The Jamesian Appeal of Scheler's Felt Metaphysics

comparative & continental philosophy, Vol. 7 No. 1, May 2015, 29 – 43 The Jamesian Appeal of Scheler’s Felt Metaphysics1 J. Edward Hackett University of Akron, USA I attempt to solve a problematic feature of Scheler’s intentional feeling. Spiritual feelings are disembodied and elements of William James’s pragmatism offer a way to make elements of Scheler’s phenomenology more concrete than Scheler’s phenomenology allows. I then further develop this insight since contact between both Scheler and James opens up possible trajectories and affinities that, in the end, reveal both thinkers share an affective underpinning to their respective metaphysics. In both thinkers, reality is given as felt. As such, this underpinning becomes a basis for interpreting Scheler’s later metaphysics through Jamesian pragmatism. keywords William James, Max Scheler, phenomenology, American Pragmatism, drive, spirit, intentional feeling Phenomenology is a name for a variety of approaches that take experience seriously. In these approaches, the common desideratum is to describe concretely how the constituting subject acts in relation to the constituted object. The core of phenomenology is the systematic description of this co-relational act-object structure in which neither act nor object is privileged more than the other. If descriptions are not concrete enough, then the phenomenologist has either privileged one-side of the relation or neglected a dimension of lived-experience that should remain explored in her descriptions of experience’s co-relational structure. I argue that Scheler’s description of intentional feeling loses sight of the concrete lived-body and, in this respect, William James’s pragmatism can help Scheler. Through this encounter with pragmatism, Scheler’s metaphysical impetus opens up the deeply felt dimension of reality underlying both James and Scheler. In trading the relevance of the lived-body for enduring psychic and spiritual feeling, Scheler reveals how feeling intends the values of the Holy and culture. In these feelings, the values acquire a sense, but no mention is made of how those values manifest in the experiencer involve the lived-body. Scheler had an intimate knowledge of the work of James. At least as early as 1914, Scheler had been given a copy of James’s A Pluralistic Universe. Moreover, Manfred Frings comments at length the similar starting points they shared with each other. As he put it: There are some incidental yet perhaps interesting parallels between James and Max Scheler, who both had their mentors, Peirce and Husserl respectively. In their own times 1 This essay owes its inspiration to the many conversations about the intersection between pragmatism and phenomenology with my mentor and friend Kenneth W. Stikkers. ß W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2015 DOI 10.1179/1757063815Z.00000000047 30 J. EDWARD HACKETT (and perhaps even still) James and Scheler were not infrequently considered by some to be renegade disciples of their mentors. But in their cases, James and Scheler broke the dependence on their mentors and developed their own thought. One can grant that both James and Scheler started along some lines of their mentors but took distinct directions in their development of them. Scheler’s starting point, intuition, is a departure from the position at which Husserl began. Scheler and James shared an early interest in moral life, in contrast to Peirce’s and Husserl’s early preoccupation with logic and mathematics. The former were over-generous in the acknowledgement of their mentors while the latter underestimated the potential of Scheler and James. (Frings 2001, 222) Despite Scheler’s criticism of pragmatism, there are strong reasons to seek out their relevant affinities. This article is an attempt to advance these affinities in two respects: first, within the scope of Scheler’s inadequate account of the lived body in intentional feeling and second, to show how the common bonds that unite Scheler and James can be employed to disambiguate Scheler’s later metaphysics. With his inadequate account of the lived-body, Scheler neglects a crucial aspect of phenomenological experience. This confronts us with a crisis. On the one hand, Scheler gives a description of intentional feeling and the value correlates that constitute experience as contents of the experienced feeling. In saying that, Scheler’s values involve our world. Values appear on the back of deeds, persons and things. They illuminate content of our livedexperience in this world, and yet by denying the relevance of the lived-body in the experience of values in psychic and spiritual feeling, the disembodied nature of the higher feelings calls into question just how concrete Scheler’s phenomenology really is beyond its articulation in vital feeling. An enhancement of Scheler’s account with new reflections on the embodied relevance of the lived-body in psychic and spiritual feeling eliminates this crisis of concretion. This enhancement is possible if we read Scheler’s thought pragmatically, even when we move beyond the lived-body. Such an effort, however, is only an opening. It is also the case that meditating on Scheler’s lived-body opens up a common pragmatic ground. Both Scheler and James regard feeling as constitutive of experience before we can articulate anything about experience. Experience is shot through with feeling. Moving from the relevance of the lived-body to feeling, I start to open up the basic insight that James not only saves Scheler from his own lack of phenomenological concretion, but the commonalities on the very relation to reality can open up a powerful pragmatic interpretation of Scheler’s later metaphysics. Here is how I propose to do these things. I first outline the problem of disembodied feeling in the four stratified layers of feeling that appear in Scheler’s Formalismus. In the second section, I introduce William James’s pragmatic thought as a way to conceive of feeling situated in a body. Working from James’s Principles of Psychology, I argue that the James-Lange hypothesis can remedy the observed defect of Scheler’s intentional feeling when we understand the James-Lange hypothesis phenomenologically. In the third section, I defend three points of agreement between Scheler and James and what I take to be a Jamesian reading of how the divine is felt in James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. When Scheler talks about the functionalization of an essence in his thought; he unwittingly introduces a pragmatic test for phenomenological descriptions. In fourth section, since Scheler’s later metaphysics articulates life’s energy as an “impulsion [Drang ],” and Scheler works from the bottom-up tracing impulsion in the lived-body, I interpret this transition as Scheler coming to grips with flaw I observed in his disembodied intentional-feeling in its higher forms. Regarded pragmatically, the activity of intentional feeling described on the side of impulsion and its relation to spirit (Geist) is shown to have the pragmatic consequence of putting embodied-ness back into feeling. While I confess that one could read Scheler’s metaphysics as an internal solution to the problem raised in the first section, a pragmatic reading avoids the charge of metaphysical dualism, and illuminates Scheler’s pragmatic appeal to a larger world that may benefit from it. THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 31 The four levels of feeling and the rising irrelevance of the lived-body I now turn to a description of Scheler’s four levels of feeling-consciousness and problematize the lived-body’s concrete givenness in terms of the higher-levels of feeling. As one proceeds from the lower to the higher, there is a decreasing relevance of the lived-body in these feelings. In this section, I work from the lowest to the highest layers of intentional feeling as outlined in Scheler’s Formalismus. I will admit the reason for this dearth of concretion in the body follows from how Scheler conceives of value’s givenness in the higher values. A value endures beyond the immediacy of the body in lower values. The permanency of the value is neither transient nor divisible and the greater the depth of the value, the less it depends on material sensible conditions and the lived-body. Scheler’s sensible feelings are localized and extended in certain parts of the body. These sensations are not acts or functions but are rather experienced through identifiable organ units in the lived-body. Scheler describes them as states. They can extend throughout the body and affect more parts of the lived body. Scheler’s most extensive example is pain, but he also uses eating, drinking, touching, and lust among his other examples. In these examples, the states are always fixed in relation to an object, and we cannot adjust our “ray of regard” to them. The objects can change from location to location. If I am pricked in my arm with a pin, I will experience pain, but the same pain would be present had I pricked my toe with a pin. Sensible-feelings do not occur at the level of intentionality. “Purely sensible feelings therefore lack even the most primitive form of intentionality” (Scheler 1973a, 333). Given that sensible-feeling is non-intentional, it cannot be given to the person. The person is Scheler’s term to describe human life purged of the natural attitude. Instead, sensiblefeelings only relate “to the ego in a doubly indirect manner” (Scheler 1973a, 334). Sensiblefeelings are not attached to the ego as, say, sadness, grief or woe in psychic feeling. Moreover, these feelings do not fill out the psychophysical union of the body-ego. They do not relate to the lived-body as an emotional shade. Instead, sensible-feelings are founded on some part of the lived-body. Sensible-feelings are passive in this respect. I experience them where they occur in the lived-body. At the next level, vital feeling participates “in the total extension of the lived body but has no special extension in it” (Scheler 1973a, 338). Vital feelings involve the whole lived-body. Vital feelings include: comfort, discomfort, health, illness, fatigue and vigor just to name a few. They involve the lived-body at a deeper level than sensible-feelings. Vital-feelings exhibit a unitary character “that does not possess the manifold form of extensionality belonging to sensible feelings” (Scheler 1973a, 339). Vital-feelings may still be present in an experience while we are paying attention to sensible feeling. I may feel incredibly vigorous after a run at the vital level even though I periodically experience a muscle spasm in sensible-feeling. I might not even notice the lingering sensation of muscle discomfort due to the more enduring vital feeling. Thus, the striking difference between vital-feelings and sensible-feelings is indicated in what Scheler calls “dead states.” Vital-feeling are always functional and intentional in character. The dead states of sensible-feelings only can hint at or symbolize certain states in organs and tissues of the body. Within vital-feeling, persons have access to so much more due to the functional and intentional character of these feelings. As Scheler puts it: In a vital feeling, on the other hand, we feel our life itself, its “growth,” its “decline,” its “illness,” its “health,” and its “future”; i.e. something is given to us in this feeling. And this holds for both the vital feeling that is directed toward our own life and the vital feeling that is directed toward the outer world and other living beings through postfeeling and fellow feeling through vital sympathy. (Scheler 1973a, 340) In a very real concrete way, vital-feeling is the start place where values come-to-be felt in life. We acquire a holistic picture of our orientation in a very bodily way in relation to the 32 J. EDWARD HACKETT physical world. In vital-feeling, we can also pick up on the value-content of the surrounding environment. In other words, vital-feeling reveals contents of life. We pick up on the “freshness of the forest” and come to know “the living power of the trees.” It is also the start of the foundation of feelings of community. Vitality is the expressive givenness of life itself and the relation such givenness manifests in our experience with particular relevance to our bodies—this is what Scheler calls the intentional character of vital feelings. The intentional character of vital-feelings is of “special importance in that vital feelings can evidentially indicate the vital meaning of value of events and processes within and outside my body” (Scheler 1973a, 341). Vital-feelings indicate the sense of an event or process, and as Scheler notes, this is quite different than epistemic moments of comprehension and representation. Vital-feelings reveal anticipated dangers, disadvantages, or advantages in the environment. Sensible-feelings, as we know, require the presence of the stimuli to engender them. Vital-feelings can anticipate dangers for instance since the value of the stimuli, event or process is given prior to its arrival. Scheler finds this value-giving quality in vital-feelings present in anxiety, disgust, shame, appetite, aversion, vital sympathy and vital aversion.2 In this way, vital feelings contain a futural orientation in what they reveal. They are concerned with and point to “the value of what is coming” (Scheler 1973a, 342). As we proceed up from the sensible and vital layers, we arrive at purely psychic feeling. In general, feelings reveal more lasting and complete givenness as they approach the height of the person. In ascending the stratified layers, the mode of givenness becomes more independent from the lived-body of both sensible and vital feelings. In this way, we can understand that the givenness of psychic feelings is “originaliter an ego-quality.” Psychic feelings are not given through the lived body, nor do psychic feelings become states by entering through the lived-body.3 For example, “a deep feeling of sorrow in no way participates in extension” (Scheler 1973a, 342) as ill-feeling suggests in the lived-body in vital-feeling or consider Scheler’s example much later in which he delineates the feeling of sadness fills the ego’s inner perception and how a person feels hunger or pain (Scheler 1973a, 411). However, the strata to which certain ego-qualities are connected have nothing to do with the lived-body though ego-qualities can be affected by different feelings of the livedbody. I can feel sorrow about someone’s sickness in vital-feeling if I acquire it or a similar condition. Psychic feelings are feeling-states. Moreover, Scheler reminds us that the lawfulness of psychic feelings are “subjected to their own laws of oscillation as are different types of feelings in general” (Scheler 1973a, 342). In other words, though there may be some connections between vital and psychic, we should not forget that the psychic realm of feeling [like its spiritual counterpart to be discussed later] shares in its own irreducibly complex givenness independent from the other strata, including the lived-body. Finally, Scheler reaches spiritual feelings. These feelings can never be states, and this Scheler considers the hallmark of the difference between psychic feelings and spiritual feelings. Instead, spiritual feelings “seem to stream forth, as it were, from the very source of spiritual acts. The light or darkness of these feelings appears to bathe everything given in the inner and outer world in these acts. They “permeate” all special contents of experience” 2 It interesting that Scheler puts anxiety in the vital sphere whereas Heidegger has no delineated typology other than fundamental and ordinary moods to which some are more primordial than others (e.g. fear is an abstraction of anxiety as the primordial mood of human existence). Scheler does mention what the translators have called “despair” in spiritual feelings, and this is closer, if not identical, to Heideggerian anxiety in content. 3 Scheler describes spiritual feelings as being independent in their givenness from bodily experience the higher one goes in his value-ranking. It is a confusing feature of psychic and spiritual feelings that the body is less relevant to valuing. “In the kind of their givenness, spiritual values have a peculiar detachment from the independence of the spheres of the lived body and the environment” (Scheler 1973a, 107). THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 33 (Scheler 1973a, 343). Spiritual-feelings are candidate experiences that color everything in one’s field of experience like bliss, despair, serenity and peace of mind.4 These feelings take possession of our whole being, and other nexus of feelings or values can steer us away from experiencing our whole being. This claim is why we must have no other motivating nexuses to feel them, and in a direct sense we cannot feel bliss or despair. One can only be blissful or in despair. These feelings can only be given to us when we are in absolute possession of ourselves as ourselves—when we exist as persons. They can only be given when “we ourselves as selves” can be given to ourselves with no mediation between how the self manifests back upon the self. For Scheler, this absolute possession of ourselves-as-ourselves is the core of the person; only as a person can I fully be revealed to myself as myself. In this way, bliss and despair are feelings revealing absolute personal being. These feelings have no other source than the person herself that is the foundation of these feelings, and to be given absolutely is a mark of the Holy uniqueness of a person. Behind the motivation to separate spiritual feeling from its locus in the lived-body lurks the age-old discrimination between the Christian identification of bodily appetites with transience and the enduring quality of spiritual feelings. In this way, spiritual feelings confer the deepest fulfillment, and as a sign of their enduring quality, they must be independent of the body. This claim of independence does not mean that the other strata of feeling are not at work in some way given the complexity of the psychic or spiritual feeling, but that the phenomenological depth of its experience is beyond the relevance of the lived-body entirely. The lived-body becomes less and less associated with feeling-consciousness as we approach spiritual feelings and Holy values. Accordingly, the person is that which is claimed to be concrete. “The person is not an empty ‘point of departure’ of acts; he is, rather, a concrete being” (Scheler 1973a, 384). The reason why bliss and despair emanate from the person and not the body is that the person is a unity of spirit given in the execution of acts: . . . the whole person is contained in every fully concrete act, and the whole person “varies” in and through every act—without being exhausted in his being in any of these acts, and without “changing” like a thing in time... the person lives into time and executes his acts into time becoming different... the person living in each of his acts... permeates every act with his peculiar character. (Scheler 1973a, 385– 86) In other words, the person stands almost as if outside of phenomenal time, and the attendant act-feelings are similarly disembodied from their bodily moorings. The fact that the person executes acts into time and remains identical as a spiritual act-center evinces the religious nature associated with the person and downplaying of the lived-body. Acts and the person are parts of spirit. As Scheler puts it, “There can be no doubt that the lived-body does not belong to the sphere of the person or the sphere of acts” (Scheler 1973a, 398).5 Scheler’s description of the last two is wanting. Making the body relevant again and opening up the pragmatic ground In this section, it is argued that the James-Lange hypothesis is a solution to the problem outlined in the previous section. I am not worried about the status of the hypothesis as a scientific description. I am rather approaching it as a phenomenological observation although there are also accounts of the James-Lange basic hypothesis in the philosophy of emotions that can be counted as Neo-Jamesian in analytic circles (Helm 2011).6 4 These feelings are given to us without mediation in much the same way that Heidegger describes the fundamental mood [Befindlichkeit ] of anxiety [Angst ]. 5 This quote is the strongest statement that generated concern for the relevance of the lived-body in human feeling. 6 Jesse Prinz and Antonio Damasio are considered thinkers that defend Neo-Jamesian accounts. 34 J. EDWARD HACKETT These accounts need not concern us here. For James as much as Scheler, reality is given primordially to us as a felt reality. Scheler’s description of disembodied feeling and the material value of the person lack the level of concretion that phenomenology demands. The person is merely the “unity of acts” found in the execution of those intentional acts (Scheler 1973a, 385 – 88). The person is consequently an expression of being held aloof from the world and at the same time the feelings reveal the intended values of the Holy in this world. The material value of the person is the concretion of the value and dignity of the whole person made manifest in experience, yet the manifestation of that value is independent of the lived-body in Scheler’s highest valuerankings. How concrete can the materialization of value remain if that concretion avoids the lived-body and attempts to describe this materialization are phenomenological? In the words of James, “emotion disassociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable” (James 1952, 745). William James’s description of the emotions in the Principles of Psychology can help answer this crisis of concretion with his James-Lange thesis about the emotions:7 “My theory is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion” (James 1952, 743).8 This thesis stipulates that every emotion felt affects the body, and further emotions are rooted in the lived-body.9 It is not the case that one mental state is felt and it gives rise to an action, rather the bodily changes are “interposed between” the mental state and action (James 1952, 743). In his words, “Every one of the bodily changes whatever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs” (James 1952, 743). James distinguishes between two types of emotions: coarser and subtler emotions. This distinction anticipates some of Scheler’s levels of feeling-consciousness we saw in the last section. The coarser emotions are those that would take an object for Scheler, and are associated with sensible and vital feelings. Consider fear: What kind of an emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of quickened heartbeats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present... (James 1952, 744) Spiritual-feelings also include: grief, fear, rage and love. All of these coarser feelings act like a soundboard according to James. They reverberate in the body in strong ways. For example, “If we abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate idea of danger can arise” (James 1952, 748). Articulated in this way, fear reminds us directly of Scheler’s vital feelings. The subtler emotions are little more difficult to align with the James-Lange hypothesis but no less clear. Subtler emotions consist of “moral, intellectual and aesthetic feelings” (James 1952, 754). Essentially, these are same as pure psychic feelings tending toward the spiritual feelings in Scheler. Even in these subtler emotions “the bodily sounding board is still hard at 7 Currently, this paper is only on the emotions even though the preceding chapter in the Principles concerns instincts. A likely expansion of these insights may address the drive-constellation in Scheler and instinct later on in James. According to James, instincts and emotions run “imperceptibly into each other”; instincts do not terminate in practical activity but the emotions terminate “in the subject’s body” (1952, 738). In a way, Scheler is committed similarly. Impulsion contains both instinct and feelings in the first part of Scheler’s Human Place in the Cosmos. “In impulsion, feeling and drives are not yet separated” (1952, 7). 8 Moreover, one might speculate that the constant search for a neurological correlate to subjective reports of experience in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in cognitive science might view James’s observations favorable, especially 4EA approaches in cognitive science (embodied, enactive, embedded, and affective). As Anthony Damasio says “The mind is embodied, in the fullest sense of the term, not just embrained” ([1994] 2006, 118). See also Gallagher (2006). 9 Jamesian pragmatism is selected over Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in order to articulate this insight. I admit that Merleau-Ponty may also be a source of ripe comparison, but Jamesian pragmatism and radical empiricism are more flexible in allowing greater synthesis given the depth of feeling in their respective philosophies. THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 35 work” (James 1952, 757).10 James proposes that the long work of familiarity and excitability gives rise to a bodily intellectual emotion, however muted it might now be from the deep familiarity we possess about the subject matter. This “intellectual emotion” is hard at work in our bodies for the expert and the layman alike. Consider the long drawn out passage on what is felt when philosophizing. Philosophy itself, which common mortals consider so “sublime” an occupation, on account of the vastness of its data and outlook, is too apt to the practical philosopher himself to be but a sharpening and tightening business, a matter of “points,” of screwing down things, of splitting hairs, and of the “intent” rather than setting the attention fine and the feeling of ease and relief when the inconsistencies are overcome. (James 1952, 758) At the level of psychic feelings, recall the deep sigh of relief after completing the last sentence of a monograph, or the defending of one’s dissertation. Yet also consider the anticipation of frustration on a logic student’s face, her hand holding her head looking over the logic final exam with trepidation and several chairs away another student comfortable and at ease with her command of the same material. We have all seen and felt relief in cognitive tasks. In such undertakings, we expel breaths of anticipation at being finished. We feel the rush of excitement after a stirring conversation of philosophy, art, or religion. Manfred Frings describes philosophy in the joy felt in its undivided attention to the pursuit of truth, and one could easily imagine this followed by a calming breath. The element that easily survives all transiency is familiar to anyone entertaining an undivided commitment to truth. It is the spiritual joy that accompanies all individual search for truth. In this search, the philosopher experiences a communion with his self; he experiences the silence of gathering of his thought and the humility and thanksgiving for all that exists. (Frings 1987, 4– 5) In these examples, cognitive undertakings take place in the lived-body. Does this discount Scheler’s account? Could not the feeling associated with those experiences that follow these experiences acquire a meaning beyond the logistics of their felt reality? James has an answer: the effect of the felt reality of those experiences depends on the purpose we assign the felt reality of emotional life. Before we can talk about assigning purpose to our felt reality, I must dispel the most damaging objection to the use of James’s James-Lange hypothesis. My use of the term “feeling” could be interpreted as exceedingly ambiguous. As Bruce Wilshire observed: “both sensations and emotions” are lumped together “under the exceedingly ambiguous phrase ‘feeling of the body’” (Wilshire, 216, italics mine). Wilshire insists then upon a difference between the emotion of fear and the sensation of pleasure. They would appear to be two different things. The James-Lange hypothesis is inadequate since every emotion is correlated to a disturbance in the body “however slight” and the correlation is therefore a causal theory and circular in nature since there is no clear way to decide which precedes the other in that ambiguity (Wilshire 1968, 216). Moreover, Wilshire’s objection is based on the James-Lange as a scientific hypothesis, not a phenomenological description. Taken as a phenomenological feature of experience, the exceedingly ambiguous phrase is what underscores the experience. Phenomenology is not a causal theory and phenomenology can only affirm this ambiguity. Generally speaking, eliciting the feelings of the body as the locus where primordial contact with the world involves an awareness of how the feelings manifest in the lived-body to the point that the feeling content will pour into the object and 10 Like Merleau-Ponty, James considers an emotion having its source in the body. The body is an origin-point, and James does not give a full phenomenological treatment to embodiment. 36 J. EDWARD HACKETT the object’s felt reality will run into the sense of the feeling too. Deciding on the purpose of human feeling in relation to an object depends on the range of excess feeling in relation to the object. The excess of feeling gives rise to a multitude of different purposes that may help or hinder living. James reminds us that classification is the lowest stage of science, and we shouldn’t be caught up in the distinction James is making. In truth, any number of emotions can be experienced as the feeling content can pour into the object and the object’s felt reality into the feeling. There is no limit to their possibility given that “there is nothing sacramental or eternally fixed in reflex action.” Such classifications may be true as any other insofar as “it serves some purpose” (James 1952, 746). Some might want to resist my opening up the pragmatic floodgate into Scheler’s thought on the grounds that Scheler is not open about assigning purpose to a felt reality. I have long suspected that Scheler’s tendency toward disembodied feeling follows from his Catholic personalism. The person is the highest material value of the Holy intended in spiritual-feeling, and yet the person is a being of spirit. The person is non-objectifiable, and if the person somehow became identified with this particular lived-body, the person would enter into the order of objective being. Objective being can be used, manipulated, and directed. Scheler’s ethical personalism is grounded on the non-objectifiability of persons. The person exceeds representation in its overwhelming fullness and therefore can never be objectified or identified with the lived-body. The problem with Scheler’s ethical personalism is that spiritual feelings lack concretion. These feelings are incapable of partaking in the lived-body. Disembodied feeling removes Holy values from concretizing in experience. Yet, the experience of the religious is embodied. When I pray, I fold my hands in supplication. I bow my head to a presence beyond myself on high. When I take communion, I invite the Holy presence of God into me, to fill and permeate the presence of the Church. When the priest beckons to invite the congregation into communion, he gestures with arms wide that welcome and invite. These gestures refer to the Holy value of persons present and resonate simultaneously with the observed feeling in our bodies. But, these embodied gestures are not identified with objective being (i.e, the lived body). However, the lived-body becomes the locus where emotions are felt, and as long as we maintain a concomitant openness to valuing persons, which is the purpose of the Holy, the person can be made concrete. This openness to valuing persons is what pragmatically determines the purpose assigned to feeling. Scheler thinks that the concretion only happens in the “execution of acts” where the sense of the person can be felt in the highest spiritual feeling and Holy values. Following James, the person is embodied, and so are the emotions. By reading Scheler into James, Scheler’s lack of concretion can be remedied by James’s close affinity to phenomenology.11 Scheler’s pragmatic ground can be revealed in what he called human beings. For Scheler, human beings are world-open (Welt-offen). If James can rectify a longstanding neglect of the lived-body in Scheler’s phenomenology, then the affinity between them should be pushed into other metaphysical areas of Scheler’s thought. In the next section, I advance several claims about their shared affinity that turn on my interpretation of what Scheler regards as “the functionalization of essence.” 11 There exists a long tradition of scholarship about the relationship between William James and his relation to phenomenology. For the connections made here, it might do the reader well to acquaint themselves with Hobbs (2003) and Drabinski (1993). Hobbs outlines the overall parallels of the later James that I have found equally prominent in Essays in Radical Empiricism. Only Drabinski and Hobbs focus on the later James. The two pre-eminent works on this in the late 1960s belonged to both Wilshire (1968) and Lischoten (1968) and both focused on the Principles of Psychology. See also Edie (1987) and Cobb-Stevens (1974). Megan Craig has produced the only extensive monograph in recent years connecting Jamesian themes to non-Huserlian phenomenology (Levinas and James: Towards a Pragmatic Phenomenology, 2010). THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 37 The affinity with phenomenology In this section, I bring James and Scheler together. Beyond the compatibility of the felt reality of the emotion and the body in the preceding section, there are three evidential claims to support why James and Scheler fit well together: (1) Scheler’s functionalization of an essence is identical to James’s commitment that an object guides our future interaction. In this way functionalization is like Peirce’s maxim cited by James. (2) If the insight of the essence and the conception of the object are the same, then the common ingredients of an affective intentionality are how reality is encountered in feeling, including the reality of God. (3) The primordial level of feeling following from (2) can be shown to underlie James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience. Scheler proposes that phenomenological description must elucidate an essence, and whether or not the description of an essence of experience is concrete is a test of how well that essence functionalizes in experience. Remarkably, Scheler is most pragmatic with his understanding of functionalization. In Idealism and Realism, we have evidence for this interpretation. Scheler reminds us that “thoughts and intuitions belonging to the human mind first arise through ‘functionalization’ of insights into the essence of a thing, originally achieved in a single exemplary experience” (Scheler 1973b, 312). Functionalization is the process whereby our ideas, concepts and the mind interact with reality. In that sense, Scheler’s understanding of functionalization is very much akin to that developed in pragmatism. In this way, the a priori in Scheler is like the pragmatic a priori. In James, the a priori structure of aesthetic and practical interests is what motivates us to hold the metaphysical beliefs we do. Unlike Kant, such an a priori originates in the essence’s functionalization with the world in an active sense. If our ideas mesh and function in accordance with reality, then our ideas work. If they do not mesh and function in accordance with reality, then they do not “functionalize.” Thus, we intuit and form essential interconnection of insight into the nature of things derived from this interaction. In Scheler’s words, “all functional laws derive from original experience of objects” (Scheler 2010, 202). These insights become the basis for the rules and norms governing our future interactions with world and being so derived “from the original experience of objects,” phenomenological insight is the root of all ideas. Conceptual intelligibility and meaning arise only from an interaction with the world through which all other subsequent apprehension and meaning of the world are made possible, and this interaction is intentional and embodied. Beyond its embodiment, one can think of functionalization as a test. By my estimation, this test of interaction is very much like, if not identical to, the conceivable effects that arise from understanding an object’s practical value in my experience. Consider the long and famous passage from Lecture II of James’s Pragmatism: *** . . . to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all. (James 1998, 27– 28) Just as the functional laws of experience are derived from experienced objects, so too are the perfectly clear significance of experience derived from “the conceivable effects of a 38 J. EDWARD HACKETT practical kind.” Both James and Scheler are united. The objects in James and essences in Scheler are the same. Importantly, we should keep in mind that Scheler’s a priori order of preferring is where values are felt. For James, the significance of a value would be something we must prepare given our reaction to that value as it is felt in the immediate flux of life. The flux of life is never reactionary lest our experience consist solely of functions. Instead, the sphere of acts is spirit, and by spirit, Scheler designates “all things that possess the nature of act, intentionality, and the fulfillment of meaning” (Scheler 1973a, 389). By opening up Scheler to pragmatism, I come into conflict with other phenomenologists that insist on an almost Platonic independence of essences. Essences are, in the words of Edith Stein, “found or discovered... the found essence does not depend on us” (Stein 2002, 66). Such an interpretation does not apply here. Instead, essences arise out of the interaction with the dynamic participation of intentional feeling with life. For Stein, there is a necessary and eternal nature of God that becomes distilled in phenomenology, and essences are only “pointers” to an intelligible world of extant spirit. In some ways, we could read Scheler tending towards this conception as she puts it several lines later identifying Scheler with this view. However, the dynamic pragmatic Scheler soon illuminates even what Stein claims about Scheler’s essences. For when even Stein says of Scheler’s instruction, “Look for yourself, then you will finally understand what I mean. I myself, a life, joy—who can understand the meaning of these words unless they have experienced this meaning within their own selves?” In other words, understanding how these words can possess a conceivable effect on my life arises first only out of looking for those essences that emerge in relation from the firstpersonal intentional feeling that undergirds both phenomenology and pragmatic methods. Textual proof for this view can be found in the Human Place in the Cosmos. Scheler writes, ***Hence, our participation in these acts is not the mere discovery and detection of independent entities, but our acting jointly with the supra-individual spirit in in genuinely cocreating and coproducing the essences coordinated with the eternal logos, eternal love, and eternal will—and ideas, values, and purposes cocreated and coproduced from the very center and the origin of the things themselves. (Scheler 2009, 35) In other words, I do not use the term essence or object here as anything but that which emerges in that intentional contact with the world shared by both the pragmatic and phenomenological viewpoint to consider the primacy of experience in the immediate flux of life first and foremost. Scheler shares this same insight—no matter how many might want to preserve the Catholic hypostasizing of his central concept of essence. We do not merely discover entities and their essences. Instead, we participate in the intentional act-feelings in relation to them. We “act jointly with the supra-individual spirit” and only through functionalization of how those entities and essences mesh with experience can we co-create essences in accord with the eternal logos, love and will. Like Scheler, James is similarly committed to the primordial level of reality occurs in feeling. In his essay, “The Thing and Its Relations,” James describes pure experience as “the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection... Pure experience in this state is but another name for feeling or sensation” (James 2003, 49). In those relations, James observed, “In all this, the continuities and the discontinuities [of experience] are absolutely co-ordinate matters of immediate feeling” (James 2003, 49). Likewise in “The Place of Affectional Facts,” James is similarly committed to this primordial level of feeling. However, in that essay, James articulates his methodological commitments of radical empiricism and how they impact his conception of the emotions. “In practical life no urgent need has yet arisen for deciding whether to treat them [feelings] as rigorously mental or as rigorously physical facts. So they remain equivocal; and as the world goes, their equivocality is one of their greatest conveniences” (James 2003, 76). James regarded feeling, thought and sensation equally important for both the acts and objects of experience. Persons participate in the intentional feeling for James just as equally as Scheler articulated. If I bend down on one knee in a church pew, I comport myself in THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 39 the feeling of reverence in the faith act. I experience God’s overwhelming presence in the feeling of reverence. Both the overwhelming presence of the sacred space and myself are saturated with reverence. The silent equanimity of my own subjectivity and the object of my relation to the sacred space are felt through reverence. The reverence, therefore, can be felt in the act or object. For this reason, James is attendant to the co-relational structure of intentional feeling. There is no essential division between the mental and physical that would divide our conception and later prioritize how we assign purpose to our feelings about reality. There is only the experience of act and object together that later becomes radical empiricism. As Bruce Wilshire writes: “James undercuts the traditional dualistic distinction which sorts the world into two different kinds of stuff, the mental and the physical” (Wilshire 1968, 164). Scheler could object to my interpretation of how he separates the lived-body from psychic and spiritual feeling. For Scheler, two values are given in relation to another. In relation to each other, two values of separate value-rankings will always appear as if one value is above the other; values find their manifestation in worldly goods, and in the act of preferring, love requires sacrifice of one good for another. Christ’s crucifixion involves the promoting of the Holy over the sensible suffering in the body for the salvation of humankind. Are disembodied feelings required for Holy values? James indicates “all our attitudes, moral, practical or emotional, as well as religious, are due to the ‘objects’ of consciousness” (James 2004, 57). In this way, Jamesian pragmatism agrees with Scheler’s intentional feeling; they are both committed to the fact that emotions take objects and in doing so, constitute the sense of an experience. The reality of consciousness’s objects acquire a depth of significance, an actcontent, and this act-content (or felt reality) constitutes the basis of a phenomenological or pragmatic realism about the Holy. To put it more boldy, the reality of objects is felt. Emotions map onto our experience as a consequence of feeling in the body without sacrificing concreteness, preserving the purpose of religion for James: “it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto” (James 2004, 1957; James 1956, 51). In contrast with Scheler, the emotional life in relation to this “unseen order” does not require that we treat our feelings as disassociated from the lived-body. Otherwise, I might think that Scheler’s spiritual feelings could not functionalize in life if we retained his disembodied interpretation. Let me take stock of what I have done in this section thus far. First, I have explained that the functionalization of an insight into an essence is identical to the test of how well an idea’s effect can guide our understanding. Connected to my earlier theme, only a wholly embodied feeling can be a guide for future ideas. Next, I have shown that the objects of consciousness in feeling guide human understanding in James and Scheler (the root of Scheler’s phenomenology is a co-relational act-object structure of feeling). The fact objects come to guide our ideas of them in James through feeling is interpreted as a thesis about what constitutes the sense of the real. I am making the strong identification that the emotional acts in James also correlate to objects in the very same way that acts correlate to objects in Scheler. Specifically, feeling acts correspond to value-correlates in Scheler. The apparent difference between them is that Scheler provides a more definite order of value to what James keeps open to human purposes of his “unseen order” though Scheler’s metaphysics will achieve this pragmatic opening in its own way. However, if we view James’s statement at the end of The Varieties of Religious Experience, then we can hardly be skeptical anymore about how the affinity is shared between Scheler and James. “That union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end” (James 2004, 418). The strong identification of our conception of reality through the feeling it engenders is highly represented in two areas of James’s thought pertaining to God. First, James regarded the psychological temperament as why one might embrace rationalism or empiricism at the very opening of his Pragmatism lecture. We find certainty in some beliefs out of the expressed need and desire we feel towards life. Thus, when James regards acquiring harmony with the unseen order as our true end, then James is delimiting what purposes we should be open to in much the same way that Scheler’s value-rankings delimit the purposes we should be open to as well. 40 J. EDWARD HACKETT Second, according to James, “the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experience” (James 1998, 56). James claimed this in 1907. In 1902, James claimed the evidence of God lies in our inner experience in his The Varieties of Religious Experience. In this way, James is continuous with his earliest pronouncements from The Varieties. The religious overtones of his thought colored the development of his pragmatism. In The Varieties, James attempts to work out the felt reality of experiencing God by consulting a multitude of experiences, and several years later, James is still devoted to his claims about religious experience in his Pragmatism lectures. In The Varieties, James understood religion as consisting in feeling and acts. “Religion... shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (James 2004, 39). In fact, this felt dimension is at the entire root of James’s pragmatism. The felt dimension of reality is the pre-reflective primordial affectivity where James derives interest and where Scheler feels the givenness of value-contents. When an idea makes a “practical difference” such a difference is felt in the life-affirming depth of the person. Moreover, Scheler’s phenomenology of value rests on the life-affirming relation to the same unseen order Scheler calls spirit, and while Scheler has a stratified conception of all possible feelings, James’s commitment to the harmonious relation reveals a similar commitment to the Holy as the highest expression of human feeling Scheler advocated. Both James and Scheler consider, therefore, that the sense of experienced reality is felt. From that feeling-encounter both God and value are first felt and it is from the “logic of heart” that underlies and informs the development of concepts and purposes for human life more generally. A Pragmatic Interpretation of the Relation Between Impulsion and Spirit Before beginning the pragmatic interpretation of Scheler’s metaphysics, let me both outline what we should keep in mind for such an interpretation in James’s thought as well as outline what I take to be the relation of phenomenology and pragmatism. To look at metaphysics pragmatically requires first of all that we recall James’s thought, most notably from the Sentiments of Rationality essay. The universe will appeal to us in different ways because the universe is felt in different ways. The idealist for instance will feel a very personal universe and the materialist will feel pessimistic given that the universe swallows up everything that is personal. Prior to conceiving of metaphysics out of personal needs, metaphysics consisted in what James called, following Matthew Arnold, “overbelief.” The latter are “doomed to eternal variation and disputes” (James 1956, 89). Given that metaphysical statements will affirm states of affairs over and beyond what can be experienced, James rejects metaphysics on these grounds. Instead, metaphysics must make sense of experience of how we feel it and affirm metaphysical beliefs out of personal need. Hence, metaphysical matters can be genuine options as James describes in the Will to Believe essay. Following this insight, we must regard Scheler’s efforts as a way of affirming the ethical reality of the person. Scheler’s metaphysics are a defense of persons feeling value. The striking difference to be explored is James’s emphasis that metaphysical concepts always reveal a practical impulse in human life. For James, however, metaphysical disputes succumb to the primacy of how these concepts are felt; in his words, “all men will insist on being spoken to by the universe in some way, few will insist on being spoken to in just the same way” (James 1956, 89). Scheler systematizes the range of feeling to reveal aspects about experiencing value; James regards classifications of our concepts open to human purpose but considers the highest human purpose to be a commitment to harmonize with the unseen order reminiscent of Scheler’s devotion to the Holy. Both have an identical orientation to how reality is felt in its deepest and most absolutely personal sense. THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 41 One must think of Scheler’s unfinished metaphysics as marginally dependent upon the phenomenological character of Scheler’s earlier thought. If the metaphysics were strongly dependent on phenomenology, the metaphysics could never achieve any insight as one would be so dedicated to the revelations of describing the co-relation act-object structure of Scheler’s thought that not even Scheler himself could exceed experience at the descriptive level. To be a metaphysician is, however, to speculate beyond the boundaries of what is given in experience and hence metaphysics’ non-phenomenological character. The metaphysician presents a unified picture of the self’s relation to self, world and God—this tripartite relation is what Scheler called philosophical anthropology. Even James, so dedicated to the Peirce’s maxim and to experience alone, regards his own radical empiricism as a “metaphysics of pure experience.” James offered his radical empiricism independently from pragmatic method though one readily sees that even Dewey so convinced of pragmatism’s dedication of experience that the constraint of experience later serves to constrain the same metaphysical impetus that Scheler wanted to develop out of a similar phenomenological restriction. Metaphysics is the speculative act of stretching concepts and categories to anticipate the experiential complexity of the world, but for both the phenomenologist and pragmatist such descriptions are tenuous and constantly open to revision. Phenomenology alone could not achieve a comprehensive account with its limited insight, yet it can serve as a limiting condition for metaphysics. Phenomenology opens up the boundaries of experience through insight, and what is given later serves to demarcated categories and the limits to which those categories can be understood. Both James’s pragmatism and Scheler’s phenomenology supply us with boundary conditions to keep experience first and foremost in view. Let us transition now to a brief discussion of Scheler’s philosophical anthropology. No question concerned Scheler throughout his life except: What is Man? In the philosophical tradition, Scheler opened and outlined three views of humankind. First, there is the conception of human beings as created by God and descended from Adam and Eve in the Abrahamic religions. Second, the Greek philosophical tradition elevated human beings in their interpretation due to our capacity to reason and participate in the logos. Third and perhaps the final view, is an answer of man in natural science and genetic psychology. In none of these conceptions, however, is there “a uniform idea of the human being” (Scheler 2009, 5). Echoing the time, Scheler may have agreed with Hannah Arendt’s words in which she claimed that modern societies have increased bureaucracies to such an extent that men are superfluous to each other. There is no common philosophical anthropology in terms of our philosophical, theological or scientific traditions. From the time of Descartes and onward, European culture has consistently de-personalized the human being. This de-personalization fosters an age of crisis in which the history of the twentieth century is rife with the exploitation of other human beings reliant upon the objectification of human life. Scheler resists this the objectification of the human being by offering us a metaphysics that puts the person front and center as the unique focal point where both value and God manifest. In the Human Place and the Cosmos, Scheler offers us two forces that constitute human life: impulsion (Drang) and spirit (Geist). All feeling and instinct is undifferentiated in plants and lower animals, but human beings become aware of the directedness of life’s energy due to our ability to reflect upon ourselves. We can suspend the forces of feeling and instinct due to our capacity of ideation. In the act of ideation, we can have insight into higher values, and this insight carries us into letting spirit pull us. As Scheler puts this point, ideation is a spiritual act. Such an act allows us to detach from the determining force of organic being. In our reflective awareness, spirit transforms the organic determinations of the world and the whatness of the world into objects. Essences are transformed into objects through the fact that what is given in the immediate flux of life is felt. Spirit is “a specific type of an intuition of primordial phenomena and essential contents, and it encompasses also a specific class of volitional and emotive acts such as kindness, love, repentance, awe, states of wonder, bliss, despair and free decision-making” (Scheler 2009, 26). We encounter these objects in our 42 J. EDWARD HACKETT participation as self-reflective and conscious persons. As a person “only the human being is able to soar far above his status as a living entity and, from a center beyond the spatiotemporal world, make everything the object of his knowledge including himself” (Scheler 2009, 33). Here again, notice Scheler’s nearly disembodied language. For this very reason, Scheler ontologizes the intentional relation phenomenologists take for granted at the heart of human life, but in soaring above the determination of organic being, human beings become “world-open [Welt-offen ]” (Scheler 2009, 27). This move is best explained by analyzing the interaction of the two metaphysical components, and it is precisely in the interaction between spirit and impulsion where a pragmatic interpretation surfaces. Scheler starts at the bottom-up in life whereas other metaphysical systems might be said to start from the top and work their way down to life. Life is full of impulsion, the feeling and drives that tend to higher forms. Scheler defines impulsion as “the unity of the human being’s complex differentiation of drives and affects” (Scheler 2009, 11). For Scheler, the reality of the world is given to us in resistance; to put that another way, the coming tension felt between what I anticipate and feel first makes its entrance into the person through the primordial affectivity shared between James and Scheler. The world resists us in terms of drive and feeling-fulfillment. In that moment when spirit reflects back upon itself, we become aware of the resistance we encounter in the world and the coming-to-be felt reality of the resisting world is value. The person is, therefore, the focus of life as consisting in impulsive drives and the ability to suspend their determination upon us to the essential contents of a felt reality through spirit. The intuited content of an essence can motivate spirit. Intuited content and representations of higher values transform the intuitions and representations into an object. By transforming intuitions and representations into object, even of the vital functions of our own organic life, we can shed and nullify the efficacious force of our drive impulsions—what Scheler calls the “suspension of reality” (Scheler 2009, 37). In this way, we shed the environment and causal order of nature to realize ourselves as persons. The capacity for realization is due to the fact that we transform the resistance of affects and drives into objects of knowledge. We may grasp that the drive for pleasure might make us feel good for a time, but creating a work of art no matter the burden may serve a higher spiritual ideal than the transient pleasure of our organic being. The process of sublimating drives to spirit is a manner of participation in the ground of being, but the sublimating of drives is ultimately a free decision to let spirit guide us. We must openly choose to let spirit guide us. The freedom of action to improve human life opens up to futural possibility by listening to spirit. Before life, spirit is impotent; spirit can only guide. The spiritualization is the suspension of drives that stem from life’s enervating impulse and spirit’s call to higher values gleamed in insight. Suspending the effect of drives and allowing spirit to guide human actions by sublimating drives to spirit is, then, the process of making disembodied feelings of psychic and spiritual feeling embodied, but it is also a moment of freedom James would invite us to explore. In this moment between the impulsion of life and spirit, we can decide between possibilities of a lower or higher forms. Being a moment of freedom, there is no enslavement to the body of drives anymore than there is an elevated Platonic world of ineffectual spirit leading us away from drive-fulfillment. Geist and Drang are never dual properties of the person as one thinks of ontologically separate forces of res extensa and res cogitans in Cartesian thought or any other forms of dualism. Instead, Geist and Drang are aspects of prevailing movements of experience within the person. If Geist and Drang are each one-side of the same coin of the person, one would then find common ground in James’s proposed neutral monism articulated about affections in “The Place of Affectional Facts” I discussed earlier. The one reality is given as a union between feeling acts and a resisting world. The world’s resistance manifests various values that form the content of the feeling act in relation to the world’s felt resistance. Yet, if the person tends to drive-fulfillment over spirit, then the person will be only reactive to the impulses of life. Such persons are often carried by their concerns only for immediate gratification and the impulses of life. So concerned with immediate gratification, such a person may identify their bodily appetites as the limit of their own aspiration THE JAMESIAN APPEAL OF SCHELER’S FELT METAPHYSICS 43 and self-activity. If a person tends to let spirit guide them, then a suspension of drives can be enacted and the person can find the freedom to realize more love into the world. In both respects, the concretion of experience is achieved either as person-as-tending-toward-drives or person-asallowing-spirit-to-guide. Tending toward the latter means allowing God and value to manifest as the ground of being. Being world-open is a way of ultimately deciding how much spirit guides a person’s self-activity, or to phrase it in James’s words how best to harmonize to an unseen order and manifest God and value in the space between us. References Cobb-Stevens, Richard. 1974. James and Husserl: The Foundation of Meaning. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Craig, Megan. 2010. Levinas and James: Towards a Pragmatic Phenomenology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Damasio, Anthony. [1994] 2006. Descartes’ Error: Reason and the Human Brain. London: Vintage Press. Drabinski, John A. 1993. ‘Radical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Philosophy and the Pure Stuff of Experience.’ Journal of Speculative Thought 2(3): 226 –242. Edie, James M. 1987. William James and Phenomenology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Frings, Manfred. 1987. Philosophy of Prediction and Capitalism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. ———. 2001. The Mind of Max Scheler: The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. Gallagher, Shaun. 2006. How the Body Shapes the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Helm, Bennett W. 2011. ‘Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts.’ The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. New York: Oxford University Publishing, 303 –324. Hobbs, Charles A. 2003. ‘Was William James a Phenomenologist.’ Streams of William James 5(4): 8 –13. James, William. 1952. Principles of Psychology. Chicago, IL: William Benton Publishers. ———. 1956. ‘Is Life Worth Living?’ The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover Publications. ———. 1956. ‘The Sentiment of Rationality.’ The Will to Believe and Other Popular Essays in Philosophy. New York: Dover Publications. Essays in Philosophy. 1998. Pragmatism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Essays in Philosophy. 2003. ‘The Place of Affectional Facts.’ Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Dover Publications. Essays in Philosophy. 2003. ‘The Thing and Its Relations.’ Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Dover Publications. Essays in Philosophy. 2004. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics. Lischoten, Hans. 1968. On the Way Toward A Phenomenological Psychology: The Psychology of William James. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Scheler, Max. 1973a. Formalism in Ethics and the Non-Formal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism. Translated by M. Frings and R. Funk. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. ———. 1973b. ‘Idealism and Realism.’ Translated and edited by David Lachtermann Selected Philosophical Essays. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. ———. 2009. Human Place and the Cosmos. Translated by. M. Frings. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University. ———. 2010. On the Eternal in Man. Translated by August Brunner. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stein, Edith. 2002. Finite and Eternal Being. Translated by Kurt F. Reinhardt. Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies. Wilshire, Bruce. 1968. William James and Phenomenology: A Study of the ‘Principles of Psychology.’. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Notes on contributor Correspondence to: J. Edward Hackett. Email: jhackett@siu.edu