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2013
The Kingdom of Patani was formally incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam a little over 100 years ago and has been in varying states of rebellion since then. This resistance has at times had a violent character, as it does right now, but has also involved a resilient attachment to various aspects of the local identity, such as the religion, language, and local historic narrative. While the right of the inhabitants of the area to legally claim self-determination under international law is tenuous, a broader understanding of self-determination may be able to support the concept of a regional autonomy arrangement within the Thai state. Prima facie, an autonomy arrangement has the potential to address many of the grievances of the Malay-Muslim community in the Patani region. There are also now some positive Southeast Asian examples of autonomy solutions made under similar circumstances, particularly Aceh and Mindanao. This possibility has entered mainstream political discussion in Thailand in recent years. However, credible and committed leadership would be needed from both sides in order for some kind of negotiated settlement to be agreed upon and implemented. Talks between an insurgent group and the Thai government began in 2013. However, these have highlighted significant challenges that would surround any peace process, particularly the dispersed nature of the insurgency.
… Politics and International Relations in the …, 1998
What is behind the recent return to violence in southern Thailand and how can the conflict be resolved? This paper from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute outlines interpretations of conflict in the Patani region. These focus on historical grievances, the role of violent Islamism, modern Thai politics and the ‘global war on terror’. Measures to address two longstanding sources of grievance – language and education – could help improve the situation. The southern region of Thailand, known as Patani, suffered several periods of instability in the 20th century. From the 1960s, a significant separatist movement, including more than 60 armed groups, was active among Malay Muslims in the region.Violence had largely subsided by the 1990s before a sudden upsurge, sparked by an army camp raid in January 2004, took many by surprise. This latest period of violence has led to more than 2400 deaths and 4000 people being injured/ The enduring ‘historical grievances’ interpretation emphasizes a history of insurrection dating from the incorporation of the southern provinces of Thailand in 1909. In this view, grievances relate to education, employment in the public sector, language and economic development. There are no clearly formulated political demands from rebels. Observers have suggested a shift from ethnonational and separatist aims towards radical Islamist ideology. Islam has a long history in Patini and notions that the region is caught up in a religious conflict may be misleading. How far religion has replaced ethno-nationalism as the driving force for the insurgency is open to question. It is plausible that the global context of Islamic resurgence has been a factor. Historical grievances and religion offer little to explain the timing of the upsurge in 2004. This has led analysts to look at recent Thai politics. The struggle to hinder or promote more liberal politics in Thailand have regularly brought pressure to bear on the South of the country. Thaksin Shinawatra’s support for the US-led ‘global war on terror’ helped destabilise Patini and increased tensions between Malay Muslims and Thai authorities. Following a 2006 coup, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont became willing to take a softer line. There is international support for a negotiated settlement, and a number of initiatives have promoted third-party mediation. But with the insurgency intensifying, it is apparently time for a new approach to the Patani conflict: The military and police continue to take a reactive approach to the violence and seem unable to respond to the shifting tactics of insurgents. Willingness to open negotiations with insurgents is to be welcomed. But these groups will see little reason to negotiate unless security services can increase pressure on them. The Thai authorities need to develop a sharper political strategy aimed at winning support amongst the Malay Muslim community and weakening support for insurgents. An exclusive focus on the Malay Muslim community does not give a full understanding of the dynamics across southern Thailand. Little work has focused on the local Thai Buddhist community. Proposals from the National Reconciliation Commission suggest measures to reorder relationships between the state and the people. While it would not be possible to introduce all the reforms proposed, addressing two longstanding sources of grievance – language and education – could improve the situation.
On February 28, 2013, for the first time in Thailand's history, the Government of Thailand announced publicly that it aimed to settle the conflict in the three southernmost provinces of Thailand – otherwise known as the deep South – through official talks with separatist leaders. In the previous annual report, Negotiating a Peaceful Coexistence between the Malays of Patani and the Thai State, the Patani Forum looked at the various attempts to generate peace talks between the Thai government and various separatist movements from 2005 to 2012. We explained why none of these initiatives, which were secretive in nature, succeeded in generating meaningful traction. Two months after this report was released, the Thai government made the February 28 announcement. While the process has faltered, as will be outlined below, the significance of Bangkok acknowledging the political nature of the separatist movement cannot be overstated. In this annual Special Report, the Patani Forum examines the significance and impact of the February 28, 2013 announcement. In the Introduction, we provide a brief overview of previous talks between separatists and Thai authorities and discuss what makes the February 28 announcement different from previous iterations of talks. In Section I, we look at insurgency activity leading up to the announcement and explore why, a year later, the peace process has come to a virtual standstill. We begin this examination with the so-called Mayo Operation of July 2012, which was caught on CCTV, and end with the Bacho Operation in February 2013, the same month the official peace talks were announced. In Section II, we focus on the peace process itself, discussing key meetings and exploring their connection to insurgent activity on the ground. We also discuss the
The insurgent groups in Southernmost Provinces of Thailand are essentially nationalist, although they are waging a jihad and using violence. Unlike transnational jihadist gropus such as ISIS, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyyah, their use of violence is political in nature, and whenever reasonable negotiatin is offered, they are ready to sit in the negotiation table. The strong influence of the insurgents based on their nationalistic set of ideologies functions as a bulwark against the influence of transnational jihadism. However, it desn't mean that Patani will be free from radicalisation, and for this purpose, fruitful collaboration between the conflicting party through the peace process shall be needed.
ABSTRACT This Undergraduate thesis discuss about failure of peace negotiation process between government of Thailand and Revolution National Front (BRN) in southern Thailand which are Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The negotiation process has been remaining in a deadlock stage among both parties in case of southern Thailand conflict. The implementation of Kuala Lumpur peace negotiation process signed in Kuala Lumpur between representative National Security Council (NSC) and BRN has not solved the southern Thailand conflict that happened since long time ago. The BRN aimed to be separated from Thailand to be Patani state, but Thailand is one country cannot be divided. It made peace negotiation process between Thai government and BRN failed. The thesis tries to analyze two factors which are the influence of the failure of peace negotiation process between Thai government and BRN in Jaya Deva Uyangoda perspective, who explains about difficulties of negotiation process in separatist conflict which tends to be failed in achieving agreement. Its influences are first, the Maximalist of insurgent of separatist; second, the inflexibility of state in responding to separatist group. In this research, extensive of relevant published materials such as books, journals, reports, newsletters, official website and other are used sources a wide variety of references in related topics to conduct the analysis. Key word: Peace Negotiation Process, Revolution National Front (BRN), National Security Council NSC, Maximalist of insurgent of separatist, inflexibility of state.
Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 2021
2020 was the year that saw the beginnings of conflict transformation in southern Thailand and the beginning of a process that should eventually lead to some form of resolution to a separatist conflict that has claimed more than 7,000 lives since 2004. 2020 began with the 'Geneva Call Declaration', which was followed by two meetings between insurgent representatives and the Thai military, in both January and March. Most importantly, 2020 saw the lengthiest cessation of hostilities that has taken place between the two sides since 2004: the covid19 ceasefire. This article assesses the importance of these developments and puts forward the argument that 2020 has been the most significant year for conflict resolution efforts in the south since the conflict began in 2004; although there are many factors in place that may obstruct efforts at securing a lasting resolution to this conflict in the near future. Additionally, this essay provides background to the arguments put forward by examining processes and events since 2014 that have paved the way for the aforementioned developments of 2020.
The recent bombings in the tourist city of Hat Yai in southern Thailand reflect deep-seated and enduring institutional problems that defy easy categorisation. Commentators have put forward many explanations for this complex situation, ranging from seeing the conflict in terms of a counter-terrorist campaign as part of the so-called global war on terror, to nationalism, religious extremism, linguistic and cultural disenfranchisement, poverty, lack of education, corruption and absence of the rule of law. These explanations have touched on aspects of the problem, but so far few have translated into a clear or compelling plan of action to restore peace and order to the Malay–Muslim dominated provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat that make up Thailand’s deep south.
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