JSPS III(1)

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES June 2012 Volume III (1) ISSN-2229-3647 A Bi-annual journal of Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad, Allahabad-211002 (INDIA) CONTENTS Editorial—Changing Dimensions of Social Justice 6 M.P. Dube Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government in India 14 B.K. Joshi A Look at Theory: Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 31 Javeed Alam The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order— Some Guiding Considerations 43 Anand P. Mavalankar Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India: The Glass is Half Full 51 P.K. Chaubey State and Talent: Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 79 I.D. Mishra The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 89 Dr. Nisheeth Rai Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 101 H.M. Jain Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 126 Lakshmi Raj Sharma Book Review Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century 147 Women’s Rights as Human Rights 150 An Outsider Everywhere 158 Advisory Board Prof. Mohit Bhattacharya Former Vice-Chancellor, Burdwan University, West Bengal, India Prof. B K Joshi Former Vice Chancellor, Kumaon University, Nainital, India Prof. Sudha Pai Centre for Political Studies, J.N.U., New Delhi, India Prof. K.L.Sharma Former Vice-Chancellor, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India Prof. Pratap Bhanu Mehta Director, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India Prof. Naresh Dadhich Vice-Chancellor, M.V. Open University, Kota (Rajasthan), India Prof. M.P. Singh (Rtd.) Professor of Political Science, Delhi University, Delhi, India Prof. M P Dube Editor, Professor of Political Science, University of Allahabad, India Contributors • B.K. Joshi, former Vice Chancellor, Kumaon University, Nainital, India • Javed Alam, former Chairman, Indian Council of Social Sciences and Research, New Delhi, India • Anand P. Mavalankar (Rtd.), Professor of Political Science, Baroda University, Baroda (Gujarat), India • P.K. Chaubey, Professor of Economics, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, India • I.D. Mishra, former professor & Head, Department of Political Science, D D U Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur (UP), India • Nisheeth Rai, Department of Anthropology, Mahatma Gandhi Antarrashtriya Hindi Vishwavidyalaya (M.G.A.H.V.) Wardha (Maharashtra), India • H.M. Jain (Late), former Professor & Head Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad, (UP) India • L.R. Sharma, Professor of English, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, (UP) India • N.R. Farooqi, Dean, Research & Development, University of Allahabad, Allahabad (UP) India • M.P. Singh (Rtd.), Professor of Political Science, Delhi University, Delhi, India • Ashok Kaul, Professor of Sociology, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi (UP) India Editor: M.P. Dube Published Bi-annually by Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad, Allahabad-211002 (INDIA) Copyright © 2012 by Department of Political Science, University of Allahabad All Rights Reserved. Material Published in this Journal cannot be reproduced without the express permission of the Publisher. Distributed by PENTAGON PRESS 206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat, New Delhi-110049 Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568 Telefax: 011-26490600 email: rajan@pentagonpress.in website: www.pentagonpress.in Pentagon Press New Delhi. Printed at New Elegant Printers, New Delhi. Journal of Social and Political Studies • The JSPS is a refereed journal published in June and December. • Prospective authors are advised to submit the manuscript with an abstract which should be original and unpublished work. • The responsibility for statement of facts, quotations given and opinion expressed in the articles and book reviews published in this journal is borne entirely by the respective authors. The Editor, Editorial office is in no way responsible for them. • 4000-5000 words with endnotes for the articles and 500-1000 words for book reviews is suggested as an appropriate length. • Decision on publication is made pursuant to the referees’ comments. No responsibility is assumed for unsolicited manuscripts. • Manuscripts should be submitted online as Microsoft Word Document only to <jsps.au@gmail.com> Subscription Rates Institutional (India) 1 NR 500.00 Individual (India) 1 NR 250.00 Elsewhere US $ 25 or equivalent Correspondence concerning contributions, book reviews, advertisements, orders and other information’s regarding the journal should be addressed to Editor, Journal of Social and Political Studies, Department of Political science, University of Allahabad, Allahabad-211002 (India). Editorial 6 Editor’s Note Changing Dimensions of Social Justice M. P. Dube John Rawls, the most important and influential liberal theorist of justice in recent decades, maintained that justice is the first of the virtues of social institutions in the way that truth is of scientific theories. It has been the subject of intense argument during the last quarter of 20th century and onwards. The idea of justice is generally distinguished between formal and substantive senses. In the formal sense, Justice is correct weighting and proportion in judgments. The core element of the idea of justice is that like cases should be treated alike. It is a rule of logical impartiality. On the other hand, what counts as like cases and what involves equal treatments are domains of substantive principles. What substantive principles are appropriate in particular situations and what they imply has been debated since ancient times. Today the most significant kinds of justice are: Procedural or unpatterned and distributive or patterned or Social Justice. Procedural theories of justice uphold the ‘rule of law’; justice is concerned with rule-following. The main concern of justice for proceduralists is not a teleocratic order, rather maintaining procedural rules to provide conditions for individual freedom. The most important procedural justice theories are Friedrich Hayak’s commutative account of justice and Nozick’s entitlement theories. But distributive justice has become the principal normative concern of modern political life. It has been defined as a question of equity in the distribution of social goods. Brighouse rightly claims that “the fundamental question is this: how and to what end, should a just society distribute the various benefits. (resources, opportunities, and freedoms) it produces, and the burdens, (costs, risks, and unfreedoms) required to maintain it?” Distributive Justice deals with the distribution of benefits and burdens ‘to each according to his due or fare allocation of burdens and benefits in society.’ There are various principles that determine ‘due’. Each principle can be formulated in the form of rights, deserts, needs, services, work, moral worth, ability, skill, or status, and so forth. These principles can be sub divided into desert and nondesert-oriented distributive principles. There is no problem with desert-oriented distributive principles because a person with merit worthy activity or a valuable quality should be rewarded in relation to that activity or quality. But most contentious are non-desert oriented distributive principles. Since the 1970s the much attention has fallen to these principles of which a larger bulk of contemporary justice the theorizing is based on contractarian claims- wide ranging agreement or consensus on a rational procedure- and empirical assumptions (needs). Editorial 7 In theorizing distributive justice, Gauthier and Buchanan advance a sophisticated form of argument of rational choice. To them justice is an outcome of a mutual bargaining process among individuals in an initial position. They regard justice as mutual advantage. On the other hand, John Rawls, Barry and Scanlon regard justice as impartiality. In Rawls theory justice is not seen as a bargaining position, as in Gauthier. It is the outcome of rational agreement between discreet individuals. To him justice is ‘the appropriate division of social advantages’. However, Michael Walzer and Miller attempt to establish a plural concept of justice. John Rawls develops a fair way of developing such principles of distribution. The basic idea in Rawls is ‘to identify a fair arrangement in society for all parties to agree to without knowing how it will affect them.’ It will cut out the possibility of arbitrariness in decision about justice. For Rawls, justice should not reflect or reenforce arbitrary chance or interests, but rather should aim to nullify them for the sake of basic fairness. Rawls initial task, and his primary innovation, was to evolve a device to achieve this nullification. For this he conceives an ‘original position’- a form of rational disinterestedness. Thus the principles of justice for basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. Rawls maintains that justice regulates the distribution of primary goods. The primary goods include basic rights and liberties, powers and offices, income and wealth, the bases of self-respect and leisure. The distribution of these goods is regulated by two principles, the first of which has lexical priority over the second. The first principle holds that basic rights and liberties are distributed in a suitably fair way, income and wealth and the rest should be distributed equally unless the unequal distribution would increase the share going to the least well off. Rawls’ is an egalitarian vision of justice. It combines values of equality and liberty in a single conception. These principles are ones that free and equal persons could accept as a fair basis for social cooperation (Andrew Vincent). Brian Barry also follows John Rawls. He emphasizes the need for impartiality in the contractualist method of constructing principles of justice. His central argument is that we should agree on the rules of distributive justice while remaining impartial to different notions of the good life individuals have. To both Barry and Scanlon impartiality reflects a commitment to equality. To them impartiality is primarily a requirement on the moral and legal rules of society. The views of Rawls have been attacked both by Robert Nozick and F A Von Hayak. In their view, justice is not a matter of how benefits or burdens are distributed, but a matter of protecting individual rights to resources. They maintain that the concept implies an agency entitled to achieve it, which is incompatible with the individual liberty. To them goods and opportunities are justly distributed when they are in the hands of their rightful owners. The traditional distributional approach has been challenged by various theorists during the 1990s and onwards; the sole emphasis on distribution without an examination of the underlying causes of the maldistributions was not acceptable 8 Editorial to several contemporary political theorists. Iris Young, Nancy Frazer, Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor argue that while justice must be concerned with classic issues of distribution, it must also address the process that constructs mall distribution. To them individual and social recognition, rather than simply fair process for the distribution of goods and benefits, are the key elements of attaining justice. In fact, they are influenced by the real world of political injustice. Their central concern is recognition. They argue that ‘a lack of recognition in the social and political realms, demonstrated by various forms of insults, degradation and devaluation at both individual and cultural level, inflicts damage to oppressesed individuals and communities in the political and cultural realms’. To them it is the foundation for distributive injustice; therefore the social context in which unjust distributions exist becomes much more significant. Young says that the examination of social, cultural, symbolic, and institutional conditions, underlying unjust distribution is an important component of justice. She says that ‘while distributional issues are crucial to a satisfactory conclusion of justice, it is a mistake to reduce social justice to distribution’. A lack of recognition of group differences determines unjust distributions. She argues that ‘Distributional injustice comes directly out of social structures, cultural beliefs and institutional contexts. If distributional differences are constituted, in part, by social, cultural, economic, and political processes, any examination of justice needs to include discussions of the structures, practices, rules, norms, language, and symbols that mediate social relations.’ For Young, distribution is not the only problem; a concepts of justice needs to focus more on elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression, particularly of those who represent difference and remain un-, mis, or mal-recognized. Likewise, Nancy Frazer also argues that justice is ‘bivalent’. It requires attention to both distribution and recognition. Both are distinct, though often linked in practice. She argues that culture is a legitimate and necessary terrain of strugglea sight of justice in its own right, yet also deeply tied to economic inequality. She focuses on both the structural nature of the construction of the subordinate and disrespected identities and communities, and on the mal-distribution experienced by these subjects. To her the recognition- redistribution dilemma is centered on the problem of ‘group differentiation’. ‘In struggling against cultural injustice, the politics of recognition tends to promote the specificity of social groups, while the politics of redistribution works to undermine such specificity. While former is primarily affirmative the latter is transformative. Sometimes these two modes of politics create problems for social groups that have both the traits. Frazer tries to resolve this dilemma between conferring respect upon misrecognized groups (recognition) and transferring resources to the under privileged (distribution) by endorsing an across – the – board transformative approach. Thus, to examine the context of oppression, to understand and remedy existing injustices are the key issues of the Fazer’s concept of justice. In the political realm, she calls for ‘participatory parity’ of all affected parties for justice. Understanding the social Editorial 9 norms, language, and mores is key to the understanding of recognitional injustice in the social and cultural realm. She says that cultural injustice is ‘rooted in patterns of representation, interpretation and communication’. For Frazer, misrecognition is an ‘institutionalized relation of social subordination, rather than an individual experience.’ She claims that a general practice of cultural domination, a pattern of non-recognition and disrespect are three processes of misrecognition. Unlike Frazer, Taylor and Honneth focus on the psychological nature of recognition. Taylor argues that self- worth comes from the recognition given by others. ‘Misrecognition can inflict harm; can be a form of oppression imprisoning someone in a false, distracted, and reduced mode of being.’ For Taylor adequate recognition involves treating others in ways that confirm and affirm their distinctive identities. He argued that ‘difference blind’ liberalism is deficient to meet the human demand for identity. To him ‘Canon Wars in Higher Education and Canadian constitutional crises are examples of the ‘politics of recognition’, in which ‘people seek to transform the ways in which they are being seen and esteemed by others, and so to satisfy the deeply rooted human need to be recognized as the bearer of distinctive identity.’(Oxford Handbook of Political Theory,2006,pp.451-55) For Honneth, recognition involves valuable qualities of individuals or groups. And injustice is felt in the first instance as a denial of inter-subjective recognition that violently disrupts a subject’s relationship to herself, whether through the violation of body, the refusal of basic moral respect or legal protection, or the denigration of individual or collective ways of life. What is crucial in the analysis of injustice is not the inflicting of the pain, but the perception of misrecognition on the part of the victim; that is, injustice is a psychological condition. For both Honneth and Taylor psychological recognition is crucial element of justice. In addition to distribution and recognition, there is a third dimension to the concept and practice of justice, namely Procedural justice. Procedural Justice is the fair and equitable institutional process of a state. Frazer, Honneth and Young insist on an integrated approach to the understanding of justice. Young argues that ‘Justice must focus on the political process as a way to discuss both inequitable distribution of social goods and the condition undermining social recognition.’ Democratic and participatory decision-making procedures are both an element of, and condition for, social justice. Young argues that a concept of justice needs to focus on the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression. For this justice must focus on institutions and political processes as a way to address injustices based on inequitable distribution and misrecognition. Frazer also advocates integration of Procedural Justice with distributive and recognitional theory of justice. She argues that ‘when patterns of disrespect and disesteem are institutionalized, for example, in law, social welfare, medicines, public education, and/or the social practices and group mores that structure everyday interaction, they impede parity of participation, just as surely as do distributive inequities.’ Frazer argues for ‘parity of participation’ She is of the firm conviction 10 Editorial that ‘to remedy mall distribution we must focus on politico- economic restructuring; but such considerations will only come along with recognition, where the remedy is in cultural and symbolic changes in how we regard the presently misrecognized, only then will participatory parity and procedural justice be attained.’ These notions of justice based on distribution, recognition and democratic participation are not contradictory, rather they are integrated. David Schlosberg’s rightly comments that ‘both distributive inequity and misrecognition hamper real participation in political and cultural institutions. Issues of justice are not just bivalent but trivalent. Improved participatory mechanism can help meliorate both other forms of injustice; but those other forms of injustice must be addressed in order to improve participation.’ Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum expand the conception of justice beyond John Rawls (distributive justice) by advancing the “capability approach”. They have developed a theory of justice that focuses on the capacities necessary for individuals and groups to function and flourish. Along with distribution of goods, the focus is on how those goods are transformed into the functioning and flourishing of individuals and communities; the focus is to judge how those distributional affect our well-being and how we ‘function’. Amartya Sen objects to fair distribution on the ground that individuals born with different physical and psychological propensities will generally be unequally efficient transformers of resources into whatever goals they might seek. Therefore, we should look beyond distribution and see to what extent individuals are able to be and do with their primary goods allotments, given their circumstances. Capabilities are about a person’s freedom to do and to be what they choose in the context of a given society; the focus is on individual agency, functioning and well-being, rather than more traditional distributive indicators. Our concern is not in what amount of goods we get, rather the capabilities that translate the basic goods into the functioning of human life. Functioning refers to various doings and beings; Sen argues that while making normative evaluation the focus should not be on what people can consume, or on their incomes, rather on what they are able to be and to do. He insists on taking note not only of the ownership of the primary goods and resources, but also of interpersonal differences in converting them into the capability to live well. Indeed, he has tried to argue in favour of judging individual advantage in terms of the respective capabilities, which the person has, to live the way he or she has reason to value. This approach focuses on the substantive freedoms that people have, rather than only on the particular outcomes with which they end up. (Sen’s lecture delivered in Stockholm, Dec.8,1998) According to Nussbaum, ‘to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is’, is the basis of capability approach. Here it is not important the how much we have, ‘but whether we have what is necessary to enable a more fully functioning life as we choose to live it.’ Sen has not prepared a well-defined list of capabilities. He insists on public Editorial 11 discussion, flexibility, and context specificity in making a list of capabilities. On the other hand, Nussbaum proposes a list of ten capabilities, which she claims as universal, although she is not against the contextual modification of the list. The ‘capability approach’, distribution, recognition and participation are linked together. Robeyns argues that the capability theory can accommodate both issues of re-distribution and recognition and yet is broader than even Frazer’s biviolent or tri-violent approach. However, she remarks that the capability approach is a framework of thought, a normative tool, but it is not a fully specified theory that gives us complete answers to all our normative questions. It is not a complete theory of justice. Theorists, Wolf and D-Shalit have tried to modify the approach. They argue that it also matters whether people can sustain their functioning, and that therefore the risk and vulnerability also need to be taken into account. However, the capability approach has been extremely influential in development economics and has added a new dimension to the concept of social justice. Traditionally, questions of justice have been central to political life. But in recent years issues of environment have become an integral part of the discourse of justice. The Reason is that the environmentalist issues are very much political in nature. Dobson, environmental philosopher, rightly remarks that ‘the natural world – normally invisible in political theory – affects and is affected by political decisions in a way which makes it necessary to consider it a site for political activity.’ Today environmental and ecological justice have become very important themes of discussion for social and political theorists and movements. Central to environmental justice is the distribution of the goods and bads, but, at the same time, it is tied to some discussion of recognition, political participation and capabilities at both the individual and community level. In the U.S.A., it is used to cover the antitoxics movement and the movement against environmental racism. Generally things like, sewage, industrial waste sites, municipal and hazardous waste dumps have been concentrated near the working poor, the minorities, deprived sections and politically disempowered groups. The movement against environmental racism in the U.S.A. popularized the term “environmental justice”. It emphasizes that there is a connection between environmental risk and poverty, that there is also connection between race and environmental hazards. Generally, deprived sections bear the brunt of the pollution. Today the neoliberal model of globalization and development has turned the inequity from bad to worse, both between the North and the South, and between the elite and the empoverished in Southern nations. It creates a threat to food security and sustainable livelihood of deprived sections, specially tribals, women and children. It drains off natural resources for economic gains. Current development process has devastated natural resources and habitats, created environmental refugees and is posing a serious threat to the continuation of life on the earth itself. Along with equity, demand for recognition and respect for cultures, tradition, local knowledge and expertise, and ways of economic, social and religious life, 12 Editorial for authentic participation and capability of functioning of both affected individuals and communities constitute the elements of environmental justice. In fact demand for equal, informed and respectful participation in decision-making is central to environmental justice. Prior to the development of the welfare state, many societies had made provision for the support of their vulnerable members through religious and charitable institutions. These provisions were not regarded as a requirement of justice, rather a matter of charity. It was during the 20th century that the argument for support centred around justice. Charity, such as assistance to the sick, the old, and those in poverty, are regarded as a duty. Such duties of charity are private and a matter of individual choice, whereas duties of justice are generally taken to be enforceable by the state. It is Gandhi who tries to synthesize tradition and modernity by presenting a very comprehensive view of justice. Gandhi believed in the doctrine of man’s oneness with God and humanity. The moment a man awakens to the spirit within he cannot remain violent; the passions, selfishness and violence do not belong to the immortal spirit of man. ‘Since all men’, argued Gandhi, ‘partake in divine essence, they are ultimately one’. They are not only equal, but identical. Since all mankind in essence are alike, what one man is capable of achieving is possible for all to attain. As such, violence has no place in relations amongst mankind; love is the only proper form of relation between them. It is ‘the law of our being’, of ‘our species’. Love implies care and concern for others and total dedication to the cause of ‘wiping every tear from every eye’. The immediate service of all mankind becomes a necessary part of the activities of human beings. Negatively, it implies non-violence. “In its negative form it means not injuring any living being whether by body or mind. In its positive form, Ahimsa means the largest love, the greatest charity. The complete nonviolence is complete absence of ill-will and active non-violence is goodwill towards all life. He equated it with humility, forgiveness, love, charity, selflessness, fearlessness, strength, non-attachment, meekness and innocence. The state represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. It speaks in the language of compulsion and uniformity. It weakens its subjects’ ‘spirit of initiative’, freedom, creativity and self-help. State, therefore, should be organized in such a way as its activities employ coercion as little as possible and that as large an area of human life as possible is left to voluntary efforts. A truly non-violent state is composed of small scale self-governing and relatively self-sufficient, politically empowered village communities relying on moral and social pressure and running their own affairs on the basis of local resources and local needs. The Police are basically social workers enjoying the confidence and support of the local community and relying not on brute force but on moral suasion and public opinion to enforce the law. Crime is not an offence requiring punishment rather it is to be treated as a disease requiring understanding and help. Decisions are taken by the majority but without overriding the minority. No one should be compelled to do things contrary to his/her conscience. Editorial 13 A non-violent state is committed to sarvodaya, the upliftment of all human beings. It is concerned for the downtrodden – the daridranarayan. His emphasis on ‘Daridranarayan’ and ‘Swadeshi’ was an outright rejection of capitalism as the instrument of development and modernization. This concern for the downtrodden gives Gandhi’s thought its universal relevance in all times and climes. To Gandhi private property is immoral; it denies the ‘identity’ and oneness of all men. Roots of exploitation, sensual indulgence and contempt for one’s fellow men lie in private property. In Gandhi’s view it is a sin against humanity to posses superfluous resources when others cannot even meet their basic needs. Since the institution of private property already exists and men are attached to it, it was suggested by Gandhi that the ‘rich should take only what they need and hold the rest in trust for the community. The tactics of Satyagraha, non-violent resistance to injustice and wrong, can used to develop the capability for functioning. It can be used to end human misery and degradation. Gandhi said: My humble occupation has been to show people how they can solve their own difficulties. ... My work will be finished if I succeed in carrying conviction to the human family, that every man or woman, however weak in body is the guardian of his or her self-respect and liberty. In theorizing justice and its realization, distribution, recognition, participation, capability, and environmental and ecological components put together, Gandhian ideas need to be made the basic foundation on which just relations between man, nature and society should be founded and sustained. The Need to create just order demands serious research of Gandhian ideas to enable man and nature to live in peace and harmony with mutual respect and recognition. 14 Journal of Social and Political Studies Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India B. K. Joshi Modern local government in India has a rather long and interesting history going back to the earliest years of British rule under the East India Company i.e. towards the end of the seventeenth century. However, it was only in the nineteenth century that the first important steps for the establishment of local government in the modern form were taken in India.2 The evolution of modern local government in India has taken place in four phases. The first phase was from the last quarter of the seventeenth century corresponding with the early years of British rule under the East India Company to about 1870. The next phase extended from around 1870 to the end of British rule. The third phase began with independence in 1947 and continued to the end of the decade of the eighties of the last century. The final phase, which commenced in 1989, is continuing. Corresponding to each phase there is a dominant conceptual view underpinning the approach. The first phase was largely influenced by a pragmatic view that in order to get the native population to contribute money for local civic functions, efforts would have to be made to also involve them, even if in a token fashion, in local administration. The second phase, which began with the Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo and reached its culmination with Lord Ripon’s famous resolution of 1882, shows a departure from pragmatism by conceptualising the role of local government in terms of the liberal ideal as a means of political education of the people. Unfortunately, this liberal approach clashed with the dominant view of British administration in India and by the end of the period was overtaken by a tendency towards centralisation and strong bureaucratic control. In the third phase, which began with independence, a strong attempt was made to make local government subserve the needs of development. Since development after 1950 was located within a strong centralised framework spearheaded by the Nehruvian Planning Commission, there was little place for autonomous local bodies. Following the report of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee a uniform three-tier structure of panchayati raj institutions was inaugurated all over the country. The term panchayati raj also came into currency at this time, although it did not connote a ‘raj’ of panchayats, but a ‘raj’ linking panchayats to development as subservient institutions. These two thematic ideas viz. a three tier structure and the erroneous nomenclature have persisted to this day. The final (contemporary) phase commenced with the introduction of the 64th and 65th constitution amendment bills by the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1989. Though they failed to garner support in the Rajya Sabha in this instance, Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 15 they were subsequently passed as 73rd and 74th constitution amendment acts in 1992 when P. V. Narsimha Rao was the Prime Minister. These amendments were influenced by the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee (1957) and the Ashok Mehta Committee (i978) and the penchant displayed by Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister for the Union Government to deal directly with local bodies, bypassing state governments. Early Phase In the early phase local government institutions were confined to larger and more important cities i.e. those with a sizable British population. The first municipal body was established in Madras in 1688. The other two Presidency towns of Bombay and Calcutta soon followed suit. These earliest corporations did not have any legislative backing. They were set up on the instructions of the Directors of the East India Company with the consent of the Crown. They were, moreover, non-representative bodies consisting entirely of nominated members from among the non-native population, and were set up mainly with a view to provide sanitation in the Presidency towns, as the situation in this respect left a lot to be desired.3 These early municipal bodies were also not very effective institutions even in respect of the limited civic function of sanitation entrusted to them. Act X of 1842 was the first formal measure for the establishment of municipal bodies in India; but it was applicable only to the Bengal Presidency. It provided for the setting up of a Town Committee for purposes of sanitation on the application of two-thirds of the householders. Incidentally, the Act remained inoperative in Bengal; but Town Committees under it were set up in the two hill stations of Mussoorie (in 1842) and Nainital (in 1845) on the request of European residents. Their record too was not very encouraging. When the Government of India passed Act XXVI in 1850, the municipal bodies of Mussoorie and Nainital were reconstituted under it. The period after 1850 saw the establishment of a number of municipal bodies in the country: about 540 between 1850 and 1870 (Tinker: 1954, Table 1, pp. 30-31). The chief among these were Darjeeling (1850), Simla (1851), Dehradun (1857), Bareilly (1858), Kanpur (1861), Lucknow, Thana, Howrah (1862), Delhi, Agra, Allahabad, Moradabad (1863), Meerut, Almora (1864), Saharanpur (1867), and Benares (1868). It needs to be emphasised that the motivation for establishing municipal bodies in the initial years was not any commitment to local government on the part of the British; it was the desire to raise money from the local population for provision of civic services. Thus, when the Directors of the East India Company decided to establish a municipal corporation in Madras, they wrote to the Madras Council on 28 September 1687 that “the people would more willingly and liberally disburse five shillings towards the public good being taxed by themselves, than sixpence imposed by our despotical powers (notwithstanding they shall submit when we see cause)...” (Tinker: 1954, p. 25). A secondary motive was the desire for “mentoring native political leadership and ameliorating the causes of political 16 Journal of Social and Political Studies dissent in India, while at the same time reinforcing the structure of colonial rule by directing native political aspirations towards constructive forms of self government” (Singh: 2009). The transformation of municipal bodies from a body of Europeans to representation of the native population, and from a nominated to an elected body was a slow and long-drawn process accomplished only in stages. According to Tinker the main reason for the development of local institutions along these lines in the 1860s was the financial constraints faced by the government in the aftermath of the 1857 uprising. Indian finances had been under strain for quite some time before 1857 as income was almost exclusively dependent on the inelastic land revenue, while expenditure had been constantly rising due to the number of wars undertaken by the colonial government. The result was constant deficits. The response, articulated by James Wilson, the newly appointed Finance Member was financial decentralisation viz., transfer of responsibility for roads and public works to local bodies. Similar views were articulated by another Finance Member, Laing, in 1861underlining the importance of teaching people not to look to the government for things they could better handle themselves. A resolution of the Government of India of 1864 also emphasised the principle of local autonomy by stressing that the business of the country should be done by the people by means of funds raised by themselves, and the government must confine itself to doing things that could be done by it alone (Shukla: 1970, p. 45). The process was carried forward by the decision of Lord Mayo’s administration to introduce a system of provincial finance whereby importance was assigned to “the necessity of taking further steps to have local interest and supervision to bear on the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical help and local public works” (Shukla: 1970, p. 46). Decentralisation of powers and responsibility for raising resources to fulfil the new mandate necessarily entailed inducting more natives into the local bodies through provincial legislation. This process continued apace during the 1860s and 1870s. As expected, the results varied from province to province as the following table shows. Composition of Municipal Boards, 1881 Province Bengal Bombay Madras N-W Province Punjab CP Total number of municipalities Municipalities with members partly or wholly elected Municipalities with members all nominated 138 162 47 107 197 61 3 10 12 75 5 61 135 152 35 32 (all in Oudh) 192 — Source: Tinker: 1954, Table 2, p. 38. Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 17 More than three-fourths of the municipalities (546 of the 712 listed) remained fully nominated. This has led Tinker to remark “by 1880 the principle of local self-government had been put into practice only in the cities of Calcutta and Bombay, and in a few of the towns of Central Provinces and North-Western Province. Elsewhere, although a framework of local administration and local taxation existed, control was firmly in the hands of the servants of the government” (Tinker: 1954, p. 42). Second Phase The second phase in the evolution of modern local government in India can be considered to begin with the viceroyalty of Lord Mayo (1869-1872). His most significant contribution is the policy of fiscal decentralisation initiated by the Resolution of 1870, whereby provincial governments were given responsibility for allocating funds for education, sanitation, medical relief and public works. Provincial governments were expected to rely on local taxation, which, in turn, would help in the growth of self-government. One result of this reform was that many provincial administrations like North-West, Punjab, Bengal and Madras introduced municipal taxation.4 The process of reform of local government took a large step forward in 1882 with Lord Ripon’s famous Resolution on Local Self-Government of 18th May. The general principles underlying the resolution bear repetition as they underline the liberal values that motivated it and provided the template for organisation of local government for many years to come. They may be summarised as follows5: • Political education is the primary function of local government, of greater importance than administrative efficiency • Rural boards, similar to municipal boards, should be set up: the unit of administration to be small—the subdivision, tehsil or taluka • All boards should contain a two-thirds majority of non-officials, preferably elected • Chairmen of all local boards should preferably be non-officials • Elections to begin immediately in more progressive towns and extended gradually to smaller towns and the countryside • Control over local bodies should be exercised from without rather than within • Each province to interpret the general directions of the Resolution according to local conditions. (Tinker: 1954, p. 45) Unfortunately, as usually happens, the above principles were not followed in the legislation that followed. 6 The legislation reflected the prejudices of the administrators, some of whom were not fully in tune with the liberal ideals of the Resolution. The main cause of disagreement was whether the Chairman should be a non-official or the District Officer. The Heads of all major provinces were in favour of the District Officer; only the Central provinces were in tune with its spirit. Elsewhere the District Magistrate remained the dominant figure. The 18 Journal of Social and Political Studies situation was somewhat better in the towns than in the rural areas. These shortcomings were also recognised by the Indian Statutory Commission, 1929 when it remarked, “No real attempt was made to inaugurate a system amenable to the will of the local inhabitants” (quoted in Shukla: 1970, p. 54). By 1885, there was a gradual increase in both the number of municipal boards that were wholly or partly elected and the proportion of elected members in the boards. In a matter of four years, between 1881 and 1885, while the number of municipalities remained almost constant, the number that were wholly or partly elected went up from 166 to 472 (or from 23 per cent of all municipalities to about 65 per cent). At the same time, elected members constituted a significant percentage of the total membership of municipalities in some provinces. This situation remained almost unchanged for the next twenty years. Despite being partly or wholly elected bodies, municipalities in the 19th century could hardly be called democratic bodies in the modern sense of the term. Two features of elections vitiated their democratic credentials. Members did not represent territorial constituencies or wards, but were chosen by caste or religious groups. Hence, they could not claim to represent all people living in a specified geographical space, but only their caste or religious brethren. Secondly, the electorate was extremely limited. Tinker estimates that in most provinces it comprised less than two per cent of the urban population. In Bengal, it was about five per cent. A further constraint was the system of open voting. As a result, people were reluctant to vote for fear of annoying powerful citizens. Not more than four or five hundred voters participated in elections even in the large towns. It was quite common for candidates to be returned unopposed. (Tinker: 1954, p. 50). Until the second half of the nineteenth century, any progress in the area of local government remained confined to the urban areas. The first small step for bringing rural areas within the ambit of local government was taken in 1869 when District Local Fund Committees were set up to manage the newly established local fund consisting of a cess of one anna in the rupee of land revenue, tolls, ferry charges and surplus cattle pound receipts. One third of the receipts were required to be earmarked for expenditure on education and the rest for local works. The District Local Fund Committee, precursor of District Boards, was a nominated body of landlords and officials, the latter being ex officio members. It was headed by the district Collector. Taluka Committees were also set up. These Committees could hardly be considered representative of rural communities. The system of provincial finance introduced by Lord Mayo in 1970 significantly enhanced the process of financial devolution, though it did not do much to make the local committees representative bodies. It did, however, lead to improvement of education, sanitation and communication in the local areas as more funds became available for these activities. The seeds of a proper system of local “self ” government are to be found in Lord Ripon’s Resolution of 1882. It is worth remembering that Lord Ripon sought to bring rural areas in India within the framework of local self-government, six years before there were any Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 19 rural councils in England. Shukla refers to Ripon’s Resolution as the Magna Carta of local democracy in India (Shukla: 1970, p. 47). Lord Ripon’s Resolution envisaged a two-tier structure of rural local bodies with the ‘sub-division, taluka or tehsil ordinarily forming the maximum area to be placed under a local board’. The district board was envisaged as only a supervising or co-ordinating authority. In the course of implementation, this provision came to be subverted in most provinces. The provincial acts entrusted the district boards with all the funds and most of the functions. They could delegate functions and money to the lower bodies at their discretion. Since district boards themselves were short of funds and without adequate functions, the lower level bodies hardly got any functions or money. In short, they failed to become effective institutions of local government. The district boards were, in practice, largely nominated bodies dominated by the local landlords, who considered it beneath their dignity to contest elections. In fact, the elected members were generally looked down upon by the nominated members. They were fully subservient to the district administration (Tinker: 1954, p. 54). Ripon’s desire was to develop rural local government on the foundations of the ancient village system. This remained only a pious wish. Ripon’s grand dream of establishing a strong and vibrant local self-government remained a dream. Writing in 1906, Gokhale said that local government “still remains all over the country where it was placed by Lord Ripon a quarter of a century ago, and in some places it has even been pushed back”. In support Tinker points out: “In the early 1900s there were even fewer non-official chairmen in U. P. and Punjab than in 1882: there were two in U.P. and twenty nine in Punjab, all presiding over petty municipalities ... and only ten non-officials—all nominated—as chairmen of ‘city’ municipalities in Bombay, right up to 1910.” (Tinker: 1954, p. 57). The next important landmark in the evolution of local government in India was the appointment of the Royal Commission upon Decentralisation in 1907 ‘to enquire into the financial and administrative relations of the Government of India and provincial governments—and of ‘authorities subordinate to them’, and to report ‘whether by measure of decentralisation or otherwise’, the system of government might be ‘simplified and improved’. The Commission submitted its report in 1909, which incidentally was also the year of the Morley-Minto reforms, called ‘the first major reform package since the 1892 Councils Act’ as it introduced the representative principle to the councils attached to the central and provincial governments. (Keay: 2000, p. 469). The recommendations of the Royal Commission have been characterised as “sound but cautious; conceived in terms of administrative improvement, rather than of national political aspirations.” (Tinker: 1954, p. 85). These recommendations may be summarised as follows: • The village must be the foundation of any system of associating the people with the administration. 20 Journal of Social and Political Studies • It was no longer possible to restore the ancient village system, but the panchayat should be re-established as the instrument of a new kind of village government. The new system should be introduced ‘gradually and cautiously’. • The village headman should become the sarpanch with other members being elected informally. The functions of the village panchayat should include petty civil and criminal cases, sanitation, minor public works and building and managing village schools. They should not be burdened with taxation. They should be supervised by district officers and not by district boards. • The problem with district boards stemmed from the shortage of funds and absence of power to manage services for which they were made responsible. The funds of the district boards should be augmented by (a) transferring all of the land revenue cess (b) authorising them to raise the cess to two annas in the rupee (12.5%) and (c) giving block grants to the poorer boards on a long term basis and not tying funds to specified purposes. Non-local duties like plague and famine relief and upkeep of trunk roads should become provincial responsibilities. They should be given a freer hand in the field of education, public works and medical services. The District Magistrate should continue to be the chairman of the district board, but he should function as a ‘constitutional’ head abiding by the feelings of the board. Control from above should be strictly limited with the provincial government intervening only to suspend or abolish a board if it failed to discharge its statutory obligations. • Taluka and tehsil boards should again be established as the ‘principal agencies of local government’. They should be assigned specific duties: management of minor roads, primary education and rural dispensaries, and given 50 per cent of the district board income. • Urban bodies should be almost entire free of official control. The chairman and a majority of members should be elected non-officials. Committees should be set up for routine supervision of different services. Municipal boards should have full powers of taxation as well as control over budgets. They should be relieved of non-local duties like famine relief, town police, and maintenance of district headquarters hospital. Municipal administration must be strengthened by appointment of competent persons as Executive Officer, Medical Officer of Health and Engineer. Higher control was to be similar to that recommended in the case of district boards: the provincial government intervening only to suspend or abolish a municipal board if it failed to discharge its statutory obligations. (Tinker: 1954, pp. 85-87) The Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, which formed the basis of the Government of India Act, 1919 (which came into operation in 1921) recognised the defects of the system. Under the Act, local government became a subject transferred to provincial governments and placed in charge of provincial ministers. Powers of local boards were enhanced and the functions were freed from official Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 21 control to a considerable degree. They became responsible to an enlarged electorate and came to have elected Chairmen, except in extraordinary situations. This Act spurred the interest of provincial governments in the progress of rural local government leading to much legislative activity to progressively eliminate official and nominated membership, widen the franchise and democratise their functioning, enhance their powers and functions and provide a schedule of taxes that could be levied by or for local bodies (Shukla: 1970, p. 55). Between 1919 and 1925 eight provincial governments viz. Bengal (1919), Madras, Bombay, Bihar, C.P. & Berar, U.P. (all 1920), Punjab (1922) and Assam (1925) passed legislation for the establishment of village panchayats. These Acts did not go beyond reviving the old institutions with limited powers and few financial resources with which to provide a fairly large array of services, viz., water supply, construction and maintenance of roads, drains, tanks, bridges, wells, culverts etc, and also perform a number of obligatory functions like village sanitation, conservancy, prevention and abatement of nuisances, maintenance, preservation and use of public buildings, street lighting, village school, cattle pounds and any other duty assigned to them (Shukla: 1970, p. 55). It is hardly surprising that these bodies remained largely non-functional. Interestingly 27 native states from across the country also enacted similar legislation between 1919 and 1948. The earliest to do so were Cochin (1919), Holkar (1920), Travancore (1925), Baroda, Kolhapur, Mysore (all 1926) and Bikaner (1928). The last off the block were Sirohi (1947) and Jaipur (1948) (Shukla: 1970, p. 56). Third Phase After independence, the trajectory of local government in India has been shaped largely by the imperatives of development and the reluctance of state governments to permit local bodies—both urban and rural—to emerge out of their stranglehold. In fact, in many instances, local bodies today may be said to be less powerful than they were in the past. The most important development after independence was the report of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee, 1957. This committee was appointed to study the Community Development (CD) projects and National Extension Service (NES), which it may be recalled, had been initiated for the uplift of rural areas in 1952 and 1953 respectively. The Committee found that the progress of CD and NES was hampered by the absence of “a representative and democratic institution, which will supply the local interest, supervision and care necessary to ensure that expenditure of money upon local objects conforms with the needs and wishes of the locality”. Such an institution, in the opinion of the Committee should be invested with adequate power and appropriate finances to enable it to evoke local interest and excite local initiative in the field of development. The Committee accordingly recommended the creation of a threetier system of democratic decentralization (which later came to be known as the Panchayati Raj System), consisting of the village Panchayat at village level, the Panchayat Samiti at block level and the Zilla Parishad at district level, and 22 Journal of Social and Political Studies recommended that the entire development administration should be handed over to these bodies. Based on the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta committee most of the states established a three-tier panchayati raj structure. Unfortunately, the experience of the working of these bodies was none too happy. Many states, it turned out, were not fully committed to the principle of democratic decentralization. As a result, despite the existence of legislation, panchayats in many cases remained a neglected lot. Elections were not held for years at a stretch, and they were not given adequate powers, functions or role. According to the assessment of the panchayat system during this period by the UNDP: However, the legislation that followed the Committee’s Report continued the earlier enactments of Provincial Governments to re-iterate the three-tier structure and provide for over-riding powers of the State Government acting through the Collector. Panchayati Raj was a strategy for rural development in a context of centralism that was then seen as a historical necessity. The moral weight of the national movement required that the aspirations of the peasantry to better conditions of life be fulfilled. The Government that came to power initiated land reforms and institutional change to do away with nefarious traditions of discrimination and domination based on religion and caste. This required the will of strong Central and State Governments to be pitted against local vested interests, whether landlords or ‘superior castes’. Moreover, land revenues had to be reduced and since income levels were low and highly skewed between individuals and regions, reliance on the spread of indirect rather than the narrow incidence of direct taxes was necessary, which naturally resulted in a centralised system of finance. These constraints, along with others related to the legacy of the Raj, partition of the country and the enthusiasm for a planned economy, shaped centralism. However, this centralism was not conducive to the growth in the status of local bodies. As the funding for Community Development projects dried up by the mid-1960s, panchayats stagnated. They languished for decades without funds, superseded by decisions of district collectors, without elections being held to reconstitute them and remained insufficient to provide representation for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In 1977, another committee under Ashok Mehta was appointed, which submitted its report in 1978. The main recommendations of this committee were: • The 3-tier system of Panchayati Raj should be replaced by the 2-tier system: Zilla Parishad at the district level and Mandal Panchayat consisting of a group of villages covering a population of 15,000 to 20,000 • District should be the first point for decentralisation under popular supervision below the state level • Zila Parishad should be the executive body and made responsible for planning at the district level Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 23 • Development functions should be transferred to the Zila Parishad and all development staff should work under its control and supervision • Panchayat Raj institutions should have compulsory powers of taxation to mobilise their own financial resources • There should be a regular social audit by a district level agency and by a committee of legislators to check whether the funds allotted for the vulnerable social and economic groups are actually spent on them • The state government should not supersede the Panchayat Raj institutions. In case of an imperative supersession, election should be held within 6 months from the date of supersession • Nyaya Panchayats should be separate from development Panchayats. They should be presided over by a qualified judge • The Chief Electoral Officer of the state in consultation with the Chief Election Commissioner should organise and conduct the Panchayati Raj elections • Seats for SCs and STs should be reserved on the basis of their population States like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh reconstituted their panchayati raj system on the lines recommended by the Ashok Mehta Committee. These, especially the Karnataka system, were held out as the model for other states to follow. Most of the other states, however, persisted with the old system. Critiques of the approach to panchayati raj inherent in the recommendations of these two Committees have been provided by the noted Gandhian, and onetime president of the Congress Party, U.N. Dhebar (in relation to the Balwantrai Mehta Committee) and by the noted Marxist and leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) EMS Nambooripad. In his Foreword to L.P. Shukla’s book Dhebar poses the question whether “self-governing institutions dealing with the village problems” are “prepared to be media for installing social and economic democracy or whether they will be simply governmental tools to carry on the day-to-day administration in the village areas” (Shukla: 1970, p. 2). The question remains valid today as well, especially in the context of the increasing tendency to make local bodies function as mere agents for implementation of government’s development programmes. This question also harks back to Lord Ripon’s position on the role of local bodies. EMS who, incidentally was also a member of the Ashok Mehta Committee, added a note of dissent to the report of the Committee. EMS’s critique emerged from the larger issue of his understanding of democracy and the imperatives of federalism within a democratic structure. According to Thomas Isaac “EMS had a very wide conception of decentralisation, which went far beyond the usual conceptions of it as bureaucratic decentralisation, or as a process where the local bodies confined themselves just to civic functions or even development functions.” In his view decentralization was part of a larger political process whereby democratic governance would be extended from the central and state level to the local level (Isaac: 1998). This becomes quite clear from the following excerpt from 24 Journal of Social and Political Studies EMS’s note of dissent to the Ashok Mehta Committee Report” The Constitution itself according to me, failed to envisage an integrated administration in which, apart from the Centre and the states there will be elected bodies, which will control the permanent services at the district and lower levels. Democracy at the Central and states levels, but bureaucracy at all lower levels—this is the essence of Indian polity as spelt out in the Constitution. Added to this is the fact, in the actual working of the Constitution, the Centre made increasing encroachments into the rights and powers of the states. It was with such a centralized administration at its core that Panchayats were envisaged in the Constitution and the Balvantrai Mehta Report. It is, therefore, not surprising that neither the bureaucrat nor the politician at the states level is prepared to decentralise whatever power has been conferred to the state under the Constitution. The point is to make a radical change in the concept of democracy and adopt what is called fourpillar democracy (quoted by Isaac: 1998). He goes on to say: I cannot therefore, think of Panchayati Raj Institutions as anything other than the integral part of the country’s administration with no difference between what are called the “development” and “regulatory” functions (quoted by Isaac: 1998). Final Phase The final phase can be identified with the efforts of Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister to provide constitutional protection to local bodies and rescue them from the “whims” and arbitrary actions of state governments. As Prime Minister he had started the practice of interacting directly with district Collectors on the development problems of the districts. In 1989, his government introduced the 64th and 65th Constitution amendment bills in Parliament to bring rural and urban local bodies respectively within the ambit of the Constitution. The amendment bills provided the template for compulsory constitution of local bodies (rural and urban) in all states. The intention was to ensure that every state would have to constitute such bodies within their jurisdiction and not supersede them at will. Unfortunately for the Prime Minister, these amendments could not pass muster in the Parliament. Though approved by the Lok Sabha, they were rejected by the Rajya Sabha. Rajiv Gandhi ceased to be Prime Minister soon after. The Congress Party government, which returned to power under P. V. Narsimha Rao in 1991, was successful in getting these bills passed as the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution in 1992. These amendments created a uniform structure of rural and urban local government in the country. The noteworthy features of these amendments, which added Part IXA to the Constitution, are: Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 25 • Three-levels of local bodies (district, intermediate and village) are now mandatory for the rural areas (for States and Union Territories with a population less than 20 lakhs the intermediate level is not mandatory) • Three categories of local bodies (Municipal Corporations , Municipal Councils and Nagar Panchayats) are mandatory in the urban areas • Elections to rural and urban local bodies are to be held compulsorily every five years • If, for some reason, a local body is dissolved prematurely then elections to elect a new body have to be held within a period of six months • Elections to rural and urban bodies are to be conducted by an independent State Election Commission • Every state is required to constitute a State Finance Commission at interval of every five years to advise on what portion of the State’s revenues should be devolved to the local bodies; what the principle of devolution should be; what should be the principle of distribution of shares between rural and urban bodies and inter se distribution between different categories of local bodies; and what steps need to be taken for strengthening local bodies and augmentation of their resources • Reservation of one-third of the seats for women and for SCs/STs in proportion to their population The import of these amendments was to establish direct links between the Central government and PRIs bypassing the state governments and devolving funds directly to them. This was quite the opposite of real decentralisation. In a strong critique of the 73rd and 74th Constitution amendments EMS argued: “The Panchayati Raj—Nagar Palika legislations that came out of Parliament is (sic.) thus a complete negation of all the principles upheld by the ruling and opposition parties in the state (Kerala) for a quarter century. It forced on the state the threetier set-up, which had been consistently opposed by all the political parties in the state. It brought about a complete separation of rural and urban self-governing institutions, making the Collector and other bureaucrats at the district level lords of all they surveyed.” (Isaac: 1998). Conceptual Strands The foregoing analysis shows that there have been at least three main conceptual strands that have influenced the evolution of modern local government in India at various periods. The first is represented by the desire of the British rulers to transfer some of the responsibility to the native population for management of cities and towns initially, and rural areas subsequently. The motivation for doing so was to raise money from the local people through taxation in order to pay for local civic and social services like sanitation, drainage, maintenance of streets and roads, street lighting, primary education, health facilities etc. This followed from the hallowed principle ‘no taxation without representation’ that goes back to the Magna Carta of 1066, and was stated most forcefully by the American colonies 26 Journal of Social and Political Studies at the end of the eighteenth century. It needs to be remembered that the principle of local involvement and representation within this framework was always subject to strict limits and control imposed by the official administrative system. Incidentally, the paternalism underlying this approach to local government persists even today in many essentials. The second strand of thought is represented by the attempt to see local governments as institutions for promoting development. The reports of the Balwantrai Mehta and the Ashok Mehta committees are the best examples of this approach. I would venture to add that it also permeates the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in substantial measure, though they have also made some hesitant attempts to promote local bodies as institutions of selfgovernment. It is useful to bear in mind that these amendments derive their inspiration and validity from Article 40 in Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Constitution, which directed the State to “organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government”. This Article, it may be recalled, was a grudging concession to Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of Panchayati Raj, about which Dr Ambedkar had serious misgivings. On one point, however, I am quite clear: the basic structure of Panchayati Raj as it exists in India today bears little relation to Gandhi’s ideas on the subject. The Gandhian concept of governance moves in concentric circles from the village upwards, not downwards from the central government, as is the pattern today. There is, however, some built-in tension, reflected in the language of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act, between the Gandhian notion of ‘village republics’ exemplified by Art. 243 G that gives the panchayats responsibility for “preparation of plans for economic development and social justice”, and their dominant role as implementing arms of state and central governments as mentioned in sub-section (b) of the same article which says the PRIs will be responsible for “implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule” (emphasis added) (IRMA, p. 35). A recent analysis that attempts to widen and link the developmental role of the PRIs to the changing relationship between the state, civil society and discourses of citizenship within the context of an evolving liberal democratic political order deserves attention and may be identified as a fifth conceptual strand. The State of Panchayats: 2007-08 by IRMA provides the clearest statement in this respect as will be evident from the following quote: The current appreciation of the importance of ‘bottom-up planning and the role of PRIs in facilitating such processes marks a significant conceptual shift in the way that the relationship between the state and citizen is being imagined. In this regard, the idea of civil society, that space in which citizens act in concert (formally or informally) to exercise critical surveillance over the state to keep it accountable becomes Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 27 important. PRIs represent an important step in bringing the citizenry, civil society and the state’s developmental objectives into greater harmony. This has significant implications for the changing contours of our liberal democratic political order, one that had its origins in a colonial past.” (IRMA, p. 20) The third conceptual strand is represented by the liberal approach of viewing local governments as essentially political institutions fulfilling the needs of representation and political education. From this perspective they are entitled to distinctive powers and functions, a specific fiscal domain and not subject to unnecessary control from higher levels of government. They have to be seen as part of the structure of governance at the local level. Lord Ripon’s Resolution is the earliest expression of this approach to local government. Unfortunately, as I have shown, his ideas were subverted in actual practice. Dhebar’s comment on the Balwantrai Mehta Committee Report also echoes the liberal view of seeing local government essentially in the context of democracy and politics. In this context it is useful to bear in mind that in an important sense only the village panchayat and the urban municipality can be considered as local government. It is also not accidental that they alone among local bodies have the power of taxation (SARC: 2007, p. 88). A fourth conceptual strand, which may be called the radical view, can be found in the ideas of EMS Namboodiripad. EMS’s critique of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee and Ashok Mehta Committee, though supportive of the idea that local government has to be seen in the context of political democracy, goes beyond this limited framework. He also brings in the notion of federalism and enlarges the ambit of the critique to encompass the constitutional scheme of centre-state relations, especially the centralisation inherent in it, as well as the subsequent steps to further centralise power in the hands of the Union government. As the Chairman of the Administrative Reforms Committee of Kerala (1958) EMS was instrumental in proposing a two-tier structure of local government with panchayats and municipalities at the grass root level and a district council at the district level. The powers and functions of the panchayats included major responsibilities in revenue administration and many regulatory functions, besides normal civic and development responsibilities. He visualised the district councils as comprehensive bodies that would coordinate the functions of panchayats and municipalities and be made responsible for the entire field of development administration in the district in a phased manner. He coined the term ‘district government’ to define the role that he envisioned for district councils (Isaac: 1998). The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (SARC) in its report on Local Governance (2007) reiterated the need for a District Council somewhat similar, though not fully so, to what EMS had proposed in Kerala. It also used the term District Government just as EMS had done. A major point of difference between the two related to the role of the Collector. While EMS wanted the Journal of Social and Political Studies 28 Collector to be subservient to the district council, the SARC favoured the retention of the Collector system as an ‘interim mechanism’. After examining arguments against and in favour of the Collector’s role in relation to the District Council the SARC concluded: The Commission is of the considered view that a golden mean between these two positions is desirable and the District government must be fully empowered while utilising the institutional strength of the District Collector. The Commission believes that these two objectives can be realised by making the District Collector function as the Chief Officer of the District Council. In such a case the Collector’s appointment should be in consultation with the District Council. The District Collector-cum-the Chief Officer would have dual responsibility and would be fully accountable to the elected District Government on all local matters, and to the State Government on all regulatory matters not delegated to the District Government (SARC: 2007, p. 31), Conclusion Finally, I wish to emphasise that restructuring the system of local government in India is an essential prerequisite for an effective and empowered representative democracy (see Joshi: 2010 for a fuller discussion of this theme). Effective representation of the people at large in institutions capable of taking care of their immediate problems can only be provided by decentralised institutions that are fully empowered. There is little doubt that it will also lead, in course of time, to improved governance. The argument of efficiency and administrative convenience, generally given in support of decentralisation and local government can only be a secondary one at best. The primary argument is political—promoting participation and representation, deepening the roots of the liberal democratic structure and giving voice to the citizens. A necessary reform for achieving this goal is a radical re-orientation of the civil service. Reform of the administrative system has to accompany any attempt at bringing about effective decentralisation. As long as the Collector system, along with its attendant mindset and attitudes, persists at the local level, any hope of meaningful empowerment of local bodies and effective decentralisation would remain only a hope. We will have to go back to the drawing board to fashion anew the framework of the administrative structure conducive to an empowered decentralised polity. Clearly, I do not share the optimism of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission that it is possible to integrate the office of the Collector into the framework of a genuinely empowered local government structure. NOTES 1. I have preferred to use the term ‘local government’ instead of the more prevalent ‘local-self government’, which appears to be unique to India since elsewhere (including Britain that has been the model in this case, as in many others) the preferred term is simply local government. Exploring the Conceptual Roots of Local Government1 in India 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 29 The reason for this idiosyncracy is an interesting one. On the one hand it refers to the sharing of power between the colonial government and the native population, whereby the latter were given some limited powers over local affairs, whereas there was no such sharing at the former level. On the other hand, it was a convenient device to distinguish municipalities from the Presidency or provincial government, which at that time were known as the local government (Singh: 2009). Two caveats need to be entered here. Firstly, India of the nineteenth century refers, for the purposes of this paper, only to British India as defined in the Interpretation Act passed by the British Parliament in 1889 as follows: “The expression British India shall mean all territories and places within Her Majesty’s dominions which are for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-General of India or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India”. It excludes any territory under the native rulers or princes. The state of local government in princely India constitutes an area of complete ignorance to me, and maybe considered a shortcoming of this paper. I keenly look forward to the labours of a researcher to fill this gap. Secondly, I have not made any reference to the pre-British history of local government, as I agree with (a) Tinker (1954, p.15) who says that “Local government in present-day India…..has inherited but little from indigenous local institutions”; (b) IRMA (2009, p. 33) according to which “The local government institutions set up during the colonial period and subjected to various degrees of transformation in the post-independence period were not the outcrop of …traditional institutions. There was a definite ontological break, from being traditional and hence deriving legitimacy from the cultural sphere, to being statutory/administrative creatures belonging to the rational-legal sphere of the state.” In similar vein B. Maheshwari in Studies in Panchayati Raj argues “However in our search in the past we should not forget that the tradition of village bodies was much different from the system of Panchayati Raj today. The old Panchayats were a spontaneous growth from the people and did not depend on any statutory regulations. They served a society based on Varnashram Dharm. The domination of higher castes in the old panchayats indicated the emphasis on natural leadership in the village. They were the basic units of government and were conspicuous by the totality of their functions. There may have been some control and supervision of the central government, but by and large, these bodies wielded great independence and were more well knit units of local government, looking after the entire administration of the village.” (Quoted by Shukla: 1970, p. 29). About Calcutta S. W. Goode wrote in Municipal Calcutta: Its institutions in their Origin and Growth (1916): “The city was little better than an undrained swamp, surrounded by malarial jungle and pervaded by a pestilential miasma” (quoted in Singh: 2009). The resolution stated: “Local interest, supervision, and care are important to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical relief, and local public works. The operation of this resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institution, and for the association of Natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore in the administration of affairs.” www.indianetzone.com/24/mayo_s_resolution_ 1870.htm and www.indianetzone.com/24/lord_mayoo.htm The full text of paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 the Resolution, which contain the most important ideas set forth by Ripon, can be found in Shukla (1970), pp. 48-49 Municipal Acts: 1883, North-Western Province; 1884, Madras, Bombay, Bengal and Punjab District Board Acts: 1883, North-Western Province, Punjab, Central Provinces; 1884, Madras, Bombay; 1885 Bengal. 30 Journal of Social and Political Studies REFERENCES Institute of Rural Management (IRMA), State of Panchayats: 2007-08, Vol. I, Thematic Assessment Isaac, Thomas (1998), “EMS on Economics and Politics of Decentralisation”, The Marxist, Vol. 14, No. 01-02 (http://www.cpim.org/marxist/marxist_index.htm). Joshi, B. K. (2010), “Towards a New Architecture of Local Government with Special Reference to Uttarakhand”, Doon Library & Research Centre, Dehradun & Centre for Budget and Policy Studies, Bengaluru Keay, John (2000), India: A History, New Delhi: Harper Collins Report of the First State Finance Commission of Uttaranchal: 2002–2006, Vol I, Main Report (June 2002) Report of the Second State Finance Commission of Uttaranchal: 2006–2011 (June 2006) Second Administrative Reforms Commission—SARC (2007), Sixth Report, Local Governance: An inspiring journey into the future Shukla, L.P. (1970), A History of Village Panchayats in India, Smt.Chandrika Shukla, Trimbak Vidya Mandir, Nasik Singh, Arkaja (2009) “Local Self-Government in Colonial India: self-government by natives and the development of municipal institutions” (unpublished mimeo.) Tinker, Hugh (1954), The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma, London: The University of London, The Athlone Press UNDP, Human Development Resource Centre (n.d.), “Decentralisation in India: Challenges & Opportunities”(http:// data.undp.org.in/hdrc/dis srs/challenges/DecentralisationCO.pdf ) Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 31 A Look at Theory: Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India Javeed Alam By looking at the case of India and working on the margins of theory, I want to examine and reformulate two received notions about civil society and the public sphere. In the first place it is of some consequence to look at the conceptual baggage we get from Habermas. The Pattern of emergence of and the manner of evolution of social institutions and the surrounding conditions has been radically different in the post-colonial societies. What are the issues of general interest in these societies around which dialogues take place? What is the manner of public debate? What are the relations between the ends undertaken and the means adopted? What kind of dialogic space for debate gets created? What also needs critical inquiry is the received belief based on the historical experience of Western Europe, that civil society is necessary or democracy and that is deeply supportive of it. Such an investigation is called for because civil society and public sphere are professional terms; that is, concepts given for an earlier historical experience by social scientists. Terms, which emerge out of or get constructed at certain inaugural moments of, in history, have a tendency to carry original assumptions when these are applied universally, globally at different historical junctures, some problems arise. How, in spite of the internal colouring, will it be possible to rework their relevance and adequacy for different historical moments. Different countries are all caught up in comparable historical developments marked by the rapid growth of capitalism and the simultaneous expansions of modernity. I believe that while we cannot go back in history, it is equally true that history never replays itself. So to look for in India what was there in Europe will be a futile exercise. Take Democracy as an idea and how popular aspirations articulate around that. Or, what are the modes of self-articulation of civil society in different parts of the world. I will continuously move, as I look at India, from one to the other. The nature of the relationship between Democracy and the Civil Society in India is a rather complex one, unlike in most of the western democracies. The route and the itinerary of an institutional set up or a political formations or a set of practices is never quite the same in two different situations. When the historical epoch and the conditions within which these take shape are different then the dissimilarities can be quite pronounced. Similar institutions with their associated values get transcribed in different socio-economic conditions and cultural practices in entirely distinct ways. Any universal trait pertaining to the social life of man can exist only as molded 32 Journal of Social and Political Studies in and infinite variety of historical circumstances. This is so because practices around the same value tend to vary a great deal. Practices around the value of friendship or hospitality among the Eskimos are not quite the same as among the Andharas in India. In the same way a value or virtue like (personal) autonomy may have a different reflection in the cultural practices of different societies. At what point it becomes excess from moderation, to see this in Aristotelian terms, and turns into anarchy or license cannot be answered theoretically for all times or for all societies at any particular point of time. Such a question has to be settled with prudence within the circumstantial and contextual constraints; there are certain givens in every society, which the actors cannot remove from the sense of action. For instance, assume the case of public display to body as a choice of autonomy; it obviously varies a great deal from one society to another. Such therefore is the case with democracy and civil society or the public sphere. Thus what we get in the world is not a Democracy but much rather democracies, similar yet so different. The story will be the same with those surrounding features or conditions, or the overall atmosphere in general, which became facilitative to the development and functioning of democracy. One such facilitative condition was, and a necessary one at that, was the rise of the civil society- the market and the public sphere. Civil society had a fraternal relation with the national community in west European societies. The two together were a result of the beginning of the same democratic awareness. This awareness was democratic in special sense. Ascendant capitalism was, at one level, breaking down the local isolation of people by forcing them into market exchanges of goods, services and contracts. Along with this there was the emergence of new types of conflicts that market societies have always been prone to. People thus started developing common understanding and new ways of handling discord; this to the extent that they could communicate and therefore the vernacular languages too became important. In this, in Europe, was the beginning of national communities. Growing capitalism by bringing people into direct interaction was also, at another level, rapidly dissolving the hold of feudal communities in which people were bound in relations of dependence as superior and inferior. Because of this, the sense of subservience was breaking down. It is in this escape that we see the emergence of individuated persons with accompanying changes in their sense of being person. Such an emerging sense of person also gave rise to new imaginings about life and society. We therefore see in Europe of the time a festive play of ideas. The interplay and clash of these created contestants and the public sphere comes to be what it is out of this contestation. This is what made the social formation emerging with the rise of capitalism liberal in spirit, if not yet democratic in content. The awareness of this was therefore democratic, though in a nascent sense. Civil society crystallizes in the course of evaluation of this change. In that sense the two the civil society and democracies were deeply supportive and facilitative Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 33 for each other. This historic development is the source of belief that democracy needs civil society to survive and thrive; that it cannot do without its support. I want to examine the relevance of this proposition and then to see in what way does the civil society relate to democracy in India. This is important because a vast literature has been growing over the last many years arguing the importance of civil society for democracy it is true that the civil society has been growing and has become quite vibrant. Powerful new “social movements” have entered the common space of contestations and taken roots in society. Today it is not possible to talk of popular movements without also considering these NGO’s. The mass media—both print and electronic- have seen an enormous expansion. Many other more conventional modes of articulation have also seen vast increase in their reach. Around all of these there is greater publicity and knowledge of worldly affairs, as if a large part of society is in constant communication. It can still be argued that in spite of its visibility, but on a closer look, below the surface, we can also see it getting eroded. It is both expanding and getting challenged at the same time. If this is so then in the background of what has been said so for the question that needs to be addressed is whether civil society is necessarily a pre-condition for the success of democracy, in the present times? Let us look at the initial trajectory of the civil society in India. Colonialism did not lead in the early period to any mass democratic awakenings. In the beginning there were among the people, especially the peasantry, rebellions and revolts against the colonial depredation. Among the modern emerging elite there was no concern or even attention to what was happening in that part of the society. There was though a vociferous debate around the value of western or our own indigenous traditions. This interestingly has still not died down; in fact, there has been a revival of this in the last few decades but in a virulent form unlike at the time when it was more a civilized exchange of ideas. Nevertheless induced modernization- bourgeois property, capital accumulation, trade and industry, urban life, modern education and so on together with the dislocation of peasantry led to the loosening of earlier social bonds. There was no exodus like in Europe but people were let lose from their earlier bonds, at varying speeds from different communities and regions but everywhere more pronouncedly from the three upper castes. This took various structural shapes like the formation of new classes, professional groups, etc. This was the beginning of the process of individuation in the Indian conditions, induced from outside to begin with. The social being of the individuated persons or one becoming such is something which, also give rise to a sense of difference from other and therefore also a sense of distance without necessarily, as hinted above, a sense of break from the community one lives in. Feeling oneself to be different and also give rise to sense of private in the sense that something of (or in) “me” cannot always be open for monitoring, that unsolicited social regulation of my personal life is a kind of invasion. Such a notion of being “private” is an important aspect of 34 Journal of Social and Political Studies becoming modern. It therefore happens that these individuals with a growing sense of private come together to constitute the modern public. The process of individuation is the moment of birth of multiple claims on the part of the person, of claims and preference in terms of newer ways of experiencing the world. It is here that the need for “rights” also begins to be felt by persons who hitherto could live without the sense of such a need. In India, in conditions like these that the “public”, in the modern meanings, took shape. Pre-modern communities did not dissolve. (They are still vibrant and remain ambivalently oriented to modernity. Resistance to modernity and bargaining for its advantages were and are two sides of the same process.) But their boundaries were loosened and redrawn. Their persistence and resilience together with the ongoing process of individuation has been a source of enormous strain in the life of the people and the functioning of the Public sphere, as the site for contestations relatively free of the constrains of power or the regulatory pressure of the state. This is part of the story of the making of civil society in India. I will in the following pages pursue this story in relation to the working of democracy. The Story reads so different from earlier histories. But before a brief recount of the European experience which, is our point of departure. Civil Society in European Philosophical writings and western historiography is a special kind of society. Not every society is a civil society. It comes about through a combination of contradictory features. We have already seen that its origin coincides with the rise of capitalist society wherein more and more people were being pushed into the market. Market is the place where one is left to herself to take care of all one’s needs. Communities on which one leaned are not there to assist us get on with the life. It is also the place where everyone is a maximiser of one’s interests. Market also is a place, which for the fist time creates a (permanent) public (everyone is anonymously together) unlike earlier societies where public, would get created on special occasions like pilgrimage but then at the end of it would dissolve into the domestic. Civil society thus at its one pole is a secularized public space made up of atomised, egoistic individual thrown into the competitive bourgeois world. That is why Hegel considered it to be the site of egoism, willfulness, whim, caprice, etc.: that is the world of particularities. Capitalism created an “exodus”, to take a term from Hegel, from the pre-existing, primordial communities, making for the society of such dissociated individuals. If market were the only cave where to live the human life, then all of us would die of suffocation. Ascendant capitalism was also the cause of, as we have seen above, democratic awareness and of new bonds of interests and concerns. New ways of imagining the society and purposes of life became available to the people the individuals in the bourgeois society also, over time, became bearers of rights, civil and political. In terms of emerging values, concerns, and interests people got together for common exertions and conversations; ideally, as if everyone is in conversation with everyone else in new ways of imaging. Something called, to Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 35 borrow a term from Habermass, the “bourgeois public sphere”, the other pole of the civil society took shape; something which ought to be accessible to all without interference of power, a world of right bearing individuals. This combination of contradictory elements makes it a specific kind of society and we should, at least, be clear in employing the term. It is for the reason of contradictory presence of traits, that it has been used in diverse ways; sometimes ideologically loaded and at other simply unnecessary. After the collapse of the socialist bloc a lot of western commentators have talked of market driven social life as civil society. Or, in the wake of globalization with its attendant privatization of welfare functions, NGO’s act, on the behest of World Bank, as if they really make up the civil society. Both these views must be resisted. Market now, in the era of globalization, has become a place of predatory practices, especially so in the third world countries where both the multi-national capital and the local bourgeoisie are out to take away those small buffers that made live livable for the poor. It is no doubt true that many of the NGO’s are doing commendable work but the World Bank perspective of privatization of social welfare functions is playing havoc with the lives of vulnerable sections of society like the women, children, Dalits, tribals, the sick, and so on. Both these views of civil society are not only restrictive but are also empty-headed in relation to the requirements of democracy in countries like India. Many others refer to the whole of society minus the institutions of power as civil society. Still other have employed the term when simply saying society should do. I would suggest that, in today’s context, the public sphere in the liberal societies where right-bearing individuals battle for the recognition of ideas, convictions, and social preferences is what ought to go for the civil society. This being so, it is simply clear that a large number of people in societies like ours are only nominally right bearing nor are they allowed, or even capable of seeking, access to any discursive space. They are just not equipped or accomplished, by the terms set for in received theory, to belong to the public sphere. And yet they struggle to be part of the public contestation in terms of demands that are rational or reasonable and therefore capable of public defense but lacking in abilities or aptitudes to engage in a sustained rational dialogue. This is where we have to seriously think through because according to habermas the public sphere cannot but be a dialogic space for rational debate. What do we do in a situation where people can make rational demands, in a strong sense, but lack in verbal skills to carry on a critical public discussion. Take the case of the oppressed communities for recognition and juridical equality through affirmative actions and some kind of quota in jobs and services given a pronounced under-representations in all institutions of civil society (e.g. media and communication) and of the state except the legislative ones. Much of the civil society is ranged against these, backing their opposition in terms of elaborate and painstakingly perfected arguments. Good argument is not only critical but also involves verbal skills, which is what the poor 36 Journal of Social and Political Studies lack. Proceeding from such a background, I want to argue that the core of the civil society in India, comprising the most modern and well-off sections of society, has turned against democracy, or, at least, turned its face away from the way it works in relation to the processes that sustain it. With the rise of the oppressed communities, known in India as the backward castes (OBC’s and MBC’s) to political prominence, the better educated and well-off sections in India coming from castes have taken cudgels against this political assertion on the lower people. The elite counter-reaction has embraced Hindutva to contain and push back this trend. The breach between the various communities of ritual and status in complete; in much of north India and to varying degrees in the rest of the country. Democracy in India is working without a covenant or a consensus. It can clearly be seen that the trajectory of democracy in India is unusual in significant ways. This assertion needs some careful interpretation. In the first sense, it does not mean those who are the active member of civil society are against the ideology of democracy or the theoretical presuppositions, which inform liberal democracy. On the contrary, they may well be deeply committed to the ways in which democracies ought to function in their modular form. If this is so, as it clearly seems to be the case going by the opinions aired in the civil society, then in the second sense, it suggests that their reference is to what goes on as democratic practice in the western societies. If we distill the opinions expressed in civil society we will find that the articulate sections have a high regard for the autonomy of their person, to rights as inalienable, notions of private and personal as beyond any social monitoring, value contestation in public sphere without interventions of power, decorum in public dealings, so on and so forth. Above all this, they imagine themselves as free of all encumbrances like pulls of the irrational, drawn by lures of power, given to self-aggrandizement, etc. Given all this, what also seems beyond doubt is that these same sections of civil society have developed deep reservations against the manner in which the processes around democracy are working in India. The manner in which the depressed sections of society have been functioning in the process has led to a clogging of the political space through an unruly presence of loud noises. The underprivileged groups have developed new capabilities of acting centered on their notions of equality, sense of sharing power, assertions about eliciting recognition (may be by force of slogans) of their worth as equal of the Savaranas, and so on. They stand up and force being counted and considered as important. The kind of struggles these ordinary people have been waging for equality and empowerment and entitlement look more like shouting and creating a din in the political arena. The public sphere seems to have jammed, other kinds of traffic in “rational exchanges’, uniformed by the pressures of sheer number, seem to have become difficult to those who stand by the values and virtues which go to constitute the civil society. The entry of the vulnerable sections in the political arena and the Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 37 electoral competition has been enormous if we go by the sheer numbers involved. In passing it is worth noting that in the last decade there has been an enormous increase in the political participation of vulnerable sections of society. Overall voting per centage has not significantly changed over the last 50 years. But the internal composition of the voting public has changed. More people belonging to lower castes, illiterate, less educated, rural based, and the poor are voting now. And an equally sharp decline in voting has taken place among those who are from the upper castes, educated, urban professionals, and the well off. Democracy in India is quite unlike that in the advanced capitalist countries where these same sociological variables operate in the opposite direction. This also is the source of din in the public sphere. But it is a mode of functioning that gives great satisfaction to the underprivileged because they feel that they can jam the voice of the privilegensia (a word which I have coined in an earlier article to refer to the vested interest that develops around the inherited privileges) which does not care to listen to them. At this point it is important to note that the process where different social forces contend against one another and fight out their battles has become autonomous form the institutions and norms that are supposed to inform participation. It is space where people stand up and force a reluctant and grudging recognition from those who like to call the shots, the privilegensia. It is here that the ordinary people compensate for the low verbal skills and argumentative inadequacies. It is a place where they function with a sense of pride. The vulnerable sections in all their diversity have entered the process with their own moral economy and cultural outlook. Entailed in this morality and culture are values and as these people see “virtues’ which are not considered as assets for a civil society. In fact these values ostensibly negate the very requirements of what goes to constitute a civil society. Communal solidarity, helping castecommunity brethren out of turn, breaking the queue for community advancement, scant regard for civility or politeness towards those who are not with you, lack of decorum in public utterances are all features which have become pronouncedly visible and prominent in the public life (or, the public sphere) of the country. Such a situation has its source in the nature of communities active in the political life. These people do not enter the public-political as individuals but as people embedded in their community ties. In addition, most of these are communities, which demand uncritical affirmation of affiliation with community life as a price to lean on for help and succor. Moreover as single persons they are ill equipped to act in the public- diffidence and inadequacy with verbal skills, so important as assets to enter a public contestation with civility. Lacking in this, they enter together in large number to makeup for the lack of verbal skills. This pattern of participation of also helps them to overcome the sense of shame at their own perceived inadequacy. The spectacle of the contest of communities in the public sphere is then a political culture at variance with our received notions of civil society. A Culture, which transcends such strong primordial bonds into same 38 Journal of Social and Political Studies common denominators and acquires certain universal features, is necessarily supposed to provide the site for the civil society. Such being the sense of civil society in its real moorings, it remains a restricted presence in Indian society. Those with education, culture, capable of carrying the baggage of rights, etc. are the core members of civil society; they carry the cross for the other assuming others to be capable of acting like them. The decline in the importance of the assumptions of their world in social life and the consequent erosion from the political process is quite pronounced. This is the reason for those of us strongly subscribing to the values enshrined in the civil society to have become alienated from the processes which sustains democracy in India on the ground. Democracy in India is surviving and functioning with all its untidiness and infirmities without the backing of a very large part of the civil society. The present conjuncture in India therefore is rather unusual, unlike in much of the western world from where we still draw our notions of what sustains democracy. Civil society as a necessary facilitative presence for the working of democracy has either gone indifferent to its actual processes here or has in certain ways ranged itself against it. I do not know in which other way to read the alienation of the elite- the established middle classes- those of the educated with traditions of learning and the well-off strata—from the democratic process. The only possible exceptions to this alienation are sizeable sections of the critical intelligentsia active in academics, social movements, and other radical activities. It is precisely in these sections of society in a third world country with a thin spread of modern culture that something called civil society takes shape and from where it spreads outward. However, it is also not necessary for a civil society to thrive that the entire society become educated and culturally accomplished in a modern way. But what however is quite necessary in a third world society where the gulf in the values and well-being of elite and the ordinary people is very wide that a kind of a covenant exist. Such was the case during the Freedom Movement and the making of the Constitution. The elite held out a promise, one of a desire future for the ordinary people. It may be that the promise made out may not be authentic as can be seen now with the advantage of hindsight. At the time it was made, it was seen to be so. In terms of this, agreements about goals to pursue and frame-works of action grew and become wide spread in society. It was due to this covenant that is acting together the differences between the world outlook of the elite and the ordinary people did not come to the fore. In other words, cultures of difference as exists within and across the communities as such remained dormant and did not influence the political process. In contrast, this culture of difference has now flooded the public sphere. A unity of purpose informed the public sphere at the time in terms of which contestation and debate among the intelligentsia, with some kind of a tacit participation from the people, took place. We could therefore see that something akin to civil society, however restricted in range and limited Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 39 in scope functioned quite well in India. Things are no longer the same. The expansion and deepening of democracy in India is taking place, as shown above, in a rather untidy way. Whether we can consider this development as radical is a moot question. Disputation can arise depending on the ideological position and perspective from which this is seen. The expansion of democracy is the result of the quest for bourgeois equality which is what has sustained are given it a wider legitimacy than ever before. However untidy the micro processes in the expansion of democracy, these have a fact allowed at the macro level to maintain some of the secular character of the polity and thus a minimal assurance to the minorities in the face of their growing vulnerability in face of the Hindutva onslaught, murderous in many instances when it comes to religious minorities. The increasing power of Hindutva also represents from the other side a direct attack on the essence of civil society. What however is different in the case of Hindutva is that while it disables the functioning of democracy, it ostensibly respects the form. Respecting the form is quite central to the Hindutva is disguising an important aspect of its drive towards Hinduising Indian politics. I want to refer in passing to the political of inclusion which is more invidious then that of exclusions. Inclusion with dressing down denudes people of their identity. The Christians or Muslims may have social features or ideas which are, Sangh Parivar insists inimical to the Indian cultural ethos. If they do not shed these, there is the lurking threat of disenfranchisements, in the sense of silencing their voice in the public sphere. The disguising act by fore grounding form is important in attracting large number of people who would not otherwise subscribe to its core ideological beliefs. It is therefore not unsurprising that a sizeable part of the core of civil society still feels at home with Hindutva. In the same way as an aside, that it feels no discomfort with the antics and incivility of Mamta Bannerjee but gets repelled in the case of Lallu Yadav. The rise of Hindutva also coincides with another development of quite some importance. With the decline in the transformative agenda of Nehruvian era, so too has gone the supportive role of the state in favour of the poor. This too has been a welcome feature of the state for the elite. However, what is equally important is that the state is no less interventionist. It has become interventionist in a different form, non-transformative interventionism in favour of the global capital. This runs counter not only to the emancipatory urges of the masses but is also against their quest for bourgeois equality and exercise of civil liberties because it takes out more and more areas out of the domain of affirmative action and reservation. The question whether the earlier agenda of chance was at all emanciptory or not central in understanding the mutual relations between the civil society and democracy. it was the basis of hope. It failed is another matter. Therefore, in addition, in the question whether the quest for bourgeois equality will lead to an improvement in the well being of the people is also not significant to the understanding of this 40 Journal of Social and Political Studies issue. It is the battleground of present day struggles. The elite is therefore in no position to help civil society become coterminous with the society, as has been the case in western democracies. The elite therefore cannot create the climate of a civil society that can furnish a supportive surrounding atmosphere to the working of democracy on the ground. It is a double-bind. On the one hand, there is the rupture between the elite and the ordinary people taking the shape of the main conflict in today’s politics. The two can hardly come together for common goals and shared exertions in day to day life of society. In fact there is no nesting between the two and in the public debates that go on the two are often talking at cross-purposes. It is here that an important feature of the public sphere in India gets greatly enfeebled. The public sphere, a place for intercommunication which itself is its justification, is deeply fragmented given the way the communities face each other in the organized political and their rupture with the elite. Communication and messages do not have an unhindered flow but get obstructed or alter their meaning when they cross the community boundaries. Such a process has been evident in the way questions of “merit” or “efficiency” or “competence”, and above all what it means to be “rational” has been talked in the public arenas as issues of debate since the anit-Mandal agitation. These terms have now become weapons of the educated upper castes to run down the claims of the deprived. On the other hand terms like equity or (politics of ) social justice have come to be the weapons of backward castes. The meanings associated with the key terms of debate have become properties of community interest, to thwart rather than facilitate intercommunications. A similar tendency is also discernible in the way Hindutva manipulates many a key terms of debate, for instance democracy to create confusion. Rather than majority in democracy be something contingent and constantly contested, made and unmade, it is imbued with permanence by associating it with the Hindu population; an ascriptive, denominational majority presence in India. Further by legitimizing the actions of mobs on behalf of the majority, as during the entire campaign leading to the demolition of Babri Masjid and in the subsequent phase of illegal exertions for building the Ram Temple, it empties the sense of democracy of all its procedural requirements and fills it with unwarranted meanings. The rupture between the elite and masses, on the other hand, extends beyond the world of meanings and communications. The elite has chosen to go all hog for narrow self-interest of maximising only their material wellbeing. In this era of globalization, they have made the state shed more and more of its welfare functions leaving people to fend for themselves. In a society with widespread poverty and unmet daily needs and no supportive civil institutions to lean on, people themselves are left without the presence of benign institutions in society. In this situation, people are forced to lean for support available with the kin groups of their communities. Communities thus become the sanctuary, rather than social Civil Society, Democracy and Public Sphere in India 41 institutions, where people can recompose their lives. This may have many consequences but let us look at one of these. Communities in India often play very contradictory roles in the life of individuals. We all know how the struggle for equality and consequently for recognition can have liberating influence on the functioning of the persons. They can stand up and insist on being counted. The significance of this in a society where silent acceptance was their fate cannot be minimised. On the other side, forced dependence on the communities for things that they should be able to do for themselves viz. fulfilling their daily needs can have very deleterious effects on their personal autonomy and self-respect. Dependence on communities of a forced kind induced on the people tends to unduly enhance the importance of the communities. Non-modern communities in India unlike the trade unions or business associations or hobby groups demand uncritical affirmation of affiliation to the community. Absorption of the persons into the normative reasoning of the community is an insistent demand made on the individuals, often there can be retaliation for non-compliance; “intractable” persons are unwelcome for other community members. Let us see this is relation to the internal constitution of the communities. They make strong claims to the importance of their “way of life” and claim a right to culture while they deny the same right to the individuals to choose a way of life, an important aspect of civil society. In the context of these strong claims, the absence of any sustained dialogue across the communities to arrive at common notions of good life, the demands on the individual members to wholly subscribe to these notions of good of respective communities, some unwholesome features of community life in India become prominent. All these also have deep repercussions on the evolving nature and working of civil society. Civil society after all is specific kind of society. Unlike society, which is as old as human life, civil society has its origin, as we saw above, along the emergence of capitalism and liberal ways of thinking about life. Although it has evolved and changed drastically, it had not entirely outgrown its origins. Exploration of one facet of this will perhaps be useful for understanding democracy in India in relation to the civil society. With deepening of the bourgeois conditions, which surrounds our life from all sides, aspirations also, taken on a different hue. Communities as collective personalities are also out to maximise the economic well being of the collectivity. They fight for the right and well being not just in the name of the needy members, which also they might do, but much more so as a necessity for communal benefits. The well being of the community is very often being measured in terms of the aggregate presence of the indices of welfare or prosperity vis-à-vis another community. If the numbers of well off and well placed people say from the Thevers is comparable to that of any other well placed community say the Mudaliars, then it would matter little if there is also the presence of large number of needy people 42 Journal of Social and Political Studies within that community. In other words, these communities, whatever the internal alternations under way, act as the equivalent of the egoistic individuals in the competitive world of bourgeois possessiveness; it is kind of “possessive” communal orientation which regulates public competitiveness and the maximization of interests through this. We have the unhealthy sight of any civil society being the site for fighting of self-maximization but absence of the inter-community exertions for common good, which is the presentable face of the public sphere, We can see from all this that the conceptual baggage received from Habermas comes apart when we look at societies like India. Such a political context, without the underlying minimal unification, to the extend which will promote intra-society communication, characteristic of public sphere, introduces an element of radical uncertainty of democracy. A win or lose situation between two who become contenders when they ought to be supportive, end in a no win situation. India thus is in unenviable situation. The core of the civil society stands in combat with the process by which democracy in India is getting transcribed, a universal imprinting itself within the particularities of a society. Most of those who stand for the universal seem to be aghast at the particularities, noisily articulating their concerns in the face of the universal. The point is not whether one ought to like it. The issue is to be able to take a position one has to start from an understanding of this. The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order 43 The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order— Some Guiding Considerations Anand P. Mavalankar In the contemporary global order, the question of justice has acquired greater prominence in the wake of growing ‘economic globalisation’ across the planet earth, and cultural and other diversities prevailing in different national societies within the contemporary world.1 Why has the justice question figured as the dominant concern in the present times, remains a matter of reflection for a student of contemporary global order. The Latin root of the word ‘Justice’ is “suum cuique tribuere” means “to allocate to each his own”. The quest for restoring and reaffirming the value of justice is indeed quite relevant and extraordinarily significant in the contemporary social discourse. Both corrective justice and distributive justice are posited as the essential endeavours on the part of sovereign states as well as the international community as a whole. The idea of corrective justice due to a person as punishment has been refined and reformulated in past few decades, although there is disagreement about the justification of the punishment. Similarly, the idea of distributive justice as due by way of benefits and burdens other than punishments has occupied centre-stage in policy debates across the political spectrum in contemporary democratic societies. At the same time, there is no agreement about the content of just principles for the distribution of benefits and (non-punitive) burdens. The main objective of this essay is to explore the question of justice in the contemporary global order. How do we approach the problem of justice from the analytical level of the global order itself? Where does justice figure in the hierarchy of values that shape the contemporary global order? How do we differentiate different kinds of justice, and what are the implications of coming to terms with the changing contemporary global order? We shall address these questions by referring to certain guiding considerations that should shape our exploration into the question of justice in the contemporary global order. In the subsequent sections of this essay, we shall discuss them at some length. I At the outset, it is important to recognize that the value of justice in contemporary international relations is not acknowledged as overriding one by certain scholars working in the domain of international or global studies. According to them, given the absence of a global sovereign authority, conditions for bringing about justice in the contemporary global order do not exist at the present juncture. The implicit suggestion here is that the state constitutes the maximal moral authority.2 44 Journal of Social and Political Studies This line of thinking is, however, contested by those who advance the idea of fundamental human equality, the belief that in some sense human beings are of equal value. As Andrew Link later, one of the leading scholars wedded to this idea, contends that the idea of humanity needs to be ‘reconstituted within a theory of history which is able to avoid the inadequacies that were endemic in traditional and modern theories of natural law’.3 At the level of the sovereign nation-state, the emphasis on social justice has been historically acknowledged, since it relates to the basic condition of inequality among communities, groups and individuals within the territorial confines of the state. The idea of the welfare state was meant to reduce disparities in income and wealth among its citizens. In a sense, it was meant to ensure credibility of the government of the day, in terms of meeting certain basic requirements of its people by fulfilling their minimum living standards.4 At the level of the sovereign state-system, however, some scholars wedded to an enlightened state-centric view of the international community prioritise the value of order over the value of justice. Hedley Bull’s argument in the Anarchical Society was based on his contention that order is considered to be more fundamental than justice. According to him, “order is a condition for the realization of other values”.5 clearly, order is recognized here as prior to justice. While this was articulated as such by way of a general statement, Bull did qualify it by saying that in any particular case, justice may come first. In this connection, Bull gave the example of international justice of self-determination and state sovereignty for colonized people in Asia and Africa. It was widely regarded as morally prior to the international order of Western colonialism in the colonized societies of Asia and Africa. Bull’s argument, however, does not squarely address the political economy context of the contemporary global order as it evolved since the late nineteenth century. The divide between the ‘North’ (advanced industrial states of the Western world) and the ‘South’ (less-developed, erstwhile colonized countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America) in the contemporary international economic order, fundamentally challenges the political conception of Bull which establishes the overriding salience of order vis-à-vis justice in the contemporary international society of states. The nature of the contemporary international economic order remains highly inequitable, as certain elements of the relationship between the developing and the developed countries are particularly irksome. In his perceptive appraisal of the contemporary order, W. Arthur Lewis outlined those elements in the following manner: “First, the division of the world into exporters of primary products and exporters of manufactures. Second, the adverse factorial terms of trade for the products of the developing countries. Third, the dependence of the developing countries on the developed The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order 45 countries for finance. Fourth, the dependence of the developing countries on the developed for their engine of growth”.6 Although these underlying elements have undergone change in the past two decades, the thrust of his argument does point towards an inherently restrictive political conception of Bull on justice, to the extent that if fails to take into account the injustice-producing structural make-up of the contemporary global order. By way of conclusion, Lewis had pointed towards domestic change in the prevailing international economic order. As Lewis put it, “The engine of growth should be technological change, with international trade serving as lubricating oil and not as fuel. The gateway to technical change is through agricultural and industrial revolutions, which are mutually dependent.”7 He went on to say that “The most important item on the agenda of development is to transform the food sector, create agricultural surpluses to feed the urban population, and thereby create the domestic basis for industry and modern services.”8 These ideas of Lewis enable us to focus on the underlying economic variables that produce conditions of injustice in the developing countries. They sensitize us to the sources of inequitable international economic order that give rise to the unjust economic environment for the countries of the ‘South’. Be as it may, the question of justice in the contemporary global order from the standpoint of the sovereign state-system has to be considered in detail from Bull’s perspective, as it focuses upon international justice. We may now briefly turn to Hedley Bull’s conception of justice. Bull makes a distinction between ‘commutative justice’ and ‘distributive justice’ in the realm of sovereign states. Cumulative justice refers to procedures and reciprocity in the international community of sovereign states. According to him, it is a process of claim and counter-claim among states. Accordingly, justice is fairness of the rules of the gamethe same rules are applied in the same way to every state. Such rules of the game are expressed by international law and diplomatic practices.9 Bull’s notion of commutative justice posits that states are socially responsible actors and they have a common interest in promoting international justice. Although complying with certain rules and norms create basic framework for society of states, it does not necessarily lead to justice among states. As regards ‘distributive justice’, Bull examines the issue of how goods should be distributed among states, as exemplified by the idea that justice requires a transfer of economic resources from rich countries to poor ones.10 The suggestion here is that the poor and weak states deserve special treatment, such as development aid. The notion of distributive justice does indicate what the developing countries are legitimately entitled to in the first place, both positively and negatively, the appropriate distribution of benefits and (non-punitive) burdens within a political order. In the latter half of 20th century and early 21st century, issues of distributive 46 Journal of Social and Political Studies justice have been vociferously presented by a whole range of groups and organizations from international civil society. The call for establishing a “New International Economic Order (NIEO)” in 1974 was a clear expression for realizing distributive justice on part of the developing countries as a united bloc to influence the workings of the prevailing global economic order. Bull’s framework on justice differentiates three distinct levels of justice in world politics. The first level refers to ‘international or inter-state justice’ which basically involves the notion of sovereign equality of states and removing unfair and unjust barriers to their economic growth. The second level refers to ‘individual or human justice’, which basically involves justice pertaining to human rights. The third level refers to ‘cosmopolitan or world justice’, which basically involves ‘what is right or good for the world as a whole’. Applying global environmental standards across the board among all nations of the world would be a case in point here. II Considering the question of justice from the standpoint of the wider planet earth or globe enables us to look at it in a holistic manner. There are principally two broad ways to examine the question of justice in the contemporary global order, which would capture the range and complexity of the justice problematic itself. The distinction between ‘international justice’ and ‘global justice’ remains vital to the discourse of justice in the contemporary global order. In the present age of economic globalization, the globe itself has become the reference point to assess the workings of the globalize world. Hence, with regard to global justice, the guiding consideration must be humanity as s whole as the referent object of justice. Clearly, it is conceptually quite distinct from the so-called ‘international justice’. Bull’s proposition that states are bound by various norms and practices is instructive in this regard. It also indicates the extent to which violence and conflict are not prevalent in the international society. In the Westphalian order, international justice rests on a ethic of co-existence of sovereign states. This being a procedural view of justice, it does not address the substantive issues relating to the nature and implications of justice in the contemporary world. In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall Terry Nardin’s11 propositions that the society of states is analogous to an association of citizens (cives) as opposed to an “enterprise association”, which is devoted to the pursuit of some substantive common goal of nations. The main difficulty with the notion of international justice is that it overestimates the degree of order in the Westphalian system. In the 21st century, this notion is ineffective due to several reasons. First of all, in a predominantly non-European contemporary global order, state will impose its own culture and provide its own support for a legal system based on coexistence among nations. Secondly, the growing trend towards democratization of the present order has undermined old diplomatic culture. The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order 47 On the other hand, ‘global justice’ focuses on humanity as a whole. In such conceptualization, interests of the entire humanity are best served by the normative principles that underlie inter-state relations. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct sets of arguments for the notion of global justice. First of all, Charles Beitz took the view that under contemporary conditions of interdependence, national societies are not sufficiently discrete to justify their being treated as separate, self-contained entities.12 In other words, the world has to be seen as, in certain respects, a single society and therefore the Rawlsian idea that differences in outcome vis-à-vis the distribution of social and economic goods must be justified, applies. Rawls’ “difference principle” can be applied to the effect that such inequalities must work to the benefit of the least advantaged should be applied internationally which would, of course, require wholesale distribution of wealth and income among different national societies.13 Its implications for the contemporary global order are quite clear cut. As Beitz put it, a Rawlsian society is to be understood as a cooperative scheme based on mutual advantage and it is by no means clear that the current world economic order could be seen in this light.14 As Beitz states that the principle that states own the raw materials found on their territory is indefensible, since they have done nothing to deserve this wealth and thus resource-poor countries should be compensated by the equivalent of a global wealth tax. The implicit assertion is that existing international economic inequalities are actually created by, rather than reflected in, the contemporary international economic order. The second set of arguments for the notion of global social justice refers to the basic assertion that rich countries of the contemporary global order are responsible for the poverty of poor countries. The argument says that rich countries have extensive obligations to the poor and weak countries. This broad line of argumentation is echoed in post-Leninist theories of imperialism, dependency theory and centre-periphery analysis.15 Another variant of the approach is that of Thomas Pogge.16 His work highlights the problems of environmental degradation, mass poverty, malnutrition and starvation, are the price paid by the poor to support the life-style of all the inhabitants of the advanced industrial world. He advocates global redistribution via a tax on the use of natural resources, which is a requirement of global social justice. This line of inquiry is, however, contested by certain economists who contend that genuine free trade would do more to help the poor.17 Both of these arguments referred to above, are challenged on the ground that they contain incorrect empirical propositions about the state of affairs in the actual global order that prevails in the contemporary times. The third set of arguments favoring social justice is based on the Kantian principle that a wrong done anywhere within the contemporary global order is felt everywhere in it. The Kantian view entails a priori moral principles which envisage all individuals as deserving of equal respect independent of boundaries of nation-state. Kant’s formulation of categorical imperative forms the basis of 48 Journal of Social and Political Studies Beitz’s (1983) account of Cosmopolitanism, and Onora O’Neill’s account of our obligations to distant strangers.18 Peter Singer’s utilitarian framework regarding obligation of the rich to the poor is another attempt to conceptualize the question of global justice.19 Brian Barry’s espousal of the principle that the basic needs of all should be met before the non-basic needs of anyone are satisfied is essentially a cosmopolitan one, which derives from the idea of justice as impartiality (Barry, 1994, 1998). In the third set of arguments, there is recognition of the prevailing social reality that such extremes of wealth and poverty in itself (that are found in the contemporary global order) create obligations on the part of the rich to help the poor. Here the debate has revolved around certain key considerations. To begin with, it is important to determine the extent of such obligations on the part of the “haves” towards the “have-nots”. Secondly, it is vital to figure out whether these obligations are necessarily fulfilled by full-blooded state intervention to redistribute resources in an inequitable contemporary global order. John Rawls, in his work , The Law of Peoples20 advances the proposition that our obligation extends only to helping societies that are not capable of sustaining internal schemes of social justice to reach the point at which they would be so capable. Rawls was of the view that the transfer of actual wealth is not necessary to put burdened societies on the road to social justice. According to him, what such societies require is the right kind of civil society and socio-political values. The real assistance, though, of a different order was suggested by economists in the form of free trade and access for less-developed countries to developed world markets.21 Rawls invokes the idea of public reason that “specifies at the deepest level of the the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood.”22 This should serve as the basis for initiating systematic efforts to address the problem of justice in the given national society. According to Rawls,…“such reason is public in three ways: as the reason of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the pubic; its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice, which questions are of two kinds, constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice; and its nature and content are public, being expressed in public reasoning by a family of reasonable conceptions of political justice reasonably thought to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.” 23 Rawls relies upon the effectiveness of deliberative democracy, as the best way to address the question of justice. He goes on to say that there are “three essentials of deliberative democracy. One is an idea of public reason;…a second is a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative legislative bodies. The third is the knowledge and desire on the part The Question of Justice in the Contemporary Global Order 49 of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct.”24 The arguments in favor of global justice are, however, subject to certain criticisms regarding the status of global justice as a feasible and desirable line of argumentation in the contemporary global order. First of all, social democracy and a strong welfare state in Western Europe have come under sustained scrutiny as a sound political economy option in the past few decades. Commitment to one’s fellow citizens and high taxes are being questioned as credible propositions. Secondly, the Westphalian assumption that power would be divided amongst a plurality of national actors no longer holds true. Thirdly, anti- global capitalist movements such as ‘Occupy Wall Street’ agitation have fundamentally critiqued the bases and motivations of global justice framework. Thirdly, changes of policy in national units in response to the demands of global justice are visible, rather than the development of effective global institutions of governance. Fourth, the Westphalian states have not been able to cope with problems thrown up by environmental degradation or the management of the global economy. III While addressing the question of justice in the contemporary global order, the above sets of guiding considerations impinge upon the problem of justice at the present juncture. The idea of global justice emerges as the most credible way of inquiring and acting upon the sources and nature of injustice in the contemporary global order. Since the globe remains the reference point for conceptualizing the nature and dynamics of the contemporary global order, the question of justice has to be addressed from the vantage point of the globe itself and its necessary implications will have to be taken into account for forging an effective strategy of countering injustice across the global spectrum. As regards human rights violations and its impact on world politics, former or even sitting heads of states are brought before various national and international courts or tribunals. In 1998, General Augusto Pinochet, the former ruler of Chile, was arrested in London on an extradition request by a Spanish Court seeking to try him for crimes committed during his military dictatorship. Later, Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Charles Taylor of Liberia were indicted for war crimes. Due to shifts in international legal standards and practices, human rights prosecutions have taken place. Sikkink has called the rise and spread of a set of ideas and norms as “justice cascade”.25 The question of justice in contemporary global order is indeed multidimensional. Under present political conditions in the contemporary world the obligations derived under conceptions of international and global justice are so stringent that compliance cannot be ensured in the foreseeable future. NOTES 1. Globalization essentially refers to the shrinking of geographical distance. It means compression of both time and place in that events in one location can be visually and aurally experienced, 50 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Journal of Social and Political Studies through the grace of modern technology, virtually instantly around the globe. See Anthony Giddens, “The Director’s Lectures: Runaway World, The Ruth Lectures Revisited, Lecture 1: 10, November 1999. Economic globalization indicates convergence in regard to income levels, social structure and behavior across the planet earth. But its critics point towards sections of society, which is not benefited by economic globalization. As regards cultural diversities, the point is that their differences must be so acknowledged, and protecting their cultural diversity means ensuring justice to them. This remains the essence of the realist thought in international relations. See Andrew Linklater, Critical Theory and World Politics. London: Routledge, 2007, p.29 On the question of welfare state, see Clause Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. Edited by John Keane. London: Huchinson, 1984. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p.93. See W. Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of the International Economic Order. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p.3. See Lewis, p.74. Lewis, p.75. See Bull, 1977. See Bull, 1977. See Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. See Beitz, 1983. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 1971. See Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideas and National Sovereignty,” in Journal of Philosophy, 80, pp.591-600, 1983. See A.G.Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Hrmondsworth: Penguin, 1971; See Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research, 13: pp. 81-94; See Iammanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, Vols. I, II and III,. London: Academic Press, 1974/19890, 1989; See Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. London: New Left Books, 1980; See Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey. London: Routledge, 1990. See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. See M. Desai, Marx’s Revenge: The Resurgence of Capitalism and the Death of Statist Socialism. London: Verso, 2002; Also see J. Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. See O. O’Neill, Faces of Hunger. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986; and also see O. O’Neill, “Transnational Justice”, in Political Theory Today. Ed., David Held. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. See Peter Singer, “Famine, affluence and morality “, In International Ethics, Ed., C.R. Beitz, et al. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999 See R. Cassen, Does Aid Work?. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. See Rawls, 1999, p.132. Ibid., p.133 Op.cit. See Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics. New York: Norton, 2011. Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 51 Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India: The Glass is Half Full P.K. Chaubey· ABSTRACT India, that is Bharatvarsha, was perhaps a cultural identity once upon a time. India, that is Bharat, is now a modern State. India is perhaps unique where within the historically given boundary there is so much diversity and plurality that some scholars choose to call it most complex nation. Yet, except very small countries and Bangladesh, all large countries in the South Asia have patterns of social diversity. Plurality and diversity are considered positive attributes of a society while disparities are considered negative attributes. But all attributes coexist. Modern State of India has tried, particularly through its constitutional provisions, to preserve diversity while mitigating disparities. It is not easy to distinguish between diversities and disparities in certain situations, and ideas of disparities are therefore often imposed on the matters of diversities. Attempts of the modern State, like various reformists earlier, may be characterized as fostering harmony without imposing homogenization and promoting unity without imposing uniformity. The goal has been to reduce disparities in various spheres of secular domain. It is considered a worth pursuing goal though difficult to achieve. The Constitution of India has duly recognized group identities of people along with individual citizenship. It has therefore inserted various provisos concerning the interests of groups, not necessarily always weaker, while providing for fundamental rights to the individuals vis-à-vis State. It makes provisions for preserving cultural rights of various groups and weaker sections in the Indian society. There is also a Part in the Constitution dealing with special provisions relating to certain classes. These provisions relate to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Anglo-Indians, and Other Backward Classes as well as for people living in the Scheduled Areas. But general provisions are spread throughout the Constitution like Art 275 which generally deals with grants in aid from the Union Government to certain States but reference is made about Scheduled Tribes/Areas or Parts IX and IXA which deal with matters of panchayats and municipalities but make reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. My approach in the present paper is to view the Indian social scenario as the ‘glass is half filled’ rather than the ‘glass is half empty’ for the audience of Nepal which is undertaking exercise of Constitution making to take lessons from working of Indian Constitution. On the relationship between a society and its State, as far as democratic dispensation is concerned, there are two, somewhat contrasting, views. One is that society creates the instrument of State as its executive wing for managing public affairs and guides the State to move in a certain direction. Society is the principal and State is its agent. The other is that the State holds the society together and is autonomous of the society it governs. In a dynamic context, both actually inform each other. It is under the general will of the people that State enacts the law and acts in accordance with it. But the law has to evolve itself with evolving empirical social reality in order to aligning its activities with the values, and at times in inculcating the values, generally held among the members who are not individually very conscious about them or hold a contrary view. There may be times where the State itself has to learn. For example, there has emerged a view that Art 44 of the Constitution of India calling for uniform civil code for the citizens throughout the country may not be pursued at all. Journal of Social and Political Studies 52 There arose several occasions in India when the view of the judiciary was not found synchronous with the ethos of the people as represented in the Parliament, which necessitated amendment of the Constitution. Clauses and provisions were added in Art 15 for securing the right to the State for taking affirmation action. Or take the example of reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Parliament and State Assemblies. To begin with the provision in Art 334 was only for 10 years but it has been extended time and again through Constitutional Amendments and is likely to be extended indefinitely. Several schemes for inclusion of ‘excluded’ and marginalized or vulnerable sections and disadvantaged regions through differential treatment have been devised and a partial success has also been achieved. There are people having reservations on the variety of reservations extended to certain sections yet the mainstream thinking is to do much more than has been done so far. It may be noted that Indians are faced with two thought streams—one of Gandhi who would like the society to reform itself and call for people to be magnanimous to accommodate every group irrespective of the traits of distinction, and the other of Ambedkar who would like to use the State power and discretion, if not coercion, to bring in results through positive discrimination or affirmative action. While the former may be enduring and very smooth but would be damn slow, the latter would be expedient, though not smooth, and may invite reactions. India has chosen the other course and weathered some troubles and reactions. Introduction Social inclusion of excluded groups and communities in societal processes of political and economic significance is a very good idea expressive of modern ethos across the globe, yet not without ambiguities. However, I do not set out here to carry out a scholastic discourse on what its nuances could be, but propose to discuss how it has been attempted and being attempted in India as it is broadly understood. Social inclusion for this paper does not mean mainstreaming the excluded, partially excluded, and secluded sections of the people in any narrow sense but does mean bringing in some kind of integration among diverse social groups and some kind of fusion between them by addressing the perceived causes of divisive, fissiparous and fissionary tendencies. Two things we need to keep constantly in mind. One, the notion of inclusion presupposes a societal core to which diverse groups may wish to be included in certain senses and yet not in many others. Two, inclusion should not mean intrusion in areas which the sections (to be included) wish to preserve simply because the latter is uninvited. Broad understanding is that in most secular matters they wish to be included and in most religious matters they may not wish to be included. For example, communities not professing Hindu religion may not like to have common civil code and may seek seclusion. India, that is Bharatvarsha, was perhaps for pretty long stretch of time a cultural identity without well-defined geographical boundaries or with shifting political boundaries. India, that is Bharat, is now a modern political State with more or less well-defined boundaries. India is unique where within the historically given boundary there is so much diversity and plurality that some scholars have chosen to call it most complex nation in the world. Yet, except very small countries Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 53 and Bangladesh, all countries in the South Asia have a good measure of diversity, even within the majority religions which people in different countries happen to practice. But I shall however dwell on India with which I am more familiar much like in the fashion of a well-known litterateur late Rahi Masoom Raza who wrote in his celebrated novel Adha Gaon that he is speaking of that half of the village which he understood better. The modern State of India is home to people of many religious faiths and castes and classes, within several of them, but they have a broad cultural affinity too. It has therefore been possible for the people to hold together despite lack of justice in certain spheres to certain sections. Even before Independence several reforms were carried out by various social reformers, generally within a given religion and particularly within Hindu fold, and at times with the State support. After Independence, many of the social grudges and grievances were addressed in the making of the Constitution. In a dynamic society like India with evolving aspirations and ethos, there could be no single permanent optimum mix; but cohesive forces were tried to be so built as to contain divisive tendencies in the society. In this paper my general approach is to view the Indian social scenario as the ‘glass is half filled’ rather than that of the ‘glass is half empty’ and my judgement is that the ‘glass will never be full up to the brim’ given the contradictions that exist between, say, notions of caste justice and gender justice, as is exemplified by the recent controversy over the bill for reservation of parliamentary and legislative seats for women or between gender justice and freedom to profess religion, as came to the fore a quarter century ago in the famous Shah Bano case. Despite the fact that we Indians (which may be true of all the people in the South Asia) are quite argumentative, it goes to our credit that we have a great capability to develop broad consensus over many issues and move ahead in a positive direction. Both of these, argumentative tendency and capability to building consensus, are healthy signs—for a democracy to thrive and not only to survive. In post-Independence India, we seem to have been broadly pursuing a course of harmony without imposition of homogenization, unity without imposition of uniformity and diversity while mitigating disparities. To paraphrase: harmony sans homogenization, unity sans uniformity and diversity sans disparity. Jawaharlal Nehru had articulated the idea long ago and characterized Indian social fabric as ‘unity in diversity’. Though at times mainstreaming was thought to be the best form of inclusion, the idea was shelved for good and preserving diversity and plurality rather than tolerating it became the dominant thinking. Some scholars have preferred to call this ethos as ‘union’ rather than ‘unity’. I would prefer to articulate it as union of minds, unity of purpose and harmony of relations. Yet justice demands doing away with disparities. It is quite a difficult task to live with diversities and pluralities, while trying to do away with disparities. Quite often it is not even easy to distinguish between diversity and disparity. Preserving 54 Journal of Social and Political Studies cultural diversity yet doing away with social disparity, preserving religious diversity yet doing away with political disparity, and preserving local traditions and doing away with economic disparity, could not be an easy task. It is rendered difficult because in most of the religions, matters ecclesiastic have not been clearly separated from matters secular, with the exception of Christianity. In fact, it is a bit surprising that almost all people(s) in India have accepted the separation of secular domain from ecclesiastic domain even while the two major religions and, of course, many minor religions (minor-major division in numerical sense) had never articulated, let alone concluded, the separation of the two domains. India chose to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic in 1949, though the words secular and socialist were added in the preamble of the Constitution of India through an amendment in 1976 only. The Preamble pronounced to all Indian citizens the liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship and also aimed to secure to all of them justice—social, economic and political. A fine balance has thus been attempted between preservation of traditional cultural values and promotion of modern secular values. In fact, the Preamble does not only aim at the liberty of belief and faith, it provides to secure it to the citizens. The state is in a pro-active mode in both the domains even though it is professedly secular. Before we proceed further, it would be appropriate to bring forth the two steams of thoughts that prevailed in pre-Independence India. Gandhi wanted to achieve social harmony through a course of social reformation without State intervention and thus promote unity, especially among Hindus and between Hindus and Muslims where he could see some discord; at the same time, Ambedkar on the other hand wanted a political solution through State intervention to bring justice to disadvantaged groups, particularly within Hindu fold, and thus preserve the union. Gandhi thought achieving social harmony through social movement and change of heart would be a permanent solution to attain social justice without unwanted repercussions, while Ambedkar thought State affirmative action would be not only expedient but the only possible course in the given circumstances. In a sense, they believed in two different theories of relationship between State and society. It was Ambedkar line that we finally chose to pursue in the making of the Constitution of India, although original Ambedkar line was itself modified as a compromise that was evolved in the Poona Pact between Gandhi and Ambedkar in 1932 and was incorporated in Government of India Act 1935 passed in the British Parliament for political dispensation in the Dominion of India. It is true that Ambedkar line proved expedient but it occasionally gives rise to dissonance in certain quarters and disruption in social and economic life people, leading to backlashes and clashes at times. The domain of reservation, the most visible form of positive discrimination, went on expanding its coverage and dimensions from Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes to Other Backward Classes to Minorities and from political representation to employment/jobs (also within Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 55 that from initial recruitment to promotion and accumulation of vacancies) to admission in educational institutions. If some people have reservations on these reservations, it is because, they feel, the game is being played in a zero-sum fashion, particularly in the economic domain. In a zero-sum game, inclusion of one implies exclusion of another and this is what people are against, though opposition is often articulated in terms of efficiency and merit. Present policy of inclusive growth in some way addresses to this issue by emphasizing on participation of people, better distribution of growth and eradication of poverty instead of redistributing existing stocks, containing concentration and removing inequality. Converting policies into positive-sum games is the real issue, but some games cannot be easily turned into positive-sum games. What Constitutes India In most of the countries with capitalistic economic framework, which the Constitution declares India to be one through its Art 39(b) and 39(c), theoretical backdrop of the Constitution revolves around the relationships between State and individual and market. State’s duty to individuals remain a major goal of a modern democratic Constitution. The State shall generally be required to oversee the conduct of a citizen vis-à-vis another citizen or entity or even the State itself. But reality is much more complex because many other institutions have to be reckoned with and regional aspirations have to be respected. More importantly, in countries like India, group identities have generally been accepted and have also been constitutionally recognized. These groups are in terms of races, religions, castes, classes, regional affiliations and gender. While we have inherited many practices which are considered bad today, we have also inherited a positive trait for appreciation for variety and traditions. India with a population of more than 1210 million is more than three times larger than the rest of the SAARC countries and therefore more diverse and plural. It has the geographical area of about 3.3 million square-kilometers, which is twice as large as that of the remaining of the SAARC countries. With an area of onethird of the US or China, it is quite dense in terms of population density, more dense than any other SAARC country, except Bangladesh. It is also home to seven major religions viz. Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism and Zoroastrianism and 200 minor religions/sects There are estimated 3500 castes, of which about 500 castes excluding duplication across states, are scheduled for special treatment and another 1000 castes for differential treatment. With 114 languages, of which 22 are recognized as ‘national’ languages (including the official languages of her three neighbours—Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan), India has around 1600 officially accepted spoken languages though mother tongues returned in the census of 2001 were around 10,000. There are several culturally different tribes in India (about 550), again with some duplication across States, which are scheduled for special treatment. There are also several primitive, de-notified, seminomadic and nomadic tribes in India, 75 of them have been identified. Criminal 56 Journal of Social and Political Studies Tribes Acts of 1871 and 1924, under which some of the castes and tribes were considered ‘criminal tribes’ were repealed in 1952 though for a while they were considered as habitual offenders. De-notified tribes exist in all categories of classification. We had had stories of thugs and pindaries committing theft and robberies. Now, no castes are considered outcastes and no tribes are considered criminal. Hindus constitute the majority, whose percentage has come down from around 85 in 1951 to 81.5 in 2001. Muslims constitute the major minority whose percentage has increased from 10.4 in 1951 to 13.4 in 2001. The two religious groups put together constitute more than 95 percent of the population. Christians and Sikhs constitute 2.3 percent and 2.0 percent respectively. Buddhists and Jains are around 0.8 percent and 0.5 percent respectively. While Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are considered as having been originated in India, Islam and Christianity are not considered likewise. Growth rate of Hindu population is the smallest, after Sikhs, and that of Muslims is the highest among the major religions. An overwhelming majority of people in any religion are converts from Hindus and as a result, scheduled castes are accepted to exist in every major religion in India. Officially scheduled castes are accepted to exist only among Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists. It may be noted that the original Constitutional Orders issued by the President on 10th August 1950 and 20th September 1951 restricted these castes to exist among Hindus only. It was only after amendments that people professing Sikhs and Buddhists were accepted to be belonging to Scheduled Castes if they originally came from such castes, races or tribes as were scheduled. Highest incidence of Scheduled Castes is found among Sikhs. Some scholars feel that freedom of religion should permit the converts (to Christianity and Islam) to be accepted as belonging to Scheduled Castes, if by origin they were from such castes, races or tribes. Scheduled tribes people are in all religions except among Muslims though there are such converts (numerically not very large) among Muslims as well. The Constitutional Orders issued by the President on 6th September 1950 and 20th September 1951 do not restrict their existence to any religion. It may reiterated that Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs and Christians are treated as religious minorities, but only followers of Buddhists and Sikhs could belong to scheduled castes while scheduled tribes people could profess any religion. However, they are found empirically almost absent, but not nil, among Muslims. However, there are also socially and educationally backward classes, often called ‘other backward classes’, which exist in all religions in India, including Islam and they account for a huge majority. As the Census of India is not conducted on caste basis, and there is some difference between castes and classes, estimates of their numbers are controversial. Their numbers vary from well below 30 percent to well over 50 percent. Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 57 Castes and Exclusion History is replete with cases of ostracism, isolation, segregation and apartheid— some of which is racial in nature. People have often been suppressed and oppressed in many civilizations. Slavery, widely extant in Greece in the ancient period, reemerged in recent past centuries. America and South Africa both practiced apartheid till late in the passing centuries. Institution of private property and market forces, much useful as they are, have been analysed as causing exploitation and deprivation as well. Jajmani system, where institution of private property was well entrenched but money mediation was not the dominant mode of exchange, is now being increasingly defended because activities of production and distribution were taken care of simultaneously in that system. Occupational castes exist everywhere in all societies, exception being non-State societies, with certain degree of division of labour. So is the case with discrimination. But exclusion from accessing certain amenities and privileges, performing certain functions and carrying out certain occupational activities has been an exclusive specialty in the caste system of Hindu society. Apart from this, there prevailed the curse of untouchabiity of certain castes doing cleaning jobs. The other characteristic of the casteism, as it is called, had been forbiddance of marriage and dining across castes. Even when occupational rigidity has melted away to a great extent, the other social practices still continue, particularly in the rural areas. Exclusion from accessing amenities, an extension of untouchability, is still prevalent in some parts of the country and in the neighbourhood though in a diluted form. Some scholars have therefore chosen to call it Indian Caste System. The system is so well ingrained and entrenched in the society that members belonging to certain low castes continue to be in the same low social status, in the eyes of others, even though they have converted to such religions which do not permit social hierarchy based on castes. In other words, they could not lose their castes even after conversion. And vocal sections have now started asserting castes, even after conversion, if their ancestors came from low castes. Almost all religions in India are found practicing casteism in marriage, if not in dining. Not to accept the existence of Scheduled Castes (and Scheduled Tribes) among Muslims, some scholars and leaders argue, is the discrimination practiced by the State. While the State is supposed to intervene generally in the market processes for securing economic justice to the poor and labour, it has to do some extra efforts for ending exclusion of people belonging to certain castes and tribes from participation in the societal processes by ensuring their inclusion in those processes—accessing amenities, performing rituals, amd carrying out activities. There had been traditionally excluded castes—some of which were untouchable and in some parts of the country even unapproachable and unseeable. Obviously, these were the castes engaged in unpleasant lowest level occupations or cleaning occupations. There has been a sort of hierarchy within the groups as well as between the groups. Some of the groups can easily be identified with the 58 Journal of Social and Political Studies varnas, but for others it is not easy. To these varnas were assimilated certain tribes, as they became part of the larger society, which can be taken seen as a process of inclusion. These tribes were not considered untouchable even while followers of other religions were called mlechhas and treated so. Tribal people were however considered low in skills, which they actually were as they came in contact with the larger society much later and were expected to take time to learn skills already developed. Low castes were considered quite adept in their various occupations as they have been a part of society always and had been naturally learning their skills and innovating for a long time. They actually made what is called as the exterior of civilization! But there are also areas within the territory of India, which have been called scheduled areas. There are also exclusive tribal areas. Some areas got politically assertive and special arrangement has been made for them, for example, in the shape of Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. Then, there are marginalized sections like women, minorities—religious and linguistic, nomadic and migratory tribes, and physically handicapped persons as also ex-servicemen for whom some differential treatment has been provided. The Constitution of India does take care of what it calls Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas. Scheduled Areas, as provided for in the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, were originally declared through Constitutional Orders issued on 26th January and 7th December of 1950. They are the areas/regions/pockets with tribal concentration that exist within the States/Union Territories except four States in the North East viz. Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. There is provision in the Fifth Schedule [under Art 244(1)] for a Tribes Advisory Council, mostly consisting of Scheduled Tribes representatives in the Legislative Assembly of the State, to advise the Governor on matters pertaining to the welfare and advancement of the Scheduled Tribes in the State. The Governor is empowered to disallow application of, or modify, any particular Act of Parliament or of Legislature of the State and may prohibit, restrict and regulate market transactions particularly with reference to transfer/allotment of land. The Sixth Schedule [under Art 224 (2) and 275 (1)], applicable to Tribal Areas in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura, makes provision for autonomous districts, and within them autonomous regions if there are different Scheduled Tribes, and District Councils (and Regional Councils) with powers to make laws, rules and regulations with respect to certain matters related with land, forest, water courses, taxes (including land revenue), social customs (including marriage and divorce), etc. The District and Regional Councils are largely bodies with members elected for a term of five years on the basis of adult suffrage. They are endowed with powers, subject to certain limitations, to constitute village councils and courts and to establish/construct/manage primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle ponds, ferries, fisheries, roads, waterways. They may prescribe the language of instructions and the manner in which primary schools would be run. They have been empowered to collect land revenue and Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 59 impose taxes on land and buildings as well as tolls on persons resident in their jurisdictions. District Councils have powers to levy and collect taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; on animals, vehicles and boats; on entry of goods for sale; and for maintenance of schools, dispensaries and roads. As of now there are nine such districts—two in Assam, three in Meghalaya, one in Tripura, and three in Mizoram. One can notice that the provisions in respect of Scheduled Areas and Tribal areas as well as Art 371A through 371C and Art 371F through 371H, pertaining to the States in the North East, are reflective of inclusion in one sense, exclusion in another and seclusion in still another sense. However, in a broad sense, these dispensations have been accepted as part of inclusion policy, because these interventions are intended to take care of those groups in the secular realm without intruding into their personal and cultural spheres where they prefer a kind of ‘seclusion’ or ‘self-exclusion’. Constitution: Framework and Working In the Constitution of India, particular and specific provisions for furtherance of welfare of the weaker sections besides general provisions have been made in the Parts dealing with Fundamental Rights (of the citizens vis a vis the State), Directive Principles of State Policy (about intervention in economic and social life), Fiscal Matters (Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits), and Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes. It needs to be mentioned that the State has been defined in Art 12 of the Constitution to include ‘the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India’. The word State has been used in the Constitution of India in several senses and we shall be using it in this paper in three senses viz., for the Republic of India, the Union of India and each of the states and UTs. There are two kinds of measures adopted. One set is preventive and protective in nature and the other is that of promoting the interest and welfare of the weaker, marginalized and disadvantaged sections of the citizenry. Both types of these measures are provided in the Constitution. Enshrining great principles in the Constitution is one thing but making them work is another. Howsoever anti-discriminatory, anti-exploitation, anti-oppressive and anti-exclusionary the Constitution is in its formulation, the issue is how much progress we could make in that direction. Making a good Constitution is the necessary condition but it is only the first step. Acts have to be legislated, rules have to be framed, institutions have to be established, and mechanisms have to be put in place. It has to be seen that dilution is not brought in the steps following the Constitution mandate. Also programmes/schemes/ missions/projects have to be planned, implemented, and monitored. We shall first deal with the provisions in the Constitution, then on the steps taken to execute them and thereafter on the outcomes. Yet, it is difficult to know 60 Journal of Social and Political Studies clearly about how much change is autonomous and how much is on account of State interventions, more so when State interventions trigger societal change, which is what it ought to do, and when State intervenes because of societal and sectional pressure. Constitutional Provisions for Positive Disrimination Constitutional provisions could be grouped in certain broad areas like civil, political, economic, educational, cultural, employment and administrative. In the section dealing with Right to Equality (Article 14 to Article 18) in the Part III called Fundamental Rights, it has been made clear that, on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth, neither the State shall discriminate against any citizen in any sphere nor shall it permit others to impose any restriction on access to public amenities and facilities. Abolition of untouchability is specifically mentioned and its practice is declared as an offence in the Constitution itself. But it seeks exemption for the State to make special provisions for women and children as well as for advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, in addition to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes. This affirmative exemption has been termed as positive discrimination. It further declares equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and makes it clear that nobody shall be discriminated on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. But it again seeks exemption for the State to make laws in favour of any backward class, which is under-represented in the services of the State. The Constitution also permits the State to make laws regarding domicile situation in certain classes of employment. In fact, the Constitution was tested soon after its promulgation. While Art 16 (4) had made provision of reservation by the State in the employment under the State, there was no exception for the State to make provision of reservation of seats in admission in educational institutions. The State of Madras (then comprising present four Southern States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) had reserved seats for certain communities based on certain religions and castes in state medical and engineering colleges, which the Supreme Court of India had found violative of Article 15. Article 15 asserts nondiscrimination but seeks exemption for making special provision only for women and children, not for castes, classes or communities. In the very first amendment of the Constitution a clause (4) was added to the Article 15, making room for the State to make special provisions for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and what came to be known as the OBCs later on through clause (5) added in 2005. Civil In order to operate the Constitutional provisions, laws were enacted quite early like Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and Untouchability Offences Act, 1955. However, when they did not prove enough, some further protective provisions Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 61 were made like Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act in 1989, Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act in 1993, and Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act in 2006. In recent years there has been made amendment in the Hindu Succession Act 1955, where word Hindu has been defined to consist of Hindus, Sikhs, Biddhists and Jains. There has also been enacted the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act in 1987 and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in 2005. There already existed Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Pre-Conceptual and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. Recently there has been enactment of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prohibition and Redressal) Act (2007). There is also an Act to take care of physically handicapped persons, namely, The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The Constitution has also provided for appointing Special Officers, or Commissions for undertaking studies and recommending remedial measures to the State for protecting the interests of the SCs, and the STs, and later on for the OBCs and the Minorities, etc. It is important to note that Uniform Civil Code, a central provision in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Art 44), impinging upon women’s status in civil matters, has been kept in abeyance for indefinite period, despite positive nod from the Supreme Court. It is because such an enactment, thought a section of intelligentsia, might militate against religious rights of certain minorities. An Act professing uniform civil code could of course be enacted yet making certain exceptions and exemptions. No enactment is ever made without a proviso or two and certain practices for example, among the tribal communities could always be accommodated in the Act. But, even the mere mention of enacting any legislation in the matter itself creates a psychosis in the mind of protagonists as well as in that of antagonists and thus the operation of the provision has been postponed for an indefinite period. Political With regard to political inclusion, there is a Part (XVI) in the Constitution wholly devoted to Special Provisions relating to certain classes (Art 330 to Art 342). India is said to be unique to make political reservation for representation even in its legislative bodies. Seats are proportionally reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the House of the People, in the Parliament, and in the Legislative Assembly of every State, with some distinction in the case of Scheduled Tribes in the Tribal Areas in the States of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. They are however not to be represented in the Council of States, in the Parliament, or Legislative Councils of States, wherever constituted. Special representation is ensured through nominations for Anglo-Indians in the House of People, as also in State Legislatures, if not adequately represented through 62 Journal of Social and Political Studies election. The provision of reservation of the seats in the House of People and the Legislative Assemblies was originally intended to end after ten years but the relevant Article has been continually amended every tenth year to extend the limit and by an Amendment in 2009 the limit has been extended till 25 January 2020. Presently 79 seats for Scheduled Castes and 42 seats for Scheduled Tribes out of total 543 seats are reserved in the House of People of the Parliament. In the Legislative Assemblies of the States, out of total 3961 seats, 543 and 527 seats would be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively. Given the circumstances, the provision is likely to be extended again and again. It is important to note that there is only one general electoral roll for each of the territorial constituencies and there are no special constituencies on the basis of religion, race, caste, or sex. But in certain constituencies only candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be, can contest for being elected to the House of People, Legislative Assemblies or local bodies. Here, candidacy is qualified but electorate is not. In autonomous districts, all constituencies are to be represented by a member of Scheduled Tribes. According to original provisions, after each census, the allocation of seats in the House of People to the States has to be readjusted to keep them in proportion to their populations in relation to national population, and also the number of seats to be reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes depending upon their populations in relation to the population of the State in question. A Delimitation Commission has to be constituted to decide the above matter but also to determine the territorial constituencies within States and as to which constituencies will go to Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes candidates. A similar provision exists for Legislative Agencies of the States. However, after three such Commissions were constituted in 1952, 1962 and 1973 and which completed their exercises as per Constitutional provision of proportionality, an amendment was brought in 1976 freezing the number of seats (as well as their territorial divisions) till the first census after 2000 so that the States do not incentive to go slow on family planning measures. Reference population composition thus remained as returned by 1971 census. However, by the time census was taken in 2001, it was discovered that even within States there was a wide variation in the size of constituencies. It was pointed out that in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, while Chandni Chowk constituency had a population of barely 0.35 million while Outer Delhi constituency had a population of over 3.0 million. An amendment was brought in 2001 to freeze the number till the census after 2026. But by an Act a Delimitation Commission was also constituted in 2002 to rationalize the territorial constituencies within each of the States. Here the word State includes Union Territory. A little history would be of some importance here. Under Government of India Act of 1919, there were created separate electorates for representation for Muslims and Sikhs (and later on also for Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 63 under Government of India Act, 1935). The British rulers decided to review, under political compulsions at home, the working of the Government of India Act, 1919, and constituted Indian Statutory Commission of British MPs in 1927 under John Simon to make an assessment and propose changes in the governance of the country. The next five years were tumultuous in a sense. During this period, Ambedkar demanded a separate electorate for Depressed Classes (as the Scheduled Castes communities were known in those days) on the pattern of Muslims and Sikhs. The Indian National Congress, the most important political party of the day, would not agree to the proposal but Ramsay Macdonald, the then Prime Minister of Britain, announced separate electorate for them in 1932. Ambedkar and Gandhi took two different and divergent positions. Gandhi undertook fast unto death. Finally, a compromise was brokered into what is popularly known as ‘Poona Pact’ between Gandhi and Ambedkar, which decided for single (joint) electorate for Hindus but doubling the number of the seats for Depressed Classes within the quota of the seats for Hindus. It is significant to note that there was constituted an Advisory Committee on Minority Rights which, in order to safeguard the political interest of the minorities, proposed to recommend to Constituent Assembly reservation for minorities in the legislatures on the basis of population. It was a little before Independence. But it came for debate in the Constituent Assembly a fortnight after Independence, the sense of the house was against such a move. In fact when the Advisory Committee met again in mid-1949, a Christian member H.C. Mukherjee moved a resolution saying that ‘the system of reservation for minorities other than SC in legislatures be abolished’. It was supported by all forty members, irrespective religions they belonged to, barring one Muslim member. Majority of Muslim members held that ‘all these reservations must disappear and that it was in the interests of the minorities themselves that such reservations (as proposed on 8th August 1947) in the Legislatures must go’. Tajamul Hussain, a vocal member in the Constituent Assembly, even said: The term minority is a British creation. The British created the minorities. The British have gone and the minorities have gone with them. Remove the term minority from your dictionary. There is no minority in India....I would like to tell you that in no civilized country where there is parliamentary system on democratic lines; there is any reservation of seats….We want to merge in the nation. It appears that to begin with, political representation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was 12.5 percent and 5.0 percent respectively as was in the case of jobs. Subsequently it was raised to 15.0 and 7.5 percent for national representation, roughly in proportion to their population, with varying degrees across the States and UTs, depending upon their numerical strengths. Though their share in population has increased, the number remains frozen as part of embargo imposed on the number of seats in 1976. This was with regard to representation in the House of People and the Legislative Assemblies in the States. 64 Journal of Social and Political Studies In the Constitutional provisions made in 1993 for panchayats and municipalities, seats have been reserved for membership and chairpersonship for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population in each constituency. It is here that political reservation has been started for women in the Indian democracy and the Constitution mandates at least one-third positions for them (Art 243D and Art 243T). Following Bihar, many a State has raised it to the mark of 50 percent, a little over-representation than their proportion in the population. Recently, the Union Cabinet has also decided to propose for an amendment in the Constitution to raise the reservation of seats to 50 percent in panchayats and municipalities. These reservations have a further complication. No single constituency can perpetually be represented exclusively by a woman candidate and likewise no particular chairpersonship can be assigned to a woman representative on a permanent basis. So, a rotational basis is evolved to carry out the provision of reservation, not based on residential dominance of the section. Government of India under different party coalitions made several attempts to make reservation of women in the Parliament and State Legislatures, but has failed so far. An articulation is now being attempted to show that it is not the removal of disabilities through Constitutional provisions, but creation of abilities through sensible affirmative action that intended results can be obtained even without invoking reservations which often provoke people against reservations. At the same time, it has to be noted, the same political parties which have favoured a higher representation of women in panchayats and municipalities are opposing this reservation in the House of People and Legislative Assemblies. Day will not be far away when there would be reservation for women in the Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies. However, with reservations in local governments, India has around one million women as panchayat members, more than the population of several countries. However, women are occupying only around 11 per cent seats in the present House of People, which has been steadily rising at least from the mid-eighties of the past century from 5.5 percent and before that the number fluctuated between 3.5 percent and 7.7 percent. The situation compares well with the same percentage in Japan, around 14 percent in France, Ireland and Russian Federation, 16 per cent in Italy as well as the US, and around 19 per cent in the UK and Switzerland. In our Council of States also women parliamentarians are around 10 percent. In many other countries where they have two houses, women representation is quite good as high as 40 percent. India is far below in the ranking of the countries in terms of percentage of women representatives. It is below 100! All our neighbours have done better, except Sri Lanka and Bhutan. To begin with it was in the Scandinavia that reservation/quota for women came up in the political parties as pressure from within. Their quota crosses the mark of one-third and reaches two-fifths in Sweden, Norway and Demark. In many modern States, some quota has been reserved for women in their national legislature. They vary from Argentina to South Africa, from Uganda to Tanzania Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 65 and Bangladesh, in some countries only notionally. Though there has been expressed some reservations in certain quarters by holding that ‘in some ways, quotas are a remedy to a disease, but in some ways they can lead to another disease’, but by and large such a move is considered progressive and inclusive and empowering. It appears that we will be able to make a law, in near future, for reservations for women, with quota for SC and ST women within it, in the House of People and the Legislative Assemblies. Cultural The Constitution of India has provided, in its Part III belonging to Fundamental Rights under section ‘Cultural and Educational Rights’ (Art 29 and Art 30), for protection of cultural and educational rights of the minorities and nondiscrimination in granting aid to educational institutions on the ground that its management is in the hands of a religious or linguistic minority. Also nobody shall be denied admission in the institutions run or aided by the State. There is also a provision in Part IV relating to Directive Principles of State Policy under Art 46 for the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections of people. Under Fundamental Rights dealing with non-discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent and place of birth and residence, Art 16 (5) guarantees that the affairs of a religious or denominational institution can be administrated by a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination. There are permanent Commissions to look after interest of the Linguistic Minorities, Women, the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and Religious Minorities. Recently, in pursuance of entry 15 mentioning ‘vagrancy, nomadic and migratory tribes’ in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, there has been constituted a National Commission for De-notified, Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Tribes. Economic Directive Principles of State Policy, the Part IV of the Constitution, though not enforceable by any court of law, are said to be ‘fundamental in the governance of the country and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws’ (Art 37). They are said to be forerunner of the UN Convention on Right to Development as an inalienable human right. These are the principles which make India a welfare State as is suggested in Art 38 that the State shall strive to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, echoing the Preamble, through ensuring that justice—social, economic and political—informs all the institutions of national life. In 1978 it was added that the State shall strive to minimize the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in 66 Journal of Social and Political Studies status, facilities and opportunities, not only among individuals but amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. Without using the modern phrase inclusion, it says a lot. Art 39, which accepts the primacy of private property and market forces, indicates the conditions for the State intervention. It specifically mentions equality among men and women about their right for adequate means to livelihood and equal pay for equal work. Art 39A, brought in as an amendment in 1976, provides for equal justice and free legal aid so that justice is not denied to anybody on account of economic or other disabilities. There are general indications for inclusion of men, women, children and workers, who are in need, in the matter of education, employment and public assistance, and there is a specific mention in Art 46 for promotion of the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, particularly of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under Art 275, the Union can provide each year from the Consolidated Fund of India such sums as grant-in-aid of the revenues of such States as may be in need of assistance to enable them to meet the costs of such schemes of development as are carried out to promote welfare of the Scheduled Tribes or to improve the level of administration of the Scheduled Areas. In pursuance of these provisions, one notices that there has been created in the Five Year Plans special component plan for Scheduled Castes since 1978 and Tribal Sub-Plan since 1976, wherein is placed 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent of total plan budget respectively for the purposes. They are at the disposal of National and State authorities created for development of SCs and STs. There have been established the National Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation in 1989 and (State) Scheduled Caste Corporations much before in 1978 as a Centrally Sponsored Scheme with 49:51 equity shares. In 1997 National Safai Karmachari Finance and Development Corporation was also established. For Scheduled Tribes there are again two bodies, viz., National Scheduled Tribes Finance and Development Corporation and Tribal Cooperative Marketing Development Federation of India. The National Backward Classes Finance and Development Corporation was also created in 1992 with an authorized capital of Rs 200 crore, further raised to Rs 700 crore and the National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation was constituted in 1994 with an authorized capital of Rs 500 crore. There are several schemes such as Post Matric Scholarship Scheme for Scheduled Castes (since 1944), Mahila Samriddhi Yojana (Women Prosperity Scheme), Adivasi Mahila Sashaktikaran Yojana (Tribal Women Empowerment Scheme), etc. There are exclusive Girls Schools, Girls Colleges and Women Polytechnics. There are several Gandhi, Ambedkar and Valmiki yojanas as well. Employment Employment and opportunity for employment is a crucial parameter in any society trying to transit from a feudal order to a capitalist order in the emerging Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 67 technological scenario. People are dispossessed of means of production and wage employment is scanty and whatever wage employment is available is in the informal sector where wages are quite low because the demand for the goods and services produced in that sector is generally low, and elastic. Most people are still in ‘forced’ self-employment, somehow making out their living, barring few professionals who by definition are part of informal sector. The State cannot normally force private employers for employment and wages at the same time in any economy, let alone in an economy where self-employment is the order and wage employment is at best intermittent and casual. Private organised sector is too small from the angle of employment as it employs barely two percent of the total labour force. Therefore, the State stipulates employment of people under its wings, where it is at most 5 to 6 percent. Accommodating huge number of aspirants in such a small opening is not possible and complications also arise because of competencies required for the jobs available. Therefore, there has occasionally been raised demand for reservation for weaker sections in private sector also, which is least likely to be finally conceded. Since there exists a general shortage of jobs, one talks of equalization of opportunity, which is supposed to be just enough. Under Fundamental Rights, Art 16 guarantees equality of opportunity to all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State and holds that no discrimination can be made on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, birthplace or residence for any employment or office under the State. The provision implies that if there is one vacancy and a hundred applicants, every applicant should stand equal chance of getting selected in the process of recruitment. However, in the same article, it is stipulated that nothing shall prevent the Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union Territory prior to such employment or appointment. So, discrimination can be built between two or more categories of employment (say class IV) and of people (say, domicile). Not only this, it further makes exception for the State to make provisions for the reservation of appointments or posts of any backward class of citizens, which in its opinion is not adequately represented in the services under the State. That is, jobs are reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward classes. Then, the principle of equality of opportunity of employment would be applicable within each class but not between classes. However, the facts of under-representation and backwardness of the castes/ classes did not prove adequate for promotion of SCs and STs in jobs and it had to be specifically provided for by insertion of Art 16 (4A) in 1995, which says, after amendment in 2001, ‘Nothing shall prevent the State from making provision for the reservation in matters of promotion of any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes which, 68 Journal of Social and Political Studies in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State’. A further clause (4B) in Art 16 was subsequently added in 2000 to cumulate un-filled posts in any year and carrying them forward in subsequent years. The Supreme Court of India had suggested a ceiling of 50 per cent for reservations of all categories and has indicated income criterion for creamy layer in the case of members of other backward classes. Art 16 (4B) makes it clear that 50 per cent ceiling will apply only for fresh vacancies caused, not to unfilled SC/ ST vacancies in the past. It is a duty of the State, under Art 46 of ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’, to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the citizens and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The same article also asks the State to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. In the Part XVI dealing with Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes, Art 335 maintains that the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. There is thus an issue of efficiency versus reservation. A recently introduced bill in the Council of States (on 23rd December, 2008), known as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation in Posts and Services) Bill restricts the reservation in 47 institutes of national importance to the lowest level of grade ‘A’ posts only. This has been seen by some quarters as a case of ‘apartheid’. There is a genuine concern that reservation in employment in the category A at all levels (Lecturer, Reader and Professor; Scientist at levels A, B, C, D, E, F, etc.) would compromise the quality of work that is expected of the organization. As of now there is reservation in the case of employment under the Government of India, generally speaking at entry level in all categories, 15.0 percent for the Scheduled Castes and 7.5 percent for the Scheduled Tribes, and 27.0 percent for the Other Backward Classes, thus totaling to 49.5 percent, over which there is supernumerary reservation of 3.0 percent for physically handicapped persons in all categories. The States are free to determine their own quota for the Other Backward Classes. Creamy layer’ of the OBC, defined by an income limit, is debarred from enjoying opportunities under reservation. Income is not a criterion for non-discrimination. Education The most significant ethos of the day and an important factor for equalizing opportunities in employment is understood to be education. Under Art 46, in Directive Principles of the State Policy, the State undertakes to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the citizens, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. There are scholarships, hostels, special coaching institutions, etc. for these sections, but Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 69 for a long time, there was no reservation in admission. Post-matric scholarship existed from 1944, pre-matric scholarship was introduced in 1977, remedial and special coaching to remove deficiencies in school subjects so as to help them enter professional and technical courses started in 1987 and Rajiv Gandhi Fellowship to help them pursue higher studies and research degrees was provided in 2005. They are given help to prepare for competitive examinations conducted by the Union Public Service Commission through coaching and hostel facilities. All this which is available to Scheduled Castes is also available to Scheduled Tribes. But in addition, for Scheduled Tribe students, there is a special focus for providing textbooks and uniforms and free tuition etc. Reservation in admission in most courses in all States is now available to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, and physically handicapped and to the Other Backward Classes in the institutions funded by the Union Government. Some differential treatment is also meted out to girls and women in the matter of education. In the wake of passage of Right to Education Bill in 2009, a good fillip is likely to be given to the provisions for scheduled and backward sections. Administrative In some way even administrative mechanism of ensuring inclusion has been provided for in the Constitution. It provides for, especially in the State of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, a Minister in charge of tribal welfare who may also be simultaneously in charge of the welfare of Scheduled Castes and backward classes. And there is specific provision for administration of Scheduled Areas and Tribal Areas and formation of autonomous State within Assam with full legislative and executive functions. Though there is no specific direction for the Union to create such ministries yet it has been over time creating several ministries to look after interests of vulnerable sections. To begin with there existed several divisions in the Ministry of Home Affairs to look after interests of excluded sections, like Scheduled Castes Development Division, Tribal Development Division and the Minorities and Backward Classes Welfare Division. The Ministry of Law had a Wakf Division. All these divisions were moved to form a Ministry of Welfare. Department of Woman and Child Development, which was a part of the Ministry of Human Resource Development created in 1985, with main constituent as the Department of Education, was made part of the Ministry of Welfare. The Ministry of Welfare had two main Departments: Department of Welfare and Department of Woman and Child Development. Department of Welfare was upgraded to the level of Ministry and renamed as Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment in 1998 while the Division of Tribal Development was taken out in 1999 and made the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. Minorities and Backward Classes Welfare Division/ Department was again divided in 2007. While there was created a Ministry of Minority Affairs in 2007, Backward Classes Welfare Division was retained in the 70 Journal of Social and Political Studies Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. Department of Woman and Child Development was also upgraded to the level of Ministry in 2006. Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment as the name suggests is to ensure equitable treatment to such sections of society who have suffered social inequalities, exploitation, discrimination and injustice. The Social Defence Bureau of the Ministry caters to the requirements of neglected and marginalized people, abandoned destitute, neglected and delinquent juveniles who need care and protection for want of support or are in conflict with the society or the law. The Disability Division is supposed to empower the physically handicapped. Current State of Affairs in Terms of Inclusion Finally, the taste of pudding is in eating. How were provisions in the Constitution implemented and how much resources—financial and administrative—were actually committed, and how well were they utilized? How were other sections of the society taken along? How was the morale of the people, excluded and marginalized, boosted? What was the end result in terms of outcomes? Political As far as political representation is concerned, we know that the Constitutional provision of reservation of seats exists for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes at all levels—national, state and local, including autonomous district/ regional councils and tribes advisory councils wherever they exist, are followed in toto. However, for women, constitutional provision is only at local level and it is strictly followed. There exists no reservation for other backward classes and their number is not exactly known as there is no constitutional order declaring castes/ classes in various States or parts thereof as is the case for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Various States have declared certain castes, including those among Muslims, as OBC but their number cannot be ascertained as the census does not enumerate people by caste. A variety of caste census is being attempted. There is no political reservation for them though they have emerged politically strong across the spectrum. The reservation for SC and ST was made to begin with for ten years only, but it has been extended time and again and currently it exists upto 2020, and before its expiry it is certain that it will be further extended. Their seats are reserved in proportion to their population at national, state and local level, as the case may be. There has been no deviation, and the provision was implemented in toto. The Constitution has made provision of reservation of at least 33 percent of the seats for women in each type and level of local government. The State of Bihar reserved 50 per cent seats for women and following Bihar, many other States have also enhanced the reservation quota. The Government of India is also contemplating an amendment for raising the quota from one-third to half of the seats at local level. The most important fact in this context is that political Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 71 reservation at local level is permanent, as against at other levels. It has also been implemented in toto. Women are increasingly coming to the legislatures, thanks to societal understanding. Their number has increased from 5.5 per cent in Ninth Lok Sabha to 11.0 percent in Fifteenth Lok Sabha, which is one-third (or less) of what Scandinavian countries have for women but about two-thirds of what other developed countries may have but more than what many other countries have fixed for women. We have at the moment a woman President and a woman Speaker in the House of People. We did have a woman Prime Minister earlier. We have been having woman Chief Ministers, Governors, Ministers and Legislators at all levels across the country. Other Backward Classes have politically done quite well. They have come on their own. They may be even over-represented in terms of their numerical strength, as legislators, if not as ministers. Practically every religion and caste/tribe group had at some point of time occupied one or the other top constitutional/political position. Even today the President is a Hindu, the Vice- President is a Muslim and the Prime Minister is a Sikh. And they are there often by their merit. No negative discrimination has been done to them on the grounds of race, religion, caste or gender. Education What is there in terms of education? Literacy is the simplest case to reckon with, which has been attempted through formal and non-formal institutions. We find from the following Table 1 that literacy level has increased from mere one-sixth in 1951 to about two-thirds in 2001, while the number of illiterates exceeded that of literates till 1990 or so. The SCs and STs still do not fare that well though increase in their proportion is somewhat better due to the efforts made by the State. It is true that the differences between overall literacy rate and those of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have increasingly come down. But, it is a sorry state of affairs that literacy rate, with so much modern value attached, was not still 2/3rds by 2001. It has improved to 74 by the census in 2011 for the country as a whole and that for weaker sections to cross the mark of 65 percent and 60 percent respectively. But when we study literacy by religion across gender in Table 2, we observe that Muslims are the least literate and Christians are the most literate, followed by Buddhists and Sikhs. The disparity between male and female is the least among Christians followed by Sikhs while it is the worst among Hindus followed by Muslims. It is, in general, a reflection of prosperity and poverty and, of course, of culture and exposure. It seems that situation would have been far worse had the promotional measures not been undertaken. Journal of Social and Political Studies 72 Table 1: Literacy Rates of SC and ST and Changes Over Time (in percent)* 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 All SC ST Difference SC Difference ST Ratio SC Ratio ST 16.7 24.0 29.5 36.2 52.2 64.8 10.2 14.7 21.4 37.4 54.7 08.5 11.3 16.4 29.6 47.1 13.8 14.8 14.9 14.8 10.1 15.5 18.2 19.9 22.6 17.7 42.7 49.5 59.0 71.7 84.4 35.5 38.4 45.1 56.7 72.7 SC=Scheduled Castes; ST=Scheduled Tribes * Difference in Percent Points Table 2: Literacy Rates Across Religion in 2001 (in percent) Religion Male Female Persons Male-Female All Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist 75.4 77.8 67.6 84.4 75.2 83.1 53.7 54.7 50.1 76.2 63.1 61.7 64.8 66.2 59.1 80.3 69.4 72.7 21.7 23.1 17.5 08.2 12.1 21.4 Female/Male 71.2 70.3 74.1 90.3 83.9 74.2 M-F = Percent point difference between male and female literacy rates; F/M= Ratio of female literacy rate to male literacy rate, in percent. Economic People’s life depends a lot on how they are employed. Despite the fact that India is presently growing fast and contribution of its agriculture has fallen below 17 per cent, a preponderant majority, close to two-thirds, of labour force is still working in the agriculture sector either as self-employed cultivators or as agricultural wage labour insofar as its rural scene is concerned. More than 76 percent of SC labour force and 85 percent of ST labour force is still on farms. The major difference between the three categories is the division between cultivators and agriculture wage labour though, given the fact that more than three-fourth holdings are small and marginal, they are all labourers. For appreciating the division, we may peruse the following Table 3. Table 3: Participation Rate of Population and Distribution of Workers in 2001 (in percent) Participation Rate of Population Workers as Cultivators Workers as Agr Labour All SC ST All SC ST All SC ST India 39.10 40.41 49.06 31.65 19.99 44.71 26.55 45.61 36.85 Rural 41.75 42.50 50.37 40.24 23.47 47.07 33.05 52.23 38.37 Urban 32.75 33.14 34.56 02.81 01.76 06.55 04.71 11.03 12.38 While all workers are divided in the ratio of 5:4 as cultivators and agricultural labour in rural areas, where all workers include all religions and all forward and backward classes/castes, the Scheduled Caste workers are divided in the ratio of Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 73 5:11 and the Scheduled Tribes workers are in the ratio of 5:4 again. Scheduled Caste people are most dispossessed of land. This is the rural scene. Urban scene is different: the ST in the ratio of 1:2, the SC in 1:6, and all in 3:5. But again, Scheduled Castes people are most dispossessed of land though land may not be the most important possession in the cities. But does ownership mean much? Not, much. Let us look at the poverty incidence by social division for which data is readily available. When compared to all population, the STs are worse off than the SCs in rural areas though they are better off in terms of land possession. The order of poverty incidence is just reverse in urban areas. When we concentrate on change between 2004-05 and 1993-94 (that is, during the years of so-called liberalization) reduction in poverty rate is better in the case of the Scheduled Castes irrespective of the area of residence (rural: 11 percent points, and urban: 10 percent points), while the Scheduled Tribes do not do better whether in rural areas (less than 8 percent points) or in urban areas (less than 8 percent points). If the STs fare better in urban areas (7.8 percent points) than the aggregate (6.7 percent points) their number is not large. Further, the gap between ‘all’ and ‘STs’ has increased between 1993-94 and 200405. See the following Table 4. Table 4: Poverty Head Count Ratios (in percent) and Differences and Reduction (in percent points) All Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Difference: All-SC Difference: All-ST 1993-94 Rural 1993-94 Urban 2004-05 Rural 2004-05 Urban 37.2 48.1 51.9 10.9 14.6 32.4 49.5 41.1 17.1 09.8 28.3 36.8 47.3 08.5 19.0 25.7 39.9 33.3 14.2 07.6 Reduction Rural Urban 09.0 11.3 04.6 02.3 - 04.4 06.7 09.6 07.8 02.8 01.1 Employment For economic well-being, but more importantly for status, in India, government jobs matter a lot, particularly for those who are very well-off. The Constitution provided, to begin with, two things: political representation in legislative bodies without exceptions and job reservation in government employment with some riders. Other things were added later. It is worth having a look at the job position in the government. Our database supports information about the employment in the Government of India. But similar and a better position exists in the case of employment under the State Governments including their parastatal bodies, if we cannot say the same about local governments. For 2004, we also have information on the other backward classes as well. First, let us see how the composition is across groups in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Journal of Social and Political Studies 74 Table 5: Employment of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Government of India Group A B 1994 1999 All SC ST 59016 6046 1727 103198 12442 All 2004 SC 93520 10558 2902 104963 13306 ST All OBC* SC ST 3172 80011 3088 9744 3311 3512 135409 3127 19602 6274 C 2381613 374758 128228 239426 378115 145482 2040970 106334 344865 136630 D 1023285 209423 62945 949353 189761 66487 802116 26149 147212 53776 Total 3567112 602670 195802 3544262 591740 218653 3058506 138698 521423 199991 *Backward calculations. We observe from Table 6 that proportion of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribe employees in each category of service under the Government of India is improving except in the D category where the Scheduled Castes are a bit over-represented while the Scheduled Tribes are under-represented. There is some moderation in D group in the proportion of Scheduled Castes in last ten years and Scheduled Tribes in last five years. In the government jobs as a whole, their proportions have reached or are reaching their share in population despite lag in literacy/education. Other backward classes are dismally represented in bureaucracy—the best they do is in the C category followed by that in the A category. We can note that in politics they seem to be doing quite well on their own without reservation. Table 6: Share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in the Employment in Government of India (in per cent) Group 1994 1999 2004 OBC SC ST OBC SC ST OBC SC ST A B C D - 10.24 12.06 15.74 20.47 2.93 2.81 5.38 6.15 - 11.29 12.68 15.78 19.99 3.39 3.35 6.07 7.00 3.86 2.31 5.21 3.26 12.18 14.48 16.90 18.35 4.14 4.63 6.69 6.70 Total - 16.90 5.49 - 16.70 6.17 4.53 17.05 6.54 How is each group (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) distributed across categories? Most of the employees are in C group and their proportion is staying put and more than three-quarters of OBC employees are in this group while in the case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes employees are in the vicinity of two-thirds as is the overall composition. It implies that general category is little less represented. Group D is coming down across the social categories while shares of groups A and B is improving. OBC is less represented in group B than SC/ST while they are doing better in group A, suggesting a little better representation of general category. It may be noted that though OBC are numerically fewer in government jobs their own composition on the better side. See Table 7. Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 75 Table7: Share of SC, ST and All in Government Employment (in percent) Group 1994 1999 2004 All SC ST All SC ST All OBC SC ST A 1.65 1.00 0.88 2.64 1.78 1.45 2.62 2.22 1.87 1.66 B 2.89 2.06 1.48 2.96 2.25 1.61 4.43 2.25 3.67 3.14 C 66.77 62.18 65.49 67.61 63.90 66.54 66.73 76.66 66.14 68.32 D 28.69 34.75 32.15 26.79 32.07 30.41 26.23 18.85 28.23 26.89 One side window we can afford to open here is that share of employees in A plus B categories is improving largely at the cost of D category employees while that of the C categories remains almost constant at 2/3rds. Calculations can be made from Table 4 where one can observe that the number of employees in groups A and B is on increase whereas that of those in groups C and D is on decrease. However, all euphoria evaporates when one notices in Table 5 stagnancy in number of all employees between 1994 and 1999 and attrition in absolute numbers in 2004 over 1999. Five lakh less people, from 35 lakh to 30 lakh, are in the Union government jobs. That is a reduction of around 15 percent in number of employees in the employ of Government of India. That is the impact of downsizing and rightsizing policies given effect to during this period. Had there been increase in private sector, we might have ignored the attrition. But the fact is in terms of employment, organized/corporate sector is not performing well. There is a tremendous work load and pressure on young generation in certain sectors of the corporate world. If we move down from job-less to job-loss scenario, inclusion policies will suffer a great blow. Reservation has much meaning when there is accretion in jobs but it loses significance when there is absolute attrition in the face of increase in the size of labour force. Sphere of wage employment, which frees one from a variety of bondage, has to increase in the present circumstances. This scenario is expected to be reflective of the government employment in general though our database is limited to Union Government, except in the North East States where major employment is in the government sector. We can recall when Dadabhai Naoroji studied poverty, he did not blame the distribution but the lack of growth due to British drain policy. Likewise, talk of inclusion loses significance if opportunities are shrinking. Ensuring equality of opportunity is not enough, growth of opportunities is even more important. If recruitment is zero, 100 percent reservation is useless. If, on the other hand, recruitment increases by 10 per cent instead of 5 percent, a little more than half the stipulated reservation will work better. Conclusion Social inclusion of excluded, partially excluded and secluded communities and groups in secular domain of societal processes of political and economic 76 Journal of Social and Political Studies significance has been attempted in India without intrusion in the privacy domain. Given the diversity and plurality that makes India, it was not an easy task to carry out inclusion agenda because removing disparity at times bumps into some notion of diversity and plurality. There has been a broad consensus about pursuing a course of harmony without imposition of homogenization and unity without imposition of uniformity of any kind, rather preserving diversity and plurality, yet doing away with or at least moderating the magnitude of disparities. However, it should be noted that in economic field we have done away with, along with the rest of the world, the idea of reducing disparity (often called inequality) and concentrated on poverty and in political and social arena we are stuck with reducing disparities. It means we shall not make attempt to do away with economic disparities but shall make attempt to do away with social disparities. In a way that is what existence of capitalist economic order and political democratic dispensation calls for! However, we are also witnessing interest, in countries like India, in reducing what has come to be known as horizontal disparity but losing interest in vertical inequality. Reduction in vertical inequality was no guarantee of reduction in horizontal inequality but overly emphasis on reducing horizontal inequality sans vertical inequality will not go a long way. Yet, on balance, social inclusion has improved—partly by autonomous movement of society and partly by State activism. India as a State pursued Ambedkar line and perpetuated by practice political reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Lower House of the Parliament and Legislative assemblies, which was a temporary arrangement in Ambedkar formulation. When it came to reservation in local government, it was made permanent in the same Constitution. Reservation for women in local government is at least one third of the total seats of members in each local government and of total number of chairpersonships in the State. But there is no reservation for women in the Parliament or State Legislature. Political success in what was proposed in the Constitution is total. In the civil matters success is more than half of the completed journey. In educational and economic matters the success is far from satisfactory. But it is not only in the case of excluded groups alone, but even in the case of so-called included. The State of India does face backlashes and clashes on reservation count. For long growth of the economy and employment was very sluggish, but good enough not to badly impact on population growth. Now, when rate of growth of the economy has picked up fast and population growth is stabilizing, employment elasticity is on a declining curve. Neither employment growth is picking up nor is the quality of employment, in terms of productivity improvement. Reduction of poverty though a bit higher for excluded sections, is not big enough to give a feeling of inclusion to those who were traditionally excluded, yet causing a feeling of exclusion in those who are supposedly included. In economic sphere, India seems to have been playing a zero-sum game leaving people on both the side of inclusion-exclusion line dissatisfied. The real challenge Social Inclusion through Exclusive Provisions in India 77 for India is to turn economic games into positive-sum ones so that fruits in terms of job and livelihood reach everyone. Jobs just do not entitle an individual for livelihood, but also empower him/her socially and psychologically. Equality of opportunity which reservation policy seems to be promoting at best should be construed as an assignment problem of who gets what rather than an allocation problem in which some get and some do not. Unfortunately, that is not happening as employment is formulated as a derivative of growth strategy which looks for acceleration per se. Of late, realizing the failure of growth process to translate into employment of the socially excluded and exclusion of the socially included we have attempted strategy of inclusive growth in the recent past. Preliminary results are not very encouraging. (Acknowledgement: Revised version of a paper read in a SAARC Regional Workshop on Social Inclusion Policies of the State: Experience and Challenges organized by Centre for Nepalese and Asian Studies, Tribhuban University, Kathmandu. The author would like to thank the organizers, particularly Nirmal Man Tuladhar and Mrigendra Bahadur Karki, who invited him to participate in the workshop and fellow participants who made fruitful observations and comments, some of which could be incorporated in the revision of the draft. The author was also benefited from the general discussion that took place in the workshop. The author would also like to thank Dr. Geeta Chaubey, Dr. D.P. Sharma and Dr. Sushma Yadav who went through the draft for revision and offered critical suggestions for improvement. However, the author alone is responsible for lacunae, gaps and weaknesses that the paper might inhere.) REFERENCES Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, The Constitution of India, various editions. Planning Commission, Government of India, Eleventh Five Year Plan 2007-2012 Volume I: Inclusive Growth, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, India, 2008. Publication Division, Government of India, India: A Reference Annual, various issues. Internet websites. APPENDIX Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes The word ‘scheduled’ in the context of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Areas is little confusing to many scholars. Therefore, the following explanation is offered. There are twelve schedules in the Constitution of India, two of which viz., the Fifth and Sixth Schedules refer to similar matter. While the Fifth Schedule provides for a Tribal Advisory Council in a State with Scheduled Areas and also in a State with Scheduled Tribes but not Scheduled Areas, the Sixth Schedule provides for administration of the Tribal Areas, each with autonomous District Council and Regional Councils if there are different Scheduled Tribes, with powers to make laws in respect of certain matters, in certain States like Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. In the latter schedule, there is a Table with parts showing 78 Journal of Social and Political Studies certain Districts as Tribal Areas. However, the word ‘scheduled’ in the above three expressions has nothing to do with these twelve schedules except that matters related to ‘Scheduled’ Areas are dealt with in the Fifth Schedule. In short, word ‘scheduled’ is different than a ‘schedule’ of the Constitution. Some of the Constitutional schedules are not in a strictly scheduler form. Some scholars have unfortunately attributed existence of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to schedules appended to the main Constitution. The President is supposed to issue an order, under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution dealing with Part X, to declare the certain areas as Scheduled Areas. By the Constitutional Order No. 9 issued on 26th January 1950, the President actually declared four areas in Bihar, now in Jharkhand; ten areas in Bombay, now in Gujarat; eleven areas in Madhya Pradesh, now in Chhattisgarh except one that is in Maharashtra; and two in Madras, now one in Andhra Pradesh and one is Lakshadweep; two in Orissa; and one in Punjab, which is now in Himachal Pradesh. They were all listed under the relevant State. Article 366 of the Constitution gives definitions of certain terms, which include Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Scheduled Castes are defined as castes, races, tribes or parts of, or groups within, such castes, races, tribes as are deemed under Article 341 which empowers the President to specify with respect to a State (in consultation with the Governor) or a Union Territory by public notification. Likewise Scheduled Tribes are defined as tribes or tribal communities or parts of, or groups within, such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under Art 342 which empowers the President to specify with respect to a State (in consultation with the Governor) or a Union Territory by public notification. These notifications are called Constitutional Orders. The Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, numbering 19 was issued on 10th August 1950 and the Constitutional (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950, numbering 22, was issued on 6th September 1950, supplemented by the Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) (Union Territories) Order 1951, numbering 32, issued on 20th September 1951 and the Constitutional (Scheduled Castes) (Union Territories) Order 1951, numbering 33, issued on 20th September 1951. Of course, the words Union Territories were substituted for other words as certain category of States were redesignated as Union territories in 1956 only. Both of the sets of orders were modified and amended several times only to include more castes and tribes or enumerate them under the newly formed/carved out States. The word ‘scheduled’ has origin in Government of India Act of 1935, in which Depressed Classes were given these ‘neutral’ expressions. Gandhi used to call the people belonging to lower castes as Harijan, a term earlier used for Brahmins say writers like saint Tulsidas. Since most of tribal people used to live on the hills, they were given a term of Girijan by certain scholars. Word ‘depressed’ was the translation of Hindi/Marathi word ‘Dalit’, which is emerging in recent years in literature and is subsuming both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; but the adjective is getting attached with Muslims and Christians as well. Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 79 State and Talent: Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System I.D. Mishra This is a modest attempt to understand the relations between state and talent. Talent as determinant of state capacity is of the highest significance both for the individuals and the state itself. It is the intrinsic worth of a person and the potential strength of a state. Talent, if misconstrued and manipulated, weakens the state and deprives its individuals from their due. Cunningness, tricking, dishonesty, intolerance, hatred, violence are alien to talent and therefore can not formulate the contours of talent. Any policy or behaviour which encourage the above one are the worst of animality to enter in to the arena of humanity. Individuals, society and state can never be safe if either of the above makes any space for itself in talent search scheme at any levels, i.e. from formative stage to competitive stage and finally at the stage of governance. We have viewed this problem in India’s context and have drawn the line of framework to explore the notion of talent and its relations with state. Statement of the Problem1 India as a state is the background in which the talent search scheme has to be functional. This involves two basic problems. First, searching the talent of the candidate in person, and second, searching the talent of the person in relation to the state. Since India as a state consists of citizens living there in, every candidate whether a citizen or prospective citizen, has the right to be searched out the talent he/she possesses. This hidden but vital background appears to be missing through out the national curriculum. Therefore, the scheme is to be desired to be evolved where the talent of every prospective candidate, as far as possible, be searched and recognized in the field he/ she is comparatively more potential of, and the state in the background of the talents deserving its due must be reckoned with its share in the process of contributions from talent. In view of this probability, the National institutions like NCERT can endeavour in evolving such system which could effectively enlarge and decentralize its area so as to extend the benefit of the curriculum to the people living in the backward rural and remote areas. In fact the ideal situation is where every learner must know one’s own talent and the opportunities to develop it. But one can find a different situations where scope remains narrowed, and opportunities remain limited to comparatively a small number. It has been observed on an average that the beneficiaries under the present scheme are those who come from elite schools. The students in majority from rural areas and low income groups can not afford to study in such schools. Therefore, these students in general lag behind in competitive race than those 80 Journal of Social and Political Studies who have been educated in elite schools and have acquired technical efficiency through training and coaching systems. Consequently students who are more trained and know more tricks remain in advantageous position than those who are less trained and are unaware of the tricks. Hence, necessity is to devise such modalities to improve the existing schemes and practices which could help search out the natural/potential talents of the maximum number as far as possible. The fallacies lie in our co-relation to talent and its core components. We bring to our notice some of these problems for exploration and exposition to the core areas of talent. Talent- Merit Relationships: Paradigm Shift Talent and merit are sometimes used interchangeably. Talent measured and recognized is known as merit. Indeed, these are the two different words with two different meanings. Merit is a comparative concept—one’s merit in comparison to the other. It is a ranking system. Ranks are provided to the individual competitors. It means merit is hierarchy of ranks and talent is evaluated as ranked merit. It acknowledges, therefore, the incompleteness of the person in the merit which is sandwiched between superiority and inferiority paradigm. One is superior to the other within the formula evolved. Moreover, it also creates frustrations among those who are ranked below and those who are excluded from the merit. This is good neither for state nor for democracy. It leads us to say that talent as merit is shift of paradigm which requires reconsideration to mark a difference. We propose here some paradigms to explore the notion of talent and its significance. The purpose is to hint about the short comings the talent search schemes at different levels have. Q-R Paradigm of Talent In this formula questions are the monopoly of evaluators where as ‘response’ is the candidates’ exclusive opportunities. Although this is a way to test/evaluate the context, this cannot claim to be comprehensive one. First, questions are the mechanized pattern to which the respondents have to interact. This means talent is = Q (Question) + R (Response). In this system Q(Question) remains always Q and R (Response- Respondents) always ‘R.’ This means ‘Q’ excludes from itself the opportunities of ‘R’ and ‘R’ excludes from itself the opportunities of ‘Q’. Therefore, at least ‘R’ which is in the process of evaluation, is partly evaluated as ‘R’ and not as ‘Q’. An argument in this reference is that ‘Q’ involves ‘R’ and ‘R’ involves ‘Q’ otherwise ‘Q’ will cease its merit as ‘Q’ and ‘R’ will also cease its merit as ‘R’. ‘R’ becomes functional only when it interacts with ‘Q’ and reaches its centre. Similarly ‘Q’ becomes functional only when it attracts the ‘R’ to interact with it and finally dissolves in to ’R’ when properly interacted. In this process the space between ‘Q’ and ‘R’ is reduced to be merged with each-other. Here ‘Q’ as ‘R’ should be formulated/ detailed or explained as such that ‘R’ as ‘Q’ may be able to formulate it as question. In this process answer is given as description of the problem from which the questions are required to be raised. Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 81 But in the existing system, we find that ‘Q’ is deprived of the ‘R’’s right, as well as ‘R’ is deprived of ‘Q’’s right. Unless at least ‘R’ has also the right to ‘Q’, one of the basic properties of talent remains veiled. This property is inquisitiveness, a quality of the mind which has been discussed later on at appropriate places. Second, evaluation of talent, based on question-response formula is indeed the evaluation of question-response and not the evaluation of respondent. In system of evaluation of subject as respondent, it is for the candidate to demonstrate himself/herself as potential doer as well as capable of introspecting his/her potentialities. Since candidate as a subject is not static being, but potential prospective doer, it is necessary for the person concerned, that he/she should introspect himself/herself and his/her introspection-ability must be tested or searched. We have discussed it at appropriate place. Thirdly, questions under the Mental Ability Test (MAT) category are asked generally of puzzles type. But ‘puzzle’ is one of the modes and not the total modes. In puzzle, a situation in complication (or complicated situation) is presented to which mind is to interact and find the expected solution. Complication is a negative situation in which the candidate is placed. The argument is that the application of mind to respond to negative situations may demonstrate one version of its talent, the next version i.e. application of mind in the positive situation remains neglected and thus, out of the scope for testing. Hence, the functioning of mind in positive (stressless) situations also requires to be tested in order to compare the capacity of mind both in negative and positive situations. Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is based on information based test of the aptitude and application of the mind. In this test, the items used ‘aim at measuring the knowledge of the subject area besides assessing the ability to apply that knowledge to solve new problems.’2 According to this guideline the evaluator (test) can use/ exercise as many options as it be thought fit to fulfill the above target of the National Talent Search ( NTS) curriculum. Since, the evaluator does not include cognitive test, test of analytical and comparative capability, use of inductive-deductive method, it is suggested that these aspects are required inclusion in scholastic test. We have observed, especially, in interview that the candidates doing well theoretically are unable to cognize the problems (including the things/ objects) they are speaking about. Besides, knowledge as an usable perspective .i.e. applicability of knowledge to solving the problem may also constitute the theme for formulation of questions for evaluation. F-I paradigms of Talent We now shift over the another important paradigms of talent. It may be named as the ‘F-I paradigm of talent’. Two questions are involved here. First, what is talent? Second, what is ‘F-I’ paradigm. These are the basic question to understand. To begin with the first, it has already been mentioned above that talent is the intrinsic worth of a person. It is potential capability to respond to the situations in right direction.3 This capacity is determined by four ‘I’s which need three ‘F’s 82 Journal of Social and Political Studies for their reflections. Thus we can say it as ‘F-I’ paradigm to evaluate the level of talent in a person. ‘F’ is the state of conditions of mind where ‘I’ as talent can function. This state of condition of mind is ‘fearlessness’, ‘freshness’ and ‘fertility’. In other words this can be explained as ‘fearless mind, ‘fresh mind’ and ‘ fertile mind’. ‘I’ stands for four intrinsic and inherent qualities of mind, viz. inquisitiveness and intuitive, informative one, intelligence and introspection ability.4 These four areas of mind may be used to describe as inquisitive and intuitive mind, informative mind, intelligent mind and introspective mind. These core areas of mind along with its three prior state of conditions constitute the datum of talent. We would come to explain it later on. First of all, we must elaborate the notion of talent from another angle as this would help outlining the basic elements involved in it. Since candidate’s response is object of evaluation, the candidate is the subject as well object in the whole process of evaluation. S-R paradigm of Talent Response to what means response to situations. Thus situation is stimuli to which candidate responds. Prior to response is required to explore the structure of situations. Hence, person’s response to the situation is subject of evaluation. If the response is not in the right direction, then question for evaluation is the methods, technique/skill being used by the person. From the above four things emerge, First, potentiality or capability of person in evaluation; second, situation in which the candidate is placed; third, the response or behaviour of the person; and fourth, appropriateness of candidate’s response or behaviour in right direction. These four segments define the contours of talent which are to be searched. Among the four, the first one .i.e. person in evaluation is in the centre, and the rest three are meant for evaluating the person. In fact, the last three are the objects which reflect the subject in proportion to its relationship and the nature there of. This subjectification of object and vice-versa presents itself as an index of talent. Objectification of subject places the candidate in the whole situation as a conscious object which can adjust, readjust or explore itself, subject to the performance of the talent. This subject-object unification can be evaluated in talent search scheme. Any problem as such is an object to which a subject is attracted for response. What does and how does the candidate respond, are the basic guidelines to search out the talent. This is one dimension of searching out the talent. Since the candidate in the evaluation process may be of different age groups, the evaluators are required to handle the persons and process in a way to protect them from any harm. Situation is another important factor in the process of evaluation. Thus, one can prepare the situations index for searching and evaluating the talent. Situation is a background in which one is placed. It is, therefore, indispensable to one’s existence. How to interact with situation is thus one paradigm to be put before Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 83 the person whose talent is to be searched. This may be big or bigger situation as well as small or smaller situation. Evaluation process prepares situations with questions representing problems for responses. Talent is to explore the situation and respond to it in right direction. If situations are problematic, talent is required to respond to them so as they could be converged in to meaningful situations and usages. If situations are to be promoted/improved for better usages, talent is required to be applied for exploring the best out of them. The searching out of inherent qualities or intrinsic worth of situation as an object depends on the talent of the searcher. It is this content of enquiry, the NTS needs to be reviewed and assessed. Direction of response is another component of evaluation. The nature of response and its direction may tell about the talent one possesses. Response is a behaviour of person. It is a link between the subject and object .i.e. between respondent and the situation. It is reflective of talent of personality as well as the rate of its success. In one way response determines the intelligence, and skill both. It also includes the communicative skill. Minds and Talent: Exploring the Core Areas Within the above contours of talent, the core areas of mind may include the following: 1. Inquisitive and intuitive mind 2. Informative mind 3. Intelligent and imaginative mind 4. Introspective mind There is no harm if we treat these areas as functions of mind. In evaluating the talent of one’s mind, the functions of mind in these paradigms may be evaluated. But before casting one’s judgment one must know what mind and its core areas mean. The western classical philosophy prioritizes mind and its realm***. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Martin Heidegger, and many other well known philosophers have considered mind as the abode of thought developed through the process of reasoning-imaginatively, intuitively, speculatively, empirically and practically either way or as a whole. The six Indian Philosophy, known as Khad darshan,is a wonderful exposition to understand the notion of mind- both as eternal and temporal. It is neither possible nor appropriate in this modest attempt to ponder in to this high level exposition and illumination. However, we refer here in substance the functions of mind as follows: i Manas—it is the sensory, processing mind; ii. Chitta—Storage of impression iii. Ahamkar—‘I’-maker of ego iv. Buddhi—knows, decides, judges, and discrimination 84 Journal of Social and Political Studies Human mind, in nut shell, ‘is the complex of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, thinking, reasoning, perception and judgment.’ We can understand the mind by observing its functioning, first, ‘by observing mind through actions and speech’, and second, ‘by observing thinking process within at the moment operating, independently and as they interact.’ Inquisitive and Intuitive Mind: Testing and Learning Method The first criterion of searching and evaluating the talent is to see whether the person’s mind is inquisitive one. Inquisitiveness is known by one’s quest for knowledge. It means ‘eager to know’/‘apt to ask questions.’ It is ‘curious ‘mind.5 It could be observed whether the person in the process of evaluation is capable of raising the basic questions. It could be applied both in MAT and SAT. The inquisitiveness may be tested both in the written and interview modes of examination. For example, a situation described in piece of writing as paragraph may be included in the questions-booklet and the examinee should be asked to raise as many questions as possible within the stipulated time. In the process of evaluation, the evaluator could see whether those questions were basic, reflecting to the quest of mind or were superficial one. In interview schedule also the inquisitiveness of mind could be tested by allowing the person to raise question related to the situations provided to the examinee. The examinee should raise situations based questions and the answer or counter questions be produced by the members of the Board. This would help the examinees two ways. First, the candidates’ inquisitive mind would be evaluated, and second, he/she would also learn the contents and size of answer as well as skill to response. In short, this method would provide opportunities both for testing inquisitiveness and learning answers. Of course, this would need more rigorous effort from the interviewers than the interviewee. The interviewer should be well read and trained in the use of this methodology. Another aspect of inquisitive mind is its contemplative nature. The candidate’s ability to contemplate on the basic question/problem is the concern of evaluation. But how to know whether one’s mind is contemplative one. For this sort of exploring the contemplative nature of mind, for example, the evaluator can ask questions, ‘Does he/she have any query in mind? Do these queries have any further queries’? Do these queries constitute the fundamental problem/question? One may also raise such questions as what does press his/her mind to think about? The basic questions to explore the contemplation ability may be formulated on the basis of response/interaction with the candidate. This however, is possible in the interview schedule only. It is also possible to explore contemplative mind through some other modes. Such modes may include essay writing, paragraph writing, precise writing through which it may be possible to explore what the candidate thinks. Whether mind is argumentative in contemplative process is then the point to be searched. Although Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 85 contemplation and imagination are sometimes interchangeably used, the meaning and context of these two words differ. Contemplation is reasoning process involving logic. In other words, it is argumentative process of mind which may use its imaginative power as well to advance its argument. However, imagination is the flight of mind .i.e. forming image out of the situations with or without concrete reality. In other words the imagined being does not exist in concrete reality when one is in the process of imagination. Informative Mind Another important aspect of exploring the talent is to see whether the mind is informative one. Its purpose is to know whether the examinee has adequate and proper information about anything raised before the candidate. One of the major points to be covered in the system is to know about candidates’ power of understanding, explanation, interpretation, examination and application, orientation and aptitude. Besides testing the applicability of acquired information based knowledge to solving the problems and other purposes as mentioned in the NTS brochure, the following may be added to improve the evaluation process. 1. Testing the range of information and interest areas, 2. Testing the authenticity of information and its sources, 3. Retention capability and memory, 4. Testing the communicative skill and, 5. Testing the capability of analysis, comparison, criticism, judgment and application. Test of Intelligence One of the above core areas of functioning of mind is intelligence. Intelligence is the genetic response to the situations and problems. However,it reflects an over all state of conditions of mind and, therefore, covers the test of the following major areas: i. Intuitive, imaginative and speculative mind, ii. Receptive capability of mind, iii. Quickness in receiving the problem and response to the problem, iv. Testing the capability of judgment and its relevance and significance, and v. Testing the ability to reduce the gap (space) between the problems and their solutions in terms of times and methods. Intelligence as an over all state of conditions of talent needs evaluated within the above major points. Since we have given the resumed perceptions of imagination and speculation in the preceding pages, it is not desirable to repeat them. However, reflection on the content of intuition requires a bit explanation. ‘Intuition is the power of the mind by which it immediately perceives the truth of things without reason or analysis. It is immediate knowledge in contrast with the mediate.’6 The 86 Journal of Social and Political Studies intuitive mind is the ability of introspection and direct apprehension. In fact, spirituality7 is the ground on which intuitive mind functions. Test of Introspection—Ability Searching the talent and its evaluation must consist of testing the introspection ability. It is act of observing directly the process of one’s own mind; a view of the inside or interior’8 self-Introspection ability consists of self cognition (i.e. cognition of self capability), self awareness, self criticism and self evaluation. It implies the test of inner vigilance and introspection of the self and its performance. It includes the introspection of the goal, capability, performance, errors and mistakes as well as will to correct and search the probability to improve. In short, the National Talent Search Scheme should be designed to test the aforesaid core areas of mind. Since, talent is total personality of a person, the test scheme should be at least designed to examine, evaluate and measure the total areas of mind and its perform ability. Significance of Talent for the State We assume that talent is the potential quality of a state. It is the fixture of statehood and its quality. It may appear strange and unconventional to relate state with talent and vice-versa. The relationship is, however, inherent and potent, and thus natural. Since state is ‘writ large’ of individual, it possesses the same qualities the individual possesses. From this perspective talent is the inherent qualities of individuals and their social groups which compose state and make it strengthful or fragile, in accordance with the placement of talent in the state system. We may hold the assumptions of relationships otherwise as well. Aristotle’s perception of state as prior to individual is of much relevance in the present context. State which provides opportunities to individuals to magnify their ‘selves’ imply two things. First, state, as supreme moral institution posseses all infrastructures to help individuals grow and develop their potentials. State as such is supposed to be the most talented institution, above individuals, their groups, society and all other institutions, as it helps grow individuals their intrinsic talent and worth, appropriate for themselves and the state as a whole. ‘State as collective talent’ is superior to individuals and their groups, at least in the sense it understands the basic questions and their solutions. This is how state and individuals are interrelated by talents. Second, it is all impossible for individuals to develop themselves without state. Individuals explore their potentialities and use them in the state itself. One’s individuality is marked by the talent, one possesses and explores within the state .i.e. ‘collective talent’. Consequently, individual in relation to state explores and individualises potentiality and utilizes it within the state’s collective purpose, albeit the talent personified individually remains inclusive for itself. Since, worth of a system is determined by the talent being used, it holds the supreme significance for its worth while functioning. Thus, talent is supreme Exploring the Dynamics of Talent and Significance in the State System 87 capability of state which can be used for the full expression of its ‘beings’ in the process of ‘becoming’. We can evaluate a system by talent—merit approach. If the approach is adopted and followed properly, it may make a system qualitatively better. For example in India’s case the systemic ideals mirrored in the constitution could be achieved successfully. Sovereignty, democracy, socialism, secularism etc. may be virtually functional in expression of their substantial and vital notions, provided the notion of talent is well defined in its inherent, natural and inclusive meaning, without any inhibitions in the process of policy framing, adopted and followed accordingly. This depends on the placement of excellence in all sectors, viz, social, economic and political. If we frame and adopt policies otherwise, it may create division and degradation, unsuitable to healthy systemic rhythms. Problems that have sprung in our system owe to inappropriate framing of talent concept and its implementation at different levels. Reference in this is not a state other than those which express themselves through democratic modes. Talent is not one dimensional, but multi-dimensional. It is neither proto type, nor expresses in one way but different ways. All people have talents in different forms required for different situations. If talents of individuals by requirement of situations are identified and used, the system may excel in performance. But the experiences narrate otherwise. Democracy is malfunctioning, governance is at risk, socialism is mortgaged, secularism is sacrificed and sovereignty is dechannelised, and state as a whole is unable to identify and use its supreme capability. In short, talent is par excellence, and its ignorance or abuse is the root cause of decay or decline of the system and its governance. Perceptions that make policies victim to lust for power upset the whole constitutional curriculum, to rule by mediocrity /mediocre than by meritocracy. Right from school stage to higher education, and at all competitive examinations, we find anomalies in the measurement and evaluation system. The system is unable to identify and recognise the talent. Talent is comprised of moral virtue, truthfulness, honesty, sociability, dutifulness, contributory, respect to constitutionality, obedience to rule of law and above all, humanity-endowed with love and spirituality which allow the mind to function in excellence within its core areas, to know oneself, social self and total self .i.e. including the state, environment/nature and the whole cosmos. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. This is a modified version of an article entitled “Selection of Talent at Secondary Stage : Exploring the Probabilities for Improvement”, presented in a National Seminar-CumWorkshop for the Review of National Talent Search Scheme organized by the Department of Educational Measurement and Evaluation, National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi.(from November 16 to 19, 2005). See Brochure for National Talent Search Scheme, DEME, NCERT, New Delhi The meaning of talent defined in the Chamber’s Dictionary is “any natural or special gift; special aptitude; eminent ability’ etc. pp.1376. The present attempt endorses these. For understanding the state of conditions of mind, Shree MADA BHAGAWAT GEETA PROVIDES the deep rooted context for exploration. The Four VEDAS, contain the super 88 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Journal of Social and Political Studies consciousness contents, to relate them with consciousness with purity intact for a world to live in, with happy and healthy life. In fact, the ancient Indian Super Classics, viz., VEDAS, SHASHTRAS, and PURANAS are unparallel treasure of Knowledge and wisdoms ever written in the history of mankind-the greatest sources of knowledge and truth useful in the present context. We suggest here at least two major classics to study with philosophical approach to derive the meaning of mind within the broad frame work. These are Plato’s Republic and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason ; and Critique of Practical Reason.Besides, Decatese’ The Meditation on First Philosophy, Heidegger’s Existence and being are also worthwhile reading and illuminating. see Chamber’s Dictionary,p.689 See chambers Dictionary pp.689-90 Spirituality is a combination of qualities, viz. simplicity, honesty, truthfulness, non-violence which includes humanity, brotherhood, sociability, tolerance, respect to all religions, constitutionality and rule of law embodied and promoted by state in the present context. Unity of Mind, Peace and Harmony, Love and kindness to all beings etc. are the reflections of spirituality .For, proper understanding of spirituality, we suggest to ponder in to VEDAS, and GEETA, nevertheless the scriptures like PURANAS. To refer BUDDHA is of special significance in the above context. Besides, the history of western philosophy in general and Greek Philosophy in particular also contain the rich contents of spiritual discourse. Chamber’s Dictionary, p. 689. The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 89 The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy Dr. Nisheeth Rai ABSTRACT The Tribes of India are one of the earliest populations in the land. India can proudly be called the largest “tribal” population in the world. Today there are as many as 704 Tribes (A.R. 2010, Tribal Ministry) across the country. The Tribals are considered the “sons of the soil” and make for 8.2 per cent of the total population of India according to 2001 census. This interprets into 84 million people. In order to handle this large population British government followed a policy of maintaining tribal culture and their distinct identities. This policy resulted in the isolation of the tribals from the mainstream of Indian life. After independence many approaches were proposed to face the question of the tribals. These approaches may be broadly classified into Isolation, Assimilation, Planned assimilation and Integration .Undoubtedly the Constituent Assembly chose the integration theory. The term Scheduled Areas denotes the tribal regions to which either the Fifth Schedule or the Sixth Schedule applies. The two Schedules have very different mechanisms for governing their jurisdictional areas. However, the Fifth and Sixth Schedule has not helped the tribal communities acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people’s bodies .The tribes feel as much culturally deprived and economically robbed as under colonial rule. The powers wield by the tribal communities are subject to a number of “exceptions and modifications” ranging from general guidelines to specific demarcation of tribal administrative authority. Tribal local governments are often ignored in development plans and the benefits of any actual development rarely percolate down to the local tribes which are subordinated to outsiders, both economically and culturally. The Fifth and Sixth Schedule only marginally altered the power balance between state governments and the tribes because of ineffectual participation by the former, and the general tendency at the state level to monopolize power rather than share power with people at large. It has debased the tribal traditions of self-governance. The abrupt shift from traditional institutions to alien concepts of elected representatives and Panchayats has resulted in “very low” tribal participation and an underutilization of the institutions. Despite the increase in tribal violence, there has never been a serious debate about alternative schemes for governing the tribal regions in India. Almost everybody presumes that the fault lies not with the substantive content of the law, but with its implementation. However, as I prove in this research paper, a major cause for the failure of governance in the tribal areas is the top down approach of decentralization adopted in the Indian Constitution. I therefore advocate a range of constitutional and statutory reforms that would institutionalize tribal autonomy (the term that I employ to refer to a bottom-up approach) and permit the tribes to maintain their individual identity while participating in national development. Introduction The Tribes of India are one of the earliest populations in the land.1 India can proudly be called as the largest “tribal” population in the world. Today there are as many as 704 Tribes (A.R. 2010, Ministry of Tribal Affairs ) across the country. The Tribals are considered as the “sons of the soil” and make for 8.2 per cent of 90 Journal of Social and Political Studies the total population of India according to 2001 census. India’s population includes nearly one hundred million tribal people.2 In order to handle this large population two major approaches protection and development were followed. During the colonial period the British government favoured isolation of the tribal areas from the mainstream. The British set in motion a series of moves in order to establish a degree of political and administrative dominance over the plains as well as the hill people. The British policies and the activities of Christian missionaries who came into the region contributed significantly in creating a freeze effect on the communities and social formations. The impact of British administration became manifest through various means and measures such as the introduction of Inner Line Regulation in 1873 and the declaration of most of the hill areas as “Excluded Areas” under the provision of Government of India Act of 1935. Most tribal communities of the hills thus remained cut off from social and political developments taking place elsewhere. Mention must also be made of impressive population movements into the region during the British period unleashed by the imperatives of colonial administration and economy. In the context of an organised colonial economy with fairly strict monitoring of exploitable resources, coupled with immigration of diverse groups in a short period of time, the earlier resilience of the regional social system was lost forever. Each community tended to become a rigid social formation and this was to the utmost advantage of the colonial rulers. The accentuation of tribal-non-tribal differences and the formation of rigid social blocks out of indigenous castes and communities as well as recent migrants were important developments in the colonial period. After independence many approaches were proposed to face the question of the tribals. V. Elwin3 wanted a revivalist isolation policy to be adopted. His scheme of “National parks” pleaded for the complete non-interference of the British rule and its withdrawal from the tribal areas. In reaction to these conservative or revivalist views, G.S. Ghurye,4 a senior sociologist, made a case for the complete assimilation of tribals with the rest of the people in India. He said that it was misleading to call the tribes aborigines as they were actually only backward Hindus and the solution of all their problems cultural as well as economic and social, lay in their complete assimilation into the Hindu society. In fact, the tribal folks have distinct cultures and their complete assimilation with Hindus may not be possible without disruption to their culture, customs, traditions etc. Tribal culture has many happy and useful facets and the same must be preserved. D.N. Majumdar5 opines that the best policy for tribes would be for their controlled (planned) and limited assimilation. By limited assimilation he implied; the need and desirability of preserving their useful institutions, customs, practices etc. though these are to be tribal in origin and character. The transcultural borrowing should be encouraged.The integrationist approach towards development was laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru,6 the first Prime Minister of independent India as follows: “We cannot allow matters to drift in the tribal areas or just not take interest in them .... At the same time, we should avoid over-administering the areas and in The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 91 particular, sending too many outsiders into their territory. It is in between the two extreme positions we have to function.”7 In conformity with this thinking, the tribal development policy in the country was formulated. The task of tribal development has been defined as social and economic development of the tribal people. According to L.P. Vidyarthi,8 historically tribal development in India was viewed as (i) a movement emphasizing upon building up organizational structures, (ii) a programme emphasizing on activities, (iii) a method emphasising on certain achievable ends (iv) a process emphasising upon what happens to people not only economically and socially but also, psychologically, and (v) institutionalization of newly discovered skills and procedures leading to social change without completely breaking away from the past. The Constituent Assembly chose the integration theory. Accordingly, two constitutional arrangements were made. Firstly, a state-wise list of tribes was drawn and it was left to the Parliament to officially determine the list of the Scheduled Tribes (STs) from time to time. Secondly, the provisions for the administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes were made and were incorporated in the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution. The Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the Constitution The legal regime laid out in the 5th and 6th schedules has its origins in the Act of 1935, which created, excluded and partially excluded areas where a different set of laws will govern the life of tribal people. Section 52 and 92 of the Act provided for the reservation of certain predominantly aboriginal areas (to be known as Excluded or Partially excluded areas) from operation of Provincial legislature. The executive of authority of provinces extends to ‘excluded’ and partially excluded areas therein’, but the administration of excluded areas is under the governor at his discretion and partially excluded areas are administered by the ministers subject to the special responsibility for their peace and good government imposed on the governor by the section 52(e) of the Art. Thus the governor is given the power to control the application of legislation whether of the Federal or Provincial Legislature, and make regulations in both these areas.9 The term Scheduled Areas denotes the tribal regions to which either the Fifth Schedule or the Sixth Schedule applies. The two Schedules have very different mechanisms for governing their jurisdictional areas. The Fifth Schedule10 is an entirely centralized system where the communities the majority being tribal were directed in their affairs by provincial governors. Scheduled Areas have certain distinct provisions meant to protect and benefit tribals: (a) The Governor of a State, which has Scheduled Areas, is empowered to make regulations in respect of the following: i. Prohibit or restrict transfer of land from tribals; ii. Regulate the business of money lending to the members of Scheduled Tribes. In making any such regulation, the 92 Journal of Social and Political Studies Governor may repeal or amend any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State, which is applicable to the area in question. (b) The Governor may by public notification direct that any particular Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State shall not apply to a Scheduled Area or any part thereof in the State or shall apply to such area subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may specify; (c) The Governor of a State having Scheduled Areas therein, shall annually, or whenever so required by the President of India, make a report to the President regarding the administration of the Scheduled Areas in that State and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of directions to the State as to the administration of the said area; (d) Tribes Advisory Councils [TAC] shall be established in States having Scheduled Areas. A TAC may also be established in any State having Scheduled Tribes, but not Scheduled Areas, on the direction of the President of India. The TAC should consist of not more than twenty members of whom, as nearly as may be, three fourth should be from the representatives of Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative Assembly of the State. The role of TAC is to advise the State Government on matters pertaining to the welfare and advancement of the Scheduled Tribes in the State, as may be referred to it by the Governor; (e) The Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), (as per the recommendation of Bhuria Commission) the provisions of Panchayats, contained in Part IX of the Constitution, were extended to Scheduled Areas, also contains special provisions for the benefit of Scheduled Tribes.11 The states were to ensure that (i) their laws comported “with the customary law, social and religious practices and traditional management practices of community resources,” and (ii) the Gram Sabhas (bodies “consisting of persons whose names are included in the electoral rolls for the Panchayat at the village level”) were “competent to safeguard and preserve the traditions and customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources and the customary mode of dispute resolution.” In contrast, the Sixth Schedule12 of the Constitution of India under Article 244 makes provisions for the administration of tribal areas through Autonomous District/ Regional Councils in the States of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura. The term “tribal areas” generally means areas with a preponderance of tribal population. In other words, areas where provisions of Sixth Schedule are applicable are known as “tribal areas”. In relation to these areas, Autonomous District Councils, each having not more than thirty members, have been set up. These Councils are elected bodies and have powers of legislation, administration of justice apart from executive, developmental and financial responsibilities. The District or Regional Councils are empowered to make rules with the approval of the Governor with regard to matters like establishment, construction or The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 93 management of primary schools, dispensaries, markets, cattle ponds, ferries, fisheries, roads, road transport and water-ways in the district. The Autonomous Councils of the North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong have been granted additional powers to make laws with respect to other matters like secondary education, agriculture, social security and social insurance, public health and sanitation, minor irrigation etc. The Councils have also been conferred powers under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code for trial of certain suits and offences, as also the powers of a revenue authority for their area for collection of revenue and taxes and other powers for the regulation and management of natural resources. The Fifth and Sixth schedule, the Bhuria Committee Report and the PESA Act of 1996 is an important step towards the realization of self-rule for tribal people in India. These concerns resonate the demand for Tribal autonomy in the sixth schedule areas in the Northeastern frontier regions of India. The Act of 1996 emphasized that “Traditional tribal conventions and laws should continue to hold validity. Harmonisation with modern systems should be consistent herewith. The committee felt that while shaping the new Panchayati Raj structure in tribal areas it is desirable to blend the traditional with the modern by treating the traditional institutions as the foundation on which the modern supra structure should be built.”13 To what extent does this legal regime equip the tribal people to move towards self-rule? What does self-rule mean when there are only few tribal people who have not become what they are not, that is have not adopted non-tribal religions and cultures? What part of their tradition remains that can harmonize with modern systems? These are some of the questions which constitute the demerits of the schedules. Demerits of the Fifth and Sixth Schedule To begin, The Fifth and Sixth Schedule only marginally altered the power balance between state governments and the tribes because of ineffectual participation by the former, and the general tendency at the state level to monopolize power rather than share power with people at large. This apathetic attitude has manifested itself in two forms. First, the majority of the states with tribal populations procrastinated in their decentralization programs. Although all states with Scheduled Areas have now enforced the Fifth and Sixth Schedule, their past slow performance has led to the risk of delays in future amendments necessary to reflect changed circumstances. Second, when they did legislate, the states either ignored tribal customary law, social and religious practices and traditional management practices of community resources or enacted incomplete laws. One such example is from the Orissa Gram Panchayat (Amendment) Act of 1997 which conferred authority on the larger Gram Sabha comprising all communities in a demarcated territory.14 As a result, the Orissa legislation disregarded the distinct socio-cultural practices and different interests of the individual communities within that territory. 94 Journal of Social and Political Studies Contrary to the Fifth and Sixth Schedule which guarantees that state laws would respect tribal customs and traditions, they have debased the tribal traditions of self-governance. The tendency to violate tribal norms is not only a product of sub national apathy, but also the outcome of a statutory scheme that compels the tribes to adopt non-tribal concepts. By promoting the system of local government prescribed for non-tribal communities in Part IX of the Constitution, the Indian Parliament has instantly abolished centuries-old systems of Indigenous governance. The abrupt shift from traditional institutions to alien concepts of elected representatives and Panchayats has resulted in very low tribal participation and an underutilization of the institutions. Thus, for example, the Lanjia Saoras, a tribe in the state of Orissa, have been unable to adopt the electoral system of government mandated by Part IX of the Constitution,15 as have the Santals.16 Similarly, the tribes in Madhya Pradesh that were asked to adopt the Panchayat form of government have not seen “the importance of panchayat … for their own welfare or societal development,”17 while in Gond and Bhil societies the Panchayat system eroded the significance of traditional councils and strained ties within the community. A more understated reason for the tension between the customary and the received is the entrenched perception in India that the tribes are primitive communities with little or no order in society. Of course, such a view can only be seen as a product of the dominant culture’s prejudice against, and ignorance of, the culture of both settled and nomadic tribal peoples, particularly those deemed ‘primitive’, since each of these groups, of course, has its own customs, traditions and laws. The Manki-Munda system in the state of Jharkhand, for instance, competes with state laws enacted to enforce PESA because the tribes prefer their traditional law’s emphasis on collective and consensual decisionmaking.18 The Fifth and Sixth Schedule drafters mistakenly believed that an ambiguous directive to the states to design their laws in consonance with such customary law, social and religious practices and traditional management practices of community resources would resolve the dichotomy. What they overlooked was the inevitable displacement of indigenous laws and institutions that accompanies the imposition of a non-native system of governance. The convergence of the opinions of politicians, bureaucrats and federal and state administrations in a decentralized paradigm has been shown to almost always result in high-discretion laws which allow the executing agencies (the states) considerable freedom to decide the fate of the target population (the tribes). In India, decentralized governance in the tribal regions follows the traditional, top-down approach of defining the political, administrative and fiscal powers of a self-contained community, such as a tribe, with the expectation that the empowered entity would function within the parameters (and towards the objectives) envisioned by the retreating State. Therefore, the Indian model of tribal The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 95 governance can hardly be considered devolved authority because even though there has been a transfer of some degree of responsibility for governing, the activities of the tribal governments are not substantially outside the direct control of central government. These acts and schedule progressively denied tribal communities selfgovernment and rights to their community natural resources which is discussed below. The Tribal Rights in a Decentralized Government Neither PESA in the last two decades, nor the Fifth and Sixth Schedule before it, has helped the tribal communities acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people’s bodies. The tribes feel as much culturally deprived and economically robbed as under colonial rule. The powers wield by the tribal communities are subject to a number of exceptions and modifications ranging from general guidelines to specific demarcation of tribal administrative authority. Tribal local governments are often ignored in development plans and the benefits of any actual development rarely percolate down to the local tribes which are “subordinated to outsiders, both economically and culturally.”19 The Fifth and Sixth Schedule have also not prevented large corporations from gaining “control over the natural resources which constituted the life-support systems of the tribal communities;”20 neither have they made the tribes prosperous from the mineral-rich land on which they live. In fact, the tribes have “gradually lost control over community resources such as forests to both settlers and the State”21 and some scholar would go so far as to equate non-tribal acquisitions with tribal displacement. Dishonesty and the active involvement of state employees with nontribal communities is another weakening factor reversing, in this case, the benefits of land reform legislation. There are numerous cases of tribal lands in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh which revealed a nexus between traditionally influential non tribal landowners and corrupt government officials. The latter exercised their discretionary powers to favour non-tribals by transferring lands over which tribal communities may have had a valid claim.22 Even in a tribal majority state like Jharkhand in the north, the tribes are the worst affected in the population since the state government’s mining operations and hydroelectric power projects exploit natural resources in the resource-rich tribal areas, thus making the tribes “outsiders in their own land.”23 Faced with this onslaught, many tribes have resisted settlers, the government and private enterprises, and sought to reassert their identity. For instance, in the Bengal region the Kamatapur tribal movement has cited neglect, exploitation, and discrimination, and demanded a separate state.24 Tribes in the neighbouring state of Orissa have demanded a prohibition on private consortiums that intend to mine bauxite from one of the most richly endowed regions in India.25 Similarly, in the south, Kerala’s tribal population has recently begun to defend its rights by banding together in various political groups at the state and local community levels in order to compel the administration to review land alienation, poverty, and 96 Journal of Social and Political Studies exploitation by private enterprises.26 It is far too easy to dismiss these incidents as mere consequences of misplaced development strategies and lack of interest among state administrations. The critics of tribal governance in India see the dangers in an extremely narrow compass, criticizing provisions in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule as impracticable or the states as legislatively ignorant.27 In sum, they believe that good civil administration alone will lessen tribal woes and they have completely forgotten that in order to make tribal local governments a true institutions of self-government, autonomous powers should be exercised rather than devolved authority. Tribal Autonomy: The Bottom-up Approach The best way to help the tribal communities is to enhance their autonomy because it will be an equity-facilitating step where the State accepts that its definition and vision of what a community can (or should) achieve does not necessarily reflect the aspirations of the tribal community. Hence, the State would encourage the tribal community to develop indigenous political, administrative and fiscal structures, with the conventional bureaucracy playing a support function. This is a bottom-up approach where governance evolves from the members of the community. An autonomous government is therefore anchored in a new deal between the State and the tribes (with civil society as a mediator) to design government according to tribal culture and tradition “Because of this legal character, the life of an autonomous entity is not subject to simple administrative measures or decisions made by a higher authority. It is in this sense that autonomy is more than mere decentralization.” 28 Autonomy also ensures “a dramatic increase in tribes representation in the political system and their participation in decision-making processes that affect their own development.”29 The extant policies of decentralization should accordingly be perceived only as the initial steps towards that ideal, offering avenues for participation that can be cultivated into independent decision-making. In other words, “autonomy lies at the end of a progression of rights that can be demanded by “Indigenous communities to exercise meaningful internal self-determination and control over their own affairs in a manner that is not inconsistent with the ultimate sovereignty of the State.”30 A compelling reason for Indian government to embrace autonomous local governments is the international acceptance of the tribes’ inherent right to autonomy as a people. The International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169,31 which is the only binding international treaty dealing with Indigenous peoples and land rights, replaced the ILO Convention 107 that had focused “on the goal of integration and assimilation rather than on the protection of Indigenous peoples lands, culture, and distinctiveness.”32 The ILO Convention 169 takes a different approach by requiring State parties to the convention to respect the cultures and institutions of Indigenous and tribal peoples, their right to continued existence within their national societies, their right to establish their own The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 97 institutions and to determine the path of their own development. ILO Convention 169 was therefore designed to reverse the integrationist policy. The irony is that the values of tribal autonomy cherished in ILO Convention 169 were also initially the principles guiding independent India’s tribal policy. Six decades ago, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, espoused the Panchasheel doctrine that the tribes could flourish and develop only if the State interfered minimally and functioned chiefly as a support system.33 Some were down the years, those values were lost and the very same bureaucratic stranglehold that Nehru warned against. In September 2007, India voted in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Declaration)34 which affirms various rights to autonomy that are inherent in the tribal peoples of the world. The UN Declaration, although not binding, has been variously described as an international norm-building document that reflects the widespread agreement with respect to Indigenous rights among many nations, and which, along with other developments, can be seen as giving rise to a body of customary international law on the subject. By supporting the UN Declaration India agreed that nations must respect some form of autonomy for Indigenous people, but the vote was conditioned on the fact that the UN Declaration recognizes “the right to internal autonomy for tribal people and not the right to impair the territorial integrity of sovereign and independent nations that India has so vigorously opposed”.35 Even so, the government’s acceptance of the right to internal autonomy for the tribes under international law greatly strengthens the case for enhancing tribal autonomy proposed in this paper. Securing property rights has been a key part of modern Indigenous peoples’ movements around the world; yet the tribes in India are regularly deprived of these rights. Also noted was the root of the problem that the tribes have a legal rather than fundamental right to property under Indian law, which has made it possible for the State to acquire tribal lands if it meets the low threshold of having consulted or sought recommendations before doing so. The most straightforward way of substituting ‘consent’ for ‘consultation’ is to alter the balance of power between the states and the tribal local governments by making property a fundamental right for the tribes as well. Even though states can still acquire tribal community property by qualifying this right (as almost all other fundamental rights are) and paying just compensation, the extent of police powers would be significantly curtailed, since any state action interfering with fundamental rights will be judicially reviewable for its effects and consequences under the well established principles of the Indian Supreme Court. The mandate for such a provision has been constitutionally given to Parliament, which can make “any special provision for the advancement of … the Scheduled Tribes.” 36 If recognized, the fundamental right would be one of many provisions securing tribal interests: the Fifth and Sixth Schedules are examples, and so is Parliament’s ability to legislatively restrict a citizen’s right to travel or reside in any part of India if such law was for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Once Journal of Social and Political Studies 98 property rights are secured, they must be sustained by a legal paradigm that strengthens tribal autonomy. Tribal autonomy is not a challenge to India’s sovereignty. Rather, in claiming the right to self-determination the Indigenous communities are “seeking new ways of being recognized by national laws and systems of decision making without losing their autonomy and their own values.”37 The basic unit of administration in an alternative structure should continue to be a community that manages its affairs in accordance with shared traditions and customs. There has never been an objection to the community as the foundation for governance in tribal areas. On the contrary, the community is the fundamental institution of all tribes whether settled or nomadic. At the grassroots, the tribal community should be empowered to constitute a local government that, for reasons given elsewhere, is based on traditional systems of government. The revised Fifth and Sixth Schedule should also prescribe the method of determining the hierarchically superior levels of tribal administration which may in many cases lie entirely within a homogeneous tribe settled over a vast area. For example, the Biar and Bhinjhal tribes of central India split their traditional governing bodies into two tiers —one at the village level, and the other at the regional level.38 It is also extremely important that the Fifth Schedule allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate traditional governments that may not closely follow the conventional division of authority between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Many tribes in peninsular India appoint traditional councils that act both as executive and legislative bodies. Conclusion The introduction of the Fifth and Sixth schedule definitively signaled the Indian Parliament’s intention to abandon command-and-control for “new governance” in the tribal areas. However, by choosing decentralization the law-makers made the mistake of matching the right idea with the wrong solution. Although decentralization has proven vital whenever national or provincial governments have desired local solutions for local problems, the system is obviously unsuitable for tribal governance. Instead, the right solution is some form of autonomous tribal government grounded in the Indian Constitution and supported by the conventional administration and civil society. In this paper, I provided one such arrangement. Autonomy is preferable to decentralization because while the decisions of the decentralized organs may be replaced by the state; the decisions of autonomous organs may be canceled but not definitively replaced.” In other words, what I have proposed is “freedom within the law” for almost one hundred million tribal people. This is certainly achievable, and the legal change would be a highly effective way of transforming ideology to create a sense of entitlement amongst the tribes. NOTES 1. Kumar S, Padmanabham PB, Ravuri RR, Uttaravalli K, Koneru P, Mukherjee PA, Das B, Kotal M, Xaviour D, Saheb SY, Rao VR. 2008, The earliest settlers’ antiquity and The Fifth and Sixth Schedule and Tribal Autonomy 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 99 evolutionary history of Indian populations: evidence from M2 mtDNA lineage. BMC Evol Biol, 8. The 2001 Government of India Census recorded 8.2 per cent of India’s population as tribal. Elwin, Verrier. The Baiga. Gyan Publishing House (Indian Edition): Delhi. 1938. Ghurye G S. 1943.The Aborgines so called and their Future. Popular Press, Bombay 1943. Majumdar, D.N. Races and Cultures of India. Asian Publishing House:Bombay. 1958. Foreword to the second edition of Elwin, Verrier. Myths of the North-East Frontier of India. North-East Frontier Agency: Shillong. 1968. Foreword to the second edition of Elwin, Verrier. Myths of the North-East Frontier of India. North-East Frontier Agency: Shillong. 1968. Vidyarthi L.P., Tribal Development and its Administration, Concept publishing Company, New Delhi, 1981. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5and1Edw8/26/2/enacted.10/10/2011 Schedule V in The Constitution of India, 1950. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 243-M(3A)(b), allows “Parliament ... [to] extend the provisions of this Part [IX] to the Scheduled Areas subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in such law.” See Schedule VI in The Constitution of India, 1950. http://www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/00-03-livelihood options/forum/schedareas/about/ bhuria_report.htm 10/10/2011 Avinash Samal, “Institutional Reforms for Decentralized Governance and the Politics of Control and Management of Local Natural Resources: A Study in the Scheduled Areas of India” (paper presented to the RCSD Conference, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 11–14 July 2003) [unpublished], online: Digital Library of the Commons <http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/ 00001084/00/Avinish_Samal.pdf> Nityananda Das, “The Tribal Situation in Orissa” in K. Suresh Singh, ed., The Tribal Situation in India (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 2002). Ibid. S.N. Chaudhary, “Tribal Leadership in Panchayats: A Study of their Profile, Performance and Plan”in D.C. Sah and Yatindra Singh Sisodia, eds., Tribal Issues in India (New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 2004) at 117. Bhubneshwar Sawaiyan, An Overview of the Fifth Schedule and the Provisions of the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit, 2002) at 45, online: Commonwealth Policy Studies Unit <http://www.cpsu.org.uk/downloads/ Bhubnesh.pdf>. Govinda Chandra Rath, Introduction in Govinda Chandra Rath, ed., Tribal Development in India: The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Ibid. R.K. Barik, “Faulty Planning in a Tribal Region: The Dandakaranya Development Authority” in Govinda Chandra Rath, ed., Tribal Development in India—The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Kripa Shankar, “Land Alienation among Tribals in Uttar Pradesh” in Govinda Chandra Rath, ed., Tribal Development in India—The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Sajal Basu, “Ethno-regionalism and Tribal Development: Problems and Challenges in Jharkhand” in Govinda Chandra Rath, ed., Tribal Development in India—The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). I. Sarkar, “The Kamatapur Movement: Towards a Separate State in North Bengal” in Govinda Chandra Rat, ed., Tribal Development in India—The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). Orissa’s Kashipur Alumina Project Rekindles Tribal Wrath” Down to Earth (25 February 100 Journal of Social and Political Studies 2007), online: Down to Earth <http://www.downtoearth.org.in/full6.asp.10/10/2011 26. Jos Chathukulam and M.S. John, “Issues in Tribal Development: The Recent Experience of Kerala” in Govinda Chandra Rath, ed., Tribal Development in India—The Contemporary Debate (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). 27. Impracticality of provisions is asserted even by the Draft National Tribal Policy. See India,Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Draft National Tribal Policy (New Delhi: Government of India, 2006). 28. Deborah J. Yashar, “Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America” (1999) 52 World Pol. 76. 29. Hector Diaz Polanco, Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: The Quest for Self-Determination, trans. by Lucia Rayas (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 30. Tomasz Branka, “Autonomy—Old Concept, New Tasks” in Current Issues of the International Politics through the Eyes of Young Europeans (Prague: University of Economics, 2005) . 31. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 27 June 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1384 (entered into force 5 September 1991) (ILO Convention 169). 32. Marcos A. Orellana, Mining, Minerals & Sustainable Dev., Indigenous Peoples, Mining, and International Law (International Institute for Environment and Development, 2002) ,online: International Institute for Environment and Development <http://www.iied.org/mmsd/ mmsd_pdfs/002_orellana_eng.pdf>.10/10/11 33. Jose George and S.S. Sreekumar, Tribal Development Legislation and Enforcement (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1994). 34. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess., UNDoc. A/RES/47/1 (2007). 35. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.10/10/2011 36. Constitution of India, Art. 15(4) 1950. 37. http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/law_hr/fpic_ips_text_only_aug04_eng.pdf>.10/10/ 2011 38. K.S. Singh, The Scheduled Tribes (New Delhi: The Anthropological Survey of India, 1994). Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 101 Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India H.M. Jain India is a Union of States. At present there are 28 States and 7 Territories forming part of the Union. The States and the territories thereof are as specified in the First Schedule. Parliament may by law admit into the union, or establish, new states on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.1 This necessarily involves changes in the First Schedule requiring a constitutional amendment. However, the Constitution Clarifies that any such law can be passed by the ordinary process of law making and will not attract the provision of Art. 368. Historically, it was the Government of India Act. 1935 which first conceived of a federal polity for India. It envisaged a federation of provinces and princely states the former under direct British rule and the latter under British Suzerainty then. After the transfer of power in 1947, the Constitution Assembly resolved to constitute India into a federation of provinces and princely States joining the Indian Union. It is noteworthy that the Indian Union is not the creation of any voluntary compact among any pre- existing States. In the USA, Switzerland, Australia the federation rose from below; the federating entities met and decided to form a federal Union. In the case of India it was the opposite. The Government of India Act, 1935 decided upon a federal system “by creating autonomous units and combining them into a federation by one and the same Act”. In the same way the Constitution Assembly of India set up a federal system by placing the provinces in a federal union and associating the princely States with them, placing them all on the same footing. The States did not exist prior to the Constitution except as administrative divisions of unitary state. They did not have any rights of their own part from those delegated to them by the Central Authority. Therefore the states cannot any in violability as regards their territory, boundary, area or even name. Parliament is empowered by ordinary legislative process to— (a) Form a new State by separation of territory from any States or by uniting two or more states or part of states or by uniting any territory to part of any State: 102 Journal of Social and Political Studies (b) Increase or diminish the area of any State: (c) Alter the boundaries or name of my State. The states have no say in the matter except that if the proposed Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any State, the bill is referred to the legislature or that State for expressing its opinion thereon within specified period. Whatever be the mode of formation of the Union and regardless of its plenary power in respect of reorganization of States, structurally India is a Union of States. It was argued in the Constituent Assembly that the word Union denotes that the States will have no power to secede from the Union. It is doubtful if the word Union has any such connotation. The former USSR granted the right of secession to the constituent Republics even though they formed Union. Ultimately secession is not a matter legal of right but of popular will. In the same way the union depends on political will and popular support. The position of the States under the Indian Constitution can be summed up as follows: (1) The Constitution does not grant to any State the right of secession. The insurgency in Kashmir should be seen in this light. No pledge or promise on plebiscite made by Prime Minister Nehru or his Government can stand if it is not supported or sanctioned by the Constitution. (2) The States do not have any a priori rights, but only such rights as have been expressly granted to them by the constitution. Even the residuary rights vest in the Union Government. In the concurrent field of powers it is the union law which prevails over a state law in the event of a conflict between the two. (3) There is a single Constitution both for the Union and the States. The States do not have the right to have a separate constitution of their own, with the single exception of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Part VI of the Constitution provides a framework for the Government of the States. (4) There is a single unified judiciary for the whole country and an integrated Civil Service under the supervision and control of the All India Services. (5) There is single Citizenship for the people of the country and no separate Citizenship for the people of any State, not even for those living in Jammu & Kashmir. (6) The Governor of States are appointed by the Union Government and besides being the constitutional head of the States, are also the agent of the Centre in the State. (7) The Constitution guarantees individual rights of certain groups, such as scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and minorities, but not of States as such. It does not concede even the right of equal representation to the States in the Upper House of the Federal Parliament. The Constitution requires the union:— (i) To protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 103 (ii) To ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is in the nature of a covenant among the people as such and the States are the creation of this Constitution. The Constitution therefore guarantee individual rights and freedoms and singles out the minorities for double protection, first under provisions of general rights and freedoms (Arts. 14, 19, 20-23) and again under special provisions relating to freedom of religion and cultural and educational rights. In this way the Indian Constitution still adheres in respect of the minorities to the long discredited principle of equal but separate.3 It is questionable whether recognition of minorities as separate entities and subjects of rights and freedoms will serve and advance the objective of national integration and secularism. Growth of the Union The constitution as it emerged in 1949 from the Constituent Assembly made India a Union in which there were to be four categories of States, named simply as A, B, C and D with 9, 8 and 10 States in the first three categories and one in the last, a total of 27 States and territories. There has been a constant process of reorganization, bifurcation and creation of States making the Union more compact and its divisions more rational. The first case of creation of a new States was that of Andhra Pradesh which was carved out of the States of Madras by separating the Telugu speaking areas to form the new State in 1953. Madras was re-named Tamil Nadu in 1968. A major recognition of States on linguistic basis took place in 1956. As result, the first three categories of State were grouped in to one so that there remained only States and Union Territories, 15 of the former and 9 of the latter. Subsequent changes have been taken place as result of— (a) Bifurcation or even multiple division of the existing States to form new ones.4 (b) Liberation of former Portuguese and French Possessions and their Admission to the Union of India.5 (c) Accession of Sikkim to the Indian Union.6 (d) Raising some of the union Territories to full Statehood.7 (e) Re-naming some of the States in deference to local sentiments and usage.8 The territorial evolution of the Indian Union since the inception of the Constitution has been shown in the following tables: States of the Indian Union as originally stipulated in the Constitution in 1949. Part A State Part B States Part C States Part D Territories Assam Bihar Bombay Madhya Pradesh Madras Hyderabad Jammu & Kashmir Madhya Bharat Mysore Ajmer Bhopal Bilaspur Andaman & Nicobar Islands Pepsu Coorg Journal of Social and Political Studies 104 Part A State Orissa Punjab Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Part B States Part C States Rajasthan Saurastra Cochin Manipur Travancore Part D Territories Delhi Himanchal Pradesh Kutch Tripura Vindhya Pradesh After the States Reorganization in 1956 States Union Territories Assam Andhra Pradesh Bihar Bombay Kerala Madhya Pradesh Madras Mysore Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh West Bengal Jammu & Kashmir Andaman & Nicobar Islands Delhi Himachal Pradesh Laccadive, Minicoy & Andmindivi Islands Manipur Tripura Changes after 1956 Year State divided State/UT Created UT raised to Statehood Acquire Territory incorporated in to the Union 1960 Gujarat Himachal Pradesh (1970) Goa, Daman Diu, 1961 1962 Bombay (Renamed Maharashtra) Assam Nagaland Meghalaya (1971) Dadra & Nagar Haveli, 1961 1966 Punjab 1969 Assam Manipur (1971) Pondicherry, 1962 1971 Assam Tripura (1971) Sikkim, 1975 2000 2000 2000 Madhya Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Bihar Haryana Chandigarh (UT) Meghalaya Sub-State Mizoram (UT) Arunachal Pradesh (UT) Chhattisgarh Uttaranchal Jharkhand Mizoram (1986) Arunachal Pradesh (1986) Goa (1987) States Participation in Constitutional Amendment The Indian Constitution is not covenant among the states. Rather the States are the creation of the Constitution and subsequently of the parliament. The States therefore do not have the right to share in the process of the amendment of the Constitution, except that a constitutional amendment requires ratification by one Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 105 half of the state legislatures if the amendment affects the powers and jurisdiction of the states, such as the scale of representation in the Electoral College or in the parliament or the Items of the three List in the VII Schedule, or the provisions relating to the Supreme Court and the High Court, or the extent of executive power of the Union and the States: In any case, the states cannot initiate the move for any constitutional amendment. Of the 78 Amendments adopted till 1995, only thirty required ratification by state legislature in accordance with the proviso to Art. 368.9 Art. 368 requires a Constitutional amendment bill to be passed by both the Houses of Parliament by the requisite majority. The defeat of the measure in either house means that it can make no further headway and must be dropped. The requirement of ratification by one half of the state legislatures in respect of amendment of specified parts of the constitution is an additional meaningful check on the parliament’s constitutive authority. There is however one item of constitutional amendment which the Constitution leaves to the initiative of the State legislatures, ands that is the creation or abolition of second chamber in the state legislatures. The legislative Council in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Punjab was abolished by acts of Parliament following the adoption of a Resolution by the legislature of the state. In Andhra Pradesh the legislative Council was first created in 1957 and then abolished in1985 by this process. In the Golaknath case (1967) the Supreme Court by a strange logic reached the conclusion that Parliament by way of constitutional amendment could take away or abridge a fundamental rights conferred by Part III of constitution. This decision was later set aside twenty fourth amendments but in the Keshvanand Bhatrti case (1973) the Supreme Court hit back with more sweeping more limitations on parliament’s Constitutive Authority as to impair its basic structure or any essential feature thereof. It reserved the right to determine the validity of a constitutional amendment on this touchstone from case to case, without specifying in advance the basic structure or its essential features. With the invention of the Basic Structure theory the Supreme Court moved towards what an American writer has said in the American context, Imperial Judiciary.10 ‘The basic structure theory has the effect of freezing the status quo and converting the Constitution into a prison house for both the Union and the States from which there can be no escape.’ This is strikingly reminiscent of Hobbesian social Contract wherein people having surrendered their powers to an all powerful Leviathan are not free to change the terms of the Contract (the Constitution) or withdraw from it except by means of civil revolution. 106 Journal of Social and Political Studies Dual Polity Introducing the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly Dr. Ambedkar said that in as much as the draft establishes dual polity it may be called federal. The 73rd and the 74th Amendments which have introduced Part IX and IXA respectively in the constitution have given constitutional status to local bodies, both urban and rural, but character of the polity remains unaltered. Local Government Panchayats & Municipalities: Part IX of the Constitution outlines the framework of institutions of rural self government, part IXA gives the framework of urban local government. Part IX envisages a three tier system of panchayat for rural areas: namely, (a) the village Panchyats, (b) the District Panchayant, and (c) the Intermediate Panchayat standing between the village and district panchayats. Three types of institutions of local self government have been provided for the urban areas namely, (a) Nagar Panchayat, for a transitional area i.e. an area which is being transformed from a rural area to an urban area. (b) Municipal Council, for a smaller urban area; (c) Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area It is obligatory for every State to constitute such units. The local Government remains an exclusive State subject. The 73rd and the 74th Amendments have outlined the scheme which would be implemented by the several States by making laws or by amending their own existing laws to bring them in conformity with these Amendments. The Constitution provides for direct election of local bodies every five years. The other notable provisions are: (i) Reservation of seats for women and for scheduled castes and tribes. (ii) A State Election Commission to conduct election. (iii) A state Finance Commission to ensure financial viability of these institutions. (iv) Devolution of powers and responsibilities to the local with respect to: (a) Preparation of plans and implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice. (b) Subjects listed in the XIth schedule for the Panchayat in the XIIth schedule for the Municipalties.13 (c) Devolution of financial powers to the local bodies.14 Prime Minister Vajpayee had promised to bring a constitutional amendment in the winter session of Parliament to give more administrative and financial powers to the pachaayat.15 It should not be supposed that these constitutional measures have attempted anything like division of powers and financial resources between the states and Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 107 the local bodies.16 Their impact is only devolution of powers and responsibilities from the States to the local bodies, not their division between the two. Therefore the two-tier federal polity remains intact unaffected. Division of Powers In his speech to the Constituent Assembly during the third meeting Dr Ambedkar said “The chief mark of federalism…. Lies in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the Centre and the Units by the Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our costitution.17 The States derive their powers, including fiscal powers, directly from the Constitution. They are not dependent on the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The result is that:— (1) It will not be possible for the Union or a State to assume powers which are assigned by the Constitution to the other Government, unless such assumption is sanctioned by some provision of the Constitution itself. (2) Nor would such usurpation or encroachment be valid by consent of the other party, for the Constitution itself provides the cases in which this is permissible consent (e.g. Arts.252, 258). (3) Nor would this be possible by delegation of powers by one legislature in favor of another. “Hence the Constitution would not permit any of the units of the federation to subvert the federal structure set up by the Constitution, even by consent.18 The Constitution elaborates in detail the legislative and administrative relations of the Union and States, and the distribution of Revenues between them.19 It has been noted by the most writers that the constitution tiites in favour of the Centre in the matter of distribution of powers and resources. The reason is that constitution making in India (1947-49) was preceded by a phase of violent communal politics which succeeded in partitioning the country. The partition and the influx of millions of refugees from Pakistan created problems of relief and rehabilitation. Besides, there were colossal problems of social and economic planning and development to be tackled if the tryst with destiny was to be kept. The historical background of disunity inviting foreign invasions and fissiparous tendencies inherent in Indian history, sociology and politics alike urged the need for a strong Centre.20 The outcome was that the Union was invested with “too large a field for the operation of its legislative and executive authority than is to be found in any other federal constitution.21 This would be evident from the following facts and features. (1) Of the three Lists of powers the Union has the exclusive powers to legislate on 97 subjects of the union List, and concurrent power to legislate on the 47 concurrent Lists. 108 Journal of Social and Political Studies (2) It shares with the States the power to legislate on subjects of concurrent List but it is provided that the Union law will have priority over any State law in the event of a conflict between the two. Santhanam expressed the view that “As there is continuous pressure on parliament to legislate on almost every item in the Concurrent List, it is not unlikely that , before long, the Concurrent List will , in Practice, become a continuation of the Federal List.22 (3) The Residuary powers as in Canada and unlike USA and Switzerland have been vested in the Union. K. Santaanam comments inter alia, “the residuary powers are vested in the Centre. Though this may be deemed to be proof of the dominant role of the centre in the Indian Federal system, the fact that all the important matters have been brought into three lists makes it more or less a nominal provision.23 (4) The Union Parliament may make laws on subjects contained in the State List. (i) if the Rajya Sabha by a Resolution passed by not less than two thirds of members present and voting declares that it is expedient or necessary in the national interest to do so (Art.249). (ii) If a proclamation of national Emergency is in operation (Art.250) (iii) Parliament may legislate for two or more States on subjects of State list. If the legislatures of those States pass resolutions to that effect (Art.252) (iv) To give effect to any treaty, arrangement or convention with any other country or any decision made at international conference association or other body, (Art253). In this way the Union may encroach upon legislative field of the States in the specified circumstances. Dr. Ambedkar justified these cases of central encroachment “as a new way to overcome rigidity and legalism inherent in federalism.”24 The powers of union are such as to enable the Indian State to fulfill its basic obligation of (a) safeguarding the unity and integrity of nation, (b) ensuring economic development and growth, (c) adoption of measures of social reform (d) promotion of higher education, Science and Technology, (e) fostering social security and welfare of labour, and (f) advancement of trade, commerce industries, agriculture, banking etc. This is why all subjects of national importance or subjects requiring uniformity of the treatment throughout the country are included in the Union List. These include; Defence, Foreign Affairs; Citizens, Railways, Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless and other like means of communication, currency, coinage and foreign exchange. Inter State Trade & Commerce, Banking, Insurance, Patents & Inventions, standard of weights & Measures, Industries; oilfield and mines, census; the higher judiciary. The Concurrent List contains items which enables the Union to undertake Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 109 measures of social reform and economic planning and growth: These include: Criminal law and procedure and Civil procedure, Marriage & Divorce, Adoption, succession, Forests, protection of wild animals and birds: Adulteration of foodstuffs and other goods, Economic and social planning: Trade Unions; Social security; Employment and unemployment; Welfare of Labour, Education Weights and measures ; price control, factories Electricity, Acquisition and Requisitioning of property. The general principle behind these items is that parliament can initiate on matters in which central initiative considered necessary to secure nation wide uniformity or to guide and encourage State efforts.25 The subjects which by their very nature require variation in treatment so as to suit local conditions and circumstances have been placed in the State List. The State legislature has the exclusive power to make laws for any subject contained in the State List. This is however subject to two limitations. The State law must not be repugnant to any provision of law made by parliament which Parliament is competent to make. In the event of a repugnancy between the two, the law made by Parliament shall prevail and the State law, to the extent of repugnancy, shall be void. In means that the State legislation is put in a subordinate position in its own or in the Concurrent field. Sir Ivor Jennings pointed out that Art. 254 which provides for the supremacy of the union law, cannot be restricted in its application to subjects in the concurrent list alone.26 In fact not such restriction can be inferred from the plain language of Art. 254. (2) Every bill passed by the Legislature has to be sent to the Governor for his assent and the Governor, among the various courses open to him opt to reserve it for the consideration of the President. It is not clear whether he can do so on his own or on the advice of the Chief Minister. Bam Kishore Vyas former Speaker of Rajasthan Legislative Assembly, disclosed that “it is not unusual for State Government to advise the Governors to reserve State Bills for the assent of the President as a precaution against possible conflict with central legislation.27 The Administrative Reforms Commission Study Team on Centre- State Relations was of opinion that “the Governor could exercise his own judgment, in case he feels and his cabinet does not, that unconstitutional or serious impropriety is involved.”28 It is notable that besides leaving it to the Governor to reserve to any bill passed by the State legislature for consideration by the President, the constitution specifies 110 Journal of Social and Political Studies that the Governor has not choice but to reserve the bill for President’s consideration. (i) If in his opinion the Bill is derogatory to the powers and position of High Court. (ii) Where the bill provides for the acquisition by the State of any State or of any rights or for therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or for taking over of the management of any property by the state, or for the amalgamation of two or more corporations, or affects corporate rights mentioned in Art. 31 A. (iii) Where a State law provides for imposition of tax in respect of water or electricity generated, distribute, or sold by any authority established by any law made by parliament for regulating or developing any inter State or river valley. The wide powers given the Union under List I and III and limited powers given to the States in List II must not be seen in terms of ‘either-or-federalism’29 of the past, which rested on a dichotomy between the Centre and the States. The two should no longer be seen as competing centres of power but as co-partners in the task of nation building. This may be illustrated by reference to Item 24 of the State List. It reads: Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52 of the Union List. Entry 7 of the Union List reads: Industries declared by Parliament by law to be necessary for the purpose of defence or for the prosecution of war. Entry 52 reads: Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the Public interest. The Union Power to legislate in respect of industries, the control of which is deemed to be in the public interest, has been an avenue for increasing Central control over industrial development. The Union Government had by 1974 extended its control over all industries with a fixed capital of Rs. 25 lakhs and over. Administrative Relations The primacy of the Union over the States in legislative fields is seen in the administrative relations as well. The basic premise is that the executive power is co-extensive with legislative power. Therefore the executive powers of the Union extend to matters contained in the Union List while the executive power of the States applies to matters contained in the State list and the Concurrent List. The Constitution directs that the executive power of every State will be so exercised as to ensure compliance with, and, not to impede or prejudice, the exercise of executive power of the Union, and the Union Shall have the power to give such directions to State as may appear to it to be necessary for the purpose.30 The Union will have the power to issue directions to a State as to: (i) The construction and maintenance of means of communication declared in the direction to be of national or military importance. Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 111 (ii) The measures to be taken for the protection of the railway within the State. The president, with the consent of the State Government, may entrust to the Government or its officers functions in relation to may matter falling within the domain of federal Executive. A law made by Parliament which applies in any State, may confer powers and impose duties upon the State or its officers and authorities, for instance, the power of subordinate legislation. The Governor of a State may also, with the consent of the Government of India, entrust to it functions in relation to any matter within the executive power of the State. When a proclamation of Emergency is in operation, then the Union Executive is empowered to give directions to any State as to the manner in which the executive power there of is to be exercised. There are two other institutional arrangements whereby the Union may exercise superintendance, direction and control over the State administration: (1) The head of the State Executive is the Governor who is appointed by the President. The Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President, though, ordinarly, for five years.31 The governor acts not merely as the constitutional head of State but also as the agent of he Centre, as the eyes and ears of the Centre in the State. The Union Government may bring a State under the President rule (pseudonym for Centre) under Art. 356, if it is satisfied on its own or on receipt of a Report from the Governor of the State that the government of the State “cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”. In such a situation powers and functions of Government of the State are assumed by the Union Government. Art. 356 is the reserve power of the Centre to dismiss any State Government which is politically unacceptable to it, besides providing a way out where no political party or coalition of parties is able to command majority support in the Legislature. Most of the cases of imposition of President’s rule in the States relate to solving the impasse created by a lack of a party or party coalition in the Assembly to support and sustain government. There have however been cases where: (1) the ruling party has resorted to a temporary spell of President’s rule in order to regroup its supporters and return to power (Rajasthan 1967) (2) the ruling party at the Centre has abused its power to get ride of its political opponents ruling in the states. (Kerala 1959), U.P. Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, (1992). 112 Journal of Social and Political Studies (3) the ruling party at the Centre riding on the wave of popular support has sought to wipe out the opposition ruled states en masse (1977, 1980) the party in power having failed to win a single seat in the Lok Sabha polls. (4) the President’s rule has been imposed a stop-gap arrangement to enable a fresh election of the Assembly, which has not taken place before the expiry of its term. (Tripura, 1993). (5) the law and order situation in the state was not conducive to the holding elections (Punjab 1983) due to internal disturbances. (6) to stall the opposition from staking a claim to power where the party favoured by the Centre: (i) had not been returned with a majority in the elections. (ii) had been reduced to a minority due to floor crossings. (iii) had no chance of forming the government on the collapse of the existing one. (Orissa, 1973, Nagaland Aug. 1988 U.P. Oct. 1995, Gujarat Sep. 1996). For these reasons the regional parties, and the several Janata brand parties seem Art. 356 a negation of the federal principle but they can not bring themselves upto demanding its deletion from the Constitution for they see in it a potential weapon for a possible use against use a BJP Government or a BJP led formation. Another institutional device to secure the superintendence, direction and control of the State administrative apparatus by the Union is the superimposition of the All India Services, the IAS and IPS on the corresponding State Services, the Provincial Civil Services and the provincial Police Service. Dr. Ambedkar claimed that a special feature of the Indian Federation is the conscious arrangement made to avoid diversity in the civil and criminal laws, in judicial administration and in civil administration. This will ensure that Indian federal system will have uniformity in all matters which are essential to maintain the unity of the country. The means adopted to secure this objective are: (1) a single hierarchical, unified judiciary. (2) Uniform civil and criminal laws and codes of procedure. (3) All India Services at the head of strategic posts in the State administration. He said, “The Constitution provides that without depriving the States of their right to form their own Civil Services, there shall be an All India service recruited on an All India basis with common qualifications, uniform scales of pay and the members of which alone would be appointed to the strategic posts throughout the Union.32 Financial Relations There is clear demarcation of the revenue resources of both the Union and the States so as to secure them financial autonomy. The sources of revenue of the Union are listed in entries 82 to 92A of the Union List, while those of the States in Entries 45 to 63 of the State List. Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 113 An important feature of the financial relations between Union and States is the provision for revenue sharing between the Union and States. The following provisions of the Constitution are noteworthy in this connection. (1) There are duties levied by the Union but collected and appropriated by the States, such as stamp duties and excise duties on medical and toiled preparations. (2) There are taxes levied and collected by the Union but assigned wholly to the States, for example, succession duties, estate duty, terminal taxes, taxes on railway fares and freights etc. (3) There are taxes levied and collected by the Union and distributed between the Union and the States. This is the position of taxes on income other than agricultural income. (4) There are taxes and duties which are levied and collected by the Union and may be distributed between the Union and the States if Parliament by law so provides. This is the position of excise duties other than duties on medicinal and toiled preparations. (5) Parliament is empowered to make such grants as it may deem necessary to give financial assistance to any State which is in need of such assistance. Such grants may either be block grants or specific grants. The Constitution provides for grants— (a) to States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal in lieu of expert duty on jute and products. (b) to State of Assam for the development of tribal Areas in the State. (c) for schemes of development for welfare of Scheduled Tribes, and for raising the level of administration of Scheduled Areas as may have been undertaken by a State with the approval of the Union. The Constitution provides that the distribution between the Union and the States of the net proceeds of taxes which are to be divided between them and the allocation between States of the respective shares of such proceeds shall be done on the recommendations of finance Commission which shall be appointed by the President every five years. The Commission will also recommend the principles which should govern the grants in aid of the revenue of the States. The grants are a means to assist development schemes in States lacking in adequate financial resources and an instrument to exercise control and coordination over the welfare schemes of the States. As the Supreme court said “Realising the limitations on the financial resources of the States and the growing needs of the community in a welfare States, the Constitution has made… specific provisions empowering Parliament to set aside a portion of its revenue… for the benefit of the States not in Stated proportions but according to their needs… The resources of the Union are not meant exclusively for the benefit of the Union activities… In the words, the Union and 114 Journal of Social and Political Studies the States together form one organic whole for the purposes of utilisation of the resources of India as a whole:33 Emergency Provisions The Constitution provides that while a proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by an order modify or suspend the provisions relating to distribution of revenues between the Centre and the States as may be specified in the order. While a proclamation of financial Emergency under Art. 360 is in operation, the Union is empowered to give directions to any State to observe such canons of financial propriety as may be specified in the directions. Such direction may include (a) a provision requiring the reduction of salaries and allowances of State officials and (b) a provision requiring all Money Bills to the reserved for the consideration of the President after they are passed by the Legislature of the State. The Union is also empowered to reduce the salaries and allowances of its officials including the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts during the period of financial emergency. While a State is under President’s rule under Art. 356, the powers of the State Legislature are exercisable by the Parliament including the power to adopt the State Budget and pass the money bills. In this way, during an Emergency the constitutional barriers between the Union and the States are scaled down and the Indian State can function more or less like a unitary mechanism.34 Inter State water Disputes The Constitution provides that Parliament may be law provide for the adjudication of any dispute with respect to use, distribution or control of the waters of any inter-State river or river valley and also provide for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in any such dispute. In exercise of this power, Parliament has enacted the inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, providing for the constitution of an ad hoc Tribunal for the adjudication of any dispute arising between two or more States with regards to the waters of any inter State river (such as Cauvery) or river valley. Inter-State Council The Constitution provides that for coordination among States on subjects of common interest and for inquiring into and advising upon inter-State disputes there may be constituted an Inter State Council. It was in 1990 that an Inter State Council comprising of 6 Union Cabinet Ministers and all the State Chief Ministers was first constituted. However subject wise Councils have been established from time to time by the Central Government to secure coordination of policy and action in the relevant field, such as Central Council of Health, Central Council of Local Self Government, a Transport Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 115 Development Council, Central Council of Indian Medicine, Central Family Welfare Council, Central Council of Homeopathy. These Councils have been set up to investigate and discuss subjects of common interest between the union and the States or between two or more States, and to make recommendations for coordination of policy and action relating to such subject. Federation at Work It follows from the above narrative that the Constitution has provided for a strong dominating Centre conceding uncertain internal autonomy to the constituent States within carefully defined limits. The proof of the pudding is the eating thereof and it is notable that the equation of powers between the Centre and States has not been static but has been fluctuating with circumstances so that several patterns are discernible in the actual working of the Constitution during the past fifty years. One Dominant Party and Charismatic Leadership The long stretch of Congress rule (1950-77), (1980-89) was characterised by the dominating position of the Congress both in the Centre and the States (with the exception of Kerala) though there was a set back for the Congress in several of the States after the fourth General Election but it was short lived and after 1971, the Congress continued to recover its lost ground except for the State of Tamil Nadu, and after 1977, the State of West Bengal. The Central command and control mechanism located in the Congress President who was invariably the Prime Minister too, and the Congress Working committee or the High Command, were the unifying thread for the political system in operation in both the Union and the States. The decisions on the selection of the Chief Minister, replacement of the incumbent any time, composition of the Ministry, dissolution of the ministry or imposition of President’s rule, and similar vital issues relating to the State government slipped into the domain of the central leadership. The charisma associated with the Nehru family and the myth surrounding the leading figures of the National freedom movement were the unifying force for the party and magnet for mass support. This is why the congress emerged as the single dominant party in the Indian political system and ensured a stable and strong government not only at the Centre but also in the States. Under Nehru and subsequently under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi Centre State disputes were invariably treated as subjects of domestic jurisdiction for the party rather than matters of constitutional concern. In this way the federal scheme was supplanted and supplemented by party discipline. 116 Journal of Social and Political Studies Planning and Federalism To the political hegemony of one dominant party under leaders of mass appeal in their respective States and beyond, Nehru added one ideological input namely, Economic planning for a socialistic pattern of society, and later on for building Democratic Socialism. This was the goal which transcended party lines and cut across State boundaries. Therefore planning soon came to be looked upon as an anathema to federal polity. The reason is that Planning process necessarily meant central initiative and leadership in plan formulation and centralized superintendence, direction and control in plan execution and performance evaluation. In 1950, in pursuance of a Resolution of the Union Cabinet, a Planning Commission was set up with the Prime Minister as its Chairman ex officio, to prepare five Year Plans for social and economic development and secure the “most effective and balanced utilization of the country’s resources” which would “initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and open out to the people new opportunities for richer and more varied life”. Besides the Prime Minister, the Ministers of home, Finance and Defence are the members of the Planning Commission. Its Dy. Chairman once the Minister for Planning is not a Minister but enjoys the status of a Cabinet Minister. Besides, there are several full time members, who are experts in Finance, Agriculture, Economics and the like. In deference to the federal nature of the polity, in 1952 a National Development Council was set up to associate the States in the formulation of the Plans and “to strengthen and mobilize the efforts and resources of the nation in support of the plans. In particular, the specific functions of the NDC are— (a) to review the working of the National Plan from time to time (b) to recommend measures for the achievement of the aims and targets set out in the National Plan. The prime Minister is the chairman of the NDC ex officials, while the members of the Planning Commission and the Chief Ministers of all the States, numbering 28 at present, are its ex officio members. The draft of the Plan is prepared by the Planning Commission in consultation with Union Ministers and State Governments and after approval by the Union Cabinet it is placed before the NDC for its approval. In this way the Plan formulation is a cooperative exercise but many critics see in it t erosion of State autonomy. The Planning Commission has been described as a “super Cabined” or a “parallel cabinet’ and as ‘the Economic Cabinet not only for the Union but also for the States.”35 Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 117 K. Santhanam laments that “planning has profoundly altered the relations between the Union and the States while maintaining intact the legal framework.36 In the context of Centre-State Relations in India the criticism of Planning rests on the following grounds: (1) The Planning Commission and the National Development Council are both extra-constitutional and non statutory bodies and have superseded the constitutional organs of power in the field of social welfare and economic planning. Even Appleby observes that “Membership of the Commission is a small edition of the Government itself. As a result of these things the development of a Plan is the development of the Government’s policy and program.37 In theory, the NDC is superior to the Planning Commission as “It is a policy making body and its recommendations cannot but be regarded as policy decisions and not merely as advisory suggestions”.38 According the Michael Brecher the NDC “lays down policy directives invariably approved by the Cabinet… the NDC and its Standing Committee have virtually relegated the Planning Commission to the Status of a research arm.”39 Santhanam cites the decision to surrender by State Governments of their sales taxes on textiles, sugar and tobacco in lieu of additional excise duties, to illustrate how the NDC is making policy decisions on behalf of the States. He writes “ the decision… was taken at a single sitting of the National Development Council at which many of the Chief Ministers had not even fully consulted their own Cabinets.”40 (2) Through Planning the Union has been able to encroach into the State sphere such as land reforms, forestry, agriculture, irrigation, power, cottage industries, primary education, health. The first Five Year Plan Stated that”…without complete coordination of policies and timely concerted action, there is danger of waste and misdirection of effort….” It is notable that 70 percent of the total expense of Planning in the First Plan and 65 percent in the Second Plan pertained to subjects of the State List.41 According to Tarlok Singh, an ex-Member of the Planning Commission, Planning widens the scope of Central responsibilities as— (i) Planning determines the directions in which central as well as State resources are to be used. (ii) In joining with the States to prepare a national Plan the Centre accepts some obligation for its implementation. (iii) the Centre inspires the States with new ideas and impulse for national development programme. During the period 1957-64 the Central expenditure on social services (which is mostly State responsibility) was nearly doubled (from 172.6 crores to 513.7 crores).42 (3) The financial dependence of the States on the power of the Union to levy 118 Journal of Social and Political Studies certain taxes for them, to levy and collect certain others, and to levy, collect and share with them the proceeds of income tax and excise duties is further accentuated by the compulsions of Plan financing. K. Santhanam was of opinion that Plan financing had become so centralized as to convert India almost into a unitary State for this purpose, He noted that 75% of capital investment of each State and about 50 percent of its revenue expenditure are derived from the Centre. The whole of the former and nearly half of the latter are at the discretion of the Union Governmen.”43 The following Table44 shows the central assistance in aid of revenue and capital expenditure of the States. Central Assistance Ist Plan 41.4% IInd Plan 48.5% IIIrd Plan 52.2% IVth Plan 56.7% The resource transfers that take place under Art. 275 on the recommendations of the Finance Commission are known as statutory grants while those under Art. 282, on the recommendations of the Planning Commission, are known as discretionary grants. It is the latter which are criticised as causing the States’ abject dependence on the Centre, also enabling it to discriminate between States. However with the Fourth Plan allocations the Statutory grants allocations began to exceed the discretionary grants.45 Transfers under Commission A. Finance Commission recommendations B. Planning Commission Recommendations C. Other transfers Total Ist Plan IInd Plan IIIrd Plan Three Annual Plans IVth Plan Vth Plan VIth Plan 429 918 1590 1782 5420 13079 20845 880 104 1344 606 2738 1272 1917 1648 4900 4992 10595 4054 13245 - 1413 2868 3600 5347 15312 27728 34090 Plan grants given under Art. 282 are matching grants which means that the state has to match the central grant with an equal sum from its own resources. It means that states have to fall in line with Central policies, priorities and preferences for securing matching grant and also dovetail their own funds to central allocations. Vertical Federalism The central grants are routed through central Ministries o their counterparts in the States. The result is that the Central Ministry is in a position to superintend, Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 119 direct and control the corresponding State ministry. In this way besides the territorial or horizontal federation set up by the Constitution a sort of vertical federation has come into being. The Central Ministries and corresponding State Departments each constitute a separate single unit for planning, programming, and funding plan projects. (4) Besides the project sanctioned for the States in the national Plan, there are some known as “Centrally sponsored schemes” which have to be necessarily located in one or the other State. These are wholly financed by the Centre but executed by the State concerned under technical guidance and supervision of the related Union Ministry. The location of public sector undertakings of the Central Government which encompass most of the infrastructure industries such as steel, heavy electrical, heavy engineering, fertilizers, becomes the subject of inter-State rivalry in view of its multiple impact on local economy and employment potential. The choice of one site in preference to the other is an exercise of patronage in the discretionary bag of the Union. As most of these schemes relate to State subjects, the Centre is able to transform them into central or concurrent subjects. New Trends in Federal Theory These grounds of criticism are no doubt factually correct but they derive from a theory of federalism which is wholly out of tune with modern times. Henry Steel Commager observed that the doctrine of state autonomy or State rights had generally been invoked by those who wanted to weaken the government and imperil the citizen’s freedom. It smacks of “narrowness, selfishness and vindictiveness.”46 When the doctrine of State autonomy becomes either a “cover for ideological strategies against the Union Government,47 (as in the hands of the CPI (M) government of West Bengal) or an “expression of aggressive cultural separatism” (as in the hands of the Akali Dal in Punjab48 or DMK in Tamilnadu in the early days49 it ceases to be a device of “Unity in diversity” which is the raison d’etre of federalism. In modern federal theory the focus in not on functional jurisdictions but on goal attainment. The concept of dual polity have been substituted by what may be called a commonwealth, or, in the words of Granville Austin, co-operative federalism, in which both the centre and the States are seen as two levels from which the tasks of economic and political development should be carried out. Under the impact of science and technology and pressure of globalisation and threats of terrorism, the tasks of development and internal security have assumed a dimension and scale which can no longer be divided into lists but require vertical allocation of responsibility between the Union and the States.50 According to one writer “both the Union and the States are parts of a single, indivisible political system. Neither level of government should be administratively weak or incompetent, Ultimately, the goals of the system are more important than the 120 Journal of Social and Political Studies specific constitutional arrangement for it is a means and no more. It is significant that the preamble of the India constitution gives us no hint regarding the federal character of the system…. But it winds up with the phrase unity and integrity of the nation.”51 Interpreted in the light of this shift in federal theory, the Indian Constitution would seem to create a “co-operative union” of States rather then a dual polity. Planning for mobilisation of national resources and their utilization most effective and balanced utilisation for the social and economic development of the country as a whole would appear to be an integral part of this concept. This mutual cooperation is institutionalised in the National Development Council which Tarlok Singh, an Ex-Member of Planning Commission calls “the highest national forum for planning”. He writes that it has “in practice embodied and given informal sanction to the underlying concept of partnership and cooperation between the Centre and the States over the whole range of development” and “which brings State governments into an organic relationship with the organization of planning at the national level.”52 Growing Role of States in National Politics The unitarian federalism as the Union State relations came to be described during the long years of Congress rule at the Centre was consequence of the dominance of the one party both at the Centre and in States. The one party dominance continued until the defeat of the Congress in the General Election of 1989, with brief spells of set-back as during 1967-70 and again from 1977 to 1979. Since 1989 there has been a minority coalition or a minority Congress Government at the Centre,53 sustained by outside support and, therefore, instable, and, in most of the States, there were governments at variance with the Centre politically. Therefore the one-dominent party system which fostered and sustained the unitarian federalism was replaced by competitive party politics. What Morris Jones calls competition in India’s bargaining federalism actually emerged after the loss of monopoly of political power by the Congress. In the formation of he National Front Governments (1989-91) and the United Front Government (1996-1998) and the NDA governments in 1998 the regional parties and the State Chief Ministers played the decisive role. The Narsimha Rao government (1991-96) was a minority government to begin with and even when it changed into a majority government by inducing defections to its side it was so rocked by scandals and scams as to be unable to exercise any leadership role over the States. The United Front Government (1996-98) was a coalition of some 14 parties depending on the outside support of the Cong (I). It was to retain support of the Con (I) that Deve Gowda was replaced by I.K. Gujral as Prime Minister in Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 121 the mid-stream (April 1997). Similarly the National Democratic Alliance is conglomeration of more than a dozen regional parties joined in an alliance with the BJP, in power since March 1998, but depending on the outside support of several other regional parties like the Telegu Desam, Trinmul Congress, AIADMK and the BSP. The leadership role of the Centre also waned because of the “end of Ideology” from political agenda. The Congress was able to rally wide support and consensus across parties around its socialistic political programmes but after the drive for liberalization and “economic reforms” politics has become a pure struggle for power in which divisive issues have gained primacy and regional political forces have come to the fore in national politics. The regional parties became share holders in power at the Centre though most of them were not in power in their own State. The State Governments politically incompatible with the Centre arrogated near autonomy to themselves, while the Union Government became a mere “federation of regional interests”. The Laloo/Rabri apparatus in Bihar, the DMK/AIADMK alternative in Tamil Nadu, the TDP supremacy in Andhra Pradesh, the CPI(M) monopoly of power in West Bengal are instances in point. In this way the Union and the States under the impact of competitive party politics and rising regionalism have become coordinate centres of power. The one party hegemony subsumed regional politics and regional political forces are bound to come on the surface with the end of this hegemony. Speaking in March 1959, K. Santhanam had expressed the view that the reorganization of States on the linguistic basis has cemented the base of State autonomy, and since then there have been added tribal States and hill States to the linguistic States. In the same lecture he had forewarned that “If at any time in the future, a considerable number of State Governments should belong to parties different from that which control the Union Government….. there may have to be reversion to the State autonomy to the full extent provided by the Constitution.54 Added to these changes in the federal equation since the break up of the Congress monopoly of political power is the consideration which was underlined by Paul H. Apple by early as 1953. Appelby had warned that howsoever strong the position of the Union in planning, programming and financing the execution of plans and projects rests in the hands of the State Governments. Appelby notes with surprise that “No other large and important national government.. is so dependent as India on theoretically subordinate but actually rather distinct units responsible to a different political control, for so much of the administration of what are recognised as national programmes… The power that is exercised organically in Delhi is influence rather than power. The method is making plans, issuing pronouncements, holding conferences… Any real power in most of the development field is the personal power of 122 Journal of Social and Political Studies particular leaders and the informal, extra constitutional, extra-administrative power of a dominant party, coherent and strongly led by the same leaders….55 Two instances are cited to illustrate how politically willful States may frustrate central plans and political implementation on the ground. While the Union Government was able to enact POTA State leaders in and outside Parliament openly declared that they know how (not) to implement it. The second instance is related to the implementation of the National Curriculum Framework issued by the NCERT. The Left, the Congress and the Janata brand parties have declared that the States ruled by them would not in any case adopt the NCERT text books. They would, go further and launch a nation-wide agitation against the Education policy of the Central Government.56 These factors in Indian federalism show that while diversity in Indian conditions is invulnerable, unity is constantly at stake. The restraining thought is that if the Union is weakened the States will be losers too. This should be guiding rule for maintaining the federal equilibrium in the days to come. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Art. 2 of the Constitution. The following cases are illustrative of the differential treatment. (a) the special status accord to the Jammu and Kasmir under Art. 370. (b) the admission of Sikkim as “an associate State” of the Union, 1974. (c) the differential treatment among the Union Territories. (d) the special provisions governing the administration of Tribal Areas as provided in Vth and Vth Scheduled of the Constitution As per the Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Court in Re Berubari Union (1960) 3 SCR 250, Parliament may not cede any portion of the national territory in favour of a foreign state. In view of this, both the Tashket declaration (1966) and Simla Agreement (1972) involving the return of portions of Kashmir territory recovered from Pakistan’s illegal Occupation back to it were politically ridiculous and constitutionally void. Reading the Court’s opinion in the Brown case (1954) Chief Justice Warren said: “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal…. Any language in Plessy V. Ferguson contrary to these findings is rejected.” See Brown V Topeka Board of Education, 374 U.S. 483 (1954). In 1960 Bombay State was bifurcated to form the two States of Maharashtra and Gujarat; in 1962 Nagaland was separated from Assam and Meghalaya in 1969. In 1966 Punjab was bifurcated to form the States of Punjab and Haryana. The North East Areas Reorganization Act, 1971 brought up Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura into the category of States and added and Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh to the list of UTs. Goa first admitted to India as a Union Territory in 1961, was raised to full Statehood in 1987. Dadra and Nagar Haveli, former Portuguese colonies were admitted as Union Territory in 1961. Pondicherry former French colony was admitted as Union Territory in 1963. Sikkim was first admitted as an “associate State” of the Union but later given full-fledged Statehood by the Constitution (36th) Amendment Act, 1975. The other cases of upgradation were Hmanchal (1970) Manipur and Tripura (1971) Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh (1986). The renamed States are Tamilnadu (formerly Madras), Karnatak (Mysore), Maharashtra (Bombay), Lakshadwitp (Laccadiv, Minicoy, Amindivi). Art. 368 goes on to say that if the amendment seeks to make any change in: (a) article 54, Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 123 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. article 55, article 73, article 162, or article 241;or; (b) Chapter 4 of Part V, Chapter 5 of Part VI or Chapter I of Part XI; or (c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or (d) the provisions of this article the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than on half of the State by resolutions to that effect passed by these legislatures. Nathan, Glazer “Towards and Imperial Judiciary” in the American Commonwealth, 1976 (eds) Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol, Basic Books, New York p. 104. CAD, VII, p.33. Dr. Ambedkar said, “This dual polity under the proposed Constitution will consists of the Union at the Centre and the States at the Periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to be excercised in the field assigned to them respectively by the Constitution… The Union is not a league of State nor are the States administrative units or agencies of the Union Governments.” The Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, and the Constition (74 th Amendment) Act, 1992 went into force form 20 April, 1993 and introduced part IX and Part IXA in the Constitution. While Pt IX relates to the Panchayats, containing Articles 243 to 243 0, part IX A relates 0 the municipalities, containing Articles 243 P to 243 ZG. The provisions in the two Parts are more or less parallel or analogues. 11th Schedule contains 29 Items such as Land improvement, Minor irrigation, animal husbandry, fisheries, education, women and child development, 12th Schedule contains 18 items such as Urban Planning. Regulation of Land use, Roads and Bridges, Water Supply, Public Health, Fire Services, Urban Forestry, Slums. Art 243X stipulates “The legislature of a State may by law (a) authorise a Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees. (b) assign to a Municipality such taxes, duties tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes. (c) provide for making such grants in aid to the Municipality from the consolidated Fund of the State. as may be specified in the law. There is analogous provision for the Panchayats. In a Resolution passed by the All India Panchyat Adhyakshas Sammelan it was urged that the Union Government introduce a new constitutional Amendment to empower the panchayati raj institutions with more administrative and financial powers. Prime Minister Vajpayee inaugurating a conference of project directors of district level rural development agencies (DRDA’s) at New Delhi on Oct. 5 2002 responded by declaring that a Constitution amendment bill would be introduced in the winter session of Parliament to give more financial and administrative powers to the panchayati raj institutions after evolving a consensus among political parties on this issue. The pioneer, Lucknow, 5 Oct. 2002. Cf. Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, 1999, p. 270. Basu believes that “The 11th Schedule distributes powers between the State Legislature and the Panchayats just as the 7th Schedule distributes powers between the Union and the State Legislature” Such a view in unwarranted. CAD, XI, p. 976. D.D. Basu, A Commentary on the Constitution of India, Vol. I. 3rd Ed. p.18 Part XI, Ch, I Legislative Relations: Ch. II. Administration Relations, Part XII, Arts. 268 to 281: Distribution of Revenues between the Union and States. “In the Context of India, so large and varied with so many religions, languages and traditions, all contending for recognition, it was imperative to invest the Centre with authority unusual in a fedration”. Ram Kishore Vyas, “Centre State Relations in the Legislative Field”, in Rajsthan Vidhan Sabha Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume (19521975), Jaipur, 1977, p. 249. Dr. Ambedkar in his concluding speech during the Third Reading debate on the Draft Constitution, CAD, IX, p. 976. K. Santhanam, “Federal Relations”, in M.G. Gupta (ed) Aspect of Indian Constitution, Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1964, p. 443. 124 Journal of Social and Political Studies 23. Ibid, p. 442. 24. Dr. Ambedkar defended these cases of Central encroachment upon the State Legislative sphere as a “new way to overcome rigidity and legalism inherent in federalism”. CAD, VII, P.36. 25. Ram Kishore Vyas, “Centre-State Relations in the Legislative Field”, Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha Silver Jubilee Volume, 1977, p. 250-51 Also see S.P. Aiyar, “Thoughts on a More Perfect Union”, in the Constitution and the Parliament in India, (Ed.). S.L. Shakdher, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, pp. 35-36. According to Aiyar, “The Functions of government are acquiring a broader significance and deeper complexity under the impact of science and technology. Many activities which in an earlier period could be left to the States have now a federal Aspect as well. This is particularly true of fields like education, health and agriculture. This is he logic of the concurrent list” 26. Sir lver Jennings, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution, Oxford, Univ. Press, 1953, p. 61. 27. “Centre State Relations in the Legislative Field”. in Rajasthan Vidhan Shbha, Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume, (1952-77), Jaipur P. 253. He writes, “Normally the President gave his assent on all the bills sent to him. He, however, withheld his assent of the following State laws and no reasons were given for withholding the assent: (i) Rajasthan Urban Property (ceiling) bill, 1972) (ii) The Indian Electricity (Rajasthan Amemdment) bill, 1975. 28. Ibid, p-254. The president returned for reconsideration the Madhya Pradesh SC and OBC Reservation bill on 11 April 2002 on the ground that the Reservation quota envisaged in it exceeded the 50% outer limit. 29. S.P. Aiyar “Thoughts on a More Perfect Union”, in the Constitution and the Parliament of India, (ed) S.L. Shakdher, Lok Sabh Secretariant, New Delhi, 1976. Aiyar writes, “It is now widely accepted that the neatness of dual federalism is unsuited to modern needs. Items of government responsibilities can no longer be regarded as falling in either the Union of the State list. The either of federalism of the past has become obsolescent in the modern world.” p.35 30. In 1967 the Home Ministry issued a communication drawing the attention of the State Governments to growing menance of gheraos and bandhs and frequent suspension of rail and air services and the stoppage of work in Central Government offices and industrial undertakings due to inaction on the part of State authorities and warning them that if they failed to protect Centre’s property and installations and to ensure proper functioning of its agencies, it will have to take action to ensure that Government is carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi 12.11.1967. 31. The dismissals of Governors Prabhudatt Patwari ( Tamilnadu 1980) Raghukul Tilak (Rajsthan 1980), Sheila kaul (Himanchal Pradesh) 1996, Fathima Bibi (Tamilnaud, sep. 2011) before expiry of five year term are some of the examples. 32. CAD VII, p.37 33. Coffee Board v. CTO AIR 1971 SC 870 34. Cf. D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Wadhwa and Co. 1999, Basu writes, “In emergencies the government under the Indian Constitution will as if it ware a unitary government” (p. 26). Again, “the Emergency provision of our Constitution enable the federal Government to ecquire the strength of a unitary system whenever the exigencies of the situation so demand”. p.339. 35. Asoka Chanda, “Institutional Base of Centre, State Relations” in B.L. Maheshwari, (ed) Centre-State Relations in the Seventies, Calcutta, 1973, p. 138. Also see K.M. Munshi “The Super Cabinet” in The Radical Humanist, 6 Dec. 1959 p.571, and, Administrative Reforms Commission, Interim Report on the Machinery of Planning, New Delhi, 1967, para 15. 36. K. Santhanam, “Federal Relations”, in M.G. Gupta (ed) Aspects of Indian Constitution, Allahabad. 1964, p. 447. Constitutional Structure, Mechanism and Working of Federalism in India 125 37. Paul H. Applebby, “The Civil Services”, in M.G. Gupta, Aspects of Indian Constitution, p.323. 38. H.M. Patel, The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Oct.-Dec.1959, p.461. 39. Michael Bracher, Nehru- A Political Biography, Landon, 1959, p.521. 40. K. Santhanam, Union State relation in India, Bombay, 1963, p. 46. 41. B.L. Fadia, State Politics in India, Vol.I, Radiant, New Delhi, 1984, p.125, 131 42. Ibid, p.136. 43. K. Santhanam, Federal Relations in Aspect of Indian Constitution. opcit., p.447. 44. Fadia, Babulal, State Politics in India, op. cit. pp. 183-84. 45. Ibid, p. 187. 46. Henry Steel Commager, “To, Form a Much Less Perfect Union”. The New York Times Magazine, 14 July 1963. 47. See the West Bengal Government’s Memorandum on Centre State Relations, 1979. 48. See the Anandpur Saheb Resolution of the Akali Dal. There are, in fact, several versions of the “Resolution”, in circulation. The “original” Resolution was adopted by the Akali Dal Working Committed at Anandpur Sabeb on 16th October 1973. Another version was adopted at the all Indian Akali Conference in Ludhiana in 1978. A third version was adopted by the World Sikh Convention organized by the Akali Dal faction led by Jagdev Singh Talwadi at Anandpur Saheb in April 1981. The Anandpur Saheb resolution assumes the concept of a “Sikh Nation’ and on this basis demands the creation of an autonomous “Sikh State” where the supremacy of the Khalsa Panth is recognised. See Harkishan Singh Surjeet, “what Anandpur Sahib Resolution Really aimed at”, in Northern India Patrika, Allahabad, July 31, 1985, p. 4. 49. Tamilnadu, Centre-State Relations Inquiry also known as Rajmannar Committee Report, Madras, 1971. 50. Saradar K.M. Pannikar observed that “No State in India, singly, even if it were dreaming of its greatness in a mythical golden age, can undertake a multi-purpose project like that at Hirakud, or contemplate an iron and steel factory like the Hindustan Steel. The costs involved, the technical skill required, the sustained planning and execution, are beyond the resources of single State”. See Fadia, op cit., p.139. 51. S.P. Aiyar, “Thoughts on a More Perfect Union”, in the Constitution and Parliament in India, Ed, S.L,Shakdher, 1976, p. 36. 52. Government of India, Planning Commission, Th Planning Process, New Delhi, 1963, pp 5354. In her address to the meeting of the National Development Council on 20 January 1973, Mrs. Gandhi said, “It would be useful if the meetings of the National Development Council are held not only for discussing the plan but also for other major problems and broad matters of national policy” The Statesman, New Delhi. Dated 21 January 1973. 53. The National Front Government headed by V.P. Singh (1989-90) was a minority coalition depending on outside support of the BJP and the CPI(M); It was followed by the “Miniscule” Government headed by the Breakaway Chandra Shekhar group having a following of some sixty members in the Lok Sabha but assured of the outside support of the Cong. (I). Cong (I) Government headed by PV Narsimha Rao was in June 1991 a minority government but gradually attained majority status when on 30 December 1993 the 10 Janata Dal (Ajit) MPs crossed over to its side. The United Front Government (1996-98) was a coalition of some 14 parties depending on the outside support of Cong (I). 54. M.G. Gupta (ed), Aspects of Indian Constitution, op.cit, p.448. 55. Paul H. Appleby, Public Administration in India, New Delhi, 1953, p.22 56. The pioneer, Lucknow, 18 October 2002, p.3. 126 Journal of Social and Political Studies Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama Lakshmi Raj Sharma Some basic questions about Shakespeare’s art have been raised time and again, and several attempts have been made to tackle these questions. This monograph may be considered one such attempt. The questions raised in this monograph and the answers attempted herein are connected with Shakespeare’s art and beliefs as reflected in Antony and Cleopatra. They relate to the play’s form as well as to its content (the philosophy it seems to support)—both of which have remained enigmatic. But the questions raised here also extend beyond the play, to perplexing attributes of the poet and dramatist as a whole. The questions: 1. Why had it become necessary for Shakespeare to write Antony and Cleopatra at the time he wrote it? 2. Does the play say anything? If it does, what does it say? 3. How does Shakespeare say whatever he wants to, in Antony and Cleopatra? How does he overcome the limitations imposed by the existing genres? (Each of the above questions is tackled in the different sections of this monograph) I Shakespeare’s extensive experimentation with literary form is no secret. He may have settled for the literary genres of that period —genres such as the sonnet, the narrative poem, comedy, tragedy, history-play, and romance—but he always put new life into the existing genres. Even a sub-genre, like revenge-tragedy or domestic-tragedy was transformed in Shakespeare’s hands. Domestic-tragedy, for instance, was first seen in the anonymous Elizabethan dramas: Arden of Feversham (1591), A Warning for Fair Women (1599), and The Yorkshire Tragedy (1606). Besides, there was Thomas Heywood’s Woman Killed with Kindness. But when Shakespeare used domestic-tragedy in Othello, and Hamlet, the result was very different. His domestic-tragedies became substantially more than what they had been earlier. Shakespeare dwelt on “generic boundaries”, as G.K.Hunter put it,1 rather than on the conventional genre itself. Due to this quality in his make-up, he was constantly trying to find newer ways of expressing his observations and experiences. To a certain extent, all great literature is a result of this saying something new in a new way. This idea has found support from critics, Coleridge down to Eliot. But with Shakespeare, the newness of the form of expression seems to have been an obsession. He was critical of poets and playwrights who wrote in blind imitation. Hamlet’s instructions to the company of players is indicative of the Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 127 fact that Shakespeare did not find contemporary theatre expressive enough. Besides, Shakespeare pointed out repeatedly that the state of contemporary poetry was deplorable.2 A number of characters figuring in the plays between 1595 and 1599 ridicule soneteers and mere rhymers.3 Ballads are ridiculed in Henry IV.4 Shakespeare had indeed become dissatisfied with verse itself in the years 15951600.5 Poets were easily bracketed with lovers and lunatics and were often disparaged. Incidentally, Shakespeare seems to have favoured the spontaneous variety of poetry,6 the variety which he later used abundantly in Antony and Cleopatra, and in his other works as well. Though dissatisfied with verse, Shakespeare was still using it in his plays as well as his poems. So he had to be original in the handling of verse as well as the literary genre he was using in order to be sufficiently expressive. But originality tends to be a problem for literary history,7 particularly if the originality crosses the bounds laid down by literary genres and/or social morality. By the latter I refer to an author who chooses to use ideas which are ahead of his times. Since Antony and Cleopatra was original on both levels, it was likely to create problems (and it actually has) for its audiences and readers. It must therefore remain one of Shakespeare’s problem plays. Shakespeare’s originality seems to have been at its highest in Antony and Cleopatra. He was indeed saying something very new in a very new way. He seems to have come to the kind of spiritual discovery that needed an almost new medium to contain it. This included a new kind of literary form and required an impressive machinery of myth, image, symbol and metaphor. What he wanted to convey was beyond the limits of social permissibility as it violated existing codes of morality in its permissiveness. Furthermore, what he had come to believe was definitely not something which was easy to grasp. I will deal with this point in the next section. For the present, suffice it to say that Shakespeare was trying to say, in a more successful way, what he had merely hinted at in “Venus and Adonis”: How love is wise in folly, foolish witty. (838) This of course is only one strand of thought from the poem which he would recast in the play; and this is not all that he says in Antony and Cleopatra. Several nineteenth century critics have considered “Venus and Adonis” a “quasi-biographical document”.8 To Shakespeare the poem had its obvious limitations, particularly because it was not expressive enough. It must have seemed “too sensual moralistically and too cold artistically”.9 In other words, Shakespeare seems to have been unsuccessful in finding appropriate symbols for expressing a thought dear to him. He was probably saddled with a fine vision that did not find an appropriate voice. Hence his desire to say in “Venus and Adonis” something which went beyond the merely social met with a failure of sorts. He was, after all, saying something new in not such a new way. The desire to put his experience into a different artistic mould seems to have resulted in Antony and Cleopatra. This can be deduced on the premise that the two texts share much in thematic terms and Cleopatra is largely Venus.10 Ovid, who was the “amorous 128 Journal of Social and Political Studies schoolmaster” of several Renaissance poets, had definitely influenced Shakespeare in “Venus and Adonis”, where the amorous element was distinctly physical and yet more than the merely physical. Similar was to be the case in Antony and Cleopatra. Even artistically there is some similarity between the two pieces. Both works use myth and create vivid pictorial presentations of a similar content. J.W. Lever’s assessment of Shakespeare’s narrative poetry is very significant for this article.11 He points to the pictorial qualities of “Venus and Adonis” describing it as “verbal painting” and linking it with “Florentine pictorial treatment of classical myth.”12 Lever says that in both “Venus and Adonis” as well as “The Rape of Lucrece”, Shakespeare’s narrative art was greatly flawed.13 Perhaps this was so because Shakespeare’s aptitude was more suited to comic art than to the tragic, at that time, and he had chosen the wrong subject.14 Now, years later, Shakespeare probably decided to say the same thing more successfully by blending the epic with that form which he had perfected—poetic-drama. He was critic enough to assess that his narrative poems lacked the finesse of his dramas. He seems to have been driven towards inventing a genre to facilitate his expressiveness in Antony and Cleopatra. Further, Shakespeare could have been impressed by the idea of writing an epic because (a) the sixteenth century regarded Virgil, and his hero, the very epitome of human perfection,15 (b) he was impressed by the Aeneid, (the Trojan episode in “The Rape of Lucrece” came from the first two books of the Aeneid).16 If Shakespeare had to write an epic as grand as the Aeneid, he had to make it different to it. The difference, he seems to have decided, would be achieved by changing narrative art to dramatic art. II A significant question that must be answered at this stage is, whether Shakespeare was actually interested in saying something in Antony and Cleopatra. Was he trying to convey a thought through this play? Morris Weitz believes that Shakespeare has said nothing at all in Antony and Cleopatra and that, . . . in the case of Antony and Cleopatra we have a great tragedy which contains a number of philosophical themes but no implied or elicitable philosophical thesis or universal claim. . . . it neither makes nor includes any general claim about man and his world. Rather it is a tragedy of two particulars, who instance no universal applicable to all.17 This seems to be the opinion of one who has learned to accept that Shakespeare was that unique author who never voiced a personal belief or philosophy. An erroneous theory, is applied by Weitz to Antony and Cleopatra. But to my mind Shakespeare had evolved certain beliefs about life which, being unconventional, could not have been stated in unambiguous terms. He had perhaps struck upon a theory which, had he been a philosopher, he might have put more explicitly. He had probably come to realise something about life and human experience which went against social norms and beliefs. And what he had realised was by no Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 129 means simple. It was a complex world-view. Perhaps Shakespeare was anticipating axiological intuitionism (or some other shade of objective idealism). This early twentieth century philosophy seems to support the asocial attitude of Shakespeare in Antony and Cleopatra. Axiological intuitionism, particularly that of G.E. Moore, questions the very basis of what constitutes the good or goodness. Moore believed that goodness is a simple, indefinable property, which can be arrived at by intuition rather than any other moralistic value-system. Similarly H.A. Prichard has maintained that moral judgements about what one ought to do cannot be analysed or proved in terms of any other consideration including self-interest or general utility. Besides, according to Axiology, values are considered extra-social phenomena. Further, objective idealist theories like neo-Kantianism, followers of Husserlian phenomenology, and neo-Thomism also share in such a value system. For them value is absolute essence outside space and time. Shakespeare had a romantic disposition and the romantic is seldom content with what is traditional and socially valid. Hence, it may not have been the legitimate or socially rational philosophy to have possessed. This philosophy may not have tallied with the world-view reflected in his other texts because he may not have been writing with the same audiences, or aims, in mind each time. In Antony and Cleopatra it appears he was neither justifying the Tudor myth nor writing to please a particular monarch, lord, or patron. This play, more than any other, seems to be Shakespeare in soliloquy. Shakespeare’s world-view, as expressed in this play, included a redefinition of what was ideal for individuals; what is the right equation between law and impulse; what constitutes the nature of true love; who is the ideal man and who the ideal woman; how far is it justified to sacrifice one’s desires for the sake of society or even one’s country. It is also possible that Shakespeare’s world-view did not fall in line with traditional ways of thinking because his imagination was not exactly hetrosexual,18 and he saw things with a different degree of sensitivity. What Shakespeare wanted to convey in this play through image, symbol, and metaphor is roughly summarised below: The ideal man is not he who is either too powerful or wealthy, too patriotic or worldly, too masculine or moral (in social terms). The ideal woman likewise, is not one who has any of these extreme traits in her personality. On the contrary, the ideal man or woman is one who has the capacity to partake of these extreme qualities, yet, at the same time, be able to remain happy in the reverse situations. The ideal person in Shakespeare possesses what he calls a “heavenly mingle” and is one who finds the role of queen or milkmaid, statesman or warrior (or “doting mallard”) equally acceptable. Note the description of Antony in the dialogue between Alexas and Cleopatra, Cleo: What, was he sad, or merry? Alex.: Like to the time of the year between the extremes Of hot and cold, he was nor sad nor merry. Cleo.: O well divided disposition! . . . . 130 Journal of Social and Political Studies He was not sad, for he would shine on those That make their looks by his; he was not merry, Which seem’d to tell them his remembrance lay In Egypt with his joy; but between both O heavenly mingle! Be’st thou sad, or merry, The violence of either thee becomes, So does it no man else. (I.v.50-61) It seems that Shakespeare’s association with stage-acting led him toward a disposition that helped him to fit into any role without being uncomfortable. One significant feature of his ideal man and ideal woman seems to be the capacity for true love. Love is the one essential human virtue; the rest is mere role-playing. Cleopatra’s character must be seen in this light if it is to be seen sympathetically. Shakespeare has stated more than once that the world is a stage and that we are merely players. Playing roles successfully would imply not the mere understanding of one’s own part but an involvement with the parts of others as well. On stage, every character must understand every other character’s part and respect it. To understand one’s own part and the parts of others is to be able to accept others with sympathy. Actors must do this in order to allow the play to proceed without confusion on stage; and in life also the same performance must go on. If we can play our roles successfully, as Cleopatra does ( but as Cordelia, Lady Macbeth, Desdemona and some others do not) then all is well. Cordelia, Lady Macbeth and Desdemona have each failed to understand the true psychology/nature of the tragic hero in question. They have not really entered that area where there is a blending of minds in the true sense. They therefore end up contributing to the hero’s suffering. Developing these ideas further, it may be possible to suggest that Shakespeare was not entirely in sympathy with a man like Othello. Othello may have been a fine general and public figure, but he seems to have been too much of the male. He is devoid of feminine experience and is unable to enter imaginatively into female experience. When brought into contact with a noble woman he is unable to understand her. The same is partly true of Lear and Macbeth. But Mark Antony has the kind of flexibility which Shakespeare seems to have approved of. As a result, Antony is unlike the ideal Roman patriot and can find his heaven in love alone. He can be, without getting frustrated, the “doting mallard” following a woman whom the Roman would consider a strumpet. Cleopatra, similarly, is not too much of woman. She is perhaps less feminine than the other tragic heroines of Shakespeare even though she has more charm. She can at times be almost like a man without losing her femininity. Lady Macbeth fails when she tries to play the male role. Cleopatra is not like the traditional woman who would allow her man to think for her. She has a mind of her own. She would not be satisfied in accepting the submissive role of the weaker sex. Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 131 She successfully carries out the other role. This is what Enobarbus and Agrippa say of her: Eno.: Upon her landing, Antony sent to her, I invited her to supper: she replied, It would be better he became her guest, Which she entreated: our courteous Antony, Whom ne’er the word of ‘No’ woman heard speak Being barber’d ten times o’er, goes to the feast; .... Agri.: Royal wench! She made great Caesar lay his sword to bed; He plough’d her, and she cropp’d. [Emphasis mine.] (II.ii.219-27) She too, like Antony, has the capacity for accepting contradictory situations without being disturbed. She in fact possesses the “heavenly mingle” and seems to remain unaffected by what ordinary mortals would be troubled or even defeated. She has the ability, as Enobarbus says, of making “defect perfection” (II.ii.231). She remains unaffected even by age and custom: Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale Her infinite variety: Other women cloy The appetites they feed, but she makes hungry, Where most she satisfies. For vilest things Become themselves in her, that the holy priests Bless her, when she is riggish. (II.ii.235-40) This does not mean that Cleopatra is unconscious of the problems of other women or is unsympathetic towards them. She can be indeed as mild a woman as any, when the need arises: Ah women, women! Come; we have no friend But resolution and the briefest end. (IV.xv.90-91) Compared to Desdemona and Cordelia, Cleopatra is much more flexible. She is also much closer to Modern Woman. She can be in the commanding position, like a man, and then revert back to a woman’s role with ease. Perhaps Shakespeare felt that one who has experienced this world only through one’s own gender has seen but half of it. It is probably for this reason that we have in Shakespeare what M.C. Bradbrook describes as “transvestite games.”19 Unfortunately, Bradbrook does not say enough on the subject. Similarly, even a critic of G.Wilson Knight’s stature stops short of explicating this point. He merely says that there is in this play a 132 Journal of Social and Political Studies blending of the sexes.20 Shakespeare’s favourite, symbolic way of suggesting this trans-gender experience can be seen in several comedies where the heroines dress in men’s attire and enact the roles of men. To Shakespeare, experiencing the other gender seems to have been one of the highest points of achievement. Bradbrook refers to the great Renaissance dream of an exchange and union of the masculine and feminine principle.21 But to me, the exchange and union is not merely an exchange or a blending of the two sexes. The entire exercise involves a certain depth—a reaching out to the soul, as it were. Going beyond the self (caged in a gender)—to the soul—is what seems to be desirable. It is not only the love of man for woman that seems the necessary ideal. Love should transcend gender. The Brihadäranyaka Upanishad says something similar: It is not for the love of a husband that a husband is dear; but for the love of the Soul in the husband that a husband is dear. It is not for the love of a wife that a wife is dear; but for the love of the Soul of a wife that a wife is dear.22 This trans-gender movement is in line with that quality of Shakespeare’s mind which has been described as “negative-capability”. Antony and Cleopatra are perhaps Shakespeare’s greatest lovers as well as his ideal human beings because they have this extreme flexibility and this capacity to transcend gender. There are, undoubtedly, some references in the text which make Antony and Cleopatra slaves of lust. On the surface, they appear to be sensual and physical but even from the first scene there are references to their higher love. The end of the play shows them to be lovers of a unique kind. Other characters in the play, who are unable to see their soul-union, belittle them. But being spiritual (as opposed to being merely physical), the love of Antony and Cleopatra transcends gender. They would have loved each other as much even if they belonged to the same sex. Each is able to empathise with the other. There are several references to this trans-gender movement in Antony and Cleopatra. Significantly, Octavius says that Antony . . . is not more manlike Than Cleopatra; nor the queen of Ptolemy More womanly than he. (I.iv.5-7) Cleopatra says: . . . now I have nothing Of woman in me. (V.ii.236-37) When Enobarbus says, “Hush, here comes Antony” (I.ii.76), it is Cleopatra who actually enters. There is a reference to Antony violating manhood (III.x.23), and Enobarbus says to Antony: “Transform us not to women” (IV.iii.36). And Antony remorses: “I . . . condemn myself, to lack/ The courage of a woman” (IV.xiv.56- Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 133 60). Some effect of this filters down to others. Canidius says, “our leader’s led/ And we are women’s men” (III.vii.68-69). And again, “. . . young boys and girls/ Are level now with men (IV.xv.65-66). Shakespeare achieves much by this fluidity of gendered experience. It is as if nobility is not to love the other for what he has (in material, political or sexual terms), but for what one is spiritually. The world of Antony and Cleopatra is perplexing if seen in social terms. What may be the cherished ideal in society (particularly the feudalistic) may be of no value in the world of the lovers. Thus worldly success, political power, patriotic leaning, love of spouse, mean little to them. This attitude is like Keats’ belief that what the imagination seizes as beauty must be truth. Thus social approval becomes less desirable than what is deeply felt in the heart and soul. Octavius Caesar, who symbolises the worldly man (materialistic, political, powerful, i.e. socially successful) says this of Antony: . . . he fishes, drinks, and wastes The lamps of night in revel; is not more manlike Than Cleopatra; nor the queen of Ptolemy More womanly than he. . . . You should find there A man who is the abstract of all faults That all men follow. (I.iv.4-9) The faults of Antony are faults in the social sense only. Lepidus says to Octavius very aptly, almost as if he were Shakespeare’s mouthpiece: I must not think there are Evils enow to darken all his goodness; His faults, in him, seem as the spots of heaven, More fiery by night’s blackness, hereditary, Rather than purchas’d; what he cannot change, Than what he chooses. (I.iv.10-15) Antony may be wanting by social standards, but seen independently of society, Antony’s faults seem “as the spots of heaven”. In this sense Antony and Cleopatra may be considered an apotheosis of the spirit of man. It can be considered a poem on the supremacy of spirit over body, impulse over social law, and intuition over intellect. One of the key messages of the play is conveyed through Antony, “Kingdoms are clay: our dungy earth alike/ Feeds beast as man;” (I.i.35-36). Shakespeare is taking an antimaterialistic position, as he has often done. In King Lear, for instance, the Fool tells the shattered Lear about the worthlessness of the crown: “Nuncle, give me an egg, and I’ll give thee two crowns” (I.iv.152-53). The human world (social, moral, political) can lead to a state in which man and beast 134 Journal of Social and Political Studies are quite alike. The “dungy earth” feeds both in the same way. The earth is a baser element. Cleopatra says she is fire and air and hence above earth. Antony uses the adjective “dungy” to show his dissatisfaction with the earth. He, after all, has the “heavenly mingle” in him. If man is to be different to beast, he must exist at the spiritual level where worldly considerations melt into insignificance. The manner in which Antony dies is evidence of this attitude. This Antony has advanced far beyond the one we saw in Julius Caesar. In the earlier play, Antony possessed the courtier’s art just as he did a calculating worldliness. In the later play he has clearly become spiritual. In Antony and Cleopatra he gives up the world, of which he had become a “triple pillar” by hard means. He has also advanced to a consciousness where there is little difference between life and death. He embraces death as a lover going to his beloved’s bed. Little wonder then, that Antony does not think it necessary to be with either Fulvia or Octavia, both of whom he has wedded in the social sense. It is not that he does not sympathise with them. It is just that they are not his soul-mates. Cleopatra, similarly, cannot be judged as a member of society, playing a social role and enjoying a corresponding social status. She is queen-milkmaid, strumpetgoddess, mistress-wife, all in one. But there is one role—not social—which she seems most keen to play: that of Antony’s soul-mate. She too, like Antony happily gives up the material world and embraces death. For her the mighty Octavius has never been more than “the scarce-bearded Caesar”. She throws him out of her life as one would a rotten apple. The problem for Shakespeare was how to justify his Antony and his Cleopatra to an audience which was clearly not as progressive and advanced as he was. It must have been a teasing problem to validate socially a man and a woman who must appear like social deviants. III Shakespeare seems to have invented a method of justifying his hero and heroine. He probably found a double-edged strategy in his use of the following formula: (a) Elevating Antony and Cleopatra to the stature of gods every now and again by presenting them through an imagery of magnitude and grandeur. (b) Blending epic and drama into a new literary form, let us call it the “dramatic epic”, and thus being able to inflate the stature of his protagonists. If he had written in the form of the traditional epic, he may not have felt as confident since he had been dissatisfied with his handling of narrative verse. If he had written just another drama, he may not have been able to deify his protagonists because they would seem awkward and unconvincing in the company of the other characters. It may be pointed out here that Shakespeare was trying out a similar experiment in Troilus and Cressida but had not quite succeeded in that play. In Troilus, Shakespeare had the additional burden of looking after a double plot. Troilus remained rather contrived and artificial but the time gap of four years seems to have brought about artistic maturity. In Antony and Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 135 Cleopatra, Shakespeare managed to do the virtually impossible: making his protagonists remain human and godlike simultaneously. This was achieved by a skilful blending of the dramatic and epic forms. Much criticism on Antony and Cleopatra has addressed itself to the apotheosis of Antony and Cleopatra but strangely none treats of the real reason for the apotheosis. G. Wilson Knight, who has always been outstanding in his explication of Shakespeare, has said merely this of the apotheosis: Here finite and infinite are to be blended. Throughout we have a new vital complexity surpassing other plays; a wider horizon, a richer content.23 But this observation hardly takes us further in understanding the process of character-magnification which the poet so successfully weaves into the play. Others like Michael Payne24 and Richard Hillman25 talk at length about the apotheosis but their reasons for doing so are very different. They don’t get to the root of the apotheosis. From the very opening dialogue of Antony and Cleopatra, Shakespeare’s chief concern seems to be to put forward the central problem and then to tide over the hurdles that present themselves in the way of its solution. Both Antony and Cleopatra are introduced with their faults, as they would appear to society. Philo is virtually a nobody in the play, but he is like any member of a society which is critical of the licentiousness described below: Philo: Nay, but this dotage of our general’s O’erflows the measure . . . . . . his captain’s heart, . . . reneges all temper, And is become the bellows and the fan To cool a gipsy’s lust . . . . . . and you shall see in him The triple pillar of the world transform’d Into a strumpet’s fool. (I.i.1-13) The very first word, “Nay” opens a debate about the respectability of Antony and Cleopatra. Philo is disagreeing with Demetrius’s (unmentioned though implicit) response to their behaviour. Antony’s dotage is overflowing the “measure”. The measure relates to social custom and expectation. Whereas Antony is Fulvia’s husband, and should ideally be with Octavius, helping Rome in its onward march towards aggrandisement and prosperity, all he is doing is to foolishly spend his time lusting after a strumpet. Whether it is actually lust or love it will take the entire play to decide, though even in the first scene we do get a glimpse of its spirituality. From the play it would appear that Shakespeare is questioning the very basis of society. The reasons for which society came into existence—the general preservation of man’s interests and his larger happiness—seem to have been 136 Journal of Social and Political Studies rendered meaningless. The demands of the social world need not always be in agreement with the world of individual pleasure and gratification. The individual is often sacrificed for the general welfare of a system. Social life has a definite rationale and yet is only what may be called a necessary evil. These lines of Byron would support such a view: Society is now one polished horde, Formed of two mighty tribes, the Bores and Bored. (Don Juan XIII.xcv) The mind has been behind the creation of society—but there are the heart and the soul—which do not always tread the mind’s path. Antony and Cleopatra brings up some very basic conflicts that arise in society. Should a married man revel in the company of a woman other than his wife? Can a man doing so still be considered respectable, especially when he is guilty of neglecting his duty towards his country? In order to justify his hero and heroine, Shakespeare has tried to distinguish them from other people. Over and again they are raised to the level of the gods. Gods are not hampered by social morality: they can choose their own values and modes of living. Shakespeare raises the protagonists’ stature by projecting them through an imagery that suggests immensity and magnitude: Eternity was in our lips, and eyes, Bliss in our brows’ bent; none our part so poor, But was a race of heaven. (I.iii.35-37) He takes pains to keep up this imagery of magnification from beginning to end, a job which in a lesser poet would result in tedium. There are, however, moments in the play when Antony and Cleopatra are allowed to appear like ordinary mortals. But these moments are few and short-lived. Given below are instances of how the two characters are often shown as gods, or larger than life at least: The general’s dotage overflows the measure of ordinary people. His eyes have “glow’d like plated Mars”; his heart “in the scuffles of great fights hath burst the buckles on his breast”; and he is “a triple pillar of the world”. By line seventeen of the first scene we have already been told by one of the characters that Antony’s love (not lust) for Cleopatra needs a new heaven and a new earth to fit into. The biblical connotation of the line takes the man closer to spiritual, rather than sensual, love. Soon after these hyperbolic descriptions of Antony, we are introduced to Octavius who (though another triple pillar of the world, and who had a virtually godlike stature in history) is yet presented very differently, in a somewhat paltry fashion. He is called “the scarce bearded Caesar” and later described as “the boy Caesar” (III.xiii.18 and IV.i.1). Fulvia, similarly, is merely described as “shrilled tongued”. These descriptions of Octavius and Fulvia make them both rather common figures. Later in the text Octavia will be described as “low voiced”, “dull of tongue and dwarfish” (III.iii.12-16). Shakespeare is using the method of Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 137 contrast—human-gods as opposed to common men and women. Having presented Octavius and Fulvia through an imagery bereft of grandeur, in the first scene, Shakespeare returns to the spiritual qualities of Antony and Cleopatra thus highlighting the difference between them and the common materialistic lot. Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch Of the rang’d empire fall! Here is my space, Kingdoms are clay: our dungy earth alike Feeds beast as man; the nobleness of life Is to do thus: when such a mutual pair, And such a twain can do’t, in which I bind, On pain of punishment, the world to weet We stand up peerless. (I.i. 33-39) Antony’s spirituality and nobility are reflected in the choice he has made. He has not opted for a life of material gratification. Instead he has asked for a life of quality; with Cleopatra. With her he achieves the true godlike state; the true nobility. The wide arches of the ranged empire are not more attractive to him than the little space beside her. His existence with her is like a nirvana before which every other consideration is insignificant. He achieves his higher self in her company. Having failed as a social, political, and worldly person Antony can still draw this praise from Agrippa: “A rarer spirit never/ Did steer humanity” (V.i.30-31). The coming together of the lovers is no ordinary meeting. It is a soulunion which puts them towering above the rest of the world: We stand up peerless. (I.i.39) Significantly, whereas others cannot understand the true nature of this world (“the world to weet”), the lovers do understand it when they stand up above the rest. Reason and intelligence seem to be limited, but instinct and impulse are without such boundaries. In the first scene we see Antony putting aside the social problem, related to marriage, without any vexation. When Cleopatra asks him why he married Fulvia if he did not love her, he merely says: Now for the love of Love, and her soft hours, Let’s not confound the time with conference harsh. (I.i.44-45) The love of Love is the love of goddess Venus. How can human considerations interfere with divine bliss? In the second scene of Act One, we similarly learn of Cleopatra’s superhuman traits: 138 Journal of Social and Political Studies Ant.: She is cunning past man’s thought. Eno.: Alack, sir, no her passions are made of nothing but the finest part of pure love. We cannot call her winds and waters sighs and tears; they are greater storms and tempests than almanacs can report. This cannot be cunning in her, if it be, she makes a shower of rain as well as Jove (I.ii.143-149) Cleopatra will later be called Venus, Isis, witch, fairy, spell, serpent of old Nile, and “thou grave charm”. She is often referred to as Egypt itself. Age cannot wither her and custom cannot stale her. Besides, she has “immortal longings” in her. The famous barge scene stands out in the reader’s mind and she remains there as Venus, enthroned, rather than an ordinary human. Of course she is, once or twice, brought to the lowest level to confuse the reader who would cling hard to his social conscience. Even a critic as sane as Edward Dowden tends to see her as an enigma: And of Cleopatra what shall be said? Is she a creature of the same breed as Cato’s daughter, Portia? Does the one word woman include natures so diverse? Or is Cleopatra . . . no mortal woman, but Lilith who ensnared Adam before the making of Eve?26 Between the first two scenes of the play, in which the protagonists are presented through images of immensity, and the last where the same impression is conveyed with a sense of finality, there are several references to the two towering above the rest. For the sake of convenience, I turn to the last scene first, where Antony’s superhuman size is communicated through a plethora of visual and auditory images: His legs bestrid the ocean, his rear’d arm Crested the world: his voice was propertied As all the tuned spheres, and that to friends: But when he meant to quail, and shake the orb, He was as rattling thunder. For his bounty, There was no winter in’t: an autumn ’twas, That grew the more by reaping: his delights Were dolphin-like they show’d his back above The element they lived in: in his livery Walk’d crowns and crownets: realms and islands were As plates dropp’d from his pocket. (V.ii.82-92) In addition to Antony’s physical description given at the beginning, there are more descriptions of his larger-than-life stature—his legs bestriding the ocean, his arm cresting the world, his voice having the music of the spheres as well as the volume Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 139 of rattling thunder. Besides, we are introduced to his immense generosity which can give in charity vast islands and kingdoms. Between the introductory and concluding scenes of the play, the same process—the enlargement of the hero and heroine—goes on. Cleo.: Lord of lords O infinite virtue, com’st thou smiling from The world’s great snare uncaught? (IV.viii.16-18) Antony says to Cleopatra: Make mingle with our rattling tabourines, That heaven and earth may strike their sounds together, Applauding our approach. (IV.viii.37-39) Of the above lines, Joseph Summers has this to say: “As the scene ends with the beginning of a triumphal march, Antony’s voice creates the military music of an almost supernatural Coriolanus . . .”27 The process goes on; Antony says: . . . when I cried ‘Ho!’ Like boys unto a muss, kings would start forth. And cry ‘Your will?’ (III.xiii.90-92) Again he says: I, that with my sword Quarter’d the world, and o’er green Neptune’s back With ships made cities, . . . (IV.xiv.57-59) Yet again he is described as “The demi-Atlas of this earth, the arm/ And burgonet of men” (I.v.23-24). He can say for himself, The shirt of Nessus is upon me: teach me Alcides, thou mine ancestor, thy rage Let me lodge Lichas on the horns o’ th’ moon. (IV.xii.43-45) Antony can even “outstare lightning”. Harold Fisch, in an illuminating article, suggests how Antony and Cleopatra “lay claim to mythological status and who at every turn adopt the posture of figures in a fertility ritual.”28 Fisch links Antony with Mars, Hercules, Bacchus, Osiris, and the Sun. Cleopatra is similarly linked with Venus, Isis (who “is no ordinary goddess. She is in fact the ultimate matrix of nature”), goddess Proserpine, and Eve. Besides, he points out that she has a changeless, timeless character, which is also clearly marked in her own 140 Journal of Social and Political Studies speech where she asserts her antiquity, her immortal, fixed and absolute quality: ‘Think on me That I am with Pheobus’ amorous pinches black, And wrinkled deep in time.’29 Fisch does see the inflated, mythological status of the lovers but does not quite see the consequences of such an inflation. He merely discovers an irony in the inflation.30 The reason for enlarging the stature of Antony and Cleopatra seems to be rather plain. Shakespeare is elevating the two characters so that they may appear different to the others. They are placed on a higher plane, on a colossal scale, making others look ordinary in comparison. A.C.Bradley has observed that Antony and Cleopatra sit “in their paradise like gods.”31 They can say proudly, as the others in the play cannot, “We have kissed away/ Kingdoms and provinces”. The result is that we tend to consider them exceptional people. It is not we alone who do that, other characters frequently do the same, and through them our responses are monitored. Note for instance, the reaction of priests to Cleopatra’s charm. Other women would not get the same response from priests: For vilest things Become themselves in her, that the holy priests Bless her, when she is riggish. (II.ii.238-40) However, the grand scale on which Shakespeare would like his hero and heroine to be seen needs more than enlargement of imagery. It is here that Shakespeare’s innovative expertise comes into play. Shakespeare writes a play which encompasses several characteristics of an epic. Antony and Cleopatra should not be judged merely as a play. Its purpose is to touch epic heights; and a simple play would not achieve such an effect. In another play, people would be judged by the moral standards of their society. But here the social dimension snaps without appearing to do so. Shakespeare seems to have created a new kind of genre, the dramatic-epic. Dr Johnson had complained that in Antony and Cleopatra events proceed “without any art of connection or care of disposition.”32 The criticism may be justified in one who would insist on the purity of literary forms in the classicist sense. But if the play is seen as a combination of two literary forms, then the criticism does not seem quite valid. It should be kept in mind that a pure epic has never been written33 and when Shakespeare uses this form he changes it to some extent. For example instead of one epical hero Shakespeare introduces two protagonists in Antony and Cleopatra. M.H.Abrams defines an epic in the following manner: Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 141 It is a long narrative poem on a great and serious subject related in an elevated style, and centres on a heroic or quasi-divine figure on whose actions depends the fate of a tribe, a nation, or the human race.34 This definition would be quite befitting for Antony and Cleopatra but for the fact that the play is not a “long narrative poem”. This is where Shakespeare has innovated upon the form of the epic. He has created the epic in dramatic form. Further, the play can be seen as a long poem rather than a drama because there is very little action in it. Little happens in the play. Harley Granville Barker says that Shakespeare “reduces the actual story to simplicity itself.35 Much of the dramatic interest is transferred to the poetry of the work. The poetry of this play outdoes the poetry of the other plays of Shakespeare. What is lost in dramatic terms is regained in the poetic. Given below is a list of epic features which have entered this play.36 (a) The subject of the play is indeed great, complex, and heroic. Much of the second section of this monograph deals with it. It may be said that the play opens a debate on certain social issues, like public versus private interests, individual versus state, law versus impulse, etc. The hero is torn between these opposing forces. (b) The hero of an epic is a figure of national or cosmic importance. Antony is such a man. (c) The setting of the epic is always on an ample scale—world-wide or even larger. We can think of Antony’s wanting “a new heaven and a new earth” to accommodate his love. Epic imagination is expansive. It proceeds in ever widening circles. Shakespeare’s world grows in this play until there is a meeting point between this world and the other. (d) The action of an epic involves superhuman deeds. To give up the world for love is itself in a sense, a superhuman act. But Antony, in the role of a Hercules-figure is certainly superhuman. He can make a statement like, “Let me lodge Lichas on the horns o’th’ moon” in a casual manner as though this was like picking up a feather. He is a “demi-Atlas”, the Sun, Mars, and Osiris. He can “outstare lightning”, and bestride the ocean. Similarly the goddess-image of Cleopatra, her “immortal longings”, her relationships with Mars and Phoebus and her timeless personality make her superhuman indeed. (e) Gods, or other supernatural beings play an active role in an epic. Hercules leaves Antony in Act IV. Shakespeare devotes a scene to this event even though the incident does not affect the plot structurally. Cleopatra talks of her communion with the sun: “Think on me/ That I am with Phoebus’ amorous pinches black,/ And wrinkled deep in Time” (I.v.27-29). Besides, as Arthur Bell informs, Shakespeare uses the heroic convention to describe Antony’s relation to Time.37 Time has been pictured as goddess Fortune in the play. Antony leaves and returns to the world of Time. However, Journal of Social and Political Studies 142 (f ) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) in this play the hero and heroine are themselves presented as gods. Hence other gods and goddesses seem to fade out in their presence. Northrop Frye sees the epic as a post-mythical genre. “The hero of a myth is a god, the hero of an epic has authority, passion and powers of expression far greater than ours, but what he does is subject both to social criticism and the order of nature.”38 Antony and Cleopatra are very much in this position. In Antony and Cleopatra, as in epics, divine worship is replaced by human awe, an awe which is prodigious but still remains human. “Epic awe as distinguished from religious or mythical awe, springs from the circumstance that a man can commit an extraordinary act while still remaining limited. The hero is understood to be subject to ignorance, foolhardiness and above all death.”39 Antony and Cleopatra inspire this awe and remain human (as they do come back to the human level now and then). Similarly, they share with the epic hero in remaining subject to ignorance, foolhardiness and death. A man’s name is very significant in heroic poetry—it becomes synonymous with the sum of his achievements. His “action is knowable and is known, and is known to be his”.40 The names of Antony and Cleopatra are important in the heroic sense. Shakespeare even says clearly, “Antony will be Antony,” and “But since my lord/ Is Antony again, I will be Cleopatra” (III.xiii.186-87). Epic narrative is a series of adjustments between the hero’s capacities and his limitations. Antony’s frequent movement towards Egypt and then back to Rome is indicative of these adjustments. That Antony and Cleopatra contains the soul of an epic can be best demonstrated by the following primary quality of epics: “The subject of all epic poetry might be said to be politics not limited to society, a politics embracing the natural and fabulous worlds, embracing the moral or spiritual worlds involving ultimately the divine.”41 The world of Antony and Cleopatra is made up of this politics which transcends the social order and co-exists at the spritual as well as this-worldly planes. The language and dialogue of this play are also those that resemble the language and dialogue of epic-verse. Speech in epics “is ampler and more formal than common speech; it is the vehicle by which the political and symbolic associations of an action or image are commonly revealed, and by which they are situated in the historical context”.42 At the same time the language of an epic being grand, and in a higher style, must yet have a living impulse which imparts energy to men and things. The actions of the lovers are described through such symbolic and living associations: This dotage of our general’s/O’erflows the measure, The triple pillar of the world transform’d/ Into a strumpet’s fool, Antony, that blood of thine/ Is Caesar’s homager, Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 143 Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch/ Of the rang’d empire fall, The nobleness of life/ Is to do thus, Sir, sometimes, when he is not Antony/ He comes too short of that great property/ Which still should go with Antony, By the fire/ That quickens Nilus’s slime, I go from hence/ Thy soldier, servant, making peace or war,/ As thou affects, Look . . . / How this Herculean Roman does become/ The carriage of this chafe, Get me ink and paper,/ He shall have every day a several greeting,/ Or I’ll unpeople Egypt, . . . from edge to edge/ Of the world, I would pursue it, For her own person,/ It beggar’d all description: She did lie/ In her pavilion—cloth of gold, of tissue —/ O’er-picturing that Venus where we see/ That fancy outwork nature, The world and my great office, will sometimes/ Divide me from my bosom, He will to his Egyptian dish again: then shall the sighs of Octavia blow the fire up in Caesar, Good majesty,/ Herod of Jewry dare not look upon you,/ But when you are well pleas’d, Antony,/ Claps on his sea-wing, and (like a doting-mallard)/ . . . flies after her, When my good stars, that were my former guides,/ Have empty left their orbs, and shot their fires/ Into the abysm of hell, The three-nook’d world/ Shall bear the olive freely, Make mingle with our rattling tambourines,/ That heaven and earth may strike their sounds together/ Applauding our approach, . . . comest thou smiling from/ The world’s great snare uncaught? But I will be/ A bridegroom in my death, and run into ’t/ as to a lover’s bed, . . . but you gods will give us/ Some faults to make us men, I am fire, and air; my other elements/ I give to baser life, The stroke of death is as a lover’s pinch,/ Which hurts; and is desir’d, Dissolve, thick cloud, and rain, that I may say,/ The gods themselves do weep. The above list is not exhaustive. The play is full of a “high-style” which impresses the reader both by its extraordinary symbolic order as well as by its living quality. The surprising thing is that here, as perhaps nowhere else, a poet writes in a language which can be said to be heroic and spontaneous, romantic and classicist, of speech and of the spirit, as it were, simultaneously. Returning to the crucial third question, which this monograph attempts to answer, I need say that Shakespeare was trying to convey something that could 144 Journal of Social and Political Studies not have been conveyed directly. He was trying to show what he considered ideal in human action. His ideal man and woman may not have coincided with the ideal of a narrow-minded social-system. With this new compounded genre, Shakespeare was conveying his nonconformist vision of the best in human beings. He is thus able to present the protagonists in a way so as to justify their ways to men. Milton too had a similar kind of problem when he wrote of Satan, in the first two books of Paradise Lost. He too had to treat with respect and seriousness, a character that earlier tradition had cast into the mould of the villain-comedian. Milton has been misunderstood as one who was unconsciously taking the side of the Devil. He too presented Satan in the same, larger than life, form. Milton could not have allowed Satan to appear as an ordinary villain-cum-comedian. The epic form required that the contest between the forces of good and evil be not too unequal. For the contest to be effective, it was necessary to make Satan impressive. Hence Satan was presented on an ample scale—with huge shield and spear. Shakespeare, for different reasons, raised his protagonists to the level of gods by introducing the epic dimension into his play. The form of Antony and Cleopatra has troubled several critics. It does not fit clearly into any of the traditional moulds. Coleridge called the play, the most wonderful of the historical plays.43 (emphasis mine) Harold H. Fisch too felt that tragedy has given way to history in this play.44 A.C. Bradley has not clubbed his play with the four “pure-tragedies” of Shakespeare.45 G.K.Hunter does not quite accept this view of Bradley’s46 because for him this play is as much a tragedy as any other. Bradley had found it a unique play because it was the only play in which Shakespeare had reserved an entire last act for his heroine.47 Besides, Bradley does not find it dramatic enough as compared to Shakespeare’s pure-tragedies.48 It is a rarely acted play, and is not painful enough to be a tragedy. To Bradley, the subject matter of the play too lacks something which one finds in the other pure tragedies.49 More recently, Richard Hillman has suggested that in writing Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare has changed the typical tragic form.50 To Hillman the play has decisively moved beyond tragedy into a world like that of Shakespearean romance—a world whose essential quality is a “sense of the participation of the mythic in human life”.51 It may be said, then, that the play is tragic yet not a tragedy and that it is at the same time a history play as well as a romance. E.M.W. Tillyard, however, does not give it the status of a pure history play (nor do other critics for that matter) because it does not cover English history, nor does it voice the Tudor myth, nor again does it foster patriotism as the other history plays of Shakespeare do.52 In fact it seems to go against Octavius, the patriot. To call the play a romance would also limit and misrepresent it. At the heart of each of Shakespeare’s romances lies an “organic unity built up of breakdown and reconstruction.”53 This is clearly not present in Antony and Cleopatra. Antony and Cleopatra can loosely be classed with the plays which are grounded Antony and Cleopatra: Shakespeare’s Epic in Drama 145 in Roman history. But even there the play is the odd one out. Roman heroes tend to be patriotic, showing a preference for public duty over private sentiment. Since Antony has chosen to give up public interest in favour of his personal involvement, the play does not quite belong to the category to which Julius Caesar and Coriolanus do. It is, on the contrary, their antithesis. It can definitely be seen as Shakespeare’s final definition of love, a definition which runs through Romeo and Juliet and Othello and culminates in this play. But to see the three plays as a group under the label of love-tragedies is not free from fault. Romeo and Juliet are “star crossed” lovers, the other two pairs cannot be similarly described. Othello, it is sometimes argued, is more in love with himself than with Desdemona, and is the only tragedic hero who kills his beloved. Antony and Cleopatra have the freedom of choice. They choose their lives as well as their deaths. Fate, or jealousy, or self-centredness plays little or no role in their lives. Antony and Cleopatra defies categorisation. If at all, it can be grouped with any plays of Shakespeare it is the problem plays. Ernest Schanzer has classified the play under this category.54 But unfortunately for Schanzer, Antony and Cleopatra is a problem play only because of its structural pattern. To me this play is not a problem play on the basis of its structure alone, but more so because of its problematic content. What Shakespeare says here is not traditional by any means. The way he says it, therefore, is also untraditional; it involves the breaking down of traditional genres and the creation of a new one—a dramatic epic. NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. See Stanley Wells (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare Studies (Cambridge, 1986), 128. Kenneth Muir, “Shakespeare’s Poets”, Shakespeare Survey (Cambridge, 1970) Vol. 23, 95. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 98. See René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York, 1968), 258, and Edward Said, The World, the Text and the Critic (London, 1991), 126. J. W. Lever, “The Poems”, Shakespeare Survey (Cambridge, 1962), Vol. 15, 19. Ibid. This point has been made by Enobarbus in the text (II.ii.205-6) and by several scholars like Adrien Bonjour, “From Shakespeare’s Venus to Cleopatra’s Cupids”, Shakespeare Survey, Vol, 74-9, and Joseph H. Summers, Dreams of Love and Power: On Shakespeare (Oxford, 1984), 117. J.W. Lever suggests that Shakespeare wanted to write narrative poetry but never quite wrote the best kind of narrative poetry. Compared to his other art-forms his narrative-art remained inferior. See 19-25. Ibid., 19. Ibid., 19-25. Ibid., 24-25. See D. C. Allen, “Some Observations on The Rape of Lucrece”, Shakespeare Survey, Vol. 15, 95. Ibid., 94-95. Morris Weitz, “Literature Without Philosophy”, Shakespeare Survey (Cambridge: 1975) Vol. 146 Journal of Social and Political Studies 28, 31. 18. Edward Jayne, “Comments on the Homosexual Imagination”, College English (1975), Vol. 37, No.1, 62-67 suggests that Shakespeare’s homosexual imagination tormented him and led to the creation of several of his characters and situations. 19. M.C. Bradbrook, Shakespeare: The Poet in his World (New York, 1978), 214. 20. G. Wilson Knight, The Imperial Theme (London, 1931, This ed. 1972), 302. 21. M.C. Bradbrook, Shakespeare: The poet in his world, 214. 22. See Juan Mascaro, translated, The Bhagavad Gita (New Delhi, 1962), 31. 23. G. Wilsom Knight, The Imperial Theme, 197. 24. Michael Payne, “The Polarity Pattern in Antony and Cleopatra”, Shakespeare Quarterly (Vol. xxiii, Summer 1972, No.3), 271-294. 25. Richard Hillman, “Antony, Hercules, and Cleopatra: ‘the bidding of the gods’ and ‘the subtlest maze of all’,” Shakespeare Quarterly (Vol. xxiii, Summer 1972, No. 3), 295-306. 26. See Shakespeare: Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Russell Brown (London, 1968), 39. 27. Joseph Summers, Dreams of Love and Power, 127. 28. Harold Fisch, “Antony and Cleopatra: The limits of Mythology”, Shakespeare Survey (1970) No. 23, 59. 29. Ibid., 60. 30. Ibid., 59-67. 31. A.C. Bradley, “Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra”, Shakespeare: Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Russell Brown, 75. 32. Samuel Johnson, Ibid., 27. 33. See Thomas Greene, “The Norms of Epic”, Perspectives on Poetry, ed. James L. Calderwood and Harold E. Toliver, (New York, 1968), 194. 34. M.H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms (Madras, 1986), 49. 35. Harley Grenville-Barker, Shakespeare: ‘Antony and Cleopatra’ ed. John Russell Brown, 88. 36. I must acknowledge, here, the debt I owe to Thomas Greene’s views on the norms of epics. Much of what follows relies heavily on Greene’s article. To me, this is one of the best pieces on the subject. 37. Arthur Bell, “Time and Convention in Antony and Cleopatra” Shakespeare Quarterly (Vol. Xxiv, Summer 1973, No.3), 260. 38. See Thomas Greene, 198. 39. Ibid., 199. 40. Ibid., 199-200. 41. Ibid., 201. 42. Ibid., 203. 43. See Shakespeare: ‘Antony and Cleopatra’, ed. John Russell Brown, 63. 44. Harold Fisch, 65. 45. See A.C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (London, 1904). 46. See The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare Studies, ed. Stanley Wells, 123-124. 47. A.C. Bradley, “Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra”, 79. 48. Ibid., 66. 49. Ibid. 50. Richard Hillman, 449. 51. Ibid., 443. 52. See E.M.W. Tillyard, Shakespeare’s History Plays (1944) revised edition (Harmondsworth, 1969) and R.L. Smallwood, “Shakespeare’s Use of History”, The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare Studies, 143-62. 53. See D.A. Traversi, “The Last Plays of Shakespeare”, The Age of Shakespeare, ed. Boris Ford (Harmondsworth, 1955), 257. 54. Ernest Schanzer, The Problem Plays of Shakespeare (London, 1963). Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century 147 Book Review Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui Primus Books, Delhi, 2010, pp 199, Rs. 795, ISBN: 978-81-908918-0-6 Historiography, it is said, is the science of committing past events and their causes to writing. This seemingly simple task is fraught with numerous constraints and pitfalls. It requires among other things a thorough knowledge of the sources, a sense of critical enquiry and judgment and a command over language. Writing about the history of historiography and that too of Medieval India is even more onerous task and scholars claiming to be expert in this field in India are few and far between. Professor I.H. Siddiqui belongs to that rare group of historians who have undertaken to take a plunge in a practically unchartered field and use his skill and expertise as a historian to study Indo-Persian historiography of the thirteenth century. It is common knowledge that by the time the Delhi Sultanate was established in India at the turn of the thirteenth century, Muslim historiography had reached a take off stage. Arab and Persian historians had already produced a number of first rate histories and had created a distinct tradition of history writing of their own. The Indo-Persian historians naturally looked towards these two traditions for inspiration and it is not at all surprising that the Arab and Persian traditions of historiography influenced the historians writing in the Indian environment. Professor Siddiqui also begins his narrative with a chapter on Arabic historiography and its impact on Persian historians. This is followed by six chapters, each devoted to an in-depth study of one prominent historian of the thirteenth century. All of these six historians, Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, ‘Ali Kufi, Hasan Nizami, Sadiduddin Muhammad ‘Awfi, Minhaj-i-Siraj Juzjani and Amir Khusrau wrote after the foundation of the Delhi Sultanate. With the exception of ‘Ali Kufi who translated an obscure Arabic history of the Arab conquest of Sindh into Persian, which came to be known as Chachnama, the other five historians focused on the rise of Muslim power in North India and provide valuable information about the early Sultans of Delhi. They not only wrote about the political problems facing the Sultanate and the individual Sultans but also shed light on the social, cultural and administrative milieu of their time. Their style was innovative and their approach to history writing was marked by freshness and originality. Professor Siddiqui has taken note of these unique features of the early Sultanate historiography. His method of analyzing these historical works is as innovative as that of the early protagonists of Indo-Persian historiography. He begins every chapter with a note on the early life and career of the historian before his arrival 148 Journal of Social and Political Studies in India, follows it up with a succinct summary of the contents of his works and concludes the chapter with incisive remarks about the author’s approach to history and his contribution to Indo-Persian historiography. Every chapter of this important book furnishes some vital piece of information regarding the early history and historiography of Muslim rule in India. We are told for instance that contrary to popular belief Hasan Nizami’s Tajul- Ma’sir contains an account of the Delhi Sultanate till 1217 only and that Sir Henry Elliot’s translation of the book bringing the account to 1229 is based on a manuscript of dubious nature and hence it is not worthy of trust (pp 13, 15-16). From chapter two we come to know that Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah Marvar-rudi (edited by Sir E. Denison Ross in 1927) containing an account of Qutbuddin Aibak’s career in India between 1192 and 1206 is not a separate work of Fakhr-i-Mudabbir but it is actually the preface of the historian’s first major work Shajra-i-Ansab which he had composed in the year 1206. The same chapter likewise reveals that Fakhr-i-Mudabbir’s famous work Adabul-Harb wa-ash-Shuja is also not a separate work of the author but is a part of his larger work Adab ulMuluk wa-Kifayat ul-Muluk (pp 18, 23). The fifth chapter, giving an account of Sadiduddin Muhammad ‘Awfi’s Jawami’ul Hikayat wa-Lavami’ul- Rivaayat, is perhaps the most important component of the book in terms of providing new information about the events related to the career of Muizuddin Muhammad bin Sam, his lieutenants in India Qutbuddin Aibak and Nasiruddin Qabacaha as well as some major episodes of Iltutmish’s reign. We also get to know that ‘Awfi had compiled the Jawami’ul Hikayat at the instance of Nasiruddin Qabacha and that Sultan Alauddin Khalji’s famous market control regulations were perhaps inspired by ‘Awfi’s narration of a similar measure undertaken by the Qarakhanid monarch Tamgoch Khan Ibrahim in Samarqand (pp 57- 58). The following chapter which covers almost one third of the book’s 199 pages gives a succinct summary of the twenty- three tabaqat of Minhaj-i-Siraj Juzjani’s famous history Tabaqat-i-Nasiri. Minhaj, we are told, migrated to India in 1227 and before shifting his loyalty to Iltutmish served for some time under Nasiruddin Qabacha in Sindh. He utilized a variety of sources but wrote primarily on the basis of his vast knowledge and experience of politics in Central Asia and India. He was not only the first scholar to write history in the tabaqat genre but also invented a novel methodology to criticize men in power either by communicating his views about them in a discreet manner through hints or by praising their adversaries (pp 94, 101, 117). In the same vein in the chapter on the historical writings of Amir Khusrau, the author informs us that Khusrau was the first Indian born historian and his writings reflect a strong sense of identity with India. He admired India and India’s (Hindu’s) contribution to philosophy and astrology. He held that the Hindus were better than the atheists or dualists as they believed in the unity of God and therefore deserve full religious freedom. He was also the first historian who recognized the significance of cultural and geographical factors in the making of history and always took care to describe the topography of the routes and places that he cites Indo-Persian Historiography up to the Thirteenth Century 149 in his works (pp 170-174). On these and related issues the present reviewer is in agreement with the learned author. Some arguments and methods of the book are however problematic. Direct and indirect references to Shamsuddin Iltutmish’s achievements in India, first as a slave officer of Qutbuddin Aibak and subsequently as Sultan of Delhi (1211-36), in the book are unduly harsh. Professor Siddiqui’s summary dismissal of Iltutmish as treacherous and usurper (pp 50, 131, 133, 135137) as well as his ready acceptance of ‘Awfi’s statements attributing all the political, military, administrative and cultural attainments of Iltutmish’s reign to his Wazir Nizam-ul-Mulk Junaidi (pp 83-87) is surprising to say the least. ‘Awfi had dedicated his book to the Wazir and hence his exaggerated eulogization of his patron should not be taken at its face value. In the same vein the author’s contention that Medieval India Muslims did not distinguish one regional dialect from the other and that they loosely used the term Hindvi for every regional dialect spoken in India at that time (p 90, n 33) is only partially correct. There is no doubt that in the medieval period ‘Hindi’ or ‘Hindvi’ was used as a generic term for any Indian language. However there were scholars who clearly distinguished between languages spoken in different parts of India. In Nuh Sipihir (1317-18), for instance, Amir Khusrau has mentioned that in India a specific language is spoken in every territory. He identifies these languages as Sindhi, Lahori, Kashmiri, Kibar, Dhaur Samanadari, Tilangi, Gujar, Ma’bari, Gauri etc. and names these languages as Hindvi or belonging to India (Amir Khusrau, Nuh Sipihir, ed. Vahid Mirza, OUP, Calcutta, 1948, pp 179-180, quoted by S.R. Faruqi, Early Urdu Literary Culture and History, OUP, New Delhi, 2001, pp 65-68). Likewise, spelling of certain words in the book leaves much to be desired. Spelling the holy book of Islam as Koran (pp 1-2, 24, 77, 146 etc.) seems inappropriate to say the least. F. Steingass has spelled the word as Qur’an (A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary, second Indian edition, New Delhi, 1981, p 962) which should be preferred over Koran. The last name of Muhammad Ghauri’s famous slave and, after his death, the ruler of Multan and Sindh, Nasiruddin Qabacha has also been misspelled as Qubacha. Both Steingass (p 950) and James W. Redhouse (A Turkish and English Lexicon, Istanbul, first published 1890, reprint, 1978, p 1430) have spelled it as Qabacha (A short jacket, cloak or tunic). There are some typographical errors as well. For instance Bahram Shah has been printed as Bahrain Shah (p 101) and the sentence ‘Take this Maulana, that it may be a good omen’ has been printed as ‘Take this Maulana, that it may be a good man’ (p 98). These are only minor blemishes and do not mar the literary or academic merit of the book. Professor Siddiqui has produced as usual a book that amply demonstrates his command over diverse dimensions of Medieval Indian history as well as the Persian sources of this history. Overall this book will be a valuable addition to many university and scholarly libraries. 150 Journal of Social and Political Studies Women’s Rights as Human Rights Mahendra Prasad Singh* I Men and women equally partake in humanity by birth, notwithstanding the biological difference between them in terms of anatomy. Hence it is axiomatic that women’s rights are human rights, rights that are naturally enjoyed by every human being by virtue of being human. The supposed vulnerability of women arising in the anatomical difference and procreative function cannot be construed to deduce the proposition that anatomy is destiny. Differences and disparities between men and women are, in fact, based on differential upbringing and conditioning among the genders, and are therefore socially constructed. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of matrilineal societies, patriarchy has been an oppressive fact of history in practically all civilizations the world over. Moreover, among the variety of disparities such as the ones based on race, ethnicity, class, etc., gender disparities have been the most persistent and pernicious. With the rise of liberalism and democracy in modern times, other disparities came to be questioned earlier than those based on gender. This was for the reason that the distinction between the private and the public spheres in liberalism as also religion-based family laws of marriage and property generally kept the state out of bounds in these matters. This is an irony and a paradox in view of glaringly iniquitous conditions of women both nationally and internationally. In the world today women notionally form half of the population, but perform nearly twothirds of its work hours, receive one-tenth of world‘s income, and own less than one-hundreths of world‘s property. They are also fewer than 5 percent of the heads of governments and lower than 10 percent of parliamentarians (popularly elected House). Their greater vulnerability to social, cultural, and economic discrimination, and to domestic and social violence and crime in normal as well as riotous and war situations are patent facts of life all over the world with variations only of degrees across countries and cultures and climes (Gale Binion 1995: 511). Even in regard to political suffrage, women happened to be the last section of the population to be enfranchised. The problem of their social and economic empowerment has, in fact, proved to be much more complex and intractable. Even in terms of their political empowerment, they have still a long way to go. But what is notable is that the present is the most propitious time for the idea of gender equality. And no one can hold back an idea for too long whose time has come. II * The Keynote Address to the National Seminar on Women’s Rights are Human Rights : Role of Non-State Actors, Patna Women’s College / Patna University, 28-29, February, 2012. Women’s Rights as Human Rights 151 For reasons outlined above, when human rights are stated all is not stated; it needs to be supplemented by women’s rights as a special variant of human rights. Ideally, a time may come when the difference between human rights and women’s rights may dissolve or become obsolescent. In that eventuality, feminism and humanism may become merged into one indistinguishable ideology or theory. That it has not happened in the past cannot be taken as an improbability in the future. For a basic lesson that philosophy of science teaches us is that the past cannot foreclose the future. There is a certain degree of fixity in the past, but the future is wide open. Indeed, entirely unanticipated developments in the future give us new ways of looking back at and reinterpreting the past. Feminist theory made its appearance earlier at the level of individual social or political thinkers than at the level of collective political action by the peoples or nations. There have been at least three waves of feminism in the thought of individual political thinkers, in terms of my somewhat parsimonious version of a review of feminist writings by Rosemarie Tong (2003). Prominent voices in the first stage of feminist thought argued that the women must emulate the same traits and qualities as men in order to be their equal. Mary Wollstonecraft in the eighteenth century and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century illustrate this line of thinking. Wollstonecraft in her monograph A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) observed that the society expected men to be educated in “morals” whereas women were taught ‘manners’. Men were supposed to be rational and abstract in their thinking, and strong, whereas women were thought to be sentimental, contingent, self-indulgent, and weak. The remedial equality with men could be attained, according to Wollstonecraft, if women cultivated the same virtues as men. John Stuart Mill, too, in his On the Subjection of Women (1869) lamented their subjugation and advocated that the society must provide the same rights and privileges as are enjoyed by men. This feminist perspective may be called the “sameness” theorem of the feminist theory. The second stage of the feminist thought may be called the “difference” theorem of feminism as it stressed on the differences rather than the importance of being the same as men. This phase also came to be marked by some degree of cleavage between liberal feminists like Betty Friedan (1974) and radical feminists like Sulasmith Firestone (1970) and Mary Vetterling-Braggin (1982). In fact, liberal feminists largely continued the point of view of the British feminist thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mentioned above. As the first President of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in the USA, Friedan took the leading role in formulating a Bill of Rights for Women in 1967. Radical feminists asserted their sexuality androgynously and sought sexual pleasures of all types— heterosexual, lesbian, and autoerotic, celebrating the new developments in reproductive, contraceptive, and genetic technology as a factor reducing the vulnerability of women due to the biological difference with men (Firestone 1970). 152 Journal of Social and Political Studies Some other radical feminists, on the other hand, refuted androgyny and masculinity and advocated the ideal of essential femaleness, predicated on “gentleness, modesty, humility, supportiveness, empathy, compassionateness, nurturance, intuitiveness, sensitivity, unselfishness” (Vetterling-Braggin 1982 : 6). Some yet other radical feminists emphasized the dangers of heterosexual sex as the prime cause of male domination, macho sadism and female masochism. Lesbianism to them appeared as a way to escape these dangers. Yet other feminists wished to discard artificial reproductive or unproductive techniques and rely on their natural capacity to procreate or refuse to procreate in order to enhance their utility and respect in male estimation (Corea 1985). The third stage of the feminist thought is marked by what may be called the “diversity” theorem of feminism. According to this view, the women condition is not simply defined in terms of the female gender. It is significantly determined by the variables of race, religion, ethnicity, class, and age. Thus the question of gender equality is confounded in a complex web of causation, almost a vicious circle. This diversity view of feminist thought finds its most acute expression in postmodern feminism that rejects any uniform foundational value of gender equality and allows a radical relativism of values contingent on variety of identities and subcultures. Thus gender emerges neither as a resultant of biology nor as an overarching social construction but as a conceptual grid through which radically different values can be interpreted or deconstructed and reconstructed (Lauretis 1994). III At the level of collective political action by the peoples and nations, the earliest declaration of rights are human rights in general without any special or separate concern with the rights of women. The American Declaration of Independence made by the second Continental Congress attended by the delegates from the 13 rebellious English colonies on July 4, 1776, for example, simply stated : “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen made by the National Assembly of France in the wake of the French Revolution on August 26, 1789, “resolved to set forth a solemn declaration of the natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man...” The Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia and of the Working and Exploited Peoples of the world made by the All Russian Congress of Soviets made in January 1918 set “as its fundamental task the destruction of any exploitation of man by man, the complete abolition of the division of society into classes, the merciless suppression of the exploiters, the establishment of a socialist organization of society and the victory of socialism in all countries....” Among these early declarations of rights, the Karachi Resolution of the Indian Women’s Rights as Human Rights 153 National Congress (29-31 March, 1931) was perhaps the first that proclaimed “equal rights and obligations of all citizens, without any bar on account of sex.” This resolution presaged all the fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy that came to be guaranteed by the constitution of independent India in 1950. However, the makers of the Indian constitution stopped short of guaranteeing some special rights of women comparable to those provisionally guaranteed to the “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes” (article 15, clause 5; the latter added by the first constitutional amendment 1951). Representational reservation for women to the tune of 33 percent of the local government councils in rural and urban areas had to wait until the seventy-third and seventy-fourth constitutional amendments in 1992/93 and the conforming laws enacted by the state legislatures subsequently. A proposed representational reservation for women in State Legislatures and Parliament has been debated for a decade but not yet enacted due to lack of consensus in the political class and political parties. IV Now, we come to some select international declarations of human rights and scan them from, the feminist perspective. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, provide a common standard of human rights worthy of “achievement for all peoples and all nations” “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (article 2). Here again we find a general prohibition against gender-related discrimination but no special rights or reverse discrimination in favour of women in view of their acute or abnormal backwardness. The UDHR (1948) was subsequently supplemented by two additional declarations by the UN General Assembly : (a) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and (b) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Both came into force in 1976 following ratification by the member-states. Both the covenants guarantee the human rights to every person, child or adult, regardless of any socio-economicpolitical differences, including those based on gender. The one and the only one age or gender-specific human rights promised under the civil and political rights covenant is that a death sentence shall not be imposed for crimes committed by a person below eighteen years of age and a pregnant woman (article 5). Feminists argue that given the grossly unequal status of women in the prevailing laws in most countries, a gender-blind law in reality works in favour of patriarchy. The ends of justice would not be served by anything less than an affirmative action or reverse discrimination. From among the myriad of other international covenants and conventions, I intend to briefly refer the three such documents : (a) Convention on the 154 Journal of Social and Political Studies Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 that came into force in 1981, (b) Declaration on the Right of Development adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, and (c) Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989 and enforced in 1990. The convention on women’s rights seeks to ensure complete equality with men before the law in all respects. It specifically also declares that the adoption by states of “temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present convention” (article 4, clause 1). This international sanction for affirmative action in favour of women is not evidently matched in the national laws, however. The Declaration on the Right to Development declares development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (article 1, clause 1). The convention on the child rights in a very comprehensive charter ensuring protection against exploitation and conditions for proper development under parental care and material assistance and support by the state. An analytical retrospective view on the evolution of human rights is suggestive of different stages through which they have developed. My teacher, political theorist Professor Christian Bay at the University of Alberta in Canada used to talk about the growth of three packages of rights, namely, the Blue Rights or the rights against the state engendered by the bourgeois revolutions in the UK, USA, and France; the Red Rights or the rights against hunger produced by the socialist revolutions in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People‘s Republic of China; and the Green Rights or the rights to clean environment and healthy life created by the movements for ecological protection and sustainable development. Similarly, others have talked about three generations of rights. The first generation rights are primarily concerned with civil and political rights born out of the liberal and democratic movements since the nineteenth century. These are the ‘negative’ rights against the arbitrary action by the state. The second generation rights are primarily related to social, economic, and cultural equality and social security typical of welfare and socialist states. The third generation rights include the more recent concern with environmental and developmental rights including special rights of women and children (Arjun Dev et. al. 1996: xi-xv). The Vienna Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed at a world conference to review the progress of UDHR (1948) and subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly, aptly remarks: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated” (article 5). The Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations believe that we can end poverty by 2015. They reiterate : Women’s Rights as Human Rights 155 “We are committed to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from want” (para 11). These goals need to be made part of the constitutions of the member-states for their entrenched and determined pursuit. For minorities and women, “rights, equality, and development may not be achieved simply by putting them in the constitution and even in government policies. For them, the issue is not recognition of cultural distinctiveness. In fact, it may be recognition of different needs or meeting similar needs in appropriate ways.” (Ghai & Cottrell 2011: 147-148). In addition to the foregoing universal or global human rights systems, there are three regional human rights systems in Europe, Americas, and Africa. The European human rights system comprises two major treaties: the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the European Social Charter (1961). As monitoring and enforcement mechanisms the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights were instituted. Now the former has become obsolete and replaced by the court itself, which accepts applications complaining violations from individuals as well as states. The Inter-American human rights system emerged with the adoption of the Americas‘ Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man in April 1948, being the first regional human rights instrument of a general nature, predating the UDHR (1948) by more than six months. Alongside were also set up the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The third and most recent of the regional systems of human rights is the African Charter of Human and Peoples‘ Rights (1981). It was first adopted under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity, which aws subsequently replaced by the African Union. It is monitored and interpreted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights set up in 1987. An African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights is also mooted under a protocol to the Charter adopted in 1998 under which the foregoing Commission is proposed to be incorporated into the Court. The operationalisation is still in process at this writing. V In view of all-pervasive patriarchy and the diversity theorem of postmodern feminism discussed above, the full realization of women’s human rights would not be a cakewalk. It will require a concerted strategy of action by the state, civil society, market, and national and international organizations to actualize the goals of gender equality and justice advocated in the feminist thought and national and international declarations of human rights surveyed above. To my mind, constitutional entrenchment of these rights, conforming laws and public policies, including affirmative action by way of special rights such as reservations on the part of nation-states , hold the key to the achievement of women’s rights as human rights in India and the world at large. 156 Journal of Social and Political Studies The human rights texts that we have rapidly reviewed above are distinguishable into at least the following categories: political thought/theory, national declarations, national constitutional or legal bill of rights, regional human rights instruments, and UN-UDHR and other universal international declarations and conventions. If we assess these texts in terms degrees of freedom as to their formulation, if not implementation, the free will and imagination enjoyed by a political thinker is unparalleled, followed by an empirical political theorist working under the double binds of rational imagination and normative justification, on the one hand, and the constraints of factual evidence, on the other. If formulation and implementation are jointly considered, a national human rights charter emerges as the most efficacious proposition for the simple reason that a sovereign nationstate produces it is not dependent on any other power to beg for its implementation. The case of regional and universal declarations is different. Their formulation, declaration, ratification, and implementation are all in stages dependent on the sovereign will of the high contracting parties, mostly or all members of the United Nations. Nevertheless, as we have argued above, women‘s rights even within the domain of domestic jurisdiction of nation-states still leave much to be desired, and they need instruments of special rights in the form of protective reservation or affirmative action. In the international domain, both globally and regionally, a lot still depends on the sovereign will of the state, though women‘s rights may be undertaken as a political mission animated by new ideas in national government, international relations, and organisations such as “governance” and “cosmopolitan democracy”. Governance goes beyond the structure of government and brings in administration in collaboration with the institutions of civil society like nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the market (World Bank 1991; Rosenau 1999). Cosmopolitan democracy refers to new developments allowing civil and economic relations among communities across international boundaries in international law without negating state sovereignty, rather jointly facilitated by the neighbouring states in the supranational region ( David Held 1994; Daniele Archibugi 2008). REFERENCES AND A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Agarwal, Bina, A Field of One’s Own : Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (New Delhi : Cambridge University Press, 1996). Archibugi, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towards Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Bakshi, P.M., The Constitution of India (Delhi : Universial Law Publishing Co., 2011, eleventh edn.) Baxi, Upendra, The Future of Human Rights (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2008, 3rd edn. with a new Preface). Binion, Gale, “Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, August 1995. Women’s Rights as Human Rights 157 Corea, Gena. The Mother Machine : Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (New York : Harper & Row, 1985). Dev, Arjun and Indira and Supta Das, Human Rights : A Source Book, (New Delhi : Indian Council of Educational Research and Training, 1996). Firestone, Sulasmith, The Dialectic of Sex (New York : Bantam Books, 1970). Friedan, Betty, The Feminine Mystique (New York : Dell, 1974). Ghai, Yash and Jill Cottrell, The Millennium Declaration, Rights, and Constitutions (New Delhi : Oxford University Press for UNDP, 2011). Held, David, “Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?” in The Polity Reader in Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), chapter 29. Lauretis, Terrecy de, “The Essence of the Triangle, or Taking the Risks of Essentialism Seriously”, in N. Schor and E. Weed, eds., The Essential Difference (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1994). Mill, John Stuart, On the Subjection of Women (New York : Fredrick A. Stokes Company, 1911, first published 1869). Rosenau, James N. “Towards an Ontology for Global Governance” in Martin Hewson and Thomas Sinclair, eds. Approaches to Global Governance Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Singh, Ujjwal Kumar, ed. Human Rights and Peace : Ideas, Laws, Institutions and Movements (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 2009). Tong, Rosemarie, “Gender and Sexual Discrimination”, chapter 9, in Hugh LaFollette, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 219-244. Vetterling-Braggin, Mary, “Feminity”, “Masculinity” and “Androgyny” : A Modern Philosophical Discussion (Totowa : Rowan & Littlefield, 1982). Wollstonecraft, Mary, A Vindication of the Rights of Women (London : Penguin, 1988, first published 1792). 158 Journal of Social and Political Studies An Outsider Everywhere M.K. Kaw New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2012, 210 pp Rs 570 ISBN 978 -93-220-0804-8 Written in a lucid language, the author gives us peep into his family genealogy and then covers his own life journey from early education to the superannuation from his active civil services in close of 2001, an event full career of forty two years. The early education of the author shows how Kashmiri Pandit homes were like established unnoticed universities. He had no formal schooling, yet in his home from grand father to his uncles, he was groomed in specialities’ of different disciplines,” over the years, I learnt English and mathematics from my father, Hindi from Baitathya(my eldest uncle), science from Saibiji(my second uncle) Urdu from Tathyaji and geometry from Bablal”(p.24). It reveals Kashmiri community until independent India and there after till the latest seventh exodus in 1989, had remained a monolithic Brahminic community. The family title’ Kaw’ has come to mark the distinctness over time and space, nothing to do with the gotra. Shifting to Delhi was not easy choice for his father but he had no option, like other Kashmiri Pandits too. Kashmir for them was a diminishing realm after independence,“ the rude awakening came….when he saw the list of the selected candidates and found his own name missing”. Affected by sixth exodus, kaw family grew out of the crisis like other Kashmiri families, Nehrus, Kathjus and saprus in the past had grown and found their niche. It was perhaps despite being outsiders; their anchorage was firm in joint family traditions and genealogical purity that gave them a huge advantage of intrinsic social, cultural capital. Kaw too was enriched with this legacy. He enters civil service career at young age and services at different challenging assignments, both in Himachal Pradesh and Delhi for more than four decades. It is this conversion of cultural capital that blends power and glamour with spirituality and poetry to make Kaw a holistic personality, unlike a compartmentalized civil servant. Many interesting incidents and anecdotes fill the book depicting Kaw’s distinct interplay between choice and range, free will and destiny and poet and administrator in a country, where it becomes extremely difficult to’reforge social issues into effective collective action’ and live as an honest actor with ramifications on social structures. He lives honestly side by side with his family life as well with his professional duties. So I told madam frankly that I would most probably have an arranged marriage with girl of my community” (P.63). “I can say that in many ways Indraprastha represented a watershed in my life. I grew up. I lost my ego. I got interested in my spirituality. I wrote poetry. I started on An Outsider Everywhere 159 my satirical pieces on the bureaucracy. I lost my illusion,” (p.90). Kaw succinctly shows how actors can make the difference despite rigid structures, the rational action with the sense of duty and altruism always give you space to stretch, which is a transformation within, as well as, makes difference to public sphere, despite all odds, “Now there were officers to note down their outstanding issues…Resultantly, the number of their pending cases came down drastically” (p.124). The last three chapters reveal unfolding of an insider, perceived to be ‘outsider’ that leaves reader with wonder in Bauman’s aphorism, ‘that there is more to what you see and hear than meets the eye., that most important part is hidden from view’. Kaw faces that schism, while encountering with the degenerative politics, ‘shameless exploitation and ruthless corruption’ (p.189). His personal ethics, polity and power are in conjunction to promote the cherished institutional means to attain the cultural and social goals, where structure and actor are existential dualities, but he defies dualism with grace and dignity. He did not bend when testing moments struck in, ”the President refereed to the high safety standards that required the latest aircraft to be provided to him, at which kaw blurted out, ‘sir is the safety and security of 350 passengers not equally important’…I was never invited to any Rashtripati Bhawan function. I did not check with Kaw if he ever was” (p.186). That self reflectivity is not one day born; it is accumulative cultural capital of generations, which produces that inner strength.”Believe it or not, at11.30 pm we got positive message from the Singaporeans and at midnight we signed the agreement” (p.187). Kaw does not hesitate to scribble about ethics of justice and rebuttal of detection that he masterly shows in two cases one about his own trip to Rome and another about minster’s fascination to visit Gulf countries. It was his power of intellectual surplus that fetched him trip to Rome to write a book on china, which he completed before stipulated time. But, not only its authorship was deprived to him, even his name in the acknowledgement was not accredited, “I was also surprised not see my name as the author of the book; my contribution was not even acknowledged in the preface” (p.135). On the other hand, “…., he had spent the entire month in a hotel room watching the TV and drinking free beer” (p.189) Over all, it is an insightful story of a civil servant, whose intellectual acumen and family grooming unfolds a reflective life world of a poet patriot, who in his own way places some of the most insistent themes that he pursues through details and compels you to gloss over the gross. There might have been missed opportunities and neglected chances, But he has saved himself ‘from triviality, cowardice and inner shame’, when it was bending in pattern variables of system management in elite power structure for material referent and self empowerment. The cherished common collective good and institutional ideology how sealed and 160 Journal of Social and Political Studies impenetrable to each other it might appear, the author has revelation about it. The book assumes historical significance, for its continuity and linkages of world view of a person that is a reflection to his past anchorage genealogy and identity. There is a threat to that kernel ‘world view’ of cerebral, cultural and genealogical continuity, which the book conceitedly is letting known. The new social cultural dynamics is melting down it fast, with paradigm shift in the ‘collective world view’. An enjoyable reading with insightful details, the book is a must read for a critical engagement of self to the public sphere. Ashok Kaul PhD, Professor of Sociology, Banaras Hindu University.