BLS WORKING PAPERS
U.S. Department of Labor
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Office of Price and Index Number Research
Reconciling User Costs and Rental Equivalence: Evidence from the U.S. Consumer
Expenditure Survey
Thesia I. Garner, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Randal Verbrugge, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Working Paper 427
August 2009
All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Reconciling User Costs and Rental Equivalence:
Evidence from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey
Thesia I. Garner
Randal Verbrugge
Division of Price and Index Number Research, Bureau of Labor Statistics
2 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, DC 20212
Email: garner.thesia@bls.gov; verbrugge.randal@bls.gov
First version: June 2008; this version: August 13, 2009
______________________________________________________________________________
Abstract
Previous research (Verbrugge, 2008a) demonstrated that housing rents and ex ante user costs
diverge markedly for extended periods of time, a finding with profound implications for income and inflation
measurement. But the primary data sources in that study were various indexes, based upon largely disjoint
data sources, constructed using different aggregation techniques, and each subject to various criticisms.
This raised doubts about the quality of the comparison. The relationship between user costs and rents
might well be much tighter at the micro level; after all, house prices and rents (and their growth rates) can
vary dramatically within cities, and rents are notoriously sticky. Furthermore, the use of indexes precludes
both cross-sectional and dollar cost comparisons. In this study, we use Consumer Expenditure Interview
Survey (CE) data to examine the relationship between user costs and rents at the individual unit level, in
dollars, using unit-level information on house value, rent, taxes, and the like. This allows us to accurately
estimate unit-specific user costs and to control for unobservables like structure and neighborhood quality.
We also make the point that in theory, after-tax user costs should equal net rent, i.e., expected rental
income, rather than gross rent.
Our findings are striking. In keeping with most previous research, we find tremendous divergence
between conventional measures of user costs and net rents, thus ruling out index construction errors as a
possible explanation. This divergence does not result from a faulty rent measure: we find that reported
rents are sensible, in that they move similarly to official rent indexes, and are not simply out-of-pocket
expenses. Instead, and most perplexing, we find a surprisingly close correspondence between net rents
and a particular estimate of user costs, one implicitly assuming zero transactions costs and constructed
using an appreciation measure that is both theoretically suspect and empirically a poor predictor of actual
appreciation.
Keywords: user costs; house price appreciation; forecasting; rental equivalence
______________________________________________________________________________
Acknowledgements: Thanks are due to two anonymous referees and to Alice Nakamura, Andy Baldwin,
Erwin Diewert, Pierre Duguay, Tim Erickson, Ryan Greenaway-McGrevy, John Greenlees, Arnold Katz,
Rob McClelland, Leonard Nakamura, Marshall Reinsdorf, Paul Schreyer, Gary Smith, Paul Sullivan, Tony
Yezer, Steve Henderson, Carolyn Pickering, Jay Ryan and other BLS Division of Consumer Expenditure
Surveys staff, and participants at the 2008 World Congress on National Accounts and Economic
Performance Measures for Nations, the 2009 SGE-ASSA meetings, and the 2009 Ottawa Productivity
Workshop. However, only the authors are responsible for remaining errors. All views expressed in this
paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or policies of the Bureau of Labor Statistics or
the views of other BLS staff members.
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
1. Introduction
What is the value of the service flow obtained from owned housing? This is an important
question, not only in the field of real estate economics (which studies the rent-versus-buy
decision, landlord decisions, and so on), but also in the fields of tax policy, macroeconomics, and
poverty measurement. In practice, different approaches to the measurement of this service flow
can lead to rather different conclusions. For example, Frick, Grabka, Smeeding and Tsakloglou
(2008) 1 and Garner and Short (2001) demonstrated that distributional measures vary
dramatically depending upon the treatment of housing flows; OECD (2005), Cournède (2005)
and Eiglsperger (2006) likewise found major impacts on inflation and real output measurement;
and Garner and Short (2009) found differences in the estimation of aggregate housing flows and
net income for the U.S.
In standard frictionless Jorgensonian capital theory with competitive markets, a durable
good’s rental cost will equal its ex ante user cost, suggesting that these alternative measurements
of the value of the flow of services should be roughly equivalent. 2 But in a study of the U.S.
market, Verbrugge (2008a) demonstrated that not only are housing rents far less volatile than ex
ante user costs, but these measures also diverge markedly for extended periods of time, a
seeming failure of arbitrage and a puzzle from the perspective of the standard theory. However,
that study largely relied upon aggregated indexes – in particular, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) rent index, Freddie Mac’s Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI), and the
Census House Price Index. 3 In this context, the use of indexes has several potentially severe
drawbacks. First, the use of indexes precludes a comparison in dollars, and precludes a crosssectional comparison. Second, the use of these particular indexes precludes a comparison of like
with like; for example, only about one-quarter of the BLS rent sample consists of detached
housing (reflecting the rental housing stock), yet – reflecting the owned housing stock – the vast
majority of the Freddie Mac and Census samples consists of detached housing. (This could be a
1
Frick et al. (2008) provide a summary of research in seven European countries that focus on poverty and inequality.
See also Garner (2005).
2
See expositions in Gillingham (1980, 1983), Dougherty and Van Order (1982), and Diewert (2003/2010).
3
Almost all other related studies have relied upon aggregated data. Perhaps the most prominent is Himmelberg,
Mayer and Sinai (2005), a study focused on explaining house price dynamics. It did not directly address the issue of
rents versus user costs, given its crude measure of expected appreciation; see Verbrugge (2008a). The treatment of
expected appreciation is key, as will be seen below; see also Johannessen (2004) for evidence. When using BLS rent
indexes before 1995, one should make the adjustments suggested by Crone, Nakamura and Voith (2009).
2
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
severe problem; for example, Chang, Cutts and Green (2005) stress the importance of adjusting
for quality differentials in rent/value comparisons.) Third, these indexes are constructed in
different ways, using different weights and index forms. It is well-known that rents and house
prices have a very strong micro-spatial dimension (see, e.g., Hwang and Quigley 2006), and the
same is true of house-price and rent inflation (see, e.g., Poole and Verbrugge, 2009). That being
the case, the choices of index form and weighting could well be consequential in this context, as
it is in other contexts (see, e.g., Deaton and Heston 2008 and Poole and Verbrugge 2009). It
would be far superior to begin with a data source in which every variable is available at the unit
level (i.e., where there is both a user cost and a rent associated with the same unit); this would
remove concerns related to differential index construction and weights, and would allow one to
control for unobservables like structure and neighborhood quality. Finally, each of the
aforementioned indexes has been subject to its own set of criticisms; for example, there is no
extant U.S. aggregate house price index which is built using a truly representative sample, and
the utilities adjustment in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER)
index has been criticized (see Verbrugge 2008b). Thus, it is possible that the use of said indexes
in studies of user costs and rents has masked a much tighter relationship between these measures
at the micro level.
This study is one of the first to use micro data to study the relationship between user costs
and rents. 4 In particular, we use Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) Interview data collected in
2004:I – 2007:I to examine the relationship between user costs and rents at the individual unit
level, in dollars, using unit-level information. 5 These data include a rent measure (reported rental
equivalence, described below), house value, and almost all of the components of unit-level user
costs, such as maintenance and repairs and mortgage information, and income and homeowner
characteristics (from which an estimate of tax rates may be obtained). In some of our analysis,
we also link these data to Census 2000 data on neighborhood characteristics, in order to more
4
Several prior studies have investigated the extent to which rents respond to their user cost determinants; see, for
example, DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992), Follain, Leavens and Velz (1993), Blackley and Follain (1996), Green
and Malpezzi (2003), and Tian (2008). More realistic user cost expressions are idiosyncratic, and little is known
about how user costs, rents, and the shadow price of housing are related to one another in realistic environments
with risk and frictions. Sommers, Sullivan and Verbrugge (2009) study this topic; see also Blow and Nesheim
(2009), a study which is related but which abstracts from transactions costs.
5
While both Verbrugge (2008a) and Garner and Verbrugge (2009) used CE data in parts of their analysis, neither
constructed unit-level user costs; instead, they compared estimates of rents and estimates of user costs pertaining to
hypothetical median structures. A companion paper to this one (Garner and Verbrugge, 2008) uses CE data to
investigate under- and over-valuation of houses both before and after the recent real estate boom.
3
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
completely control for unobserved quality variables which may influence rent differentially from
house price. In our estimates of user costs, we construct measures of expected appreciation using
a forecasting approach (based upon CMHPIs), and in addition explore a popular ad hoc
approach – simply using overall price inflation – which amounts to an assumption of no expected
real capital gains even in the short run. The CE data is described in more detail in Section 2. In
addition to other advantages listed above, an additional advantage to using CE data is that we are
able to obtain concurrent rent and user cost estimates; conversely, since market rents typically
change on an annual basis, market rents inevitably reflect lagged conditions – and thus, perhaps,
lagged rather than current user costs – potentially making it more difficult to discern a
relationship between these variables. Given the wealth of information at the individual unit level,
and given the expansive geographic coverage, CE data appear to be well-suited to a study of this
type.
Our two aims in this paper were to compare rents and user costs at the micro level (and
then at aggregated levels, where aggregation is done in the same way for both variables), and to
study which factors are related to reported rental equivalence, which may provide clues towards
understanding how rents relate to user costs.
Is the relationship between rents and user costs tighter in these micro data? Yes and no.
When constructing user cost estimates using the expected appreciation measures that most
naturally follow from theory, we find striking divergence; indeed, in the cross section, the
correlation appears to be negative. While the evidence in Verbrugge (2008a) suggests that
constructing user costs using long-horizon forecasts markedly reduces user cost-rent divergence,
our evidence suggests that such long-horizon user cost measures still diverge conspicuously from
rents. The cross-sectional dispersion of rents versus these user cost estimates is also surprisingly
large. In dollar terms over the 2004:I-2007:I period, expected user costs were generally well
below rents – mainly driven by expectations of real appreciation in the short run – and often
negative. A priori, we expected concavity in the rent/value relationship 6 to result in reduced
divergence for higher-valued properties, but – while the user cost/value relationship is also
concave – we find the divergence to be even greater for more expensive properties.
6
Others who have noted this concavity include Garner and Short (2001), McBride and Smith (2001), and Heston
and Nakamura (2009). Diewert and Nakamura (2009) and Diewert, Nakamura and Nakamura (2009) highlight the
implications of this curvature for rent/user cost comparisons and inflation measurement. Tian (2008) highlights and
directly studies this phenomenon, using a unique micro data set; this study also examines the relationship of rents to
a measure of user costs. His findings are very much in keeping with those in the present study.
4
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
However, we find that the use of inflation as the proxy for expected appreciation in the
user cost estimate results in striking correspondence of user costs and net expected rent earnings,
with slightly less correspondence for more expensive homes. Both informal (graphical) and
formal (statistical) evidence suggest that, on average, net expected rents are largely a function of
user costs (as constructed in this manner). A key to detecting this relationship is to recognize that
expected rental earnings lie below market rents: market rents must be adjusted downwards to
account for taxes and the rental vacancy rate (as units do not earn rental income when they are
vacant). An important area for future research is to explain why a theoretically suspect user cost
estimate appears to be so useful for explaining rents.
Since we use CE data, our rent measure is reported rental equivalence, an estimate that
CE respondents make regarding the rental values of their homes. It is commonly suggested that
respondents are naïve and simply report the out-of-pocket expenses associated with owning their
home. However, both informal and formal evidence rule this out decisively. Reported rents
appear to grow at the same rate as the BLS OER index, lie well above out-of-pocket expenses,
respond to other market-rent-determining factors, and have a correlation with out-of-pocket
expenses that is well below unity. Thus, homeowners are doing something other than simply
reporting out-of-pocket expenses. However, the relationship of rents to expected appreciation is
tenuous.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 investigates the relationship between rent and
value, and the relationship between rent, out-of-pocket expenses, and user costs using a series of
graphs and regressions. Section 4 uses regression analysis to study the relationship between
homeowner rental estimates, user costs, and other covariates. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Measurement Description
The primary source of data for this study is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) interview
data. Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage Home Price Indexes (CMHPIs) for the U.S. and for
28 metropolitan areas form the basis of the appreciation forecasts, as described below. We also
apply the analysis of Kumcu (2009), which uses IRS tax tables and CE homeowner information
data to impute marginal income taxes to CE consumer units. 7
7
A consumer unit is defined as: (1) all members of a particular housing unit who are related by blood, marriage,
adoption, or some other legal arrangement, such as foster children; (2) a person living alone or sharing a household
5
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
2.1 Consumer Expenditure Survey Data
CE Interview data, collected between 2004 calendar quarter one and 2007 calendar quarter one
(2004:I to 2007:I) from consumer units living in the United States, were used as the basis for
estimating user costs and rents for the same structure. The CE is a nationwide household survey
designed to be representative of the U.S. civilian population. The first step in sampling is the
creation and selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), which consist of counties (or parts
thereof), groups of counties, or independent cities grouped together into geographic entities (see
http://stats.bls.gov/cex for details). The current sample of PSUs consists of 91 areas, most of
which are also used by the Consumer Price Index program. For this study we restricted attention
to the 28 largest PSUs which were present in the CE sample over the entire 2004-2007:I period;
these are listed in Appendix Table 1.
Using personal interviews, CE Interview data are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau
from consumer units on behalf of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS reviews and
edits the data after collection, imputing values when missing using a variety of variable-specific
techniques. The CE Interview is designed so that each consumer unit in the sample is
interviewed over five consecutive quarters, once every three months; every quarter 20 percent of
the sample is replaced with new households. The first interview is used to bound expenditure
estimates using one-month recall, and to collect other basic data such as housing unit
characteristics (e.g., number of rooms). Interviews two through five are used to collect detailed
expenditures and related information from the three months prior to each interview, and for the
current month in some cases (e.g., rental equivalence).
Among the data collected in the CE Interview are both estimated current market values
and “rental equivalences” or rental values for owner-occupied and vacation homes. Current
market value is asked only in the first interview (if the property was currently owned), and is
subsequently inventoried to the following interviews. 8 Consumer units are asked, “About how
with others, or living as a roomer in a private home, lodging house, or in permanent living quarters in a hotel or
motel, but who is financially independent; or (3) two or more unrelated people living together who share certain
major expenditures. Financial independence is determined by the three major expense categories: housing, food, and
other living expenses. To be considered financially independent, at least two of the three major expense categories
are to be provided entirely, or in part, by the respondent. Students living in university sponsored housing are
included in the sample as separate consumer units. (See http://stats.bls.gov/CE/csxgloss.htm)
8
If a property is owned when the bounding interview takes place, the interview respondent is asked to estimate the
current market value of the property as of the date of the interview. If a property is acquired in a later interview, the
6
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
much do you think this property would sell for on today’s market?” Rental values for owneroccupants are collected each quarter, by asking consumer units, “If someone were to rent your
home today, how much do you think it would rent for monthly, unfurnished and without
utilities?” Given the timing and structure of the data, we use only data from the second interview,
so that each household enters only once, and the value and rent estimates are only three months
apart. The only exception would be for newly acquired properties and for consumer units
entering the survey after the bounding interview.
Other data collected by the CE include: mortgage information; housing structure type;
consumer unit income 9 ; property taxes; and expenditures on maintenance and repair and home
insurance. For this study, a number of restrictions were placed upon the data. Only owneroccupied housing which was not a condo or coop was considered. 10 None of the costs of this
housing could have been paid for by Federal, State, or local government. If property value or
rental equivalence was missing or imputed during BLS data processing, the observation was
dropped from the sample. We also restricted the sample by the family type variable; in particular,
in order to be able to accurately estimate marginal tax rates, we dropped observations where
family type was coded as “other” by the BLS. 11 We then restricted the sample by house value; in
particular, we dropped 4 percent of the observations corresponding to home values in excess of
$950,000 within the 2004:I-2007:I survey data period, as these units possess very high leverage
and distort parameter estimates. Finally, on a PSU-by-PSU basis, we dropped any observations
whose rent/value ratio was outside of two standard deviations from the mean of this ratio; this
reduced our sample by about 120 observations. In sum, our restrictions regarding missing and
imputed data and outliers reduced the sample size to 5,802 observations. See Appendix Table 2
for sample sizes by PSU. Additional outlier treatment, applied at the regression estimation stage,
is discussed below.
current market value of the property is collected as of the time of the first interview after acquisition of the property.
Beginning in April 2007, the market value of owner-occupied housing and vacation homes has been asked each
quarter, rather than only once.
9
Starting in 2004:I, the BLS began imputing income data when these were missing.
10
Condo and coop owners comprise less than 5 percent of the population. Paulin (2005) highlights several reasons,
including coop and condo fees, which suggest that condo and coop ownership is a distinct form of housing tenure
that should probably modeled separately.
11
We included singles, single parents, and husband-and-wife families with and without children.
7
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
2.2 User cost; tax model; and CMHPI data
While research is progressing on the nature of user costs when owners face frictions of various
sorts (see, e.g., Diaz and Luengo-Prado 2008; Luengo-Prado et al. 2008), almost all housing
studies use an annual ex ante user cost formula 12 associated with a frictionless model, similar to
uct = Pt h (it (1- t tFed )+ t tprop (1- t tFed )+ g t - Et p th )
(1)
where Pt h is the price of the home; it is a nominal mortgage interest rate; 13 gt is the sum of
depreciation, maintenance and repair, and insurance; p th is the 4-quarter constant-quality home
price appreciation between now and 1 year from now; and Et p th represents the expectation of
this appreciation at time t. Given the current U.S. tax code, such appreciation will almost
certainly remain untaxed for the homes we consider. As Diewert (2006/2009) points out, one
may interpret (it - Ep th ) as a period-t real interest rate. 14
We use the 30-year fixed mortgage rate as our measure of interest rates, except when
computing measures of out-of-pocket costs, when we use actual respondent data. 15 Homeowner
marginal income tax rates are computed by applying the analysis of Kumcu (2009) to the CE
data. Aside from the measure of expected appreciation (discussed below), all the other elements
in (1) are generally available in CE data.
12
Such user costs are readily derived from the fundamental capital pricing equation. The standard frictionless theory,
which builds upon Hall and Jorgenson (1967), implies that rents equal user costs, and is exposited in Gillingham
(1980, 1983), Dougherty and Van Order (1982), and Green and Malpezzi (2003). For more details and extensive
discussion about user costs and other housing measures, see Diewert (2003/2010).
13
Sometimes researchers distinguish between the equity in the home and the loan amount, and apply distinct interest
rates to them. This is controversial; some hold that the mortgage interest rate is the relevant rate to apply even to
equity, given the riskiness of housing investment (see Wang, Basu and Fernald 2005 and Verbrugge 2008a for a
brief discussion). Chinloy (1991) emphasizes the risk facing homeowners; he estimates an average risk premium in
excess of 2% in the California data he examines (conversely, Sarama (2009) estimates premia in the 0.1% range).
Chinloy also argues that standard mortgage rates are not appropriate in (1), since they include the prices of options,
in particular options to prepay and to default. In (1), the marginal income tax is applied regardless: for debt cost,
mortgage interest is deductible, while for the opportunity cost associated with equity, investors only obtain after-tax
interest earnings. Note that landlord user costs are fairly similar to (1); the main distinction is that expected
appreciation is taxable for landlords. At least during periods of low inflation, owning is typically less costly than
renting mainly because landlords pay taxes on rents, while owners obtain shelter services from their housing tax-free.
14
Note that some authors refer to uct/Pt as the user cost. Some authors, e.g. Prescott (1997) and ILO et al. (2004),
suggest including expected transactions costs in (1). In Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008), these costs do appear in the
derived user cost expression in the differentiable case. Equation (1) assumes that all owners itemize, but many tax
returns are filed using a standard deduction; furthermore some itemizers run up against the alternative minimum tax.
15
More specifically, we use the series “average contract rate on commitments for 30-year fixed-rate first
mortgages” from the Federal Reserve Board. This rate includes risk, default, and pre-payment premia.
8
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
However, imputation of these measures is occasionally necessary, either because the data
are missing for a unit or because they are ex post and hence of the incorrect form for use within
an ex ante user cost measure. A handful of units did not report property taxes; this variable was
imputed using CE data on the basis of a simple regression model with PSU, year, home value,
and Census neighborhood characteristics as the regressors. We use number of rooms as a control
variable in some of our regressions; this variable, when missing, was imputed on the basis of
each year’s set of data, based upon region, PSU, dwelling age, and structure type. More
extensive imputation was necessary for maintenance and repair costs and for home insurance.
Actual annual maintenance and repair costs are highly variable and seasonal, and CE data
include only ex post quarterly expenditures, but we are forming expected annual user costs.
Hence we must construct a prediction of annual maintenance and repair costs for every unit.
Annual home insurance is often missing, perhaps because many homeowners may pay for their
insurance less frequently than every quarter, 16 which implies that many respondents do not
report any home insurance expenses in their second interview. Both of these variables were
imputed in a similar manner. Each used available data from four consecutive interviews (not just
second interview data) on a year-by-year basis. Regressors consist of home value, PSU, number
of rooms, dwelling age, structure type, and housing amenities (such as air conditioning). Finally,
user costs include not only maintenance and repairs, but also depreciation. Depreciation
encompasses several notions, not only including physical deterioration (which is accounted for in
maintenance and repair), but also the notions of aging and obsolescence (which is not thus
accounted for). Thus, to ensure that our estimates line up with comparable measures from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and from the Census, we add 1 percent of home value to
our maintenance and repair estimates, which may be interpreted as adding an estimate of
depreciation, or as an estimate of deferred major maintenance. 17
The treatment of expected appreciation is central. Rather than restricting attention to a
crude proxy, city-by-city forecasts for Eπh were constructed. This choice is crucial, for at least
four reasons. First, home price appreciation is quite persistent, so it has a significant forecastable
16
For example, homeowners who no longer possess mortgages do not usually have quarterly home insurance
expenses.
17
The BEA estimates for annual depreciation are 1.5% and 1.8% for owner-occupied and renter-occupied housing,
respectively. In computing owner costs, the BEA also includes various costs of acquisition and disposal, such as
realtor fees.
9
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
component; market participants are aware of this, and are expected to take this into consideration
in their decision making. Second, expected home price appreciation is quite variable across time
and across cities, so it would appear to be inappropriate to use a time- or city-averaged rate.
Third, this term has an enormous impact on user costs and their divergence from rents. After all,
one can always assume the theory is valid and solve for the appropriate appreciation term which
makes user costs equal rents; but the resultant appreciation term can be strongly at odds with the
data in practice (see Verbrugge 2008a). Finally, there is no agreed-upon model of house price
dynamics, so it is more conservative to take a more agnostic, statistical viewpoint to these
expectations. Our forecasts are based upon metro-area house price indexes, namely the CMHPIs
which are described briefly below. While ex post house price appreciation has a strong
microspatial element, differences in housing appreciation rates across neighborhoods within a
given city will be extremely hard to predict. Thus, the approach we take is arguably the best that
market participants could do.
Based upon popular conjectures and the findings of previous research, we use four
alternative measures of Et p th in (1), which give rise to four different user cost estimates for each
unit. The first measure is a forecast of expected appreciation over the next year; the resulting
user cost is defined as uc{1}. The second is an annualized forecast of expected appreciation over
the next four years; the resulting user cost is defined as uc{4}. (We provide a justification for
this second measure below.)
The third expected appreciation measure we investigate is current annual overall inflation
(“pi”). This measure treats overall inflation as a proxy for expected appreciation – which is
equivalent to an assumption of zero real capital gains even in the short run. The resulting user
cost is defined as uc{pi}. 18 There are many different inflation estimates which could be used,
and we explore three alternatives. Our baseline measure, uc{pi(1)}, is very crude and uses the
previous calendar year’s overall CPI inflation as the inflation estimate. Our second measure,
18
While this measure has little theoretical justification, it is nonetheless popular amongst practitioners; see, e.g.,
Poterba (1992), Blackley and Follain (1996), OECD (2005) and Cournède (2005). A similar user cost measure is
also used in Iceland’s CPI (see Guðnason, 2004, 2005 and Guðnason and Jónsdóttir 2008), and variants are in use in
the system of national accounts statistics in several Western Balkan countries such as Croatia and Serbia (see
Roberts 2008) – though Eurostat guidelines are to make the operational assumption that (i-Eπh)=2.5% (see Katz
2009). A priori, this no-real-capital-gains-in-the-short-run assumption seems strange since it is both so strongly at
odds with the U.S. data, and is also so theoretically dubious – in that, at least outside of steady state, there is no
reason to believe that expected inflation equals expected home price appreciation.
10
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
uc{pi(2)}, is similar but more timely, and uses the average of the current, and lagged, 4-quarter
inflation rate. Our third measure, uc{pi(3)}, is identical to the second, except that it uses the
overall CPI-less-shelter to compute 4-quarter inflation rates.
The fourth and final expected appreciation measure we investigate is zero, at least
roughly speaking. More specifically, in this case we treat out-of-pocket costs as the measure of
“user costs.” In this out-of-pocket case, two implicit assumptions are thus made: first, expected
real capital gains are negative; and second, the opportunity cost of equity in the home is zero. We
explore two variants: baseline out-of-pocket expenses, which include only interest from first and
second mortgages; and extended out-of-pocket expenses, which include interest from home
equity loans and lines of credit. Out-of-pocket expenses refer to after-tax out-of-pocket expenses
and, for household j, are computed as
out -of -pocket j = (mort. int. j )(1- t
Fed
j
)+ (prop. tax j )(1-
t
Fed
j
)+ (m & rj )+ (ins. j )
where mort. int.j refers to actual annual mortgage interest payments of household j, prop. taxj
refers to annual property taxes paid by household j, m & rj refers to annual maintenance and
repair costs by household j, ins.j refers to annual home insurance paid by household j, and t
Fed
j
refers to the marginal income tax rate of household j.
The standard theory leading to equation (1) and to its equality with rent is derived from a
riskless frictionless model, in which continuous asset rebalancing occurs. But long-horizonforecast advocates correctly point out that, owing to large transactions costs, the expected tenure
for homeowners is much longer than one year; indeed, it is actually closer to a decade. Thus, the
forecasting horizon of the typical owner is far longer than one year. The expected tenure for
renters is shorter, but is still itself about four years. This suggests that the margin of indifference
between homeownership and renting has an implied horizon longer than the one-year horizon of
a rental contract. 19 On this basis, one could argue on behalf of a longer horizon forecast in an
otherwise standard user cost expression. 20 A second line of argument in favor of long-horizon
19
The question of the appropriate horizon for comparing renting to homeownership is discussed in Sinai and
Souleles (2005).
20
Over extremely large horizons, say decades or longer, one might argue that a no-real-capital-gains assumption is
not too unrealistic (see, e.g., Eichholtz 1997); furthermore this assumption corresponds to a simple random walk
view of real house price dynamics. It is also possible that during this period, homeowners had zero-real-appreciation
forecasts. Schreyer (2008) discusses this assumption in the context of discussing the challenges posed by the
existence of bubbles. The literature on bubbles in real estate markets is growing rapidly; we mention only a few
papers here. Case and Shiller (2003) provide survey evidence indicating “irrational exuberance.” Peterson (2009)
combines a search model with a particular behavioral assumption – namely, that market participants ignore the
11
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
forecasts derives from postulated landlord behavior: landlords might use long-run appreciation
measures in their own cost calculations, and form rents on that basis. 21 However, this
explanation requires a theoretical justification for rent inflation stickiness. One such justification
is sketched out in Diewert (2003/2010): landlords, reflecting the preferences of tenants, may
attempt to minimize volatility in rent changes. (Rent control, which surprisingly turns out to
impact aggregate rent inflation, may also provide a partial answer; see Poole and Verbrugge,
2009.) A desire to avoid rent inflation volatility leads directly to the use of long-run appreciation
rates in landlord user cost calculations.
Forecasts were constructed as follows. Following best practices in the forecasting
literature, we use averages of several different forecasting models (see, e.g., Granger and Jeon
2004, Stock and Watson 2004 or Timmerman 2006); the data, CMHPI indexes, are described
below. For one-year forecasts, for each city and for every quarter we constructed a weighted
average of five different models: four distinct forecasting models, and a model which is simply
the four-year moving average of annual appreciation rates. The dependent variable in each of the
forecasting models was the latest-available four-quarter appreciation rate, and the independent
variables included four-quarter city-specific appreciation rates at lags greater than three quarters,
four-quarter all-US appreciation rates at lags greater than three quarters, and lagged quarterly
appreciation rates. 22 In all cases, models were re-estimated every quarter, and forecasts were
formed using only information available at time t. In particular, the models and weights were: a
Bayesian Vector Autoregression (VAR) model with four lags of city-specific and aggregate
annual (four-quarter) appreciation rates, estimated with a tight random walk prior, receiving a
weight of 0.4; a VAR model with one lag each of city-specific and aggregate annual appreciation
rates, receiving a weight of 0.1; a univariate model with three lags of quarterly city-specific
appreciation rates, receiving a weight of 0.3; a naïve unit root model (i.e., simply using the last
annual appreciation rate as the forecast), receiving a weight of 0.1; and the four-year moving
effects of frictions on past prices – and argues that this will generate bubbles. Credit and information frictions (such
as rational inattention) can amplify the effects of shocks. Using their measures of fundamentals, Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai (2005) found “little evidence of housing bubbles” in 2004; see also Smith and Smith (2006), another study
comparing prices to fundamentals. Applying a demand/supply analysis and defining bubbles accordingly, over the
2000-2005 period Goodman and Thibodeau (2008) found bubbles in 30% of the U.S. metropolitan areas they study.
Ayuso and Restoy (2007) note that many studies do not adequately address frictions which prevent immediate
adjustment, so that gaps between data and model predictions might be misinterpreted.
21
This suggestion is due to Tim Erickson (private communication).
22
We considered other independent variables, such as interest rates, but these did not significantly aid prediction; we
also considered Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) models, but did not find a model which significantly
improved prediction. If the data existed, one might want to forecast land and structures separately.
12
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
average, receiving a weight of 0.1. For four-year forecasts, we used the simple average of the
four-year moving average and a model with the (annualized) four-year appreciation rate as the
dependent variable and with lags 16-18 of this variable as independent variables.
We end this section with a brief description of CMHPIs. The most widely-used US home
price data series which are available for most cities are the Federal Housing Finance Agency
house price indexes and the Freddie Mac CMHPIs, which behave similarly. Each of these
quarterly indexes uses the same data to construct an index using a weighted repeat-sales method
(see Case and Shiller, 1987, 1989); CMHPI construction is described in Stephens et al. (1995).
The common data source consists of repeat mortgage transactions – both purchases and
refinancings – for single family homes in a database of loans purchased or securitized by Freddie
Mac or Fannie Mae. Over our data period, these comprised approximately 60 percent of all loan
originations. These indexes have been subject to various criticisms, which are briefly sketched
out here. 23 These data do not fully represent the housing stock of the U.S., as neither the lower
end nor the upper end of the market is fully represented. While repeat-sales methods limit the
extent to which changes in the composition of the sample influence the estimated index – since
only price changes on the same property are used in estimating the index – still homes which
turn over more frequently are overrepresented, and major renovations are poorly captured. Since
we only use these indexes for estimating appreciation rates, and since they are almost certainly
the best-available data for market participants (imperfect though they may be), we do not believe
that these criticisms are of major importance for our analysis.
Because we form our expectation forecasts using a statistical model, from time to time
our estimated user costs are negative. As noted above, expression (1) derives from a riskless
model without transactions costs and in which continuous portfolio rebalancing occurs. In reality,
transactions costs imply a region of inaction, and imply that user costs are idiosyncratic and
depend upon the agent’s current housing portfolio, idiosyncratic shocks, expectations of
switching domiciles (and incurring transactions costs), and the like. These considerations will
greatly alter estimated user costs, and will likely imply that expected user costs are nonnegative,
at least for prospective homeowners. However, this theory is not yet developed, so measures like
(1) are the estimates being used by practitioners. Given our use of (1), we believe it preferable to
be transparent about the implications of our assumptions, rather than apply ad hoc adjustments
23
See Haurin, Hendershott and Kim (1991), Case, Pollakowski and Wachter (1997), Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997),
Dreiman and Pennington-Cross (2004), McCarthy and Peach (2004), and Leventis (2006) for evidence.
13
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
that would ensure user costs remained nonnegative – since these would potentially change our
implications.
3. Rents, Out-of-Pocket Expenses, and User Costs
We plot the entire 2004:I-2007:I cross-section of reported annual rents against home values in
Figure 1. We also plot the best-fit curve from a regression of reported annual rents on a constant,
value, value2, and value3; for this and other best-fit curves, we trimmed the top and bottom 1
percent of rents. This regression also received our standard outlier treatment: after the initial
regression, all observations with externally studentized residuals which were greater than 2.5 in
absolute value were removed, and the regression re-estimated. (In total, 218 observations were
dropped.)
50000
Reported Rent ($)
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
Hom e Value ($)
Fig. 1. Reported rents against home values
As can be seen, there is both a fair amount of dispersion (reflecting variation in the
rent/value ratio within as well as across cities) and considerable rounding in the reported
14
1000000
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
numbers. It is evident that the relationship is relatively concave. Average user costs will also
feature some concavity, as a result of the correlation of higher marginal income tax rates and
higher home values in conjunction with the federal income tax treatment of interest expenses
and/or income (see equation (1)). But all homes within a metropolitan area share a common
appreciation expectation, so it is not a priori obvious how much concavity user costs will possess.
We next provide, in Figure 2, a plot of annual user costs as defined in equation (1) with
the conventional one-year forecast (i.e., uc{1}) against home values. We also plot the best-fit
curve from a regression of user costs on a constant, value, value2, and value3, which trimmed the
top and bottom 1 percent of user costs, and which received our standard outlier treatment. (In this
case, 178 observations were dropped.)
75000
50000
25000
0
uc{1} ($)
-25000
-50000
-75000
-100000
-125000
-150000
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
Hom e Value ($)
Fig. 2. User costs with conventional annual forecast against home values
In Figure 2, note the expanded vertical scale relative to Figure 1; still, we must drop 8
observations with estimated user costs below -$150,000. As can be seen, there is a tremendous
amount of cross-sectional dispersion (three times that of reported rents), and uc{1} is estimated
to be negative for 41percent of the homes. This reflects both the deductibility of mortgage
15
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
interest and property taxes in the federal income tax code, and the fact that expected annual
house price appreciation exceeds 6 percent for over half of the observations. Furthermore, in
these data, expected annual house price appreciation is modestly positively correlated with home
value: more expensive metro areas evidently featured higher expected appreciation during this
period.
Previous work (Verbrugge 2008a) explored the use of longer-horizon forecasts in
equation (1), and found much closer coherence of rents and user costs dynamics when these were
used. Figure 3 below accordingly plots uc{4} – user costs with an annualized four-year inflation
forecast – against home values. As before, we plot the best-fit curve from a regression of user
costs on a constant, value, value2, and value3, again trimming the top and bottom 1 percent of
user costs; thus a total of 344 observations were dropped.
50000
uc{4} ($)
25000
0
-25000
-50000
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
Home Value ($)
Fig. 3. User costs with annualized four-year forecast against home values
Notice that the scale of Figure 3 is expanded relative to Figure 1, but contracted relative
to Figure 2. The dispersion of uc{4}is roughly equal to that of reported rents (at $9,000), but on
average uc{4} lies well below average rent ($1,700 versus $18,700). While expected annual
appreciation derived from longer-horizon forecasts is 2 percent lower on average, still uc{4} is
negative for 31 percent of the sample; this reflects the fact that even this measure of expected
16
1000000
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
annual house price appreciation exceeds 6 percent for over half of the observations. Clearly the
use of a long-horizon forecast does not guarantee that the corresponding user cost will be close to
rent.
As noted above, there are two other measures of owner costs which have been considered
in the literature: user costs with inflation as the measure of expected appreciation, and out-ofpocket costs. Neither of these is completely defensible on theoretical grounds: the first assumes
zero expected real capital gains, while the second – by implicitly assuming a nominal
appreciation rate of 0 –assumes negative expected real capital gains. Nonetheless, it is of interest
to investigate the correspondence of these measures to reported rents.
Figure 4 below accordingly plots our baseline version of uc{pi} against home values. As
before, we plot the best-fit curve from a regression of user costs on a constant, value, value2, and
value3, which received our standard trimming and outlier treatment; altogether a total of 340
observations were dropped. Unlike the previous user cost measures, these unit-specific uc{pi}
measures are all positive, and we plot this on the same scale as that for Figure 1. Some concavity
is evident in the relationship. Both the mean ($15,053) and the standard deviation ($7,546) are
below that of reported rents, facts to which we return below.
50000
40000
uc{pi} ($)
30000
20000
10000
0
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
Home Value ($)
Fig. 4. User costs with inflation as forecast against Home Values
17
1000000
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Given the degree of dispersion of reported rents for a given house value, it is of interest to
see how, on a unit-by-unit basis, uc{4} and uc{pi} correspond to rent. This is particularly
interesting since, as shown in Figure 1, higher rent does not correspond perfectly to higher value.
We do not, however, compare the (after-tax) user cost to the reported rent. This is
because the net (after-tax) rental earnings that a unit would provide to an owner, in expectation,
are given by (1- vact )(1- t tFed )rentt , where vact is the vacancy rate in the city. Put differently,
for a landlord to break even, rent would need to exceed user costs by the markup factor
(1 − vact )(1 − τ tFed ). Accordingly, we construct an estimate of this net measure for each unit, using
the marginal tax rate for the household and the region’s vacancy rate. 24
In Figure 5, we plot uc{4}, and our three versions uc{pi}, against net, vacancy-corrected,
reported rent (in the first column), and then against net, vacancy-corrected, predicted rent (in the
second column). “Predicted rent” corresponds to the fitted values from a regression of reported
rent on the regressors described in Section 4; we use this measure to reduce the level of noise in
reported rents. We have included a 45º line, and also the best-fit curve from a regression of each
user cost measure against a constant, rent, and rent2 which received our standard 1 percent
trimming (of both variables) and outlier treatment.
24
PSU-by-PSU vacancy rates are not reported by the Census. Note that the user costs here considered are
homeowner user costs, which differ from landlord user costs in that landlords may deduct essentially all the
expenses of ownership (including interest and maintenance), but may face higher maintenance and depreciation
costs due to moral hazard, and must treat capital gains as income (so their user costs are less sensitive to expected
appreciation). Landlord user costs usually exceed homeowner user costs.
18
40000
40000
30000
30000
20000
20000
10000
10000
uc{ 4} ( $)
uc{ 4} ( $)
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
0
-10000
0
-10000
-20000
-20000
-30000
-30000
-40000
-40000
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Reported Rent ($)
30000
40000
35000
30000
30000
25000
25000
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Correct ed Predicted Rent ($)
30000
40000
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Correct ed Predicted Rent ($)
30000
40000
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Correct ed Predicted Rent ($)
30000
40000
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Correct ed Predicted Rent ($)
30000
40000
uc{ pi ( 1) } ( $)
40000
35000
uc{ pi ( 1) } ( $)
40000
0
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Reported Rent ($)
30000
40000
35000
30000
30000
25000
25000
uc { pi ( 2) } ( $)
40000
35000
uc { pi ( 2) } ( $)
40000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Reported Rent ($)
30000
40000
35000
30000
30000
25000
25000
uc { pi ( 3) } ( $)
40000
35000
uc { pi ( 3) } ( $)
40000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
0
10000
20000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Reported Rent ($)
30000
40000
Fig. 5: User costs with inflation as forecast against net, vacancy-corrected,
reported and predicted rent
The top two panels in Figure 5 compare uc{4} to reported and predicted rent. The
divergence of these user cost measures and rents in the cross-section is remarkable; indeed these
appear to be inversely correlated. Noise in reported rents cannot resolve this puzzle, as the
19
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
divergence between uc{pi} and predicted rents is even more striking than its divergence with
reported rents, as evidenced by the best-fit curves and by the respective amounts of dispersion.
Evidently, the aggregation implicit in previous studies understated the degree of divergence
between rents and user costs … when these are defined using a conventional long-horizon
forecast.
However, this is not the end of the story. The remainder of the panels in Figure 5
compare our three alternative uc{pi} measures to reported and predicted rent; uc{pi(1)} is our
baseline measure, uc{pi(2)} is the measure using the current and lagged 4-quarter inflation rate,
and uc{pi(3)} is the measure using the inflation in the CPI-less-shelter series. (As the
conclusions are similar, henceforth we consider only uc{pi(1)}, and refer to this measure as
uc{pi}.) Using uc{pi} as the measure of user costs, one reaches the opposite conclusion. In
particular, the correspondence between this measure of user costs and net, vacancy-corrected,
predicted rent is remarkable. We also note the dispersion of uc{pi} for a given reported rent,
indicating noise in reported rents. Perhaps uc{pi} represents a steady-state user cost notion
which anchors rents, despite the fact that it evidently does not guide house purchase decisions.
Findings like these cannot be discovered using index data.
In Figure 6 below, we simply plot several best-fit curves against house value, including
two which correspond to out-of-pocket expenses. Each curve was constructed in the manner
described above: trimming, removing outliers, using a third-degree polynomial, etc.
20
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Alternative Shelter Cost Measures ($)
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
-10000
-20000
5000
95000 185000 275000 365000 455000 545000 635000 725000 815000 905000
Home Value ($)
Net, Vacancy-Adjusted Reported Rent
uc{pi}
Extended Out-of-Pocket Expenses
Baseline Out-of-Pocket Expenses
uc{4}
uc{1}
Fig. 6. Best-fit Curves of Cost Measures against Home Value
Several key findings are evident. First, vacancy-corrected, after-tax rents are relatively
closely related to uc{pi} – at least by the metric of similar cost/value structure over this time
period – but not to other user cost measures. Second, on average, uc{pi} lies above the rent
measure for homes exceeding $230,000, a finding which corresponds to assertions of Diewert
(2003/2010) and Diewert and Nakamura (2009) and to assertions and empirical evidence in
Heston and Nakamura (2009); these authors, on this basis, argue that statistical agencies should
consider an opportunity-cost OOH-services measure which is the maximum of rental equivalence
and user cost. Third, vacancy-corrected, after-tax rents lie distinctly above out-of-pocket
expenses for all home values. Furthermore, the relationship of house value to out-of-pocket
expenses is about the same regardless of the measure of out-of-pocket expenses used. As we
found this to be true of their relationships with other variables as well, henceforth we consider
only the simpler baseline out-of-pocket expenses.
Up until this point, we have focused attention on cross-sectional comparisons. But for
inflation measurement, what matters more is the similarity of evolution over time. Figure 7
21
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
accordingly plots these measures over time. These estimates were obtained by regressions of the
measure in question on time and PSU dummy variables; each regression is estimated once, then
outliers specific to that regression are identified. Finally, all regressions are re-estimated after the
union of all the outliers from each regression is removed. Thus, each resulting “index” has the
character of a simple average, and each is estimated over the same data. In Figure 7, we also plot
an index whose initial value matches that of our initial average rent estimate and which is
subsequently adjusted by the movements in the CPI’s OER index. Movements in the OER index
are based upon changes in the market rents of about 25,000 rental properties located in 87 PSUs.
20000
15000
10000
5000
20
07
I
20
06
IV
20
06
III
20
06
II
20
06
I
20
05
IV
20
05
III
20
05
II
20
05
I
20
04
IV
20
04
III
-5000
20
04
II
20
04
I
0
-10000
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Reported Rent
uc{4}
Scaled OER index
uc{1}
Baseline Out-of-Pocket Expenses
uc{pi}
Fig. 7. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, National
The evolution of the average of owners’ net, vacancy-corrected, self-reported rents fairly
closely matches that of the Scaled OER index 25 – meaning that reported rents grow, on average,
at the same rate as do market rents, a finding that is reassuring to users of these CE data. The
25
Recall that over 300 observations have been dropped, due to our outlier treatment. If these are included in the
estimation, the evolution of the estimated measure even more closely matches that of the OER index. Arguably,
including all the observations results in a more appropriate comparison, since BLS rent indexes are constructed
using every observation, even an “outlier,” as long as its accuracy has been verified by BLS commodity analysts.
22
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
correspondence of these measures with uc{pi} is also noteworthy. Over the entire time period,
reported rents remained well above the other alternative measures of shelter costs. The volatility
of the growth rate of the average net, vacancy-corrected rent was considerably lower than other
cost measures (out-of-pocket expenses and uc{pi} were both about three times as volatile). Over
quite long horizons, each cost measure, except the out-of-pocket expenses measure, is likely to
grow at the same rate as rents; but the measures can evidently diverge substantially even over the
medium term (see Verbrugge (2008a) for more evidence on this topic).
Figures 8a-8e plot our estimated measures for 27 of the 28 the metro areas in our sample;
Houston, omitted in order to limit each graph to 6 panels, features dynamics very similar to those
of Dallas/Forth Worth.
23
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
5000
0
0
-5000
-10000
-10000
-15000
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
New York City - Connecticut Suburbs
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
uc{1}
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
-10000
-10000
-15000
-15000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
-10000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
15000
20
07
I
20000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
uc{1}
Pittsburgh
25000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
uc{4}
-5000
20
07
I
Philadelphia
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
25000
-10000
-15000
uc{pi}
uc{4}
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-5000
-5000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
New York City - New Jersey Suburbs
25000
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
uc{pi}
-5000
20
07
I
5000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
10000
20
07
I
15000
10000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
15000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
New York City - Central
25000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
Boston
25000
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
Fig. 8a. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, Northeast Metro Areas
24
uc{4}
uc{1}
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Chicago
Cleveland
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
-10000
-15000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Detroit
uc{1}
5000
5000
0
0
20
07
I
-5000
-10000
20
07
I
10000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
15000
10000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
15000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
uc{4}
Minneapolis
25000
-10000
-15000
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
St. Louis
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
uc{pi}
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
25000
-5000
20
07
I
-10000
-15000
uc{pi}
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-10000
-15000
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
Fig. 8b. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, Midwest Metro Areas
25
uc{4}
uc{1}
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Atlanta
Baltimore
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
-10000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
20
07
I
uc{1}
0
-10000
-5000
20
07
I
5000
0
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
5000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
10000
20
07
I
15000
10000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
15000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20000
-10000
-15000
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Tampa
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
Washington, D.C.
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
-10000
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-10000
-15000
uc{pi}
uc{4}
Miami
25000
-5000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
Dallas/Fort Worth
-5000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
25000
uc{pi}
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
-5000
-10000
-15000
uc{pi}
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-15000
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
Fig. 8c. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, Southern Metro Areas
26
uc{4}
uc{1}
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Los Angeles - Central
Los Angeles - Suburbs
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
-10000
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-10000
-15000
-15000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
-10000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
15000
20
07
I
20000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
25000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
uc{1}
San Diego
25000
-5000
uc{4}
-5000
20
07
I
Portland
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
uc{pi}
-10000
-15000
-15000
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
San Francisco Bay Area
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
Seattle
30000
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
-5000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
0
-10000
-10000
-15000
-15000
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
Fig. 8d. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, West-Coast Metro Areas
27
uc{4}
uc{1}
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Anchorage
Denver
25000
25000
20000
20000
15000
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
-10000
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
20
07
I
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
-5000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
0
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
0
-10000
-15000
-15000
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
15000
10000
10000
5000
5000
0
0
-10000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
15000
20
07
I
20000
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
20000
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
25000
20
04
I
20
04
II
20
04
II I
20
04
IV
uc{1}
Phoenix
25000
-5000
uc{4}
-5000
20
07
I
Honolulu
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
20
06
I
20
06
II
20
06
II I
20
06
IV
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
20
05
I
20
05
II
20
05
II I
20
05
IV
uc{pi}
-10000
-15000
-15000
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
uc{1}
uc{pi}
Net, Vacancy-Corrected Rep. Rent
Baseline Out-of-Pocket
uc{4}
Fig. 8e. Alternative Shelter Cost Measures Over Time, Other Western Metro Areas
At the level of the metro area, more sampling variation is evident; however, the general
conclusions regarding the cost measure dynamics remain unchanged, and an examination of the
cross-metro variation yields interesting insights. Net rents generally adhere closely to uc{pi},
though there is a tendency for uc{pi} to lie above net rents in more expensive metro areas,
perhaps reflecting smaller depreciation rates where land is a bigger proportion of value. In some
metro regions – regions which did not experience large house price inflation – all the alternative
measures of housing costs move together fairly closely. Out-of-pocket expenses lie distinctly
below net rents; the remaining user cost measures, uc{4} and uc{1}, almost always lie below the
other measures (and sometimes below zero) early in the period. Late in the period, collapsing
house prices drove uc{1} far above net rents in several metro areas, which illustrates the extent
to which expected appreciation drives user costs. The examples of Phoenix and San Diego are
noteworthy. These markets experienced strong appreciation prior to the middle of the period,
driving uc{1} well below 0, which reversed later on. Examination of the uc{4} measure across
metro areas illustrates a key weakness in user costs with long-horizon forecasts: they will tend to
28
uc{1}
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
respond sluggishly, even to sharp and obvious changes in house price dynamics. We suspect few
market participants in early 2007 would have expected the low (or negative) user costs indicated
by uc{4} in some regions.
We now turn to using regression analysis to study the relationship between rents and the
alternative shelter cost measures.
4. Regression Analysis
We begin with the most basic comparison: that of tax- and vacancy-corrected reported rents to
the various alternative measures of costs, with a minimum of other control variables. As our user
cost estimates are often negative, we cannot take logs and compute elasticities; accordingly, in
Table 1, we present results from simple linear regressions in levels. Each model received our
standard outlier treatment, and we report the number of observations which remain after outliers
are removed. Estimated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis in each case
corresponds to a coefficient estimate of one on the cost variable (or variables), and zero on the
constant.
29
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Table 1
Linear regression of tax- and vacancy-adjusted reported rents on user costs and cost measuresa
Model Name
uc{1}
uc{4}
uc{pi}
I
uc{pi}
II
Out-ofPocket
Ib
Out-ofPocket
II
Out-ofPocket
IIIc
uc{0}d
I
uc{0}d
II
12,941
(174)
-0.05
(-17.4)
13,564
(185)
5,087
(42.6)
2,277
(10.9)
8,418
(63.3)
7,034
(34.7)
7,377
(63.9)
5,795
(44.5)
5,432
(42.2)
0.55
(63.2)
0.94
(32.4)
-1.1E-5
(-13.1)
0.46
(37.8)
0.71
(21.6)
-8.6E-6
(-8.00)
0.24
(19.2)
0.32
(27.6)
-0.01
(-0.69)
0.43
(22.5)
Variable
Constant
uc{1}
-0.18
(-20.5)
uc{4}
uc{pi}
uc{pi}2
Out-of-pocket
expenses
Out-of-pocket
expenses2
uc{0}
0.16
(38.5)
PtEπ4,t e
-0.26
(-6.16)
PtEπpi,t f
N
5671
5665
5643
5653
5654
5653
5656
5651
5651
Adjusted R2
0.06
0.08
0.50
0.50
0.29
0.29
0.46
0.50
0.50
a
Coefficient estimates are reported; associated t-statistics are reported underneath, in parentheses.
Using a more inclusive measure of out-of-pocket expenses yields essentially identical results.
c
Using PtEπpi,t yields an even larger positive coefficient on expected dollar appreciation. Including home value
as a control variable results in an economically and statistically insignificant coefficient estimate on PtEπ.
d
This term refers to user costs computed as uc{pi}, but with Eπt removed (i.e., set to 0).
e
This term is expected appreciation in dollars, using the annualized 4-yr. forecast.
f
This term is expected appreciation in dollars, using expected inflation (pi) as expected appreciation.
b
Regression analysis confirms the conclusions above: uc{pi} is much more closely related
to rents than are uc{1} and uc{4}; indeed both of these latter measures are estimated to have an
inverse relationship to rents, a vivid rejection of the theory. Model uc{pi} II, in particular,
suggests a very close relationship between net rents and uc{pi} – a finding hinted at in Figure 5 –
30
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
although the fit of this model is nearly identical to that of the simpler linear model, Model uc{pi}
I. Reported rents are not simply out-of-pocket expenses either; 26 net rents are much more closely
related to uc{pi} than to out-of-pocket expenses. 27 Adding an expected appreciation term (Model
Out-of-pocket III) improves the fit of the model, but the coefficient estimate has the wrong sign.
Models uc{0} I and II are obtained by taking different versions of (1) and splitting these into two
parts, the Pt Et p th term, and everything else. Model uc{0} I results from starting with uc{4}, and
undertaking this split; this improves the model fit dramatically. It also suggests that rents do not
respond at all to expected appreciation, which is a puzzle, since even professional landlords
receive the bulk of the benefits of appreciation. Conversely, splitting uc{pi} into two parts – i.e.,
moving from Model uc{pi} to Model uc{0} II – does not improve the fit, and reduces the size of
the estimated coefficient(s), although these coefficients do have the expected sign.
We next investigate how reported rents are related to a wider variety of covariates. In
these log-linear specifications, log(net rent) becomes the dependent variable, with levels of each
variable as independent variables. We are most interested in the relationship of rents to the
various components of user costs, including expected appreciation. The hypothesis that
respondents merely report out-of-pocket expenses formally corresponds to the hypothesis that
the estimated coefficients on these expenses are non-zero (and is consistent with a one-for-one
transmission of costs into rents) and that the estimated coefficients on all other regressors are
zero. Regression results are reported in Table 2.
26
In Tables 1 and 2, we use baseline out-of-pocket expenses in the specification. As alluded to above, using
extended out-of-pocket expenses yields essentially the same results.
27
A log-log specification yields coefficient estimates of 0.65 for uc{pi}, and 0.40 for out-of-pocket expenses.
31
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Table 2
Log-linear regression: Linear regression of log (tax- and vacancy-adjusted reported rents) on
shelter cost measures and other covariates
Model 1:
Out-of-Pocket
Model 2:
Components of (1)
Variable
Estimate
(t-stat.)
Estimate
(t-stat.)
Constant
Valuea
Value2a
8.896
0.153
-0.010
(97.1)
(6.34)
(-6.95)
8.867
0.211
-0.007
(97.1)
(5.78)
(-4.06)
0.089
(7.92)
(7.22)
(5.90)
(4.14)
(1.72)
(-0.65)
(2.94)
(-2.38)
(0.42)
(-1.19)
(6.55)
(-6.63)
(-6.30)
(3.10)
(0.28)
(-1.09)
(2.45)
(-5.87)
(0.32)
(1.61)
User cost components
Out-of-pocket expenses b
(1-τ)(mortgage payments)b,c
(1-τ)(property tax payments)b,c
Home insurance residuald
Maintenance and repairs b
PtEπpi,t a,e
-0.147
(-0.20)
0.102
0.287
0.608
0.441
-0.489
Other covariates
Rooms
Rooms2
Bathrooms f
Bathrooms2f
Single detached
Mobile home
Age of dwelling f
Age of dwelling2f
Central City
Block % renter in 2000
% renter2
Block % poverty in 2000
CU Education mediumg
CU Education highh
0.071
-0.003
0.413
0.024
0.136
-0.329
-0.033
0.001
0.030
-0.125
0.447
-1.01
0.006
0.041
(4.90)
(-3.01)
(1.16)
(0.03)
(5.81)
(-6.84)
(-5.89)
(3.48)
(1.59)
(-0.92)
(2.42)
(-6.94)
(0.26)
(1.65)
0.045
-0.002
0.153
-1.082
0.155
-0.318
-0.042
0.001
0.005
-0.148
0.450
-0.86
0.008
0.040
0.000
0.565
5793
0.37
F-test p-value: PSUs
F-test p-value: dates
N
Adjusted R2
a
0.000
0.040
5795
0.38
We divided value and expected appreciation by 100,000.
We divided components of user costs by 10,000.
c
Mortgage interest payments and property tax payments are tax-deductible in the federal income tax code;
see (1) and discussion in Section 2.2.
d
As home insurance is typically a fixed percentage of value, we instead include the residual of a regression
of home insurance on value.
b
32
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
e
This term is expected dollar appreciation, using expected inflation (pi) as the appreciation forecast.
We divided bathrooms and age of dwelling by 10.
g
This variable equals 1 when the consumer unit reference person has education level between that of high
school graduate and of bachelors degree.
h
This variable equals 1 when the consumer unit reference person has education level with a bachelors degree
or higher.
f
There are several things to note. First, and most important, we can easily reject the
hypothesis that respondents merely report out-of-pocket expenses. Variables such as home value,
number of rooms, structure type, and so on each have an impact on reported rent over and above
their indirect impact on expenses. Of course, higher costs of ownership – in particular, interest
rates, property taxes conditional on value, home insurance, and expected maintenance and repair
costs, do translate into higher rents. However, the semi-elasticity with respect to out-of-pocket
cost is modest. Clearly, homeowners are not simply reporting their out-of-pocket expenses. This
low semi-elasticity must reflect the influence of market conditions; these potential landlords are
not ignorant of the market and recognize that their costs might well diverge from the rents their
properties would likely command (see Tian 2008).
Second, as noted previously, the rent/value relationship is concave. Third, expected
appreciation does not appear to exert a statistically-significant influence on net, vacancycorrected reported rent, once time- and PSU-dummies and the separate components of user costs
are included as regressors. This is not surprising: in these data, expected dollar appreciation is
highly collinear with out-of-pocket expenses and time- and PSU-dummies. Fourth, most other
coefficient estimates are intuitively plausible. Several unit characteristics influence reported rent
as one would expect: rooms (more rooms means a higher quantity of housing, given house price);
single detached housing and mobile home (detached being higher quality, and mobile home
being lower quality, given house price); and age (increased age leading to lower rents conditional
on house price). We conjectured that value above the metro-region median might have a separate
influence on rent, but this does not appear to be the case, and we eliminated this variable.
Similarly, the national vacancy rate was not estimated to be statistically significant in an earlier
specification of the model, and thus was eliminated as a covariate. This lack of statistical
significance is not that surprising, since it is a national measure, its variability is not terribly high
in these data, and we include time dummy variables. Several other variables seem to be
functioning as proxies for neighborhood quality – although it is worth keeping in mind that this
33
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
refers to an increased desirability (or increased cost of production) of rental properties
conditional on house value, so that these effects influence rent in a way that is not fully reflected
in the price of the home. Variables in this category include: percent of renters in the
neighborhood (more renters leads to higher rents conditional on house price – either reflecting
more demand for rental housing in the neighborhood, given house prices, or reflecting depressed
house prices in high renter neighborhoods); income and the percentage of homeowners with high
education (more of these variables perhaps point to higher quality of housing, given house price);
and the percentage of the population in poverty (with an increased percentage of those living in
poverty reducing quality conditional on house price).
5. Conclusion
The comparison between alternative measures of housing services consumption is a topic of key
interest in many fields of economics. In the standard frictionless theory, rents should equal ex
ante user costs. But prior research, most notably Verbrugge (2008a) and Garner and Verbrugge
(2009), highlighted the dramatic divergence between these measures. However, such prior
research has mostly used aggregated (and dissimilar) index data; when micro data were used,
these relied exclusively upon crude proxies for expected appreciation. Thus, the relationship
between these measures at the micro level is an important issue that has not been adequately
explored.
Herein, we use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to examine the relationship
between user costs and rents at the individual unit level, in dollars, using unit-level information
on house value, rent, taxes, and the like. This allows us to accurately estimate unit-specific user
costs, compare rents and user costs at a point in time, and to control for unobservables like
neighborhood quality.
There are three key findings. First, at the unit level, rents diverge significantly from user
costs – at least as these costs are conventionally estimated using house price appreciation
forecasts. Second, reported rents in the CE appear to be noisy but sensible; over this time period,
they evolve similarly to OER, and the hypothesis that respondents simply report out-of-pocket
expenses is rejected. Third, while noisy, reported rents are ‘‘well-explained” inasmuch as
34
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
expected net rental earnings correspond closely to an ad hoc estimate of user costs, namely one
which counterfactually imposes an assumption of no real capital gains in the short run.
These three findings jointly constitute an important but puzzling set of facts regarding the
relationship between rents and user costs. The first finding, considered alone, could have been
easily explained had not the other two findings been made. This first finding is consistent with
those from, e.g., Cournède (2005) and Verbrugge (2008a), which point to marked divergence
between market rents and user costs. Indeed, the evidence here suggests that the divergence is
even more striking at the micro level: even with long-horizon forecasts, the dispersion of rents
about the user cost estimate is large, user costs lie well below rents, and the estimated
relationship is actually inverse. Since we find this divergence at the micro level, we have
basically ruled out index construction errors as the cause of rent-user cost divergence – though
there remain numerous other potential explanations related to deficiencies in the theories of rent
determination, of user costs, and of house price dynamics (see Verbrugge 2008a for a more
thorough discussion). 28
The fact that the rent measures in CE data are respondent estimates rather than actual
arms-length transaction prices would have seemed to offer an additional and promising
explanation for the striking divergence of conventional user costs and rents that is present in
these data. However, the second finding appears to rule this explanation out. Reported rents are
not simply chosen at random, nor are they simply out-of-pocket expenses. Rather, they seem to
be quite sensible, and move similarly to OER, suggesting that respondents (on average) have a
reasonably good idea about what their homes would rent for. Still, without the third finding, the
first finding could potentially have been explained using the standard explanations alluded to
above.
The third finding is a conundrum. Current-generation user costs measures are constructed
on the basis of frictionless Hall-Jorgenson theory. But there are significant frictions in real estate:
pricing frictions, perhaps relating to asymmetric information; construction lags, associated with
land acquisition, permits, and the construction process itself; information frictions, relating to
search and to distinguishing permanent from transitory movements, and prompting delay; and, of
28
Of course, an alternative argument is that perceived user costs were indeed very low, much lower than rents, and
that such divergence is simply reflecting disequilibrium in the market, so one should not try to figure out a technique
that manages to make estimated user costs equal to rents.
35
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
course, the sizable transactions costs associated with buying and selling properties. 29 Adding
transactions costs renders user cost formulas more complicated and, indeed, there is uncertainty
even about the form that user costs take in a more realistic framework (though Diaz and LuengoPrado 2008 have made some progress; see also Luengo-Prado et al. 2008 and Sommer, Sullivan
and Verbrugge 2009, who study the relationship between rents, user costs, and the shadow price
of housing in a more realistic framework with transactions costs). We would certainly expect,
though, that given the significant frictions associated with real estate, a formula premised upon a
frictionless environment would be a decidedly weak foundation to start from. Hence one would
have thought that making a second dubious assumption, one decidedly at odds with the data – i.e.,
zero expected real capital gains in the short run – would have made things much worse, rather
than better. Adding to the puzzle is the fact that previous research has largely failed to find a
tight linkage between rents and this ad hoc user cost measure; see, e.g., Blackley and Follain
(1996). Even those studies which did find some evidence for a significant relationship
nonetheless found it to be deficient along some dimensions; for example, Verbrugge (2008a)
found that while this measure evolved more similarly to rents than did more conventional
alternatives, nevertheless significant divergence remained; 30 and while Green and Malpezzi
(2003) located a statistically significant relationship between rents and lagged user costs, the
coefficient estimates were well below their theoretical magnitudes.
It will be quite important to determine whether these three findings carry over to other
data sets, as few micro data sets contain information on value and rent simultaneously. Similarly,
these findings motivate further research into rent determination, house price dynamics, and user
costs. An important area for future research in particular is explaining why user costs constructed
using the ad hoc proxy for expected appreciation – a proxy which is suspect theoretically, and
poor predictor of actual appreciation in practice – appear to be so useful for explaining rents.
29
Quigley (2002) lists many transactions costs associated with housing markets. Smith and Smith (2006) emphasize
the weakness of the mechanisms which would correct inefficiency in the housing market. In a principal-agent
framework, Bruce and Santore (2006) study optimal real estate commissions.
30
This point was also made by Cournède (2005) and Eiglsperger (2006).
36
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
References
Ayuso, Juan, and Fernando Restoy (2007) “House prices and rents in Spain: Does the discount
factor matter?” Journal of Housing Economics 16.3-4, 291-308
Blackley, Dixie M., and James R. Follain (1996) “In search of empirical evidence that links rent
and user cost,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 26, 409-431.
Blow, Laura, and Lars Nesheim (2009) “A Retail Price Index Including the Shadow Price of
Owner Occupied Housing.” Institute for Fiscal Studies CEMMAP Working Paper WWP03/09.
Bruce, Donald, and Rudy Santore (2006) “On optimal real estate commissions.” Journal of
Housing Economics 15, 156–166.
Case, Bradford, Henry O. Pollakowski and Susan M. Wachter. (1997) “Frequency of transaction
and house price modeling.” Journal of Real Estate Economics 14, 173-187.
Case, Karl, and Robert Shiller (1989) “The efficiency of the market for single-family homes.”
The American Economic Review 79, 125-137.
Case, Karl, and Robert Shiller (2003) “Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2, 299-342.
Chang, Yan, Amy Crews Cutts, and Richard K. Green (2005) “Did Changing Rents Explain
Changing House Prices During the 1990s?” Manuscript, The George Washington University.
Chinloy, Peter (1991) “Risk and the User Cost of Housing Services.” AREUEA Journal, 19.4,
516-531.
Cournède, Boris (2005) “House Prices and Inflation in the Euro Area.” OECD Economics Dept.
Working Papers #450.
Crone, Theodore, Leonard Nakamura and Richard Voith. (2009) “Rents have been rising, not
falling, in the postwar period.” http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-anddata/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-28.pdf. Forthcoming, Review of Economics and
Statistics.
Deaton, Angus and Alan Heston (2008) “Understanding PPPs and PPP-based National
Accounts,” Manuscript, Princeton University.
Díaz, Antonia, and María J. Luengo-Prado. (2008), “On the User Cost and Home Ownership,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 11.3, 584-613.
Diewert, W. Erwin (2003/2010) “The Treatment of Owner Occupied Housing and Other
Durables in a Consumer Price Index,” Discussion Paper 03-08, Department of Economics,
University of British Columbia. http://www.econ.ubc.ca/discpapers/dp0308.pdf. Forthcoming in
37
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
W.E. Diewert, J. Greenless and C. Hulten (eds.), Price Index Concepts and Measurement, NBER
Studies in Income and Wealth, University of Chicago Press.
Diewert, W.E., (2006/2009), “The Paris OECD-IMF Workshop on Real Estate Price Indexes:
Conclusions and future Directions.” Paper presented at the OECD-IMF Workshop on Real Estate
Price Indexes held in Paris, 6-7 November 2006. http://www.econ.ubc.ca/diewert/dp0701.pdf
Published as Diewert, W.E. (2009), “The Paris OECD-IMF Workshop on Real Estate Price
Indexes: Conclusions and Future Directions,” chapter 6, pp. 87-116 in Diewert, W.E., B.M. Balk,
D. Fixler, K.J. Fox and A.O. Nakamura (2009), PRICE AND PRODUCTIVITY
MEASUREMENT: Volume 1 -- Housing. Trafford Press. Also available at
www.indexmeasures.com.
Diewert, W. Erwin, and Alice O. Nakamura (2009) “Accounting for Housing in a CPI”
chapter 2, pp. 7-32 in Diewert, W.E., B.M. Balk, D. Fixler, K.J. Fox and A.O. Nakamura (2009),
PRICE AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT: Volume 1 -- Housing. Trafford Press. Also
available at www.indexmeasures.com.
Diewert, W. Erwin, Alice O. Nakamura and Leonard Nakamura (2009) “Negative Equity and the
Treatment of Owner Occupied Housing in Inflation Measures” Manuscript, University of British
Columbia.
DiPasquale, Denise, and William C. Wheaton (1992) “The Costs of Capital, Tax Reform, and the
Future of the Rental Housing Market,” Journal of Urban Economics 31, 337-359.
Dougherty, Ann, and Robert Van Order (1982). “Inflation, Housing Costs, and the CPI.” The
American Economic Review 72(1), 154-164.
Dreiman, Michelle H., and Anthony Pennington-Cross (2004). “Alternative Methods of
Increasing the Precision of Weighted Repeat Sales House Prices Indices.” Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 28.4, 299-317.
Eichholtz, Piet M.A (1997) “A Long Run House Price Index: The Herengracht Index, 16281973.” Real Estate Economics 25.2, 175-92.
Eiglsperger, Martin (2006) “The treatment of owner-occupied housing in the harmonized index
of consumer prices.” IFC Bulletin 24, 68-79.
Follain, James R., Donald R. Leavens, and Orawin T. Velz (1993), “Identifying the Effects of
Tax Reform on Multifamily Rental Housing,” Journal of Urban Economics 34, 275–98.
Frick, Joachim R, Markus M. Grabka, Tim Smeeding, and Panos Tsakloglou (2008)
“Distributional Effects of Imputed Rents in Seven European Countries,” AIM-AP Project 1 –
Comparative Report.
Garner, Thesia I., (2005) “Developing Poverty Thresholds,” paper presented during the
American Statistical Association annual meetings, Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 10, 2005,
38
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
2005 Proceedings of the American Statistical Association, Social Statistics Section [CD-ROM],
American Statistical Association, Alexandria, VA, revised September 18, 2006.
Garner, Thesia I. and Kathleen Short (2001) “Owner-Occupied Shelter in Experimental Poverty
Measurement with a ‘Look’ at Inequality and Poverty Rates,” paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the Southern Economics Association, Tampa, Florida, November.
Garner, Thesia I. and Kathleen Short (2009) “Accounting for Owner-Occupied Dwelling
Services: Aggregates and Distributions,” Forthcoming, Journal of Housing Economics.
Garner, Thesia I., and Randal Verbrugge (2008). “Patterns of Housing Overvaluation Before and
After the Boom: Evidence from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey.” Manuscript in
preparation, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Garner, Thesia I., and Randal Verbrugge (2009). “The puzzling divergence of rents and user
costs, 1980-2004: Summary and Extensions.” chapter 8, pp. 125-146 in Diewert, W.E., B.M.
Balk, D. Fixler, K.J. Fox and A.O. Nakamura (2009), PRICE AND PRODUCTIVITY
MEASUREMENT: Volume 1 -- Housing. Trafford Press. Also available at
www.indexmeasures.com.
Gatzlaff, Dean H., and Donald R. Haurin (1997) “Sample-selection bias and repeat-sales index
estimates.” Journal of Real Estate Economics 14, 33-50.
Gillingham, Robert (1980). “Estimating the User Cost of Owner-occupied Housing.” Monthly
Labor Review 103.2, 31-35.
Gillingham, Robert (1983). “Measuring the Cost of Shelter for Homeowners: Theoretical and
Empirical Considerations.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 65.2, 254-265.
Goodman, Allen C., and Thomas G. Thibodeau (2008) “Where are the speculative bubbles in
U.S. housing markets?” Journal of Housing Economics 17.2, 117-137.
Granger, C. W. J. , and Y. Jeon (2004), “Thick modeling,” Economic Modelling 21, 323--343.
Green, Richard, and Stephen Malpezzi (2003) A Primer on U.S. Housing Markets and Housing
Policy. Washington DC: The Urban Institute Press.
Guðnason, Rósmunder (2004) “Simple User Cost and Rentals.” Manuscript, Statistics Iceland.
Guðnason, Rósmunder (2005) “Market Prices and User Cost.” Manuscript, Statistics Iceland.
Guðnason, Rósmunder and Guðrún R. Jónsdóttir (2008) “Owner Occupied Housing in the
Icelandic CPI,” chapter 9, pp. 147-150 in Diewert, W.E., B.M. Balk, D. Fixler, K.J. Fox and A.O.
Nakamura (2009), PRICE AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT: Volume 1 -- Housing.
Trafford Press. Also available at www.indexmeasures.com.
39
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Hall, Robert E. and Dale W. Jorgenson. (1967). “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.” The
American Economic Review 57.3, 391-414.
Haurin, Donald, Patric Hendershott and Dongwook Kim (1991) “Local House Price Indexes:
1982-1991.” Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, Fall, 451472.
Heston, Alan and Alice O. Nakamura (2008) “Reported Prices and Rents of Housing:
Reflections of Costs, Amenities, or Both?” in W. Erwin Diewert, Bert M. Balk, Dennis Fixler,
Kevin J. Fox, and Alice O. Nakamura (eds), Price and Productivity Measurement, Volume 1:
Housing, Chapter 7, 117-124.
Heston, Alan and Alice Nakamura (2009) “Questions about the Equivalence of Market Rents and
User Costs for Owner Occupied Housing,” forthcoming, Journal of Housing Economics.
Himmelberg, Charles, Christopher Mayer and Todd Sinai (2005) “Assessing High House Prices:
Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19.4, 67-92.
Hwang, Min and Quigley, John M. (2009) “Housing Price Dynamics in Time and Space:
Predictability, Liquidity and Investor Returns.” Forthcoming, The Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics.
ILO, IMF, OECD, UNECE, Eurostat and the World Bank (2004) The Consumer Price Index
Manual: Theory and Practice, Geneva.
Johannessen, Randi (2004) “Owner-Occupied Housing in Norway: Why the Rental Equivalence
Method is Preferred.” Manuscript, Statistics Norway.
Katz, A.J. (2009), “Estimating Dwelling Services in the Candidate Countries: Theoretical and
Practical Considerations in Developing Methodologies Based on a User Cost of Capital
Measure,” chapter 3, pp. 33-50 in Diewert, W.E., B.M. Balk, D. Fixler, K.J. Fox and A.O.
Nakamura (2009), PRICE AND PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT: Volume 1 -- Housing.
Trafford Press. Also available at HYPERLINK "http://www.indexmeasures.com"
www.indexmeasures.com.
Kumcu, Aylin (2009) “No Longer Tax-Exempt: Exploring Income Tax Calculation and Related
Issues in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.” Manuscript in preparation, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Leventis, Andrew. (2006). “Removing appraisal bias from a repeat transaction house price index:
a basic approach.” Manuscript, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
Luengo-Prado, María J., Paul Sullivan, Randal Verbrugge and Kamila Vetechova (2008) “The
Dynamics of User Costs and Rents,” manuscript in progress, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
40
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
McBride, D. and G. Smith (2001), “Rental Income of Persons, Gross Nonfarm Housing Product,
Households and Institutions Compensation and Related Measures of the National Income and
Product Accounts,” Manuscript, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
McCarthy, Jonathan, and Richard W. Peach (2004) “Are Home Prices the Next “Bubble”?
FRBNY Economic Policy Review, December.
OECD (2005) “Illustrative Estimates of the Impact of Owner Occupied Housing Costs on
Inflation.” OECD Economic Survey of the Euro Area 2005. Paris: OECD.
Paulin, Geoffrey D. (2005) “A comparison of consumer expenditures by housing tenure.” The
Journal of Consumer Affairs 29.1, p. 164-198.
Peterson, Brian (2009) “Fooled by Search: Housing Prices, Turnover and Bubbles.” Manuscript,
Indiana University.
Poole, Robert, and Randal Verbrugge (2009) “Explaining the Rent-OER Inflation Divergence,
1999-2006.” Forthcoming, Real Estate Economics.
Poterba, James M. (1992) “Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers.” The American
Economic Review 82.2, 237-242.
Prescott, Edward C. (1997) “On Defining Real Consumption.” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review May/June, 47-53.
Quigley, John M. (2002) “Transactions Costs and Housing Markets” Berkeley Program on
Housing and Urban Policy Working Papers No. W02-005.
Roberts, David (2008) “Estimating the imputed rents of owner-occupiers by the user cost
approach in Western Balkan countries.” Agenda item 1c, paper number 3, UNECEEUROSTAT-OECD meeting on national accounts: session for transition economies, Geneva, 21
April 2008.
Sarama, Robert F. (2009) “Pricing Housing Market Returns.” Manuscript, The Ohio State
University.
Schreyer, Paul (2009) “User Costs and Bubbles in Land Markets,” Forthcoming, Journal of
Housing Economics.
Sinai, Todd, and Nicholas S. Souleles (2005) “Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against
Rent Risk.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.2, 763-789.
Smith, Margaret Hwang, and Gary Smith (2006) “Bubble, Bubble, Where’s the Housing
Bubble?” Manuscript, Pomona College.
Sommer, Kamila, Paul J. Sullivan and Randal Verbrugge (2009) “Measuring Real Housing
Services Consumption.” Manuscript, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
41
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Stephens, William, Ying Li, Vassilis Lekkas, Jesse Abraham, Charles Calhoun, and Thomas
Kimner (1995) “Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index.” Journal of Housing Research 6.3,
389-418.
Stock, James H., and Mark Watson (2004), “Combination forecasts of output growth in a seven
country data set,” Journal of Forecasting 23, 405-430.
Tian, Chao Yue (2008) “Arbitrage Conditions, CAP rates, and Segmentation in the Housing
Market: A Micro Study.” Manuscript, The George Washington University.
Timmerman, Allen (2006) “Forecast Combinations,” in G. Elliott., C.W.J. Granger, and A.
Timmerman (eds), Handbook of Economic Forecasting, North-Holland: Elsevier, 135–196.
Verbrugge, Randal (2008a) “The puzzling divergence of aggregate rents and user costs, 19802004.” The Review of Income and Wealth, 54.4, December, 671-699.
Verbrugge, Randal (2008b) “Do the CPI's Utilities Adjustments for OER Distort Inflation
Measurement?” Manuscript, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Wang, Christina, Susanto Basu and John Fernald (2005) “A General-Equilibrium Asset-Pricing
Approach to the Measurement of Nominal and Real Bank Output.” Manuscript, University of
Michigan.
42
Appendix Table 1. Analysis Based on Data from Homeowners Liviing in the Following Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)
Northeast Region
Midwest Region
South Region
psu1102 Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic
psu1207 Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI
psu1312 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV
City, PA-NJ-DE-MD CMSA
CMSA
DC portion:
NJ portion:
IL portion:
District of Columbia
Atlantic, Burlington, Camden,
Cook, DeKalb, DuPage,
MD portion:
Cape May, Cumberland,
Grundy, Kane, Kankakee,
Calvert, Charles, Frederick,
Gloucester, Salem
Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Will
Montgomery, Prince George’s,
DE portion:
IN portion:
Washington
New Castle
Lake, Porter
VA portion:
MD portion:
WI portion:
Arlington, Clarke, Culpeper,
Cecil
Kenosha
Fairfax, Fauquier, King George,
PA portion:
Loudoun, Prince William,
Bucks, Chester, Delaware,
psu1208 Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI
Spotsylvania, Stafford,
Montgomery, Philadelphia
CMSA
Warren, Alexandria city, Fairfax
Genesee, Lapeer, Lenawee,
city, Falls Church city,
psu1103 Boston-Brockton-Nashua, MALivingston, Macomb, Monroe,
Fredericksburg city, Manassas
NH-ME-CT CMSA
Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw,
city, Manassas Park city
CT portion:
Wayne
WV portion:
Windham (part)
Berkeley, Jefferson
MA portion:
psu1209 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA
Bristol (part), Essex, Hampden
IL portion:
psu1313 Baltimore, MD PMSA
(part), Middlesex, Norfolk,
Clinton, Jersey, Madison,
Anne Arundel, Baltimore,
Plymouth, Suffolk, Worcester
Monroe, St. Clair
Carroll, Harford, Howard,
(part)
MO portion:
Queen Anne’s, Baltimore city
ME portion:
Franklin, Jefferson,
York (part)
Lincoln, St. Charles,
psu1316 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX CMSA
NH portion:
St. Louis, Warren, St. Louis
Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis,
Hillsborough (part), Merrimack
city
Henderson, Hood, Hunt,
(part), Rockingham (part),
Johnson, Kaufman, Parker,
Strafford (part)
psu1210 Cleveland-Akron, OH CMSA
Rockwall, Tarrant
Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga,
psu1104 Pittsburgh, PA MSA
Lake, Lorain, Medina, Portage,
psu1318 Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX
Allegheny, Beaver, Butler
Summit
CMSA
Brazoria, Chambers, Fort
psu1109 New York City
psu1211 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI
Bend, Galveston, Harris,
Bronx, Kings, New York
MSA
Liberty, Montgomery, Waller
Queens, Richmond
MN portion:
Anoka, Carver, Chisago,
psu1319 Atlanta, GA MSA
psu1110 New York-Connecticut Suburbs
Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti,
Barrow, Bartow, Carroll,
NY portion:
Ramsey, Scott, Sherburne,
Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb,
Dutchess, Nassau, Orange,
Washington, Wright
Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas,
Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk,
WI portion:
Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton,
Westchester
Pierce, St. Croix
Gwinnett, Henry, Newton,
CT portion:
Paulding, Pickens, Rockdale,
Fairfield, Litchfield (part),
Spalding, Walton
Middlesex (part), New
Haven (part)
West Region
psu1419 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA
PMSA
Los Angeles
psu1420 Los Angeles Suburbs, CA
Orange, Riverside, San
Bernardino, Ventura
psu1422 San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose,
CA CMSA
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,
Napa, Santa Clara, Santa
Cruz, San Francisco,
San Mateo, Solano, Sonoma
psu1423 Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA
CMSA
Island, King, Kitsap, Pierce,
Snohomish, Thurston
psu1424 San Diego, CA MSA
San Diego
psu1425 Portland-Salem, OR-WA CMSA
OR portion:
Clackamas, Columbia, Marion,
Multnomah, Polk, Washington,
Yamhill
WA portion:
Clark
psu1426 Honolulu, HI MSA
Honolulu
psu1427 Anchorage, AK MSA
Anchorage
psu1429 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA
Maricopa, Pinal
psu1433 Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO
CMSA
Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder,
Denver, Douglas, Jefferson,
Weld
Reconciling User Costs and Rents
Appendix Table 1. Analysis Based on Data from Homeowners Liviing in the Following Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) (continued)
Northeast Region
Midwest Region
South Region
West Region
psu1111 New Jersey-Pennsylvania
psu1320 Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL CMSA
Suburbs
Broward, Dade
NJ portion:
Bergen, Essex, Hudson,
psu1321 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater,
Hunterdon, Mercer,
FL MSA
Middlesex, Monmouth,
Hernando, Hillsborough,
Morris, Ocean, Passaic,
Pasco, Pinellas
Somerset, Sussex, Union,
Warren
PA portion:
Pike
Reference: BLS Handbook of Methods, Chapter 17. Consumer Price Index (Updated 06/2007), Appendix 5. Sample areas, population weights, and pricing cycles.
Available at: http://stats.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch17.pdf
44
Appendix Table 2. Sample Sizes of Homeowners by Primary Sampling Unit (PSU)
PSU Number
Abbreviated PSU Area Description
Number of Observations
psu1102
Philadelphia
368
psu1103
Boston
271
psu1104
Pittsburgh PA
199
psu1109
New York City
93
psu1110
New York-Connecticut suburbs
329
psu1111
New Jersey Suburbs, NJ
249
psu1207
Chicago
411
psu1208
Detroit
271
psu1209
St. Louis MO-IL
180
psu1210
Cleveland
177
psu1211
Minneapolis
185
psu1312
Washington, DC
264
psu1313
Baltimore
163
psu1316
Dallas
234
psu1318
Houston
197
psu1319
Atlanta
239
psu1320
Miami
133
psu1321
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwate
113
psu1419
Los Angeles
295
psu1420
Los Angeles suburbs
188
psu1422
San Francisco
212
psu1423
Seattle
181
psu1424
San Diego
106
psu1425
Portland, OR
163
psu1426
Honolulu HI
92
psu1427
Anchorage AK
166
psu1429
Phoenix AZ
163
psu1433
Denver CO
160
TOTAL
5802
Source: Authors' own calculations based on the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey Data
2004 quarter one through 2007 quarter 1.