Patočka's Asubjective Phenomenology

Kontradikce/Contradictions, 2018

PhaenEx, 2017

2000

2012

Czech philosopher, Jan Patočka is increasingly considered to be one of the most important phenomenologists of the 20 th century. As with Merleau-Ponty, Patočka’s intellectual path is shaped by an enduring critical engagement with Husserl and Heidegger’s respective versions of phenomenology. The present paper takes up Patočka’s later thought, which is characterized by the interplay of three interrelated but incomplete trends: the turn towards an asubjective phenomenology, the elaboration of the “three movements of human existence”, and a phenomenological philosophy of history. In turn, these emerge from his dissatisfaction with his earlier elaborations of the “natural world”, his unfinished attempt to elucidate a negative Platonism, and his enduring interest in the world horizon. The present paper seeks to reconstruct Patočka’s turn towards movement and its connections to the temporality of history and the asubjective field, as part of a broader project to reconsider modalities of tr...

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2016

de la Cadena, Nathalie, 2023

In this article, I present the phenomenological tradition as a new grounding for human method, a priori law in order to offer a new grounding to human rights. Combining a priori. It would be present as eidos of each object, and I name it as material a priori; it also be present in the eidetic relations and I name it as formal a priori. Yet the object would have an essence, a necessary content, a material a priori, and necessary states of affairs, necessary relations and connections, a formal a priori. Reinach, in The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law, describes eidetic relations, such as the relation between promise, claim, and obligation. I propose three eidetic universalities to ground law; these are what I will call human rights. I also face a few difficulties presented by DuBois and De Vecchi derived from the amoral approach of a priori laws. Then, I that a priori laws are beyond natural and positive laws.