On Sadrian Ontology: Taskik in the Masaʿir

Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 I. Introduction On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir In the History of Islamic Philosophy, one could not discount the importance of the 16th/17th century Safavid philosopher and jurist, ​Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad Šīrāzī, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā. Born into a well-known family of jurists around 1571-1572 CE (979 AH) in Shiraz in Persia, Mullā Ṣadrā would show intellectual promise from an early age and go on to study under some of the most prominent scholars of his time including the highly influential Šayḥ Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Āmilī (d. 1030 AH/1620-21 CE) and Mīr Muḥammad Bāqir Damād Astarabādī (d. 1030 AH/1620-21 CE) (Kalin and Nasr 2014, xxi). Living at a unique moment in Islamic history, in which Twelver Shiism for the first time was established as an official state religion, Mullā Ṣadrā was able to benefit from a political and intellectual milieu that was willing and able to facilitate his life and work. This facilitation is partly evident in the prolific nature of Mullā Ṣadrā's scholarly life in which he produced over 45 works (Rizvi 2009b). Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system, which he calls ​al-ḥikma al-mutʿālīya (transcendent wisdom or transcendent theosophy) represents an dynamic school of thought in which one may find a robust synthesis of Aristotelian rationalism, Twelver Shiite theology as well as Islamic Neoplatonism which is used in order to produce an ontology, metaphysics, logic and epistemology that is at once rational yet gnostic, Shi’ite yet Neoplatonic. Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system earns him his indispensable status in the History of Islamic Philosophy for several reasons. First, Mullā Ṣadrā not only revitalizes the Peripatetic philosophical tradition, but innovates and critiques it in various (arguably revolutionary) ways (Rizvi 2009b). In fact some, like Pourjavady and Schmidtke (2015), would argue that Ṣadrā plays an important role in what may be considered by some as a veritable Safavid philosophical renaissance. In metaphysics, he completely rejects the substance metaphysics of the Avicennian and Aristotelian tradition in which the fundamental buildings blocks of the world are taken to be fixed substances and rather describes and defends a 1 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir Heraclitian-style metaphysical model in which the world is to be understood through principles of change which are fundamentally processual in their nature (Rizvi 2009b). As opposed to a world which ‘is’ Mullā Ṣadrā describes an ontology based on ‘coming to be’. In epistemology, Mullā Ṣadrā accepts and values the ratio-intellectual epistemic methods of the Peripatetic tradition, but argues that the ultimate metaphysical doctrines may only be captured by a type of direct witnessing (​šuhūd ‘aynī​) or ‘illuminative presence’ (​ḥuḍūr išrāqī) (Kalin and Nasr 2014, xix)​. ​This emphasis on the epistemological importance of an internal, presential and experiential type of knowledge is part of what affords to Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy its mystic and gnostic aspects. In ontology, which will be the focus of our discussion here, Mullā Ṣadrā famously rejects the primacy of essence (​aṣālat al-māhiyya) found most notably in the works of of the 12th century philosopher and mystic Šihābaddīn as-Suhrawardī (and also possibly in Avicenna). He rather formulates and defends an ontology based on the primacy of being (​aṣālat al-wuǧūd) (Marcotte 2016, Wisnovsky 2012, 28). Succinctly stated, in the classical Avicennian philosophical tradition, non-necessary substances (everything that is not God) are taken to be dyads (composites) of essence, or māhiyya, ​and ​wuǧūd​, or being. ​Māhiyya ​is what makes a thing the thing which it is; it is that thing’s essential property or properties without which it could no longer be that which it is (its quiddity or ipseity) (Lizzini 2016). Etymologically the word is a simple compound formed from mā​, meaning ‘what’, and ​hiya​, meaning ‘it is.’ For example, in the ​māhiyya ​of a square one would find the property corresponding to the having of four congruent sides, and in the ​māhiyya of a triangle one would find the property corresponding to the having of interior angles which sum to 180 degrees (assuming Euclidean space). ​Wuǧūd ​concerns the fact ​that ​squares are as opposed to ​what ​they are (this is the realm of ​māhiyya​). In what concerns God, who is the only independently necessary being, his quiddity is identical to his ​māhiyya​. In this way, existence is 2 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir one of his necessary attributes; his being is part of what he is. For Suhrawardī (and arguably for Avicenna), existence is only a conceptual or mental predicate; it one of those ‘aspects’ of a contingent thing (​i‘tibārāt​) that is purely intellectual (Wisnovsky 2012, 27). Existence for Suhrawardī is a common term which applies to all things; it is just a ‘secondary intelligible’ (al-ma‘qūl al-ṯānī) (Kalin and Nasr 2014, xx). It is thus the ​māhiyya ​(quiddity) of a thing, and not its ​wuǧūd ​(existence) which individuates a given thing from something else, since existence applies uniformly to all things. It is for this reason that learning that a given quiddity has existence thus tells us nothing substantively new about the quiddity itself. It is for this reason that one may deduce all of the properties of a right triangle whether or not one ever existed ​in concreto​. Mullā Ṣadrā famously rejects the purely mental non-real nature of existence ​and vehemently formulates and defends what he calls the primacy of ​wuǧūd ​(​aṣālat al-wuǧūd) as a correct alternative to the doctrine of the primacy of quiddity (​aṣālat al-māhiyya). A rudimentary glance at the modern literature surrounding this important thinker’s ontology shows a noticeable focus on his doctrine of the primacy of wuǧūd (​aṣālat al-wuǧūd) and the manner in which it is informed by Ṣadrā's peripatetic as well as mystic and Twelver Shiite theological convictions; Nasr (1962), Nasr (1977), Abdul Haq (1967) and Rida (2003) all represent important works in which such an approach is found. Indeed Ṣadrā's rejection of the primacy of māhiyya ​is usually placed at the center of Ṣadrā's Transcendent Wisdom philosophical system. Nevertheless, in his (2009a) book Islamic Scholar Sajjad Rizvi seeks to shift the way in which modern thinkers approach Ṣadrā's Philosophy. As opposed to considering the primacy of wuǧūd ​as the chief component of Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology, Rizvi hopes to the focus of Mullā Ṣadrā's ontology to its modulation, or ​taškīk​. Through a close reading of Ṣadrā's self-declared magnum opus, the Ḥikmat al-muta‘ālīya fi-l-asfār al-‘aqlīyya al-arba‘a (Transcendent Philosophy on the Four 3 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir Intellectual Journeys) Rizvi argues three distinct points. First, that Ṣadrā himself considers the taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​to be the key thesis of his ontology (not its primacy). Second, that the ​taškīk ​of wuǧūd ​represents the prime hermeneutic tool by which one may understand and harmonize the ensemble of the Sadrian idea system and third, that Ṣadrā accords to the taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd​ a prime methodological importance in the doing of philosophy. In this essay, I hope to test Rizvi’s thesis by applying it to another one of Ṣadrā's important works in which the ontological theory of Ṣadrā's Transcendent Wisdom is discussed, Kitāb al-Mašāʿir ​(translatable as the book of Metaphysical Penetrations) (Rizvi 2009a). If the taškīk of wuǧūd ​(modulation of being) plays the essential role in the overall Sadrian ontological system that Rizvi argues it does, one would naturally expect ​taškīk ​to appear throughout the works in which Ṣadrā discusses his ontology. Interestingly enough, however, a quick glance through the ​Mašāʿir ​does not reveal a single instance of the term ​taškīk ​or the phrase ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ where it denotes modulation (a derived form does appear at points, for example ​šukūk ​at [38]). This need not,​ prima facie​, jeopardize Rizvi’s thesis. Mullā Ṣadrā may still employ the concepts of ​taškīk ​even though he does not employ the term itself. That is to say, there may be conceptual ​taškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir ​despite the lack of lexical ​taškīk​. This is the core question of the of the present essay; does Mullā Ṣadrā employ the concept of taškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir​? Is it accorded a prime conceptual, methodological and hermeneutic importance in the text? What consequences would this bear for Rizvi’s ideas? In order to answer these questions, I will provide a textual analysis of the ​Mašāʿir​, concentrating on and explaining those areas where Ṣadrā seems most to be employing or describing taškīk ​in his work. As discussed above, Rizvi presents and defends three theses regarding the role of ​taškīk ​in Sadrian ontology, and I hope to use my analysis of the text in order to evaluate all three. First I will examine if the ​taškīk ​of 4 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir wuǧūd plays a key conceptual role in Sadrian ontology as it is presented in the ​Mašāʿir​. That is, is it the most important part of Ṣadrā's ontology as Ṣadrā himself understands it? Second I will examine if the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​is afforded a key methodological role in the ​Mašāʿir​. That is, does Ṣadrā repeatedly invoke the taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​with respect to the doing of philosophy itself ? Finally, I will evaluate Rizvi’s claim that the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​is the prime hermeneutic principle around we, as Ṣadrā's readers, may organize the whole of his ontology and philosophy. Textually, I will be relying primarily on Seyyed Hussein Nasr and Ibrahim’s (2014) and Parviz Morewedge’s (1992) Arabic-English translations of the ​Mašāʿir​. To preserve the didactic efficacy of my work, I have tried to resort to the English translations of the ​Mašāʿir​ only when Ṣadrā's Arabic words seemed completely opaque to me. Furthermore, since the focus of my analysis will be the ​Mašāʿir ​and not the ​Asfār​, it is important to note that I will be granting to Rizvi, for the sake of argument, the thesis of his book that the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd​ indeed plays the central hermeneutic, methodological and conceptual role in the ​Asfār​. My goal here is to see whether this hermeneutic and conceptual primacy for ​taškīk ​found in the ​Asfār ​may also be found in the ​Mašāʿir​, and what general consequences this will entail for Rizvi’s argument. In terms of my citations of the ​Mašāʿir ​I will follow the paragraph numbers assigned by Corbin (1964) and found in Nasr and Kalin’s (2014) translation. Finally, before entering into the text, it is important to clarify how Rizvi understands taškīk​. Linguistically, ​taškīk ​is the verbal noun (​maṣdar) of the second form root ​š k k​ (of the form ​taf‘īl​). This root is usually linked to doubt or misgiving. For example, ​šak ​is the noun for doubt and the verb ​šakka​ means to doubt. Hence, when Rizvi writes that for Mullā Ṣadrā existence (​wuǧūd​) is m ​ ušakkak ​(the active participle of ​šakkaka​) he means that existence is of an ambiguous nature such that it is marked by doubt and the causing of aporiae (Rizvi 2009a, 39). This for Rizvi is closely linked to the notion that being is equivocal, that is, it is predicated of 5 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir different things differently. Rizvi furthermore interprets ​taškīk​ as modulation. This related yet distinct understanding of the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​refers to the idea that ​wuǧūd ​is accepting of degrees of intensity and weakness and anteriority and posteriority; it is hierarchically graduated and dynamic. Hence the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​as Rizvi understands it implies two notions. First, it implies that ​wuǧūd ​is an inherently ambiguous entity and one which causes doubt and misgiving for the undiscerning mind. Second, the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​implies that ​wuǧūd ​is modulated; it is, much like light, accepting of degrees of intensity and weakness despite remaining ultimately one and the same. With the scope of the essay and its methodology outlined, I now turn to an analysis the Mašāʿir ​themselves. II. Textual Analysis: ​Taškīk ​as the Causing of Doubt In the ​Mašāʿir ​we read a preface followed by an introduction which is followed followed by eight ​Mašāʿir ​(penetrations) and a seal (​ẖatm). The last penetration is itself divided into three paths and each of these paths is subdivided into a number of penetrations. The first seven Mašāʿir ​deal with the nature of ​wuǧūd​, while the eighth deals with a number of other philosophical and theological issues such as the nature of God and his attributes, the metaphysics of resurrection, the emanation of the many from the One, and the epistemological relationship between the knower and the object of knowledge. If we understand the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​as its doubt-causing nature, then the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd is indeed present in the ​Mašāʿir ​and it does play an important role in Ṣadrā's ontology. This is most clearly evidenced in the preface of the work, in addition to in a section of the 2nd ​mašʿar​. In the preface, Ṣadrā presents the purposes of his treatise. He states that the question of wuǧūd ​is the basis for all philosophical principles (​mas’alat al-wuǧūd assa-l-qawā’id al-ẖikmīyya, [3]). It is the ‘pole’ (​quṭb) around which the science of ​tawḥīd and the science of eschatology (‘ilm 6 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir al-ma’ād​) and the science of resurrection (​‘ilm al-ḥašr) turn [4]. If one is ignorant about the true nature of ​wuǧūd​, then this ignorance will permeate and corrupt the whole of one’s philosophical thought, (​yasri ǧuhlahu fi ummahāt al-maṭālib, [4]) and this will block him from the attainment of truth in all of the other important philosophical matters. It is for this reason that Ṣadrā says he begins his treatises with an analysis of ​wuǧūd ​and the proof that ​wuǧūd ​is the ‘immutable principle within every existent’ (​aṣl al-ṯābit fī kullī mawǧūd) and that all else (i.e. quiddity) is not but a shadow or reflection (​ʿaks wa ḍil, [4]). We may glean from this preface that the settling of the question or problem of ​wuǧūd ​(​mas’alat al-wuǧūd​) is of prime importance for any truth-seeking philosopher. Without a proper understanding of the problem of ​wuǧūd​, no other philosophical matter may be correctly settled. This importance is also reflected in the organization and composition of the work; not only is the nature of ​wuǧūd ​the first matter to be discussed in the ​Mašāʿir​, but it is the one to which the greatest analysis is dedicated. Out of the eight ​Mašāʿir​, ​wuǧūd ​is the subject of the first seven. Only in the eighth ​mašʿar ​does Ṣadrā begin to discuss the other subjects of the work, which he himself describes as ancillary and secondary when compared to ​wuǧūd​. In what way, if at all, is conceptual ​taškīk​, understood the aporia-causing nature of wuǧūd​, present here in the preface? An important observation is his use of the phrase ​mas’alat al-wuǧūd​’ as opposed to ‘​haqīqat al-wuǧūd​,’ the truth concerning ​wuǧūd​, or ‘​mafhūm al-wuǧūd​, the concept of ​wuǧūd​. These are phrases that appear elsewhere in the ​Mašāʿir ​(see for example [18], [57]) but Ṣadrā instead chooses to open his work citing the importance of the mas’ala of wuǧūd​. The word ​mas’ala​, from the verb ​sa’ala ​meaning to ask, implies the presence of questioning, of doubt and discourse. It implies that ​wuǧūd ​is a matter which merits and causes discussion and disagreement. In fact, Nasr and Kalin (2014) have chosen to translate ​mas’ala here as ‘problem.’ If we accept such a translation, then it is clear that for Ṣadrā wuǧūd ​is 7 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir mušakkak​, that it represents a philosophical problem and is the sort of thing which accepts discussion and disagreement. As Ṣadrā writes, this ‘problem’ of wuǧūd ​is the most important question in philosophy, and ignorance with respect to its nature will lead to ignorance with respect to a wide range of philosophical topics, while its correct understanding will illuminate the whole of one’s philosophical reflection. Hence the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​, understood as ​wuǧūd's doubt-causing nature, is definitely conceptually present in the ​Mašāʿir​. But, is it the most conceptually permeative of aspect the whole of ​Ṣadrā’s ontology, as Rizvi argues? I argue that this does not seem to be the case. As Ṣadrā writes in the preface(see [4]) as well as the first mašʿar ​(see [10]) the main thesis of the ​Mašāʿir ​is that ​wuǧūd ​is real, and that all of reality is ultimately ​wuǧūd​ (​al-wuǧūd ... huwa al-haqīqa,​ [4]). It it is the unchangeable principle within every existent ​(al-aṣl al-ṯābit fī kullī mawǧūd​, [4]) and that all which is not ​wuǧūd ​(i.e. quiddity) is like a reflection or a shadow (​‘aks wa ḍil,’ [4]). ​wuǧūd ​does not require anything added to it in order to be (​lā yaftaqir aṣlan fi taḥaqqaqihu wa taḥassalihu ilā ḍamīma, [10]). In addition to Ṣadrā stating himself that key subject of the work is the reality of ​wuǧūd ​at several points, this thesis is re-presented and defended at length throughout the work. For example, the third ​mašʿar ​consists of eight proofs to show that ​wuǧūd ​is the most appropriate thing to possess external reality (​anna al-wuǧūd ahhaq al-ašyā’ bi’an yakūn ḍa haqīqa mawǧūda, [15]) and the fourth ​mašʿar ​contains the systematic presentation and rejection of eight hypothetical objections posed against those who believe in the external reality of wuǧūd [38-68]. In the seal of the treatise, Ṣadrā writes that the sages look firstly at the reality of ​wuǧūd ​(​al-rubbānīyūn yanḍurūna ilā haqīqat al-wuǧūd awwalan, [144]) in their doing of philosophy. In the wake of these textual observations, it does not seem that the taškīk of wuǧūd​, understood as its doubt-causing nature, is the main thesis of Sadr’s ontology as presented in the ​Mašāʿir​. It seems at the very least that the external reality of ​wuǧūd ​and the 8 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir non-reality of ​Māhiyya ​is a more important thesis than the doubt-causing nature of ​taškīk​. Although the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​is not the primary conceptual point of Ṣadrā's ontology, we will see that it does however enjoy a key hermeneutic and methodological importance. This importance is mostly clearly evidenced in the 2nd ​mašʿar​, which is another place where Ṣadrā directly invokes and highlights the doubt-causing nature of wuǧūd​. Overall, the second penetration concerns the manner in which ​wuǧūd ​comprises things (​kayfīyyat šumūlihi lil ašyā’​ [12]). Here Ṣadrā writes that that wuǧūd ​is not accepting of genus, species nor accident (​haqīqat al-wuǧūd laysat ǧinsan wa lā naw‘an wa lā ‘arḍ an, [12]) because ​wuǧūd ​is not a natural universal (​iḍ laysat [al-wuǧud] kullīyan ṭabī‘ī yan, [12]). It follows that the relationship between ​wuǧūd ​and the things which have ​wuǧūd ​(existants) is not like the relationship between universals and particulars. This is because the universal/particular relationship requires the involvement of logical notions such as species, genus, and specific difference. Since the reality of ​wuǧūd ​does not partake in any sort of categorization or predication (and hence does not have a genus or species), those things which have ​wuǧūd ​(mawǧūḍāt, existants) cannot be said to particulars of ​wuǧūd​. This point, that ​wuǧūd ​does not accept any of the logical categories involving accident, species and genus is an important Sadrian thesis that is re-visited at several points in the ​Mašāʿir​, both as a philosophical claim in an of itself as well as an evidence for other points (see, for example, [18], [54], [102], [145]). Indeed, it is closely related to Ṣadrā's understanding of God as the the Necessary Being (​al-wāǧib​) as being the purest and simplest wuǧūd​. Since this pure ​wuǧūd ​is unbounded by the logical universals (species, genus, etc.) and since definition necessarily requires such categories, the Necessary Being which is pure ​wuǧūd ​is undefinable (​lā yumkin ta‘rīfahu​, [6]). It is also indescribable, since the description of a thing must be through that which is better known than it or through that which is equally clear as it. Since nothing is better known than ​wuǧūd ​, nor is there any form that is equal to it, it follows that 9 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir its description, like its definition, is impossible (​lā yumkin idrakāhu bimā huwa aḍhar minhu ... wa lā biṣūra masāwīya lahu). It for this these reasons that Ṣadrā writes later in the eighth maš‘ar that there is nothing that renders ​wuǧūd ​known, and nothing that reveals it except itself ​(lā mu‘arraf lahu wa lā kāšif lahu illā hūwa​, [105]). The realization of this exemplary status accorded to ​wuǧūd​, that it escapes logical categorization and definition, is not an exoteric piece of knowledge accessible by the usual discursive means of ratio-intellection. Ṣadrā (with clear allusion to 3:7 in the Quran) writes in the second ​mašʿar ​that its understanding is open only to those gnostics who are ‘firm in knowledge (​lā ya‘rifuhu illā al-‘uraf ā’ al-rāsiẖūn fil ‘ilm, [12]). In the preface he writes that this type of knowledge is not found in theological debate, popular tradition, nor philosophical insight (​mujadālat al-kalāmīyya … taqlīdāt ‘āmīyya​ … ​anḍār ḥikmīyya, [4]). As he mentions in the first penetration, it is rather discoverable only the discovering or unveiling demonstrations (​barāhīn al-kāšifīyya​, [4]). In the fourth ​mašʿar​, Ṣadrā writes that the knowledge of the reality of wuǧūd can only be through ‘illuminative presence’ and ‘real witnessing’ (​al-‘ilm bihaqīqat al-wuǧūd la yakūn illā ẖudūran ‘išrāqīyyan wa šuhūdan ‘aynīyyan) [57]. It is for this reason that the correct solutions of the ​mas’ala ​of ​wuǧūd ​have eluded so many of the previous philosophers [85]. This observation, taken in conjunction with the prime importance which Ṣadrā accords to the problem of ​wuǧūd ​in the preface, provides solid evidence for the claim that the doubt-causing nature of ​wuǧūd ​holds a methodological importance for Ṣadrā. Since the nature of wuǧūd ​is in its nature is inherently esoteric and elusive to all those who seek to solve it in the usual intellective ways, one must realize that the proper approach to the ​mas’ala ​requires a non-rational ‘unveiling’ type of demonstration (​burhān kāšifī​) which is inherently non-obvious and ambiguous. If one understands this epistemically elusive nature of the question of ​wuǧūd​ as one which causes aporia and doubt, then there is indeed a methodological importance to ​taškīk​. In the 10 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir doing of philosophy, one must face and internalize the ​mušakkak ​(doubt-causing, doubtful) nature of ​wuǧūd ​in order to realize that it is not graspable through the usual ratio-intellective means. Without this important methodological realization, one will futilely attempt to understand wuǧūd ​through ratio-intellective manners of thought and thereby become one of the ignorants alluded to in the preface. The proper understanding and internalization of the problematic nature of ​wuǧūd ​will lead the philosopher to realize that its true nature is one that is attainable only through epistemologies of unveiling and revelation, and he will not fall into this trap. Hence the taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​and its consequences do indeed play a decisive methodological role within Sadr’s philosophy. There is another way to see the methodological role of the ​taškīk of wuǧūd ​in the Mašā‘ir​. This is evidenced in the fact that Sadra uses the apororae caused by ​wuǧūd​ in order to explain its primacy. That is, Sadra’s methodology in the ​Mašā‘ir​ by which he presents and describes the primacy of ​wuǧūd ​is one that regularly uses the presentation and dissolution of apororai caused by ​wuǧūd​. This is best evidenced in the 4th ​maš‘ar​, where Sadra, with relative analytic precision and care, presents and solves eight ‘problems’ or objections (​aškāl​) brought against the primacy of ​wuǧūd ​by those who deny its reality. The title to the ​maš‘ar ​announces that the purpose of the chapter involves the ‘pushing away of doubts that have been brought against the realness of wujud’ (​fī daf‘ šukuk awradat ‘alā ‘aynīyyat al-wuǧūd​, [37]. This reinforces the fact that for Sadra the reality of ​wuǧūd ​is indeed a doubt-causing matter, and it reveals that this doubt-causing nature plays an important methodological role, since it is precisely through the ‘pushing away’ of ​wuǧūd’s ​doubt-ridden nature that Sadra hopes to elucidate and defend his thesis. A similar methodology is present in the third ​maš‘ar​, where Sadra presents eight proofs for the reality of ​wuǧūd​. In several of these proofs (at for example [23], [24], [27] and [35]) Sadra uses a ​reductio ad absurdum​ style argument by assuming the 11 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir opposite of the thesis he is trying to defend and then demonstrating how this assumption leads to a genuine doubt or aporia (or several aporiae). This textual observation further reinforces the methodological importance of ​taškīk ​for Sadra as he goes about rejecting the non-reality of wuǧūd​ and defending its ​in concreto ​realness. What about a hermeneutic importance for the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​? Here, again, Rizvi does not seem to be misguided. The ​mušakkak ​nature of ​wuǧūd ​is hermeneutically important in that it helps Ṣadrā' readers better understanding the importance of esoteric epistemologies (truth-seeking methods) in his idea system. A key part of ​wuǧūd​'s ​mušakkak ​nature is the fact that it does not accept ratio-intellective means of thinking. It has thus eluded and misguided many philosophers, despite its fundamental importance for philosophy at large [85]. Hence, for Ṣadrā, the development of the epistemological faculty relevant for the ‘revelatory demonstrations’ (​barāhīn al-kāšifīyya, ​[4]) is essential for the attainment of philosophical truth, be it in ontology or in the other philosophical subjects. These types of demonstrations are inherently esoteric, and Ṣadrā himself says, as noted earlier, that they are only known to those gnostics firm in knowledge (​lā ya’rifuhu illā al-‘uraf ā’ al-rāsiẖūn fil ‘ilm, [12]. Hence ​wuǧūd​'s mušakkak​ nature does indeed play a very important hermeneutic role for Ṣadrā's readers. Since the problem of wujud is the most important philosophical question, and since its highly esoteric and ​mušakkak​ nature is only treatable through the development of esoteric non-rational epistemic faculties, it follows that understanding the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​will enable us to better interpret and appreciate the importance of these non-rational epistemic faculties which are clearly so central the Sadrian philosophical system. To recapitulate, we are evaluating Rizvi’s three theses regarding the role of the ​taškīk ​of wuǧūd ​in the ​Asfār​ as applied to the ​Mašāʿir​. Thus far, we have understood the ​taškīk of wuǧūd as its doubt-causing nature. First, we asked if the concept of ​taškīk ​present at all in the ​Mašāʿir​? 12 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir This is trivially clear. Second, does the​ taškīk of wuǧūd​ hold a central philosophical importance for Ṣadrā? As demonstrated, this does not seem to be the case. At the least, The non-reality of māhiyya​ and the reality of ​wuǧūd​ seems to be a more important thesis. Third, does the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ hold a key methodological importance for Ṣadrā? Manifestly so; the aspiring philosopher must internalize the ​mušakkak​ nature of ​wuǧūd ​to realize that it is not accepting to ratio-intellective methodologies but rather requires a more esoteric ‘unveiling’ type of epistemic approach. Since the problem of ​wuǧūd​ is the fundamental problem of philosophy, this methodological realization is paramount. Finally, does taskik hold a hermeneutic importance for the readers of Ṣadrā? That is, is it revelatory with respect to the nature and overall organization of Sadrian ontology? Yes; the​ taškīk of wuǧūd​ is important for understanding Ṣadrā's philosophy since it shows that the nature of ​wuǧūd​, which is the most important philosophical matter, is an esoteric concept that is not epistemically amenable to comprehension using the usual ratio-intellective means. This is revelatory with respect to the role of gnosticism within the Sadrian system in general. III. Textual Analysis: ​Taškīk​ as Modulation So far I have been examining the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​understood as ​wuǧūd​'s aporia or doubt-causing nature. As explained in the introduction, there is another related yet distinct manner in which Rizvi understands the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​; its modulation. That is, for Rizvi, the fact that ​wuǧūd ​is accepting of degrees of intensity, or of anteriority and posteriority, is conceptually, methodologically and hermeneutically the central pillar of Sadrian philosophy. It is this second understanding of ​taškīk ​which I turn to now. Once again, I will evaluate the presence of ​taškīk ​in three ways. First, is it the conceptual cornerstone of Ṣadrā’s ideas? Second, is it the central methodological component? Finally, does it hold the hermeneutic key by which we can 13 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir interpret and unify the ensemble of Sadra’s ontology? As my textual analysis will hope to show, the modulation of ​wuǧūd​ is a point that conceptually permeates Sadrian ontology as presented in the ​Mašāʿir ​and it appears in the text at several points. But, as we will see, it does not enjoy a methodological nor hermeneutic prominence as Rizvi argues. My presentation of Sadr’s ontology begins in the second ​mašʿar​, glossed above, in which Ṣadrā explains that the relationship between wuǧūd ​and existents is not like the relationship between universals and particulars because ​wuǧūd ​is not a natural universal (​kullī ṭabī ‘ī). It is purely simple and it is not contaminated by the non-unity implied by the logical categories of species, genus, and specific difference. Hence it has no quiddity, since quiddity necessarily requires these logical categories. If this is the case, however, then Ṣadrā must explain the origin of differentiation. That is, if ​wuǧūd ​is the ultimate ontological principle of all things, and it is purely simple, then why are there distinct things in the world? Why is the world not simple? In the second ​mašʿar ​Ṣadrā uses pre-empts this objection and exploits it for the explanatory opportunity which it presents. He writes that ​wuǧūd ​is differentiated through itself. That is, it individualizes or particularizes itself ​(al-wuǧūd … mutašaẖaṣṣan biḏātihi , [13]). It also individualizes all the universal quiddities which exist through it (​al-wuǧūd​ … ​mušaẖaṣṣan limā yūjad bihi min ḍawāt al-Māhiyya al-kulīyya) despite itself not having any quiddity or differentiation. The manner in which this self-particularization proceeds directly involves the modulation of ​wuǧūd ​in terms of degrees and stages. I quote: ‘The reality of ​wuǧūd​ is differentiated in relation to the different contingent quiddities, each one of which is united with a degree of [wuǧūd's] degrees and a stage of its stages’ (​haqīqat al-wuǧūd​ …​ muḥtalifa al-haqā’iq biḥasb iḥtilāf al-māhiyyāt al-imkānīyya al-muttaḥida kul minhā bidaraǧatin min darajātihi wa martaba min marātibihi​, [14]). Hence ​wuǧūd ​is differentiated in terms of itself through its various degrees of intensity of itself. Particular quiddities are entities that contingently unite with 14 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir wuǧūd’s​ various hierarchical stages. That is, ​wuǧūd ​becomes individualized through its particular stages of strength with which particular quiddities contingently unite. ​Wuǧūd ​is thus differentiated by its modulation, its ​taškīk​, and particular quiddities correspond to its particular modulations. But if particular quiddities unite with ​wuǧūd​, then they must also enjoy an existence like ​wuǧūd ​in order to be able to hold this relation with ​wuǧūd​. But this is counter to the claim that quiddities only enjoy a type of ‘shadowy’ existence while wuǧūd has external ​in concreto ​existence. This also contradicts Ṣadrā's claim that wuǧūd ​is the fundamental immutable ontological principle of the world; ultimately all that exists is comprised by ​wuǧūd ​(​al-wuǧūd​ … al-aṣl al-ṯābit fī kullī mawǧūd, [4]). It for this reason that Ṣadrā must explain where quiddity comes from and how it comes to be united with ​wuǧūd​. Ṣadrā presents and responds to this important clarifying objection most clearly in the 4th and 5th penetrations, although it is an important point that is re-glossed elsewhere ([see for example [87], [96], [115]). In the fifth ​mašʿar​, Ṣadrā hopes to explain how māhiyya ​is qualified by ​wuǧūd ​if māhiyya ​does not enjoy actual external existence. He writes that this difficulty arises from the fact that subjects which qualify or are qualified, or have accidents, must have some degree of existence which precedes their qualification or acceptance of the accident or qualification (​fa lā budda lahu min martaba min al-wuǧūd yakūn mutaqaddaman biḥasbihi ‘alā tilka al-ṣifa aw ḏālika al- ‘arḍ, [75]). In this sense if a body were to be white, the body must enjoy some type of being before its acceptance of the accident of whiteness. When applied to ​wuǧūd ​and quiddity, Sadra states that three possibilities follow. Either ​wuǧūd ​occurs in pre-existent quiddities, and this results in an regress​ ad infinitum​ (for one may always invoke the ​wuǧūd​ of the ​wuǧūd​ of the quiddity). The second option is that ​wuǧūd​ qualifies​ ​quiddities that do not exist, and this is contradictory (for how can something which does not exist be qualified?). Finally, it may be the case that the ​wuǧūd ​occurs in a quiddity which altogether does not exist or not not exist (​lā 15 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir mawǧūda wa lā ma‘dūma ǧamī‘an​, [75]). Ṣadrā calls this the canceling out of two contradictions (​irtifā‘al-naqīḍayn, [75]). Ṣadrā opts for the first option but denies that this need entail and ​a ​regress ad infinitum​. Although quiddities do enjoy an external existence, this existence is nothing different than wuǧūd ​itself . Externally, the ​māhiyya ​of a contingent being is identical to its ​wuǧūd ​(​wuǧūd kullī mumkin ‘ayn māhiyyātihi ẖārijan, [74]). Hence ​wuǧūd ​does occur in quiddities that exist, but this existence is not at all independent of ​wuǧūd​. In fact, the existence of quiddities is just a mode (​ḍarf) of ​wuǧūd​, which is generated by the mind. This is the important point; quiddities are a product of the mind’s interpretation or analysis of the various modulations of ​wuǧūd​. As Nasr and Kalin mention (2014, note 49), this notion is linked to the classical philosophical notion that the mind cannot epistemically interact with material objects in a direct manner. The mind rather can only understand the properties and essences which are related in various ways to the material objects corresponding to these essences and properties. This notion is expressed in the fourth mašʿar ​when Ṣadrā writes that ‘it is in the nature of the intellect to analyze that which exists into essence and ​wuǧūd​,’ ​(inna lil ‘aql an yaḥlil al-mawjūd ilā māhiyya wa wuǧūd, [77]). Since essences are properties are the intellective principle by which the mind operates, it naturally prioritizes that with which it is familiar (i.e. ​māhīyya​) over that which is less known to it (​wuǧūd​). Hence in what concerns the external world, it is ​wuǧūd ​which is the anterior principle of that which exists since it is what there really is; it is what is caused (or instaured) by God (​biḥasb al- ẖārij fa-l-aṣl al-mawǧud huwa al-wuǧūd li’annahu al-ṣādr ‘an al-ǧā ’il bil-ḏāt, [77]). In what concerns the mind, quiddity is what is anterior since it is a universal mental concept whose has its very essence occurring in the mind (​biḥasb al-ḏihn fal-muttaqadim hīya al-māhiyya li’annahā mafhūm kullī ḏihni yaḥṣul bikawnhihā fi-l-ḏihn, [77]). 16 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir This point, that quiddity is a conceptual product of the mind’s analysis of ​wuǧūd​'s modulation, is also presented in the fourth ​mašʿar​, where Ṣadrā responds to 8 hypothetical objections posed by those who accord to quiddity external existence. In the last objection, it is noted that if there is a relationship between ​wuǧūd ​and ​māhīyya​, then this relationship must also have a ​wuǧūd ​(​iḏā kāna al-wuǧūd mawǧūdan lil māhiyya falahu nisba ilayhā wa lil nisba ayḍan wuǧūd​, [68]). The ​wuǧūd ​of this relationship must then also have a ​wuǧūd ​which consists in another relationship between another ​māhiyya ​and ​wuǧūd ​and this would go an ​ad infinitum​. Ṣadrā responds lucidly that in concreto wuǧūd ​is nothing else than quiddity (​al-wuǧūd ‘ayn al-māhiyya ẖāriǧan, [68]). The difference between them is only in the mind, i.e. conceptual. The relation between them (that is, the qualification of ​wuǧūd ​by ​māhīyya​) is purely mental and conceptual (​al-wuǧūd ‘ayn al-māhiyya ẖārijan wa ġayruhā fi-l-ḏihn. Falā nisba baynahumā illā biḥasb al-i‘tibār al-‘aqlī, [68]). We can understand from these observations several things. First, in ​in concreto​ external existence, there is no difference between quiddity and being. They are one and the same; they are simply being. It is in the mind’s nature to understand things according to essences and quiddities, and hence it ‘breaks down’ or analyzes what is pure ​wuǧūd ​externally into a combination of wuǧūd ​and ​māhiyya ​mentally. Since quiddities and essences are the operational principle of the mind, the mind has a natural tendency to afford quiddity an anteriority over ​wuǧūd​. It is more familiar with quiddity since it can never interact with pure ​wuǧūd​. This is why so many philosophers have been misled to incorrectly give to ​māhiyya ​actual existence; it is in the nature of the mind to do so. Nevertheless, the ultimate principle of actual ​in concreto​ existence is nothing but simple ​wuǧūd ​itself. Returning to the original question motivating this analysis, we now know from where māhiyya ​comes; it is a mental extrapolation. But if ​wuǧūd ​is simple and not accepting of 17 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir differentiation or species, then how can the mind extrapolate from the simple and unique ​wuǧūd all the various non-simple ​māhīyyas ​that correspond to all the universals the particulars of which with we engage with everyday? The answer is most clearly found in the section second ​mašʿar and it is the subject of our discussion; it is the ​taškīk ​of wuǧūd which allows the mind to analyze simple division-less ​wuǧūd ​into categorized species-having and accident-accepting ​māhīyyas​. As glossed above, in the second ​mašʿar ​Ṣadrā writes that quiddity is differentiated through its unification with a particular stage or degree of ​wuǧūd (muḥtalifa al-haqā’iq biḥasb iḥtilāf al-māhīyyāt al-imkānīyya al-muttaḥida kul minhā bidaraǧatin min daraǧātihi wa martaba min marātibihi, ​[14]). With this observation in hand, we may now come to understand that it is the taškīk of wuǧū​d which the mind analyzes into ​māhīyya​. If ​wuǧūd ​were not ​mušakkak​, then there would be no differentiation in it that the mind could analyze into ​māhīyya​. Hence the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ externally is what produces quiddity mentally. ​Wuǧūd ​(externally)​ ​accepts no quiddity and it is individualized through itself, through its modulation, and these modulations is what the mind subsequently analyzes into a ​wuǧūd ​and ​essence​. There is an important and revelatory qualification to be made in the preceding analysis. The ontological picture that we have described so far, that is that quiddity is the product of the mind’s analysis of ​wuǧūd's ​taskik, concerns contingent beings only. When it comes to God, who is the Necessary Being (​wāǧib al-wuǧūd, ​[104]), matters are quite different. God in Sadrian ontology is taken to be the first ​wuǧūd​ of which nothing else is more intense nor more perfect (​al-wuǧūd al-ḥaq al-awwal … lā atam minhu wa lā ašadda quwattan wa kamālan, [14]). As Ṣadrā writes in the 8th mašʿar​, since this ontologically supreme being enjoys an infinite intensity (​wāǧib al-wuǧūd ǧayr mutanāhī al- šidda wa-l-quwwa,​ [105]), his ​wuǧūd​ is not at all modulated; it is rather the ultimate source of modulation. It is the thing in virtue of which all other things are modulated; in the same way that rays of sunlight and their reflections are 18 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir deficiency-having modulations of pure non-modulated non-deficient sunlight, contingent beings are deficiency-having modulations of the necessary being, which is their ‘Sun,’ that is their ontological principle and source (assuming that the sun is self- subsistent) [108]. Since God is not at all modulated (he is of infinite ontological intensity), he has no specific difference, no particularization and no form (​wa lā yašūbihi ‘imūm wa ẖusūs … lā faṣl lahu … wa lā ṣūra lahu, [105]). This because all of these things would require quiddity which would require modulation, deficiency, and contingency. There is thus no way for the mind to know him, since as mentioned above, the mind is only able to operate on that which has quiddity. This is why Ṣadrā writes that ‘there is nothing that makes it known and there is nothing which unveils it except itself (​lā muʿarraf lahu wa lā kāšif lahu illā huwa,​ [105]). It (God) is indefinable indescribable and unprovable. All things depend on it, for all things are are imperfect modulations of it which emanate out from it. In this regard it is the perfect (infinitely intense) cause and the ontological principle of all being. It is the emanator for all which is not it (​innahu fayyāḍ ʿalā kulli mā siwāh, [108]). Since all which is not it is contingent quiddity and deficient essence (​mumkināt al-mahīyāt … nāqiṣāt al-ḏawāt, [108]) it follows that all essence and all contingent beings emanate from it and are caused by it. These entities (contingent quiddities and deficient essences) are necessarily inferior to their cause, since for Ṣadrā the caused is necessarily inferior to the causer (​la šakka an al-ǧāil akmal wuǧūdan wa atamma taḥaṣṣulan min maǧʿūlihi [102]). This idea, that the caused is necessarily ontologically ‘less intense’ than its causer is also present when Ṣadrā writes that ‘the relationship between the caused and the causer is the relationship of deficiency to perfection, of weakness to strength’ (​inna al-nisba-t-ul maǧʿūl ilā al-ǧaʿil nisba-t-ul naqṣ ilā al-tamām wa al-ḍu’uf ilā al-quwwa, [107]). Therefore all contingent beings are just instaured (caused) deficiency-having modes of ​wuǧūd (al-maǧʿūl laysa illā naḥwan min 19 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir al-wuǧūd​’ [115]) which is their cause and ontological principle and is the only Necessary Being who is ineffable, immutable and of infinite ontological intensity. It follows from this that every intelligible thing is a product of the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​. All quiddities which we know are a product of our mind’s analysis of the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​. The world as we know it is entirely comprised of the modulations of ​wuǧūd​. We can never perceive the source of this ​wuǧūd​ since it is of perfect intensity and thus does not admit modulation and therefore the mind cannot mentally unify it with any quiddity. In the same way, we only see the illumination of things in virtue of their illumination by the Sun ([108]) although we may never perceive the Sun itself directly due to its extreme brightness. With this textual analysis complete, we may now evaluate Rizvi’s thesis in the four previously explained ways. First, it is manifest that the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd ​understood as the modulation of being is indeed present in the ​Mašāʿir​, but how important is its role? Is it the most important thesis around which the whole of Sadrian ontology is based? From Ṣadrā's perspective, I do not think that this is the case. That is, I do no think that Ṣadrā presents his ontology in the ​Mašāʿir ​as one which is centered around the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​. The ontological primacy of ​wuǧūd​ over māhiyya and its having of ​in concreto ​existence seem to me to be the central theses of the ​Mašāʿir’s ​ontology. This is textually evidenced first by Ṣadrā's own description of the goals of his text. As glossed above, he writes in the preface ([4]) as well as the first ​mašʿar ​([10]) that the main thesis of the ​Mašāʿir ​is that ​wuǧūd ​is real, and that all of reality is ultimately ​wuǧūd ​(​al-wuǧūd ... huwa al-haqīqa​, [4]). He also writes in the seal of the treatise that the wise (the sages) first look to the reality of wuǧūd in their ontological considerations (​al-rubbāniyūn yanḍurūna ilā haqīqat al-wuǧūd awwalan, [144]). The​ taškīk of wuǧūd​, which is linked to the production (emanation) of contingent deficient ​mawǧūdāt ​(existents) from the first pure ​wuǧūd ​comes after this original prime realization regarding the reality of ​wuǧūd​. Hence as 20 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir Ṣadrā presents it, the in concreto ​reality of ​wuǧūd​ is a more important and more fundamental ontological thesis than the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​; the realization and internalization of the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ is secondary to the realization and internalization of the ​reality ​of​ wuǧūd​. This prime importance of the reality of ​wuǧūd​ is further evidenced by the structure of the text. As previously discussed, In addition to Ṣadrā stating himself that key subject of the work is the reality of ​wuǧūd ​at several points, this thesis is re-presented and defended at length throughout the treatise. For example, the third ​mašʿar ​consists of eight proofs to show that wuǧūd ​is the most appropriate thing to possess external reality ​(anna al-wuǧūd ahhaq al-ašya’ bi’an yakūn ḏa haqīqa mawǧuda, [15]) and the fourth ​mašʿar ​contains the systematic presentation and rejection of eight hypothetical objections posed against those who believe in the external reality of ​wuǧūd ​[38-68]. The​ taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​, although conceptually described and utilized several times, is never laid out and defended with the same technical precision or detail as the reality of ​wuǧūd​. It is for these reasons that I argue that the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd,​ understood as the modulation of being, is not the key conceptual concept nor the organizing point of Ṣadrā's ontology as he understands it. This does not mean, however, that for Ṣadrā's readers and students, it may not enjoy a conceptual primacy. Since our minds can only interact with quiddities, and since the ta​škīk ​of​ wuǧūd​ is the reason for the existence of quiddity (if ​wuǧūd ​were not modulated, there would be no differentiation in ​wuǧūd ​that our minds could analyze into quiddity) it follows that the ​taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​ is what produces our world as we know it. Everything which we perceive is a product of our mind’s analysis of the​ taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​; we never directly perceive pure ​wuǧūd​. Hence in a quotidian way, the ​mušakkak ​nature of ​wuǧūd ​is of a great importance in that it literally comprises the intelligible world as we know it. Nevertheless, I do not think that ​taškīk ​is the main ontological thesis of the ​Mašāʿir​. 21 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir In terms of Ṣadrā's methodology, I also do not think that the taškīk ​of​ wuǧūd​, understood as its modulation, is the prime methodological component of Ṣadrā's philosophy. That is, in terms of the way in which Ṣadrā does philosophy in the Mašāʿir​, the taškīk of ​wuǧūd​ does not seem to an important methodological principle within the philosophical activity of the ​Mašāʿir​. As argued above, if we understand the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ as its aporia-causing nature, then it does indeed play a non-dispensable methodological role as discussed earlier. But in terms of ​taškīk understood as modulation, I see no evidence for a methodological primacy. That is, I do not see how the degree-accepting and modulated nature of ​wuǧūd​ plays a role in the way in which Ṣadrā goes about presenting and defending the theses of the treatise. With respect to a hermeneutic importance, I once again do not think that the modulation of ​wuǧūd ​is the prime hermeneutic principle of Sadrian ontology, for him or for his readers. That is, I do not think that the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ represents, for Ṣadrā or for his readers, the prime explanatory lense through which the ensemble of his ontology may be understood. I rather see tawḥīd (the oneness of God) and his as being the prime hermeneutic tool. As mentioned above, the key thesis of the ​Mašāʿir ​is the reality of ​wuǧūd​. But why must wuǧūd ​be real? That is, why is Ṣadrā so opposed to the idea of māhiyya ​enjoying an actual existent reality along with ​wuǧūd​? Why is he so committed to the thesis of ​aṣalāt al-wuǧūd (the primacy of ​wuǧūd​)? The answer is most clearly read in the 8th penetratin where Ṣadrā argues that if there were two actually existent necessary principles of being, each of the two would have a degree of perfection not enjoyed by the other (​likulli minhumā … martaba min al-kamāl al-wuǧūdi laysa lil-āẖir, [107]). This would introduce a lack into the necessary being, and it would follow from this that the Necessary Being is no longer simple nor perfect. Since ​tawḥīd necessarily holds that God, the Necessary Being, is one and perfect, the idea of ​māhiyya ​enjoying real ​in concreto ​existence alongside ​wuǧūd ​would threaten the ​tawḥīd of God. As for the 22 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir possibility that ​wuǧūd​ be anterior to ​māhiyya​, since as we noted above ​māhiyya​ is essentially connected to division and logical categorization, and ​tawḥīd requires that God be one and indivisible. I argue thus that ​tawḥīd is at the very least a better hermeneutic lense than the ​taškīk of ​wuǧūd​ with respect to Sadrian ontology as presented in the ​Mašāʿir​. Ṣadrā is vehemently arguing against the primacy (or equivalence) of ​māhiyya ​and for the primacy of ​wuǧūd ​because he feels this is the only way to protect the ​tawḥīd of God. Given Ṣadrā's status as a Shi’ite Twelver jurist writing for an equally Islamic and juridical crowd, this reading fits perfectly with Ṣadrā's historical context and religious convictions. III. Conclusion I have extended and evaluated Rizvi’s thesis that ​taškīk ​plays the key conceptual, methodological and hermeneutic role in the ​Asfār ​to the ​Mašāʿir​. I have undertaken this analysis in consideration of the two ways in which Rizvi understands ​taškīk​; in the first the ​taškīk ​of wuǧūd​ is understood as its doubt-causing nature and in the second it is understood as its modulation in terms of intensity and weakness. With respect to the first understanding, I have argued that ​taškīk ​is indeed conceptually present in the ​Mašāʿir ​but it is not the main ontological thesis of the work; I argued that the ontological of primacy of ​wuǧūd ​is a more important thesis than the doubt-causing nature of ​wuǧūd ​and the equivocal nature of being. With respect to the methodological importance of wuǧūd, I showed that the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​ does indeed play a key methodological role in Ṣadrā's ontology; the mušakkak​ nature of wuǧūd​ is one of the signs that the realization of the reality of ​wuǧūd ​is unattainable through the usual ratio-intellective manners of thought. Through properly understanding the problems ​wuǧūd poses and that these problems are non-solvable by rational epistemic means the philosopher can realize that the problem (​mas’ala​) of ​wuǧūd ​is only answerable through esoteric ‘unveiling’ 23 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir proofs (​barāhīn al-kāšifīyya​, [4]). Furthermore I noted how Ṣadrā’s methodology itself employs the dispelling of the doubts caused by wujud as a recurrent philosophical method throughout the work (especially in the 3rd and 4th penetrations). This further corroborates the idea that wujud is mušakkak​, and that, methodologically speaking, it is through the treatment and dissolution of these doubts that one may come to realize the truth about ​wuǧūd. With respect to the hermeneutic centrality of the ​taškīk of wuǧūd​, I once again argued that it may be construed as the prime hermeneutic element within Sadra’s ontology in the ​Mašāʿir​. Since the problem of ​wuǧūd ​is the self-expressed fundamental problem in Sadrian ontology [4], and since the ​mušakkak ​nature of wuǧūd is closely tied to ​wuǧūd's ​esoteric epistemic nature, it follows that it is through the ​mušakkak ​ nature of wuǧūd that we may understand and situate the importance of gnostic epistemologies (means of truth-acquisition) in Sadrian ontology. Given that these gnostic epistemologies represent the only way to attain the supreme philosophical truths (such as the reality of ​wuǧūd​), the hermeneutic centrality of the ​taškīk ​of ​wuǧūd ​becomes clear. With respect to ​taškīk ​understood as the modulation of Being, I concluded that Rizvi’s thesis was overall weak. ​Taškīk​ is definitely present within the ​Mašāʿir ​but that does not play the prime conceptual role which Rizvi argues it plays in the ​Asfār​. I argued, rather, that the structure of the text as well as Ṣadrā's own words depict the in concreto ​reality of ​wuǧūd​ as the most important thesis of the ​mašāʿir’​s​ ​ontology. With respect to the methodological primacy of the taškīk of wuǧūd​, I argued that there was no evidence to suggest such a primacy if we understand the ​taškīk​ of ​wuǧūd​ as its modulation. With respect to a hermeneutic importance, I once again argued that it does not seem to be the prime hermeneutic lense through which the text is best read. I rather argued that the oneness and simpleness of God (​tawḥīd) seems to be the best way to 24 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir interpret the ​mašāʿir​; Ṣadrā's considers the possibility of the primacy of māhiyya ​as a threat to tawḥīd. Therefore, all in all, if we understand ​taškīk​ as the causing of doubt, then Rizvi’s thesis is textually supported with respect to hermeneutics and methodology. There is however no textual evidence to support reading it as the prime conceptual aspect of the work. If we understand the taškīk​ of ​wuǧūd​ as its modulated nature, then Rizvi’s thesis is quite weak; ​wuǧūd​ is clearly mušakkak​, but this does not enjoy a prime conceptual, nor methodological, nor hermeneutic status in the larger philosophical system. An important part of my analysis is Rizvi’s dual-understanding of ​taškīk ​and it is here that I hope to close the present discussion. As we have seen, the manner in which we understand taškīk ​affects greatly how read it its role in the ​Mašāʿir​. But the question remains, which of the two meanings is it? Rizvi in his book understands ​taškīk​ as implying both modulation and doubt-causing. The description of this dual-understanding of a ​taškīk ​was a point that I felt was noticeably undertheorized in his book and it was my main critique of the book when I reviewed it. Here we see this issue resurfacing; I have found no evidence in the ​Mašāʿir ​that suggests that Ṣadrā considers the doubt-causing nature of wuǧūd ​to be related to its modulated nature. ​Wuǧūd is indeed doubt-causing and it is indeed modulated, but there does not seem to be a clear unifying link between these disparate notions. Hence although the evaluation of Rizvi’s thesis as applied to the ​Mašāʿir ​has been a fruitful and revelatory endeavour, the complete evaluation of Rizvi’s thesis is somewhat overshadowed by Rizvis’ unclear delineation of the meaning of ​taškīk ​itself. Even if in the ​Asfār​ the link between ​taškīk ​understood as the causing of doubt and ​taškīk understood as modulation is clear, there is unfortunately no evidence, textual or otherwise, for such a link in the ​Mašāʿir​. 25 Zain Alattar ISLA 788 Term Paper Fall 2018 Works Cited On Sadrian Ontology; ​T​aškīk ​in the ​Mašāʿir ‘Abd al-Haq, “Mulla Sadra’s Concept of Being,” ​Islamic Studies ​6 (1967): 267-276. ‘Abd al-Majid, Rida. ​Hiwar al-falasifa: asalat al-wujūd wa-l-mahiya bayna Mulla Sadra wa-l-falsafa al-ishraqiyya​. Beirut: al-Dar al-Islamiyya, 2003. Ibrahim Kalin, “An Annotated Bibliography of the Works of Mulla Sadra with a Brief Account of his Life,” ​Islamic Studies​ 42 (2003): 21–62. Lizzini, Olga, "Ibn Sina's Metaphysics", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ​Fall 2016 <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/>. Marcotte, Roxanne, "Suhrawardī", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ​Fall 2016. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/Suhrawardī/>. Morris, James Winston. The Wisdom of the Throne : an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. ​Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy​. Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977. Pourjavady, Reza, and Sabine Schmidtke. "An Eastern Renaissance? Greek Philosophy under the Safavids (16th–18th centuries AD)", ​Intellectual History of the Islamicate World​ 3, 1-2 (2015): 248-290, doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/2212943X-00301010 Rizvi, Sajjad. Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. London: Routledge, 2009a. -- "Mulla Sadra", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ​Summer 2009b. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/mulla-sadra/>. Shirazi, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-din & Corbin, Henry. ​Le Livre des Pénétrations Métaphysiques. Kitab Al-Masha’ir​. Tehran ; Paris : Département d'iranologie de l'Institut franco-iranien : Adrien Maisonneuve, 1964. Shirazi, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-din, and Parviz Morewedge. ​The metaphysics of Mullā Sadrā: the Book of [metaphysical] Prehensions. New York: SSIPS, 1992. ̣ Wisnovsky, Robert. “Essence and Existence in the Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Islamic East (Mašriq): A Sketch, in ​The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics​, D. Hasse A. Bertolacci (eds.), Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 27-50. 2012. 26