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right
time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is
it easy” (1109a.27). It is indeed not an easy task, after all, our beliefs and
judgments about someone are not detached from other beliefs and judgments
that we hold, and in this case a strongly held belief (“you must have done
something wrong, because God does not punish for no reason”) prevents Job’s
friends to fully understand their friend and develop compassion accordingly.
If nothing else, this illustrates the difficulty of examining emotions in
relationship to judgments when judgment itself may be impaired or restricted by
the power of belief. There is another problem with the claim that emotions are
structured and/or constructed by evaluative judgments. For it implies a
relationship of priority between judgments and emotions, such that once I have
a judgment or a series of judgments about someone or something, then I easily
feel compassion or develop any other emotion towards a person or an object.
This time, then, the slogan of “emotion precedes cognition” (e.g. Robinson), is
replaced with “cognition precedes emotion.” Though I believe that there is an
intrinsic relationship between the two, the cause-effect formulation misses the
proper understanding of the phenomenon. A particular emotion may also have
the power to suspend or even to change our judgments about someone, or a
group of people or even about an idea. This, I think, is what Aristotle means by
saying that “passions [are] those feelings that so change men as to affect their
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judgments and that are also attended by pain and pleasure” in Rhetoric
(1378a19-21). For instance, someone who is in love may perceive things in a
completely new way than he/she would otherwise do, and as such, his/her
judgments might be suspended. Nietzsche draws our attention to such a state:
“imagine a man seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea:
how different the world has become to him! Looking behind him he seems to
himself as though blind, listening around him he hears only a dull, meaningless
noise; whatever he does perceive, however, he perceives as he has never
perceived before” (Nietzsche, 1997, p. 64). Coming back to Job’s friends’
attitude: should had there been a strong compassionate love towards Job, his
friends’ and wife’s strongly held belief, that is, “you must have sinned, because
otherwise you would not be punished that severely” could have been suspended,
or at least questioned.
Or think of the actions of a couple who rescued Jews during the Nazi
period but who also helped a German soldier who was bleeding to death. They
are labelled as “heroes” or “Righteous Gentile” by many but at the same time as
“traitors” by some friends and people who were hiding in their house. In an
interview the woman explains why she rejects all the titles:
We are now called “Righteous Gentiles” or even sometimes “heroes.”
We very much object to this title, and I can tell you why. One day there
was an air raid on the German barracks near our house. . . My husband
happened to be there. . . When it was over, the barracks were badly hit.
A German soldier came out with his head practically destroyed. . . My
husband saw that within minutes he would fall down and bleed to death.
So my husband put him on his bicycle – without thinking about it – and
brought him to the commandment’s house. . . Later some of our
friends and people who were hiding with us heard about it and said:
“You are a traitor because you helped the enemy.” My husband
replied: “No, the moment the man was badly wounded, he was not an
enemy anymore but simply a human being in need” (Quoted in Taylor,
1999, p. 73).
For Taylor this couple acted simply because they were “moved by the suffering
of another” (Taylor, 1999, p. 73). This couple is labelled as “traitor” because
they “had already been acting as part of some larger group with a specific
commitment to fighting Nazism – a commitment that the woman’s husband
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betrayed in helping the wounded soldier” (Taylor, 1999, p. 74). However, her
explanation shows that, in helping someone who is suffering and in need, she
suspends her judgments about ill-doings of the Nazis who in fact are the source
of a great suffering, or even if a suspension of judgment may not be involved in
it, their action illustrates that, compassion felt towards this soldier transcends
any kind of judgment: the wounded soldier is there lying before their eyes
“simply as a human being in need.”
Some encounters in life can strike us, and force us to question and reconsider our ideas, judgments and beliefs, or at least suspend them. Think of
Levinas’ Bobby, the dog whom he encounters in a Nazi labour camp and whom
he calls “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany” (Levinas, 1997, p. 153). Bobby,
Levinas says, who “would appear at morning assembly and was waiting for us as
we returned” (Levinas, 1997, p. 153), recognises the prisoners as human
beings. Though this encounter does not make a fundamental difference to
Levinas’ ethics, where the face of the other is always the face of a human being,
it makes him write this short essay which begins with a verse about eating meat
(Exodus 22:31) and which makes Levinas horrified at the “butchery that every
day claims our ‘consecrated’ mouth” (Levinas, 1997, p. 151). Upon reading the
verse, Levinas remembers Bobby, their brief encounter and the way it reminded
him of the vulnerability of animals. Bobby, by recognising the prisoners as
human beings, also reminded them of their being vulnerable. This encounter
makes Levinas see the commonness between human-animals and animals, which
depends not on the capacity to think or to have logos or whether they are created
in the image of God (the Face of the other), but on “whether they can suffer”
(Bentham).
Perhaps Spinoza is right in saying that we need to be open to new
encounters and new interactions with other bodies which leave traces on the
body as well as in the mind (Spinoza, 1996, p. 96). Whether it be a person, or
an idea, these encounters, with the right ethical attitude (“a good encounter”),7
result in the improvement of the intellect and enhancement of our power of
acting. Now, the question is whether reading fiction can possibly come close to
Levinas’ experience with Bobby. Can it help us to maintain, and also develop,
our capacity to respond to these encounters when they occur? Clearly it cannot
be the same because reading is a voluntary act rather than a stark existential
experience. However, when we do decide to read fiction, we open ourselves to a
7 See Deleuze,
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, pp. 17-30.
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range of possible encounters with other beings and some of these encounters
may be more like those exemplified by Levinas’ encounter with Bobby than
others are.
3. Literature and Emotions
The question of how literature can evoke emotions has been answered by many
through various theories and claims. Gregory Currie’s “simulation theory”
claims that when we simulate someone else’s state of mind, her beliefs and
desires operate on me, i.e. in imagining someone noticing a huge snake before
his eyes, I start to feel the visceral sensations of fear and wish to flee; however
these beliefs and desires are of a different kind from the real ones: not only they
are temporary and cancellable, but also, and more importantly, they run off-line,
“disconnected from their normal perceptual inputs and behavioural outputs,”
thus the desire to flee is not put into action (Currie, 1995, p. 253). Or, as we
have seen, Robinson claims that pre-cognitive affective appraisals do not make a
distinction between real and imagined scenarios, but the distinction occurs at
the cognitive level which, coming after the affective appraisal, approves or
denies the primary reaction. And knowing that it is just a fiction, we do not
attempt to act upon the emotion aroused by a fiction. However, neither Currie’s
nor Robinson’s approaches can explain the considerable number of suicides
after the publication of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther.
Roger Scruton, on the other hand, distancing himself from both
Currie’s and Robinson’s accounts, argues that our capacity for imagination
should be the starting point: imagination is a cognitive capacity which is subject
to the will, and as such is different from belief or desire. This does not mean that
imagination is detached from belief, but the relation between the two can be
understood via the active and passive mental states, the former being the states
that are subject to the will: “when someone imagines that p, and when he
believes that p, he is in one case imagining exactly what in the other case he is
believing” (Scruton, 2010, p. 96). Scruton concludes that works of fiction are
explicitly directed to the imagination and they call up thoughts without asserting
them as true. However, since our “real” emotional life is a response to what we
believe and also “real” emotions involve actions, we cannot assert that we
respond to fictions in the same say we respond to real life situations. Thus,
imagination alone cannot solve the problem, but the idea of imitation, whose
precondition is imagination, and its relation to sympathy, can.
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Referring to Aristotle’s theory of imitation in the Rhetoric, Scruton
claims that, “Motives are bound up with the actions that express them; and by
imitating those actions we rehearse the motives. We equip ourselves with the
ability to act from anger, remorse, pity or whatever, by imitating the outward
expressions of those passions in dancing, marching, or play-acting” (Scruton,
2010, p. 97). This means, for instance, even though we admire courage,
admiration itself does not necessarily result in courageous actions, however, the
desire to do honourable deeds, which is also imagining ourselves as doing such
deeds, can produce them. The motive itself, that is the desire to do the rightful
thing in this case, can be realised gradually and eventually through imitating
and/or performing its outward expressions (Scruton, 2010, p. 98). Scruton
comes to the conclusion that through a work of literature, we can rehearse
various emotions, and gradually possess them in real life and also in our actions.
However, imitation here does not mean the character’s roles and actions are
displayed or his/her emotions are rehearsed directly; rather he says: “In
responding to literature we are responding sympathetically to an imagined
situation, and we do this by ‘imitating’ or, more properly, rehearsing the motives
that would lead us to sympathise towards the real-life version of the characters
and feelings described” (Scruton, 2010, p. 100). A significant feature of
sympathetic responses is that they can be directed to past and present events as
well as to real and imagined scenarios. And he continues: “the true work of art
is the one that teaches us what to feel. . .” (Scruton, 2010, p. 100).
Before we proceed further, in order to avoid misunderstanding, some
clarification of Scruton’s use of the term sympathy. Etymologically the Greek
sympathy and the Latin compassion derive from the same root: suffering with,
together, and some philosophers such as Nussbaum do use them
interchangeably: thus, compassion or sympathy are “a painful emotion
occasioned by the awareness of another person’s undeserved misfortune”
(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 301). However, Scruton uses the term sympathy (“feeling
with,” rather than “suffering with”) to suggest a capacity rather than an emotion
because he says, we may respond sympathetically to a situation, and even when
we sympathise with a character, we neither suffer that character’s pain nor
experience his or her pleasure. My aim here is not to start a conceptual
discussion and investigate whether compassion and sympathy should be used
interchangeably or not, but just to show that for Scruton sympathy is a capacity
that we all have and also can enhance through the reading of fiction: we
sympathise with the imagined situations and characters’ feelings; and as a result
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our capacity to respond with sympathy to real versions of these characters’ fates
is enhanced. Sympathising with a character, in Scruton’s account, is not the
same as identifying with him: we do not have to identify with Raskolnikov in
order to understand the psychology of the criminal. Thus, a good work of art can
help us both develop this capacity and enrich our ethical engagements in life.
Let us turn to some fiction to investigate the phenomenon better. In the
following section I concentrate on Robert Musil’s first novella Young Törless
(1906) where sympathising with a character seems to be rather difficult.
4. Musil’s Young Törless
Törless, the only child of a wealthy family, attends a boarding military school in
the provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where he befriends two boys,
slightly older than himself: Beineberg and Reiting. One day, upon discovering
that another student, Basini, has been stealing money from Beineberg and
perhaps from other students, Reiting comes up with an idea: Basini needs to be
punished, not by being reported to the school authorities, but, thanks to their
“extraordinary mercifulness” by being turned into their servant and slave, so
much so that he should be forced to do in blind obedience whatever they ask
from him. This means physical and psychological torture, including rape.
Törless observes all these in a semi-active way, semi-active because even though
he does not approve Beineberg’s and Reiting’s ill-treatments, he does not do
anything to stop them either.
Beineberg is an egoistic boy who claims that he is leading a life
following Indian mysticism, while, in fact, he is only repeating what he hears
from his father who as a young officer had been in India in British service. The
father, upon his return home from India, had brought back not only the various
souvenirs, but also “something of a feeling, which he had never lost, for the
mysterious, bizarre glimmerings of esoteric Buddhism” (Musil, 1979, p. 26).
Reiting, who loves power for the sake of itself, is an admirer of Napoleon; he is
“a tyrant, inexorable in his treatment of anyone who opposed him” (Musil, 1979,
p. 54). Unlike Beineberg, he does not attempt to “rationalise” his will to power
by appealing to some metaphysical and mystical justifications. While Reiting
sees Basini as an opportunity that will enable him to test his power, Beineberg
sees him as a means to test his mystical theories: all the cruel things, he says,
done by Indian ascetics are done with one aim, that is, “to kill the miserable
desires directed towards the external world, which, whether they are vanity or
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hunger, joy or pity, only take away something from the fire that everyone can
kindle in himself” (Musil, 1979, p. 79).
Törless’ attitude to Basini is one of ambivalence: he is quite indifferent
towards his friends’ deeds. Even when he learnt that both Beineberg and Reiting
raped Basini many times, he does not feel compassion towards Basini. We can
think of some reasons for this: he himself might be afraid of attracting his friends’
anger and sadistic desires, he might be afraid of exclusion, or he might simply be
an adolescent boy who is not emotionally mature enough. But Törless’ attitude
is more complicated: he sees Basini as the epitome of the double nature of
things: things as they appear to us and invisible powers behind things.
He felt as though torn between two worlds: one was the solid everyday
world of respectable citizens, in which all that went on was well regulated
and rational, and which he knew from home, and the other was a world
of adventure, full of darkness, mystery, blood, and undreamt-of
surprises (Musil, 1979, p. 55).
Now, in Young Törless Musil’s subject matter is the adolescent boy; while in The
Man without Qualities it is a man with no qualities. This is important because
Törless is neither a child nor an adult. It is as if Törless does not have a form.
Even though the other characters are described physically in the novel, we do
not know what Törless looks like. The reader is free to imagine his appearance,
as she wishes. As we have seen, Scruton claims that “we can rehearse our
sympathies through our encounter with fictions, and so come to ‘know what to
feel’ in situations that we have not previously encountered” (Scruton, 2010, p.
102). The difficulty however, with both Törless and Ulrich is that they do not
themselves seem fully to encounter the situations in which they find themselves;
neither do they have very determinate characters, and in so far as they do they
are deeply sceptical. Do Musil’s own musings on emotions help us?
5. Emotions and actions; emotions and moods
Opposing James’ idea that emotions are mere translations of bodily reactions,
Musil defends a notion somewhat similar to judgmental (cognitive) theories of
emotions. I say somewhat, because Döring has summarised Musil’s account
thus: “the evaluative qualities that cognitivists [such as Nussbaum and Solomon]
associate with the different emotion types are instantiated as the Gestaltorganisation of the emotion’s first-order components, and not as qualities of the
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emotion’s object” (Döring, 2013, p. 48). In order to understand this, we need
to look at: 1) the relationship between emotions and actions; 2) the relationship
between emotions and moods.
As opposed to the cause-effect relationship between an emotion and
behaviour, that is, to the idea that “an emotion brings about a behaviour, and the
behaviour reacts on the emotion”, Musil says:
. . . this crude observation easily allows a better one to counter it, that
between both there is, rather, a relationship of mutual reinforcement
and resonance, a rampant swelling into each other, which also, to be sure,
brings about mutual change in both components. The emotion is
translated into the language of the action, and the action into the
language of the emotion. As with every translation, something new is
added and some things are lost in the process. (Musil, 1995, p. 1269).
There is, Musil thinks, a process of “shaping and consolidating” between
emotions and actions: “. . . an emotion changes not just as a consequence of the
action it evokes, but already within the action by which it is assimilated in a
particular way, repeated, and changed, in the course of which both the emotion
and the action mutually shape and consolidate themselves” (Musil, 1995, p.
1270). In Musil’s account, Döring says: “emotion and action are conceptually
connected because emotion always involves components – needs, but also
‘desire[s]’ and ‘intention[s]’ – which provide goals for action. It is thus the goaldirectedness of central first-order components that links emotions conceptually
to actions” (Döring, 2013, p. 54). Then, compassion, for instance, does not
only involve a painful emotion caused by the suffering of another person’s
undeserved misfortune (Nussbaum), but it is also closely – conceptually – linked
to an action, for instance, helping the sufferer, and the action itself or the
consequence of it may both; 1) transform our understanding of compassion; and
2) lead to some other emotions, and correspondingly to actions. And more
importantly, the whole process establishes an engagement with ourselves, with
others, in other words, with the world. Musil says: “. . . we only truly recognise
it [emotion] after it has had some effect in the world and has been shaped by the
world; we do not know what we feel before our action has made that decision”
(Musil, 1995, p. 1277).
However, even though Musil presents us with a dynamic relationship
between emotions and actions, an individual’s relationship with the world is not
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317
that dynamic, since “an individual’s worldview is shaped by his emotions in that
it is shaped by the things that have valence to him” (Döring, 2013, p. 56). This
is also a process of fixation, that is, attending the world in a particular and
selective way. Musil says: “. . . every emotion, if it attains a certain strength and
duration, creates its own world, a selective and personal world, and this plays no
small role in human relations!” (Musil, 1995, p. 1262). Just like the senses,
Musil thinks, emotional experiences are intellectual, that is, as we hear or see or
smell what we already know, our emotional experiences are shaped or structured
through a particular framework we already have: “. . . one may say without
exception that the form they [emotional experiences] assume in different people
is that of the picture these people had already formed beforehand” (Musil, 1990,
p. 201). But there is more to it.
First of all, when we talk about, say, the fear of a dog and the fear of
darkness, we obviously are not talking about the same fear; in other words, it is
the specific object that qualifies the type of the fear we have. However, even
though the fear of a dog seems to be directed at a specific object, it is never
limited to it, for in the absence of the very same object, I am still afraid of dogs,
or darkness etc., and thus, when we experience fear “we experience directly, as
a whole, . . . fearsomeness” (Döring, 2013, p. 56). As Goldie says, even though
specific emotions “die in action” they “can live on in spirit,” in your psyche,
“continuing to colour your way of thinking and feeling towards the world”
(Goldie, 2002, p. 148). In other words, I construct a particular worldview; this,
however, is my worldview, which involves a particular participation into the
world, or an apprehension of the world, which in turn means a particular
relationship with myself. And this world of mine is different from others’ worlds.
There is still more to it: in this fearsome world, I, consciously or not, may limit
my encounters (in a Spinozistic sense) in life, may live in a fixed pattern; because
of my fear, I may deprive myself from the long walks in nature where Rousseau
“encounters” the “feeling of existence” (Rousseau, 1979, p. 89). Is this a
problem? For Musil yes, because in such a world there is no place for openness
towards new encounters, new associations, more importantly, to otherness; in
such a world one can easily live without realising his/her potentialities and
possibilities, i.e. without becoming other than himself/herself, which is a
precondition for welcoming the other in his/her/its otherness. What is to be
done? For Musil this fixation can be dissolved, and it is in fact “resolvable, which
happens when an emotion does not develop into a specific one, but into an
unspecific mood” (Döring, 2013, p. 57). An emotion that is not satisfied or
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discharged, in other words, when it does not end up in an action, may turn into
a mood which “merely allows us to participate from behind a colourful window”
(Musil, 1995, p. 1305).
In attempting to show the relationship between emotions and moods,
Musil suggests that it is possible to reverse the whole mechanism: a certain mood,
that is, however, a certain Love, can also, in turn, affect the specific emotions,
correspondingly, my beliefs, intentions, desires and actions, that frame my
normal condition (“the nonspecific emotion changes the world in the same way
the sky changes its colours, without desire or self, and in this form objects and
actions change like the clouds”). How?
Musil believes that human existence unfolds within two distinct
domains of experiences, within ratioid and non-ratioid as he calls them.
Scientific precision attempts to relate the ideas to each other within a causeeffect structure, and as such, aims to reach generalizations. Whereas things that
are experienced in the realm of non-ratiod are unique and cannot be
conceptualised; they are ineffable (just like Törless’ experiences).8 If the realm
of ratioid enables us to establish “the rules with exceptions” (Musil, 1990, p.
63) the realm of the non-ratioid is defined by a “dominance of the exceptions
over the rules” (Musil, 1990, p. 63). He also calls these two realms “the normal
condition” and “the other condition” and says: “. . . even though they have
influenced each other in many ways and entered into compromises, have
nonetheless never properly mixed with each other” (Musil, 1990, p. 198). The
question for Musil is, how can these two realms, which cannot be associated with
one particular faculty (one with emotion and the other with intellect),
communicate with each other appropriately? How can the unique and singular
ethical and aesthetical experiences that belong to the realm of non-ratioid or
“the other condition” illuminate the experiences occur in the realm of ratioid,
in the average and ordinary condition, in which events, people and objects are
perceived in their relations to other things, and are evaluated under the economy
of generalisations and universal values? How can new connections between
8 This
distinction reminds us of the distinction that Henri Bergson made between two different
ways of knowing a thing: the way of analysis and the way of intuition. Analysis “is the operation
which reduces the object to elements already known, that is, common to that object and to others.”
By intuition, Bergson means the kind of intellectual sympathy “by which one is transported into
the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently
inexpressible in it” (Bergson, 1946, pp. 161-162). Analysis is a way to understand something by
comparing it with other things, and by putting something under universal concepts while intuition
leads us “to the very inwardness of life” (Bergson, 1983, p. 176), as well as to the “deeper” self.
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things and/or new encounters be established? In the normal condition, we
engage in a world which has been shaped through “the emotions’ fixation”
(Döring, 2013, p. 61) but this is not the only possible world for us. In “the other
condition,” which one always experiences as a certain mood (unspecific
emotion) and which there is no action, or conceptualisation or fixation, one feels
a kind of Love, or ecstasy: “To have some notion of this one does not even need
to study the literature of mysticism, for almost every person has experienced this
at some time as “the rupture of love” (as opposed to the “love flame” of desire”)
(Musil, 1990, p. 208). Recall Nietzsche’s statement about a man who is in such
a state (“seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea”): takenfor-granted structures, beliefs, judgments dissolve for him, “whatever he does
perceive, however, he perceives as he has never perceived before” (Nietzsche,
1997, p. 64). Similarly, Musil says: “As long as one loves the other, and because
one loves the other, everything is enchanting” (Musil, 1995, p. 1314).
What is all this to do with Törless or the man without qualities?
Firstly, The Man without Qualities is a “sort of novel” which combines
fairly realistic scenarios with numerous chapters that consist mostly of essays.
There is of course a plot in it and in Törless, however the continuity of the story
is constantly disrupted with the author’s and the protagonists’ rather
philosophical discussions. This can mean that the act of reading is different from
that of many novels where, forgetting that he is reading a fiction, one may be
guided by the characters’ emotional experiences, events etc. Probably while
reading Dickens, Austen or the Brontës one easily forgets herself and just goes
along with the flow of the story, and as such the border between fiction and
reality is blurred, or even dissolved. In Musil, however, the reader cannot forget
her “real” position easily or once she is about to forget, she is pushed back to
reality once the “chapters” or essays that involve philosophical discussions
begin. In these chapters we are not invited into the characters’ emotional life but
encounter sophisticated discussions that seem to be detached from any
character. As we have seen Scruton argues that “the true work of art is the one
that teaches us what to feel. . .” (Scruton, 2010, p. 100), but, it does so via
making us imagine being in the position of the character and in doing so
sympathising with his situation. But in Musil’s work, it seems that such sympathy
never really flows.
This observation suggests another: Törless ia an adolescent, at a
transitional stage after which he can become anything: “If at that period one
could bring a boy to see the ridiculousness of himself, the ground would give
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way under him, or he would plunge headlong like a somnambulist who, suddenly,
awaking, sees nothing but emptiness around him” (Musil, 1979, p. 18).
However, it is also such a period where one’s worldview is not fixed or
structured through stabilised emotions. “Compared with that of a young child”
says Döring, “the region of valences of an adult is extraordinarily narrowed
down” (Döring, 2013, p. 55). The reader is not asked to sympathise in
Scruton’s sense with such a character, it is not easy anyway; rather she is invited
to imagine, or maybe she is even forced to think, how Törless might behave in
such a difficult state. This, however, occurs via being invited to suspend our own
worldview (“the normal condition”) and to attempt to understand how an
existence at a larval period would feel, a period which the reader himself/herself
must have left so long ago. And perhaps here there is (contra Scruton)
imagination without sympathy, where the imagination involved is the
imagination not of oneself as someone else in a certain situation, but oneself
being in a certain state. Surely imagining oneself in a state where there is
constant confusion or dividedness or compartmentalisation, is not the same as
being in the state of “the other condition,” but rather than stable meanings,
beliefs and desires, and emotions, there is the suspension and/or
problematisation of them. If in the world of adulthood emotional experiences
are recognised and classified according to the emotions’ fixation to certain
objects, in the world of adolescence precisely because connections between
things and events are blurred and fluid, we are reminded that things (“the
fixation process”) could have been different, as it can be experienced in the
mood of Love (“the other condition”) where all the familiar connections dissolve.
Now, let me try to connect these two observations. The movement
between reality and fiction during the act of reading is not simply as being now
in “reality” and then in “fiction.” It is more like, when the flow of the story is
distracted via the philosophical discussions, the reader is invited to imagine
herself being in a state where all the familiar judgments, beliefs and also
connections between things are questioned and problematised. One may argue
that there is still sympathy here, because after all imagining oneself being in the
character’s state, even if this state is one of confusion or ambiguity, is still
sympathy. However, both in reality and in fiction we get to know people or
characters through their ideas, thoughts, judgments, emotions etc., in short,
stretched across time we construct a narrative about them. Yet in Musil’s novels
precisely because the ideas seem to be detached from the character (and surely
this is how Musil “constructs” these “formless” characters), we are left only with
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the state itself, a fictitious state through the imagination of which the reader is
invited to re-value his/her own “reality” in a more direct way. This does not
mean that there is no questioning in novels where the story flows. However, by
not letting us sympathise with a character, Musil’s novels are more demanding,
sometimes impossibly so.
It should be noted that Musil’s novels have one foot in realism and one
in modernism, have one foot in the nineteenth century and one in the twentieth
century. Musil, as a thinker, seems to have more insight into emotions than many
other nineteenth century novelists, however, his novels, as compared to Dickens,
or Austin, or the Brontës, do not seem to teach us what to feel in the way that
these influential novelists do. If as Milan Kundera says in Testaments Betrayed,
Nietzsche brings philosophy nearer to the novel, then Musil as a novelist brings
the novel nearer to philosophy (Kundera, 1995, p. 176). This is why perhaps
we hear many people say that they start to read The Man without Qualities but
do not advance much. With his “characterless” characters, the capacity of
sympathy does not seem to be operating on us in his work, nor, then, does our
feeling compassion towards a character in the novel. The size of the suffering he
witnesses, the undeservingness of it, and an awareness of similar possibilities do
not seem to be acknowledged by Törless either. The reader is placed in an
ambivalent position, and not only because Törless is ambivalent, but also
because Basini himself seems to lack a concrete form.
6. Conclusion
Musil says he had always been interested in ethics rather than psychology.9 But
here ethics is to be understood as being engaged with unique and
unprecedented experiences as they can be lived in “the other condition” or in a
larval stage like adolescence, where these experiences cannot and should not be
conceptualised and expressed either in the language of everydayness, or in
philosophical language. However, Musil is aware that “the other condition”
cannot be a permanent state; just like the state of adolescence, it can only be a
transitional period:
This condition is never of long duration except in pathological form; it
is a hypothetical borderline case, which one approaches only to fall back
repeatedly into the normal condition, and precisely this distinguishes
9 Robert Musil,
Diaries (New York: Basic Books, 1998), p. 442
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art from mysticism, that art never entirely loses its connection with the
ordinary attitude (Musil, 1990, p. 208).
The distinction between art and mysticism is made clear in the title of Der Mann
ohne Eigenschaften which echoes the 14th Century mystic Meister Eckhart’s
phrase “áne eigenschaft” (“without qualities”) and which was used “to designate
the condition of being ‘empty and free’ for a mystical union with God” (Crooke,
2008, p. 15, 78). In Eckhart’s mysticism such a union requires one to become
timeless and spaceless, as well as free from any agency or subjectivity. However,
while for Eckhart being without qualities means a mystical readiness to unite
with God, and as such withdrawing from “the normal condition” so much that
“the other condition” becomes a permanent state, in Musil’s investigation it
refers to Ulrich’s not conditioning himself with any fixed worldview. As opposed
to mystical experience, art, Musil thinks, “has the task of ceaselessly reforming
and renewing the image of the world and of our behaviour in it” and “through
art’s unique experiences [Erlebnisse] it breaks out of the rigid formulas of
ordinary experience [Erfahrung]” (Musil, 1990, p. 206). Just like the artist, or
the composer, Musil thinks, the task of the author is to establish the appropriate
connection between the two realms, hence the rigid structures of everydayness
can be shattered and the ossified values and judgments which might be
governing one’s everyday life (The Book of Job) can be suspended and/or put
into question. A good work of art, or of literature, Musil says, “offers not merely
an immediate experience but an experience that can never be completely
repeated, that cannot be fixed but is individual, even anarchic” (Musil, 1990, p.
205). Musil’s ethical task, as a writer, was to explore the ineffable characteristics
of aesthetical experiences along with how these experiences, lived within and
through “the other condition” can be related to “the normal condition.”
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