adam hanieh
PETROCHEMICAL EMPIRE
The Geo-Politics of Fossil-Fuelled Production
he last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary surge
in radical scholarship on oil. Starting with Timothy Mitchell’s
path-breaking work on the transition from coal to oil and
its part in the emergence of ‘carbon democracy’, a series of
important contributions have sought to weave oil more fully into the
narration of 20th-century capitalism.1 Scholars have retold the story of
oil from the perspective of anticolonial protagonists in Latin America
and the Middle East, situating these against the broader backdrop of the
Bandung moment.2 Other work has critically interrogated the putative
claims of ‘oil security’ and supply scarcity that have long underpinned
traditional accounts of us oil expansionism.3 Alongside this historical
revisionism, a rich set of ecological-Marxist accounts have sought to
integrate oil more systematically into the rhythms of accumulation, profitability crises and uneven global development—an analytical shift that
bears directly on the challenges of climate change and the energy transition.4 This literature has significantly widened the conceptual purview
of oil; from debates around finance and neoliberalism to discussions of
contemporary aesthetic and cultural forms, oil can now be found as a
core analytical referent.5
T
Common to all this new work is the attempt to situate oil as part of the
actual making of social categories and patterns of political and economic
power. As such, this literature upends many of the traditional tropes that
have governed thinking about it, including notions of ‘peak oil’, oil as
geopolitical ‘prize’ or oil as a ‘curse’ that inevitably damns resource-rich
countries in the South to a future of bloated and parasitic Rentierism.6
These longstanding certitudes served to animate oil with some sort of
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determinative and semi-mystical power; in their place, attention has
been refocused on the social relations in which oil is embedded and that
give particular meaning to it as a commodity. There is, in other words, a
strong echo of Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism in contemporary
writing about oil—an attempt to see oil’s power as deriving not from
some ‘thing-like’ nature, but rather arising through its co-constitution
with the relations of capitalism itself.
Nonetheless, there is a palpable absence in this expansive, revisionist
reworking of our thinking about oil. Almost without exception, this scholarship treats it solely as an energy source or transport fuel—disregarding
completely the other aspect of oil’s mid-20th century emergence as the
dominant fossil fuel: the birth of a world composed of plastics and other
1
Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil, London and
New York 2011.
2
Bernard Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State, New York 2002; Christopher
Dietrich, Oil Revolution, Cambridge 2017; Giuliano Garavini, The Rise and Fall of
opec in the Twentieth Century, Oxford 2019.
3
Mazen Labban, Space, Oil and Capital, New York 2008; Robert Vitalis, Oilcraft:
The Myths of Scarcity and Security That Haunt us Energy Policy, Redwood City ca
2020.
4
John Bellamy Foster, The Ecological Revolution, New York 2009; Jason Moore,
Capitalism in the Web of Life, London and New York 2015; Andreas Malm,
The Progress of This Storm, London and New York 2018; Geoff Mann and Joel
Wainwright, Climate Leviathan, London and New York 2018; Roberto Ortiz, ‘OilFueled Accumulation in Late Capitalism: Energy, Uneven Development and
Climate Crisis’, Critical Historical Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, Fall 2020, pp. 205–40.
5
On the relationship between oil, financialization and neoliberalism, see Mazen
Labban, ‘Oil in Parallax: Scarcity, Markets and the Financialization of Accumulation’,
Geoforum, vol. 41, no. 4, July 2010, pp. 541–52; and Caleb Wellum, ‘Energizing
Finance: The Energy Crisis, Oil Futures and Neoliberal Narratives’, Enterprise &
Society, vol. 21, no. 1, March 2020, pp. 2–37. On oil and culture, see Ross Barrett
and Daniel Worden, eds, Oil Culture, Minneapolis 2014; Imre Szeman, ‘System
Failure: Oil, Futurity and the Anticipation of Disaster’, South Atlantic Quarterly, vol.
106, no. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 805–23; Matthew Huber, Lifeblood: Oil, Freedom and the
Forces of Capital, Minneapolis 2013.
6
For an excellent critique of peak oil and notions of scarcity, see Mazen Labban’s
Space, Oil and Capital and ‘Oil in Parallax’. Robert Vitalis’s Oilcraft takes a new look
at the 1970s oil crises and the us–Saudi relationship, taking aim at the idea of oil
security as the main driver of us foreign policy in the Middle East. Adam Hanieh,
‘Rethinking Class and State in the Gulf Cooperation Council’, in Joel Beinin et al.,
eds, A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa, Redwood City
ca 2021, presents a recent critique of Rentier State Theory as applied to the Gulf
States of the Middle East.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
27
synthetic products derived from petroleum.7 From the 1950s onwards, a
wide array of naturally derived substances—wood, glass, paper, natural
rubber, natural fertilizers, soaps, cotton, wool and metals—were systematically displaced by plastics, synthetic fibres, detergents and other
petroleum-based chemicals. This ‘petrochemical’ revolution enabled the
syntheticization of what had previously been encountered and appropriated only within the domain of nature; the very substance of daily life
was transformed, alchemy-like, into various derivatives of petroleum.
Here is oil not as energy source, but as feedstock, the literal raw material
of commodity production itself.8
The making of a synthetic world is a missing piece in understanding the
place of oil in contemporary capitalism.9 It is a story that begins in the
early 20th century with the growth of the chemical industry in Germany
and the us, subsequently moving through the rise of fascism and two
7
A partial exception to this oil-as-fuel assumption is work on agriculture and the
Green Revolution, which often acknowledges oil as a raw material utilized in the
expansion of fertilizers and pesticides from the 1930s onwards. Jason Moore, for
example, has recently emphasized the role of oil in enabling what he describes as
the proliferation of ‘cheap food’. For Moore, oil’s place in agriculture turned ‘oil and
natural gas into food’; ‘farming was no longer farming. It was petro-farming’: Web
of Life, pp. 251–2. Another important exception is Matthew Huber’s Lifeblood, which
presents a fascinating account of oil’s impact on us cultural and political practices,
specifically post-war sensibilities of individuality and ‘freedom’. Huber’s work is
distinctive for its wider consideration of petrochemicals, including plastics, in this
process.
8
According to the iea, around 15 per cent of global oil is used for purposes other
than energy or transport, a proportion that has increased from around 9 per cent
in 1973: iea, Key World Energy Statistics 2019, pp. 46–7. There is, however, a great
deal of uncertainty in these estimations due to problems with data collection and
the difficulty of disaggregating the energy and raw-material uses of oil in chemical
production.
9
There has been little critical engagement with the emergence of the petrochemical industry, although Barry Commoner’s pioneering work of the 1970s
provides important clues for how such a history could be written. See in particular
Commoner’s The Closing Circle, New York 1971, and his Poverty of Power: Energy
and the Economic Crisis, London 1976. An important book covering some of the
issues surrounding petrochemicals and environmental policy (with a foreword by
Commoner) is Kenneth Geiser, Materials Matter: Toward a Sustainable Materials
Policy, Cambridge ma 2001. Significant accounts of the development of the history of petrochemicals from an industry perspective include Keith Chapman, The
International Petrochemical Industry, Oxford 1991; Peter Spitz, Petrochemicals: The
Rise of an Industry, New York 1988; and Louis Galambos et al., eds, The Global
Chemical Industry in the Age of the Petrochemical Revolution, Cambridge 2006.
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World Wars that pitted Germany’s coal-based chemical giants against
their weaker us counterparts. By the end of the Second World War, the
us emerges as the dominant global chemical power. Its dominance,
however, is premised on a chemical revolution that takes place during
the War itself—the shift towards the use of oil and gas as the main chemical feedstock, rather than coal. This shift was deeply synergistic with
oil’s rise as the world’s primary fuel, and with the emergence of the us as
the hegemon of the new oil-centred world order. The new petrochemical
industry also carried distinctive and radical implications that fundamentally transformed the nature of post-war capitalism itself—qualitatively
increasing the scale and scope of available consumer goods, cheapening
the cost of industrial production and enabling huge increases in productivity through labour-saving technologies. The commodification and
massification of social life, including the rapid ascendancy of industries
such as tv advertising, were in good part based upon the new synthetic
products derived from petroleum. All of this was inseparable from continuous scientific and technological innovation, which in turn drove the
restructuring of state–business relations and far-reaching changes to
industrial organization and the corporate form.
The narrative that follows focuses predominantly on these historical lineaments of our synthetic world. The weight of this history, however, sits
elephant-like within the ecological crisis of the present. Petrochemicals
are the means through which oil has become woven into the very fabric
of our social existence, yet this ubiquity has made them almost invisible to our everyday consciousness. This fact was noted recently by the
Executive Director of the International Energy Association, Fatih Birol,
who described petrochemicals as ‘one of the key “blind spots” of the
energy system’, poorly understood even by energy professionals.10 Today,
petrochemicals are decisive for the future trajectory of fossil-fuel use:
they will almost certainly form one of the fastest-growing sources of
demand for oil over the next two decades, and there exists no viable alternative to petroleum as a material feedstock—the basic raw material—for
synthetic production. In reducing the problem of oil to simply the question of finding an alternative source of energy and transport fuel, we
implicitly confirm the invisibility of petrochemicals. We remake our
10
iea, The Future of Petrochemicals: Towards more sustainable plastics and fertilisers,
2018, p. 14.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
29
synthetic world as something natural. As such, foregrounding the story
of petrochemicals not only opens an entirely new vista to understanding
the intertwined histories of oil and capitalism, it points directly to the
necessity and challenges of moving beyond both.
Roots of the chemical industry
There was little indication in the early 1900s of the sweeping transformations that would be ushered in by the petrochemical revolution just
fifty years later. At the turn of the century, the chemical industry was
largely focused around dye-stuffs, utilizing coal as the main precursor for chemical production. Globally, the industry was dominated by
Germany’s Big Three chemical companies—basf, Bayer and Hoechst—
who, in 1916, established the ig Farben (igf) cartel in order to coordinate
research and divide up European and international markets.11 At that
time, the German chemical industry was vastly superior to that of the us
or any other European country. Germany supplied around 90 per cent
of the world’s synthetic dyes up until the First World War. The us dye
industry consisted of only seven firms in 1913, employing a mere 528
people with a product value of $2.4 million; in comparison, the German
industry was worth $65 million and employed 16,000 people. German
dominance was backed through an aggressive policy of overseas patent
protection; one 1912 survey estimated that 70 per cent of all us patents
granted on synthetic organic chemicals were actually German-owned.12
The First World War—sometimes described as the chemists’ war—
would provoke significant changes to chemical production and provide a
powerful impetus to the growth of the industry. In Germany, igf played
a central role in the war effort, pioneering the development of poison-gas
weapons (utilizing by-products of the dye industry) and synthetic nitrates
for the manufacture of explosives and fertilizers.13 Despite Germany’s
defeat and the crushing terms dictated by the Treaty of Versailles, igf’s
component companies remained intact and continued to be recognized
11
Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: ig Farben in the Nazi Era, New York 1987.
Kathryn Steen, The American Synthetic Organic Chemicals Industry: War and Politics,
1910–1930, Chapel Hill nc 2014, pp. 17, 64, 55.
13
These synthetic nitrates allowed Germany to manufacture explosives despite the
British blockade of Chile, then the world’s major exporter of saltpetre, an essential
ingredient in both fertilizers and explosives.
12
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as world leaders in chemical research and production after the War. In
1925, the cartel was formally reorganized as a single entity, becoming
the largest corporation in Europe and the most important chemical company in the world.14
Across the Atlantic, leading American chemical companies also profited handsomely from the War.15 In addition to increased demand for
basic chemicals, a pivotal moment for the industry came with the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act (twea) in October 1917 and the
establishment of a new office called the Alien Property Custodian (apc).
Through this office, the American state seized German-owned patents
and German-owned businesses, with a particular focus on the chemical
industry. Initially, this property seizure was viewed as a temporary act—
after all, ‘the United States is not a pirate nation’, opined a 1917 New
York Times editorial.16 However, less than a year later, German industrial
firms were to be denounced by the apc, A. Mitchell Palmer, as ‘spy centres’ and ‘a knife at the throat of America’.17 At the end of the War, the
apc held an estimated $700 million worth of seized German assets in
30,000 trust accounts.18
For the nascent us chemical industry, the twea turned out to be an
immensely fortunate turn of events. Just one week before the Armistice
was declared on the Western Front, the Act was amended to allow the
permanent confiscation of chemical patents; thousands of these patents were then sold at a pittance of their reputed value to the newly
14
Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of ig Farben, New York 1978, p. 37.
The author of this fascinating book served on the team that prosecuted igf for war
crimes at the conclusion of ww2.
15
It has been estimated that DuPont earned $89 million through its wartime expansion, a windfall of retained earnings that enabled the company to expand research
and production significantly after the War: Chapman, International Petrochemical
Industry, p. 65. Likewise, around 90 per cent of Dow Chemical’s production was
devoted to materials such as explosives and mustard gas during the War: Jason
Szilagyi, ‘American Chemical Companies in the First World War’, Proceedings of
Armistice & Aftermath, Michigan Technological University Symposium, September
2018, p. 9.
16
Benjamin Coates, ‘The Secret Life of Statutes: A Century of the Trading with the
Enemy Act’, Modern American History, vol. 1, no. 2, July 2018, p. 158.
17
Coates, ‘Secret Life of Statutes’, p. 158.
18
Steen, American Synthetic, p. 23.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
31
established Chemical Foundation, a non-profit organization that was
headed by the Alien Property Custodian himself. From there, the
Chemical Foundation issued non-exclusive licences to American-owned
chemical firms. This mechanism for appropriating German technical
knowledge was developed in conjunction with leading American companies, including DuPont, the largest chemical firm in the us at the time,
which actually drew up a precise list of patents that should be targeted
for seizure.19 The apc explicitly identified the twea and the Chemical
Foundation as a means of ‘Americanizing’ the chemical industry, and in
later Congress debates, one representative would describe the Act as ‘the
only safeguard’ for ‘the existence of the new chemical industry in this
country’.20 In this manner, the law constituted a massive lever of capital
accumulation for America’s burgeoning chemical sector.21
The establishment of the Chemical Foundation as a means of transferring patents to American firms was formally designed to prevent the
monopolization of scientific techniques by a handful of firms. In actuality, however, a small number of companies emerged as leaders of the
us chemical industry through the 1920s, most notably: DuPont, Union
Carbide & Carbon Corporation, Dow Chemicals and Monsanto. These
firms benefitted greatly from the transfer of German patents, applying
new techniques to expand their output and range of basic chemicals.
Of particular importance to these firms was the expanding automobile
industry, which provided a steady source of demand for new chemical
products at a scale that made production profitable. American chemical
companies grew in lock-step with the major car manufacturers, supplying fuel additives such as the anti-knocking agent tetraethyl lead,
synthetic rubber for tyres and the first synthetic plastic, Bakelite, for
components such as spark plugs, batteries, steering wheels and instrument panels. Indeed, the close association between the chemical and
automotive industries was expressed in joint ownership structures—
DuPont, for example, owned up to 38 per cent of General Motors in
the inter-war years, and when Pierre du Pont passed the presidency of
19
Steen, American Synthetic, p. 299.
Coates, ‘Secret Life of Statutes’, p. 159.
21
The Trading with the Enemy Act was retained as a permanent mechanism of us
foreign policy, later put to use for economic sanctions. See Coates, ‘Secret Life of
Statutes’ for a discussion.
20
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the company to his brother in 1919, he went on to become chairman of
General Motors.22
American conquest
The 1920s and 1930s were important decades in basic chemical
research, focused particularly on polymers, large molecules made up
of repeated chains of smaller molecular units, called monomers. The
German scientist Hermann Staudinger first discovered this basic structure of polymers in 1920.23 His ideas initially met with scepticism but
soon found practical application in the development of new synthetic
compounds. Through the inter-war years, numerous polymers were
discovered (mostly accidentally) in the labs of the largest chemical companies, including plasticized polyvinyl chloride or pvc (1926), neoprene
synthetic rubber (1930), polyethylene (1933), nylon (1935) and Teflon
(1938).24 However, with the exception of nylon—developed by DuPont
scientists over an eleven-year period—these polymers generally lacked
significant commercial application. Most importantly, coal remained the
key feedstock utilized in the production of these new polymers and the
wider chemical industry.
The Second World War, however, drove three major changes to the
chemical industry: first, an immense increase in the diversity, output
and commercialization of polymers; second, a shift towards the use of
petroleum rather than coal as the basic feedstock for polymer production; and third, the emergence of the us as the dominant global chemical
power, and the concomitant decline of the German chemical industry. These changes were closely related, implicitly pitting the German
and American chemical industries against one another through the
mediation of war. In both Germany and the us, there was an intimate
connection between the development of industrial chemical techniques,
the rapid growth of the leading chemical firms, and the initiative and
material support of the state.
22
Steen, American Synthetic, p. 443.
Staudinger was later employed as a consultant by igf during the inter-war years:
Chapman, International Petrochemical Industry, p. 45. He was nonetheless sympathetic to pacifist ideas, and his first wife Dorothea was an active socialist.
24
The leading developers of these polymers were igf, DuPont, the British firm ici
and Dow.
23
hanieh: Petrochemicals
33
In the years preceding the War, igf continued to be the clear leader
in the world chemical industry, despite the increased prominence of
American firms like DuPont and Dow Chemicals. igf was central to
Nazi war preparations, with the company’s efforts focused particularly
on the use of coal to produce synthetic fuels and artificial rubber. Hitler
had identified these materials as essential to the success of Germany’s
future expansion. Lacking the direct colonies of other European powers, and facing the certainty of naval blockade on rubber supplies from
Malaysia, Nazi planners placed enormous priority on the development
of synthetic alternatives that could ensure German self-sufficiency. By
1937, igf had become ‘completely Nazified’: ‘almost all of the members
of the ig managing board who did not already belong now joined’ the
Nazis, and ‘all Jewish officials of ig were removed, including a third of
the supervisory board’. The company was essentially transformed into
the industrial arm of Germany’s military, producing almost all the country’s synthetic gasoline (derived from coal) as well as ‘synthetic rubber,
poison gases, magnesium, lubricating oil, explosives, methanol, sera,
plasticizers, dyestuffs, nickel and thousands of other items necessary for
the German war machine.’25
Prior to its entrance into the War in December 1941, the us similarly
sought to develop synthetic polymers as potential replacements for
metals, natural rubber, wood and cotton.26 Due to the looming shortage
25
Borkin, Crime and Punishment, pp. 58, 60. This relationship with the Nazi war
machine was enormously profitable for igf. With each successful German conquest, the chemical company took over factories and looted assets of rival European
firms: a step-wise expansion that was to encompass Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Norway and France. igf also benefitted enormously from the seizure of
Jewish property and the use of forced labour in Hitler’s concentration camps. The
firm built a huge industrial complex in Auschwitz for the production of synthetic
rubber and oil that was run by an ‘almost limitless reservoir of death camp labour’
and ‘used as much electricity as did the entire city of Berlin’: p. 7. The company’s profits between 1941 and 1943 were nearly five times those of 1935, and huge
amounts were invested in the expansion of new plants such as those at Auschwitz.
For documentation and further discussion, see ‘ig Farben at the End of the Second
World War’, Wollheim Memorial website.
26
With the entry of the us in December 1941, the old Trading With the Enemy Act
was once again employed to confiscate German patents, which were made available to any member of the public willing to pay $15: Arnold Krammer, ‘Technology
Transfer as War Booty: The us Technical Oil Mission to Europe, 1945’, Technology
and Culture, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1981, p. 75.
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of basic raw commodities, these new materials would find widespread
use in aircraft, submarines, tanks, tents, parachutes and other essential
military items—a us army order even mandated that the rubber combs
carried by soldiers be replaced by a plastic version.27 Over the course of
the War, production of vinyl resins such as pvc increased nearly fiftyfold, acrylic polymers such as plexiglass increased by a factor of ten and
overall production of plastics nearly quadrupled.28 Even the development
of radar technology and the atomic bomb was dependent upon two newly
invented polymers, polyethylene and Teflon. Given the importance of
these new synthetic materials to the Second World War, it would be little
exaggeration to term this later conflict the polymers war.
As with Germany, American production of the new polymers initially
utilized pre-war technologies based upon the conversion of coal and
other organic materials. Over the course of the War, however, a radical transformation occurred in manufacturing techniques. Driven by
escalating military demands, production shifted decisively towards the
use of oil and gas as the primary feedstocks for synthetic manufacture.
This transition was enabled by innovations in petroleum ‘cracking’, a
technique that oil companies had been experimenting with through the
1920s and 1930s as part of efforts to increase the quantities of gasoline
produced in their refineries.29 In addition to improving gasoline output,
cracking also generated significant quantities of other highly reactive
hydrocarbons known as olefins and aromatics, which could be utilized
as building blocks for synthetic polymers. In the minds of us government planners, this new ‘petrochemical’ industry was viewed as crucial
to guaranteeing the supply of essential military materials, including various plastics, aviation fuels and chemicals such as toluene, an aromatic
hydrocarbon that was necessary to the manufacture of explosives.30
27
Susan Freinkel, ‘A Brief History of Plastic’s Conquest of the World’, Scientific
American, 29 May 2011.
28
John Kenly Smith, ‘The American Chemical Industry Since the Petrochemical
Revolution’, in Galambos et al., Global Chemical Industry, p. 175.
29
Prior to ww2, this largely involved thermal cracking, the use of very high
temperatures and pressures to achieve greater control over the yield of refinery
products. In the early years of the War, however, this technique was displaced by
catalytic cracking—the use of a catalyst to achieve the same results but in easier
operating conditions.
30
Toluene production had traditionally derived from coal. By 1944, however, 81
per cent of the toluene supply in the us was made from petroleum: Chapman,
International Petrochemical Industry, p. 74.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
35
By shifting to petroleum as a basic feedstock, the abundance of us oil
and natural-gas supplies would enable these materials to be produced
cheaply and at large scale.31
Significant levels of us government funding were thus directed into
petrochemical research and refinery construction during the War, and
manufacturing volumes for basic petrochemicals grew at an unprecedented pace. Between 1940 and 1946, the production of ethyl benzene
(used in synthetic rubber) rose from 500 to 135,000 tons, ethylene
dichloride (for pvc) from 9,000 to 27,000 tons, ethyl chloride (antiknocking gasoline additive) from 3,000 to 28,500 tons and ethylene
oxide (an antifreeze and fumigation agent) from 41,500 to 78,000 tons.32
These products were not only utilized by the American military but
were essential to supporting other Allied powers—Standard Oil’s (now
ExxonMobil) Baton Rouge refinery, for example, was the largest source
of aviation fuel for the Allies during the War and was said to have ‘saved
England in the Battle of Britain’.33
Arguably the most important petroleum-based industry that emerged in
the us during the War was that of synthetic rubber. Before 1939, 90 per
cent of the world’s natural rubber originated from just three countries—
Ceylon, India and Malaysia—but with Japan’s conquest of Asia,
American access to these supplies disappeared.34 The us government
took various initiatives to conserve rubber—including mandating the
first-ever national speed limit in May 1942—but these measures could
not satisfy the tremendous demand for rubber coming from all branches
of the military.35 Indeed, just six months after the us entered the War,
31
Geiser, Materials Matter, p. 43.
Peter Spitz, Primed for Success: The Story of Scientific Design Company, Cham,
Switzerland 2019, p. 40.
33
Spitz, Primed for Success, p. 32. More than half of total capital expenditure on
Baton Rouge came from the us government: Chapman, International Petrochemical
Industry, p. 74. In 2010, ExxonMobil used this support to sue the us government
for reimbursement on environmental damages it had been required to pay at this
refinery. In 2020, the us government lost the case and was ordered to pay $20 million and partially foot the bill for future clean-up costs.
34
Paul Samuelson, ‘The us Government Synthetic Rubber Program 1941–
1955: An Examination in Search of Lessons for Current Energy Technology
Commercialization Projects’, Working Paper mit-el 76–027wp, mit, Cambridge
ma, November 1976, p. 4.
35
The so-called ‘Victory Speed Limit’ of 35 mph lasted from May 1942 until the end
of the War in August 1945.
32
36
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Ferdinand Eberstadt—then chair of the Army and Navy Munitions Board,
and destined to be an instrumental figure in the creation of the National
Security Council—claimed that the us would have ‘no alternative but
to call the whole thing off’ unless synthetic rubber could be produced
in large enough quantities.36 Driven by these fears, the us government
embarked on a massive programme to build synthetic rubber plants that
could produce rubber derived from petroleum.37 These plants would be
government-owned, but operated by private firms on a ‘cost plus management fee’ basis. By the end of the War, over 2 million tons of synthetic
rubber had been produced by more than fifty plants.38 This huge expansion permanently altered the nature of American rubber production: in
1941, almost 99 per cent of all us domestic rubber consumption was
natural; by 1945, this figure had fallen to 15 per cent.39 Perhaps most
remarkably, the us emerged from the War as the world’s largest exporter
of rubber; prior to 1939, it had been the world’s largest importer.
With the end of the War, the us government sought to divest ownership
of this immense network of rubber plants to the private sector. Plans
were initially delayed by the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, but
just ten days after the end of that conflict the us Congress passed the
Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Act of 1953. Much like the seizure
of German patents in the wake of the First World War, this Act represented another major transfer of wealth to the us chemical industry,
with plants worth a total of $700 million sold for a mere $260 million.
During Congressional hearings in 1954, one opponent protested that
the sale should properly be ‘labelled a giveaway’ and accurately predicted
that it would ‘bring about complete domination of the industry by a few
mammoth corporations’.40 Indeed, the ultimate beneficiaries of the sale
were a handful of oil, rubber and chemical firms including Standard Oil,
Shell, Goodyear, Firestone and Dow Chemicals. By 1958, just six firms
36
Cited in William Tuttle Jr, ‘The Birth of an Industry: The Synthetic Rubber “Mess”
in World War II’, Technology and Culture, vol. 22, no. 1, January 1981, p. 38.
37
Initially there was an inter-industry dispute over whether synthetic rubber should
be produced from alcohol (derived from grain) or from petroleum. In the end, oil
companies won out. See Tuttle, ‘Birth of an Industry’ and Chapman, International
Petrochemical Industry, pp. 69–72, for an account of these disputes.
38
Kenly Smith, ‘American Chemical Industry’, p. 175.
39
Tuttle, ‘Birth of an Industry’, p. 65.
40
James Patton, President of the National Farmers Union, ‘Rubber Facilities
Disposal’, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, us Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 691, 4a, 1955.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
37
controlled 79 per cent of all us plant capacity for the main type of synthetic rubber production.41
The story of rubber illustrates the extraordinary impact that the petrochemical revolution would have on American capitalism. At the
beginning of the War, a commercial petrochemical industry did not
exist in the us. By 1950, half of the American output of organic chemicals would be made from petrochemicals. By the end of the 1950s, this
figure would reach just under 90 per cent.42 This transformation of
synthetic production was not simply a result of technological innovation or the contingent choices of American war planners. Crucially, the
petrochemical revolution embodied a more fundamental shift towards
oil as the fulcrum of the world’s energy regime, a process that had begun
in the early 20th century but that was fully consummated by the War
itself.43 The expansion of the oil industry massively increased the availability of basic feedstocks for chemical production; this considerably
cheapened the cost of material manufacture because the inevitable byproducts of fuel production were transformed into a profitable input for
petrochemicals. What was essentially ‘waste’ had suddenly become an
indispensable component of circulating constant capital. In short, at the
heart of the petrochemical revolution was a radical change to the wider
reproduction of capital: the production of commodities had become
derivative—or a by-product—of the production of energy.
Moreover, and no less significantly, all this occurred in the context of a
global oil industry that was largely dominated by us firms. By the time of
the Second World War, the us was the world’s largest producer of oil and
gas and held over 70 per cent of global refining capacity, compared to
41
Stanley Boyle, ‘Government Promotion of Monopoly Power: An Examination of
the Sale of the Synthetic Rubber Industry’, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 9,
no. 2, April 1961, p. 158.
42
Kenly Smith, ‘American Chemical Industry’, p. 178.
43
Lord Curzon famously observed of ww1 that the winning side had floated to
victory on a sea of oil—all the more so in ww2. Petroleum energy sources were
more efficient than coal and easier to transport; they were also cheaper and more
plentiful. Naval ships, aircraft and military vehicles all depended upon ready supplies of liquid petroleum fuels. The emergence of a post-war oil-centred world order
was also closely connected to the development of the automobile industry (Huber,
Lifeblood) and the rise of industrial farming (Moore, Web of Life). In this sense, the
petrochemical revolution can be seen as another core element of oil’s consolidation
at the centre of the world’s energy regime.
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only 7 per cent in Western Europe. Five of the famed Seven Sisters—the
seven oil companies that controlled 85 per cent of the world’s petroleum
reserves—were American-owned. At the end of the War, almost all the
world’s production capacity for ethylene—the fundamental building
block of petrochemical production and today frequently described as the
‘world’s most important chemical’—was located in the us.44 There was
thus a mutually reinforcing relationship between the rise of American
hegemony, the shift to an oil-centred global energy regime and the revolution in commodity production inaugurated by petrochemicals.
Europe subordinated
In late 1944, with Allied leaders looking in growing anticipation to
the end of the War, the issue of Germany’s long-standing and powerful chemical industry loomed large in the various scenarios of post-war
planners. Much of the physical infrastructure of German industry lay
in rubble, or was in territory conquered by the Soviet Union. There
was, however, considerable scientific expertise, built upon decades of
chemical experimentation, scattered through research facilities and
laboratories across Germany. Cognizant of this potential treasure trove
of knowledge, us oil-company executives began lobbying American officials in August 1944 for a plan to seize this research in the event of
Germany’s defeat. Competing interests in the us government initially
failed to agree on a united approach, but by the end of the year an audacious scheme had cohered.
Two dozen leading us oil-company managers and scientists were temporarily drafted as colonels of the us army, provided with uniforms and
secretly ushered into German territory to visit industrial facilities and
collect documents from igf and other German firms. Between February
and August 1945, these teams gathered material that ran to over 300,000
pages; their visits continued after the War, and by 1948 a dedicated office
set up by President Truman would report that ‘more than 5 million
microfilmed pages of technical documents, all in German, containing
drawings, flow sheets, reports of chemical experiments and meetings of
German technical societies’ were still being processed. One later historian would describe these events as akin to ‘technology transfer’ through
‘war booty’, commenting that ‘never in the history of the modern world
44
Chapman, International Petrochemical Industry, pp. 60, 17.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
39
has a sophisticated industrial nation had at its complete disposal the
industrial secrets of another nation’.45
With the conclusion of the War, the inextricable connections between
German fascism and the German chemical industry were formally recognized at the Nuremburg war-crime trials. Twenty-four leading executives
of igf were indicted and tried at Nuremburg, with thirteen eventually
found guilty of war crimes including slavery, mass murder and plunder.46 However, in a pattern replicated throughout post-war German big
business, those eventually sentenced to prison received extremely short
sentences and early pardons and were quickly reintegrated into the top
echelons of West German industry. igf itself was broken up into its original constituent parts of Bayer, Hoechst and basf. Heading each of these
companies into the 1950s and 1960s were the igf managers of the Nazi
era, including those that had served time for war crimes.47 Beyond the
reconstitution of the Big Three under the auspices of former war criminals, other leading igf directors were released early from prison and
went on to prosperous careers with the us government and American
chemical firms.48
Alongside the diffusion of German scientific knowledge, post-war planners also sought systematically to shift Germany’s chemical industries
away from the use of coal-based technologies towards oil. The Potsdam
Conference of 16 July 1945 went so far as to ban Germany from utilizing coal as a feedstock for fuel production—a move that forced the
expansion of oil refining in order to satisfy the country’s need for
45
Krammer, ‘Technology Transfer’, p. 97.
Borkin, Crime and Punishment, p. 121.
47
igf board member Friedrich Jähne, who had been convicted of war crimes at
Nuremberg, was hired as the chairman of the Hoechst supervisory board in 1955.
Fritz ter Meer, also convicted of war crimes at Nuremberg, became chair of the
board of directors for Bayer in 1956. Although he was acquitted of war crimes in the
Nuremberg trial, former igf board member Carl Wurster, who became chief executive of basf in 1952, had been a ‘military economy leader’ (Wehrwirtschaftsführer)
and was awarded a Knight’s Cross for War Service by the Nazis in 1943.
48
One of these was Otto Ambros, who was found guilty of crimes against
humanity—the use of slave labour—at Auschwitz and is credited with the invention of Sarin gas. Ambros was granted clemency by the us government in 1951,
becoming an advisor to the us Army Chemical Corps and Dow Chemicals, among
other leading us chemical firms. See the entry for ‘Ambros, Otto / W. R. Grace and
Company’ at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum website.
46
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liquid fuels.49 In 1951 this order was rescinded, but by that stage all
four German coal-to-fuel plants in Western-controlled zones had either
been deactivated or converted to processing oil. As oil became more
available and necessary infrastructure such as pipelines were built,
basf, Hoechst and Bayer entered the petrochemical industry through
partnerships with British and American oil firms. By 1961, oil and gas
had overtaken coal as the primary feedstock for the German chemical
industry—and by 1963, 63 per cent of all German chemical production
was derived from petroleum.50
A similar transition away from coal occurred in other West European
states. Despite some initial opposition by us oil companies, who feared
losing their dominant position in world oil markets, funding from the
Marshall Plan supported a significant expansion of European refining
capacity in the immediate post-war years.51 European refinery capacity
increased five-fold between 1948 and 1955, and by 1960 Europe’s share
of global refining capacity stood at 16 per cent, up from 7 per cent in
1940.52 The increase in the output of refined-oil derivatives enabled a
decisive shift towards petroleum-based production of chemicals. This
was most evident in the uk, where more investment went into petrochemicals than any other branch of British industry between 1948 and
1958.53 By 1962, around two-thirds of all British chemical production
would be petroleum-based. In that same year, petrochemicals averaged
58 per cent of chemical production across Western Europe as a whole—a
figure that had increased from negligible levels in just over a decade.54
Crucially, however, the crude oil that fed European refineries, and
thus the nascent petrochemical industry, was supplied wholly through
49
Anthony Stranges, ‘Germany’s synthetic fuel industry, 1927–1945’, in Lesch, ed.,
The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century, Dordrecht 2000, p. 213.
50
Ulrich Wengenroth, ‘The German Chemical Industry after World War II’, in
Galambos et al., eds, Global Chemical Industry, p. 149.
51
David Painter, ‘Oil and the Marshall Plan’, Business History Review, vol. 58, no. 3,
Autumn 1984, pp. 359–83.
52
Chapman, International Petrochemical Industry, p. 83.
53
Wyn Grant, ‘The United Kingdom’, in Galambos et al., eds, Global Chemical
Industry, p. 299.
54
Chapman, International Petrochemical Industry, p. 82. The frontrunner in this
transition was the uk. British scientists had participated in the secret teams that
visited igf plants between 1944 and 1945, and Britain was the first West European
country to utilize petroleum feedstocks for chemical production.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
41
imports—unlike the us, where plentiful supplies of domestic oil and gas
had enabled the earlier expansion of the petrochemical industry. The bill
for European oil imports was the largest dollar item for most Marshall
Plan countries, striking testimony to the central importance that oil had
now assumed in capitalist growth.55 By providing this funding, the us
state not only facilitated the oil-based trajectory of European industrial
development, it also directly supported the international expansion of
the Seven Sisters, who were the sole source of European oil imports.
As vertically integrated firms that dominated each step in the exploration, production, transportation and refining of oil, these oil majors
were thus embedded at the core of Europe’s emerging petrochemical
revolution. Shipping terminals, oil pipelines, refineries and petrochemical plants formed distinct spatial agglomerations superintended
by one or other of these firms—most notably bp, Shell, Esso and Texaco.
The initial extension of the petrochemical industry across Europe took
place largely through joint ventures between these oil majors and local
European capital.56
The geographical origins of Europe’s oil imports were no less consequential to the emergence of its petrochemical industry. Through the
1950s and 1960s, most of the oil exported to Europe came from oil fields
located in the Middle East. The oil majors operated these fields through
concessionary agreements with host governments and held the power to
set the price of oil which was then used to calculate royalty payments.57
These royalties and other tax expenses were thereby minimized through
the oil majors’ arrogation of price controls, which kept the costs of oil
production in the Middle East very low compared to other oil-producing
areas of the world and in relation to coal. This was extremely advantageous for the Seven Sisters, and by the mid-1950s, the profitability of
foreign operations for us oil companies was double that of domestic production.58 All of this ultimately depended upon effective Anglo-American
control over territory and political authority in the Middle East, which at
that time was divided principally between Britain across Kuwait, Iran,
Iraq and the smaller Trucial States in the Gulf, and the us in Saudi Arabia.
A direct thread thus connected the emergence of a synthetic world with
55
Painter, ‘Oil and the Marshall Plan’, p. 362.
See Galambos et al., eds, Global Chemical Industry, for a survey of different
European countries.
57
Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum, London 2004.
58
Commoner, Poverty of Power, p. 55.
56
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patterns of colonial domination: the rise of petrochemicals in Europe
was as much an American and Middle Eastern story as a European one.
Chemical century
The post-war petrochemical revolution inaugurated a far-reaching transformation in patterns of industrial production and consumption. The
ubiquitous spread of synthetic materials derived from petroleum rapidly
colonized all aspects of everyday life, not only driving the emergence of
new industries such as plastics and packaging, but also reshaping cultural practices and the set of material products associated with the ‘good
life’ and the American Dream.59 Business historians have subsequently
described this period as the ‘chemicalization’ of industry, with virtually
all forms of commodity production linked to petrochemicals in some
manner. In the us, the chemical industry moved to the centre of capitalist development through the 1950s and 1960s, experiencing growth
rates double that of gdp and profit rates at least 25 per cent higher than
those found in other manufacturing industries.60 With the chemical
industry ‘unmatched by any other’ in growth, earnings and potential,
normally circumspect pundits of the post-war era foresaw a future in
which ‘most industries will be absorbed into the chemical industry’. This
was the beginning—proclaimed a Fortune magazine headline in 1950—
of the ‘Chemical Century’.61
One important consequence of this petrochemical revolution was its
impact on science. With chemistry research located ever more centrally within the circuits of commodity production, the ‘chemicalization’
of industry was associated with a parallel phenomenon, more broadly
described by Harry Braverman as the ‘transformation of science itself
into capital’.62 In the us, this was expressed through the growing collaboration between industry and university chemistry departments, as well
as the increasing prominence of chemical engineering as a distinct
branch of academic research.63 Chemical engineering itself became
organized largely around the notion of ‘unit operations’, a kind of theoretical Taylorism that approached chemistry through a small number
59
See Huber, Lifeblood, Chapter 3.
Kenly Smith, ‘American Chemical Industry’, p. 169.
61
‘The Chemical Century’, Fortune, March 1950, p. 70.
62
Harry Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, New York 1974, p. 167.
63
Spitz, Primed for Success, pp. 20–1.
60
hanieh: Petrochemicals
43
of generic processes—separation, crystallization, distillation—easily
transferable across the development of new synthetic products. Large
firms became major donors of chemistry departments, often mandating
the prioritization of research connected to product development. At the
same time, chemical engineers gained increasing prominence as managers and executives of chemical firms, coming to identify ‘the scientific
transformation of America and the corporate transformation of America
[as] one and the same’.64
With science increasingly an appurtenance of business calculus, the
internal organization of firms in the chemical industry was also transformed. Historians of the industry frequently point out that the major
challenge presented by petrochemicals for business was not the act of
discovering new chemical products—this was relatively straightforward,
given the basic structure of polymers—but inventing a use for these new
chemicals. As a result, chemical firms increasingly prioritized activities
such as marketing and product commercialization. In turn, companies
began to structure themselves around individual product lines rather
than generic activities. Associated with this internal reorganization
were innovations in accounting; DuPont, for example, pioneered the
introduction of Return on Investment (roi) as an accounting measure,
a means to capture the costs of invention, marketing and revenue for
discrete products.65 And because this enabled individual units to be easily valued and then offered for sale by their parent companies, this form
of organization propelled repeated waves of consolidation in the chemical industry. Consequently, a small number of very large companies
emerged around specific product specializations.66
At the same time, a handful of basic petrochemical products such as
ethylene, propylene, benzene and toluene formed the core inputs for
64
David Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate
Capitalism, New York 1977, p. 19.
65
Alfred Chandler Jr, ‘The Competitive Performance of us Industrial Enterprises
since the Second World War’, Business History Review, vol. 68, no. 1, Spring 1994,
pp. 11–12.
66
By the 1960s, it was estimated that just 15 companies controlled most us petrochemical production: Geiser, Material Matters, p. 49. This concentration and
centralization of capital is a long-standing feature of the chemical industry. Indeed,
the 1925 formation of igf occurred because the German chemical giant basf could
not alone afford the commercialization of a newly discovered means of producing
synthetic fuels: Borkin, Crime and Punishment, p. 39.
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more complex derivative chemicals. The production of these essential
precursors was increasingly associated with huge increases in the size of
petrochemical plants, as producers sought to achieve economies of scale.
One industry expert in 1979 described the proliferation of ‘massive,
integrated industrial complexes’ where basic petrochemical production
was connected to the manufacture of more complex derivative products
through a spaghetti-like maze of pipes, tubes and specialized storage
hubs. Between 1950 and 1970, the size of such plants in the us increased
by a factor of ten, and they could take up to 42 months to construct, with
some components so large that they required on-site manufacture.67
These massive fixed-capital costs typically exceeded the capacity of individual firms and thus drove further industry consolidation through
mergers, exclusive-partnership agreements and joint ventures.68
While the basic costs of materials, fuel and machinery in the petrochemical industry were very high, the proportion of labour costs was
extremely low—indeed, considerably less than other industrial sectors.
In this respect, petrochemicals were one of the first branches of industry to exhibit what Ernest Mandel described as the ‘third technological
revolution’: almost full automation, where plants were designed around
‘automated flow systems’, integrated networks of machinery, vessels and
pipes that ran continuously with only a few workers monitoring the process.69 Indeed, the cost of labour for the petrochemical industry in the
early 1970s was calculated at significantly less than 1 per cent of total production expenses.70 As the size of petrochemical complexes increased,
67
Mark Cantley, ‘The Scale of Ethylene Plants’, International Institute of Applied
Systems Analysis Working Paper, 1979, pp. 17, 12.
68
Another structural change associated with this process was the emergence of specialized chemical engineering firms that developed petrochemical processes and
innovations in plant designs and would then license these technologies to manufacturers, rather than proprietary engineering knowledge remaining exclusively
in the hands of individual chemical firms. This innovation helped encourage the
post-war diffusion of petrochemical plants through Europe and Japan. The leading
engineering firm in this respect was the Scientific Design Company (see Spitz,
Primed, for a history), which, after numerous acquisitions, is today owned by a joint
venture of Saudi Arabia’s sabic (see below) and the Swiss multinational, Clariant.
Many of the world’s largest engineering firms such as kbr have their origins in
these activities.
69
Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, London and New York 1998, pp. 184–223.
70
Charles Levinson, Capital, Inflation and the Multinationals, London 1971,
pp. 228–9.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
45
the need for extra labour was estimated by industry analysts as ‘not significantly different from zero’. That is, at a certain size of plant, it was
theoretically possible to increase output to ‘any level by merely increasing
other inputs while holding labour at a fixed level’.71 For these reasons,
petrochemicals have consistently had higher levels of productivity than
any other branch of industry.
This higher technical composition of the petrochemical industry was a
leading element within the post-war increase in the organic composition
of capital, a fact that has gone largely unremarked in Marxist discussions over post-war profit rates. But the degree to which petrochemicals
drove the ‘replacement of living labour by dead labour’ extends far
beyond the enormous costs of constant capital (fixed and circulating)
within petrochemical plants themselves. At a more elemental level,
petrochemicals marked a qualitative shift in the nature of commodity
production: labour-intensive naturally occurring goods—often sourced
from far-flung colonial territories—were replaced by synthetic materials
that had an average necessary labour content approaching zero. This was
not simply an increase in the quantity or scale of production. Rather, use
value itself was irrevocably detached from its long-standing association
with specific exchange values: the functional attributes of wood, glass,
paper, natural rubber, natural fertilizers, soaps, cotton, wool and metals,
would now be served by plastics, synthetic fibres, detergents and other
petroleum-based chemicals.72
Moreover, the development of these synthetic materials had far-reaching
implications for other industrial sectors. By the early 1950s, a new generation of materials known as thermoplastics had become widespread.
These plastic polymers become mouldable when heated and hard when
cooled, as opposed to thermosetting plastics that keep their initial shape
permanently. With the development of injection-moulding machines
through the 1950s and 1960s, thermoplastics enabled the automated
fabrication of cheaply reproducible components that transformed whole
branches of industrial production, including the manufacture of heavy
machinery, automobiles, medicine, construction, consumer goods,
71
Cantley, ‘Scale of Ethylene’, p. 27.
This qualitative transformation in the nature of post-war commodity
production—and its enormous ecological implications—was first highlighted by
Barry Commoner in The Closing Circle and Poverty of Power, cited above.
72
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packaging and so forth.73 Akin to modern day alchemy, a bag of small
thermoplastic pellets could be transformed into any simple commodity
after the appropriate mould was set. And once a mould was in place,
there was little extra cost to manufacturing each additional item; this not
only further accelerated the expulsion of labour from a widening sphere
of commodity production, it also encouraged enormous increases in
commodity output.74
In this manner, the petrochemical revolution was inseparable from the
chronic levels of overproduction that came to mark the post-war era.
As huge quantities of new and easily reproducible synthetic goods displaced natural materials during the first decades after the War, producers
were faced with the obstacles of limited market size and the restricted
needs of the post-war consumer. Ever-accelerating quantities of waste,
inbuilt obsolescence and the ubiquitous spread of disposability became
the hallmarks of capitalist production, a situation presciently narrated
by Vance Packard in his 1960 classic, The Waste Makers. As he noted,
the solution to this dilemma was closely connected to the spectacular
expansion of another ‘new’ industry, advertising, which aimed at inculcating the mass consumer ‘with plausible excuses for buying more of
each product than might in earlier years have seemed rational or prudent.’75 But all branding needs a ‘skin’, and here advertisers turned once
again to petrochemicals for a solution. The pervasive supply of cheap
and malleable petrochemicals enabled a huge expansion in packaging
and labelling, which soon came to adorn all consumer goods. Packaging
quickly became the largest end-use for plastics and currently makes up
more than one-third of the global demand for plastics.76
Synthetic futures
Today a small number of very large firms dominate global petrochemical
production. With costs heavily dependent upon the price of crude oil
73
Geiser, Material Matters, p. 70.
As Barry Commoner pointed out in The Closing Circle, ‘If you asked a craftsman
to make you a special pair of candlesticks he would be delighted; if you asked for
two million pairs he would be appalled. Yet if you asked a plastics moulder for one
pair of candlesticks he would be appalled, but delighted if you asked for two million
pairs.’ Today, around 90 per cent of plastics are thermoplastics: Geiser, Material
Matters, p. 70.
75
Vance Packard, The Waste Makers, New York 1960, p. 23.
76
iea, ‘Future of Petrochemicals’, p. 19.
74
hanieh: Petrochemicals
47
inputs and petroleum refining, production tends to be clustered around
major oil producing sites, and most new petrochemical complexes are
joint-ventures that involve both oil majors—ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron
and bp—and more specialized chemical firms that frequently originate
in German and American militarism: Dow, DuPont and basf. The us
remains a major production zone, a position accentuated by the rise of
shale oil from 2011 onwards, which gave us-based producers access to
a ready supply of low-cost feedstocks. However, there has been a steady
decline in the relative power of long-standing Western petrochemical
companies; in 2010, 32 of the top 50 chemical producers in the world
were headquartered in North America or Europe, a figure that had
dropped to 28 by 2020.77
The most significant change to affect the global petrochemical industry
over the last decade has been the rise of China and the wider Asia region
as core zones of petrochemical production and consumption. With
China’s emergence as a key centre of global manufacturing, the country’s consumption of petrochemicals has skyrocketed. Petrochemical
consumption underlay initial Chinese production of cheap domestic
goods, furniture and clothing, thus spearheading the country’s export
dominance across markets in the rest of the world.78 In 2017, chemical
sales in China represented nearly 40 per cent of global chemical-industry
revenues, and between 2010 and 2015, China’s market grew each year at
a rate that was equivalent to the combined chemical sales of Spain and
Brazil.79 To meet this rapidly increasing consumption, China’s petrochemical production increased from 10 per cent of global petrochemical
capacity in 2000 to a staggering 37 per cent in 2017; over this same
period, Europe’s share of global capacity fell from 20 per cent to 12 per
cent, and North America’s from 25 per cent to 14 per cent.80 Nearly 30
per cent of the world’s increase in petrochemical capacity over the next
decade is expected to come from China, far more than for any other
producer worldwide.81
77
Alexander Tullo, ‘Global Top 50’, Chemical & Engineering News, 3 August 2009.
A similar pattern of petrochemical-led development was evident in the earlier rise
of East Asian ‘tigers’ through the 1960s and 1990s.
79
Sheng Hong et al., ‘China’s Chemical Industry: New Strategies for a New Era’,
McKinsey & Co., 20 March 2019, p. 2.
80
‘The gcc Petrochemical and Chemical Industry: Facts and Figures 2017’, Gulf
Petrochemicals & Chemicals Association (gpca), 2018, p. 27.
81
‘China to contribute 28% of global petrochemical capacity additions by 2030’,
GlobalData website, 30 October 2020.
78
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Apart from China, the region that has seen an increased share of global
production over recent years is the Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc),
a group of six Arab states that now holds 6 per cent of global petrochemical capacity, a figure that has doubled since 2000.82 Led by Saudi
Arabia, the gcc is now a leading producer of several basic petrochemicals. Foremost here is ethylene, which continues to be the world’s most
important petrochemical and forms an essential input for the manufacture of packaging, construction materials and automobile parts.83 World
consumption of ethylene doubled over the last decade, and between
2008 and 2017, the Gulf’s share of ethylene capacity grew from 11.5 to
19 per cent, the region rising from the world’s fourth to second ranked
producer, just behind North America, whose global share fell from 27
to 21 per cent.84 The gcc added more ethylene capacity than any other
region of the world over this period: indeed, since 2005, around onethird of the increase in global ethylene capacity has come from the gcc,
more than China (28 per cent), the rest of Asia (22 per cent) and the us
(13 per cent).85
The rise of China and the Gulf has pushed large state-owned firms to
the centre of the world petrochemical industry. Conspicuous examples are China’s Sinopec and Saudi Arabia’s sabic, which now rank as
the second and fourth largest petrochemical companies in the world
respectively, up from fifth and seventh places in 2007.86 The power of
these firms stems, in part, from their close linkages to the upstream
oil sector: Sinopec is directly involved in the ownership, exploration
and production of crude oil and gas, while sabic is 70 per cent owned
by Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil producer. These linkages
further illustrate the structural evolution of the global petrochemical
industry towards vertically integrated ownership of oil and gas fields,
82
gpca, ‘Facts and Figures 2017’, p. 27.
Approximately 75 per cent of the global demand for ethylene comes from these
three manufacturing activities: gpca, ‘Ethylene: A Litmus Test’, 2019, p. 2.
84
Experience Nduagu et al., ‘Economic Impacts and Market Challenges for the
Methane to Derivatives Petrochemical Sub-Sector’, Canadian Energy Research
Institute, March 2018, p. 2; Duane Dickson et al., ‘The Future of Petrochemicals’,
Deloitte, 2019, p. 4.
85
‘Rapid changes in the ethylene capacity world order’, Wood Mackenzie website,
4 December 2019.
86
Tullo, ‘Global Top 50’: in 2000 sabic was ranked as the 29th-largest chemical
company in the world, and Sinopec did not even make the list of the top 50.
83
hanieh: Petrochemicals
49
refining and chemical production. Importantly, however, while these
firms are majority state-owned, this does not mean that private capital
is absent from petrochemical production in either China or the Gulf.
Many privately owned firms are connected through joint ventures and
strategic partnerships with Sinopec and sabic, mostly focused on the
downstream production of plastics and other synthetic polymers. In
this manner, state involvement in the petrochemical sector has been
a significant driver of private capital accumulation across Asia and the
Middle East.87
Despite the substantial expansion in Chinese and Gulf petrochemical
production over the last decade, global demand for petrochemicals continues to outstrip increases in production capacity.88 This inexorable
growth in consumption has occurred across all types of petrochemicals,
but perhaps the best illustration is the most pervasive of all petroleum
products, plastics. Between 1950 and 2015, the annual global production of plastic grew nearly 200-fold, greatly eclipsing the growth of other
bulk materials such as aluminium, cement and steel. This seemingly
unstoppable demand is driven by the systematic displacement of natural
materials by plastics across many different sectors.89
87
Since 2015, China has allowed full private ownership in refining and petrochemicals, including by foreign firms. Several very large privately controlled
Chinese petrochemical firms are expanding into basic petrochemicals as well as
upstream oil production—e.g. Hengli Petrochemical, which is now ranked as the
26th largest chemical firm in the world. For an analysis of the relationship between
private and state-owned capital in the case of the Gulf’s petrochemical sector, see
Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States, London 2011; and Money,
Markets, and Monarchies: The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Political Economy of
the Contemporary Middle East, Cambridge 2018.
88
A widely used proxy for the petrochemical market is ethylene. Global capacity for
ethylene increased 30 per cent between 2008 and 2017, while consumption doubled: Dickson, ‘Future of Petrochemicals’, p. 4. Nonetheless, chronic overcapacity is
a recurrent feature of the global petrochemical industry, and the likelihood of supply gluts in key products has been accentuated given new production units planned
in China and the Gulf. As with other industrial sectors, these cycles of overcapacity
have historically been a main driver for the concentration and centralization of
capital in petrochemicals.
89
To give but one example, the production of polyester fibre recently exceeded that
of all other fibres combined, including wool and cotton, and now makes up around
60 per cent of total global fibre production; iea, ‘Future of Petrochemicals’, pp. 17,
20. Similar trends can be seen in the output of other high-volume plastics, including polyethylene, polypropylene and polyvinyl chloride.
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The growth of plastic production is accelerating—remarkably, around
half of all plastics ever made were produced in just the last twenty years.
This carries far-reaching ecological implications. Plastics are by their
very nature incompatible with normal biological cycles and can only be
disposed of by dumping, incineration or recycling. More than 90 per
cent of all plastic waste ever produced by humankind has been dumped
into the ecosystem or incinerated, both routes that release toxic materials into the environment and cause long-term and cumulative damage
to life itself.90 Today, recycling rates for plastic are at best around 20
per cent, and most plastic waste in North America and Europe ends up
being exported to Asia, where its ultimate fate is typically hard to determine. Indeed, alongside China’s role as a key global producer of plastics,
the country for several decades became the final graveyard of the world’s
plastic waste—since 1992, just under half of all global plastic waste has
been exported to China.91
The continued expansion of the production of plastics and other
petroleum-based synthetic materials is rapidly becoming the largest
factor in the growth of demand for oil. The iea estimates that petrochemicals will make up more than one-third of the growth in oil demand
to 2030 and nearly half to 2050, an amount greater than trucks, aviation or shipping—the other components of oil demand that are difficult
to replace.92 It is conceivable that some of the demand for oil and gas
as an energy source can be reduced through alternative technologies and improved energy efficiencies—such as solar, wind or electric
vehicles—but there is no way of imagining a future without oil as long as
petroleum remains the fundamental material basis of commodity production.93 This is a fact openly acknowledged by industry analysts and
90
Roland Geyer et al., ‘Production, use and fate of all plastics ever made’, Science
Advances, 19 July 2017, p. 3: ‘None of the mass-produced plastics biodegrade in any
meaningful way; however, sunlight weakens the materials, causing fragmentation
into particles known to reach millimeters or micro-meters in size’. ‘Research into
the environmental impacts of these “microplastics” in marine and freshwater environments has accelerated in recent years, but little is known about the impacts of
plastic waste in land-based ecosystems.’
91
Dickson, ‘Future of Petrochemicals’, p. 7. China banned the import of plastic
waste in 2018, and most of this trade has now been diverted to other Asian countries, with Malaysia becoming the top destination in 2020.
92
iea, ‘Future of Petrochemicals’, p. 11.
93
Moreover, chemicals are the largest industrial consumer of energy—exceeding
iron, steel and cement: iea, Future of Petrochemicals, p. 27.
hanieh: Petrochemicals
51
oil firms alike, who now speak of petrochemicals as a guarantee for ‘the
future of oil’.94
All of this points to the real problem with oil. Having become so accustomed to thinking about it as primarily an issue of energy and fuel
choice, we have lost sight of how the basic materiality of our world rests
upon the products of petroleum. These synthetic materials drove the
post-war revolutions in productivity, labour-saving technologies and
massified consumption. Birthed in war and militarism, they helped constitute an American-centred world order. Today, it is almost impossible
to identify an area of life that has not been radically transformed by the
presence of petrochemicals. Whether as feedstocks for manufacture and
agriculture, the primary ingredients of construction materials, cleaning
products and clothing or the packaging that makes transport, storage
and retail possible—all aspects of our social being are bound to a seemingly unlimited supply of cheap and readily disposable petrochemicals.
Synthetic materials derived from petroleum have come to define the
essential condition of life itself; simultaneously, they have become normalized as natural parts of our daily existence. This paradox must be
fully confronted if we are to move beyond oil.
94
Alexander Tullo, ‘Why the future of oil is in chemicals, not fuels’, Chemical &
Engineering News, 20 February 2019.