ISSN 0975-3214i
T HE I NDIAN J OURNAL
OF
I NTERNATIONAL E CONOMIC L AW
Volume 3 (1)
2010
B OARD
OF
E DITORS
Ms. Jayashree Watal
Prof. Yuji Iwasawa
Dr. CHOI, Won Mog
Dr. Andrew T. Guzman
Prof. Hans-Bernd Schäfer
Dr. Tomer Broude
Prof. Pär Hallstrom
Dr. A. Jayagovind
Dr. Tania Voon
B OARD
OF
P ATRONS
Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati
Mr. Rajiv Luthra
S TUDENT E DITORIAL B OARD
Abhimanyu George Jain
Chief Editor
Devina R. Deshpande
Convenor
Vrinda Bhandari, Surabhi Kuwelkar, Surya Kiran Banerjee
K. Aishwarya, Bhavya Mohan, Divya Shenoy, Archit Dheer
Kushal Bhimjiani
Bhishaan Anup Shah, Protiti Roy, Radhika Chitkara
Raag Yadava
Editors
Administrative Member
Administrative Assistants
Technical Member
All opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the National Law School of India
University or the Student Editorial Board of the Indian Journal of
International Economic Law. IJIEL disclaims all responsibility for the same
iiii
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iv
I NTRODUCTION
After two fulfilling years and two successful issues, in the third year of its
existence, the Indian Journal of International Economic Law has sought to
build upon its strengths and broaden its profile. IJIEL is proud to have been
the first third world perspective on international economic law in India, and
continues to be proud of its efforts to contribute to this area of law. Amongst
the many steps we have taken this year, two in particular are worthy of special
mention.
The first was the first IJIEL International Student Essay Competition. The
theme for the essays was ‘TRIPS-plus Obligations and Free Trade Agreements
with Developing Countries’, and the competition was judged by Profs. Carlos
Correa and Daniel Gervaise. Over 40 undergraduate students from around
the world registered their participation. The second was the IJIEL Special
Issue on Space Law and International Economic Law. The issue consists of
five articles on different economic and commercial aspects of international
space law, an area that, in our estimation, was not only relatively unexplored,
but also of great interest and importance.
Through these and other efforts, this year’s Student Editorial Board has
endeavoured to engage in a discussion of international economic law that
may succeed in increasing interest in and access to, international economic
law for students everywhere. This effort has carried through into the contents
of this issue.
In ‘Managing India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve: an Exploration of the SWF
Temptation’, Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty and Jaydeep Mukherjee
analyse sovereign wealth funds, their working and their obstacles, focusing
specifically on the domestic and foreign challenges facing Indian SWFs.
Akshay Kolse Patil examines the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis
in investor-state arbitration, arguing in favour of the existence of a limited
but powerful de facto rule of precedent.
Dr. A Jayagovind, Member of the Board of Editors of IJIEL, contributes a
guest article on the ‘Anti-Dumping Agreement and Exhaustion of Law
v
Remedies’, where he seeks to examine the applicability of the international
law doctrine of ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ in international economic law,
and specifically under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Dr. Jayagovind
concludes that current practice reveals a worrisome trend of immediate resort
to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
The last full length article in this issue is the winner of the 1st IJIEL International
Student Essay Competition. In ‘TRIPS through the Lens of Global Public Goods:
Are TRIPS-plus FTAs eating up all the Good there is?’, Ishupal Singh Kang
analyses TRIPS-plus obligations in FTAs with developing countries from
the global public goods perspective. This is the first article written by an
undergraduate student that is being published by IJIEL.
Concluding the issue is a case study-based analysis of the European
Commission’s application of competition law to high technology industries:
‘Article 102 and High Technology Industries: the Impact of the European
Microsoft and Intel Cases’, by Michael Reynolds and Michelle Chowdhury.
In light of recent investigations initiated against Google, this is definitely
going to be an area of increasing interest and concern.
The student editorial board of IJIEL must express its gratitude to our board of
editors, our faculty advisor – Dr. Jayagovind, and our patron and sponsor –
Mr. Rajiv Luthra and Luthra & Luthra Law Offices, without whom none of
our plans could have achieved fruition.
Abhimanyu George Jain
Chief-Editor
Devina R. Deshpande
Convenor
vi
vi
C ONTENTS
Introduction .............................................................................................. iv
Foreword
Thomas Cottier ........................................................................................... vii
A RTICLES
Managing India's Foreign Exchange Reserve: an Exploration of the
SWF Temptation
Julien Chaisse, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of
Hong Kong; Debashis Chakraborty, Assistant Professor of Economics, Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi and Jaydeep Mukherjee, Assistant
Professor of Economics, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi ..... 1
Precedents in Investor State Arbitration
Akshay Kolse Patil, Advocate, Bombay High Court ................................. 37
Anti-Dumping Agreement and Exhaustion of Law Remedies
Dr. A Jayagovind, Professor of Law, National Law School of India University,
Bangalore .................................................................................................. 66
TRIPS through the Lens of Global Public Goods: Are TRIPS-plus
FTAs eating up all the Good there is?
Ishupal Singh Kang ..................................................................................... 81
Article 102 and High Technology Industries: the Impact of the
European Microsoft and Intel Cases
Michael Reynolds, Partner, International Antitrust Group at Allen & Overy
LLP in Brussels and London and Michelle Chowdhury, Trained at Allen &
Overy LLP, now completing an LL.M. at Georgetown University .......... 90
vii
F OREWORD
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the third volume of the Indian Journal
of International Economic Law addresses issues of both trade and investment
– with the latter being predominant. Traditional issues of trade regulation
are the topic of the paper on exhaustion of remedies in anti-dumping
procedures. The papers on precedents in investment disputes and on sovereign
wealth funds relate to the problem of foreign direct investment. The
contribution addressing intellectual property and the issue of TRIPS-plus
obligations equally does so, as both protection of intellectual property and
the regulation of services in GATS inherently address investment. The same
is true for competition law where trade and investment intrinsically merge.
Trade regulation dominated the ascent of international economic law in
the first decade following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995. It
placed this field at the heart of international law thanks to WTO dispute
settlement and the impressive proliferation of case law of panels and the
Appellate Body. Current work and scholarly interests pay considerable
attention to investment issues. The present papers offer a welcome contribution
to this debate which needs to carefully address the interface of trade and
investment protection. The two fields increasingly overlap on substance while
following entirely separate procedural structures.
The past and current differences between the two fields are striking. While
trade disputes are framed by a multilateral order and transparency, investment
disputes continue to follow the traditions of 19th century ad hoc arbitration.
Neither transparency nor legal security is secured, given that there are more
than two thousand bilateral investment protection agreements. Although they
overlap, they do not share a common language or common standards. The
possibility for private companies to directly challenge governmental
regulations and action amounts to the most prominent feature and explains
the attractiveness of this avenue. Yet, the appointment of arbitrators is often
not transparent, and the role of precedents is not settled. The companies
involved often do not wish to share the outcomes with the public, contributing
to the law as a public good. For many years, access to decision and rulings
viii
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
[Vol. 3 (1)
was accidental. Yet, the most important differences relate to substantive law.
While trade rules seek an appropriate balance between trade and non-trade
concerns in the process of progressive liberalization and regulation, refined
in WTO dispute settlement, investment protection agreements primarily aim
at serving the needs and interests of investors. For those affected, the costs
can be high: governments are increasingly engaged in costly disputes, seeing
policy space in domestic policies reduced and threatened. Most of the
agreements do not provide exceptions for non-economic concerns comparable
to those within the WTO. People affected by and large depend upon
governments to defend their interests and property rights; often they see
themselves without appropriate remedies. The recent shift in foreign direct
investment from flows to the South to flows to the North, and the new
phenomenon of large-scale investment by emerging economies in particular
in Africa, calls for a review of the traditional foundations of investment
protection law. There is a need to broaden the scope of interests taken into
account, ranging from non-economic goals to property rights and human
rights. There is a need to take into account environmental concerns, in
particular those relating to the complex regulatory issues of climate change.
There is a need to find ways and means to prevent disputes arising in the first
place and to reinforce the bargaining tools not only for those benefitting, but
also for those being affected, by foreign direct investment.
The task ahead consists in bridging the conceptual gaps between trade
and investment, and in bringing about greater coherence between these two
main fields of international economic law. It is pleasing to see that the Indian
Journal of International Law has embarked on this journey. It can play an
important role in the upcoming debate.
Professor Thomas Cottier
Managing Director
World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland
2010]
1
Managing India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve:
An Exploration of the SWF Temptation
Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty and Jaydeep Mukherjee1
A BSTRACT
Despite increasing inclination towards market liberalization and privatization observed over
the last decade,2 the role of States has, in this period of time arguably grown in importance in
some particular aspects of investment. Notably, investments from emerging economies have
increased, and a large proportion of which was executed by State-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Both forms of investments originate from State ownership
and State activity, and are thus regularly referred to as investments by “state-controlled
entities” (SCEs).
Investment through the SWF route is not a recent phenomenon, but has been in operation for
around five decades. The purpose of SWFs is to invest surplus State reserves in foreign currency
to yield profits. The funds improve the liquidity of the financial markets, create long term
growth and jobs and ensure stability for the companies they invest in. These responsible and
reliable investors have pursued a long-term, stable policy that has certainly stood the test
during the recent turmoil in the financial markets.
SOEs are particularly important in emerging and transitioning economies such as China,
India, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Czech Republic and Russia. Many SOEs are listed on the
Fortune Global 500 list. Chinese SOEs figure most frequently in this listing, and count for 24
spots on the same. Due to the significance of foreign direct investment by Chinese SOEs, their
characteristics have received particular attention.3 By far the largest outward investments by
1
2
Dr Julien Chaisse is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
This paper is part of his research on ‘the evolving international investment regime’. The author can
be contacted at: julien.chaisse@cuhk.edu.hk. Debashis Chakraborty is Assistant Professor of
Economics at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi. He can be contacted at:
debchakra@gmail.com. Jaydeep Mukherjee is Assistant Professor of Economics at the Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi. He can be contacted at: jaydeepm74@gmail.com . The
views expressed by the authors here are personal.
The recent economic crisis is however underlining the role to be played by the national Governments
in no uncertain terms.
2
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
[Vol. 3 (1)
Chinese MNEs are made by SOEs, and all investment projects follow a scheme that ensures
that they are strictly in line with government policies. The motivations of Chinese firms to
internationalize and the government interest in this effort are to a large extent aligned and
institutionally intertwined.
This paper attempts to analyse the trends in SWF investment and the main obstacles they face.
In particular, the analysis focuses on the major potential challenges for Indian SWFs, in case
they come into existence. The analysis is arranged along the following lines. First the global
SWF experience is reviewed, followed by the possibility of creating Indian SWFs. The
subsequent analysis intends to identify the main regulations in the EU and the US markets that
Indian SWFs might face. These regulations might function as potential obstacles in the sense
that they incorporate conditions for any investment to enter their domestic markets. The
analysis will then focus on the multilateral (IMF) guidelines on SWFs,4 which might, as well be
perceived as an obstacle. However complying with these multilateral rules could be
advantageous for Indian SWFs, if these regulations help them to avoid the EU and US obstacles
to investment. On the basis of the analyses with respect to legal perspective, the policy
conclusions on Indian investment strategies are drawn.
C ONTENTS
I.
TRENDS IN SOVEREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE WORLD ....................................... 3
A. Towards An Indian SWF? ............................................................... 5
B. Pros and Cons ................................................................................ 10
C. Possible characteristics of the Indian SWF .................................. 16
II.
THE REGULATORY OBSTACLES AN INDIAN SWF WOULD FACE .................. 18
A. The regulation of SWF in the United States ................................ 21
B. The regulation of SWF in the European Union ........................... 23
C. Multilateral rules: obstacles or opportunities? ............................ 27
III. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 30
ANNEX 1: A SUMMARY OF THE 24 GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES (GAPP) ................................................................................ 32
3
4
P. Gugler and B. Boie, The Rise of Chinese Multinational Enterprises, EXPANSION OF TRADE AND FDI
IN ASIA: STRATEGIC AND POLICY CHALLENGES 25-57 (J. Chaisse et al. eds., 2009).
The IMF principles detailed below are not regulations in the strict sense of the term but rather
they offer guidelines covering governance, accountability, transparency, and conduct of investments
for SWFs.
2010]
I. T RENDS
MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
IN
S OVEREIGN I NVESTMENTS
IN THE
3
W ORLD
SWFs can be defined as pools of investment capital (whatever may be the
legal form of the SWF: private or public) controlled by a government or central
bank and invested in economic activities in other countries. The source of this
capital is foreign exchange reserves, which all governments keep (typically in
widely traded currencies such as the Dollar, Euro, or Yen). When there is a
surplus current account balance those reserves can be put into an investment
fund and used to increase national wealth or diversify sources of revenue.
Sovereign wealth funds have come into the spotlight, especially since
2007 when China declared its intention to invest USD 3 billion of its fund
reserves in private holding companies. The SWFs have raised concerns about
financial stability, corporate governance, and political interference and
protectionism.5 Interestingly, it is observed that the funds for many Merger
and Acquisition (M & A) transactions originate from potential geopolitical
rivals. Currently SWFs and central banks with a large SWF function manage
an estimated USD 3.2 trillion of assets.
It is however important to put SWFs into perspective with other existing
investment options. In 2006, by comparison, global stock market capitalisation
was USD 42 trillion, while the market value of private debt securities was
USD 23 billion. The importance of SWFs in global capital markets is expected
to grow, mainly because of high oil prices, the relative weakness of the US
dollar and the persistent current account surpluses in China and certain other
Asian countries.6 The idea here is that a country can establish its SWF only if
5
6
It should be borne in mind that SWFs usually lack structures that are transparent and management
processes that are domestically and internationally accountable. They work in an opaque way.
SWFs do not publish statistics on their composition and size or their investments and strategies.
Another concern is that management of SWFS may be motivated by “nationalistic considerations”
and not only made in search of investment opportunities that yield optimal risk-adjusted rates of
return as suggested by classical economic theories. See J. Chaise and P. Gugler, Investment
Regulation: Is Fragmentation further Increasing in the Light of Emerging Investment Issues? THE
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION – 12 ESSAYS ON ACHIEVING COHERENCE (T. Cottier
et al. eds., 2010).
A. Blundell-Wignall,Y. Hu, and J. Yermo, Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues 14 OECD
WORKING PAPERS ON INSURANCE AND PRIVATE PENSIONS. 6-7 (2008).
4
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[Vol. 3 (1)
it has surplus foreign currency. Looking at the data on SWFs it is observed
that the surplus is generated through two channels7 On one hand, UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Norway, Russia etc. set up SWFs from their oil revenue. On
the other hand, the SWFs of China, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand etc.
depend on their non-commodity export earnings.
In 2007, Morgan Stanley predicted that SWFs may manage USD 12 trillion
by 2015.8 Global Insight announced in 2008 that SWFs have been growing by 24
per cent annually for the past three years.9 Projecting from this annual growth
rate, Global Insight forecasted that SWFs will surpass the entire current economic
output of the United States by 2015, and that of the European Union by 2016. In
2010, Preqin Special Report on Sovereign Wealth Funds gave an updated
assessment of SWF growth. The start of a global economic recovery has helped
the aggregate assets under management of all SWFs to reach $3.59 trillion, which
represents a 11% increase from last year. The picture is striking- despite the
global economic and financial crisis, SWFs have retained their influence.10
As a result of the financial crisis, the US market remains an attractive
option for the emerging economy SWFs (especially China). This has become a
matter of concern there, the most prominent being the fear of foreign government
investment for the wrong reasons like threatening national security. The
concerns expressed in the US are known and shared by the EU. Owing to the
geographic proximity, however, Europeans are perhaps more concerned about
Russia. This explains to some extent the different perceptions on the two sides
of the Atlantic and the differences in terms of regulatory approach.
Four issues are generally important in relation with SWFs. First, the role
of investing governments is often called into question. Second, the lack of
transparency of SWFs is another area of concern. Third, the alleged political
motivations behind SWF operations represent a major clash. Finally, from a
political economic standpoint, there is certainly a difficulty for developed
countries in accepting a shift in the balance of power in the world economy
to new emerging market giants.11
7
8
9
10
11
The data is obtained from Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php.
S. Jen, How big could Sovereign Wealth Funds be by 2015? MORGAN STANLEY (May 4, 2007).
The details can be obtained from http://www.globalinsight.com/.
See Preqin, Special Report on Sovereign Wealth Funds 190 (2010).
G. Lyons, State Capitalism: The rise of sovereign wealth funds LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE
AMERICAS 14 ((2008).
2010]
MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
5
A. Towards An Indian SWF?
The idea of an Indian SWF was not conceivable in the eighties or the
nineties, owing to the relatively low level of overall foreign exchange reserve
(FER) of the country and the consistent adverse current account balance during
that period. The overall level of FER was quite low and fluctuating in the
eighties. Owing to this reason, investment outflow was never actively
encouraged. The situation reached an all time low in 1989-90 with an FER of
USD 3962 Million. The FER scenario improved to some extent with increase
in gold reserves in the next year, but the foreign currency asset holding
declined, which offset the effect partially. The transition towards an outwardoriented economic policy was adopted subsequently, which resulted in an
increase in FERs, but has been followed by a simultaneous decline in India’s
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) reserves since then. India’s FER scenario is
graphically represented below in Figure 1.
Figure 1. India’s Nominal and Real Foreign Exchange Reserves
from 1990-91 to 2008-09
Source : Drawn with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10)
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[Vol. 3 (1)
Since mid-nineties as exhibited in Figure 1, India’s FER – both nominal
and real, adjusted for price level – started growing considerably, and reached
a new peak in 2006-07 at USD 199179 Million. India’s foreign currency
reserves are currently ranked the World’s fourth-largest. Besides, the level
of exports increased considerably during late nineties and as a result during
2001-02 to 2003-04, the country’s current account balance was in surplus.
Though, in the following period, India’s current account balance turned
negative again, the capital account balance was always surplus in the new
millennium, which helped the overall balance of payments in remaining
emphatically positive.
It is worthwhile to note that during 2007-08 the Rupee had appreciated
vis-à-vis the Dollar by more than 10%. This increased the return earned in
foreign exchange, when rupee assets were sold and the revenue converted
into dollars. The investments turned even more attractive and it triggered an
investment spiral. This availability of investible funds in the economy paved
the way for outward investment opportunities and the government
encouragement to the same should be interpreted in this background.
Thus, the overall picture has been one of secular growth since 1990,
interposed by a noticeable acceleration of Reserves buildup since 2002.
However, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008
and the ensuing global financial crisis, there has been significant amount of
capital outflow,12 resulting in a sharp decline in India’s FER, both real and
nominal.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of FER relative to the GDP. The reserves–GDP
ratio shows a similar pattern as the absolute amount of reserves; a continual
increase, which partly echoes India’s economic growth over time. However,
unmistakably, the ratio declines in the aftermath of the recent global financial
crisis.
12
Although the recent global financial crisis started with the busting of housing bubble in US, US
financial markets continue to be of crucial importance to the rest of the world: more than $4
trillion of reserves are held in US currency. With global financial crisis, there is a ‘flight to safety’
and investors all over the world are buying US treasury bills even at near zero interest rates.
Economists argue that a lack of financial development at home makes foreigners keener to invest
in America. What attracts them is the size, liquidity, efficiency and transparency of its financial
markets compared with what is on offer in their domestic markets.
2010]
MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
7
Figure 2: Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to GDP
Source : Drawn with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10)
In the new millennium, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) undertook a
number of steps for increasing the flow of private outward investments in
order to maintain macroeconomic stability, which helped the Indian corporate
houses significantly.13 For instance, the 2003-04 budget of the Government
smoothened overseas investment norms for corporate houses by allowing
prepayment of External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) of over US$100
million.14 In the subsequent period, April, 2005, the limit to overseas
investment under the automatic route was increased from 100 percent of the
net worth of the Indian entity to 200 percent.15 In June 2007, the limit of
overseas investment was further increased to 300 per cent of net worth and
further to 400 per cent of net worth in September 2007.16 Soon thereafter, the
RBI further relaxed the overseas investment norms for mutual funds and
amended the remittance opportunities through various policies. 17
13
14
15
16
17
World Investment Report 2007 UNCTAD (Geneva, 2007).
The Budget Speech of the Minister of Finance, Government of India (2003-2004), http://
indiabudget.nic.in/ub2003-04/bs/speecha.htm.
Chronology of Major Policy Announcements: April 2005 – July 2006 ANNEX IV IN ‘RBI ANNUAL
REPORT’ OF THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA 250-266 (2006).
Lakhwinder Singh and Varinder Jain, Emerging Pattern of India’s Outward Foreign Direct
Investment Under the Influence of State Policy: A Macro View MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE
(2009), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13458/1/MPRA_paper_13458.pdf.
Investment by Mutual Funds in Overseas Securities - Liberalisation of RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RBI/
2006-07/88, A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 3 (July 26, 2006); Liberalised Remittance Scheme of
USD 50,000 for Resident Individuals RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RBI/2006-2007/216, A.P. (DIR Series)
Circular No. 24, (December 20, 2006).
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
8
[Vol. 3 (1)
Subsequently, RBI has increased the overseas investment limit for the mutual
funds to US$ 5 billion from the earlier level of US$ 4 billion.18 Moreover,
the limit on overseas portfolio investment by Indian companies was increased
by RBI from 35 percent of their net worth to 50 percent of their net worth in
September 2007.19 The Export Import Bank of India also supported more than
200 outward investment ventures by 164 Indian companies in over 50
countries.20
As a result of the reforms undertaken in India, the volume of outward
investment flows has increased considerably over the years, as can be observed
from Figure 3. It is learnt from the RBI documents that India’s total
investments in joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) abroad
reached US$ 23.07 billion (with 2261 proposals) in 2008 as compared to the
corresponding figure of US$ 15.06 billion (with 1817 proposals) in 2007.21
Figure 3 : Comparing FDI Inflow and Outflow Figures for India
(US $ Million)
(Source : Calculated from the data provided in Singh and Jain (2009)
18
19
20
21
Indian Investment Abroad in Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries RESERVE BANK OF
INDIA, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=10364 .
Overseas Direct Investment- Liberalisation, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA RBI/2007-08/148, A. P. (DIR
Series) Circular No.11 (September 26, 2007).
Developing Countries: Globalisation through Overseas Investment WORLD BANK (2008), http://
www.fdi.net/documents/WorldBank/databases/india/EXIM07.pdf .
Indian Investments Abroad INDIA BROAD EQUITY FOUNDATION (2008), http://www.ibef.org/economy/
indianinvestmentsabroad.aspx.
2010]
MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
9
Looking at the investment flows in the Indian private sector, it is observed
that the investment flows has been directed towards energy sources, metal
(e.g. - steel, aluminium), pharmaceuticals, IT, banking, industrial products
etc., and spanned over various continents. The energy sector has been the
maximum receiver of Indian investment, till date. For instance, Essar
Exploration & Production (EEPL) has recently bought two offshore petroleum
exploration blocks in Australia, and this is first time such initiative being
shown by an Indian oil company.22 In September 2007, Reliance Industries
had bought a majority stake of East African oil retailer Gulf Africa Petroleum
Corporation (GAPCO), which owned and operated large storage facilities
and a retail distribution network in several East African countries.23 In Latin
America, Venezuela’s State-owned oil company PDVSA has recently entered
into an agreement with an Indian oil company.24 Moves to acquire stakes in
the retail businesses of BP, Europe’s largest oil company in Malaysia and
Singapore have also been considered.25
Apart from the private sector, the State supported public sector has also
played a key role in ensuring investment in energy sector. The Indian OilOil India combine recently procured three onshore oil blocks in Libya, in
addition to the two blocks they already were operating in.26 Oil and Natural
Gas Commission (ONGC) and Videsh Ltd (OVL) have won an oil block in
Colombia through auction as part of a consortium.27 The presence of Indian
firms in Africa is also to be noted, as ONGC (24 percent stake) with Malaysian
state oil firm Petronas (68 percent stake) enteres into a $400 million agreement
22
23
25
26
27
Essar Exploration buys two oil blocks in Australia 14(1) ALEXANDER’S GAS AND OIL CONNECTIONS
COMPANY NEWS (January 29, 2009), http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cns90490.htm.
Reliance Industries buys out GAPCO Group in East Africa INDIA BUSINESS REVIEW (September 5,
2007), http://www.indiabusinessview.com/2007/09/reliance-industries-buys-out-gapco.html24
Joe Duarte, Peak Oil - Venezuela: Slowly Turning Off the Tap Toward the US FINANCIAL SENSE
EDITORIALS, (April 22, 2006), http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/duarte/2006/0422.html.
Saritha Rai, Asia: India: Oil Bid Planned, (February 3, 2004), THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C00E7DC143BF930A35751C0A9629C8B63.
Indian Oil-Oil India win 3 onshore oil blocks in Libya THE ECONOMIC TIMES (December 14, 2007),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Oil__Gas/Indian_OilOil_India_win_3_onshore_oil_blocks_in_Libya/articleshow/2623110.cms .
Piyush Pandey, OVL consortium bags Colombia oil block, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, (November 13,
2008), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/News_By_Industry/Energy/Oil__Gas/
OVL_consortium_bags_Colombia_oil_block/articleshow/3706744.cms .
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to develop Thar Jath oil fields in Sudan for to an initial capacity of 80,000
barrels per day.28
One interesting feature has been the initial competition between China
and India in oil exploration in Africa and Central Asia. China National
Petroleum Corportation (CNPC) at one point purchased oilfields in
Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Nigeria, which ONGC was also interested in getting
into at the time.29 However, cooperation between the two sides was noticed
subsequently as in December 2005 companies from the two countries
successfully bought the Al-Furat oilfields in Syria. Later, the two countries
attempted to finalize modalities of future cooperation between OVL and the
CNPC, which may pave the way for joint biddings in future.30 The presence
of SWFs may come beneficial in that scenario.
B. Pros and Cons
India over the last few years has witnessed a stable macroeconomic regime
until the recent global economic downturn and its growth scenario has been
comparable only with China over this period. It is observed from the Economic
Survey (2007-08) that while the annual GDP growth rate in 2002-03 was 3.8
percent, the same has consistently been over 7 percent for the last five years
before the global meltdown. In particular the GDP growth rate during 200506 and 2006-07 has been 9.4 and 9.6 percent respectively, the service sector
being the largest contributor to this growth. This unprecedented growth
scenario has fuelled both gross domestic savings and gross domestic capital
formation (investment) significantly. While the gross capital formation
expressed as a ratio of GDP has increased from 22.8 percent in 2001-02 to
35.9 percent in 2006-07, gross domestic savings has increased from 23.5
percent of the GDP to 34.8 percent over the same period. The inflation
fluctuated over this period, and increased considerably at times, but as a whole
28
29
30
Sudan inks oil field deal with ONGC consortium FINANCIAL EXPRESS (March 29, 2005), http://
www.financialexpress.com/news/Sudan-inks-oil-field-deal—with-ONGC-consortium/130731/ .
China, India for joint Kazakh oil bid, CHINA DAILY (June 11, 2006), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
china/2006-06/11/content_613810_2.htm .
Siddharth Varadarajan, India, China, and The Asian Axis Of Oil, THE HINDU (January 26, 2006),
http://www.countercurrents.org/po-varadarajan260106.htm.
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
11
remained within controllable limits. The export growth rate has however
suffered to some extent in recent periods, owing to the appreciation of the
Indian Rupee vis-à-vis the American dollar. This favourable macroeconomic
scenario resulting in the unprecedented level of FER perhaps prompted the
Indian Government to think of a hitherto unexplored investment strategy for
boosting growth rate further.
In spite of strong macroeconomic fundamentals, India’s balance of payment
on its current account has mostly been negative. However, following
liberalization in the 1990s (precipitated by a balance of payment crisis), India’s
exports increased for some time, covering 80.3 percent of its imports in 2002–
03, up from 66.2 percent in 1990–91. However as of 2008-09, the ratio stood
at 61.40 percent.31 At the same time substantial inflows of foreign capital in
the form of FPI and FDI explain India’s unprecedented accumulation of FER
buildup to the tune of USD 251985 million in 2008-09. According to
economists, there are usually two main motives behind such buildup: the
precautionary motive and the mercantilist motive. According to the first
explanation, like many Asian economies, following the East Asian currency
crisis of 1997-98, Indian Government followed a protectionist approach to
safeguard against sudden shortage of international liquidity, by accumulating
a large volume of FER. The second explanation says that India’s soaring
reserves are an indicator of the country’s overdependence on trade and capital
inflows as engines of growth (Park and Estrada, 2009).32
Following Park and Estrada (2009)33 one may use two measures of reserve
adequacy to examine whether India has too much reserve buildup and hence
‘surplus’ reserves. One of the measures of India’s susceptibility to currency
crisis is the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt. According to the socalled Greenspan-Guidotti rule,34 the critical value of this ratio is one, with a
31
32
33
34
Calculated from India’s trade data.
D. Park, and G. Estrada, Developing Asia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds and Outward Foreign Direct
Investment, 26(2) ASIAN DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 57–85 (2009).
Id.
The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti – Argentine former Deputy Minister of Finance – and Alan
Greenspan – former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. Guidotti first
stated the rule in a G-33 seminar in 1999, while Greenspan widely publicized it in a speech at the
World Bank. Guzman Calafell and Padilla del Bosque found that the ratio of reserves to external
debt is a relevant predictor of an external crisis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guidotti–
Greenspan_rule.
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value below that signaling danger. The rationale is that countries should have
enough reserves to overcome a massive withdrawal of short term foreign capital.
The second indicator of reserve adequacy is the ratio of reserves to M3 or
broad money. This ratio is especially relevant for countries like India that
are a haven for ‘hot money’ investments by large foreign institutional investors
and hence are subject to a major risk of capital flight. The higher the ratio,
the greater is the confidence of the general public in the value of the local
currency and hence the lower the risk of capital flight from the country. Park
and Estrada (2009) suggested a critical value in the range of 5 to 20 percent as
a measure of reserve adequacy.
Figure 4 presents a diagrammatic representation of in the time-series
value of the two ratios from 1990-91 till 2008-09. Column 2 shows that India
comfortably passes the Greenspan-Guidotti test of reserve adequacy as the
ratio of reserves to short-term external debt exceeding one in all the years
since 1991-92.
Figure 4: Ratio of reserves to short-term external debt
Source : Ratios Calculated with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10)
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
13
Column 3 exhibits that the ratio of reserves to M3 or broad money is
above 20 percent for all the years since 2002-03. Thus, a look at both these
ratios indicate too much of reserves buildup for the Indian economy
particularly since 2002, suggesting thereby that India has substantial amount
of surplus reserves.
Figure 5: Ratio of reserves to M3 or broad money
Source : Ratios Calculated with data obtained from RBI (2009 -10)
Since 2008 the possibility of creation of an Indian SWF has been floated
at times, although the same is yet to be constituted. The idea of strategic
investment in overseas debt and equity markets has been supported on the
ground that it will enable Indian firms in their acquisition drive on one hand
and enable higher return on accumulated foreign exchange reserves on the
other. The Prime Minister’s Advisory Council on Trade and Industry has
recently recommended the creation of a SWF with an initial corpus of $5
billion.35 It has been argued that the creation of such a fund would boost
domestic economic growth.36 While the huge volume of FER has prompted
35
36
Gaurav Choudhury, RBI not keen on managing sovereign wealth fund HINDUSTAN TIME (August 18,
2008).
Finance Ministry May Approve $5 Billion Fund for India SWF INSTITUTE (February 21, 2008) http:/
/www.swfinstitute.org/fund/india.php .
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the Council to come out with such a recommendation, the fiscal deficit (3.4
percent of GDP in 2006-07) and a widening current account deficit (1.58
percent of GDP in 2006-07) has perhaps prompted the Indian Government to
move cautiously in this regard.
Because of the democracy in India, the Government would be accountable
for the fund’s performance and would face constant pressure of managing
dynamic risks involved with a SWF.37 The transparency and accountability
that go with a democracy are not a convincing argument against having a
SWF. Many democracies have very successful, accountable, and transparent
SWFs including Norway, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Alaska).
The increasing inclination of India towards SWFs in the recent period is
becoming evident through the perspectives of policymakers in different
forums. Carl Linaburg, Co-Founder and Vice President of the Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute, noted that the Governor of the RBI has recently
mentioned during a speech in Washington that India is indeed interested in
creating a variant of SWF in the coming future. It is expected that the SWF
would function as a reserve investment corporation, and try to earn higher
returns through diversifying into equity investments rather than lower risk
investments such as treasury bonds.38
However, the justification of India’s recent inclination towards SWFs
has been questioned by a section of professionals and economists. One major
cost of reserve accumulation is that it is inflationary. When the RBI issues
domestic currency to purchase foreign currency, it increases the monetary
base, which in turn leads to inflation. Although the RBI uses a sterilization
mechanism to neutralize such inflationary effect and through open market
sale of bonds, it puts pressure on interest rate and hence on Government’s
fiscal prudence.
It is argued that India’s achievements in sectors such as infrastructure,
education basic health care are still innocuous as compared to China and
37
38
India not in a good position to start SWF EXCESS LIQUIDITY (February 12, 2008), http://
sovereignwealthfunds.wordpress.com/category/sovereign-wealth-funds/ .
Carl Linaburg, India might create reserve investment corporation (2008), http://
www.swfinstitute.org/news/apreight.php .
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
15
other economies currently having SWFs. Moreover, the country possess a limited
natural resource endowment and the current account deficit is quite high. In these
circumstances, returns on well-picked domestic investments should match the
same earned by corresponding SWF returns. It is also argued that the SWFs take
time to mature in terms of investment decisions,39 and that in the learning stage
they are susceptible to mistakes just like the financial companies.
India has however made its choice clear in recent period, when it decided
to create room for investing the FER in infrastructure projects abroad. For
this purpose, India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited has been set up
as a wholly owned subsidiary in London in 2008. The subsidiary will borrow
up to US $ 5 billion from RBI by issuing US-dollar denominated bonds and
will lend the resources to Indian infrastructure companies for meeting their
capital expenditures outside India (Economic Survey, 2009-10).
Another major criticism against the possible establishment of a SWF by
India highlights the potential volatility of the FER and the global capital
markets, especially in the face of the economic downturn. The investments
in the global market in general are risky, and a consequence even the SWF
investments would be such. Moreover, the idea of floating SWFs has been
guided by massive FER in recent years. While the average annual FER growth
rate was 9.66 percent over 1995-96 to 2000-01, the same has increased to
30.15 percent from 2001-02 to 2006-07. Over 2001-02 to 2006-07, the FER
has increased by more than 145 billion. Now if the global economic downturn
continues and the FER stock depletes, the future of the SWF venture may not
be very bright.
The Asian Development Bank in 2008 noted that in the traditional SWFs,
countries like Norway and the Gulf states have mostly invested their oil export
revenues through the fund. On the other hand, the newly created SWFs in
Asia (e.g. - China and Singapore) are mostly relying on conventional current
account surpluses derived from non-resource exports for investment.40 Given
39
40
Should India Set up a Sovereign Wealth Fund? It’s a Bad Idea INDIA KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (March
27, 2008), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4272.
Donghyun Park, Developing Asia’s New Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Financial Stability 1
ADB BRIEFS (2008), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Briefs/ADB-Briefs-001-Sovereign-WealthFunds.pdf .
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the fact that India’s current account balance has worsened in the last couple
of years, it could be noted that Indian SWF would not belong to either group.
On the other hand, the increase in India’s FER has been caused by speculative
capital inflows on the capital account. Hence, it is argued that the amount
needs to be considered as ‘liabilities’ created by sound domestic macro
conditions and the global liquidity boom but not as ‘sovereign wealth’. In
other words, the reserve is very much exposed to potential sudden outflows
by foreign investors and any decision should be taken keeping this perspective
into account.41
Apart form the economic criticisms, the possibility of the existence of
SWF should also be understood in terms of the political scenario in India.
The experience of Capital Account Convertibility (CAC) should be taken as a
parallel here. The Tarapore Committee report on CAC in 1997 recommended
introduction of CAC in India. However, the Southeast Asian crisis delayed
the same. Even a decade after the debate on introduction of CAC was initiated
by the Prime Minister of India the required policy change was not witnessed.42
It is to be noted that the previously elected coalition Government was then
receiving support from conservative Left parties. After completion of the
general election in 2009, the new government was not dependent on the Left
parties for support, and was in a better position to negotiate new financial
policies. Hence, the idea of creating an Indian SWF may eventually materialize
in coming days.
C. Possible characteristics of the Indian SWF
Given the fact that the policymakers have expressed their willingness to
realize an Indian SWF in recent years, three issues needs to be taken into
account to understand the coverage and depth of a potential SWF in the future.
The first issue would be the potential size of such an SWF; second, the
investment strategies to be adopted by the SWF; and finally, the management
pattern of the newly created SWF.
41
42
Arpitha Bykere, Cost of India’s Burgeoning Foreign Exchange Reserves: What to Do With So
Many Reserves?, (March 6, 2008), http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitor-monitor/248231/
cost_of_indias_burgeoning_foreign_exchange_reserves_what_to_do_with_so_many_reserves .
Prepare road map for full rupee float: Manmohan THE HINDU (March 19, 2006), http://
www.blonnet.com/2006/03/19/stories/2006031902920100.htm.
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
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The first and foremost question in this subject is to determine the size of
the proposed Indian SWF. It is revealed from the reactions of the policymakers
at various points of time that the Government is considering creation of a
SWF with an initial corpus of US $ 5 billion. However any final decision on
that front is yet to be arrived at.43 Given the fact that currently India’s FER is
about to touch 200 billion, the figure may look meagre in that comparison in
isolation. However, it needs to be borne in mind that barely a decade back,
India’s FER was around US $ 26 billion and in 2002-03, the same was around
75 billion. The spectacular growth in the FER has been witnessed only in the
recent period fuelled by capital inflow. In that perspective, India should
perhaps start with a modest initial SWF operation of US $ 5 billion and
contemplate over the optimal size of it’s SWF a few years after the same is
operational, based on practical experience (i.e., risk uncertainty and the size
of returns).
It is generally argued that SWFs intend to manage non-commodity based
assets to increase returns on reserves. However, their investment decisions
should be based on commercial considerations and not on geo-strategic
reasons. Looking at India’s current outward investment trends, it could be
ascertained that its SWF investment strategies might keep two considerations
in mind: one, increased returns on reserves and two, ensuring energy security.
Given the oil price trends in recent times, perhaps the two may not be
completely uncorrelated from an Indian perspective. Hence, a proportion of
the newly created SWF may definitely be utilized in India’s energy security
quest. The other target areas might include iron and steel sector and other
fields where the possibility of return looks higher.
The management of SWF in the turbulent era of global slowdown has
received wider focus in recent period. Linaburg has however argued that India
is not a new player as far as SWF type operation is concerned.44 The country
has earlier created the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFC)
in 2004, which provides long-term debt for financing public private
43
44
Sovereign Wealth Fund, THEME 197 SOUTH INDIAN BANK, (2008), http://www.southindianbank.com/
UserFiles/Theme_197.pdf.
Supra note 38.
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partnership infrastructure development projects in India. The IIFC has the
experience of raising money through equity finance, currency debt raised on
the open market, debt from multilateral and bilateral institutions, foreign
currency debt through external commercial borrowings etc. All these
experiences makes IIFC an ideal body for managing the Indian SWF, once
the same is established.
It is to be noted that the RBI has welcomed the idea of setting up of a
SWF but is not keen to manage it. The argument is that the existing RBI
mandate to perform as a Central Bank might refrain it from successfully
managing the SWF type operation. It has recently suggested to the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance that a dedicated and
independent entity set up by an act of Parliament instead would be the best
forum to do so.45
Given these circumstances, perhaps the best way of managing an Indian
SWF would be to follow the RBI recommendation, and the independent entity
created for this purpose should be benefited from the experience of both the
IIFC and RBI. There should be executives from both these bodies present in
the managerial board of the Indian SWF. The newly created entity should
also have representatives from the Ministry of Finance and industry
associations.
II. T HE R EGULATORY O BSTACLES
I NDIAN SWF W OULD F ACE
AN
There are few, if any, examples of SWFs that have caused damage to
MNEs or the international financial system. Nevertheless, the newly established
SWFs such as CIC from China have led to considerable concern among experts
in international economics and finance. These concerns are mostly based on a
fear of political interference by the Chinese Government in economic exchange
and business activities rather than actual incidence of it.
The prime goal for China in establishing an SWF seems to be to make
profitable use of the foreign exchange it has accumulated as the result of
45
Supra note 35.
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
19
trade imbalances or foreign exchange intervention. Yet, other reasons may
also play an important role. Essentially, China is saving today to consume
even more in the future when China will be richer. This poses a puzzling
behaviour. China is, after all, a relatively poor but rapidly growing country,
and would possibly be better off with a higher consumption rate today. The
ultimate outcome is that the Chinese government exchanges its own bonds
for foreign assets. But this mechanical explanation fails to answer the question
why China accumulates foreign assets, rather than consuming more or even
investing more in domestic physical assets? It follows from such
argumentation that the activities of the Chinese SWF must be assumed to
also be being used for other, strategic goals: Chinese economists have argued
that the available savings could support the economic development of China
best if used to as means to acquire international technologies, brands, and
resources, and to smoothen access to international markets.46
From a macro-economic perspective, major shifts in SWF investments
could potentially disrupt global financial markets. On a national level,
politically driven investments in a country could raise national security
concerns. Furthermore, there is a possibility that China could use the CIC as
a mechanism to pursue geopolitical objectives. For example, a strategic
investment in natural resources with means that exceed those of Western
MNEs could be a step towards controlling resources in times of future
shortages. Yet, one may doubt the neutrality of State actors in a landscape
dominated by private business.
The controversy over SWFs is essentially about the interaction of two
very different concepts of the role of government in a capitalist economy,
state capitalism as opposed to market capitalism. Where elements of state
capitalism interfere in a tradition of market capitalism, a potential for abuse
or corruption may arguably be created by the greater proximity an SWF
creates between governments and the private sector. Particularly with regard
to banks and the financial sector, in which the CIC has already strongly
invested, a growing network of interlinked investments between banks and
46
See P. Gugler and B. Boie, The Rise of Chinese Multinational Enterprises EXPANSION OF TRADE AND
FDI IN ASIA: STRATEGIC AND POLICY CHALLENGES 25-57 (J, Chaisse et al. eds., 2009).
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other financial firms within China and overseas can be assumed. In practice,
CIC’s investment in companies such as Morgan Stanley may provide them
with unfair preferential access to China’s domestic financial markets, or, in
return, overseas financial firms may be put under pressure to treat Chinese
companies in global business preferentially compared to others. Neutrality
of the business sector and a level playing field for MNEs worldwide is at
stake.
The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries are currently
witnessing 14 percent of global SWF inward investments. For instance, among
the major global investors, Temasek is currently holding stakes in ICICI Bank
in India.47 Also the Norwegian Pension Fund, the world’s third largest
sovereign welfare fund, is keen to invest $2 billion in Indian bonds and
equities.48 The inflow has been caused by the absence of strong control over
foreign SWF movements. India currently does not restrict the inflow of the
SWF investments in any discriminatory manner vis-à-vis any comparable
investment made by other agencies. The Ministry of Finance has noted in
2008 that foreign SWFs do not pose any threat to India’s economic interests.49
However, the decisions to allow firms in India may sometimes be
influenced by the SWF-related provisions elsewhere. For instance, Reiche
(2008) has noted that the operation of the British Metal and mining firm
Vedanta Resources Ltd. and its subsidiaries Sterlite Industries Ltd. and Madras
Aluminum Company Ltd. have been banned in India because of their
environmental and human right violation records. Interestingly however the
ban was introduced after Vedanta’s exclusion from the Norwegian SWF.50
In response to the global stream of events, the United States maintain the
option of screening investments made on their territory. The considerable
47
48
49
50
Ming Zhang and Fan He,17(1) China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund: Weakness and Challenges CHINA
AND WORLD ECONOMY 101-116 (2009).
Economic News GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 6 (10) (2008).
Sanjiv Sankaran, No threat from sovereign wealth funds, says Finmin, (July 22, 2008), http://
www.livemint.com/2008/07/22005327/No-threat-from-sovereign-wealt.html.
Danyel Reiche, Sovereign Wealth Funds as a new Instrument of Climate Protection Policy? Study
of Norway as a Pioneer of Ethical Guidelines of Investment Policy, Working Paper No. 173,
(2008), WUPPERTAL INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE, ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY, http://www.wupperinst.org/
en/info/entwd/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/WP173e.pdf.
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
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flows of international investments occurring in Europe reflect their freer
policy regime regarding movement of capital. Because of the concerns existing
in Europe, the European institutions decided in 2008 to agree on the basic
principles that should shape the EU approach towards SWFs. A consensus
emerged towards a common approach. It has been decided not to create ex
nihilo a new mechanism of control but to rely on the existing rules of the
common market that enable Member States to derogate to the principle of
freedom of movement of capital. The next part of the paper focuses on the
regulatory mechanisms in the US and the EU.
A. The regulation of SWF in the United States
Though the earlier Bush Administration had been generally supportive
of SWF investments, concerns were expressed at times. For instance,
Christopher Cox, Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), raised concerns on the following issues:
•
At times, foreign governments may not be fully cooperative with insidertrading investigations.
•
On certain occasions, SWFs may be the beneficiaries of economic
intelligence from national security services.
The US approach since 2007 has been summarized by the former Secretary
of Treasury Paulson : Who said that “money is naturally going to gravitate
toward dollar-based assets because of the strength of our economy,” …
Paulson further noted, however, that “I’d like nothing more than to get more
of that money. But I understand that there’s a natural fear that they’re going
to buy up America.”51 This psychology has been strengthened in the aftermath
of the global economic downturn.
In the US, a specific mechanism ensures the control of SWF investments
in the national economy. Indeed, since 1988, the United States has had a legal
framework to forbid a foreign investment if it threatens to impair US national
51
Steven R. Weisman, U.S. fears overseas funds could ‘buy up America, NEW YORK TIMES (August 21,
2007).
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security. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),
an inter-agency committee chaired by the Secretary of US Treasury, takes
part in the US investment policy analysis through reviews that protect national
security while maintaining the credibility of open investment policy.
As a committee of the US executive branch, the CFIUS takes responsibility
for monitoring overseas acquisitions of 10% or more of a domestic company’s
total ownership. Critics argue that the 10% ownership threshold for reviewing
these investments is inadequate, pointing out that investors who acquire
smaller ownership shares can have a dramatic impact on a company, and on
an economy at large. Interestingly no definition of national security exists in
CFIUS.
Filing a notice with CFIUS of a foreign acquisition is voluntary and
typically done at the initiative of the parties. However, parties are motivated
to file by the fact that the law empowers CFIUS and the President to dissolve
the acquisition at any time in the future, even after an acquisition has been
completed, if a filing was not made.
After a transaction has been filed, CFIUS conducts an initial review,
utilizing the full intelligence and national security infrastructure of the US
government, based on detailed information from the parties, which frequently
receive questions and requests for clarification from CFIUS. The scope of
these reviews focus on two key thresholds:
⇒ Test 1: Is there credible evidence that the foreign interest exercising control
might take action that threatens national security?
⇒ Test 2: If yes, do laws other than the Exon-Florio and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act provide adequate and appropriate
authority for the President to protect national security?
If consensus exists that no credible threat to national security exists, or
threat has been mitigated, CFIUS decides, within 30 days, not to open a further
investigation. If threats exist, or agencies are divided in their opinion, CFIUS
conducts an investigation for an additional 45 days, after which CFIUS is
required to file a report with the President. The President will have 15 days
to make a decision whether or not to block a transaction.
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23
It is always possible to negotiate during both initial and further reviews.
It is observed that in the past, certain parties have dropped out of transactions
when CFIUS’s national security concerns have been insurmountable, made
commitments regarding the composition of the Board of Directors (adding
American citizens or guaranteeing that a Board will only be composed of
Americans), or even committed to maintain research and development in the
US. In other words, CFIUS can leverage the approval process to win
concessions that further improve and guarantee US national security.
Since 1988, foreign companies have sent CFIUS several thousand
notifications of intent to purchase US companies, but CFIUS has only
investigated a few, and of these, it has blocked only one. That case involved
the purchase by the China Aviation Technology Import-Export Corporation
(the import-export arm of Beijing’s Ministry of Aerospace), of MAMCO, a
privately-owned, Seattle-based manufacturer of civilian aircraft parts. CFIUS’s
actual impact however may be greater, since many firms withdraw their offers
if it looks like CFIUS may investigate them.
B. The regulation of SWF in the European Union
It is often argued that an EU committee on foreign investments is required
to mirror arrangements in the US, for an EU-wide screening mechanism or
some “golden shares”52 mechanism for non-EU foreign investment. Such a
mechanism is not anticipated at the European level. The internal debate
experienced on this area within the EU had different aims from those of the
US. There is a clear consensus of EU institutions towards a common approach.
The European Commission took the initiative in a communication released
in February 2008, which was supported by the European Council and the
European Parliament later in the year.
52
These are non-standard shares, the ownership of which confers special rights on the holder.
Recent landmark decisions of the ECJ regarding compatibility of “golden shares” with EC law are
a clear indication that the concept of “golden shares” violates one of the four fundamental freedoms
conferred on individuals by the EU Treaty, namely the free movement of capital. According to
case law of the ECJ rules governing “golden shares”, an actual exercise of any rights attached to a
“golden share” by any public body must be based on criteria of non-discrimination and an effective
legal remedy has to be guaranteed. The judgments do not present a straightforward prohibition of
“golden shares”, however, they set out strong limits on their application. See European Court of
Justice, Commission v Netherlands, C-282/04 (September 28, 2006).
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In February 2008, the Commission presented a communication entitled
‘A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds’.53 In common
with all the Commission Communications documents, this text is one with
no legal significance sent by the Commission to the other European
institutions. The aim of the Commission is to set out new programmes and
policies. According to this 2008 communication, new legislative measures
at Community level are unnecessary. The common approach recommended
by the Commission was based on five principles:
-
commitment to an open investment environment,
-
support of multilateral work,
-
use of existing instruments,
-
respect of EC Treaty obligations and international commitments,
-
and finally, proportionality and transparency.
The Commission is thus seeking to avoid legislative action and envisages
soft measures, such as guidelines, accompanied by efforts at the international
level to increase transparency of SWFs. It is important to note that the
Commission’s communication is recommending the common European
approach as a complement to the prerogatives of Member States regarding
the use of their national legislation.
The Council took over the ideas set out by the Commission, clarifying, in
particular, two principles out of the initial five, along the following lines.
•
On the one hand, rather than expressing its support for the multilateral
approach in general, it preferred to express its position specifically on the
work under way in the IMF and the OECD.
•
On the other hand, rather than referring to the use of the existing
instruments, and once again taking a more general approach, the Council
thought it more appropriate to adopt as a basic principle the use of national
instruments and EU instruments, if necessary.
53
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A common European approach
to Sovereign Wealth Funds, COM/2008/0115 final (February 27, 2008).
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MANAGING INDIA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE
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The European Council supported the objective of agreeing at the
international level on a voluntary Code of Conduct for SWFs and defining
principles for recipient countries at the international level. In this respect,
they reiterated the EU’s “support for the ongoing work in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD”. In any event, this is a clear rejection
of a European wide screening mechanism that would echo the system in the
United States.
The most important measure with respect to potential obstacles to SWFs’
investment in the EU is Article 58 EC. It stipulates that the Member States
have the right to put in place restrictions on grounds of public order or public
security. A Member State is entitled to restrict Treaty freedoms on the basis
of legitimate national security concerns. Free movement of capital, unlike
the other freedoms of movement established by the EC Treaty, does not apply
solely between Member States. It also prohibits restrictions on the movement
of capital between Member States and third countries. This is true in respect
of all investments, be they from SWFs, State-controlled companies, private
companies or others. Furthermore a number of Member States have measures
in place that, for example, restrict investments in the defence sector.
It needs to be emphasized here that the list of justification measures in
Article 58(1)(b) EC is not exhaustive. However, whatever the ground relied
on, the measure in question must be suitable for the purposes of attaining the
objective which it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to
attain it: proportionality test. The Court has also provided criteria to assess
the proportionality: national measures must aim at the protection of a
legitimate general interest and foresee strict time limits for the exercise of
opposition powers; assets or management decisions targeted must be
specifically listed.
Article 58 has never been invoked in the context of SWFs. In other words,
no Member state has ever adopted a law restricting FDI from SWFs nor has
a Member State ever enforced a decision rejecting a SWF investment arguing
as to the validity of the decision as an exception (Art. 58) to the principal of
freedom of capital movement (Art. 57).
Recent experience shows that the opacity of some SWFs risks prompting
defensive reactions. In October 2008, the Italian government announced first
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that SWFs wanting to buy shares in Italian companies should ‘generally’ stay
below 5 per cent, suggesting that a new law should be passed. This was a
reaction to the purchase by Italy’s former colony, Libya, of a 4.23 per cent
stake in the number two Italian bank UniCredit SpA.54 However, shortly after
this, Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said that while there was no need for a
threshold there was a need for transparency.55 Such a reversal should be
interpreted as an abandonment of any plans to pass a new law. On the other
hand, it possibly refers to the multilateral approach supported by the EU.
However the UK and France have already introduced legislation allowing
them to fend off investments from SWFs. Germany passed a new law that
came into force in April 2009. The Cabinet of the German Ministry for the
Economy took a decision on Foreign Trade and Investment Law on 20 August
2008.56 This decision is aimed at protecting strategic German industries from
unwanted foreign takeovers. Since April 2009, the law gives the German
federal government the right to veto any investment from non-EU or European
Free Trade Association countries (i.e. Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein
and Iceland) amounting to 25% or more of a company’s stakes, if it deems
that “public security” or “public order” is at risk.57
There is a risk of witnessing a different strategy being implemented in
each of the Member States rather than a unique policy at the EU level, which,
ultimately, would not help tackle reality. There is a need to make clear at the
European level the sectors that ought to be protected from foreign takeovers
and an attempt should be made to go beyond the existing vague criteria of
public order and public security.
54
55
56
57
G. Dinmore,Italy set to curb sovereign wealth funds FINANCIAL TIMES (October 21, 2008).
No need to cap sovereign fund holdings REUTERS AGENCY (October 23, 2008).
B. Benoit, Berlin foreign investors’ bill clears hurdle FINANCIAL TIMES (August 20, 2008), http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ac2762d6-6eff-11dd-a80a-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 .
Thirteenth Act amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments
Regulation (April 18, 2009). Based on the US model, Germany’s plans could lead to further
attempts across the 27-Member EU aimed at blocking foreign investment incursions into sensitive
industries. US inspiration is obvious as foreign investors can now pre-notify the German
administration, on a voluntary basis, before an intended acquisition to obtain legal certainty. Under
Germany’s proposals, “public order and security” are the principal criteria for triggering a review
of foreign groups’ investment plans.
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Such a list of EU strategic sectors should be drafted, which may isolate
energy, technologies and other relevant sectors from SWF entry. In addition,
public mistrust of overseas investment and isolationist sentiment could cause
an overreaction to the question of regulation. This could have far-reaching
consequences not only financially, but also in terms of diplomatic and
economic relationships with other nations. For instance, European leaders
do not have the same policy towards Russia as they do towards the US.
As a result, there is a need to clarify the interpretation of Article 58 ECT,
which provides for restrictions on the free movement of capital on grounds
of public order. Because it has not been applied until now in the context of
SWFs, it is worthwhile ensuring that Member States will not be tempted to
make extensive use of it.
C . Multilateral rules: obstacles or opportunities?
In October 2007, the G7 Finance Ministers invited major multilateral
organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD, to launch a reflection on the
role of SWFs and on the mechanisms to address the challenges they pose.
Since the G7 summit, the activities in the IMF and OECD have been running
in parallel but do not deal with exactly the same themes. They are however
generally described as complementary.
OECD has finished its work in 2009, and the playing field has not been
changed. The IMF agreed on a set of 24 voluntary principles for the funds to
follow and to ensure their competitiveness in global financial markets. These
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) or “Santiago Principles”
were released on 11 October 2008 and appeared in Annex 1. A bit earlier, the
pioneering work of Edwin Truman, which provides a basis for evaluating the
results of the IMF-sponsored dialogue, chalked out a blueprint for SWF best
practices.58
The drive by the US and the EU to draw up the code of best practices,
including a renunciation of political motives, has stirred resentment among
58
Edwin Truman, A blueprint for SWF best practices, Number PB08-3 PETERSON INSTITUTE
ECONOMICS, ( April 21, 2008).
FOR
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some of the investors responsible for the funds, particularly in China and
some Gulf States. The challenge for IMF in delivering this difficult task was
known from the beginning, but it became even more complex in the context
of the financial crisis.
The IMF principles encourage the funds to explain their investment
criteria, and recommend that they avoid buying stakes in sensitive companies,
such as Western defence contractors. They also vote on setting up a Standing
Committee that will update the guidelines and liaise with Western
governments and institutions such as the World Bank and IMF on issues of
concern.
The principles make repeated mention of the need for greater transparency.
The full list of principles includes recommendations that SWFs coordinate
their activities with their respective governments and central banks to avoid
interfering with domestic economic policy. The members have committed
that funds should disclose their sources of funding and the conditions under
which their owners can withdraw them. They have committed to make
disclosures as applicable under local laws and regulations. Of key significance
in this regard are Principles 11, 12, and 22. Further, sovereign fund managers
should be independent of the fund owners, but fully accountable, publishing
annual reports and undergoing annual audits.
To address the criticism among some economists that the funds’ secrecy
contributes to volatility in capital markets, the principles call for funds to
disclose “relevant financial information” to “contribute to stability in
international financial markets and enhance trust in recipient countries.” Each
funds’ investment policies should be made public, including the extent to
which they employ outside managers. The principles also address concerns
about conflicts of interest arising between the funds and their government
owners, calling for funds to avoid taking advantage of privileged information
or influence when investing.
But the principles stop short of requiring an explicit pledge not to invest
for political ends. The principles include a call for funds to abide by local
rules and regulations and base their investments on financial and economic
grounds. They even call on funds to disclose any investment decisions “subject
to other than economic and financial considerations.”
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Above all the IMF guidelines are based on a standard definition of SWFs.
They do not cover SOEs as made clear by a footnote. Consequently they could
find themselves in the pointless situation of being rigorously adhered to, for
e.g. by Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, while Russia’s Gazprom
felt no need to take any notice of them. If so, the SWF guidelines will serve
little more than a public relations purpose if they encourage sovereign investment
to flow through other investment vehicles not covered by the guidelines.
It might then make sense to go on to redefine SWFs along broader lines.
Robert Kimmit, the current Deputy Secretary of the Department of the US
Treasury, suggests that SWFs could be conceived as “large pools of capital
controlled by a government and invested in private markets abroad”,59 rather
than as the funds that serve exclusively as investment vehicles for these pools.
With “sovereign wealth fund” defined in this way, a code of conduct for SWFs
would cover sovereign wealth at its source, regardless of the route it then
took to reach any foreign investment target.
Edwin Truman made a preliminary assessment of the GAPP using the 33
elements in the “2008 Blueprint for SWF Best Practices”. The GAPP receives
a satisfactory “score” of 74. The GAPP rank within the top group of 22 pension
and nonpension SWFs out of 46 such funds. It means that should each SWF
comply completely with the GAPP, they would all move into that top group.
As emphasized by Truman, “the fact that the GAPP does not score 100 on my
rating system reflects reality. It is a compromise, a negotiated document”. 60
The weakest area is with respect to accountability and transparency.
Disturbingly, many of the principles are silent about disclosure to the general
public or only call for disclosure to the fund’s owner. That approach does not
promote the needed accountability to citizens of the country with the SWF
or of other countries.
It seems then that it would be in the interest of governments to make use
of the multilateral code of Santiago principles, rather than being subjected to
the EU or the US mechanisms. A robust implementation of the ‘Santiago
principles’ should go far towards resolving questions about the transparency,
59
60
Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World
Economy FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2008).
Edwin Truman, Making the World Safe for Sovereign Wealth Funds (October 13, 2008).
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accountability, and operations of SWFs. The issue for the IWG is “voluntary”
compliance with the GAPP. However, some signals are encouraging, since
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) had expressed support for the
Santiago Principles. Additionally, “to underline its commitment to full
compliance, ADIA has established an inter-departmental committee to
oversee compliance with the GAPP. Furthermore, ADIA is analyzing the
feasibility of establishing a mechanism that would provide independent
verification of its compliance with the GAPP”. 61
What can be seen at first sight as a burden could be turned into an
advantage. Indeed complying with the Santiago Principles will mean
accepting the multilateral rules accepted by all. Any SWF which would
comply with such rules could expect a good treatment from both US and
European authorities, and will not be subject to the uncertainties resulting
from their procedures.
III. C ONCLUSIONS
As the current financial turmoil demonstrates, financial liquidity is vital
for Western economies. Recently firms on both sides of the Atlantic – for
example Barclays and Citibank, seek out sovereign funds. Their finance was
needed to allow these companies to fulfil their strategic aims. Even Russian
sovereign funds have not attempted to buy into any strategic assets; they are
taking very limited stakes in some companies and the European Commission
and the national governments are watching this activity. But there is no
evidence at the moment that these sovereign funds are being used for any
nefarious purpose.
This paper does not explore all the potential rules applicable to SWF. For
instance, it is questionable whether WTO law (and GATS through its mode 3
in particular) gives rights to SWFs and limit the scope of control governments
have the right to exert.62 There is a strong presumption for this but this complex
issue calls for further research.
61
62
Available at http://www.adia.ae/ADIA_AE_press.asp.
Philippe Gugler and Julien Chaisse, Foreign Investment Issues and WTO Law - Dealing with
Fragmentation while waiting for a Multilateral Framework ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION 135-171 (Julien Chaisse et al eds., 2008).
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SWFs constitute an important element in the policy dimension of many
countries that decided to set up such a fund. For instance in China, they are a
key example of the interference of the Chinese government in business
transactions and the private sector, which may not be present in the Indian
case. However, as the earlier analysis suggests, there may exist a commonality
of interest between the public and the private sector in India in terms of
outward investment (e.g. – energy). In addition, it is to be noted that acquisition
attempts in strategic sectors like steel by Indian private players have already
been criticised in Europe (e.g. – Arcelor-Mittal takeover in 2006) and any
SWF operation in that area might also be viewed in that light.
The objective of this paper has been to depict the existing regulatory
framework applicable to SWF investment in order to identify the main
regulatory challenges an Indian SWF might face abroad. IMF principle 24
says that “A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP
should be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF”. It is seems to us that there
is a necessity to respect all the Santiago principles when setting up Indian
SWF so as to take advantage of these minimal standards. Respecting each
Santiago Principles will put Indian SWF in the category of “good SWF” and
then limit regulatory obstacles it could face in the US market or the
multiplicity of regulations in the EU market. Interestingly, the use of mere
guidelines as opposed to hard regulation may in fine mark a milestone in
rationalizing the integration of SWFs into the global capital markets.
Complying officially with IMF guidelines should not require a lot of
concessions from the Indian side. Since the Santiago principles remain quite
vague and minimal, a good strategy would be to respect them and use these
standards as a tool to ensure that Western countries will not create obstacles
that run against the philosophy of this core of multilateral principles.
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ANNEX 1: A SUMMARY OF THE 24 GENERALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (GAPP)
•
GAPP 1. Principle
The legal framework for the SWF should be sound and support its effective
operation and the achievement of its stated objective(s).
-
GAPP 1.1 Subprinciple The legal framework for the SWF should ensure
the legal soundness of the SWF and its transactions.
-
GAPP 1.2 Subprinciple The key features of the SWF’s legal basis and
structure, as well as the legal relationship between the SWF and the other
state bodies, should be publicly disclosed.
•
GAPP 2. Principle
The policy purpose of the SWF should be clearly defined and publicly
disclosed.
•
GAPP 3. Principle
Where the SWF’s activities have significant direct domestic
macroeconomic implications, those activities should be closely
coordinated with the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to
ensure consistency with the overall macroeconomic policies.
•
GAPP 4. Principle
There should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures,
or arrangements in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding,
withdrawal, and spending operations.
-
GAPP 4.1 Subprinciple The source of SWF funding should be publicly
disclosed.
-
GAPP 4.2 Subprinciple The general approach to withdrawals from the
SWF and spending on behalf of the government should be publicly
disclosed.
•
GAPP 5. Principle
The relevant statistical data pertaining to the SWF should be reported on
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a timely basis to the owner, or as otherwise required, for inclusion where
appropriate in macroeconomic data sets.
•
GAPP 6. Principle
The governance framework for the SWF should be sound and establish a
clear and effective division of roles and responsibilities in order to
facilitate accountability and operational independence in the management
of the SWF to pursue its objectives.
•
GAPP 7. Principle
The owner should set the objectives of the SWF, appoint the members of
its governing body(ies) in accordance with clearly defined procedures,
and exercise oversight over the SWF’s operations.
•
GAPP 8. Principle
The governing body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and
have a clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out
its functions.
•
GAPP 9. Principle
The operational management of the SWF should implement the SWF’s
strategies in an independent manner and in accordance with clearly defined
responsibilities.
•
GAPP 10. Principle
The accountability framework for the SWF’s operations should be clearly
defined in the relevant legislation, charter, other constitutive documents,
or management agreement.
•
GAPP 11. Principle
An annual report and accompanying financial statements on the SWF’s
operations and performance should be prepared in a timely fashion and in
accordance with recognized international or national accounting standards
in a consistent manner.
34
•
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
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GAPP 12. Principle
The SWF’s operations and financial statements should be audited annually
in accordance with recognized international or national auditing standards
in a consistent manner.
•
GAPP 13. Principle
Professional and ethical standards should be clearly defined and made
known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management,
and staff.
•
GAPP 14. Principle
Dealing with third parties for the purpose of the SWF’s operational
management should be based on economic and financial grounds, and
follow clear rules and procedures.
•
GAPP 15. Principle
SWF operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in
compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements
of the countries in which they operate.
•
GAPP 16. Principle
The governance framework and objectives, as well as the manner in which
the SWF’s management is operationally independent from the owner,
should be publicly disclosed.
•
GAPP 17. Principle
Relevant financial information regarding the SWF should be publicly
disclosed to demonstrate its economic and financial orientation, so as to
contribute to stability in international financial markets and enhance trust
in recipient countries.
•
GAPP 18
18.. Principle
The SWF’s investment policy should be clear and consistent with its
defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set by the
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owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound portfolio
management principles.
-
GAPP 18.1 Subprinciple The investment policy should guide the SWF’s
financial risk exposures and the possible use of leverage.
-
GAPP 18.2 Subprinciple The investment policy should address the extent
to which internal and/or external investment managers are used, the range
of their activities and authority, and the process by which they are selected
and their performance monitored.
-
GAPP 18.3 Subprinciple A description of the investment policy of the
SWF should be publicly disclosed.
•
GAPP 19. Principle
The SWF’s investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy, and
based on economic and financial grounds.
-
GAPP 19.1 Subprinciple If investment decisions are subject to other than
economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in
the investment policy and be publicly disclosed.
-
GAPP 19.2 Subprinciple The management of an SWF’s assets should be
consistent with what is generally accepted as sound asset management
principles.
•
GAPP 20. Principle
The SWF should not seek or take advantage of privileged information or
inappropriate influence by the broader government in competing with
private entities.
•
GAPP 21. Principle
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of
their equity investments’ value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its
ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its
investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The
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SWF should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of
listed entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of ownership
rights.
•
GAPP 22. Principle
The SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and manages
the risks of its operations.
-
GAPP 22.1 Subprinciple The risk management framework should include
reliable information and timely reporting systems, which should enable
the adequate monitoring and management of relevant risks within
acceptable parameters and levels, control and incentive mechanisms, codes
of conduct, business continuity planning, and an independent audit
function.
-
GAPP 22.2 Subprinciple The general approach to the SWF’s risk
management framework should be publicly disclosed.
•
GAPP 23. Principle
The assets and investment performance (absolute and relative to
benchmarks, if any) of the SWF should be measured and reported to the
owner according to clearly defined principles or standards.
•
GAPP 24. Principle
A process of regular review of the implementation of the GAPP should
be engaged in by or on behalf of the SWF.
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37
Precedents in Investor State Arbitration
Akshay Kolse-Patil1
A BSTRACT
While admittedly there is no rule of stare decisis (binding precedent) in international law or
investor state arbitration, increasing number of tribunals refer to “precedents”. This trend has
led many to ask if there is a system of binding precedent in investor state arbitration. This
paper seeks to answer this question with a qualified affirmation – though there is no strict rule
of binding precedent in international investment law, previous decisions do have a limited but
powerful precedential value. While previous decisions are not binding, they provide guidance
and may influence future tribunals in their decision making. The current regime has some of
the characteristics (like timely publication of awards, similarity of applicable law, similar facts
and authoritative tribunals) of a common law system required to establish precedents.
However, this passing similarity is not sufficient to establish a binding rule of precedent due to
the lack of formal power and ad hoc nature of the tribunals, the difference in the wording of
investment treaties and the likelihood of inconsistent decisions. Therefore, tribunals use prior
decisions as aids to justify their reasoning and not as straightjackets to bind their reasoning.
C ONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 38
II.
WHAT ARE PRECEDENTS? ......................................................................... 40
A. Common Law ................................................................................ 40
B. Civil Law ....................................................................................... 41
C. International Law .......................................................................... 42
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION ........... 44
A. International Commercial Arbitration and
Investor State Arbitration ............................................................. 45
B. Rules against Precedent ................................................................ 46
1
Advocate, Bombay High Court.
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THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
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IV. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION DECISIONS - EMERGENCE OF A NEW JURISPRUDENCE? ..... 47
A. Publication of Awards .................................................................. 48
B. Similarity of Facts ........................................................................ 50
C. Similarity in Applicable Law ....................................................... 52
D. Authority of Tribunals .................................................................. 55
V. CASE LAW ............................................................................................. 57
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 64
I. I NTRODUCTION
Some would say that consistency requires you to be as ignorant today, as
you were a year ago.2 However, in the field of international investment law,
and the law in general, consistency may be more a sign of enlightenment
than ignorance. Consistent application of precedents provides fairness and
equality as like cases are dealt with in a like manner.3 This paper will look at
recent decisions in investor state disputes that have at once sought to establish
consistency, through the use of precedents, in contradistinction to those that
have through divergent and diametrically opposite decisions added an element
of inconsistency. This paper through analysis of the emerging case law seeks
to establish that while currently there is no strict rule of binding precedent in
international investment law, previous decisions do have a limited but powerful
precedential value. Though previous decisions are not binding, they do provide
guidance and may influence future tribunals in their decision making.
One of the principal aims of investment treaties has been to provide a
stable climate for investments4 - investment climate matters for the level of
productivity, wages, and profit rates, and for the growth rates of output,
employment, and capital stock at the firm level.5 In contrast inconsistent
2
3
4
Attributed to Bernard Berenson. (March 2, 2008) http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/990.html.
C. Schreuer and M. Weiniger, Conversations Across Cases – Is there a doctrine of precedent in
Investment Arbitration, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 2 (Muchlinski, Ortino,
Schreuer eds., 2008).
The preamble of the US model BIT reads as follows: “The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of [Country] (hereinafter the “Parties”)… Agreeing that a stable
framework for investment will maximize effective utilization of economic resources and improve
living standards.”
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PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
39
decisions threaten to frustrate the purpose of investment treaties – providing
states and investors with a stable climate and confidence regarding their
respective rights and obligations.6 Consistency in decisions, which can be
obtained through precedents, would definitely assist in providing stability.
The need for consistency and stability is further accentuated with the current
rise in flows of capital across borders. According to UNCTAD global FDI
flows totaled at $ 1.979 trillion in 20077.8 Flows to developing countries
increased by 17% over 2008 to a total of $ 621 billion9. There has also been a
startling growth in the number of BITS. In 2008 alone 59 new BITS were
concluded, bringing the grand total to 2,676.10 At the same time there has
been a dramatic rise in trade agreements with provisions relating to
investment. There were 273 such agreements by the end of 2008.11
As a consequence of the rise in FDI flows and in the number of investment
related agreements, as well as their increasing sophistication and breadth of
coverage, it is hardly surprising that there has been a growth in the number
of investment related disputes. International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) has decided a total of 189 disputes and a further
127 disputes are pending.12 Many investment disputes are conducted under
ad hoc tribunals under different rules, such as UNCITRAL rules, and are not
publicized. Therefore the true number of disputes is larger. Further given
that the specter of bankruptcy is haunting several countries in Europe, and
also may be elsewhere, there is a genuine possibility that may be a slew of
new disputes. This imminent threat of new disputes requires an urgent study
of the concept of precedents in investor state arbitration.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
D. Dollar, M. Hallward-Driemeier, and T. Mengistae Investment climate and firm performance
in developing economies, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 27 (2005).
G. Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Application of the Most-Favored Nation
Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2006-2007).
Foreign investment reached new high of $1.5 trillion in 2007, say UN experts - (April 30, 2010)
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25237&Cr=unctad&Cr1=fdi.
Investment flows have reduced currently because of the ongoing financial crisis, but are expected
to recover by 2011 as per the UNCTAD (New York and Geneva, 2009) - World Investment
Report 2009 xix (2009).
See World Investment Report 2009 (Overview), supra note 7.
Supra note 8, at 12.
Supra note 8, at 12.
See List of ICSID Cases (June 4, 2010) http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home.
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This paper seeks to understand the value, and the role, of precedents in
international investment. The paper shall proceed as follows: the second part
of the paper will explain the concept of precedent, as it exists in different
legal systems. Part three will then look at limitations on the development of
precedent in international investment law. Part four will discuss some of the
systemic requirements that would be needed to be satisfied by the current
investor state arbitration regime to establish precedents. Part five will then
analyze recent case law to see if there actually exists a system of precedent in
international investment arbitrations. And Part six will conclude.
II. W HAT
ARE
P RECEDENTS?
A. Common Law
The common law doctrine of stare decisis or binding precedent was born
from Bracton’s first collection of English decisions.13 Bractons Note Book
containing the first collection of English decisions gave early impetus to the
doctrine.14 The doctrine, stare decisiset non quietamovere – to abide by the
precedents and not disturb settled points, embodies the policy of the courts,
and the principal, upon which rests the authority of judicial decisions as
precedents in subsequent litigations.15 The concept is applied by common
law courts so that once a principle of law has been laid down applying to a
certain set of facts, they will adhere to that principal and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same.16 Not every opinion or
judgment is regarded as binding: in order that an opinion or judgment may
have the weight of a precedent two conditions must be fulfilled, 1) it must be
an opinion rendered by a properly constituted court and 2) it must be an
opinion the formation of which is necessary for a decision of a particular
13
14
15
16
J. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration – A Citation Analysis of Developing
Jurisprudence, 24(2) J. INT’L. ARB. 129, 133 (2007).
R. Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should
Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 501 (1945).
H. Bh thalack, The Principal of Stare Decisis, 34 AM. L. REG. 745, 745 (1886).
H. W. Jones, Dyson Distinguished Lecture – Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L.
REV. 11, 19 1983-1984.
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PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
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case, in other words it must not be an obiter dicta.17 However the rule of stare
decisis is not a strict one: Courts can decline to follow their own previous
decisions when those precedents are judged to be clearly in error.18 Lawyers
and judges, moreover, regularly display-amazing ingenuity in “distinguishing”
unfavorable precedents that otherwise would be “controlling.”19 And even in
common law systems, the decisions of courts at the same level in the judicial
hierarchy are not binding on each other, but only act as “persuasive
precedents”20. The purported values promoted by a system of stare decisis
include stability, certainty and predictability, reliability, equality and
uniformity of treatment, and convenience and expediency.21
B. Civil Law
The concept of stare decisis does not exist in civil law. Most civil law
countries relegate case law to the rank of a secondary legal source.22 However,
in civil law systems, although the courts seldom acknowledge this, in practice
precedents are recognized as providing strong force and can also be cited as
providing further support for decisions that have other legally justifying
grounds of the kind that may seem somewhat shaky, but for the assistance
provided by the precedents.23 Thus courts in civil law countries developed
the doctrine of jurisprudence constante - the doctrine under which the court
is a required to take into account past decisions only if there is sufficient
uniformity in the previous case law.24 According to Pierre Dupery:
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Supra note 13, at 134.
C. J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105(8) Y. L.
J. 2031, 2034 (1996)
Ibid., at 17.
A precedent that is not binding on a court, but that is entitled to respect and careful consideration.
For example, if the case was decided in a neighboring jurisdiction, the court might evaluate the
earlier court’s reasoning without being bound to decide the same way – BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
(B. A. Garner et al. ed.s, 2004).
R. A. Sprecher, The 1945 Prize-Winning Ross Essay Development of the Doctrine of Stare
Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 505-6 (1945).
V. Fon and F. Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis, INT. REV. L. &
ECON., 519, 523 (2006).
Supra note 13, at 134.
Supra note 22, at 4.
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“while the rule of precedent is not recognized in French law, the
significance of courts decision depends on the level of the
jurisdiction. In general, courts tend to have a coherent approach
in deciding cases, to avoid discrepancies. Nevertheless nothing
prevents a lower court from making a decision that would
contradict a decision made by a higher court.”25
C . International Law
Public international law is based on the Roman civil law of continental
Europe rather than on the English common law tradition. Therefore it is
understood that there is no system of stare decisis or binding precedent in
international law.26Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
explicitly provides that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Article 38 of the
same statute provides that judicial decisions constitute only a subsidiary means
of a determination of international law. However, according to Judge
Mohamed Shahabudden though there is no rule of precedents binding in
international law, it does not mean that there are no precedents and as a matter
of fact the Court seeks guidance from previous decisions; “the Court uses its
previous decisions in much the same way as that in which a common law
court of last resort will treat its own previous decisions.”27
Thus while there is no rule for binding precedents in international law,
the ICJ does look to prior decisions for guidance. Similarly in the WTO there
exists a de facto precedent.28 Recently the WTO Appellate Body in US –
Stainless Steel (Mexico) explained the role of precedent in the WTO system
by stating:
25
26
27
28
P. Dupery, Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents? Should Commercial Arbitration be
Distinguished in this Regard from Arbitration Based on Investment Treaties?, in TOWARDS A
UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW? 251, 255-256 (P. Pinsolle, A. V. Schlaepfer and L.
Degos, eds., 2005).
C. S. Gibson and C. R. Drahozal, Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Precedent in Investor-State
Arbitration, 23 J. INT’L. ARB. 521, 525 (2006).
M. Shahabudeen, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 2-3 (1996).
See R. Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law - Part One of a Trilogy,
14 (4) AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999).
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“Dispute settlement practice demonstrates that WTO Members
attach significance to reasoning provided in previous panel and
Appellate Body reports. Adopted panel and Appellate Body
reports are often cited by parties in support of legal arguments in
dispute settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and
the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes. In addition, when
enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to
international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the
legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in
adopted panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the legal
interpretation embodied in adopted panel and Appellate Body
reports becomes part and parcel of the acquis of the WTO dispute
settlement system. Ensuring “security and predictability” in the
dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the
DSU implies that in the absence of cogent reasons, an adjudicatory
body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a
subsequent case.”29
According to Professor Jackson while there is no stare decisis in
jurisprudence of the WTO, there is certainly a very powerful precedent effect.
Professor Jackson believes that panels or Appellate Body are not required to
follow prior cases, except where there have been numerous cases resolving a
particular issue and the resolution has been accepted by all Members, then a
“practice under Agreement” as defined by the Vienna Convention may have a
stronger precedential impact. However, “the “flavor” of the precedent effect
in the WTO is still somewhat fluid, and possibly will remain fluid for the
time being.”30
While decisions of international courts and tribunals do not have a formal
binding authority under international law, this point does not materially
undermine the genuine and effective influence that runs from the broader
understanding of precedent – one that does not require binding adherence to
the prior decision.31 Thus, though the principals of international law do not
contain a rule for binding precedent, in practice permanent tribunals, such as
29
30
31
Appellate Body Report: United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from
Mexico, (May 20, 2008), WT/DS344/AB/R at para. 160.
J. Jackson, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177 (2006).
Supra note 26, at 526.
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the ICJ and the WTO panels and Appellate Body have followed a somewhat
loosely formed rule of de facto precedents.
III. A RGUMENTS A GAINST P RECEDENTS
A RBITRATION
IN
I NVESTOR S TATE
As stated above there is no rule of binding precedent in international law.
However, international courts and tribunals do consider previous decisions
to have at least persuasive value, if not considered as binding precedents.
However, investment arbitrations, in contradistinction to the ICJ or WTO,
are not conducted under the aegis of any permanent courts or tribunals.
According to Schreuer:32
“Investment arbitration takes place before ad hoc tribunals. Their
composition varies from case to case. This makes it considerably
more difficult to develop a consistent case law than in a permanent
judicial institution such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) or The Court of
Justice of the European Communities.”
Further according Schill investor state arbitration does not incorporate
the concept of stare decisis because, first some investment treaties explicitly
provide for the ‘relative nature’ of awards and decisions in investor-State
disputes.33 Second the MFN clause in treaties cannot be used to justify
following precedents because
“applying MFN clauses in this way is not possible because they
apply only to more favorable treatment granted by the host State
and thus require conduct that is attributable to the host State.
The award of an arbitral tribunal, by contrast, is not attributable
to the host State. MFN clauses, therefore, cannot operate with
respect to decisions by international tribunals and produce the
effect of establishing a system of precedent.”34
32
33
34
C.H. Schreuer, Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration,
3(2) TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2006).
S. Schill, MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 288 (2009).
Ibid., at 290.
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PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
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Third, and final, the procedural law governing investor-State disputes
equally does not furnish a basis for establishing a system of stare decisis.35
The ad hoc nature of investor state tribunals (like commercial arbitration)
along with the variations in treaty wordings and obligations create difficulties
in the development of consistent case law, and therefore precedents, in investor
state arbitration. Hence, the question of whether there are precedents in
international investment law is a complicated and nuanced one.
This section will examine some of the legal and practical difficulties in
establishing a system of precedent or something akin to it in investment law.
The section first compares international investment arbitration to international
commercial arbitration and then sets out the legal norms in various
conventions and rules dealing with investment arbitration that could be
construed as creating a bar against precedent in investor state arbitration.
A . International Commercial Arbitration and Investor State
Arbitration
Much like international commercial arbitration, ad hoc panels conduct
investment arbitration. BITS and other investment treaties often provide for
the jurisdiction of ICSID or its additional facilities or ad hoc arbitration under
UNCITRAL, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, ICC etc.36 ICSID, Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce or ICC only provide for rules for the conduct of the
arbitration, whereas the substantive provisions are contained in investment
treaties, general principles of international law and the domestic law of the
host country.
In many respects investor state arbitration has much in common with
international commercial arbitration. Firstly both involve a claim by private
party before a private tribunal. Second, investment arbitrations are many
times governed by the same or similar rules as those governing international
commercial arbitration.37 Given these similarities and the lack of a rule of
35
36
37
Supra note 33, at 291.
Supra note 25, at 252.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, (April 30, 2010) http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitration_rules.html.
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precedents in international commercial arbitration38 it would seem only
logical to conclude that the rule is similarly lacking in international
investment arbitration.
However, investor state arbitration can be differentiated from
international commercial arbitration. According to Harten and Loghlin:39
“it would be a mistake to confuse investment arbitration, pursuant
to a treaty, with commercial arbitration. Commercial arbitration
originates in an agreement between private parties to arbitrate
disputes between themselves in a particular manner, and its
authority derives from the autonomy of individuals to order their
private affairs as they wish. Investment arbitration, by contrast,
originates in the authority of the state to use adjudication to resolve
disputes arising from the exercise of public authority. Investment
arbitration is constituted by a sovereign act, as opposed to a
private act, of the state and this makes investment arbitration
more closely analogous to domestic juridical review of the
regulatory conduct of the state.” (internal citations omitted)
Also unlike awards issued in international commercial arbitrations, awards
in investment arbitrations are often made public and publication is the first
step towards the formation and use of precedents.40 Given these important
differences it is necessary to study the existence or non-existence of binding
precedent in international investment arbitration in isolation from
international commercial arbitration.
B . Rules against Precedent
As mentioned above most investor state arbitrations are conducted under
the ICSID convention or UNCITRAL rules etc. Article 53 of the ICSID
convention states that:
“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject
to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for
38
39
40
This is a hotly debated topic and beyond the scope of this paper.
G. Van Harten and M. Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative
Law, 17(1) EUR.. J. INT’L. L. 121, 140 (2006).
This topic is dealt with on page 13, infra.
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PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
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in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the
terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall
have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this
Convention.”
In a similar vein Article 32(2) of the UNICTRAL rules states that “The
award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties.”
Both these rules, which limit the scope of the awards by making them
binding only to the parties to the dispute, may be read as excluding the rule of
a binding precedent in investor state arbitration. Also nothing in the travaux
preparatories of the ICSID convention suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis
should be applied.41 However according to Gabrielle Kaufman Kohler “this
does not appear to be an extremely convincing basis to deny the existence of
any form of precedent in this field”.42
IV. I NVESTMENT A RBITRATION D ECISIONS –
E MERGENCE OF A N EW J URISPRUDENCE ?
Despite the limited scope of application of the decisions issued by the
tribunals some consider these awards to constitute new investment law
jurisprudence.43 Previous decisions, though, not binding on tribunals because
of the absence of the rule of stare decisis, “exercise, as a matter of fact, strong
extra-legal constraints upon subsequent tribunals.”44According to Tai-Heng
Cheng there are three reasons why precedents may exist in investor state
arbitration:
41
42
43
44
Supra note 32, at 11.
G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields
Lecture, 23(3) ARB. INT’L. 357, 368 (2007).
“A “consolidating jurisprudence,” an “international common law of investor rights,” “an investment
jurisprudence,” or a “common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante” — these are just some of
the labels that have been given to the burgeoning corpus of precedents emanating from ICSID and
other investment treaty tribunals.” Supra note 12, at 135.
“That a special jurisprudence is developing from the leading awards in the domain of investment
arbitration can only be denied by those determined to close their eyes.” See J. Paulsson, International
Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law, 3(5)
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2006).
Supra note 33, at 323.
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“Firstly, arbitrators are often eminent practitioners and scholars.
They are steeped in the methods of legal reasoning in domestic
and international law, and will tend to apply these methods with
which they are most familiar. To the extent that precedent is now
a method of legal reasoning embedded in many legal systems,
arbitrators will naturally operate within a system of precedent.
Second, methods of legal reasoning in domestic legal systems are
designed, inter alia , to promote the orderly exposition and
development of domestic law. Arbitrators are acutely aware that
international law should also be developed in an orderly fashion
and thus would tend to apply the legal methods that promote
such an orderly development of international law. The third reason
may be less noble. Arbitrators reap significant reputational benefits
among fellow arbitrators, lawyers and the college of international
jurists if they render awards that are regarded as well reasoned.”45
For the development of this jurisprudence, however, a few conditions
must be fulfilled. This section will deal with some of the basic requirements
needed to be satisfied for establishing a system of precedent and therefore
investment law jurisprudence. First there would need to be publication of
awards. Second there will need to be some similarity in the facts. Third there
would need to be similarity in applicable law, i.e. terms of the treaties and
principles of international law. Fourth the tribunal issuing the decision should
be reliable and authoritative.
A . Publication of Awards
As stated above the doctrine of stare decisis evolved from Bracton’s first
collection of English decisions. Similarly for there to be an evolution of
international investment law jurisprudence there needs to increased
publication of awards. According to Fabien Gelinas “the only conceivable
way of preventing a body of case law from developing in investment
arbitration would be a total ban on publication”.46 ICSID and UNCITRAL
rules do not allow for automatic publication of awards. Article 48(5) of the
45
46
Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investor State Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM J. INTL. L. 1014,
1045-1046 (2007).
Supra note 13, at 136.
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ICSID convention provides that “the Centre shall not publish the award without
the consent of the Parties”. Similarly Article 32(5) of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules provides that “the award may be made public only with the
consent of both parties”.
However, regulation 22(1) of ICSID Administrative and Financial
regulations provides that:
“The Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information about
the operation of the Centre, including the registration of all requests
for conciliation or arbitration and in due course an indication of the
date and method of the termination of each proceeding.”
Similarly rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration rules states that “The Centre
shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre
shall, however, promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal
reasoning of the Tribunal.” Thus the ICSID rules do allow for limited
transparency.
In reality, however, most awards are now available online. According to
Jeffery Commission:47
“Investment treaty awards and decisions are now readily accessible
and available from a number of sources, including but not limited
to: (i) ICSID reports, and a number of other printed publications
around the world, such as International Legal Materials, Journal
de Droit International, and ICSID Review—Foreign Investment
Law Journal; (ii) the World Bank’s ICSID website; (iii) dedicated
investment treaty websites such as investment claims, NAFTA
claims, investment treaty arbitration, and transnational dispute
management; and (iv) online at commercial legal service providers
such as Kluwer Arbitration, LEXIS, and Westlaw.”
Publication of awards increases awareness of previous holdings amongst
the arbitrators and parties to the disputes. Such awareness can help prevent
inconsistency between arbitral awards. In fact, as a rule publication of awards
contributes to increasing consistency and predictability.48 Publication of
47
48
Supra note 13, at 136.
C. Knahr and A. Reinisch, Transparency versus Confidentiality in International Investment
Arbitration – The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 THE L. & PRAC. INTL. CT.S &TRIBUNALS 97, 115 (2007).
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awards also fosters scholarly debate on many issues that turn out to be
controversial in the holdings of the arbitral tribunals.49 For example this paper
refers to opinions of academics on published decisions as well the decisions
themselves to reach its conclusions. The work of legal scholars and the
decisions themselves, in accordance with Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of
the ICJ, provide at least a subsidiary means of determination of rules of law.50
Therefore availability of documents contributes to the development of
substantive standards of investment law through arbitral practice.51
Publication of awards may also be necessary in public interest. A citizen
of a state involved in an arbitration proceeding may be interested in the
progress of the proceeding because on many occasions they deal with issues
of great public importance and any damages or payments made as a
consequence of awards issued by the tribunals are paid out of public money.
In 2004 there were at least are nine cases being considered in which foreign
investors who have been awarded contracts to provide water and sewage
services in developing countries have run into conflict with regulatory
authorities, and have taken recourse to investor-state arbitration in an effort
to resolve their differences.52 Secrecy in such issues of social and national
importance would seem to be against public interest.
Thus publication of awards not only helps in developing a new corpus of
jurisprudence but also is necessary for public interest purposes thereby adding
a layer of legitimacy to the awards by providing transparency.53
B . Similarity of Facts
Applying a precedent entails applying the legal reasoning in a previously
decided case to a subsequent case. One of the most important ingredients for
49
50
51
52
53
Id.
Article 38(1)(d) says that “subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law.”
Supra note 48.
See L. E. Peterson, Bilateral Investment and Development Policy Making, (April 22, 2008) http:/
/www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_bits.pdf .
Supra note 48, at 110.
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a precedent to be applicable in such a manner is that the original decisions
must have facts, which are identical or as nearly similar as possible to the
pending case. According to Jeffery Commission, “while there is no requirement
that the facts be identical, or the later case must be on “all fours” with the
prior one, there needs to be sufficient factual similarities between the two
cases to support the process of analogical reasoning.”54 In following precedents
we should therefore leave the realm of absolute identity.55 Prior decisions
establish a precedent for some different array of facts, ones that contain some
points of identity with the facts of the prior decision.56 In the alternative,
dissimilarity of facts may make the ruling of a prior case inapplicable in a
subsequent case.
For investor state arbitration tribunals to develop binding precedents not
only should the decisions be published, they must also cover a wide variety
of fact and commercial circumstances that continue to occur in international
business and in relation to foreign investments. Considering the growing
number of investor state disputes there is a realistic possibility that many
disputes may have identical, similar or overlapping factual issues. For example
a considerable number of disputes arising in the wake of the Argentinean
financial crisis could be considered to have some overlapping factual
circumstance. For example “the state of necessity” defense was raised by
Argentina in two disputes arising out of the same factual background, i.e.
privatization of gas distribution industry, namely CMS Gas Vs
Argentina57(CMS Gas) and LG & E Vs Argentina58(LG), in connection with
obligations under the US-Argentina BIT.59
54
55
56
57
58
59
Supra note 13, at 531.
F. Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1986-87).
Ibid, at 578.
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2007),
(Decision on Annulment).
LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp and LG&E International Inc v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (2006), (Decision on Liability).
However, the tribunals in these two cases reached contradictory conclusions. Whereas the CMS
tribunal rejected the “state of necessity” defense, LG & E tribunal concluded that Argentina was
indeed in a “state of necessity” and was therefore excused from non-performance of BIT obligations
for 18 months.
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C . Similarity in Applicable Law
For a decision to function as a precedent not only must it be based on
similar facts, it is also of paramount importance that there should be similarity
in applicable legal principles. According to Gibson and Drahozal “this is an
element which receives most attention when considering limits of a prior
precedent”60. They further state that if the law in two cases differs significantly
in substance, there is a limit to the applicability of one case to another.61 This
makes sense because if the law applicable to cases is different, then the legal
rules and principles on which the holdings will be based will vary, and
sometimes might be incompatible, and therefore the cases cannot be
reconciled.
Looking at different treaties it appears that only a minority of investment
treaties make the municipal law of a country the applicable law. In case of
the absence of a provision selecting applicable law, the ICSID convention
provides that “the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party
to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable”.62 Similarly Article 33(1) of the
UNCITRAL Rules provides that “The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing
such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law
determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable”.
Article 42(1) has been interpreted to mean that in case of absence of a
provision selecting applicable law international law is called upon to play a
dual role in this case – i.e., to fill in the gaps of the applicable municipal law
and amend the relevant contents in case the latter are incompatible with
international law.63 The law, which applies to most of ICSID arbitrations and
similar types of arbitrations, is a mixture of public international law, private
international law (i.e. international conflict of laws64), and municipal law,
60
61
62
63
64
Supra note 26, at 532.
Supra note 26, at 532.
Article 42(1) of ICSID Convention.
A. Giardina, International Investment Arbitration: Recent Developments as to Applicable Law
and Universal Recourse, 5 THE L. & PRAC. INTL. CT.S &TRIBUNALS 29, 30 (2006).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20.
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PRECEDENTS IN INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION
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with all three types of law relevant to the resolution of particular disputes.65
Thus international law66 seems to provide a common thread in investor state
arbitrations. According to Gibson and Drahozal investor state arbitral tribunals
are required to enquire into municipal law only on rare occasions, thus the
possibility of case law, being a limiting factor in the application of a precedent
is diminished.67 Further even if municipal law is invoked, there may be a
high degree of similarity in the principles of law, e.g. contracts, applicable in
the nations of the world. According to some, recent BIT arbitrations accord a
controlling role for international law, by providing the standard by reference
to which the legality of the conduct of the host state is to be assessed.68
One of the most important sources of law applicable in investment law
are the investment treaties themselves. Most BITS contain specific substantive
provisions, which are applicable in investor state arbitrations. These
provisions enshrine the protections that are sought to be bestowed upon a
foreign investment. Although each country has its own model BIT, virtually
all BITS treat the same issues and there is a substantial degree of uniformity
in the substantive provisions contained in the treaties.69 Thus, taking into
account the vast web of BITS and their overlapping content, according to
Schwebel “Customary international law governing the treatment of foreign
65
66
67
68
69
T. Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?, 14 LIEDEN J.
INT’L. L. 267, 270 (2001).
According to the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, the term “international law” as
used in this context should be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ: “The Court, whose
function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall
apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.”
Supra note 26, at 533.
A. Redfern, and M. Hunter, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19
(2004).
J. Salacuse, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain, in
ARBITRATION FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 53, 61 (N. Horn and S. Kroll eds., 2004) and supra note
55, at chapter 11, 23.
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investment has been reshaped to embody principles of law found in more than
two thousand concordant bilateral investment treaties. With the conclusion of
such a cascade of parallel treaties, the international community has ….. fashioned
an essentially uniform foreign investment law70”71 However, it must be noted
that each BIT has its own peculiar wording and that may affect the true meaning
or scope of similar provisions and thus their interpretation.
According to some BITS principles of customary rules of international
law are also an important source of law.72 However, there is a debate as
whether some of these principles with respect of investments exist. The legal
structure relating to protection of foreign investments in the post war era
was seriously lacking because 1) applicable international law failed to take
into account contemporary investment practices and address concerns of
foreign investors, 2) principles of international law that did exist were vague
and subject to varying interpretation, 3) the existing structure has prompted
disagreements between developed and developing countries and finally73 4)
international law did not seem to provide adequate remedies to a disgruntled
70
71
72
73
S. Schwebel, The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary International Law, 98
AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 27 (2004).
For a contrary opinion please refer to M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
232 (2004). According to Sornarajah, there would have been no need for international treaties if
international law on investment protection had been clear.
For e.g. Article 5(1) of the US Model BIT provides, “Each Party shall accord to covered investments
treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security”. Similarly article 3(5) of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT
provides that the countries will treat investments at least as well as required by “obligations under
international law existing at present or established hereafter.” Agreement on Encouragement of
Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, Neth.-Czech Rep.-Slovk., art. 3(5) [hereinafter Netherlands-Czech
Republic BIT], (June 6, 2010) http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
czech_netherlands.pdf. The Canada- Poland BIT provides that investments “shall at all times be
accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles of international law.” Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Poland for the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nov. 14, 1991, Can.-Pol., art. III(1), (June 6,
2010) http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_poland.pdf.
The developing countries challenged the principles of international investment law during the
1970’s. They used the United Nations as a platform for question the existence of the international
law standards which sought to be imposed by the developed countries. Their position is best
exhibited in article 2 of the Charter of rights and duties of states, adopted in 1974, which provided
that every state would have sovereign rights to govern its natural and economic resources and
could expropriate foreign investors property for a after payment “appropriate compensation” as
opposed to “prompt, adequate and effective compensation”. Resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly 3281 (XXIX). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974
(April 10, 2008) http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3281.htm.
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55
investor against host countries.74 Further there is uncertainty as to whether
principles of customary international law can be used to determine obligations
under a BIT. The issue of “state of necessity” arose in the disputes concerning
gas distribution in Argentina. In the cases of CMS Gas and LG, Argentina
invoked “state of necessity” defense under Article XI of the US-Argentina
BIT.75 The tribunal in CMS Gas rejected Argentina’s defense referring to
“necessity” under customary international law as expressed in Article 25 in
the International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility. On the
other hand the tribunal in LG referred to the express provisions in the BIT
and upheld Argentina’s defense for a period of 18 months. Thus the two
tribunals diverged on the use of customary international law to interpret treaty
obligations.
D . Authority of Tribunals
Under common law for a decision to be a precedent, a judge appointed to
a properly constituted court must make the decision. Also due to the hierarchy
of courts, decisions of a judge in upper echelons are binding on lower ones. In
the case of investor state arbitrations these requirements are not satisfied
because ad hoc tribunals conduct the arbitrations and there is no hierarchy
amongst the tribunals. As a result it would appear that decisions issued by
tribunals would not be accepted as binding precedents because they arbitrators
lack the authority to bind their peers. However, it will be shown below that
the arbitrators do have “de facto” ability to establish persuasive precedents.
International arbitral awards can be seen as a source of international law
under Article 38(1) d because they can be viewed as the equivalents of judicial
decisions or pronouncements of the most highly qualified publicists.
According to Jan Paulsson:76
74
75
76
J. Salacuse and N. Sullivan, Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and
their grand bargain, 46(1) HAR. INT’L. L. J. 67, 68-69 (2004).
Article XI provides that “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential
security interests.”
J. Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and
International Law, 3(5) TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4-5 (2006).
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“One can hardly fail to remark that among the most frequently
appointed members to international investment tribunal panels may
be found former Presidents of the International Court of Justice
(Guillaume, Schwebel, Bedjaoui), a former President of the WTO
Appellate body and member of his country’s Supreme Court
(Feliciano), a former President of the UN Security Council
(Fortier), the rapporteur of the International Law Commission’s
draft articles on state responsibility (Crawford), and the present
and immediate past Presidents of the leading international arbitral
institution of the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (Briner, Tercier). Indeed,
the current President of the International Court of Justice (Higgins)
chaired the oft-cited ICSID tribunal which decided the second
Amco v. Indonesia case. The list could be extended to include
numerous scholars and practitioners of international renown, but
no more is needed, it seems, to conclude that among the authors
of these awards are those who must surely qualify for
consideration as “the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations”.
As a practical matter there could as be said to be a “bench” of investor
state arbitrators.77 A review of 115 concluded ICSID arbitrations reveals 43
arbitrators accounted for 176 of the possible 361 appointments (49%).78
Further a review of the 103 pending cases shows that 32 arbitrators accounted
for 153 appointments (54%).79 Thus there is a clearly consistent appointment
of experienced and highly qualified arbitrators in ICSID arbitrations. This
consistency adds one more layer of legitimacy to the decisions issued by the
tribunals.
Given the fact that decisions of arbitral tribunals do, at least, constitute a
subsidiary source of international law, coupled with consistency of
appointments of high quality arbitrators, the decisions issued by these tribunals
do carry some “authoritative value”. In sum it can be said, that while the
current regime for investor state arbitrations does not, in the strictest sense,
77
78
79
This could also be construed as a negative because this means that there is an exclusive coterie.
Formation of such a coterie could act as a challenge to the legitimacy of tribunals.
Supra note 13, at 138.
Supra note 13, at 138.
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satisfy all the major requirements for making binding precedents, it does
satisfy enough of the requirements to make decisions which are at least
persuasive.
V. CASE LAW
We have seen above that the tribunals instituted under the current regime
of investor state arbitration do have some of the trappings required to issue
decisions that could be persuasive precedents in subsequent arbitrations. This
section will now look at the views of different arbitral tribunals to see if they
view themselves as being bound by previous decisions.
Amco Corp Vs. Republic of Indonesia80 is the first publicly available
decision to use the word “precedent”.81 In those proceedings the tribunal
commented on the parties numerous references to and reliance upon the
unpublished awards in the Holiday Inns case on the first decision on
jurisdiction:
“To refer to the Holiday Inns award—in spite of the same not
being a binding precedent in this case—here, this agreement is by
no means implied…The tribunal will state again that in spite of
superficial resemblances, the facts in the Holiday Inns case and in
the instant one are largely different, so that the references to
Holiday Inns are not really relevant, except that as in said case,
the arbitrators extended an arbitration clause to parties which had
personally executed it; accordingly, it would not seem to be
contrary to that precedent(to the extent to which it is a precedent)
to apply an arbitration clause.”82
More recently in the case of Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,
L.P. Vs. Argentine Republic83 the tribunal held that “decisions of ICSID or
other arbitral tribunals are not a primary source of rules”. The same tribunal
80
81
82
83
Amco v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 (1984), (Decision on Jurisdiction).
Supra note 13, at 144.
Supra note 80, para.s 14 and 25.
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/3 (Decision on Jurisdiction) at para. 40.
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in an ancillary claim held that “the decisions of ICSID tribunals are not binding
precedents and that every case must be examined in the light of its own
circumstances”.84
The question of the authority of previous decisions came under strict
scrutiny in the cases against Argentina in the wake of the financial crisis.
Despite numerous decisions finding jurisdiction, Argentina steadfastly raised
similar objections to jurisdiction over and over again.85 In the decision on
jurisdiction in the resubmitted Vivendi case Argentina once again raised the
question of whether the participation of foreign shareholders in a domestically
owned company constituted an investment.86 The tribunal rejected Argentina’s
case, and in order to bolster its reasoning added an appendix to its decision in
which it listed previous decisions that had dealt with and rejected the same
argument. The tribunal observed that similar objections had been raised by
Argentina in 18 other cases and had been rejected every time, and that the last
tribunal held that “this very objection which Argentina raises in this case has
been made numerous times, never, so far as the Tribunal has been aware,
with success”87
The question of “precedent” was discussed in much depth in the case of
AES Corporation Vs. Argentina.88 In this case the claimant pointed out that
all the objections raised by Argentina with respect to jurisdiction had been
consistently rejected by other tribunals.89 The tribunal however noted that:
“There is so far no rule of precedent in general international law;
nor is there any within the specific ICSID system for the settlement
of disputes between one State party to the Convention and the
National of another State Party. This was in particular illustrated
by diverging positions respectively taken by two ICSID tribunals
84
85
86
87
88
89
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
01/3 (2004), (Decision on Jurisdiction - Ancillary Claim) at para. 25.
Supra note 32, at 12.
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3 (2001), (Decision on Jurisdiction) at para. 10.
Supra note 86, at para. 94.
AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17 (2005), (Decision on
Jurisdiction).
Ibid., at para.s 17 & 18.
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on issues dealing with the interpretation of arguably similar language
in two different BITs. As rightly stated by the Tribunal in SGS v.
Philippines, although different tribunals constituted under the ICSID
system should in general seek to act consistently with each other,
in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence
in accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be
different for each BIT and each Respondent State.”90
It should be noted that the tribunal states that there is “so far” no rule of
precedent, leaving the door open for future reconsideration of the topic. The
Tribunal then referred to the decision in the Enron case, which has been
mentioned above.91 The tribunal then pointed out:
“that each BIT has its own identity; its very terms should
consequently be carefully analyzed for determining the exact scope
of consent expressed by its two Parties.
This is in particular the case if one considers that striking similarities
in the wording of many BITs often dissimulate real differences in
the definition of some key concepts, as it may be the case, in
particular, for the determination of investments or for the precise
definition of rights and obligations for each party.”92
Thus the tribunal concluded firstly that findings of law made in one case,
of the terms of a BIT, are not necessarily relevant in other cases and secondly
that Argentina is allowed to raise similar objections in successive
arbitrations.93 However the tribunal went on to conclude:
An identity of the basis of jurisdiction of these tribunals, even
when it meets with very similar if not even identical facts at the
origin of the disputes, does not suffice to apply systematically to
the present case positions or solutions already adopted in these
cases. Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it is
confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the
same problem; but decisions on jurisdiction dealing with the same
90
91
92
93
Supra note 88, at para. 23.
Supra note 83.
Supra note 88, at paras. 24 and 25.
Supra note 88, at para. 26.
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or very similar issues may at least indicate some lines of reasoning
of real interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to
compare its own position with those already adopted by its
predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by one
or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to
adopt the same solution.94
Thus even though the tribunal rejected the rule of precedent it did not bar
the possibility of development of the rule in the future. The tribunal also
recognized that while ICSID tribunals are not bound by previous decisions,
those decisions may at least “indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest”.
It is interesting to note in this case, that even when rejecting the rule of
precedent the tribunal refers to previous decisions for guidance.95
In some cases ICSID tribunals do not make reference to a doctrine or rule
of precedents and simply refer to cases and precedents throughout, and do not
make any efforts to disguise their outright reliance on previous cases.96 For
example in the CMS Gas97 case the tribunal first refers to the Lanco Case98
and then says that “The task of the Tribunal is again rendered easier by the
fact that a number of recent ICSID cases have had to discuss and decide on
similar or comparable provisions concerning contracts and the scope of the
Treaty.”99
In some cases, much like the appendix in the aforementioned Vivendi
case, tribunals have dedicated portions or sections of their decisions, typically
a paragraph, labeled “opening considerations”, “introductory matters” etc.,
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Supra note 88, at para. 30.
The Tribunal refers to SGS v. Philippines and Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v.
Argentine Republic decisions to reach in reaching its conclusion that “in the hearing on jurisdiction
held in respect of this dispute, to the effect that the decisions of ICSID tribunals are not binding
precedents and that every case must be examined in the light of its own circumstances” - Supra
note 86, at para. 23.
Supra note 13, at 146.
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (2007)
(Decision on Annulment).
Ibid., at para. 63.
Supra note 97, at para. 72.
Supra note 13, at 147.
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to the study of previous decisions.100 In some of these cases the tribunals
accept that while there is no precedent, tribunals still respect prior decisions.
Thus the tribunal in El Paso101 held:
“ICSID arbitral tribunals are established ad hoc, from case to case,
in the framework of the Washington Convention, and the present
Tribunal knows of no provision, either in that Convention or in the
BIT, establishing an obligation of stare decisis. It is, nonetheless, a
reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, notably
those established within the ICSID system, will generally take
account of the precedents established by other arbitration organs,
especially those set by other international tribunals. The present
Tribunal will follow the same line, especially since both parties, in
their written pleadings and oral arguments, have heavily relied on
precedent.102
In the case of Jan De Nul103 the tribunal held, “The Tribunal considers
that it is not bound by earlier decisions, but will certainly carefully consider
such decisions whenever appropriate.”104 Thereafter the tribunal follows
Bayindir Vs. Pakistan.105
There have, however, been cases in which conflicting decisions have
passed on identical or similar questions of law or fact. For example the
“umbrella clause” has been a source of much debate. Decisions in SGS Vs.
Philippines106 and SGS Vs. Pakistan107 are clearly inconsistent. In SGS Vs.
Pakistan the tribunal opined that the placement of the clause near the end of
the Swiss-Pakistan BIT, in the same manner as the Swiss Model BIT, was
indicative of an intention on the part of the Contracting Parties not to provide
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15
(2006), (Decision on Jurisdiction).
Supra note 100, at para. 39
Jan de Nul N.V., Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/
13 (2006) ), (Decision on Jurisdiction).
Ibid., at para. 64.
Supra note 103, at para. 71.
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/
02/6 (2004), (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction).
Id.
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a substantive obligation.108 The Tribunal considered that had the Contracting
Parties intended to create a substantive obligation through the umbrella clause
it would logically have been placed alongside the other so-called “first order”
obligations.109 By contrast, the SGS Vs. Philippines Tribunal opined that while
the placement of the clause may be “entitled to some weight,” it did not
consider this factor as decisive.110 In this respect, the Tribunal stated “it is
difficult to accept that the same language in other Philippines BITs is legally
operative, but that it is legally inoperative in the Swiss-Philippines BIT merely
because of its location”.111 According to Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler:
“A review of the relevant decisions raises three considerations.
First, there would seem to be a significant inconsistency between
the two SGS awards. Secondly, there are a number of decisions
that adopt a restrictive approach towards umbrella clauses, such
as Salini v. Jordan, Joy Mining v. Egypt, and more recently the El
Paso v. Argentina and Pan American v. Argentina decisions, which
stated that:
an umbrella clause cannot transform any contract claim
into a treaty claim, as this would necessarily imply that
any commitments of the State in respect to investments,
even the most minor ones, would be transformed into
treaty claims.
Thirdly, the analysis reveals that other tribunals, such as the ones
in Eureko v. Poland, Noble Venture v. Romania and Siemens v.
Argentina have adopted the opposite view and have accepted
that the concept of an umbrella clause is usually seen as transforming
municipal law obligations into obligations directly recognizable in
international law. In sum, the tribunals are divided when it comes
to the umbrella clause, and no clear rule has emerged. Some tribunals
have noted that their decisions were dependent on the terms of
the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) involved. However, this
explanation does not provide a satisfactory justification for all of
the discrepancies.”112
108
109
110
111
112
Ibid., at para. 169.
Supra note 107, at para. 170.
Supra note 106, at para. 125.
Supra note 106, at para. 124.
Supra note 42, at 369.
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There have also been decisions, which reached contradictory conclusions
on the same facts. Recently in a case involving the Czech Republic two
independent treaty claims were made by a broadcasting firm (CME) and its
major shareholder (Ronald Lauder). Two separate tribunals examined nearly
identical issues and yet managed to reach completely contradictory
conclusions as whether the Czech Republic had violated its obligations relating
to non-discrimination and expropriation.113 Thus according to well-known
Swiss arbitrator Jacque Werner investor state arbitration is at risk of becoming
a “legal casino”.114
These cases highlight very different approaches to precedents by the
tribunals. Some tribunals have denied the existence of a rule of precedent,
others have followed previous precedents but have not discussed the existence
or nonexistence of the rule of precedent, while other have accepted the absence
of the rule of precedent and even then discussed and referred to previous
decisions in reaching their conclusions and in some cases parties have referred
to previous decisions but the tribunals have refused to follow the cited cases
due to a lack of rule of precedent. Some cases have even issued completely
contradictory decisions on identical points. These various approaches,
however, seem to, more or less, present a common theme that even though
there is no rule of precedent, previous decisions have been referred (even to
question the existence of a rule of precedent) in many cases.
Citation analysis conducted by some seems to support this conclusion.
Gibson and Drahozal conducted a study to see how often decisions of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal have been cited by ICSID tribunals. They
concluded that 17 out of 38 (44.7%) of the ICSID decisions on merits cited
the Tribunals precedent.115According to a study conducted by Jeffery
Commission the use of precedents in investor state arbitration under the aegis
of ICSID has increased dramatically since 2001.116 According to him in 2006
ICSID tribunals decisions on jurisdiction contained on an average 11.25
113
114
115
116
Supra note 42, at 27.
See J. Werner, Making Investment Arbitration More Certain – A Modest Proposal, 4(5) J. WORLD
INV. 767 (2003).
Supra note 26, at 540.
Supra note 13, at 149.
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citations of pervious ICSID awards, whereas in the same year ICSID final
awards contained 9.3 citations to ICSID awards.117 Jeffery Commission further
shows that non-ICSID tribunals, such as those constituted under UNCITRAL
rules, LCIA arbitrations etc., contained on an average 18.43 citations to
previous treaty awards and decisions.118
VI. C ONCLUSION
Precedents allow for the development of the law, but also make
development constrained by the past. However, at the same time if the
decisions of a tribunal are to be used as precedents in the future they must
constrain the present. As one eminent scholar says:
“An argument from precedent seems at first to look backward.
The traditional perspective on precedent, both inside and outside
of law, has therefore focused on the use of yesterday’s precedents
in today’s decisions. But in an equally if not more important way,
an argument from precedent looks forward as well, asking us to
view today’s decision as a precedent for tomorrow’s decision
makers. Today is not only yesterday’s tomorrow; it is also
tomorrow’s yesterday. A system of precedent therefore involves
the special responsibility accompanying the power to commit the
future before we get there.”119
Such an effect of precedent does not exist in investor state arbitrations.
Whereas tribunals are examining precedents, to make reasoned and consistent
decisions, they must at the same time remain true to the unique wording of
each BIT. As ad hoc tribunals their responsibility lies primarily to the parties
appointing them.
In this sense the use of precedents in investor arbitration does not seem to
point towards a definitive rule of binding precedent. However, neither does
the practice preclude in toto the use the precedents. As the tribunal in AES
Corporation put it – “decisions … with the same or very similar issues may
117
118
119
Supra note 13, at 150.
Supra note 13, at 151.
Supra note 55, at 572.
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at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest”.120 Precedents appear
to have a limited but powerful precedential value. This approach places
responsibility on lawyers and decision makers in investor state arbitrations
to review prior cases thoroughly to determine if they sufficiently analogous
to facts in hand, and whether such a prior precedent will actually help in the
final determination of the proceedings.121 In the current economic climate
with countries tethering on the brink of bankruptcy and the possibility of a
slew of new investor-state related disputes, precedents could have a significant
bearing on the not only the development of investor-state jurisprudence, but
the fate of entire countries.
120
121
Supra note 88.
Supra note 26, at 544.
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Anti-dumping Agreements and
Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Dr. A. Jayagovind1
A BSTRACT
Article VI of the GATT, 1947, for the first time, sought to standardize national anti-dumping
laws by reference to international standards. The Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round Codes
on anti-dumping further refined the concepts and provided procedural safeguards so as to
curb the arbitrariness of national administrative authorities. The Uruguay Round produced
a comprehensive anti-dumping code providing for judicial review of administrative action
imposing anti-dumping duties on imported goods. But it is noticed that exporting countries
often resort to the dispute settlement body of the WTO without exhausting judicial remedies
provided by the legal system of the importing countries. This article argues that this bypassing
of judicial remedies is a violation of Public International Law.
C ONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 67
II.
THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION ......................................... 70
III. EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES .............................................................. 71
IV. THE WTO AND THE RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS ................................................. 73
V. THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT ............................................................. 74
VI. THE ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENT AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES ...... 77
VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................. 79
VIII.CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 80
1
Professor of Law, National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
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ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Among all international institutions, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has the most effective and credible system of settlement of disputes
between member states. The dispute settlement mechanism embodied in
the Agreement on Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), forming part of
the WTO system, has often been hailed as the ‘crown jewel’ of the regime
governing international trade. It will be interesting to consider the interface
between the traditional international legal doctrine of exhaustion of local
remedies and settlement of disputes under the WTO. Going back to 1947,
when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was adopted, the
relevance of the ‘local remedies rule’ to the GATT/WTO regime was raised
only in the context of the provisions governing anti-dumping measures under
the GATT and presently under the WTO.2
The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies is concerned with the
treatment of foreigners by the host governments. Among the Multilateral
Trade Agreements (MTAs) constituting the WTO system, the Anti-Dumping
Agreement (ADA) (i.e. “Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
GATT 1994” as per the WTO terminology) is the only agreement under which
foreigners are subjected to adverse treatment by host governments for the
conduct attributable to them. In other words, the importing country can
impose anti-dumping duty on the products dumped by foreign traders. In the
case of two other trade remedies, namely, countervailing and safeguard
measures, the foreign traders suffer the consequences of the acts attributable
to their home and host governments. Countervailing duties are levied on
imported products to counterbalance the subsidies given by the home
governments of exporters. Safeguard measures are imposed on imported
products to help the domestic industries tide over their own problems. Against
this background, it is surprising that the application of the local remedies
rule was contested precisely in the context of ADA. The issue was officially
raised for the first time by a GATT Panel in the United States: Anti-Dumping
Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinkers from Mexico.3 The
relevant observations of the Panel are as follows:
2
3
For a general discussion on these issues, see Rustel Silvestre J. Martha, World Trade Dispute
Settlement and Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule 30(4) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 107-30 (1996).
ADP/82 (September 7, 1992).
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The Panel further noted that in respect of administrative
proceedings in the U.S., there was nothing in the Agreement which
explicitly required the exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e.
that for an issue to be properly placed before a Panel, it would
have had to have been raised in the domestic administrative
proceedings. The Panel considered that if such a fundamental
restriction on the right of recourse to the Agreement’s dispute
settlement process had been intended by the drafters of the
Agreement, they would have made explicit provisions for it. The
Panel noted that Article 15.5 provided that the Committee “shall
establish a panel to examine the matter, based upon: …(b) the
facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic
procedures to the authorities of the importing country”. The Panel
observed that this provision did not require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, but provided that the matter examined by
the Panel would have to be based on the facts raised in the first
instance, in conformity with the appropriate domestic procedures,
in the administrative proceedings in the importing country.4
It may be noted that this case was based on the Tokyo Round Code which
did not mandate the judicial review of administrative decisions concerning
dumping. In fact, international anti-dumping law evolved within the
framework of the GATT, 1947 to counteract the abuse of anti-dumping law
by the domestic authorities of importing countries. Thus Article VI of the
GATT, 1947, defined dumping authoritatively for the first time and required
‘material injury’ as a condition precedent for imposing anti-dumping duties.
The Kennedy Round Code and Tokyo Round Code elaborated the
administrative procedures to be followed by the domestic authorities of
importing countries. The Uruguay Round Code, as will be shown, introduced
for the first time, judicial review of administrative decisions imposing antidumping duties. In the context of the Tokyo Round Code, it was correct to
say that it did not mandate exhaustion of local remedies, generally associated
with judicial safeguards.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Tokyo Round Code laid down the standards to be
followed by administrative authorities while investigating the complaints
4
Ibid. at para. 5.9
2010]
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
69
concerning dumping. The central issue in this case was whether Mexico
could raise certain arguments concerning “standing” (i.e. whether the
American complainants represent American domestic industry as per Article
4 of the Agreement) and “cumulation” (i.e. the U.S. administrative authority’s
decision to assess the impact of imports from Mexico cumulatively with
imports from Japan). The U.S. argument was that these issues were not raised
before the U.S. administrative authorities by Mexico and hence they could
not be raised before the Panel for the first time. The Panel ruled that Mexico
could raise these issues de novo, provided they were based on the “facts made
available to the authorities of importing countries”; Mexico’s arguments were
based on such facts.
It may be noted that as per Article 5 of the Tokyo Round Code, the function
of administrative authorities was to investigate the existence, degree and effect
of any alleged dumping. Article 6, titled ‘Evidence’, shows that the
administrative authority is essentially engaged in investigation of facts, for
Article 6 uses the expression “information” to be supplied by the parties. The
implication is that the administrative authority is engaged in the investigation
of facts and legal arguments, if any, would be incidental to questions of fact.
Article 13 of ADA, forming part of the WTO Agreement, reads:
Each member whose national legislation contains provisions on
anti-dumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia,
of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final
determinations within the meaning of Article 11. Such tribunals
and procedures shall be independent of authorities responsible for
the determination or review in question.
The above article provides for what we call in Common Law parlance the
judicial review of administrative action. It is in perfect consonance with the
international legal requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. But there
exists a loophole in Article 17.4 of the ADA, which reads:
If the Member that has requested consultation considers that the
consultations…have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution,
and if final action has been taken by administering authorities of
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the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties or to
accept price undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). When a provisional measure has significant
impact and the Member that requested consultations considers
that the measure taken is contrary to the provisions of paragraph
1 of Article 7, that member also may refer the matter to the DSU.
(Emphasis added)
The above provision is often construed literally and the governments of
exporting countries often rush to DSB once the administrative authorities of
importing countries decide to levy anti-dumping duties bypassing judicial
authorities.5 Surprisingly, this bypassing of judicial authorities was never
questioned in the WTO proceedings by the respondents (i.e. the importing
countries). It is humbly submitted that this bypassing amounts to violation
of Public International Law relating to exhaustion of local remedies and right
of diplomatic protection.
II. T HE WTO
AS AN
I NTERNATIONAL I NSTITUTION
The WTO text assiduously avoids the expression ‘Public International
Law’. The closest it comes to this expression is in Article 3.2 of the DSU,
which provides that the WTO text shall be interpreted “in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law”. Practically
every panel report ritualistically quotes this provision and refers to Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as the expression of
customary rules of interpretation of Public International Law.
In many cases, such as the Beef-Hormone Case between the USA and the
EC, the question was raised whether the WTO is bound by the general
principles of International Law, such as the precautionary principle. The
panels dodged the issue, but were categorical that the so-called general
principles of Public International Law cannot override the specific provisions
of the WTO.7 In brief, they take the position that WTO agreements are lex
6
5
6
7
This is based on information given by Indian lawyers engaged in practice in this area.
EC: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products WT/DS 26/R/1997.
Ibid, at para. 8.158.
2010]
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
71
specialis within whose framework the disputes have to be decided. No specific
provision of the WTO can be overridden by reference to the general principles
of International Law.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which has been repeatedly relied
upon by the panels, also contains paragraph 3(c), which provides that while
interpreting a treaty:
There shall be taken into account, together with the context: any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
Exhaustion of local remedies is definitely a fundamental rule applicable
in relations between states and all MTAs forming part of the WTO must be
interpreted keeping this fact in mind. Of course, it is well recognized that
states can waive the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies if they so
choose. For example, under International Convention on Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitrations, the local remedies rule will not
apply unless the host state makes it an express condition of its consent while
adhering to the Convention. This is so because of Article 26 of the Convention.
In the context of the ADA, the relevant question is whether member states
have specifically waived the requirements of exhaustion of local remedies
and whether Art. 17.4 can be so interpreted.
III. E XHAUSTION
OF
L OCAL R EMEDIES
A state would incur international responsibility if there is a denial of
justice to foreigners and this denial of justice takes place if it administers
justice to aliens in a fundamentally unfair manner. In other words, a state is
under an international obligation to create and maintain a system of justice
which ensures that unfairness to a foreigner either does not happen, or is
corrected. It is the whole system of legal protection as provided by the
municipal law which will be put to test when the denial of justice is alleged.8
The exhaustion of local remedies is a precondition for denial of justice in the
sense that a foreigner is equally duty-bound to avail all the remedies provided
under the municipal system to get justice. If the foreigner concerned fails to
8
Jan Paulson, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-10 (2007).
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get justice even after exhausting local remedies, he may appeal to his home
state to take up his case with the host state at international level. Relying
upon the international legal maxim: “injury to its national is finally injury to
the state”, the state concerned can take up the matter in exercise of its right of
diplomatic protection.
Given the complex governing structure and the process of decision-making
of any given state, a wrong committed by an official cannot be attributed to the
state, unless the government is given an opportunity to deliberate on it and take
appropriate action. In other words, to attribute a wrong of an official to the
state, it is necessary for the victim of the wrong to exhaust the available local
remedies. As the International Court of Justice put in the Interhandel Case:
“The rule that the local remedies must be exhausted is a wellestablished rule of customary international law. The rule has been
generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause
of national, whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in
another state in violation of International Law. Before resort may
be had to an international court in such a situation, it has been
considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred
should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means within
the framework of its domestic legal system.”9
Under any constitutional system of governance, these local remedies are
provided by judicial institutions independent of executive branch responsible
for causing the injury. If the judiciary fails to deliver justice, there would be
“denial of justice” by the State. This is so, since from international point of
view, the judiciary is a constituent of the State; its failure to deliver justice
will thus be attributed to the State. Given the hierarchical structure of the
judiciary designed to avoid the possibility of miscarriage of justice by human
frailty, the judgment, to be attributable to the State, must be that of the final
court. As Judge Jiminez de Archega put it:
“An essential condition of a State being held responsible for a judicial
decision in breach of municipal law is that the decision must be the
decision of court of last resort, all remedies having been exhausted.”10
9
10
U.S.A v. Switzerland, ICJ Reports (1959) 6.
Jiminiz de Archya, International Law in Part III of the Century 1 RECUEIL DES COURS 159 (1978) 282.
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ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
73
The idea of justice signifies that a person must get what is due to him.
Therefore, denial of justice to a foreigner means the deprivation of his
entitlements as a result of an action attributable to the State. These
entitlements are recognized and enforced as rights under a functional legal
system. These rights may have their origin either in municipal law or in
International Law. But, insofar as these rights have their origin in International
Law, it is necessary that such rights are incorporated in national legal system
administered by local courts. The local remedies rule has no application if
these rights are not transformed into municipal law rights; in such cases, the
executive branch of the government has to account for any breach thereof at
the international level.11
IV. T HE WTO
AND THE
R IGHTS
OF
FOREIGNERS
The basic premise of the GATT/WTO is that international commercial
transactions are essentially carried out by private individuals or entities. Tariff
concessions have no meaning if governments carry on all import-export
transactions. Viewed from this angle, one can argue that the WTO has sought
to establish and ensure “right to trade” on the part of private individuals under
International Law; this right may be considered as the realization of the
economic rights recognized by International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, 1966. Whenever this right (as defined by the
constituent agreements of the WTO) is violated by an action attributable
to a foreign state (i.e. the state other than home state of the private party
concerned), it can give rise to an international cause of action under the
WTO. Insofar as such violations can be properly redressed by the domestic
legal system, the foreigner concerned is expected to exhaust the available
local remedies. But, most of the time, and probably in most cases, the
violation of the right to trade may be the result of the policy decisions
taken at the highest level and local remedies may not be available or
appropriate under those circumstances. The DSU provides the mechanism
to settle such disputes at the international level.
11
There are very few countries in the world wherein municipal courts can directly enforce rights
derived from International Law. In such cases, the affected foreigners have to exhaust local
remedies.
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Most of the MTAs of the WTO require the member states to take necessary
legislative actions to implement their obligations in their territories.
Especially in the context of trade remedies, namely, anti-dumping,
countervailing and safeguard measures, the agreements lay down elaborate
procedures which have to be incorporated in the domestic legal system. The
result is that national institutions, while applying their own laws, are
implementing international obligations as well. It is reasonable to assume,
in light of the above analysis, that all available domestic remedies must be
exhausted before resorting to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. In
brief, all member states of the WTO are obligated to protect the right to
trade of foreign traders as per the provisions of the MTAs.
The first anti-dumping statute was passed by Canada in 1904 to counteract
dumping of steel by the U.S. This was followed by New Zealand (1905),
Australia (1906) and South Africa (1914). In the beginning, the USA treated
anti-dumping as part of its anti-trust law, but it adopted the proper Antidumping Act in 1921.12 All these national legislations vested power in
administrative authorities without leaving any scope for affected foreign
traders to challenge their decisions. As pointed out above, International Law
on anti-dumping, initiated by the GATT in 1947, sought to regulate national
discretion in this regard. The Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round Codes
prescribed the procedures to be followed by administrative authorities and
the Uruguay Round Code, for the first time, provided for judicial review of
administrative decisions. The local remedies rule hardly had any application
till the Kennedy Round Code, since there was no local remedy at all. We
have full-fledged local remedy provisions for the first time under the Uruguay
Round Code.
V. T HE A NTI -D UMPING A GREEMENT
A literal reading of Art. 17.4 of the ADA may lead to the conclusion that
the home state of the exporter may approach the DSB once “the final action
has been taken by the administrative authorities” without testing the legality
of such administrative actions before a court of law. It may be noted that Art.
12
GATT Doc. L/712 (1957) 45.
2010]
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
75
17.4 is substantially analogous to Art. 15.3 of the Tokyo Round Code.
Apparently, like so many other provisions of the Tokyo Round Code, Art.
15.3 also found its way into the WTO Code with a few appropriate changes
necessitated by the new institutional framework. The drafters failed to
adequately appreciate the significance of the introduction of Art. 13, for the
first time providing for judicial review of administrative action in
international anti-dumping law, which had been evolving over a period of
time. It must be noted that allowing the home state of an exporter to challenge
an administrative action before the WTO, bypassing the national judicial
review provided under Art. 13 amounts to defeating the raison d’etre of
momentous change ushered in by Art. 13.
Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties, often quoted by
the panels, reads:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
The clause in Art. 17.4, “if final action has been taken by administering
authorities of importing countries…”, must be interpreted in the context of
the newly introduced Art. 13, keeping in mind the objects and purposes of the
WTO Agreement. This is perfectly in consonance with Art. 31.3 (C) of the
Vienna Convention, which requires that the relevant principles of International
Law applicable between the parties must also be taken into account while
interpreting treaty provisions.
As was pointed out already, before attributing an act committed at a
relatively lower level of official hierarchy to the State, the State must be
given adequate opportunity to apply its mind and redress the grievance. It is
only at that stage that such an act can be properly attributed to the State and
that is the very purpose of the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies.
Applying the same logic, the expression “final action by administering
authorities” must be understood in the light of Art. 13 i.e. only after the final
administrative decision has been subjected to judicial scrutiny and upheld by
the judiciary can the act be considered an act of the State. It is submitted that
focusing only on “final action” in Art. 17.4, ignoring the context, would be a
violation of Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention.
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There is an authority for the above approach in international investment
jurisprudence. As was pointed out earlier, under Art. 26 of the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the local remedies rule is
not a condition precedent for resorting to international arbitration, unless
the host state specifically demands it. In an ICSID award of 2003, namely,
Generation Ukraine, Inc. Vs. Ukrain,13 the scope of Art. 26 was considered in
detail. In this case, there was a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the
USA and Ukraine and the treaty was silent about the requirement of local
remedies. This was considered as the waiver of the local remedies rule. In
this case, Generation Ukraine Inc. was a subsidiary of a US Construction
company and was engaged in several construction works in Kyiv City. In the
course of its work, it had to face several administrative and regulatory hurdles
created by Kyiv City Administration. Generation Ukraine, Inc. treated this
as indirect expropriation and invoked the international arbitration clause
straight away, without availing of the local judicial remedies. The Tribunal
ruled:
The claimant did not attempt to compel Kyiv City State
Administration to rectify the alleged omissions in its administrative
management by instituting proceedings in Ukranian courts. This
Tribunal does not exercise the function of an administrative review
body to ensure that municipal agencies perform their tasks
diligently, conscientiously and efficiently. That function is within
the proper domain of domestic courts and tribunals that are
cognizant of the minutiae of the applicable regulatory regime. There
is of course no formal obligation upon the claimant to exhaust
local remedies before resorting to ICSID arbitration pursuant to
the BIT between the USA and Ukraine. Nevertheless, in the
absence of any per se violation of the BIT discernible from the
conduct of Kyiv City State Administration, only possibility in this
case for the series of complaints relating to highly technical matters
of Ukranian planning law to be transformed into a BIT violation
would have been for the claimant to be denied justice before
Ukranian courts in a bonafide attempt to resolve those technical
matters.14
13
14
(2005) 44 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 404.
Ibid. paras. 20, 33
2010]
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
77
VI. T HE A NTI-D UMPING A GREEMENT AND
E XHAUSTION O F L OCAL R EMEDIES
Article VI of the GATT, 1947 for the first time sought to standardize
national anti-dumping laws by reference to international standards. The
Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round Codes on anti-dumping further refined the
concepts and provided procedural safeguards so as to curb the arbitrariness
of national administrative authorities. The Uruguay Round produced a
comprehensive anti-dumping code providing for judicial review of
administrative action imposing anti-dumping duties on imported goods. But
it is noticed that exporting countries often resort to the dispute settlement
body of the WTO without exhausting judicial remedies provided by the legal
system of the importing countries. This article argues that this bypassing of
judicial remedies in violation of Public International Law.
Under the ADA, the administrative authorities investigate the complaints
relating to dumping and take decisions in accordance with national antidumping laws which are expected to be in conformity with the ADA. These
decisions are not taken at such a high level as to be attributable to the State
directly. The purpose of Art. 13 of the ADA is to ensure that these
administrative decisions are in conformity with the law. Given the complexity
of anti-dumping law, these administrative decisions cannot be prima facie
considered as violations of the ADA. Following the logic of of the Generation
Ukraine Case, the denial of justice cannot be presumed in the absence of
judicial review of administrative decisions. In brief, “final action to levy
anti-dumping duties”, envisaged in Art. 17.4, can materialize only after the
“final determination” of administrative authorities have been upheld by the
judiciary under Art. 13. The distinction between “final determination” under
Art. 13 and “final action” which would follow “final determination” after the
approval of the “final determination” by the judiciary under Art. 17.4
emphasises the need for exhaustion of local remedies.
The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case
concerning Electronica Sincula S.P.A.15 supports the above conclusion. In
15
U.S.A. v. Italy, ICJ Reports (1989) 1.
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this case, which, incidentally, deals with the issue of the exhaustion of local
remedies, the U.S.A. brought an action against Italy on the basis of the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty concluded between them in
1948. The relevant provision of the Treaty, relied upon to support the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, reads as follows:
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to
interpretation or application of this Treaty which the High
Contracting Parties shall not satisfactorily adjust by diplomacy
shall be submitted to the ICJ, unless the High Contracting Parties
shall agree to settlement by some other specific means.
The cause of action in this case arose out of the actions of the Italian
Government, injuring the investments of American company Electronica
Sincula in Italy. When Italy raised the preliminary objection that the
American investor had not exhausted local remedies, the U.S.A. took the stand
that the treaty provision quoted above dispensed with such a requirement. In
other words, if the dispute could not be settled by diplomacy, there was no
need for resorting to local remedies; the above provision must be taken as a
waiver clause.
The ICJ, while agreeing that the local remedies rule can be waived by the
agreement, refused to treat the above provision as waiver. On this point, it
ruled:
The Chamber finds it unable to accept that an important principle
of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly
dispensed with in the absence of any words making clear an
intention to do so.16
Applying the same logic, it is clear that Article 17.4 cannot be interpreted
as a waiver clause in the absence of categorical expressions to that effect.
One omission in Art. 13, when it is compared with Art. 17.4, is that Art.
13 does not specifically provide for the review of provisional measures as
well. Normally, judicial review follows final administrative decisions; the
16
Ibid. para. 50.
2010]
ANTI-DUMPING AGREEMENTS AND EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES
79
drafters probably followed this general principle, overlooking the possibility
of review of provisional measures. Following the arguments developed above,
once the national legislation provides for judicial review of provisional
measures, exhaustion of local remedy would cover the review of provisional
measures by the judiciary as well.
VII. S TANDARD
OF
R EVIEW
The ADA is the only MTA of the WTO containing a distinct standard of
review to be used by panels while settling disputes. Art. 17.6 paragraphs (i)
and (ii) lay down this distinct standard in relation to facts and law respectively.
It may be noted that Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, laying down the investigation procedure in the context of
countervailing duties, contains more or less identical provisions as that of
the ADA. But it does not contain provisions similar to Art. 17.6 (i) and (ii).
A Ministerial Decision taken on the eve of the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round provided for the review of Art. 17.6 of the ADA “with a view to
considering the question of whether it is capable of general application”.
Apparently, such a review failed to yield any result. This further underscores
the importance of Art. 17.6.
Under Art. 17.6 (i), the panel will accept the findings of facts by the
national authority, provided the establishment of the facts was proper and
the evaluation of the facts was unbiased and objective. Similarly, the panel
will accept the interpretation of legal provisions by the national authorities
provided such an interpretation is permissible as per the customary rules of
interpretation. In either of the cases, national determinations will be accepted,
even if the panel would have reached different conclusions on questions of
fact or law. Though this distinct standard is confined to the ADA, in practice,
the panels have extended the same approach to Part V of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.17
The reason for this distinct standard of review is that the ADA itself has
laid down elaborate rules which have to be complied with by the administering
17
Jan Bohanes and Nicolas Lockhood, Standard of Review in WTO Law in Bethlehem stat (ed.) THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 395-6 (2009).
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authorities; judicial review would ensure this compliance. It may be noted
that there are quite a few other MTAs which lay down elaborate procedure to
be followed by administrative authorities, such as the Agreement on Customs
Evaluation, Technical Barriers to Trade, but these agreements do not contain
the provisions analogous to Art. 17.6 of the ADA. One plausible reason could
be the absence of judicial review under these Agreements. On the other hand,
the presence of judicial review in the Agreement on countervailing measures
could have been the reason for the panels to follow the special standards of
review in those cases.
VIII. C ONCLUSION
Evolution of international anti-dumping law has been by way of
introducing more and more conceptual clarity and procedural safeguards with
a view to preventing the abuses thereof. The GATT, 1947 laid down only the
basic rules and the Kennedy Round and Tokyo Round Codes clarified the
concepts such as material injury, causal link etc. and elaborated procedural
safeguards to be followed by the domestic authorities in charge of anti-dumping
administration. The WTO contains the comprehensive anti-dumping code.
In the absence of adequate domestic legal safeguards, national courts could
not have played any kind of significant role prior to the WTO Agreement,
and the WTO for the first time provided for the judicial review of antidumping administration.
Art. 17.4 of the ADA literally carried forward Art. 15.3 of the Tokyo
Round Code. Apparently the significance of Art. 13, providing for judicial
review, was not adequately appreciated while drafting Art. 17.4. However, a
contextual interpretation in light of the purpose and object concerned requires
that the home state of the exporter ensure that available judicial remedies
must be exhausted before resorting to the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. “Final action” under Art. 17.4 requires the approval of the “final
determination” by the judiciary under Art. 13. This interpretation is
consistent with the principles of Public International Law.
2010]
81
TRIPS through the lens of Global Public Goods:
Are TRIPS-plus FTAs eating up all
the good there is?
Ishupal Kang
A BSTRACT
With the adoption of TRIPS Agreement in 1994 emerged an unprecedented international
legal regime of global IP protection. Much has been talked about the fairness of this regime
and almost all of such discussions conclude that the TRIPS agreement leans in the favour of
the developed nations. Still, it is argued that TRIPS can be viewed as possessing certain features
which make the regime set up by TRIPS being identified as a Global Public Good (GPG). The
article outlines the peril faced by this GPG, in the form of the recent practice of the developed
nations to negotiate higher levels of IP protection in the guise of bilateral free trade agreements
known as TRIPS-Plus FTAs. Though these FTAs are compliant to the TRIPS and other WTO
norms, they tend to make the common minimum standards of TRIPS irrelevant. These FTAs
not only worsens the already skewed global IP protection framework but also hampers the
availability of other public goods such as elimination of epidemic diseases, improvement in
human health and well being which are of far much importance than the unbalanced global
IP scenario. The article concludes by offering plausible solutions which could be pursued to
deal with this complex issue.
C ONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 82
II.
IS TRIPS ANY GOOD AT ALL?: TRIPS AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD .............. 82
A. Global Public Good Approach: A brief outline ............................ 82
B. TRIPS as a Global Public Good .................................................... 84
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III. TRIPS-PLUS FTAS ................................................................................. 86
A. TRIPS-Plus FTAs: A Closer Look ................................................ 86
B. Impact on TRIPS ........................................................................... 87
IV. TACKLING THE TRIPS-PLUS PROBLEM .......................................................... 88
I. I NTRODUCTION
The TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS) was adopted in 1994, as part of a bundle
of multilateral agreements ushering a new global trading regime called the
World Trade Organization. Since its adoption, TRIPS has had a bitter history
and has sparked plenty of controversy.1 It has predominantly been accused of
being tailored to the needs of developed and industrialized nations, though it
does contain certain provisions which seem to accord developing and poorer
countries some room to adjust their Intellectual Property (IP) norms in
conformity with the interests of their people. In brief, the distinguishing feature
of TRIPS is that it establishes minimum standards of IP protection and hence
creates a never-seen-before harmonization of norms and standards relating
to IP protection worldwide. Latching onto this thread, this essay analyses
TRIPS through the Global Public Goods perspective and considers whether
TRIPS itself can be seen as a Global Public Good (GPG) and, consequently,
what the impact of the current flurry of TRIPS-plus FTAs on the proper and
efficient utilization of this GPG is, especially by developing countries.
II. I S TRIPS ANY GOOD AT ALL?:
TRIPS AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD
A
A.. Global Public Good Approach: A brief outline
In simple terms, a public good is one which has the twin properties of
being non-excludable, i.e., nobody can be excluded from its use, as well as
non-rival, i.e. the availability of the good is not diminished after consumption.
1
See, Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 505, 507 (2005); See also, Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 982-997 (2009).
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Public goods can be best understood in comparison to private goods:2 clean
air, often cited and much clichéd, is an example of a pure public good, while
a commodity like a burger is essentially a private good. The GPG approach,
which is a recent offshoot of the traditional public good theory, is concerned
with the transnational spill-over effects of some public goods: elimination of
epidemic diseases, environmental sustainability and promotion of free trade,
to name but a few, are now seen as GPGs, as their availability considerably
impacts the well being of all mankind. The GPG approach has emerged as an
important perspective to look at the phenomenon of globalization and the
trends and processes that come with it.3
Non-excludability and non-rivalry, however, are not intrinsic attributes
of goods, but are often the result of societal choices to make goods available
in that manner. In light of this, Kaul and Mendoza4 propose a wider definition
centred around the idea of being ‘de facto public in consumption.’5 For
instance, roads - a typical illustration of a public good - can, as an
infrastructure, support different uses, which may be deemed more or less
beneficial to society as a whole (think of a road used by tractors for farming,
as opposed to one leading to an elite holiday resort and used chiefly by
polluting SUVs). Depending on what uses that infrastructure can be put to, it
may (or may not) be kept non-rival and non-excludable.
A similar approach can be taken vis-à-vis GPGs: demand for a GPG may
vary depending on the particular international situation. TRIPS itself, for
example, has emerged only when the need was felt, owing to increasing
globalization, to establish uniform protection of intellectual property.
2
3
4
5
Inge Kaul, Governing Global Public Goods in a Multi-Actor World: The Role of the United
Nations, On the Threshold: The United Nations and Global Governance in the New Millennium,
International Conference, 19-21 January 2000, UNU Tokyo, (May 28, 2010) available at http://
www.unu.edu/millennium/kaul.pdf (last visited on 28-05-10) at 4 (Hereinafter Kaul, GPGs in
Multi Actor World).
See Inge Kaul et al., Why Do Global Public Goods Matter Today?, in, PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION at 1, 1-5 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003) [Hereinafter PROVIDING
GPGS].
See Inge Kaul and Ronald U. Mendoza, Advancing the Concept of Public Goods ?, in, PROVIDING
GPGS, supra note 3, at 78, 80-81.
Id.
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Hence, according to Morrissey, the best way to define a GPG is as a utility,
bestowing some kind of benefit which is, in principle, available to everyone
across the globe.6
B . TRIPS as a Global Public Good
To establish the basic premise of this essay, we have to place TRIPS among
the class of GPGs. For this purpose, TRIPS will first be analysed as an
international legal regime and, afterwards, the concerns will be addressed
about the benefits of the legal regime established by TRIPS.
(i) International Legal Regimes as GPGs: TRIPS included
Exponential rise in interaction and interdependence among states has led
to the necessity of formulating some commonly accepted norms, rules and
standards, with the aim of enhancing cooperation and reducing conflicts.
International legal regimes which establish these global standards are usually
considered to have a ‘crucial public good component’.7
From this point of view, TRIPS, by establishing minimum standards on
IP protection, and also as part of a wider multilateral trade regime, displays
such properties which indicate it being a GPG.8 First of all, it creates the
widest international intellectual property regime owing to its extensive
membership, which includes all the WTO members, making it truly
multilateral and global in nature. The non-excludability feature is a corollary
following this wide membership, in the sense that once a nation joins TRIPS,
it cannot, in principle, be excluded from the benefits of the global IP regime
under it. Again, it is also non-rival in consumption, implying that
participation of any new members does not lead to a reduction in the benefits
available to existing ones.9
6
7
8
9
See Oliver Morrissey et al., Defining International Public Goods: Conceptual Issues, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS: INCENTIVES, MEASUREMENT, AND FINANCING at 31, 35
(Marco Ferroni & Ashoka Mody eds., 2002).
See John O. McGinnis and Ilya Somin, Should International Law be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1175, 1237 (2007).
See Kaul and Mendoza, supra note 4, at 98.
See Ronald U. Mendoza, The Multilateral Trade Regime: A Global Public Good For All?, in,
PROVIDING GPGS, supra note 3, at 455, 460.
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(ii) Is TRIPS a global benefit in real sense?
While analysing TRIPS vis-à-vis the GPG approach, neither the question
of non-excludability nor that of non-rivalry is as contentious as the question
of whether TRIPS is, indeed, a public good (i.e. whether it generates some
kind of utility), especially for poorer countries. TRIPS reflects the bitter
conflict between the interests of the developed and developing countries and
the persistent efforts of the former to maintain their dominance over the latter,
which are perceived as nothing more than markets for selling products.10
Further, there hardly appears to be much substantial correlation between
greater IPR protection and potential benefits, like increased FDI, technology
transfer, and so on.11
Theoretically, the benefits arising out of a GPG must be completely global,
in practice it is not so.12 Public benefit does not imply that every member of
the relevant public actually derives a ‘measurable benefit’, or the same level
of utility.13 Hence, the guiding principle here is that benefits should
theoretically be available to all, even if some users do not benefit as much as
others. Supporting the idea that TRIPS makes benefits available to all its
members, one can refer to pro-South provisions of the Agreement, like Arts
7 and 8, dealing with object and principles, which, in the words of Yu, ‘may
provide less-developed countries with important tools for restoring the
balance of the international intellectual property system’,14 along with several
other flexible provisions15 such as those on compulsory licensing,16 parallel
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
See, Scott Holwick, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 57 (2009).
Charles T. Collins-Chase, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries
Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763, 781-83 (2008).
See Morrissey supra note 6, at 34.
See Morrissey supra note 6, at 34.
See Peter K. Yu, supra note 1, at 982.
See Carlos Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 65-79, 91-102 (South Centre, 2000) www.southcentre.org /publications/publichealth/
publichealth.pdf.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (opened for signature on 15 April 1994,
came into effect on 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299 [Hereinafter TRIPS] (March 15, 2010), http:/
/www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm, see Art. 31.
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importation,17 experimental use exception18 and developments like the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.19 Moreover, some
scholars, like Reichman, are of the view that ‘the medium and long term
effects of the IP regime set up by TRIPS may ‘boomerang’ against the
developed countries leading to a more equitable position for developing
countries’.20
III. TRIPS- PLUS FTA S
Recently, it has become more common for developed countries, most
prominently the U.S., to enter into Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with
developing countries, which contain IP protection that is more stringent
than the minimum standards prescribed in the TRIPS Agreement, thus
known as TRIPS-plus FTAs. This has emerged as an important tool for
developed countries in the wake of stronger resistance put forward
collectively by developing countries in the multilateral set-up.21 In this
sense, the TRIPS agreement becomes a ‘floor rather than the ceiling’22 as
far as global IP norms and standards are concerned. But these TRIPS-plus
FTAs do not only raise the level of IP protection, but also restrict the use of
TRIPS’ flexibilities.23
A . TRIPS-Plus FTAs: A closer look
Concerns of public health, due to the higher patent protection, are the
most pressing in the TRIPS-plus FTAs debate. As an illustration, FTAs
concluded by the U.S with developing countries like Chile, South African
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
Ibid., Art. 8.1.
Supra note 16, Art. 30.
World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In The Twenty-First Century: Will The Developing
Countries Lead Or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1119-20 (2009).
Collins-Chase, supra note 11, at 780.
Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility Of Non-Violation Disputes,
12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1024 (2009).
See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. World Intell. Prop. 791,
793 (2001).
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TRIPS THROUGH THE LENS OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
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and Central American States contain TRIPS-plus provisions, like extended
protection by longer patent terms, a wider range of patentable subject matter
and, most importantly, limitations on TRIPS flexibilities like those on
compulsory licensing and parallel importation.24 These flexibilities in the
TRIPS Agreement are crucial from the developing nations’ perspective, most
remarkably those battling with epidemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and
facing the problem of access to life-saving drugs. Narrowing policy options
in these areas leave such nations with hardly any choice or strategy to combat
similar threats to human health. The negative impact of such FTAs can
even be seen in countries like Australia and Jordan, who have TRIPS-Plus
FTAs with the U.S., resulting in a two-year delay in release of generic
versions of patented drugs, rise in drug prices and harm to local production.25
B . Impact on TRIPS
Considering sovereign states act in the international arena as private actors,
always following policies which are conducive and in consonance with their
national interests, the impact of such an approach is definitely a matter of
concern. Ass there is no central agency to govern and supervise the conduct
of sovereign states, keeping the interests of all in perspective, there is always
the need for a minimum standard of international cooperation to arrive at
some common ground.26 Though some may debate it, TRIPS can be viewed
as such a common ground. Raising the level of IP protection through these
FTAs disrupts whatever little balance we can make out of TRIPS. The main
purpose of TRIPS may be to establish minimum standards of IP protection,
but the provisions like the flexibilities are an integral part of it, giving space
to nations to exercise their autonomy by moulding IP protection to suit their
specific needs.
Moreover, the problem is not just limited to disequilibrium caused in
respect to the legal utility and benefits of the TRIPS Agreement, it is deeper
24
25
26
See Assafa Endeshaw, Free Trade Agreements as Surrogates for TRIPS-Plus, 28(7) E.I.P.R. 374380, 384 (2006).
See Collins-Chase, supra note 11, at 780.
See Kaul, GPGs in Multi Actor World, supra note 2, at 7.
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and much more sinister. TRIPS-plus FTAs restrict the availability of other
public goods like reduction of epidemic diseases and overall improvement in
human health, which are much more essential than protection of intellectual
capital. In this sense, as Chon puts, TRIPS can be seen as a global intermediary
good which leads to provision of several public goods.27
IV. T ACKLING
THE
TRIPS- PLUS P ROBLEM
The solution to the problem posed by TRIPS-plus FTAs is not
straightforward. Objectively speaking, these FTAs are WTO-compliant,
as even the TRIPS Agreement provides that enhanced levels of IP
protection may be negotiated and enforced between the member nations.28
Moreover, the weak bargaining position of developing countries, in a
bilateral setting, which is a strong incentive for developed countries to
resort to TRIPS-plus FTAs, makes the prospect of renegotiations or other
such efforts improbable.
In such a situation, analyzing the problem from a GPG approach seems
to offer some plausible solutions. The approach offers a wider perspective
which is not limited to TRIPS as a tool for establishing a global IP regime.
Instead, it helps us to view the regime set up by TRIPS in relation to other
key policy concerns. Accordingly, the TRIPS-plus obligations which are
being thrust upon developing countries through FTAs can be seen as “public
bads” which, apart from affecting the functioning of TRIPS, are also
becoming big obstacles in the ability of several countries to provide for
other more important public goods such as control of epidemic diseases and
a high level of public health.
The strategy to be adopted to combat this issue is twofold. In the short
term, the focus should be on addressing those issues which are more pressing,
rather than on restoring the balance of the global IP regime. Accordingly,
problems like the access to essential medicines are to be seen independently
27
28
See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2821, 2833 (2006).
TRIPS, supra note 16, Art. 1.
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TRIPS THROUGH THE LENS OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
89
from the TRIPS-plus debate. It must be understood that such problems can be
best tackled if efforts are made in alternative fora of international cooperation
which are much more suited and are sympathetic towards such concerns, like
specialized agencies of the United Nations such as WHO and other civil
society groups.
On other hand, the ambitious goal of achieving an equitable stand in the
global IP regime can be best pursued through collective efforts in the
multilateral set up. This suggestion seems easier said than done. However,
keeping in mind the recent developments such as the Doha Declaration29 and
the 2005 TRIPS Amendment,30 there is some room for hope.
29
30
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,
41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
World Trade Organization, Amendment of TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6 December 2005,
WT/L/641, (June 5, 2010) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
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Article 102 and High Technology Industries:
The Impact of the European Microsoft and
Intel Cases
Michael Reynolds and Michelle Chowdhury1
A BSTRACT
High technology industries have frequently come under scrutiny by competition authorities,
and the computer software and hardware industries are no exception. In the last few years
the European Commission (the Commission
Commission) has imposed record fines on two of the world’s
Microsoft
largest high technology companies, the Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft
Microsoft) and the Intel
Intel
Corporation (Intel
Intel), for abuse of their respective dominant positions under Article 82 of the
Article
EC Treaty (now Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article
102
102)).2 Two separate cases have been brought against Microsoft, one of which started in
1998 and is still ongoing. The Intel case has also taken almost a decade so far, and has yet to
reach its final conclusion.
This article gives an overview of these cases, all three of which are substantively and
procedurally complex. The article concludes with some reflections on the impact of these
cases on the development of antitrust law and the consequences for future defendants.
1
2
Michael Reynolds is a partner in the International Antitrust Group at Allen & Overy LLP in
Brussels and London. He led the team advising Sun Microsystems, the main complainant in one of
the Microsoft cases discussed in this article. Michelle Chowdhury trained at Allen & Overy LLP
and is now completing an LL.M. at Georgetown University. The authors would like to thank Fiona
Muir and Katherine Abraham for their invaluable research assistance.
As a result of the Lisbon Treaty there has been a wholesale renumbering of the Articles of the EC
Treaty, including of what were previously known as Articles 81 and 82 – renumbered now to
Articles 101 and 102. There has been no substantive change, as the original wording has been
retained. The Microsoft and Intel cases were originally brought under Article 82, but for clarity
the new numbering will be used in this article.
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ARTICLE 102 AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
91
C ONTENTS
I.
MICROSOFT V. COMMISSION ...................................................................... 91
A. Sun Microsystems – the Work group server and WMP case ...... 91
B. Opera – the File formats and IE case ............................................ 98
II. INTEL V. COMMISSION ............................................................................. 100
A. Background ................................................................................. 100
B. The Decision ............................................................................... 101
III. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................ 102
I. M ICROSOFT V . C OMMISSION
The Commission has brought two major cases against Microsoft for
infringement of Article 102, the first concerning work group servers and
WMP
Windows Media Player (WMP
WMP) – the Sun Microsystems case3 - and the
second relating to Internet Explorer (IE) and file formats – the Opera case.4
A . Sun Microsystems – the Work group server and WMP case
(i) Background
Microsoft is active in the supply of a range of software products including
and in particular, operating systems. An operating system is a software product
that controls the basic functions of a computer and allows the user to run a
variety of applications. Microsoft supplies operating systems for client PCs
(i.e. individual computers, which may or may not be connected to a network),
as well as for work group servers (i.e. operating systems for small- to mediumsized networks of computers that allow delivery of basic network services –
sharing of files stored on servers, sharing printers, and administration of
network access). In order for a work group server to function, its operating
system must be compatible with the operating system of the client PCs
connected to the network, as well as with the operating systems of any other
networks with which the work group server is integrated.
On 10 December 1998 Sun Microsystems Inc. lodged a complaint against
3
4
Case COMP/ 37.792.
Case COMP/39.9530.
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Microsoft with the Commission, alleging that Microsoft was acting in breach
of Article 102. Sun Microsystems was also active in the supply of work
group server operating systems. Sun Microsystems complained that
Microsoft was refusing to disclose to it the technology necessary to allow
interoperability of Sun Microsystems’ work group server operating system
with the Windows client PC operating system, supplied by Microsoft. Sun
Microsystems claimed that without this interoperability information it would
be unable to compete on the market for work group server operating systems.
In addition, in February 2000 the Commission launched an investigation
into Microsoft’s WMP product.5 WMP is one of several software products
capable of reading sound and image content in digital format “streamed” over
the internet, i.e. it can decode the corresponding data and translate them into
instructions for hardware (for example, loudspeakers or a screen). The
Commission’s concerns centred on the integration by Microsoft of WMP
into its Windows operating system.
SOs
The Commission sent Microsoft three Statements of Objections (SOs
SOs) in
which it set out its preliminary view of the case. The First SO, sent on 2
August 2000, raised concerns in relation to interoperability between the
Windows client PC operating system and third party work group server
operating systems (“client-to-server interoperability”).6 The Second SO, sent
on 29 August 2001, expanded the objections of the First SO to include issues
of interoperability between third party work group servers and Microsoft’s
work group servers (“server-to-server interoperability”).7 The Commission
also addressed the concerns relating to WMP. The Third SO, issued on 6
August 2003, further supplemented the first two.8
More than five years after the initial complaint had been lodged, the
Commission adopted a decision on 24 March 2004 (the Infringement
5
6
7
8
9
IP/00/141, Commission examines the impact of Windows 2000 on competition.
IP/00/906, Commission opens proceedings against Microsoft’s alleged discriminatory licensing and
refusal to supply software information.
IP/01/1232, Commission initiates additional proceedings against Microsoft.
IP/03/1150, Commission gives Microsoft last opportunity to comment before concluding its antitrust
probe.
Commission Decision 24 March 2004 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792.
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ARTICLE 102 AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
93
Decision
Decision) finding that Microsoft had infringed Article 102 EC. 9
(ii) The Infringement Decision
The Commission found that there were three distinct product markets in
issue:
Market 1.
Market 2.
Market 3.
Client PC operating systems
Work group server operating systems
Streaming media players
In relation to the client PC operating system market (Market 1) the
Commission found that, at least since 1996, Microsoft had held a dominant
position with a market share of over 90%. This dominant position had been
protected by significant barriers to entry attributable to indirect network
effects. These indirect network effects were caused by two factors: (i) end
customers appreciate platforms on which they can use a large number of
applications, and (ii) software developers design applications for the PC
operating systems that are most popular with customers.
The Commission identified two ways in which Microsoft was leveraging
its dominance in Market 1, with the conduct having effects in Markets 2 and
3 respectively:
Refusal to supply – Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant
position in Market 1 by refusing to supply Sun Microsystems and other
suppliers of server operating systems with the interoperability information
needed by these firms in order to compete effectively against Microsoft’s
work group server operating systems in Market 2. The interoperability
information was so vital that Microsoft’s refusal risked eliminating
competition in Market 2. The Commission found Microsoft to have both
short run and long run incentives to foreclose rivals from the work group
server market, and this contention was supported by documentary evidence
in the form of internal communications within Microsoft. The abusive
conduct was found to have taken place from October 1998 to the date of
the Infringement Decision and was part of a general pattern of conduct
that involved a disruption to previous levels of supply of information
with a negative effect on technical development. The Commission rejected
THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
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[Vol. 3 (1)
Microsoft’s arguments that there was an objective justification for its
refusal.
Tying – Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant position in
Market 1 by tying WMP with its Windows client PC operating system,
such that no version of the Windows client PC operating system was
available without WMP. The Commission found that since this mode of
distribution to PC users was only available to Microsoft, and was by far
the most effective means of distribution, it would allow Microsoft to
weaken competition in Market 3. Microsoft’s conduct satisfied the four
conditions for tying, for the purposes of Article 102 EC:
(i)
Microsoft has dominance in the market for the “tying good”
(i.e. client PC operating systems),
(ii)
The tying good and “tied good” (i.e. streaming media players)
are separate products,
(iii)
No untied supply is available (it was not possible to get a
Windows client PC operating system without WMP), and
(iv) The tying forecloses competition in the market for streaming
media players.
The abusive conduct was found to have taken place from May 1999 until
the date of the Infringement Decision.
(iii) Remedies
Microsoft was fined almost €500 million (US$600 million) and ordered
to remedy the abusive conduct. To address its refusal to supply abuse,
Microsoft would be required to disclose to its competitors specifications of
protocols used by Windows work group servers on reasonable terms by 27
July 2004. The Infringement Decision also provided for the appointment of
a monitoring trustee, nominated by Microsoft, to provide impartial expert
advice to the Commission on compliance issues. The trustee was empowered
to access Microsoft’s documents, premises, employees and source code and
to monitor implementation of the remedies. Microsoft was made liable for
the costs of the trustee.
To address the tying abuse Microsoft was ordered to offer a version of its
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ARTICLE 102 AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
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Windows operating system that did not include the WMP by 28 June 2004,
and to refrain from using technological, commercial or contractual means
that would be equivalent to tying in the future.
(iv)
Appeals and non-compliance
Following the initial Infringement Decision in March 2004, Microsoft
Appeal with the Court of First Instance (the
lodged an appeal (the Main Appeal)
10
CFI
CFI) on 7 June 2004. Later that month Microsoft announced that it had also
filed for interim measures (the Interim Request
Request), requesting that the CFI
suspend the remedies ordered by the Commission until the outcome of the
Main Appeal, so as to delay the disclosure of information and the release of
an unbundled version of Windows until the CFI had ruled on the Infringement
Decision.11
The Interim Request was dismissed on 22 December 2004.12 The following
year, in November 2005, the Commission took a decision under Article 24(1)
of Regulation 1/2003 finding that Microsoft had not complied with the March
2004 Infringement Decision.13 The Commission issued an SO relating to
this alleged continuing non-compliance and, after receiving Microsoft’s
responses, imposed a penalty of €280.5 million (US$350 million) on Microsoft
on 12 July 2006 (the First Compliance Decision
Decision).14 On the same date, the
Commission decided that, should Microsoft continue to fail to comply, the
maximum amount of the penalty would be increased from €2 million per day
to €3 million per day with effect from 31 July 2006.
The Main Appeal was not heard until April 2006 when a five-day hearing
took place before the CFI. On 17 September 2007, almost a year and a half
later, the CFI handed down its judgment upholding the Commission’s
10
11
12
13
14
15
OJ C 179 of 10.07.2004 at 18.
Statement from Microsoft Corporation on Filing of Request for Suspension of European Commission
Remedies http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/jun04/06-27eususpensionstatement.mspx.
Order dated 22 December 2004 in Case T-201/04 R.
Commission Decision dated 10 November 2005 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792.
Commission Decision dated 12 July 2006 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792.
Judgment dated 17 September 2007 in Case T-201/04.
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Infringement Decision.15 The only modification related to the monitoring
trustee. The CFI ruled that the Commission did not have the power to oblige
Microsoft to appoint and pay for a trustee empowered to retrieve various
prescribed information from Microsoft.
In relation to the refusal to supply interoperability information, the CFI
confirmed that a refusal by a dominant firm to license intellectual property
does not itself constitute an “abuse” under Article 102. Such conduct may be
an abuse if the product or service is indispensable to competing in a different
market, but even then, only if the refusal would exclude competition on the
neighbouring market, and if the refusal prevents the appearance of new
products for which there is potential consumer demand. The CFI ruled that
these exceptional circumstances were present in the case of Microsoft, and
that there was no objective justification for its conduct.
In relation to the WMP tying abuse, the CFI used a weaker legal test than
had been previously applied, stating that it was only necessary to examine
whether the tying by its nature had a foreclosure effect, and not necessary to
look at the actual effects the bundling had already had on the market. The
CFI therefore significantly widened the scope of the tying abuse.
The following month, Microsoft made commitments to comply with the
Infringement Decision and withdrew the remaining appeals it had lodged
with the CFI, firstly against the First Compliance Decision (the First
Compliance Appeal
Appeal), and secondly against aspects of the remedies imposed
by the Infringement Decision.16
On 27 February 2008 the Commission took a further decision against
Decision).17 The
Microsoft on compliance (the Second Compliance Decision
Commission fined Microsoft €899 million (US$1.1 billion) for noncompliance. The Commission found that, contrary to the Infringement
Decision, Microsoft had not provided other work group server suppliers with
complete and accurate technical information on reasonable terms to allow
16
17
Order dated 27 November 2007 in Case T-313/05 and Order dated 6 December 2007 in Case T271/06.
Commission Decision dated 27 February 2008 in Case COMP/C-3/37.792.
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ARTICLE 102 AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
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them to compete. In particular, Microsoft was attempting to charge excessive
royalties for protocols which it claimed were innovative but which the
Commission found were not. The fine related to non-compliance for the
period between June 2006 and October 2007, the earlier period having already
been covered by the First Compliance Decision.
On 9 May 2008 Microsoft lodged an appeal against the Second Compliance
Decision (the Second Compliance Appeal
Appeal).18 The grounds for appeal were
as follows:
•
The Commission imposed the penalty payments in order to force
Microsoft to apply “reasonable” price terms without first specifying what
terms the Commission would consider to be reasonable. Microsoft was
therefore unable to avoid the penalty.
•
The Commission made a manifest error of assessment and breached its
duty to state reasons.
•
The Commission did not give weight to the fact that (i) Microsoft’s
published rates were lower than those which a third party determined
were reasonable, and (ii) no prospective licensee had failed to reach an
agreement.
•
The Commission based its assessment on reports of the monitoring trustee
which in turn were based on documents obtained using investigatory
powers which the CFI had held to be unlawful.
•
The €899 million fine was excessive and disproportionate.
In November 2008 the CFI granted leave to intervene to Computing
CompTIA
CompTIA) and the Association for
Technology Industry Association Inc (CompTIA
ACT
Competitive Technology, Inc (ACT
ACT) on behalf of Microsoft; and to the
SIAA
Software and Information Industry Association (SIAA
SIAA), Free Software
FSFE
FSFE), Samba Team, Red Hat, Inc. and the European
Foundation Europe (FSFE
18
19
OJ C 171 of 05.07.2008 at 41.
Order dated 20 November 2008 in Case T-167/08.
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Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS
ECIS) – which groups together
ECIS
companies including Adobe, IBM, Nokia and Oracle – on behalf of the
Commission.19 As of May 2010 no further progress had been made on the
Second Compliance Appeal. We will have to wait and see how this case pans
out before we fully understand the CFI’s position in relation to the
Commission’s power to impose remedies.
B. Opera – the File formats and IE case
(i) Background
Like the Sun Microsystems case, the Opera case also consists of two strands
– an alleged refusal to supply abuse and an alleged bundling abuse.
Opera, a Norwegian internet browser company, filed a complaint with
the Commission on 13 December 2007 in relation to web coding standards
and the bundling of Internet Explorer (IE) into the Windows client PC
operating system. The Commission sent Microsoft an SO on 15 January 2009.20
The SO followed the precedent set in the previous Infringement Decision
and the CFI judgment.
In April 2009 the Commission granted “interested third party” status to
ECIS.21 ECIS alleged that Microsoft was refusing to disclose sufficient
interoperability information across a range of products, including information
relating to its Office suite, a number of its server products, and also in relation
to the so-called .NET Framework. In addition ECIS claimed that Microsoft’s
new file format (Open Office XML), as used in Microsoft Office, was not
sufficiently interoperable with competitors’ products.
Google, Mozilla, FSFE and PIN-SME joined ECIS in intervening in the
case on behalf of the Commission. The Association for Competitive
ACT
Technology (ACT
ACT) intervened on behalf of Microsoft.
20
21
MEMO/09/15, Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Microsoft on the tying
of Internet Explorer to Windows.
Support Grows for EU Browser Case against Microsoft, www.ecis.eu/documents/
ECISanIntervenorinEUMicrosoftbrowsercaseApril2009.pdf.
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(ii) Commitments
The initial prospects did not look good for Microsoft. Commentators
speculated that the fine that might be imposed by the Commission could well
exceed the record fine levied against Intel in 2009. The Commission stated
that the start date of the infringement, if one was found, would be 1996 and
the end date would be beyond the 2004 Infringement Decision. This would
have led to a large multiplier, which could also have meant that the fine
would have hit the statutory ceiling of 10% of global revenues, i.e. over $5
billion.
A closed-door hearing was initially proposed for 3 to 5 June 2009 but
Microsoft objected to the dates because an international conference of antitrust
officials was to be held over the same dates and the scheduling clash would
mean that key decision-makers might be absent from the hearing. The hearing
officer deemed Microsoft to have withdrawn its request for an oral hearing
and the hearing was not rescheduled.
The remedies in the first Microsoft case were widely criticised as
ineffective. In particular, sales of the version of the Windows operating system
supplied without WMP were very low. The Commission’s concerns in
relation to IE mirror those in the WMP case – i.e. that Microsoft has unique
access to a distribution system making IE available to 90% of PC users, and
that this also encourages software developers to design their products so as to
be Windows and IE compatible. Therefore when, in June 2009, Microsoft
announced that it would be launching a new Windows operating system
without IE, the Commission expressed concern that this proposal would
actually offer consumers less, rather than more, choice and would therefore
not be an effective remedy.22
In July 2009 it was reported that Microsoft had proposed substantial
22
23
24
MEMO/09/272, Commission Statement on Microsoft Internet Explorer Announcement.
MEMO/09/352, Commission welcomes new Microsoft proposals on Microsoft Internet Explorer
and Interoperability, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/39530/
commitments.pdf.
2009/C-242/04, Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003
in Case COMP/C-3/39.530.
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remedies to deal with these concerns.23 Amongst the five-year commitments
market tested by the Commission in October 2009, Microsoft offered to supply
a version of Windows which would enable original equipment manufacturers
OEMs
(OEMs
OEMs) or consumers to suppress IE.24 The deadline for comments on
Microsoft’s commitments was 9 November 2009. On 16 December 2009 the
Commission announced that it had adopted a Commitment Decision under
Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 accepting Microsoft’s commitments and making
them legally binding.25
Under the commitments, Microsoft has agreed to make available for five
years in the European Economic Area a “Choice Screen” enabling users of
Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7 to choose which web browsers
they want to install in addition to, or instead of, IE. This facility will be
available through the Windows automatic update mechanism. The
commitments also provide that OEMs will be able to install competing web
browsers, set those to default and turn off IE.
If Microsoft were to break its legally binding commitments it would be
subject to a fine imposed by the Commission of up to a maximum of 10% of
Microsoft’s annual turnover. The Commission would not have to prove breach
of EU competition rules.26
The commitments are to be reviewed by the Commission in two years’
time. This review will confirm whether the commitments made by Microsoft
have been sufficient to allay the Commission’s concerns, and will therefore
be followed very closely by other players in high technology industries.
II. I NTEL V . C OMMISSION 27
A
A.. Background
AMD
AMD) filed a complaint
In October 2000 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD
25
26
27
Commission Decision dated 16 December 2009 in Case COMP/C-3/39.530.
Mlex, EC Statement: Antitrust- Commission Accepts Microsoft Commitments to give users browser
choice, 16 December 2009.
Case COMP/37.990.
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with the Commission against Intel for offering allegedly abusive rebates and
imposing exclusivity provisions in relation to x86 Central Processing Units
CPUs
(CPUs
CPUs) – the computer chips that make up the main hardware component of
a computer. Five years later, the Commission and national competition
authorities raided Intel’s offices across Europe. In 2006 AMD and the
Federation of German Consumer Organisations (Verbraucherzentrale
Bundesverband, VZBV) filed complaints with the German competition
authority (Bundeskartellamt), which were subsequently passed to the
Commission. The Commission sent Intel an SO in July 2007,28 and raided
Intel’s premises again in February 2008. After an oral hearing in March
2008, a second SO was sent to Intel in July 2008.29
B . The Decision
In May 2009 the Commission imposed a record fine on Intel of €1.06
billion (US$1.3 billion),30 or 4.15% of Intel’s worldwide turnover in 2008,
for abuse of its dominant position; the largest fine ever levied on one firm.
The abuse was found to have taken place between 2002 and 2007, during
which Intel held at least 70% of the market for x86 CPUs.31
Applying its new guidelines on exclusionary abuses,32 the Commission
found that Intel had foreclosed the market by:
1. Offering illegal royalty rebates
Intel offered significant rebates, which were wholly or partially hidden,
to OEMs that bought all or substantially all of their x86 CPU requirements
from Intel. Intel also made direct payments to a major retailer on the
condition that it stocked only computers with Intel x86 CPUs. It is
important to note that the Commission did not hold that rebates are illegal
28
29
30
31
32
MEMO/07/314, Commission confirms sending Statement of Objections to Intel.
MEMO/08/517, Commission confirms supplementary Statement of Objections sent to Intel.
MEMO/09/235 Commission imposes fine of 1.06 billion Euros on Intel for abuse of dominant
position; orders Intel to cease illegal practices - questions and answers.
Commission Decision dated 13 May 2009 in Case COMP/C-3/37.990.
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 102 of the EC Treaty to
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (C(2009) 864).
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in themselves; the Commission accepts that rebates are an inherent part
of doing business and can be beneficial to the consumer. The Commission
did however find that the conditions attached to the rebates/payments
offered by Intel excluded AMD from the market, impeded innovation
and prevented customers (and ultimately consumers) from choosing rival
products.
2 . Payments to manufacturers
Intel also made payments to OEMs which were unrelated to the purchase
of Intel products, to delay or cancel the launch of AMD-based products and/
or to put restrictions on the distribution of specific AMD-based products.
The Commission concluded that these payments had the effect of preventing
competing products, for which there was a consumer demand, from being
introduced to the market.
Intel lodged its appeal against the fine in July 2009, claiming that the
Commission committed several legal errors.33 Intel claimed that the
Commission misinterpreted and ignored certain evidence when constructing
its case, and failed to meet the required standard of proof. In particular, Intel
believes that the Commission failed to conduct any analysis of the foreclosure
effects of the rebates in Europe, and also incorrectly applied the “as efficient
competitor” test which formed part of its analysis.
In November 2009 the EU Ombudsman, a watchdog that monitors EU
institutions, criticised the Commission’s handling of the case, in particular
the failure of the Commission in taking a proper note of the meeting with the
computer-maker Dell, which formed part of its investigation.34 The
Commission has however stood-by its interview procedure in the face of the
Ombudsman’s criticism, claiming that informal interviews, such as those
that occurred with Dell, were valuable as part of the investigative procedure.
It is worth noting, however, the Ombudsman did not find that the Commission
had infringed Intel’s rights of defence.
33
34
OJ C 301 of 22.11.2008 at 60.
Decision of the European Ombudsman closing its enquiry into complaint 1935/2008/FOR against
the European Commission, http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/decision.faces/en/4164/
html.bookmark#hl0.
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III. C ONCLUSIONS
Although the cases discussed above are still in progress, it is not too early
to reflect on their impact, not least because more than a decade has passed
since the first Microsoft case was launched. This in itself demonstrates a key
problem with antitrust enforcement in high technology industries – by the
time the cases have reached their conclusion the marketplace has moved
quickly beyond the problems dealt with in the case, and some of the
competitors involved may have fallen by the wayside in the meantime.
Further, the fate of Microsoft, subject to a second investigation just as the
first was finally drawing to a close, should be noted by other companies as an
indication that allowing the relationship with the Commission to sour may
lead to a string of antitrust cases. The support the Commission had from the
CFI in the Microsoft case will also be useful to the Commission as a bargaining
tool against any future infringers contemplating bringing an appeal against a
Commission decision.
The above cases clearly demonstrated a movement towards large fines
for antitrust breaches – Microsoft’s fine of almost €500 million (US$600
million) under the Infringement Decision was the highest fine ever to be
imposed on an individual company as of 2004, a dubious title now held by
Intel. The revised fining guidelines35 give the Commission the power to
impose very large fines and it has not shied away from using such power.
The Commission has made clear that it wants to send a strong message that it
takes abuse of dominance seriously and this area of antitrust law is a key
enforcement priority. The Commission is trying to reinforce its position as
a progressive and activist enforcer, something that has not changed with the
rotation of power within the Commission towards the end of 2009.
There has been much criticism of the mounting levels of fines imposed
by the Commission, in Article 102 cases and also in cartel cases. Some
35
36
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No
1/2003 (2006/C 210/02).
See e.g., D. Slater et al., , Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the
right to a fair trial: no need for reform?, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW CENTRE WORKING PAPERS SERIES,
GCLC W ORKING P APER 04/08, http://www.coleurope.eu/content/gclc/documents/
GCLC%20WP%2004-08.pdf.
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perspective is of course needed – the €500 million (US$600 million) fine
imposed on Microsoft in the Sun Microsystems case can be compared to the
€50 billion of cash on Microsoft’s balance sheet at the time of the decision.
However, the growth in the fine amounts imposed by the Commission over
the last few years has been almost exponential. Some have argued that such
penalties are contrary to the principles of due process.36 The argument goes
that the fines have been so high that they can now be deemed criminal in
nature. If that is the case then the concern is that the administrative procedures
that make up an antitrust investigation would not meet the standards of a
criminal investigation. Further, the dual role of the Commission as
investigator and adjudicator becomes even more perverse, and may even
violate Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
ECHR
ECHR). 37
There are naturally two sides to this story. The other side concerns
adequate punishment of offenders, successful deterrence through
administrative penalties, and some concept of proportionality that takes into
account the level of damage caused by competition law infringements.38 From
this point of view the Commission’s latest spate of penalties have not been
“too high”, rather the fines levied in the preceding decades have been “too
low”.39 The legal basis of the fines has not changed and the fines are no more
criminal than they ever were. It is still relatively rare for the Commission’s
fine to reach the 10% turnover cap, the express purpose of which is to limit
the penalties to a proportionate amount.40 Finally, the Community courts
37
38
39
40
41
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221, UKTS 71 (1953).
Wouter P.J. Wils, The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review, and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 33(1) WORLD COMPETITION (2010).
See Philip Lowe, Cartels, Fines and Due Process, GCP ONLINE, Release Two (2002).
See e.g. Joined Cases C189/02 Dansk Rørindustri A/S and others v Commission, [2005] ECR
I5425, ¶ 281: “That [10%] limit is therefore one which is uniformly applicable to all undertakings
and arrived at according to the size of each of them and seeks to ensure that the fines are not
excessive or disproportionate.”
See e.g. the recent judgment in Case T54/03 Lafarge v Commission, ¶ 35 (not yet published); also
see Joined Cases 209/78 et al. Heintz van Landewyck and others v Commission, [1980] ECR 3125,
¶ 81.
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have repeatedly ruled that the Commission is not a “tribunal” under
Community law and therefore its dual role does not violate the ECHR.41
Putting aside the remarkable fines, the Intel and Microsoft cases also raised
issues of the nature of the Commission’s investigation. The Intel case in
particular gives an example of the extensive powers of investigation that the
Commission is prepared to use in abuse of dominance cases. The Commission
highlighted that Intel went to great lengths to conceal the existence of the
anti-competitive conditions attached to its rebates and payments, ensuring
that they were not evident on the face of the agreements. However, the
Commission relied on emails and other contemporaneous evidence, gathered
from the dawn raids of Intel’s offices and through responses to information
requests, to establish the illegal conditions.
Microsoft argued that the proposed disclosure remedies in the work group
server and WMP case would limit its incentives to innovate. It may turn out
however that the increase in interoperability actually enhances Microsoft’s
incentives to innovate, as it tries to ensure that its work group servers are
better than the competition. If this increase in innovation manifests itself
then it may have an impact on remedies in future high technology cases.
In other respects the Microsoft case does have some unique features, i.e.
Microsoft’s “super-dominance”, which may prove a distinguishing factor in
terms of the cases’ substantive precedential value. However, the CFI’s
judgment in the work group server and WMP case may prove to have
significantly lowered the threshold for an obligation to license IP rights as
well as having widened the scope of abusive tying. The CFI was at pains to
point out the “special responsibility” to the market which dominant
undertakings have. Whatever the distinguishing features, the Intel and
Microsoft cases will clearly be used as a guide and a benchmark for Article
102 cases in high technology industries in the future.