ARTÍCULO
DE INVESTIGACIÓN
No maps for these territories:
exploring philosophy of memory through
photography*
Alun Kirby
York, United Kingdom
E-mail: streptococcus@gmail.com
Recibido: 8 de abril de 2021 | Aceptado: 1 de junio de 2021
https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a03
Abstract: I begin by examining perception of photographs from two directions: what
we think photographs are, and the aspects of mind involved when viewing photographs.
Traditional photographs are shown to be mnemonic tools, and memory identified as a
key part of the process by which photographs are fully perceived. Second, I describe
the metamorphogram; a non-traditional photograph which fits specific, author-defined
criteria for being memory. The metamorphogram is shown to be analogous to a composite
of all an individual’s episodic memories. Finally, using the metamorphogram in artistic
works suggests a bi-directional relationship between individual autobiographical memory
and shared cultural memory. A model of this relationship fails to align with existing
definitions of cultural memory, and may represent a new form: sociobiographical
memory. I propose that the experiences documented here make the case for promoting
a mutually beneficial relationship between philosophy and other creative disciplines,
including photography.
Keywords: photography, memory, cultural memory, perception, art
*
This work was supported by a bursary grant (INDR-00253686) to Alun Kirby from Arts Council England. I thank the Philosophy
of Memory community for your generosity and openness. Specific and heartfelt thanks to Christopher McCarroll and Kourken
Michaelian for their support and understanding.
Cómo citar este artículo
Kirby, A. (2021). No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy through photography. Estudios
de Filosofía, 64, 47-71. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a03
Estud.filos n.º 64. Julio-diciembre de 2021 | pp. 47-71 | Universidad de Antioquia | ISSN 0121-3628 | ISSN-e 2256-358X
47
ARTÍCULO
DE INVESTIGACIÓN
No hay mapas para estos territorios:
una exploración de la filosofía
de la memoria a través de la fotografía
Resumen: Al inicio se examina la percepción de las fotografías desde dos direcciones:
qué pensamos que son las fotografías y los aspectos de la mente involucrados al ver
fotografías. Se muestra que las fotografías tradicionales son herramientas mnemónicas:
por ello, la memoria es una parte clave del proceso mediante el cual las fotografías se
perciben por completo. En segundo lugar, describo el metamorfograma; una fotografía
no tradicional que se ajusta a criterios específicos definidos por el autor para ser memoria. Se muestra que el metamorfograma es análogo a una combinación de todos los
recuerdos episódicos de un individuo. Finalmente, el uso del metamorfograma en obras
artísticas sugiere una relación bidireccional entre la memoria autobiográfica individual
y la memoria cultural compartida. Un modelo de esta relación no se alinea con las
definiciones existentes de memoria cultural y puede representar una nueva forma: la
memoria sociobiográfica. Propongo que las experiencias aquí documentadas justifican la
promoción de una relación mutuamente beneficiosa entre la filosofía y otras disciplinas
creativas, incluida la fotografía.
Palabras clave: fotografía, memoria, memoria cultural, percepción, arte
Alun Kirby
was an immunologist for many years, researching immune responses to mucosal infections in London, Sweden, and York, and making photographs all the while. Since leaving science he has focused on artistic work, using philosophy of memory and the lived
experiences of people living with dementia as sources of inspiration.
ORCID: 0000-0001-5663-2961
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No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy of memory through photography
Introduction
How do we perceive photographs? Can a photograph ever be a memory? What can
we learn about memory, and our relationship with memory, from photographs? I have
been exploring philosophical ideas of memory and its relationship with the self through
photography, and this paper sets out the lessons learnt during that process.
In the first section I examine our relationship with photographs. The culturally
accepted analogy equating photographs with memories is contrasted with their
experimentally observed functions. The actual roles photographic images play in relation
to memory defines them not as ‘memories’ but as mnemonic tools. I then examine the role
of memory in our perception of photographs by revisiting the work of Roland Barthes.
By placing his documented experience in the context of contemporary theories, the
potential contribution of memory to affective perception of photographs is revealed.
Typically, photographs are second-generation copies of visual scenes external to
the camera, captured in a fraction of a second. However, other photographs can be
created that do not require a camera and do their work over long time periods. These
photographs do not record phenomena external to themselves, instead recording what
they directly ‘perceive’. The second section explains how I developed a photographic
process broadly analogous to physical human memory: the metamorphogram. The type
of memory represented by metamorphograms is examined against existing definitions
of procedural, semantic and episodic memories, showing most similarity to a composite
of all episodic memories recorded during an individual’s lifetime.
In the final section, this photographic analogy is used to explore relationships
between individual and cultural/collective/social memory. Inspired by a Japanese folktale, several works were created which implied a bi-directional relationship between
memory and self: that individuals can alter culturally shared memories, and in return
cultural memories can affect individuals at the level of their autobiographical self. This
relationship is explored in more detail, revealing a distinct form of non-institutionalised,
non-behavioural, socially shared memory. Not fitting any extant definition, it is proposed
that this be entitled ‘sociobiographic memory’.
1. Our perception of photographs
‘We capture your memories forever’
‘We are that strange species that constructs
artefacts intended to counter the natural flow
of forgetting’
(William Gibson, 2012)1
1
This quote is from William Gibson’s collection of non-fiction writings, ‘Distrust That Particular Flavour’ (2012), at the start of
the article Dead man sings (pp. 51–53), in which Gibson considers our rapidly changing relationship with the past.
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Alun Kirby
The question ‘how do we perceive photographs?’ can be interpreted in two ways,
depending on our definition of ‘perceive’. First, it may mean ‘what do we recognize or
understand photographs to be?’ As a society as well as individuals, we blithely entrust
the recording of important memories to cameras; or, more precisely, to photographs. We
even call the most perfect, albeit apparently non-existent, version of memory — in which
every detail is recalled with absolute clarity— “photographic memory”. A generalized
acceptance exists within society that a photograph is somehow equivalent to a memory.
This apparent equivalence has been promoted and exploited by camera manufacturers
Eastman Kodak since the 1960s and 1970s onwards. One print advertisement copy
includes the following;
Then and Now Good Memories Deserve Good Processing
What are memories made of? […] You live them all once. You live them again and
again in pictures […]. And make your memories last.
As economist Theodore Levitt noted, “Kodak promises with unremitting emphasis the
satisfactions of enduring remembrance, of memories clearly preserved. […] The product
is thus remembrance, not film or pictures.”2 The messages are clear: memories are
‘captured’ in photographs; photographs extend the functional lifespan of memories.
The arts writer John Berger concurred, suggesting that photographs may be a direct
replacement for memory:
What served in the place of the photograph, before the camera’s invention? The
expected answer is the engraving, the drawing, the painting. The more revealing
answer might be: memory (Berger, 1980, p. 54).
In this he iterated Susan Sontag, who stated that photographs are “not so much an
instrument of memory as an invention of it or a replacement” (Sontag, 1979, p. 178).
And so, we entrust our fallible memories to cameras which “cannot lie”.
However, Kodak, Berger and Sontag are wrong; in fact, Sontag’s quote works
better reversed, to infer that photographs are not a replacement of memory, but an
instrument of it. Photographs are not analogous to memories, but to tools. Participants
in studies of how we use photographs directly refer to them as memories: “It’s
important for me that they’ll have [the picture collection] when they are grown up, so
they will be able to leave home with a big box of memories” (Whittaker, Bergman &
Clough, 2010, p. 34). However, when participants’ interactions with photographs are
further interrogated, it is clear that they understand the functional purposes, whether
memorial, communicative or aesthetic (Fawns, 2020, pp. 3, 6, 8 & 9), for which they use
photographs. Fawns describes a multitude of ways in which photographs are used to
2
50
From the article ‘Marketing intangible products and product intangibles’, Harvard Business Review, May–June 1981, pp. 94-102
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No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy of memory through photography
support (autobiographical) memory construction, recall, association and distribution.
Participants in Fawns’ studies understand that they use photographs as tools to aid
recall, noting that selecting images to keep is “important potentially in the future and
you want to make the right choices” (Fawns, 2020, p. 6). They show understanding
of how photographs trigger memory: “The photograph becomes the focal point of the
memory system that everything then extends out from” (Fawns, 2020, p. 3). Fawns sees
photographs as part of a process, including taking, sorting, viewing and distributing
images, which we use to support memory. The photographs themselves are merely one
of the tools in this process, interacting with our memory, functioning as symbols to be
interpreted (Rowlands, 2016, pp. 160-162).
Our reliance on photographs as mnemonic tools is a double-edged sword.
Photographs have been shown to aid reactivation of memories, but may also induce
bias in our memory (see St Jacques & Schacter, 2013, pp. 537-343; St Jacques,
Montgomery & Schacter, 2015, pp. 876-887 for examples), or, albeit in somewhat
contrived circumstances, create completely false memories (Garry & Gerrie, 2005,
pp. 312-315). Photographs clearly function in multiple and complex ways with our
memory, often in the context of other contemporary non-visual (e.g. textual, verbal,
social) information (reviewed in Garry & Gerrie, 2005). The strength of their potential
influence led to the suggestion that photographs supporting memories can validate a
sense of self (Heersmink & McCarroll, 2019, pp. 98-101).
Decades of research have provided objective clarity in terms of the function of
photographs. Despite this, the power and simplicity of the label ‘memory’ for driving
engagement with images (as evidenced by Instagram Memories, Google Photo Memories,
Facebook Memories… and the continuing use of ‘memories’ as a hook word by almost
every major camera manufacturer) suggests photographs will remain commonly
perceived as memories. After all, who would buy a camera that lets you capture “visual
tools to aid your recall”?
Punctum power
We have seen that the generalized perception of photographs as memories is at odds
with their actual function as mnemonic tools. Given this role in triggering recall, I now
return to the question ‘how do we perceive photographs?’.
The primary definition of ‘perceive’ by the Oxford English Dictionary is ‘to take in or
apprehend with the mind or senses’ (further: ‘to apprehend with the mind; to become
aware or conscious of; to realize; to discern, observe’).3 In this section, I restate the
3
The Oxford English Dictionary (online) was the source for definitions in this work. For the definition of ‘perceive’ see: https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/140537
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Alun Kirby
question as ‘with what aspects of our mind or senses do we interpret photographs?’
To answer I focus on Roland Barthes’ observations in Camera Lucida (Barthes, 1980).
Barthes became fascinated by photography and photographs, examining the viewer’s
relationship with images. Barthes’ testimony will be re-evaluated in the light of more
contemporary philosophical theories.
In Camera Lucida Barthes describes finding a box of photographs belonging to
his beloved mother, who had recently died. In some he recognizes his mother and
other family members, with little affective consequence despite his obvious grief.
However, in the “Winter Garden photograph”, which shows his mother as a child, he
finds something immediately and profoundly affective. He attests that this image has
captured the essence of his mother, allowing him to ‘rediscover’ her. How has Barthes
perceived this photograph, and not others of his mother, such that it affects him so
deeply? The image is explicitly not an autobiographical memory: it shows his mother
as a young girl, long before he was born. Indeed, Barthes knows that “what [he sees] is
not a memory” (Barthes, 1980, p. 82) and that “The Photograph [is] never, in essence, a
memory” (Barthes, 1980, p. 91). For him it is “reality in a past state”; confirmation that
what he sees once existed and has “evidential force” (Barthes, 1980, p. 89).
Barthes found affective power in some photographs, and knows this power relates
directly to the viewer. He says of the Winter Garden photograph, “[F]or you, it would
be nothing but an indifferent picture” (Barthes, 1980, p. 73). What strikes Barthes
about photographs with affective content is something he describes as an image’s
“intensity”; the part of the image which “jumps out and pierces” the viewer, an aspect
of visual content which he calls a “punctum” and which “is poignant to [him]” (Barthes,
1980, pp. 26-27). His perception of the punctum is crucial for the effect, and Barthes
understands that its presence or absence is viewer-specific.
Perceiving the punctum
Above, I defined the question under examination as “with what aspects of our mind or
senses do we interpret photographs?”. So far, we have Barthes viewing photographs, but
only finding affective content in a fraction of them. This suggests that while perception of
photographs includes input of visual information, other aspects of perception facilitate
recognition of a viewer-specific punctum able to transform indifferent pictures into
objects with the affective capacity.
What is this punctum? Baudrillard, another philosopher captivated by
photography, said that in most photography “what Barthes calls the ‘punctum’, that
absent point, that nothingness at the heart of the image which gives it its power, no
longer exists”. Baudrillard appears to equate the punctum with a “void”: a complete
absence of symbolism. He suggests that taking a photograph of a living human which
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No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy of memory through photography
contains a punctum may be “almost impossible” (Baudrillard, 1998, p. 93) as there
can be no “absence”.
Barthes seems to say that the punctum is more obvious when Death is present in
the image. In the Winter Garden photograph and other historical images he notes that
the subject is at once alive / going to die / has died / dead, suggesting some necessary
relation to time or, as Barthes melancholically phrases it, “death in the future” (Barthes,
1980, p. 94). However, by no means all the puncta he uses to illustrate this idea are
people. The punctum may be an object, a stance, a house, a sheet, or the entirety
of the image. A punctum has the “power of expansion”, which Barthes says is often
metonymic. He sees one thing, and his mind fills with much, much more. From a picture
of a blind gypsy he “recognize[s], with [his] whole body” his long-past travels in Eastern
Europe (Barthes, 1980, p. 45). In a photograph of an unknown woman he realises the
punctum is due to his associating her necklace with that of someone he once knew
(Barthes, 1980, p. 53), and from there a whole trail of memories related to this object
unfolds within him. This same associationist phenomenon of “expansion” is also noted
by participants in recent studies (Fawns, 2020: see the first section for an example).
The power of the punctum thus emanates from the viewer. Barthes and I would not
share puncta, we would each find our own. I propose that each punctum’s power is due
to a second aspect of our perception of photographs; that we perceive photographs
in the context of our memory. The consequence of this perception is some level of
emotional affect.
Not all images contain a punctum; they show nothing which “pierces” our memory
and induces affect. Many are “inert under [Barthes’] gaze” (Barthes, 1980, p. 27),
others elicit semantic memories such as recognition of a particular form of clothing.
Photographs may therefore act with a scale of affect, ranging from nothing at all,
through factual recognition, and all levels of “punctum” affect up to a punch-in-the-gut
emotive force. The viewer-specific power of a photograph arises from the association
of something within the image with an aspect of the viewer’s memory.
In the Winter Garden photograph, Barthes’ perception of the punctum which
provides the affect is clearly expressed. Barthes receives the visual stimulus of his mother
as a child, sees her particular pose, the line of her face, and is filled with emotion. The
image itself has no intrinsic power; I doubt you or I would be affected should we see
it. Barthes’ memory has been triggered to engage with this photograph. Therefore, the
viewer’s memory, in concert with visual stimuli, determines whether any personally
relevant or affective content is perceived.
From Barthes’ account we see the scale of affect puncta may trigger. Only the Winter
Garden photograph arouses the notable affective state he discusses, despite looking
at other photographs of his mother from the same box, including one “in which she is
hugging me, a child, against her, [and] I can awaken in myself the rumpled softness of
her crepe de Chine and the perfume of her rice powder” (Barthes, 1980, p. 65). Degree
of affect can thus distinguish one image from another, even when the representational
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Alun Kirby
content —in this case, Barthes’ mother— is very similar. The Winter Garden photograph
may be set apart as particularly valued for its ability to conjure such strongly emotional
memories. Or, we may say, for the ability of Barthes’ memory to facilitate perception
of it in such an intensely affective manner.
Barthes’ response to the Winter Garden photograph is so strong we may consider it as
an evocative object, one which “intentionally or unintentionally aids us in remembering
our personal past” (Heersmink, 2020, p. 7). The intensity of Barthes feeling suggests a
“love-at-first-sight” moment, a viscerally affective flood of connected memories triggered
by the image. Barthes could be describing the moments during which the Winter Garden
photograph is transformed, for him, from a mere image into what we might now label
a particularly powerful evocative object.
Overall, Barthes’ testimony, together with more recent empirical observations,
suggest that perception of photographs is a complex process in which visual stimuli
interact with memory to facilitate perception of anything of relevance to the viewer
within the image, be that purely semantic information or associations with affective
autobiographical content. All this is done in the context of the viewer’s present
cultural, social and personal situation, rather than the (distant or recent) past
depicted in the image. It is within this network of interactions that our mind fully
perceives a photograph.
2. The metamorphogram
Photographic memory
I have shown that photographs do not function as memory. However, so far we have
only looked at “traditional” photographs. By this I mean images of scenes external to
the camera or film, which exist only for the fraction of a second it takes for the shutter
to open and close —usually less time than our brains are capable of perceiving. My
artistic practice uses non-traditional photographic techniques, which I have previously
used to create visual analogies for philosophical ideas. For example, a photographic
sculpture constructed along associationist principles,4 or a series of images using the
same source material to depict the reconstructive nature of memory.5 These explorations
led to the question ‘can a photograph ever be a memory?’ That is, is it possible to create
photographs which are directly analogous to a memory?
I will first define “a memory” with relatively broad yet consciously restrictive
terms chosen to replicate, or be representative of, central characteristics of human
4
For details on my sculptural piece please see: ‘Associationism’ http://alunkirby.com/portfolio/reconstructed-memory-associationism/
5
‘(Re (Re)) Reconstructed Memory was exhibited in 2020 as part of this exhibition: ‘False Memory’ https://www.ragm.co.uk/
falsememory
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No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy of memory through photography
episodic, autobiographical memory. They are designed to allow easy comparisons
between traditional photography and the approach described below, and to allow
flexibility within a practical artistic context. Such a memory should: (1) be created as
a result of direct perceptual experience, (2) be recorded directly and independently
by the object having the experience, and (3) be recallable. The criterion of “direct
perceptual experience” is intended to push away from semantic into episodic and
autobiographical areas of memory. In addition, a photographic analogy of a memory
should (4) function on the same timescale as human episodic memory, to ensure the
capture of an experience, rather than a transient external scene. Traditional photographs
do not fit these criteria; we may exclude them at criterion (1) by noting that such images
are indirectly experienced. The exposure to the scene visualized happened to the film
or digital sensor; traditional photographs are secondary interpretations.
To fulfil these criteria and approach this analogy photographically I used a
process called cyanotype (blueprint), which uses light-sensitive chemicals and has
no requirement for a camera.6 Photograph means “light drawing”, and many of the
earliest photographs were cameraless. To create a cyanotype, a photosensitive
solution is usually painted onto paper. When exposed to ultra-violet light (sunshine,
for example), a permanent blue colour is formed. In contrast to the fractions of a
second over which traditional photographs work, cyanotypes can be left to expose
for months if needed. This allows the cyanotype to fulfil criterion (4), working on a
human-relatable timescale. To fulfil criteria 1-3, I chose to create an approximation
of human physical memory. Our capacity to record and recall is held in our brain,
contained in our body, with the ability to perceive external stimuli through our
sensorium. Through these physical components our experiences are processed,
recorded, and made available for recall.
The ‘brain’ of the photograph is the photo-sensitive solution applied to the paper,
providing the record-and-recall function. The ‘body’ is the paper itself, which can be
given almost any shape we wish through folding. The surface of the paper capable
of being exposed to light is analogous to the sensorium, which ‘responds’ to external
stimuli by altering the chemicals.
Finally, a critical aspect of this attempt to create a photographic model of an
episodic-type memory is that it should result from direct experience. The definition of
experience in this case is “an event by which one is affected”; a state or condition to
which one is subject. To create an authentic episodic memory I experience an event
directly, and translate my perceptions of the event into a memory of that event. The
model of creating a cyanotype-memory, below, is based on this human-level process.
6
Cyanotype is an iron-based, simple photographic process invented in 1842. Cyanotype was used by Anna Atkins to create
the first ever book containing photographs, which can be viewed at the British Library; https://www.bl.uk/catalogues/
photographyinbooks/record.asp?RecordID=3048
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Alun Kirby
Making the metamorphogram
Here I describe the process used as an analogy of human physical form capable of
recording its own episodic memories. Paper coated with light-sensitive cyanotype
chemicals provides the capacity to record and recall external visual stimuli —the brain
of the model (Figure 1a).
Figures 1a, b & c
Production of a metamorphogram (2019)
(a) Paper coated with photosensitive chemicals prior to use. (b) An abstract 3D form is folded and
allowed to expose. (c) The ‘killed’ final form, showing the resultant image. In white areas no light
reached the paper. Blue areas were exposed to sunlight. Greenish-blue areas, such as the central
circle, received most light.
The paper is then altered, usually using origami techniques, to give a form specific
to the individual model (e.g. Figure 1b). Forms were either nominally two-dimensional,
essentially various layers of paper, or three-dimensional, where the form is more-orless limitless. Now we have a ‘body’ (the form), a ‘brain’ (the light-sensitive chemicals),
and the primarily outward-facing, chemical-coated surface(s) of the form comprise the
‘sensorium’ (areas capable of perceiving and responding to external stimuli). It may be
helpful to consider the form at this stage as analogous to a new-born creature, with no
autobiographical memory, ready to have experiences and create its own episodic memories.
The process is not intended to create an equivalent to human memory, but a smallscale analogy of it, with a sensorium and capacity to record and recall information limited
to certain visual stimuli. To complete the process and determine whether a photograph
can really fulfil the criteria for being a memory it needs to have experience(s) —events
by which it is affected— and record and recall them.
Experience was not dictated. That is, apart from early “proof-of-principle” studies,
in which the events were somewhat controlled, the locations where forms were placed
and what happened to them during their “life” was left to happenstance, and forms
were treated arbitrarily. Once created they are placed into the environment (usually
inside my home) and may be moved or left still, played with or ignored, forgotten …
neither rhyme nor reason dictated the ‘events-which-affect-them’, their experience.
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No maps for these territories: exploring philosophy of memory through photography
Accumulation of experiences was allowed to continue until some arbitrary external
force ended it. As creator, I acted as ‘arbitrary external force’. Some forms lived a few
hours, some days, weeks or months. Some had their own adventures (were lost) until the
arbitrary external force caught up with them. Through these methods it was intended
that every individual form had unique experiences.
Once the experiential time is over, the form is ‘killed’, which is merely the undoing
of form, returning it to a relatively flat piece of paper. At this stage any “memory” is
statically recorded in chemical changes which have occurred within the surface of the
paper. To complete the process, the “memory” is recalled by washing the paper in water
to remove any unused chemicals and leave an extremely light- and colour-fast final
image (Figure 1c). I have named the photograph created by this process —transforming
paper into a distinct form which then returns to a flat image— a metamorphogram.
Experience-dependent photographic memory
We now have a photographic process adapted to create a loose analogy of
autobiographical memory as instantiated in the human body. Forms are allowed to
have ‘subjective’ experiences, events-which-affect-them, which creates the final image.
The following simple demonstration examines the crucial formative role of direct
subjective experience in creating the final image. Two identical pieces of tissue paper
were coated with the same batch of chemicals at the same time, and folded into exactly
the same form; a flat origami called a “tato”, which has all its folds on one surface
(Figure 2a). These were placed in sunlight adjacent to one another for the same length
of time; in this case several days. The only difference between the two forms is that one
was placed folded-side up, while the other is folded-side down. Their creation and “life
experience” is identical in every way, with “killing” and recall also identical in each case.
Figures 2a, b & c
The influence of experience on the visual image recorded by a metamorphogram (2017)
Coated tissue paper was folded into the tato form (a) and left to gain experience either folds-up
(b) or folds down (c). All other variables were identical. (b) and (c) are the final ‘killed’ images
from each form.
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The images produced are dramatically different (Figures 2b and 2c). We can
say one is the experience of ‘being-a-tato-face-up’ and the other the experience of
‘being-a-tato-face-down’. Their single difference in perceptual experience directly
and strikingly affected the image recorded of their otherwise identical ‘life-as-a-tato’.
We may imagine the analogous situation of two people standing back-to-back; they
would have different perceptual experiences, and therefore different memories, of
a particular event.
We are now able to ask whether these finished metamorphogram images fit the
previously given definition of a memory. Are they (1) created as a result of direct
perceptual experience? Yes, and the above experiment shows that the subjective
nature of the experience affects the final image “memory”. Was the image (2) recorded
directly and independently by the object having the experience? Yes, as no external
force, device or process was required for recording the image (traditional photography
normally requires a camera and human operator or other physical mechanism to
choose and trigger exposure and recording). Was the recorded information (3)
recallable? Yes, we may consider this as analogous to me asking somebody to recall
an event. I trigger and perceive the recalled memory, but the recall is independent
from me. For a metamorphogram, I ‘ask’ it, for example, what it was like to ‘be-atato-face-up’. My external stimulus ‘initiates’ the recall (and in this case physically
aids recall by washing the paper), but the memory recalled is entirely specific to, and
dependent on, what the object had recorded during the experience. Finally, the image
was (4) created over a human-relatable time period, and so is much more reflective
of human memory than the single instant recorded in a traditional photograph. This
allows the conclusion that a metamorphogram image is a photograph which is directly
analogous to a memory, based on these criteria.
Metamorphogram memory
I will now give further examples showing how the images created relate directly to the
perceptual information recorded during an individual object’s experience. We must
note that metamorphograms are highly limited in both their perceptual and recording
capabilities. They can only record using the chemicals on their surface and, to some
extent, perhaps with their physical ‘body’; the paper from which they are formed.
In a project working with people living with dementia, 3D origami shapes made from
chemical-coated paper were fitted with recording devices.7 Participants could tell their
thoughts to the boxes, which would ‘remember’ what they said, while the box itself
7
The ‘Memory Box’ project, funded by a grant from York Dementia Action Alliance in 2018. The ‘Minds & Voices’ support group,
which is part of the DEEP network (https://www.dementiavoices.org.uk/) were participants in the project. Details can be
found here: Memory Boxes http://alunkirby.com/2d-works/memory-boxes/
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created its own memory of its time (weeks to months) living with the person. Some of
the images are shown in Figure 3.
With practical understanding, these metamorphograms can be ‘translated’ in the
context of the known experience. For example, in Figure 3a:
•
the visible folds and the pattern of coloured areas show this was a cube,
•
the overall colour has become a gold-green, which indicates that this box was
‘alive’ in a bright place for several weeks at least,
•
the far right, darkest in colour, was facing the light,
•
the triangles below the gold squares are much paler than those above the squares
due to experiencing much less light, and so formed the bottom of the box, and
•
most interestingly, the random marks and smears in the coloured areas show
us that this box lived in the participants kitchen, near the sink. The marks are
splashes from the washing-up water which altered the chemicals in those places.
Figures 3a, b & c
Metamorphogram images from the Memory Box project (2018)
Box (a) has recorded both visual and physical stimuli, as well as multiple interactions
with its external environment. Boxes (b) and (c) show again the influence of experience
on the final image / memory produced.
Together these visual characteristics constitute the memory of this metamorphogram’s
‘life’ as a box-form in this person’s house. Unlike a traditional photograph it has not
simply recorded a transient moment external to itself. It has, within the limits of its
capacity to do so, recorded its direct perceptual experiences —formation, placement,
duration, light exposure, orientation, and even the consequences of interactions
with others.
In Figures 3b and 3c we see the visual memories of two boxes with the same initial
form, but which spent their lives with different people. The box on the left (Figure
3b) was in a fairly bright place, with light coming mostly from the right, and shows a
splash where some tea was spilt. The square in the centre was the bottom of the box,
and so is white.
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The box on the right (Figure 3c) shows more colour, and the colour is relatively
even. It has had more light, and from all sides. Interestingly, the square in the centre
is blue, which means the bottom of the box has been exposed to light. It happens that
the participant moved house during the project, so the box experienced movement
including being turned upside down for a while. The box recorded that experience, and
our process has recalled the memory of it in visual form: we can visualise the biography
of the form. This is a self-created biography, distinct from the biographies ascribed to
personally or culturally important objects predominantly through human agency, as
described by, for example, Hoskins (2005).
We seem to have a photograph which fulfils our criteria for memory. But what
sort of memory? The analysis above also identified experience recorded in the
physical media of the object itself, i.e. folds in the paper. Let us deal with this first.
We may argue that folds in the metamorphogram constitute procedural memory.
The folds made to create the form remain, and often show which direction the paper
was folded. A competent origamist could refold the form from these creases, but the
paper could not refold itself, arguing against procedural memory. We may instead argue
that folds are another visual aspect of our analogy to memory, but we have defined the
paper as the form’s ‘body’ rather than part of the light-sensitive sensorium. I conclude
that these folds represent ‘birth marks’ or scars. They act as reminders of an experience,
rather than a memory of that experience.
We are left with our photographic image. What kind of memory is it analogous to?
As the image does not show non-autobiographical, non-experiential factual information,
I exclude it being analogous to semantic memory. This leaves episodic memory. Some
aspects of the metamorphogram relate to specific episodic experiences, such as the
tea splash in Figure 3b. The washing-up splashes in Figure 3a are likely due to repeated
incidents (note that the experience of being splashed is recorded by the photographic
‘sensorium’; these marks are not mere ‘stains’ masquerading as a memory), and so result
from multiple individual episodic experiences.
The colour of each image also arises due to the overlaid memory from multiple
episodic experiences of ‘being-in-a-particular-place’ and recording the specific
amount of light (dependent on direction, intensity etc.) perceived by the sensorium
each time. A little colour from one dull day, overlaid with more colour from the
next, brighter day, colour on different sides when moved for a day, and so on.
Together these experiences result in an image which is a composite memory built
up from many individual ‘episodes’.
Metamorphograms are not, then, engrams or memory traces. They do not
show the multiple aspects of a single experience, unless we consider their entire
‘life-as-a-form’ as a single experience. They are instead an amalgamation of all the
recordable perceptual experience perceived by the form during its entire ‘lifespan’.
The analogy here would be to every episodic memory retained by a person, overlaid
one on top of the next.
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3. The individual and cultural memory
In this section I set out how artistic explorations led from initial examinations of
individual memory to finding connections between individual and collective memory.
I show that bi-directional agency exists between individuals and certain social groups
to which they belong, such that (1) individuals can directly influence the nature of
a collective memory, and (2) that collective memory can influence individuals at the
level of their autobiographical ‘self’.
I have shown that, while traditional photographs are tools rather than memories,
it is possible to create a photographic image analogous to memory. These
metamorphogram images appear to comprise a ‘lifetime’ of episodic memories in a
single expression. Applying artistic licence, I now take a metamorphogram’s memories
at the time of its ‘killing’ to be somewhat comparable to an individual ‘self’, if it were
possible to visualise such a thing. Each metamorphogram is unique due to its specific
and subjective recorded experience, despite sharing features such as creative process,
form and sensorium with other metamorphograms.
My interest in origami led me to explore what I considered to be ‘cultural memory’,
long before I had read any philosophical or sociological definitions of what cultural
memory might be. Naively, I thought the practice of origami may itself comprise a
cultural memory. These early inquiries coalesced into one two-pronged question:
How does cultural memory affect the individual, and how does the individual affect
cultural memory?
At this stage, I had no definition of cultural memory in mind. However, in deciding
that I could consider each metamorphogram as representing a unique individual,
I was able to explore the relationship between cultural and individual memory
through art.
There is a Japanese folk tale surrounding the origami crane, known as the
orizuru (ori – paper; tsuru – crane). The red-crowned crane, as a bird, has various
symbolic meanings in Japan, including longevity and authority. The origami version
long predates its appearance in the first printed origami book, Hiden Senbazuru
Orikata of 1797 —origami has existed in Japan since around 600AD.8 Pre-second
world war, the act of folding 1000 orizuru— called senbazuru —was thought to
bring the folder a boon, such as long life, good health, or a wish. After the atomic
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a girl called Sadako Sasaki developed leukaemia.
She decided to fold senbazuru to wish away her illness, but died while still folding
them (Sasaki & DiCicco, 2020). As a result of the perception of her experience
by others, the cultural meaning of senbazuru has been altered. It has become
8
Much information can be found online regarding the history of origami. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History_of_origami includes mention of Hiden Senbazuru Orikata, which can also be viewed in full here: http://www.
origamiheaven.com/senbazuruorikata.htm
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a symbol of hope and peace; hundreds of thousands of cranes are delivered to
shrines at Hiroshima and Nagasaki every year. Senbazuru projects for peace are
now abundant across the world.
This story led me to construct two hypotheses. First, that an individual could
directly affect cultural memory; in this case, expanding or altering the meaning of
a long-standing cultural symbol. Second, that some cultural memories could affect
individuals at the level of their autobiographical ‘self’; people temporally and spatially
distant from the original event are affected enough to fold one thousand cranes, use
the imagery and symbolism, and encourage others to do so — enough to become a
lesser or greater part of ‘who they are’.
To test these hypotheses through art I decided to fold my own senbazuru, where
each of the 1000 cranes would become a metamorphogram.9 That is, cranes were
folded from chemical-coated paper, allowed to ‘live’ according to the principles set
out in section 2, above, and then ‘killed’ to reveal the the visual memory of their
‘time-as-an-orizuru’. Although each of the 1000 metamorphograms was formed in
an identical process, each was also unique as a final image (Figure 4a), representing
the recorded experiences of a unique individual, and many of those experiences
were shared across the 1000 individuals. I therefore had a group of individuals
with shared experiences analogous to some sort of ‘cultural’ memory, and began to
explore the relationships between them.
In Cliques and Networks (Figure 4b) 81 crane metamorphograms were arranged
together. The individual metamorphograms cannot communicate with each other,
so the relationships formed are based entirely on the memories they recorded while
‘alive’ in crane form. The patterns which appear infer how our personal experiences
lead us to form a range of connections with others, and together those interactions
form something new. Small groups of individuals together create circular ‘cliques’
where aspects of their individual memories meet. Other parts of the individual images
form an extended diagonal grid, or ‘network’, connecting individuals well beyond
our immediate social circle or clique.
9
The project to fold 1000 orizuru and express them as metamorphograms was inspired by the folk tale boon of a wish, and
so is entitled ‘1000th of a Wish’. More details can be seen here: 1000th of a Wish Project http://alunkirby.com/portfolio/
one-thousandth-wish-senbazuru/
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Figures 4a, b & c
Exploring interactions between individual memory and collective
or cultural memory (2019-20)
(a) An individual orizuru metamorphogram. (b) Cliques & Networks collage. (c) Six Degrees of
Separation installation of over 100 individual metamorphogram cranes.
The artwork visualizes through these linked individuals the concepts that each
individual has its own memories; that some memories (i.e., experiences) are shared
with a close social group, and other memories or experiences are shared on a much
wider social level.
The second work shown is a hung installation entitled Six Degrees of Separation
(Figure 4c), which has individual metamorphograms hung in five grouped layers, with
the sixth layer to be provided by the viewer. The title arises from the popular, yet
inaccurate, notion that any individual is connected to any other via no more than
six social interactions. The five layers of individuals are ‘connected’ via their shared
experience, which has resulted in them appearing very similar to one another. The
work asks of the viewer, are you able to connect as the sixth layer, or do you lack a
shared experience which would allow that connection? Individually recorded shared
experience — a form of cultural or social memory — allows us to come together as a
social group. The experiences gained within the social group may then feed back and
become part of each individual’s memory.
These works, created naively, without reference to literature on cultural memory,
seemed to support the idea that a memory of an event experienced by a cultural or
social group could link that group together, even though the event was experienced at
an individual level. Further, that the coming together of individual memories created
something new, new connections, or social structures. Further, that it was each
individual’s memory that combined to create these new things. The model represented
by the artworks is certainly weak, almost barely there. However, it opened a pathway
down which the idea developed.
Considering these works strengthened my conviction that the original linked
hypotheses (1. that an individual can directly affect cultural memory, and 2. that
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cultural memory can affect individuals at the level of their autobiographical ‘self’) were
worthy of a more rigorous examination. To do this, two significant issues needed to be
addressed. First, the art-based models only indirectly address the hypotheses. At this
stage their validity is based on extrapolation and artistic inference. A stronger, realworld example is required. Second, no definition of ‘cultural memory’ has been given
here. Since various types of cultural memory exist in philosophical and sociological
literature (see, e.g., Adams, 2019; Manier & Hirst, 2008; Wang, 2021), any model needs
to be tested against them.
City or United?
While the senbazuru example offered a glimpse of something, a more concrete
example is needed to fully examine whether there exists a bidirectional flow of
influence between individual and what, lacking a more specific term at this point, I
will continue to call cultural memory until I compare it with extant models.
The hypothesis indicates that I should seek a social or cultural context to which
individuals contribute, and by which individuals are influenced at the level of their
autobiographical memory or ‘self’. I choose to use as my model supporters of English
Premier League Football clubs, although many other organisations, clubs or social
groups would substitute.
Major football clubs are large businesses, their identity and product branded
and sold around the world. However, football clubs require supporters, and the
supporters’ experience of football is far from institutionalized, and extremely
social. Of importance for later comparisons with other forms of cultural memory,
relationships between individual fans do not require familial, employment or other
common social links. While support for a specific club may ‘run in the family’, with
successive generations supporting the same team, intrafamilial rivalries are also far
from uncommon (I am a Liverpool fan, which antagonizes my father, a Manchester
United fan). Using this model, I set out how supporting a football team creates a
cultural memory influenced by individuals within that culture (the supporters), and
how supporters are in turn influenced by being part of this cultural group.
The act of supporting your team is ongoing, and not restricted geographically
or temporally, e.g., it is limited neither to the days matches are played, nor to the
stadia, cities or even countries in which the matches take place. Supporting is a
very social activity generally characterized by oral storytelling, semantic knowledge
sharing, and reminiscence about events and characters associated with a club down
the years. The matches themselves are, for the supporters, shared, repeated, very
emotive experiences whether experienced in the stadium, in a local pub or half way
around the world watching on television. The ‘I was there’ (or, for distant fans, ‘I
witnessed’) motif of storytelling adds weight and authority, and interesting details
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heard from one source may be incorporated into the next telling, adding to the
cultural memory.
Songs and chants associated with the team are sung communally, and are often
created by generally anonymous individual supporters. This is our first example of
individuals having agency to affect a shared experience. It takes a single supporter to
start a new song eulogising a player, and that song may be sung for decades; indeed
many songs sung in football stadia have been around for generations. As a recent
example, a pop group enlisted two celebrity supporters to sing a song in support
of England at the European Championships in 1996. The lyrics drew heavily on
cultural memories surrounding the English national team, and immediately engaged
supporters.10 The ‘Three Lions’ song is still sung, now by supporters who were not
alive in 1996. The imagery and the words ‘three lions’ have become a central part
of their shared memory.
There is a strong trans-generational aspect to this social support activity;
contemporary supporters sing songs and tell stories of players and events they
have never witnessed, or quote the wisdom of managers who died before they were
born. Taking part in these activities does not require any prior links to any other
participant. What is needed is (1) to self-identify as a supporter of that team, (2) to
be identifiable by other participants as a supporter of that team, and (3) to share
in the cultural memories of the team as embodied by the supporters.
Symbols, therefore, constitute a crucial part of the social experience. They not
only allow members to identify each other, but can themselves form part of the
shared cultural memory. While the business of the club includes selling merchandise
such as team shirts, much of the most iconic symbolism is generated by supporters.
Some of the most potent examples are flags and banners. For example, many created
by Liverpool fans celebrating triumphs of the 1970s and 1980s are still displayed by
supporters in the stadium and revered by their supporters elsewhere specifically
because of the shared cultural memory for which they serve as reminders. New
banners are created and displayed regularly, offering opportunity for any individual
to create something which will become part of the evolving cultural memory of
their club.11
Football supporters often define themselves, or at least an important part of
their self, as a ‘Liverpool fan’ or a ‘Chelsea fan’. Anyone ever asked by a Mancunian
10
The ‘Three Lions’ song is perhaps the most famous of English football songs, and has been updated by supporters over the
last 25 years to maintain its relevance to contemporary tournaments. For full information see; https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Three_Lions
11
Fan-produced banners have become a large part of Liverpool supporters’ collective identity and shared narrative, particularly
since the 1960s. Supporters talk about banners being more for the ‘collective’. Images of some Liverpool banners can be
found here; https://lfc-fan-banners.com/ A fabulous documentary about Liverpool banners, with much input from makers,
can be viewed here; https://youtu.be/e_z6CbrLOp8
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the dreadful question ‘City or United?’ will feel the importance of their answer
to the identity of the questioner. Are you one of us, with our shared history and
understanding? Or are you one of them? One whose experiential memories – and
identity – are in direct opposition to our own?
In these ways the culture is not only rich and vibrant for its members, but is
also reliant on their participation in its generation and maintenance in order for
it to continue as the same-but-not-the-same thing. By this I mean that the shared
memory maintains a consistent yet constantly reconstructed composition by
being comprised of shards derived from every member of the culture. It relies on
distributed remembering and may be an example of an exceptionally widespread
‘transactive memory system’ (Heersmink & McCarroll, 2019, p. 99), where each
individual remembers overlapping parts of the whole and each supports the memory
of the other.
Looking at the model above we have a large group of geographically disparate
people joined by a shared cultural memory powerful enough that these people
consider it, to lesser or greater extents, part of their autobiographical selves or
personal identities. The cultural memory is not static, but is maintained, renewed,
expanded and transmitted across generations by the supporters themselves through
participation in it. It is this requirement for participation which allows individuals to
modify the cultural memory for all members. This model therefore appears to fully
support the bidirectional relationship between individual and cultural memory hinted
at by the senbazuru works. It offers multiple and ongoing opportunities for individuals
to influence the nature of the shared memory, and the shared memory can become
a significant aspect of the autobiographical ‘self’ of individuals within the collective.
Sociobiographical memory
I began by questioning the nature of photographs and how we perceive them, showing
that traditional photographs are not memories. From trying to create a photograph
which mimics aspects of memory came the metamorphogram; an object which takes
a ‘photograph’ of its own experiences as a unique visual expression of ‘self’. Using
the metamorphogram to create many ‘individuals’ with shared experiences begged
questions of shared memories and a stream of influence which flows both ways.
This long and interesting journey as an artist entering the philosophical world
has exposed another bi-directional relationship. Interrogating photography with
philosophical questions proved extremely valuable to the development of my artistic
ideas. Interrogating philosophy through photographic art has led me to questions I
had not previously considered. In the first part of this section I used art to develop
a hypothesis around a form cultural memory which (1) can be directly affected by
individuals, and (2) can affect individuals at the level of their autobiographical ‘self’.
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I then set out the Football Fan model, which appears to be a real-world example of this
form of cultural memory. One may be able to think of many groups of people whose
personal and shared identity is similarly entwined; punks (and steampunks), K-pop
fans,12 and MAGA enthusiasts (particular grass-roots supporters of Donald Trump)
would fit equally well. In this final part I examine what sort of cultural memory are
we seeing among these groups by comparison with existing definitions.
Empirical research shows that cultural context influences autobiographical memory.
That is, self-identity is modified by shared cultural practices. Human groups seem
predisposed to create social or cultural memories. Mnemonic practices, such as oral
storytelling and behavioural habits, maintain and spread cultural memory across the
generations. These mnemonic practices directly influence aspects of individual selfidentity such as moral boundaries and taboos (for a review and examples see Alea &
Wang, 2015; Wang, 2021; Zhang & Cross, 2011). However, in this sense cultural memory
provides the context into which autobiographical memory is placed and reconstructed.
Wang describes memory as being ‘saturated in cultural context’, with culture influencing
what details are selected for remembering (Wang, 2021). ‘Cultural memory’ in this form
may be thought of as a series of learned behaviours, morals and contexts; scaffolding onto
which autobiographical memory is built. The shared experiential memory of a football
fan would be constructed within such context, but is not this form of cultural memory.
In revisiting the works of Ricoeur, Suzi Adams (2019) describes Jan and Aleida
Assmanns definition of Cultural Memory, which I capitalize to distinguish it from
earlier uses. Adams calls Cultural Memory the ‘institutionalized heritage of a society’,
the triad of remembered / forgotten / not forgotten (Assmann, 2006) information
and artefacts which contribute a formative role in creating a ‘collective identity’
(Adams, 2019). The process of institutionalization — choosing which information is
remembered — is generally carried out by a very small, select group, independent of
input from almost all individuals within the society. The resultant collective identities
appear prone to being, as Jan Assmann described all collective identities, ‘products
of the imagination’, or abstracted stereotypes. They apply to large groups, nations
or religions for example. Individuals are given little choice as to the nature of the
collective identity of which they are a part, and the memories are not embodied within
most people. Therefore, the Assmanns definition of institutional Cultural Memory does
not fit our model.
12
K-pop (Korean pop music, exemplified by the band BTS) attracts very devoted followers with a predominantly younger
demographic, who also share a self-created activist history. The fans famously made many hundreds of thousands of spoof
applications for Trump rally tickets (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/21/trump-tulsa-rally-scheme-kpopfans-tiktok-users), supported Black Lives Matter on social media by ‘drowning out’ hashtags of right-wing groups by posting
K-pop memes (https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/04/us/kpop-bts-blackpink-fans-black-lives-matter-trnd/index.html), and
have history of social activism as a community (https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/22/asia/k-pop-fandom-activism-intl-hnk/
index.html).
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Communicative memory, which Adams (2019) suggests is very similar to Halbwachs’
‘collective memory’, is described by Aleida Assmann as being about the everyday or
the mundane, existing within living generations of people, often communicated orally.
Retention beyond these limited temporal horizons requires it to become part of cultural
memory. Assmann goes on to describe social memory as a part of communicative
memory (Assmann, 2006). Social memory is about everyday life, intergenerational and
based on lived experience. However, this sort of memory belongs to relatively small
groups, such as families, work colleagues and so on. It addresses memories with social
functions, providing contextual and socially useful information such as remembering
jokes and the personal stories of others. Communicative memory, and subgenres
within it, seem close to our football supporter model. However, communicative memory
lacks a defined and consistent overall narrative shared by all members. Neither does
communicative memory, being predominantly functional, appear to impact individuals
at the level of their autobiographical self.
These existing definitions of cultural memory as a contextual scaffold, as institutional
Cultural Memory, or various shades of smaller-scale communicative memory do
not cover all social contexts. Whole areas of social interaction and lived experience
encompass shared memories which fall outside of these systems, none of which offers
agency to individuals with regard to shaping shared memory.
The shared memory exemplified by football supporters is not behavioural or
generally unconscious as cultural contexts are described to be by Wang and others.
It is neither tangential to nor abstracted from individual experience, in sharp contrast
to institutionalized Cultural Memory. Instead it is direct and participatory, active
and evolving. Strong autobiographical-yet-socially-shared memories are created and
reinforced in specific social contexts. These memories are not semantic, having affective
episodic content which is generally similar for all members. In this sense, there are
strong similarities to the ‘collective episodic memory’ described by Manier & Hirst
(2008, p. 257). Though developed entirely independently, both I and Manier & Hirst
use football fans as an example. They note, for instance, that sports fans may form a
collective memory of a specific event. However, the current model not only expands
on this thinking, but differs from it significantly. The striking feature of this form of
cultural memory —a narrative shared by all members of a group— is that it is malleable
by individual effort. Its main defining characteristic may be its effect on individual
self-identity, an effect produced by shared, direct and valued experiences. In light of
the bi-directional influence between socially shared experience and autobiographical
content, I propose ‘sociobiographical memory’ as a suitable descriptor.
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Conclusion
This paper is more about a journey and a relationship between art and philosophy
than it is about any philosophical conclusions. Having begun this paper examining our
perception of photographs, how have I arrived at a point where I am discussing forms
of cultural memory? The path began with John Sutton’s Philosophy and memory traces
(Sutton, 1998). When developing the metamorphogram my naïve, art-led interpretations
no longer seemed appropriate to answer the questions arising from the process. What
exactly were these images I was creating? And what exactly was I trying to represent?
Sutton’s writing showed the direction in which the answers might lie.
Through further reading of philosophical literature, I understood why traditional
photographs are not memories, and why the metamorphogram might be. The explorations
of philosophers, psychologists and sociologists allowed me to set definitions against
which artistic ideas could be tested. They provided a structure supporting the artworks
themselves. Most interestingly, the art developed in this context provided a visual
language to communicate philosophical ideas to lay audiences outside of an academic
context. Art driving engagement with philosophy, and philosophy informing art is, in my
experience to date, a productive and generous two-way relationship.
In a world where photographs are everywhere, it can only be of benefit to understand
our relationship with them. The concept of photographs as memories may be wrong, yet
it is deeply embedded as a cultural metaphor and unlikely to change. However, Barthes’
deeply personal reflections on photography have been built upon to show that we actually
use photographs as tools ranging in power from mnemonic aids, to evocative objects
which may become a physical part of an extended memory system (Heersmink, 2020).
These developments in our understanding are already inspiring novel ways of helping
people with memory problems.13
Photography, triggered by philosophical literature, then led me to explore cultural
memory. Currently, ‘sociobiographical memory’ is an idea awaiting further development.
However, the process of trying to understand what I was showing people (see Figure 4)
begs questions of how philosophy relates to the real world. I found no extant definition
for a myriad of everyday examples of shared memories which constitute part of an
individual’s autobiographical self. There exist mind-boggling numbers of self-creating,
self-organizing groups, both short-lived and long-lived, which seem to fit preliminary
criteria for sociobiographical memory. Modern technology means geographical limitations
on forming social interactions with like-minded others, commonplace until the last decade
or two, no longer exist. ‘Furries’, goths, Wall Street Bets14 and other dynamic, almost
13
Studio Meineck is a design group focused on social benefit. Of particular relevance are projects for people living with dementia
(‘Music Memory Box’ https://www.musicmemorybox.com/) and for narrative building (‘Trove’ https://studiomeineck.com/
trove/).
14
WallStreetBets came to prominence for their collective attack on hedge-fund short selling of stocks (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/R/WallStreetBets). Their collective identity and shared pathway continued with sponsorship of 3500 gorillas; https://
edition.cnn.com/2021/03/16/investing/wallstreetbets-gorillas-reddit/index.html.
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Alun Kirby
exclusively online groups, and any number of comic and film-related fandoms are just
some that spring immediately to mind. Their lived experiences and shared culture,
and how these affect individual self, seems to be relatively unexamined philosophical
territory, outside the domains of existing Cultural Memory.
In summary, communicating philosophical insights through art is one way to share
these important discoveries about who we are with a much wider audience. Though
only a sample of one, my practice has gained immeasurable benefit from working
within philosophical contexts. From introducing concepts of memory into origami
workshops, to better understanding the lived experience of people with dementia,
philosophy adds something valuable to each conversation, and I am grateful to have
stumbled into it.
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