African Security Review ISSN: 1024-6029 (Print) 2154-0128 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20 Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing Al Chukwuma Okoli & Cornelius O. Ogayi To cite this article: Al Chukwuma Okoli & Cornelius O. Ogayi (2018) Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing, African Security Review, 27:2, 129-143, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2018.1499545 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1499545 Published online: 19 Sep 2018. Submit your article to this journal View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rasr20 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2018, VOL. 27, NO. 2, 129–143 https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2018.1499545 ESSAY Herdsmen militancy and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: A theoretical briefing Al Chukwuma Okolia and Cornelius O. Ogayib a Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, Lafia, Nigeria; bDepartment of Political Science, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article explores the phenomenon of herdsmen militancy as a new trajectory for the farmer–herder crisis in Nigeria, with reference to its humanitarian implications. Relying on a systematic analysis of secondary data and aligning with the analytical anchorage of liberal political ecology theory, the article posits that herdsmen militancy depicts a contradiction in agrarian relations in the context of a national security crisis which has been complicated by salient socioecological factors such as climate change, armed violence, and identity politics. In view of the dire humanitarian consequences of this situation, the article submits that herdsmen militancy constitutes a major threat to human and national security in Nigeria. It makes a case for a pragmatic policy capable of mitigating the myriad socioecological factors that tend to trigger herdsmen militancy, with prohibition on open grazing in critical hotbeds of herder–farmer conflict as a strategic measure. herdsmen; herdsmen militancy; humanitarian crisis; national security; political ecology Introduction Nigeria’s national security has been tragically embattled over the years. This is evident in the alarming incidence of the Boko Haram insurgency, which has resulted in dire humanitarian consequences.1 While a fair amount is known about the Boko Haram insurgency, there are other internal security threats in Nigeria whose primary and secondary impacts are yet to be fully appreciated. Of these threats, the nascent phenomenon of herdsmen militancy is a case in point. Militancy is a form of extremist civil action that is based on the abusive application of militarised aggression by a non-state group in order to progress a cause. It occurs in two fundamental patterns: (1) spontaneous, and often incidental, eruptions of violence in the context of civil unrest; and (2) the systematic perpetration of violence by an established militia or nonstate armed group.2 Elements of militancy can be found in the various dimensions of nonstate civil offensives, such as public unrest, revolution, insurgency, and terrorism – with this last manifestation being the most extreme and abusive in nature. Militancy belongs to the province of extremist activism. It is often driven by extremist grievance-related world views, whether ideological, primordial or nationalistic. CONTACT Al Chukwuma Okoli okochu007@yahoo.com 146 Lafia, Lafia, Nasarawa State, Nigeria © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Department of Political Science, Federal University Lafia, PMB 130 A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI Herdsmen militancy refers to the systematic aggression exhibited by nomadic pastoralists in the context of socio-ecological struggles with sedentary farmers.3 It is a degeneration of the traditional farmer–herder conflicts within the context of the deteriorating national security complexion, as instantiated by the prevalence of armed violence and criminal impunity.4 However, quite unlike the conventional farmer–herder crisis, the phenomenon of herdsmen militancy is associated with a great deal of organised militarism and maximum violence. Portraying herdsmen as ‘militants’ in this article is by no means prejudiced. It presupposes that they are, more or less, proven aggressors in the context of contemporary farmer–herder face-offs in Nigeria. Although the herdsmen often rationalise their violent onslaughts against settled farming communities as reprisals occasioned by the farmers’ provocation – in the fashion of violent attacks on either the herd or the herders, or cattle rustling5 – it is curious that such reprisals have often assumed the scale of war, frequently leading to the raiding of villages and multiple human killings. This is not without prejudice to the fact that herdsmen can, and indeed have, also become victims of such violence themselves. The contemporary trajectories and dynamics of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria reveal that incidents have become a lot more organised, sophisticated and complicated: The attacks by Fulani herdsmen have in recent years taken more sophisticated dimensions with the use of new types of weapons and communication devices. In consequence, the sedentary agrarian communities have resorted to self-defense through local vigilante groups … This has further aggravated violence, with destruction of lives and properties.6 This pattern of violence had, hitherto, been widely characterised in the extant literature as being ‘along the lines of traditional antagonism between farmers and pastoralists’ over farmlands or rangelands.7 However, emerging empirical indicators suggest that the violence is becoming complicated and lethal. More importantly, apart from occasioning dire humanitarian outcomes that negate sustainable human security, the violence is prevailing in apparent defiance of all remedies. What is the nature and incidence of herdsmen militancy? What do the humanitarian consequences of the phenomenon portend for national security? This article, in the main, seeks to proffer answers to the afore-stated analytical posers in an attempt to advance a theoretically rigorous discourse on the emerging herdsmen question in Nigeria. Perspectives on herdsmen militancy: literature, themes and theories Rural farmers and pastoral livestock breeders (designated ‘farmers’ and ‘herders’ in the context of this article) are the primary producers of food in Africa.8 Recently, livestock breeders – notably transhumance pastoralists –and sedentary farmers have engaged each other in internecine violence that is threatening their ability to fulfil their respective livelihood functions and ensure their corporate survival.9 While the conflicts between these two groups date back to the earliest times, the frequency of their occurrence was initially low, owing to a number of enabling factors such as low human and livestock populations and a favourable climate for traditional pastoralism.10 However, subsequent socio-ecological changes, especially from the 1980s onwards, have compelled herders to seek pastures in rangelands outside their traditional ecological domains.11 This has often brought them into antagonistic relations with sedentary farmers along their transhumance routes. Improved human health and a rising birth rate have increased the overall population, while improvement in veterinary medicines has enhanced herd sizes and thus increased the pressure placed on arable land.12 But even then, the conflicts had remained within manageable proportions. The marked expansion of AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 131 river-basin and valley-bottom (fadama) cultivation since the 1980s has heightened the competition between herders and farmers for access to riverbanks, with a consequent increase in violent contestations.13 More recently, the pressure on arable land has been further compounded by climatic changes which have led to desertification and drought, thereby shrinking the belts of pasture upon which the pastoralist mode of production depends and drastically reducing access to rangeland.14 This has resulted in a fundamental transformation in the character of the conflicts between the transhumance pastoralists and sedentary farmers from rudimentary skirmishes to outright militancy, with both sides becoming unusually combative and each conflict becoming increasingly ferocious, leading to the wanton destruction of both lives and property.15 Cattle rustling, the availability of dangerous weapons, mercenary elements and dangerous drugs have all added to the combustion.16 These factors not only have heightened the level of national insecurity but also demonstrate a high potential to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in a country already ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency.17 Generally, the extant literature approaches the subject matter from the standpoint of conventional farmer–herder conflicts. Foremost works, such as those of Blench and Dendo, and Gyuse and Ajene, maintain that the crisis stems from needs-based eco-resource competition.18 This perspective reverberates in the second-generation literature on the subject matter, by authors such as Adogi, and Okoli and Atehle.19 The major shortcoming of this perspective is that it is not capable of accounting for the growing lethality and impunity associated with such conflict in its nascent manifestations. Expectedly, the emerging scholarship seems to be departing from the traditional farmer–herder narrative and moving to a more forthright account that portrays the growing lethal complexion of the crisis as a form of militancy. Representing this perspective, Okoli and Ayokhai typify the rising aggression of pastoral Fulani in the context of farmer–herder land-resource contestations in Nigeria as militancy.20 This position is also held by the 21st Century Wilberforce Initiative (CWI) and Bagu and Smith, to the effect that the prevailing Fulani onslaughts in different places in the country amount to organised militancy.21 According to the CWI, reducing the Fulani militancy to ‘a conventional farmer–herdsmen conflict does not adequately address a reality where thousands have been killed, weaponry and sophistication of attacks are increasing, dozens of villages have been destroyed, and tens of thousands have been displaced’.22 The phenomenon of herdsmen militancy can be explained from a variety of theoretical perspectives. The foremost perspective is the ‘natural-resource-use conflict’ thesis. In this paradigm, herdsmen militancy can be understood as the degeneration of traditional farmer– herder antagonism regarding access to, control over and use of land-based natural resources – i.e. rangelands, farmlands and fresh water.23 Here, the issue at stake is the scarce natural resources which the farmers and herders alike struggle to exploit in advancement of their livelihoods. This livelihood struggle shifts from mild to stiff competition when the resources being competed for become scarcer. In this context, competing parties may resort to aggressive modes of gaining the advantage over each other, thereby provoking violence. This perspective vividly resonates with the environmental security–scarcity approach. Akin to the above perspective is the eco-violence thesis, which holds that herdsmen militancy is a consequence of the dialectical interaction between socio-ecological and demographical factors, complicated by the dynamics of climate change.24 Implicit in the ecoviolence perspective is the assumption that competition and struggles over scarce ecological resources in the context of contemporary rapid climatic-cum-demographic change oftentimes engender violent conflicts.25 The kernel of the eco-violence perspective can be summarised 132 A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI after Buseth inter alia: climate change begets volatile ecological changes which interact with changes in demography to engender environmental scarcities, leading to serious livelihood struggles that result in resource-based violence.26 Contemporary climatic adversities such as drought, erosion and desertification have created necessary environmental scarcity by shrinking the quantity and quality of the natural resources available. Similarly, modern demographic changes such as explosions in the human and animal populations have brought about significant depletion of the available natural resources. Such developments often create ecological ‘red lines’ that drive aggressive resource contestations. The position of the eco-violence theory has been transcended and refined in the theory of eco-survivalism. Representing this perspective, Okoli and Atelhe succinctly opine that ‘the rising wave of militancy among the Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria is a phenomenon that is principally driven by a do-or-die struggle for survival in an environment that is competitive and perceptibly hostile to their collective sustainable livelihood’.27 In other words, herdsmen militancy is a survivalist strategy adopted by the nomadic Fulani to cope with the socio-ecological conditions that threaten their livelihood. As rationalised by a nomadic pastoralist: Our herd is our life because, to every nomad, life is worthless without our cattle. What do you expect from us when our source of existence is threatened? The encroachment of grazing fields [s] and routes by farmers is a call to war.28 Herdsmen militancy can also be approached from the standpoint of the contours and contradictions of identity politics. Although the root causes of the crisis are ecological and economic, over the years the fault lines of ethnicity and religion have been explored and exploited in the apparent dynamics of degeneration.29 In effect, the phenomenon has been constantly implicated in the flux of inter-communal conflagrations in central Nigeria.30 The identity-politics thesis seeks to interrogate the primordial dimensions of herdsmen militancy. The thinking in this perspective is that these conflicts are often compounded by existent or imaginary communal differences or antipathies. For instance, the farming and herding communities in most parts of central Nigeria are generically dichotomised into the broad categories of non-Muslim and Muslim, respectively. In another sense, they are also categorised as either nomadic Fulani or native tribesmen. So, when a skirmish occurs between the two social categories over resource use, extraneous religious and ethnic sentiments and rationalisations can be imported into the conflict scenario. In this context, an isolated resource-based disagreement can suddenly degenerate into identity-based violence. This has been the case in Plateau and Nasarawa states, where farmer–herder conflicts have led to perennial orgies of ethno-communal violence.31 Scholars have also sought to explain this crisis from a political–economical perspective. In this respect, emphasis is laid on property cum power relations apropos the farmers’ and herders’ social existence. The average nomadic pastoralist in Nigeria’s context is more or less a landless migrant who banks on the goodwill of the landed farmers, but also on the protection of the state, to graze his herd and further his livelihood. He has been marginalised into the fringes of society to the extent that he perceives himself to be living at the mercy of unfair societal structures which promote property and power relations in favour of the settled farmers. Hence, considering the asymmetrical nature of power relations between farmers and pastoralists in the contemporary period, conflict may be the only viable means of empowering the disempowered groups namely the pastoralists; and in this way, addressing injustice in the distribution of scarce resources.32 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 133 There is no gainsaying the truism that nomadic pastoralists (herdsmen) constitute a structurally marginalised ecological tribe in Nigeria. The existing state land-use policies and practices have largely alienated the herdsmen, who are widely perceived as land usurpers in many settled localities. Modern developments such as urbanisation, the advent of mechanised commercial agriculture, the emergence of mega-state development projects, and increasingly competitive land use as a result of the human population explosion have further compounded their existential plight. This is in addition to the collapse of grazing reserves and routes, as well as ever-shrinking ‘ecological resources’ (range fields, freshwater reservoirs, etc.) in the era of climate change.33 These adverse developments have marginalised the herdsmen and instilled in them a sense of frustration that often engenders aggression.34 From the perspective of what could be termed the security–governance nexus, it has been argued that the prevalence of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria is a consequence of the failure of state security and governance capabilities. The underlying presupposition in this respect is that the pattern of violence prevails under an atmosphere of stiff ecological struggles and livelihood insecurities that are unmediated or mis-mediated by the state.35 The inability of the government to regulate agrarian relations through pragmatic land- and resource-use policies, as well as the structural neglect of the livestock sector in the country, has been particularly unhelpful. Thus, in the absence of an entrenched mechanism for resource security and governance, what prevails in the agrarian sector is simply anarchy and criminal impunity, as exemplified by the incidence of herdsmen militancy. To a large extent, this perspective agrees with the governance-deficit theoretical paradigm that implicates ‘state failure’ as a factor in resource-based violence.36 The apparent lethargy of the Nigerian state towards finding a pragmatic remedy to the raging herdsmen menace has all the more been demonstrated by the contradictory postures of the federal government and some affected states in respect to dealing with the situation. While the federal government favours the idea of cattle colonies and the revitalisation of moribund grazing reserves, the affected states prefer the prohibition of open grazing and a ranching mode of husbandry. Meanwhile the crisis continues unabated. An emerging pseudo-empirical and anecdotal narrative that is popularly held in central Nigeria claims that herdsmen militancy in that context is part of the millennial jihadist grand design to Islamise the people of the region. This cynical viewpoint is reinforced by the selective nature of herdsmen militancy in central Nigeria, which is often targeted at non-Muslim communities.37 This perspective is culminating in a sort of ‘conspiracy theory’ to the effect that such violence depicts a disguised Islamic agenda dedicated to forced Islamic proselytisation and hegemonisation. As Ogebe puts it, ‘[t]he narrative of the farmer/ herder conflict is common but underneath it is the subterranean stream of bitter religious battle that takes no prisoners’.38 Further interpretations have diversified the horizon of the herdsmen militancy discourse to encompass elements of a conflict–crime nexus. For instance, Awogbade, Olaniyan, and Faleye link the ‘violence to transnational terrorism’.39 According to them, the ‘violence symbolises an emerging trend of trans-border pastoral terrorism in Nigeria’.40 This reinforces the views held by some analysts that herdsmen militants have operational links to the Boko Haram sect.41 Characterising herdsmen militancy as a trans-border phenomenon may be plausible considering the involvement of foreign mercenaries.42 Nonetheless, it remains problematic to establish that herdsmen typify a terror group, given their manifest atypical ideological and tactical orientations.43 134 A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI Of all the extant perspectives on herdsmen militancy in Nigeria, the liberal political ecology interpretation clearly stands out in terms of analytical plausibility and rigour. This perspective is an attempt to situate the organic socio-ecological and sociopolitical conditions that induce herdsmen militancy.44 The political ecology perspective views phenomena through an eclectic and contextually sensitive theoretical prism that focuses on the dialectics of social ecology and political economy. In doing so, it bridges the analytical orthodoxy of economic determinism in political economy and that of ecological reductionism in eco-violence and environmental scarcity theory by proffering a rigorously contextual analysis. An important strand of this viewpoint is the tendency to implicate state structures (laws, policies, institutions) in the occurrence of herdsmen militancy.45 Thus, [t]he inability of the Nigerian state to properly regulate land-use and resource exploitation through effective policies has informed un-moderated struggles between farmers and herders in the current era of climate change induced environmental scarcities. The struggles have in the recent years become rather fatal as parties resort to desperate means of self-protection and survival through arms bearing and militancy.46 Allied to the above is the convolution of the forces of politics, identity, demography, governance, ecology, economy, livelihood, and the like, which interplay to add impetus and complications to the crisis. As observed by Omilusi, ‘[v]arious conflicts in Nigeria involving the Fulani pastoralists and farmers consist of significant variables in economic, social, political and ecological parameters’.47 It is within such an eclectic and contextual perspective that the phenomenon of herdsmen militancy can be better understood. Within the wider political ecological discourse, two existential variables are prominently emphasised as constituting critical drivers of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria: climate change and cattle rustling.48 Climate change has pushed a significant percentage of herdsmen to the threshold of ecological marginality.49 A necessary outcome of this is the desperate southward sojourn of herdsmen towards central and southern Nigeria, where they often get involved in antagonistic relations with the sedentary population. Cattle rustling, on the other hand, presents an abiding pretext for herdsmen’s aggression towards the settled communities, members of which they often accuse of conducting raids and stealing their cattle.50 These incidents are taking place in a political milieu characterised by acute governance deficits wherein the state has manifested an unpardonable incapacity to govern.51 This governance failure has manifested in agrarian relations as an inability on the part of the government to ‘harness’ the gains and burdens of climate change in such a manner that forecloses the emergence of perpetual ‘losers’ and ‘gainers’, which adds another layer of complication to the crisis.52 Worse still, the apparent lethargy of the Nigerian state in relation to transforming the country’s agricultural sector through effective policies and legislation (land use, grazing reserves and routes, and farm-holding laws) has created a structural void that is often exploited by actors to indulge in treasonable excesses and impunity, ostensibly in defence of their endangered livelihood. Apparently, the state has also shown tacit ‘complicity of negligence’ by not taking concrete action to mitigate the situation. The political ecology of herdsmen militancy, therefore, seeks to probe, understand and situate the complex and dynamic socio-ecological, sociopolitical, sociocultural, and socioeconomic contexts that interact to predispose the violence. In effect, this nicely represents a synthesis of most of the theoretical traditions that are explored in the earlier sections of this article. This discourse differs from the political ecology perspective in view of its strong comparative utility in proffering a rigorous analysis of the subject matter. AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 135 History and incidence of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria Herdsmen militancy is the latest complication in the farmer–herder crisis in Nigeria. It is essentially a post-2000s development that crystallised and culminated around 2015/16. Hitherto, there had been cases of ‘low-intensity’ skirmishes or clashes between native farming communities and pastoral herdsmen over competitive land use – especially over claims of farmland and rangeland trespasses.53 Such clashes were largely restricted to peak planting and harvesting periods in northern Nigeria. At worst, they involved the use of rudimentary arms and ammunition such as Dane guns, machetes, spears and arrows, and amulets.54 In the mid-2010s, however, there was a dramatic turn in the farmer–herder crisis in Nigeria. This is evident in the advent of organised and militarised onslaughts orchestrated by migrant herdsmen – or their mercenaries – on native farming communities, under the pretext of the farmers’ unwarranted provocation.55 A typical instance of this aggression takes the form of a well-coordinated village raid, conducted with warlike brutality, lethality and destructiveness. Modern, sophisticated weapons such as AK-47s are employed to inflict maximum collateral destruction on the targeted community. In some cases, whole villages are razed, looted, and dislodged in an overnight or day-long campaign of obscene violence.56 The transformation of the farmer–herder crisis into a pattern of agrarian militancy reflects the contemporary dynamics of armed conflict in Nigeria in the era of arms proliferation and criminal impunity. Since its escalation in 2016, herdsmen militancy has prospectively competed with the Boko Haram insurgency as the dominant national security challenge in contemporary Nigeria.57 The Global Terrorism Index 2015, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), named Fulani (herdsmen) militants as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in the world in 2014: Alongside the destabilised security situation in Nigeria due to the increased activity of Boko Haram, there was a dramatic increase in attacks by Fulani militants in 2014. From 2010 to 2013, Fulani militants killed around 80 people in total. In 2014, Fulani militants killed 1,229.58 The threat of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria had steadily grown for a number of years, but has rapidly escalated since 2014.59 In effect, the violence is now characterised by immense military sophistication, with the deployment of modern weaponry and mercenary fighters.60 Consequently, the attacks of the past two years (2014–2016) cannot be construed as simple reprisals when multiple credible reports from across the region describe assaults that include supply helicopter raids launched from multiple boats, machine guns mounted on vehicles, AK47s, scorched earth policies that level entire communities, and sustained offensives that last for months in particular locations without governmental intervention.61 The critical locus of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria has been the Middle Belt (central Nigeria). The majority of the deaths (847 counted in 2014) associated with the militancy occurred in the five states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba.62 According to one account, ‘between 1997 and 2010 there were 18 incidents involving herdsmen and farming communities in the Middle Belts, while between 2011 and 2015, there were 371’.63 Regarding the trends and dynamics of herdsmen militancy in the Middle Belt, a recent report cynically avers: Since 2014, there [has] been a precipitous acceleration of conflict in primarily predominantly Christian Local Government Areas with sophisticated weapons in an environment of impunity. The acceleration has transformed the nature and scope of the violence beyond a narrative of traditional conflict, although it is politically useful to shield what would otherwise be analyzed as efforts by the 136 A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI Fulani to ensure hegemony of power, control over larger areas of land and the violent expansion of one religion over others.64 In its apparent dialectics of degeneration, herdsmen militancy in Nigeria has exploited the existing fault lines of religion and ethnicity to metamorphose into a complex combustible mix of protean identity conflict, thereby sowing the seed of destabilisation throughout the Middle Belt and threatening to engulf the esteemed Federal Capital Territory (Abuja).65 This has further exacerbated the internal security situation already engendered by the Boko Haram insurgency in the country. Available empirical data indicate that fatalities relating to the herdsmen crisis have been a significant source of violent death in Nigeria. Within a period of eight years (June 2006 to May 2014), the Nigerian Watch database recorded 615 cattle-grazing-related violent deaths, out of a total of 61,314 violent fatalities in that period in Nigeria.66 This distribution of incidents per year is given in Table 1. More recent indicators from 2016 point to the fact that herdsmen militancy is fast escalating into a national emergency. Curiously, the phenomenon is no longer restricted to central Nigeria; rather, it is now variously recorded in many states of southern Nigeria. What is more, the militants often operate with an air of impunity, as the government has been, manifestly, so grossly negligent in dealing with the situation. Consequently, the incidence of herdsmen militancy has witnessed an alarming rate of rapid escalation in 2016: In the past sixteen months, there have been 55 separate Fulani attacks in 14 different States resulting in over one thousand deaths. Even though the data for 2016 only include four months (January – May), there has already been a 190% increase in fatalities from 2015 to 2016. Benue State has been the most impacted, with 26 distinct attacks leaving 738 dead.67 Tables 2 and 3 chronicle incidents of herdsmen militancy (attacks) recorded in various parts of Nigeria in 2015 and the first four months of 2016. Table 2 shows that the incidence of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria in 2015 was sporadic, spiral and persistent. Most of the attacks occurred in northern Nigeria, with Benue State in central Nigeria recording a disproportional lead in terms of frequency and preponderance of incidents. Table 3 catalogues the recorded incidents of herdsmen attacks across the various parts of Nigeria for January to April 2016. It can be seen that the incidence of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria is on a rapid and phenomenal rise. The table also points to the fact that the phenomenon has dramatically assumed a national spread, manifesting in virtually all the segments of the polity. The more recent figures for 2017 and 2018 regarding the incidence of herdsmen violence are pertinently alarming. For instance, a report by Amnesty International reveals that no fewer than 717 persons were killed in the various episodes of herdsmen violence Table 1. Yearly distribution of cattle-grazing-related fatalities in Nigeria (June 2006–May 2014).68 Year 2006 (from June) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 (to May) No. of deaths 7 9 6 13 9 15 17 27 8 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 137 Table 2. Attacks by herdsmen in 2015.69 Date of attack Victims killed 27 January 27 January 30 January 15 March 10 April 27 April 11 May 23 May 7 July 1 September 6 September 2 October 5 November 9 November 9 November 1 December 13 December 15 December 2015 total 8 17 9 90 2 28 5 23 1 2 1 0 12 1 22 1 15 22 259 Local government area Zangong Kataf Agatu Logo Agatu Ethiope-East Guma Kwande Logo Kwande Ndokwa West Plateau Yewa North Buruka Udi Dekina Isoko Plateau Borno State Kaduna Benue Benue Benue Delta Benue Benue Benue Benue Delta Plateau Ogun Benue Enugu Kogi Delta Plateau Borno Table 3. Attacks by herdsmen in January to April 2016.70 Date of attack 1 January 4 January 10 January 17 January 25 January 6 February 7 February 7 February 11 February 24 February 27 February 28 February 3 March 5 March 8 March 8 March 9 March 10 March 11 March 13 March 13 March 13 March 17 March 17 March 19 March 21 March 29 March 4 April 9 April 10 April 13 April 13 April 16 April 18 April 25 April 26 April 27 April Jan–Apr 2016 total Victims killed Local government area State 1 12 45 0 20 12 1 10 2 300 9 9 1 0 40 12 8 2 0 90 2 6 25 15 1 2 7 1 1 15 44 0 1 18 20 0 20 752 Nkanu East Nasarawa Agatu Wukari Adamawa Buruku Yewa North Buruku Ozo Uwani Agatu Wukari Agatu Logo Agatu Logo Buruku Logo Agatu Senator David Mark’s convoy attacked Agatu Buruku Tarkaa Logo Buruku Udi Guma Ogba-Egebema North Tarkaa Oktipupa Cashaka Bali Ifedore Ayamelum Kwande Uwani Ndokwa Ozo-Uwani Enugu Nasarawa Benue Taraba Adamawa Benue Ogun Benue Enugu Benue Taraba Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Benue Enugu Benue Rivers Benue Ondo Taraba Taraba Ondo Anambra Benue Enugu Delta Enugu 138 A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI across Nigeria between 2017 and 2018.71 On 1 January 2018 more than 300 villagers were killed in a scorched-earth onslaught by the herdsmen militants in Benue State. Given the degenerating complexion and trajectory of the violence, the implication is that the trend has the potential to provoke a major widespread national security emergency if urgent care is not taken to mitigate it. Humanitarian complications and consequences of herdsmen militancy Herdsmen militancy has occasioned dire humanitarian crises in Nigeria, the scale and scope of which have been vividly captured: What is unfolding in Northern and Central Nigeria is one of the gravest current humanitarian crises in the world, with millions affected, thousands killed, insecurity rampant, children ravaged by malnutrition, one of the world’s highest populations of IDPs [internally displaced persons], schools closed, houses of worship destroyed and entire communities burned to the ground in scorchedearth attacks. Moreover, the threat posed by Fulani militants in the Middle Belt is escalating into one of the most significant security concern[s] in West Africa.72 In 2014 alone, the violence led to the death of 1,229 people, 847 of whom were killed in the central states of Kaduna, Taraba, Nasarawa, Plateau and Benue.73 Many persons have also sustained varying degrees of injury in these episodes of violence, resulting in different levels of partial and permanent morbidities. Functional and potential breadwinners of homesteads have been lost in this crisis, which brings about aggravated material destitution in the affected households. Herdsmen militancy is also associated with waves of population displacement, further compounding the already existing cumbersome burden of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. These IDPs are exposed to hazardous socio-economic conditions that adversely affect their health and material well-being.74 The dislodgement of people from their traditional productive domains also results in low rural productivity. In relation to agriculture this has led to decreased output, which has in turn fuelled food shortages and insecurity. Furthermore, there is the issue of the loss of assets and livelihoods. Houses, farmsteads, places of worship, markets and other critical community amenities that support rural livelihood have often been destroyed. In most cases, the entire community is left in utter desolation in the aftermath of a major attack.75 The ripples of such attacks have been detrimental to the livelihood structures of society, leading to mass impoverishment and exacerbated material hardships. Implications of herdsmen militancy for national security The humanitarian consequences of herdsmen militancy point to the fact that it is a threat to human security and, by extension, to the national security of Nigeria. By displacing farmers from their productive bases it has led to decreases in agricultural productivity and output, to the detriment of food security. These episodic occurrences of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria have also worsened rural insecurity in the country. To ward off possible attacks by herdsmen, local farming communities have often mobilised for self-defence through the instrumentality of self-help vigilantism. The activities of the vigilantes vis-à-vis the herdsmen have more often than not led to multiple reprisals in a manner that plunges the affected AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 139 communities into a circle of mutual violence and vendetta. This was the case in Nasarawa State during the showdown between the Ombatse militia and the ‘Fulani aggressors’.76 More than anything else, herdsmen militancy has occasioned volatile and recalcitrant intergroup relations in Nigeria. It has led to mutual distrust and suspicion between the native communities and the migrant herders. This has often been misplayed through ‘identity politics’ to engender inter-communal violence. Cases in point include the situations in Nasarawa and Plateau states, where herdsmen militancy has ossified the already polarised communal (or identity) cleavages, giving rise to spiralling ethno-religious and inter-communal conflagrations.77 More disturbing is the fact that some herdsmen militants have recently been accused of associating with Boko Haram insurgents as strategic collaborators.78 To say the least, herdsmen militancy has created an ambience of civil unrest, tension, and crisis in the affected areas. It is now associated with mercenary fighting, arms proliferation, and rural banditry. The implication of this is that herdsmen militancy is inimical to societal peace and stability. In effect, it has proved to be a serious threat to the human and national security of Nigeria. Conclusion The deteriorating complexion of Nigeria’s national security has become rather ominous in recent years. This is evident in the incidences of Boko Haram insurgency and herdsmen militancy, whose humanitarian complications have been devastating. While the Boko Haram onslaughts appear to be attenuating, the activities of herdsmen militants are tending towards aggravation. The escalation of herdsmen militancy in Nigeria adumbrates a national security debacle within an enabling context of unmediated identity politics, armed violence, and rising livelihood scarcities and contestations. The unfolding trajectories and dynamics of herdsmen violence in Nigeria in recent years are alarming. Given the government’s apparent inertia to mitigate the crisis, it is not out of place to reason that another major internal security crisis is brewing in the country. The collateral humanitarian consequences associated with herdsmen militancy – as exemplified in human fatalities and morbidities, population displacement, and livelihood crises – indicate that the phenomenon typifies a national security emergency. To mitigate this scourge there is a need for a pragmatic approach to security governance in the agrarian sector. In this regard, the federal government and its state counterparts should collaborate on fashioning an effective policy that is capable of moderating the relations between farmers and herders in such a manner that would guarantee mutually beneficial land-use practices for both groups. The prohibition of open grazing in the critical hotbeds of farmer–herder disturbances is a policy option in this regard. But for the sake of sustainability, it is imperative to systematically and holistically address the myriad complex socio-ecological factors that tend to predispose and complicate the occurrences. Principal among these are the adversities of climate change, armed violence, and identity politics. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Onuoha, ‘Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra’, 173. Ilagha, ‘Federalism and Politics of Resource Control’. Okoli and Atelhe, ‘Nomads against Natives’. Okoli and Ayokhai, ‘Insecurity and Identity Policies’. Olaniyan and Yahaya, ‘Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts’. Olayoku, Trends and Patterns, 4. 140 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. A. C. OKOLI AND C. O. OGAYI CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 58. Tukur, ‘Perspectives on the Conflict between Farmers and Transhumance Pastoralists’. Olayoku, Trends and Patterns. Adogi, Fulani–Farmers Conflicts. Adekunle and Adisa, ‘Empirical Phenomenological Psychological Study’. Ibid. Blench and Dendo, Natural Resource Conflicts. Adogi, Fulani–Farmers Conflicts. Tenuche and Olarewaju, ‘Resource Conflict’. Tukur, ‘Perspectives on the Conflict between Farmers and Transhumance Pastoralists’. Onuoha, ‘Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra’, 173. Blench and Dendo, Natural Resource Conflicts; Gyuse and Ajene, Conflict in the Benue Valley. Adogi, Fulani–Farmers Conflicts; Okoli and Atelhe, ‘Nomads against Natives’. Okoli and Ayokhai, ‘Insecurity and Identity Policies’. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 58; Bagu and Smith, Past Is Prologue. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 1. Blench and Dendo, Conflict between Pastoralists and Cultivators. See also Blench and Dendo, Natural Resource Conflicts; Gyuse and Ajene, Conflict in the Benue Valley. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. See also Adogi, Fulani–Farmers Conflicts. Okoli and Atelhe, ‘Nomads against Natives’, 79. Buseth, ‘Conflicting Livelihood and Resource Security’. Okoli and Atelhe, ‘Nomads against Natives’, 10. Abbass, ‘No Retreat No Surrender’, 331. Alubo, Ethnic Conflicts. See also Olayoku, Trends and Patterns. Ugwu and Okoli, ‘Political Exclusion and Conflict in Nigeria’. Okoli and Ayokhai, ‘Insecurity and Identity Policies’. Shettima and Tar, ‘Farmer–Pastoralist Conflicts’, 179. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike, ‘The Cattle are “Ghanaians”’, 53. Okoli, ‘Trajectories and Dynamics’, 22. Ibeanu, ‘Oil, Environment and Conflict’. See also Egwu, ‘Political Economy of Rural Banditry’. SB Morgen, Terror in the Food Basket. See also CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten. Ogebe, ‘The US Role in Helping Nigeria’, 5. Awogbade, Olaniyan, and Faleye, ‘Eco-Violence’, 41. Ibid., 41. McGregor, ‘Alleged Connection’. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten. Compare with insights from IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015. Olaniyan, Francis, and Okeke-Uzodike, ‘The Cattle are “Ghanaians”’. Ibid.. Okoli, ‘Trajectories and Dynamics’, 54. Omilusi, ‘Revolving Terrorists’, 48. Adogi, Fulani–Farmers Conflicts. See also Olaniyan and Yahaya, ‘Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts’. Okoli and Atelhe, ‘Nomads against Natives’. Olaniyan and Yahaya, ‘Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts’. Olaniyan, ‘Foliage and Violence’. Buseth, ‘Conflicting Livelihood and Resource Security’. Blench and Dendo, Conflict between Pastoralists and Cultivators. Gyuse and Ajene, Conflict in the Benue Valley. Olayoku, Trends and Patterns. Egwu, ‘Political Economy of Rural Banditry’. SB Morgen, Terror in the Food Basket. IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 43. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten. AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 141 Olayoku, Trends and Patterns. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 59. IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 43. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 68. Ibid., 60. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten. Olayoku, Trends and Patterns, 7. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 76. Olayoku, Trends and Patterns, 7. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 75–76. Ibid. ‘Amnesty International Brands Nigeria’s Response to Fulani Herdsmen Violence Inadequate’. CWI, Nigeria: Fractured and Forgotten, 7. IEP, Global Terrorism Index 2015, 43. Ugwu and Enna, ‘Conflict Transformation in Nasarawa’. SB Morgen, Terror in the Food Basket. Ayuba, Ombatse. Egwu, ‘Political Economy of Rural Banditry’. McGregor, ‘Alleged Connection’. Notes on contributors Okoli, Al Chukwuma (B.Sc., M.Sc., Political Science), holds a Ph.D in Defence and Strategic Studies from Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). He is a lecturer in Political Science at Federal University Lafia where he doubles as the Co-ordinator of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution programme. 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