Kurdish frontier: Ideological boundaries are the hardest to transcend

Kurdish frontier Ideological boundaries are the hardest to transcend Katia Zagoritou For the first time in the modern history of Syria and Iraq, two de facto Kurdish autonomous entities – the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), as well as various Kurdish forces, share control of border portions on both sides, in Northwestern Iraq and Northeast Syria. This geopolitical shift invigorates the discussion around Kurdish unity and the concept of “Greater Kurdistan” highlighting the longstanding political and ideological boundaries concomitantly among the Kurdish political movements. These boundaries, alongside the socio-cultural ones, mirror different approaches vis-à-vis territoriality and governance, rendering Kurdish unity goal elusive. 34 Μiddle East Bulletin | June 2021 - vol. 40 T HE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KURDS AND THE BORDERS has been historically important and of a particularly complex nature, con- sidering the very geographical position of the Kurdish-majority regions, mainly in the borderlands within the states they live. From the first partition of the Kurdish homeland in the 16th century following the Battle of Chaldiran (1514) between the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires to its split into four states in the Middle East – Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria - in the aftermath of World War I, Kurdish regions have served as buffer zones, while their partition has not hampered cross-border activities and transnational relationships.1 Yet, apart from the differences among Kurds due to the existing state borders and their respective assimilation policies, boundaries do exist and persist between them, not only in socio-cultural - linguistic or religious - terms, but also in political ones which translate into different goals pursued by the various Kurdish political actors often leading to intra-Kurdish fights. Hence, in the absence of a unified Kurdish movement echoing the spatial fragmentation of the Kurdish space,2 each national movement has rather opted to invest in the political field of the state within it has been evolving in order to promote its political and cultural rights.3 The divergences among the Kurdish political parties and movements have obtained, however a new dimension in the light of the weakening of the Syrian and Iraqi central governments and the growing Kurdish autonomy. The intricate state of affairs in the IraqSyria border is telling. The KRG and the AANES have so far managed not only to effectively control the two sides of the border but also to erect new crossing points (Symalka-Faysh Khabur, al-Waleed), acting as state-like actors at the local level and shaping new transnational spaces.4 The border crossings’ control constitute an essential military, political, and economic resource enabling the movement of both people and goods. More specifically, the Symalka and the al-Waleed crossings primarily serve the growing trade between the KRG and the AANES while they enable the transfer of aid, wounded patients in the KRI and the US troops’ movement. Importantly, both crossings, alongside the al-Faw one, constitute key entry points for Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliated groups’ fighters. Still, these crossing points reproduce the political power plays between the two sides with the border’s closure and opening as a means of pressure or punition. This ongoing regional development has therefore had a twofold effect: the somewhat formation of the Kurdish frontiers has invigorated the Kurdish transboundary unity making it appear more feasible while it has not ceased to generate, if not exacerbate, intra-Kurdish rivalries.5 Kurdish space in the re-making As for the Kurdish territory’s transformation, the Kurdish space(s) in both Iraq and Syria has been reshaped owing to the central governments’ weakening and the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In Syria, for the first time, the geographical unification of the Kurdish-majority areas has been partially achieved, with the exception of Afrin enclave, whose linkage was thwarted by two Turkish military operations in 2016 and 2018, the latter leading to its occupation. Afrin’s unification would have further redrawn the northern part of Syria by extending the Kurdish region of Rojava closer to the Mediterranean Sea; Turkey’s Hatay province being the only gap preventing Rojava from accessing the Sea.6 Furthermore, another important territorial shift took place in Rojava after the liberation of the Syrian border town of Kobanî. In- UNIVERSITY OF THE PELOPONNESE Μiddle East Bulletin | June 2021 - vol. 40 35 deed, Kobanî’s victory was followed by a territorial expansion beyond the core Kurdish-majority areas in Northeast Syria, related with the campaign of Raqqa’s liberation from ISIS and gradually led to the AANES’s control of about a third of Syria - a region stretching from the Euphrates River’s left bank to the Turkish and Iraqi borders - at the time that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the last ISIS’s stronghold, Baghuz, in March 2019. Ünver notices that the Kurdish expansion in Syria generated the move of the Kurdish space’s western barrier from the Tigris river system as far west to the Euphrates.7 Similarly, Kurdish territorial expansion went hand in hand with the fight against ISIS in Iraq. However, the 2017 independence referendum held by the KRG and its aftermath led to the loss of Kirkuk and other disputed territories to Baghdad, gained and controlled by Peshmerga forces during their fight therein against ISIS. This event stresses the fluidity and the shifting nature of territorial transformations amidst wartime. Nevertheless, the KRG’s control on segments of the Iraq-Syria border remains whilst the situation is more complicated in the Yazidi-majority district of Sinjar (in Nineveh province) and the al-Faw informal border crossing whose location has been strategic to various armed groups as an entry point to Syria. Al-Fawl was used by the PKK and the People’s and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/J) in 2014 in order to secure a safe corridor to Syria for thousands of Yezidis who fled the ISIS onslaught.8 Hence, the PKK boosted its presence therein and alongside Yazidi militia Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ) and Yazidkhan Women’s Units (YJE^) control parts of the district.9 Intra-Kurdish antagonisms In addition to Rojava and Qandil mountains, Sinjar has become the main theatre for the rivalry between the two dominant Kurdish actors, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PKK, following the former’s inability firstly to protect Yazidis during ISIS’s attack in 2014 and later, in 2017, to annex Sinjar to the KRG. Sinjar’s case also highlights the fluid and transient nature of the Kurdish territorial boundaries: the district passed from the KDP’s control (from 2003 until 2014) to the growing influence of the PKK since 2014, notably after 2017. Moreover, the October 9, 2020 agreement between Erbil and Baghdad with the aim to eliminate the PKK’s and Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMU) presence in Sinjar suggests the alliances’ shifting nature when it comes to intraKurdish rivalries. The longstanding antagonism between the KDP and the PKK has transcended the borders of the states within they first emerged as each one has sought to assert itself as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish cause. Their profound political differences entail differentiated agendas and goals while they engage different social constituencies. The depth and extent of this cleavage are embodied in the rivalries which endure despite the momentum created by the fact that the KRG and the AANES enjoy simultaneously UNIVERSITY OF THE PELOPONNESE 36 Μiddle East Bulletin | June 2021 - vol. 40 a degree of autonomy, albeit at different levels, and the growing geographical connection between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Rojava. Political divergences are reflected in each actor’s vision of territoriality, state-building and governance and, therefore, in its alliances. In the same vein, although Ünver sees major incentives for a KRG-AANES unification in issues related to water security and oil policies linked with a potential access to the Mediterranean, he recognizes though the existence of “fundamental cultural differences between them in terms of administrative structures, their approach to tribalism and religion and their global orientation”. In this sense, tribalism in the KRG and its gradual transformation into rentier state has increased its dependency on external actors – the US and Turkey- and has rendered it unable to dominate other Kurdish actors in its vicinity, such as the PKK and its affiliates. The KRG’s relationship with the latter becomes more problematic considering, on the one hand, its ties with Turkey in economic and commercial terms - which constitute for Turkey a way to deepen intra-Kurdish rivalries and counter the PKK’s presence in Qandil and on the other hand, the PKK’s growing presence within the KRI. The KRG, despite being reluctant to openly collaborate with Turkey against another Kurdish group, shares Ankara’s concerns not only in relation to the PKK’s presence in its territory but also to the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) dominance in Syria.10 Regarding Rojava, the AANES’s state-building experiment significantly differs from the KRG’s one in that it officially rejects secession claims and instead promotes the building of a multi-ethnic entity with decentralized administration and representative bodies within Syria. It is besides noteworthy that historically, Kurdish political parties in Syria have never sought to challenge Syrian national borders. Additionally, Greater Kurdistan does not constitute a political goal for the Kurds in Syria while in the PYD’s view, Rojava constitutes a space to be shaped by its political project and not a political project with a bordered territory along ethnic lines. Moreover, unlike the relative stability of the KRG’s territorial boundaries, Rojava’s territoriality remains elusive despite the fact that a wide range of political actors seem to take its political project for granted.11 In conclusion, the current and in process formation of Kurdish-Kurdish frontiers in the Iraq-Syria border with the control and domination of its segments by a variety of Kurdish forces has been unprecedented in the modern history of the region, making Kurdish territorial unity appear less elusive. Yet, intra-Kurdish competition, as well as a number of challenges - the increasing Turkish presence in the KRI and the occupation of Rojava’s regions, and a future withdrawal of the US military and financial support to name but a few- seriously hamper such an outcome. Last but not least, taking into consideration the different aspirations and political agendas of each Kurdish political actor alongside the strong transnational nature of the Kurdish movement(s), the concept of the “Greater Kurdistan” might be currently rather read through symbolic lenses.12 UNIVERSITY OF THE PELOPONNESE Μiddle East Bulletin | June 2021 - vol. 40 37 NOTES All links accessed on 27/05/2021 1. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (I.B. Tauris, 2004), 25-26 see also H. Akin Ünver, “Schrödinger’s Kurds: Transnational Kurdish geopolitics in the age of shifting borders”, Journal of International Affairs 69, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2016): 68, 70. 2. The use of the term « Kurdish space » here follows Bozarslan’s thought who considers it preferable to ‘Kurdistan’ because it “better captures the ramifications and complexity of the Kurdish issue in the Middle East. “L'espace kurde entre unité et diversité,” Hérodote 148, no. 1, (2013). 3. Didier Billion, “L’improbable État kurde unifié,” Revue internationale et stratégique 95, no. 3, (2014) : 18-31. 4. Symalka-Faysh Khabour existed as an informal crossing point since the 1990s; it turned into a proper border crossing with the construction of a floating bridge after the Hewler-1 (Erbil) agreement between the PYD-led Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) and the KDP-backed Kurdish National Council (KNC); for more see Harith Hasan, Kheder Khaddour, “The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian Borderlands,” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 30, 2021, https://bit.ly/3vgXCs4 see also Leïla Vignal, “The changing borders and borderlands of Syria in a time of a conflict,” International Affairs 93, no. 4 (2017): 819, 824. 5. Allsopp Harriet, Wladimir van Wilgenburg, The Kurds of Northern Syria. Governance, Diversity and Conflicts (I. B. Tauris, 2019), 103 see also Harith Hasan, Kheder Khaddour, op. cit. 6. Mahmut Bozarslan, “Kurdish cantons in northern Syria already linked,” Al Monitor, June 2, 2017, https://bit.ly/2SmV1OX ; the Mediterranean Sea lies roughly 100 km from the westernmost edge of Kurdish-majority land; for more see also Mark Townsend, “Syria’s Kurds march on to Raqqa and the sea,” The Guardian, May 6, 2017, https://bit.ly/3yES3WK 7. Nicholas A. Heras, “The Battle for the Tribes in the Northeast Syria”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Discussion Paper 19, (October 2020), https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/battle-tribes-northeast-syria see also H. Akin Ünver, op. cit., 77. 8. Gunes Cengiz, The Kurds in a New Middle East. The changing geopolitics of a regional conflict. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 22 see also Harith Hasan, Kheder Khaddour, op. cit., 11. 9. The YBŞ are an officially recognized force by Baghdad and are registered as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU), for more see also Saad Sallum, “Turkey targets Yazidi militia in Iraq over PKK links,” Al-Monitor, October 6, 2020, https://bit.ly/3fHcx8A 10. H. Akin Ünver, op. cit., 83, 88-89, 91 see also Didier Billion, op. cit. 23 see also Johannes Jüde, “Contesting borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto state,” International Affairs 93, no. 4 (2017): 862. 11. Jordi Tejel, “The complex and Dynamic Relationship of Syria’s Kurds with Syrian Borders: Continuities and Changes,” in Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State, ed. Matthieu Cimino (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), 244, 262-263 see also Rosa Burç, “Non-Territorial autonomy and gender equality: the case of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria,” Philosophy and Society 31, no. 3 (2020): 327. 12. Washington Kurdish Institute, “Turkey has the largest presence in Iraq and is occupying more lands,” May 11, 2021, https://bit.ly/35TqifQ see also Karwan Faidhi Dri, “Ankara has built nearly 40 ‘military points’ in Kurdistan Region: Turkish presidency,” Rudaw, July 6, 2020, https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/06072020 see also Harith Hasan, Kheder Khaddour, op. cit., 20. UNIVERSITY OF THE PELOPONNESE