Decentralised versus centralised governance of health
services (Protocol)
Sreeramareddy CT, Sathyanarayana TN
This is a reprint of a Cochrane protocol, prepared and maintained by The Cochrane Collaboration and published in The Cochrane
Library 2013, Issue 11
http://www.thecochranelibrary.com
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HEADER . . . . . . . . . .
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . .
BACKGROUND . . . . . . .
Figure 1.
. . . . . . . .
OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . .
METHODS . . . . . . . . .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
. . .
REFERENCES . . . . . . . .
ADDITIONAL TABLES . . . . .
APPENDICES . . . . . . . .
CONTRIBUTIONS OF AUTHORS
DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST .
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Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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i
[Intervention Protocol]
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services
Chandrashekhar T Sreeramareddy1 , TN Sathyanarayana2
1 Faculty
of Medicine and Health Sciences, University Tunku Abdur Rahman, Kajang, Malaysia. 2 Health Policy and Management,
Public Health Foundation of India, Hyderabad, India
Contact address: Chandrashekhar T Sreeramareddy, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, University Tunku Abdur Rahman,
Kajang, Selongor, 43000, Malaysia. chandrashekharats@yahoo.com.
Editorial group: Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group.
Publication status and date: New, published in Issue 11, 2013.
Citation: Sreeramareddy CT, Sathyanarayana TN. Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services. Cochrane Database
of Systematic Reviews 2013, Issue 11. Art. No.: CD010830. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD010830.
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
ABSTRACT
This is the protocol for a review and there is no abstract. The objectives are as follows:
To assess the effects of decentralisation or centralisation of governance of health services on access to health care, utilisation of health
services, population health and other outcomes of interest.
BACKGROUND
Governance, particularly ‘good governance’ is an important determinant of economic growth, social advancement, and overall development, including the eight millennium development
goals (MDGs) to be achieved in low-and-middle-income countries (LMICs) (Akin 2001; Davoodi 1998; Siddiqi 2009). According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), governance is “the exercise of political, economic and administrative
authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels”
(United Nations Development Program 1997). In order to achieve
development goals, public sector policy reforms are ongoing in
both high-income countries (HICs) and LMICs. Decentralisation
is one such public sector policy reform, in which greater autonomy
is provided to lower levels for one or more governmental services,
including those levels responsible for health services. Thus decentralised governance of health services means transfer of authority in planning, management and decision making from national
to sub-national level (i.e. to the regional, state, district/municipal
level), or in general from higher levels to lower levels in the hierarchy of governance (Robalino 2001). Decentralised governance of
the health system may encompass some of the typical functions of
higher level (central) government such as the allocation of central
funds and recruitment of human resources for health. Authority
for some functions may remain centralised while others are decentralised. Typically, decentralisation is a dynamic phenomenon
with greater or less centralisation of governmental services at different times, depending on the political context.
In HICs such as the USA, UK, Spain and Italy, decentralisation of
health services has been a part of broader fiscal decentralisation in
which federal authority has been devolved to the sub-national level
by providing autonomy to regional and local authorities (Litvak
1998; Mills 1990; Saltman 2007). In contrast to this, decentralisation of the health services in many LMICs has mostly occurred as
a response to the primary healthcare approach promoted by international agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO)
and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (Akin 2001;
WHO 1995). Health system decentralisation has been implemented in different forms and to different extents depending on
the existing political and public administrative structure of the
country and the organisation of the health system itself (Bossert
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1
1995; WHO 1995). For instance, in Botswana, primary health
care was decentralised to district and town councils and managed
by a district health team while central government continued to
fund the capital grants and recurrent expenses (Maganu 1990).
In Chile, there are two levels of decentralisation: regional level
and municipalities. The regional health secretariat and area health
services have complete autonomy in all functions and in health
services administration. Through an agreement with the director
of health services, the municipalities own the primary healthcare
system (which includes infrastructure, equipment and staff ) but
the costs of services, including staff salaries, are paid by national
health funding (Montoya-Aguilar 1990).
Several countries in south-east Asia, including India, Nepal
and Bangladesh, have also accepted decentralisation in principle through their respective constitutions and policy frameworks.
However, the implementation of decentralisation has been very
limited due to a lack of committees, boards or local governments
(such as municipalities) in many settings; the unwillingness of
central actors to take forward these policies; and resistance from
health staff themselves (Pokharel 2000).
cision space map’ to help analyse the range of choices available.
This approach focuses on how much choice is exercised by decentralised decision makers over ‘what functions’. The decision space
approach defines health system functions (such as financing, service delivery, human resources, access rules, and governance) and
their sub-functions, and the range of choice exercised by officials
at different levels of the health system for these functions (defined
as ‘narrow’, ‘moderate’ or ‘wide’) (see Table 1) (Bossert 1998). The
approach is therefore applicable to both decentralised and more
centralised health system governance. Where governance is more
centralised, the range of choice (authority) over various health system functions is greater for higher administrative levels, such as
state/regional/provincial or national levels.
We will draw on elements of the ’decision space approach’ for this
review.
Based on this approach, we will include healthcare decisions made
both at central and decentralised levels and covering a range of areas
such as financing, service delivery and organisation over which
the decision makers have authority. However, we will not attempt
to classify the range of choice exercised by officials into ‘narrow’,
‘moderate’ and ‘wide’ since these categories are difficult to define
clearly in the context of this review.
Description of the condition
Decentralisation of health services is not a simple health sector reform since it is not always clear which functions should be decentralised, who will initiate the process and at which levels decentralisation should take place. Furthermore, the enabling or constraining conditions for successful decentralisation are not well understood(Asfaw 2007; Jutting 2005).
Available studies on the effects of decentralised public governance
(in general) report only outcomes such as government’s size and
quality, and economic growth, and little on the effects of decentralisation on population health outcomes (Robalino 2001) and
health systems performance, in terms of quality, access, utilisation, equity and efficiency. This literature is diverse in quality and
content. It includes country case studies with descriptive analyses,
qualitative studies and appraisals of decentralised health services
governance. This literature provides theoretical frameworks and
causal hypothesis about the possible effects of decentralised governance of health services on population health outcomes. However, there are a few quasi-experimental and mixed methods studies which have assessed the effects of decentralised health services
governance on health outcomes.
Description of the intervention
There is a lack of clear definitions for types and levels of decentralisation. Two approaches have been proposed for understanding
decentralisation of health services. In the early 1990s, the WHO
proposed a four-fold typology (Mills 1990). Later, Bossert outlined a ’decision space approach’ (Bossert 1998) which uses a ‘de-
How the intervention might work
Governance forms one of the WHO’s building blocks for health
systems and influences the functions of the other building blocks
within this framework (WHO 2007). It has been suggested that
good governance may lead to improved health system performance
(Bossert 1995). Indeed, the ultimate goal of health system reforms
involving decentralised governance is often to improve access to
and utilisation of healthcare services. Improved access may, in turn,
lead to improvements in population health outcomes such as morbidity, disability and mortality (Collins 1995; Khaleghian 2004;
Mills 1990).
In centralised governance, resources such as staffing and funding
are managed from the centre and allocated to specific health programmes or functions. However, more decentralised models of
governance, in which local decision makers have greater decision
space, may help to ensure that the selection of priorities is more
congruent with local needs as lower level authorities may have a
better understanding of how best to use available resources. Decentralised governance may also be more accountable to local communities and stakeholders and may help to build local institutional
capacity (Heywood 2010). One of the pathways through which
decentralisation may improve access to health care and other social services may therefore be through enhancing the participation
of the community in decision making (Collins 1994; Robalino
2001). However, it has been argued that institutional capacity and
mechanisms of accountability are necessary for decentralised authority to translate into improvements in lower level health systems
(Bossert 2011). In addition to the above benefits, decentralised
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
2
health programs are said to be closer to their users, fulfil local
health needs and allow for increased flexibility and transparency
(Lieberman 2002; Litvack 1999). Figure 1 shows a logic model
of pathways leading to improved health outcomes as a result of
decentralised governance of health.
Figure 1. Logic model for pathways of decentralised governance of health services on health outcomes
Decentralised health systems governance may also have negative
impacts. For example, poorer local governments may not be able
to raise necessary revenues, resulting in the inadequate allocation
of funds. For instance, local governments may provide inadequate
funding for preventive services in the absence of centrally-funded
vertical health programs. Other unintended effects could include
increased workloads of frontline health workers due to the integration of services at local level and expansion of the range of services provided by them. This, in turn, may lead to burnout and
low morale (Lakshminarayanan 2003). Other potential negative
consequences include the mismanagement of funds in the absence
of control by higher authorities, and poor management of health
services due to new roles and responsibilities, particularly if local
managers do not have sufficient capacity and training to take on
these roles (Tanzi 1996).
Why it is important to do this review
There is conflicting evidence regarding the desirable and undesirable effects of decentralisation and centralisation (Anokbonggo
2004; Atkinson 2004; Bossert 2002; Bossert 2003; Bossert 2007;
Gupta 2004; Heywood 2010; Jimenez 2005; Lakshminarayanan
2003; Robalino 2001; Rubio 2011; Soto 2012). To date, no systematic review has been undertaken to assess the available evidence of the effects of decentralisation or centralisation on access
to health care, utilisation of health services, population health and
other outcomes of interest.
OBJECTIVES
To assess the effects of decentralisation or centralisation of governance of health services on access to health care, utilisation of
health services, population health and other outcomes of interest.
METHODS
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
3
Criteria for considering studies for this review
Types of studies
1. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
2. Non-randomised controlled trials (NRCTs)
3. Controlled before-after (CBA) studies
4. Interrupted time series (ITS) studies
CBA studies with at least two intervention sites and at least two
control sites and ITS studies with at least three time points before and after the implementation of the intervention will be considered. We will include cluster randomised and non-randomised
studies, provided that they meet our other inclusion criteria.
Types of participants
Decision makers, including policy makers, public officials and
health facility managers; health service providers; and health service users in any country.
Types of interventions
• Centralisation of governance of health services where the
authority for policy making, planning or management is
transferred to a higher (more central) level of government from a
lower (more decentralised) level of government; e.g. from district
to state or from state to national authorities.
• Decentralisation of governance of health services, where the
authority for policy making, planning or management is
transferred to a lower (more decentralised) level of government,
from a higher (more central) level of government; e.g. from
national to state or from state to district authorities.
Interventions to decentralise or centralise health service governance may include components intended to change the degree to
which officials and others making decisions regarding health care
make use of their decision-making powers (i.e. their decision space
(Bossert 1998)).
‘Authorities’ include governments and government agencies with
responsibility for policy making, planning or management of
health services. Government agencies can have varying degrees of
autonomy, independence and accountability.
Exclusions
We will exclude interventions that transfer authority from the government to a government agency, or from a government agency to
the government at the same level of government. This is because
such changes do not constitute either centralisation or decentralisation of health service governance.
We will exclude interventions that do not transfer authority for
policy making, planning or management of health services. This
includes transfer of authority over educational institutions that
train health professionals and transfer of authority over other sectors that affect health (e.g. food or housing), unless it is part of a
broader reform that also includes transfer of authority over health
services.
We will exclude interventions that expand the authority of the government or government agencies by transferring authority from
the private sector to the government or a government agency. Interventions that transfer authority from the government or a government agency to the private sector (privatisation) also will be excluded. This includes transfer of authority to or from professional
organisations, non-governmental organisations, and international
development agencies. This is because such changes do not necessarily constitute either centralisation or decentralisation of health
service governance.
Types of outcome measures
Primary outcomes
To be included, studies must report at least one of the following
types of outcomes:
• Utilisation, coverage or access to health services or health
insurance
• Quality of care
• Patient outcomes
• Resource use
• Productivity or efficiency
• Any adverse (undesirable) effects
Secondary outcomes
In addition we will record any of the following outcomes that are
reported in included studies:
• Impacts on equity (i.e. differential effects across advantaged
and disadvantaged populations, such as low-income or rural
populations)
• Health provider outcomes, including workload, work
morale, stress, burnout, sick leave
• Satisfaction of patients, providers, decision makers or other
stakeholders
• Changes in revenue sources
Search methods for identification of studies
We will search for and include both published and unpublished
studies and studies reported in any language without any time
limits.
Electronic searches
We will search the following electronic databases:
• The Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials
(including The Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
4
Care (EPOC) Group Specialised Register) (The Cochrane
Library)
• MEDLINE (Ovid)
• EMBASE (Athens)
• PubMed
• International political science abstracts (Ebsco)
• PAIS
• Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
• Health Management
• Global Health (CAB Direct)
• World Health Organization (WHO) Global Health Library
• The Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE,
The Cochrane Library)
• LILACS
We will develop strategies that incorporate the methodological
component of the EPOC search strategy combined with selected
index terms and free text terms. The MEDLINE search strategy
will be translated into the other databases using the appropriate
controlled vocabulary as applicable (See Appendix 1 for our MEDLINE search strategy).
We will search for ongoing trials in the following two trial registries:
1. International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP),
World Health Organization (WHO): http://www.who.int/ictrp/
en/
2. ClinicalTrials.gov, US National Institutes of Health (NIH):
http://clinicaltrials.gov/
Searching other resources
We will search the websites and online resources of the following organisations: United Nations Development Program, World
Bank, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, the
Society for Health Systems Research.
We will also handsearch the journals Health Policy and Planning
and Health Services Research.
We will check the reference lists of all the identified primary studies
to identify additional studies. The authors of relevant studies will
also be contacted to identify any further published or unpublished
studies. In addition, we will search the Science Citation Index and
the Social Sciences Citation Index for studies which cite studies
included in the review.
We will contact experts in the field of health systems research or
authors of other relevant reviews to check if they are aware of any
relevant studies.
Data collection and analysis
Selection of studies
The search results from the various sources will be uploaded into
EROS (Early Review Organising Software) (see: http://www.eros-
systematic-review.org/). We will use EROS for managing and
screening references. We will delete duplicate records of the same
references. Titles, abstract and full text articles for potentially-relevant studies will be screened independently by two review authors
(CTS and TNS).
Any disagreements between the authors will be resolved through
discussion or by consultation with a potential third review author.
If a potentially-eligible study or included study has incomplete
information, we will attempt to contact the authors to obtain
further details.
Data extraction and management
Each of the two review authors will independently extract data
from the eligible studies, including the following elements:
1) Study details
• Name of the first author
• Year when the study was conducted
• Date of publication
• Country and region within the country where study was
conducted
• World Bank classification of the country (low-income
country, middle-income country or high-income country)
2) Types of interventions
• Level of government or government agencies to which
authority is transferred
• Level of government or government from which authority
is transferred
• Types of areas for which authority is transferred (e.g.
decisions about financing, service organisation, human resources)
• How decentralisation/centralisation was undertaken (i.e.
the process used to implement this change)
• Intervention group participants
• Control group participants
We will also extract information about key functional areas for
which authority was transferred. For example, these may include
the formation of local governing bodies (e.g., at district hospitals
or at community level) who have autonomy to levy user fees and
to use the funds generated for hospital development, procuring
essential drugs and equipment, recruiting doctors, nurses, technicians, etc.
3) Study characteristics
• Study design
• Risk of bias (see Assessment of risk of bias in included
studies below)
4) Outcome measures assessed in the study
• Primary outcomes
• Secondary outcomes
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Assessment of risk of bias in included studies
Two independent authors (CTS and TNS) will assess the risk of
bias for studies that are included in the review. For this purpose we
will use the ’Risk of bias’ criteria suggested by the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) group (EPOC
2013). These include nine criteria which provide guidance to assess sequence generation, allocation concealment, blinding, incomplete outcome data, selective outcome and reporting and other
potential sources of bias for randomised trials, non-randomised
trials and controlled before-after studies, and seven criteria for interrupted time series studies. The studies will be divided into three
categories based on the ’Risk of bias’ approach suggested in the
Cochrane Handbook (Higgins 2011): low risk of bias, moderate
risk of bias, high risk of bias. Disagreements about risk of bias will
be resolved either through discussion or by consulting the third
author.
Measures of treatment effect
Continuous and categorical data extracted from eligible studies
will be analysed separately. For dichotomous outcome variables
we will calculate risk ratios and their 95% CIs. For continuous
data we will calculate mean differences and their 95% CIs. If
similar outcomes are measured on different scales, we will calculate
standardised mean differences. For continuous outcomes, we will
preferably extract post-intervention values if the required means
and standard deviations are available, since all studies may not
report change from baseline (change score) (Higgins 2008).
For ITS studies, we will perform re-analysis if sufficient data are
available from the eligible studies or authors provide the data (if
sufficient data are not available). For each outcome measure we will
undertake re-analyses to calculate standardised short- and longterm effects as the changes in level and in trends (respectively)
before and after the intervention (Aaserud 2006).
Unit of analysis issues
If cluster randomised trials or controlled before-after studies are
included in the review, we will use the reported cluster adjusted risk
ratios or mean differences and their 95% CIs. If the analysis was
not adjusted for clustering we will use the intracluster correlation
coefficient (ICC), if available, to adjust the confidence interval. If
the ICC is not available, we will attempt to impute it from other
studies included in the review.
Dealing with missing data
We will try to contact the authors of included studies to obtain
missing data where possible. If it is not possible to obtain missing
data, we will attempt to impute missing values. All the assumptions
made for any imputations will be documented.
We will use intention-to-treat analyses if the authors have reported
this or contact the authors to perform such re-analyses. In case of
unavailability of intention-to-treat analyses, and indications that
the data are not missing at random, we will consider whether this
constitutes a risk of bias.
If aggregate data such as the standard deviation for change-frombaseline are missing, we will use the standard deviation for the same
outcome from another study, if available, or we will impute the
standard deviations using recommended methods (Abrams 2005).
Assessment of heterogeneity
Studies meeting the inclusion criteria will be assessed for heterogeneity on the basis of the context (including the income level of
the country), differences in the participants, differences in the interventions with respect to the levels from and to which authority
is transferred and the decision space (types of authority that are
transferred), and differences in study designs.
For studies that evaluate similar interventions and report similar
outcomes and might therefore be included in a meta-analysis, statistical heterogeneity will be measured according to recommendations in the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions (section 9.5.2). We will measure heterogeneity using the I2
statistic. This statistic describes the percentage of total variation
across studies that is due to heterogeneity (Higgins 2011).
Assessment of reporting biases
If there is a sufficient number of included studies (at least 10) reporting similar comparisons and outcomes, we will examine asymmetry in funnel plots as an indication of the need to explore the risk
of publication bias or other causes of asymmetry (Sterne 2001).
For continuous outcomes with intervention effects measured as
mean differences, the test proposed by Egger 1997 will be used to
test for funnel plot asymmetry. For dichotomous outcomes with
intervention effects measured as risk ratios, and continuous outcomes with intervention effects measured as standardised mean
differences, we will not undertake funnel plot calculations as the
methods for this are not well developed.
We will interpret the results of tests for funnel plot asymmetry in
the light of visual inspection of the funnel plot, as the statistical
results may not be representative if there are small-study effects.
Data synthesis
Studies that evaluate similar interventions will be grouped together
and the results for those studies will be summarised in tables, including key characteristics of each study (explanatory factors), outcomes reported in natural units and, when relevant, standardised
outcome measures to facilitate comparisons across studies. If there
are two or more studies that evaluate similar interventions and
report similar outcomes, we will calculate pooled risk ratios, mean
differences or standardised mean differences using a random-effects model. Otherwise, we will report the median and range of
effects, if relevant, or measures of effect from individual studies
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
6
when there are not other studies evaluating a similar intervention
and reporting a similar outcome.
For each group of studies we will prepare a ’Summary of findings’
table, including an assessment of the quality of evidence for each
of the main outcomes or types of outcomes (as listed under Types
of outcome measures above). Quality of evidence will be assessed
using the GRADE approach (Guyatt 2008).
Subgroup analysis and investigation of heterogeneity
We expect that there could be variations in the findings of the
different studies included in the review due to various sources of
heterogeneity. These include the level to and from which authority
was transferred, the areas of health service governance for which
authority was transferred, economic status of the countries (HICs
or LMICs according to the World Bank classification), political
structure (i.e. the system of government of the country) and the
outcomes measured (e.g. utilisation, coverage or access for different types of health services) (see Table 2). We will use graphical
ways to report the results (e.g. bubble plots or box-plots displaying medians and quartiles) to visually explore heterogeneity due
to the factors outlined above. If this approach suggests important
heterogeneity, and there are sufficient numbers of studies, metaregression will be used to examine the listed variables as predictors
of heterogeneity. We will use ’metareg’ command in STATA (version 10) with the restricted maximum likelihood option (Sharp
1998). We will also consider equity analysis for selected outcomes.
Equity analysis will explore if subgroups of the included populations, such as the poorest and richest or lowest educated and highest educated groups, benefited equally from the intervention. We
will classify the populations according to whatever relevant social
determinants of health are reported in each study.
If sufficient studies reporting similar interventions and similar outcomes are available we will perform subgroup analyses to explore
the differences in main outcome measures according to the categories outlined in Table 2.
Sensitivity analysis
We will test the robustness of our findings by modifying any assumptions that are made about missing data within a plausible
range of values and by removing studies at a high risk of bias, if
there are studies with different risks of bias evaluating the similar
interventions and reporting similar outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors acknowledge the help provided by Marit Johansen in
developing the search strategies and additional support from the
Cochane EPOC Review Group.
REFERENCES
Additional references
Aaserud 2006
Aaserud M, Dahlgren AT, Sturm H, Kosters JP, Hill S,
Furbert CD, et al.Pharmaceutical policies: effects on
rational drug use, an overview of 13 reviews. Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews 2006, Issue 2. [DOI:
10.1002/14651858.CD004397.pub2]
Abrams 2005
Abrams KR, Gillies CL, Lambert PC. Meta-analysis of
heterogeneously reported trials assessing change from
baseline. Statistics in Medicine 2005;24:3823–44.
Akin 2001
Akin J, Hutchinson P, Strumpf K. Decentralization and
Government Provision of Public Goods: The Public Health
Sector in Uganda. Carolina Population Center University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Working Paper 01-35 2001.
Anokbonggo 2004
Anokbonggo WW, Ogwal-Okeng JW, Obua C, Aupont
O, Ross-Degnan D. Impact of decentralization on health
services in Uganda: a look at facility utilization, prescribing
and availability of essential drugs. East African Medical
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∗
Indicates the major publication for the study
ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table 1. A ‘decision space map’ for analysing the range of choices exercised by decentralised decision makers
Key functional areas
Financing- Sources of revenue - Allocation of expenditures - Income from fees and contracts
Service delivery and organisation- Hospital autonomy - Insurance plans - Payment mechanisms - Contracts with private providers
- Required programs/norms
Health workforce- Salaries - Contracts - Civil service
Access rules- Targeting
Governance rules- Facility boards - Health offices - Community participation
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
9
Table 2. Subgroup analyses for differences in the effects of decentralised or centralised authority
Explanatory factors
Categories that will be considered for Predicted interaction and its direction
each factor
Functional areas of health services gover1. Financing (sources of funds as
nance for which authority was transferred disbursed centrally or locally raised and
allocation for current activities)
2. Service delivery and organisation
(autonomy of local health systems/
hospitals over implementation of
activities, making decisions about
insurance plans and payment mechanisms
for health personnel, etc.)
3. Health workforce (recruitment,
postings, discipline and decisions on
salaries of health personnel)
1. The effects of decentralising the
financing of health services only may be
less than the effects of decentralisation
that includes a wider range of functional
areas. This is because locally raised funds
alone may be insufficient for local needs
(in the absence of central funding).
2. Decentralisation that involves service
delivery and organisation may be more
effective than that involving other
functional areas. This is because lower
levels of the health system may then be
able to better organise health services
according to local priorities.
3. The effects of decentralised
governance for heath workforce issues
only may be less than if decentralisation
includes a wider range of functional areas.
This is because staff salaries and health
staff allocation may not match local needs
if the funding of health programmes is
still centrally decided.
Economic status of the country (World
Bank definition)
The effects of decentralised governance of
health services may be less in LMICs compared to HICs. This is because the infrastructure and resources to support decentralisation are inadequate or less developed
in LMICs
1. High-income countries
2. Middle-income countries
3. Low-income countries
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
10
APPENDICES
Appendix 1. MEDLINE search strategy
#
Searches
1
(decentraliz* or decentralis* or de centraliz* or de centralis*).ti,ab
2
(((transfer* or transition? or hand* over or handover or pass* over or passover or shift* or delegat* or devolv* or devolution)
adj6 (authority* or responsibilit* or resources or funds or funding or autonomy or autonomous)) and (district* or region* or
local or municipal* or community or communities or town?)).ti,ab
3
(governance adj3 (district* or region* or local or municipal* or community or communities or town? or centralized or centralised)
).ti,ab
4
or/1-3
5
randomized controlled trial.pt.
6
controlled clinical trial.pt.
7
multicenter study.pt.
8
(randomis* or randomiz* or randomly).ti,ab.
9
groups.ab.
10
(trial or multicenter or multi center or multicentre or multi centre).ti
11
(intervention? or controlled or control group? or (before adj5 after) or (pre adj5 post) or ((pretest or pre test) and (posttest or
post test)) or quasiexperiment* or quasi experiment* or evaluat* or effect? or impact? or time series or time point? or repeated
measur*).ti,ab
12
or/5-11
13
exp Animals/
14
Humans/
15
13 not (13 and 14)
16
review.pt.
17
meta analysis.pt.
18
news.pt.
19
comment.pt.
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
11
(Continued)
20
editorial.pt.
21
cochrane database of systematic reviews.jn.
22
comment on.cm.
23
(systematic review or literature review).ti.
24
or/15-23
25
12 not 24
26
4 and 25
CONTRIBUTIONS OF AUTHORS
CTS: drafted the protocol, will obtain copies of the studies and select studies to be included, extract data and enter data into RevMan,
perform the analysis and interpret the results, and draft and update the final review.
TNS: will obtain copies of the studies and select which studies to include, extract the data and carry out duplicate data entry, interpret
the analysis, and co-draft the final review.
DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST
No conflict/s of interests to declare.
Decentralised versus centralised governance of health services (Protocol)
Copyright © 2013 The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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