The Rise of Developing Asia and the
New Economic Order
by
Dale W. Jorgenson1 and Khuong M. Vu23
Abstract: This paper identifies emerging trends in the world economy during the
next decade. The first is that China will overtake the U.S. in terms of gross domestic product
(GDP), ending more than a century of U.S. leadership as the world’s largest economy. The
second is that Developing Asia, excluding Japan, will overtake the G7, a group of the seven
largest industrialized economies established in 1975-6. Finally, India will overtake Japan,
Russia will overtake Germany, and Brazil will overtake the U.K., leading to a New World
Economic Order: China, the U.S., India, Japan, Russia, Germany, and Brazil.
Key words: growth, information technology, investment, productivity.
JEL classification: O47.
1. Introduction.
As the world economy recovers from the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the revival of
growth in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Japan, and other industrialized countries has been slow
and protracted. International imbalances and fiscal consolidations have become more pressing,
both economically and politically.4 A successful recovery will require skillful withdrawal
1
Samuel W. Morris University Professor, Harvard University.
Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of
Singapore.
3
We are grateful to Jon Samuels of Johns Hopkins University and Hieu Nguyen of the National University of
Singapore for excellent research assistance and very helpful comments.
4
See IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2011.
2
1
from policies adopted to cope with the downturn. Could a new and perhaps unexpected shock
interrupt the recovery?
An obvious threat to the restoration of economic growth is the continued worsening of
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the inability of international institutions to cope with a
fiscal and financial crisis in large countries like Spain and Italy. Among the emerging
economies the challenges are different, but equally daunting. Can China successfully handle
the inflationary pressures following the vast expansion of lending in response to the financial
crisis? Will India undertake a fiscal consolidation without threatening rapid growth, now
exceeding the growth of China?
In this paper we shift attention from threats to the short-term growth of the world
economy, as formidable as these may be, to growth potential over the next decade. The
fundamentals for the world economy are strong. Moreover, it is time to recognize the
emerging trends that have developed since the watershed reforms of China and India more
than two decades ago. A massive reconfiguration of the world economy is gradually unfolding
and will be completed in the next ten years.
We focus on the Rise of Developing Asia, where this refers to sixteen economies of
East and South Asia, excluding Japan. These include China and India, the two largest
countries of the world in population and two of the most rapidly growing economies.
Developing Asia also includes the Newly Industrialized Economies of Asia – Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Developing Asia has emerged from the Great Recession of
2007-2009 with growth trends largely intact. This reflects “lessons learned” during the Asian
Crisis of the 1990’s and the deployment of substantial international reserves as buffers against
the recessionary shock.
2
The first of the major trends in the world economy to be realized within the next
decade is that China will overtake the U.S. One of the most heralded economic developments
of 2010 was that China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy. In terms of
purchasing power parities this was old news. According to the World Bank scorecard, China
overtook Japan more than five years ago.5 What was the hullaballoo? In 2010 China overtook
Japan in terms of exchange rates rather than purchasing power parities.
Whether international comparisons are based on purchasing power parities or exchange
rates, we can agree that China is No. 2. However, China is growing much faster than the U.S.,
the world’s No. 1 economy for more than a century, according to the authoritative estimates of
the late Angus Maddison.6 When will China become No. 1? The International Monetary
Fund’s World Economic Outlook for April 2011 calls for parity between the two economies in
2016. Our conclusion is that the most likely date for China to become No. 1 in terms of
purchasing power parities as defined by the World Bank is 2018.
An exclusive focus on China-U.S. comparisons is unwarranted, even though these two
economies will comprise more than a third of the world economy in 2020. What other changes
can we anticipate? The second major trend is that Developing Asia will overtake the G7 in
2018. This trend will be largely driven by the rapid growth of China, but India will also make
a significant contribution. Growth in the Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan – will continue to slow, but all except Hong Kong will grow more rapidly than the
world economy. Indonesia’s growth will equal that of the world economy.
The final trend is that India will overtake Japan, Russia will overtake Germany,
5
6
See World Bank (2008).
See Maddison (2006).
3
and Brazil will overtake the U.K., leading to a New World Economic Order in 2020: China,
the U.S., India, Japan, Russia, Germany, and Brazil. The G7 was established as a group of the
six leading advanced economies in 1975 and Canada was added in 1976. The rise of
Developing Asia and other emerging and transition economies like Russia and Brazil is
already anticipated in the shift from the G7 to the G20 for international policy deliberations.
How do we arrive at these conclusions? We first analyze the sources of economic
growth for the world economy, seven regions, and fourteen major economies during four
periods – 1990-1995, 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2009. We then project the potential
growth rates of labor productivity and GDP for 122 economies over the ten-year period 20102020. Relative to historical growth for 1990-2009, we project lower growth rates for the world
economy and the major regions.
In a previous paper7 we have presented measures of real output and input, as well as
productivity, for 122 countries for the period 1990-2008. Our concept of real output employs
measures of real GDP presented in the World Bank’s International Comparison Program
(ICP). We have developed measures of real input based on the production account proposed
by Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006). Productivity is the ratio of real output to real input. These
estimates are essential for projecting the potential growth of the U.S. and the world economy,
as demonstrated by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008).
As recently as 2000 the G7 economies accounted for more than half of world GDP,
while Developing Asia accounted for just under twenty percent. The rise of Developing Asia
has been unrelenting and the corresponding figures for 2009 were 41.5 for the G7 and 27.5 for
Developing Asia. Our projections indicate a change of leadership to Developing Asia in 2018.
See Jorgenson and Vu (2010). Our measures of productivity are also consistent with Paul Schreyer’s (2001)
OECD Productivity Manual.
7
4
Noting that Japan belongs to the G7 and not to Developing Asia, the change to Asia will occur
even earlier.
In Section 2 we present our measures of output, input, and productivity. We
document the resurgence of economic growth in the world economy after 1995 and the
deceleration of growth after 2005 in Section 3. In Section 4 we allocate economic growth to
the contributions of capital and labor inputs and productivity and show that input growth
greatly predominates. We present relative levels of output and input per capita and
productivity for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009 in Section 5. Section 6 describes the
uncertainties about the future growth of the world economy and Section 7 gives our
projections of potential growth for 2010-2020. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Growth Accounting.
The major challenge in implementing a consistent and integrated production account
like that of Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) is the construction of a measure of real input.
The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) and BLS (1993) have provided measures of
the price and quantity of labor services. These can be combined with the price and quantity
of capital services introduced by BLS (1983) to generate price and quantity indexes of real
input, as well as multifactor productivity. The primary obstacle to constructing of capital
service measures is the lack of market rental data for different types of capital.
An alternative approach for measuring rental prices is to impute these prices from
market transactions prices for assets, employing the user cost formula introduced by
Jorgenson (1963). This requires estimates of depreciation and the rate of return, as well as
asset prices. Measures of asset prices and depreciation, as well as investment and capital
stocks, are presented in BEA’s (2011) reproducible wealth accounts. BLS employs the
5
imputed rental prices as weights for accumulated stocks of assets in generating price and
quantity measures of capital services.
The most important innovation in the prototype system of national accounts
developed by Jorgenson and Landefeld (2006) is to include prices and quantities of capital
services for all productive assets in the U.S. economy. The incorporation of the price and
quantity of capital services into the 2008 System of National Accounts (SNA) was approved
by the United Nations Statistical Commission at its February-March 2007 meeting. The 2008
SNA was published in 2009. Paul Schreyer, head of national accounts at the OECD, has
prepared an OECD Manual, Measuring Capital, also published in 2009.
In Chapter 20 of the 2008 SNA, “Capital Services and the National Accounts,”
estimates of capital services are described as follows: “By associating these estimates with
the standard breakdown of value added, the contribution of (labor) and capital to production
can be portrayed in a form ready for use in the analysis of productivity in a way entirely
consistent with the accounts of the System.” Our measures of capital and labor inputs are
consistent with the new architecture for the U.S. national accounts, the 2008 SNA,
Schreyer’s (2001) OECD Productivity Manual, and his OECD Manual, Measuring Capital.
The output data for our growth accounts are compiled from World Development
Indicators Online (2011). The input data are drawn from the following sources:
The Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED) is our source for all input data for
24 OECD countries and data on employment and hours worked for all countries.8 This is
8
See http://www.conference-board.org/economics/database.cfm. The OECD countries are: Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and South Korea.
6
also the source of labor quality growth for 103 countries; we use our own estimates, as
described in Jorgenson and Vu (2010) for the remaining countries.
The data on investment in information technology equipment and software are from
Digital Planet reports published by the World Information Technology and Services
Alliance (WITSA).
Our sample consists of 122 economies, which account for over 95 percent of world GDP
and IT expenditures. For purposes of analysis, we divide the world economy into seven
economic groups/regions:
1. G7 (seven largest industrialized economies): Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
United Kingdom, and United States.
2. Non-G7 (17 non-G7 industrialized economies): Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
3. Developing Asia (16 economies):: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
4. Latin America (20 economies): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
5. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (22 economies): Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
7
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
6. Sub-Saharan Africa (29 economies): Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Central African Rep., Chad, Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and
Zambia.
7. North Africa and Middle-East (11 economies): Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon,
Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.
We also report results for seven leading countries of Developing Asia – China, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
3. World Economic Growth, 1990-2009.
We have sub-divided the period 1990-2009 in 1995, 2000, and 2005 in order to
capture the response of IT investment to the accelerated decline in IT prices in 1995
documented by Jorgenson (2001). The period 1995-2000 encompasses the IT-generated
investment boom of the last half of the 1990’s. The period 2000-2005 includes the dot-com
crash of 2000, the shallow U.S. recession of 2001, and the slow recovery that followed. The
period after 2005 is dominated by the economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009.
World economic growth has undergone a powerful revival since 1995. The GDP
growth rate jumped more than a full percentage point from 2.20 percent during 1990-1995 to
3.37 percent in 1995-2000 and then to 3.71 percent in 2000-2005, as shown in Table 1. Not
surprisingly, given the world-wide financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009, the growth of
world GDP decelerated to 3.06 percent in 2005-2009. We can underscore the significance of
8
more rapid growth by pointing out that GDP growth of 2.20 percent doubles world output
every 32 years, while 3.71 percent growth doubles world output in less than 19 years.
To analyze the restructuring of the world economy, we first consider the shares of
world product and growth for the seven regions, the G7 economies, and seven leading
economies of Developing Asia presented in Table 1. The G7 economies accounted for
slightly over half of world product in 2000. However, the growth rate of these economies has
lagged considerably behind world growth rates. This has led to a decline of eleven
percentage points in the G7 share of world product from 52.5 percent in 1990 to 41.5 percent
in 2009.
The rise of Developing Asia is almost a mirror image of the decline of the G7
economies. The 16 economies of Developing Asia generated only 13.1 percent of world
output in 1990 but 17.4 percent in 1995, 19.2 percent in 2000, 22.6 in 2005, and 27.5 percent
in 2009. Developing Asia generated more than half of world growth during the remarkable
revival of 1990-1995, but this share declined to 24.2 percent during the period 1995-2000,
which includes the Asian economic crisis. These economies accounted for 43.6 percent of
world growth during 2000-2005 and an astonishing 64.9 percent during 2005-2009!
The U.S. has been the world’s largest economy for more than a century. By 2005
Japan had fallen from its ranking as the world’s second largest economy to third largest after
China, but remained second among the G7 economies.9 Germany had dropped to fourth
place by 2000, following the U.S., China, and Japan, but had fallen behind India by 2009.
However, Germany has retained its position as the leading European economy. France, Italy
9
The World Bank’s growth rates for China may be exaggerated, as pointed out by Maddison (2009).
9
and the U.K. were considerably smaller, but similar in size. Canada was the smallest of the
G7 economies.
4. Sources of World Economic Growth.
In this section our first objective is to allocate the growth of world output between
input growth and productivity. Surprisingly, input growth greatly predominates. Productivity
growth accounted for 14.1 percent of world growth during 1990-1995, while input growth
accounted for the rest, as shown in Table 2. Productivity growth contributed 17.8 percent of
growth in 1995-2000, but surged to 36.4 percent during the world-wide boom in 2000-2005,
before plunging back to only 7.2 percent in 2005-2009.
We next allocate the sources of input growth between capital and labor inputs. The
contribution of capital input exceeds that of labor input for the world economy during the
period 1990-2009 and all four sub-periods. Capital input predominates for all sub-periods for
the G7 industrialized economies and Developing Asia and for all regions after 2000. The
growth pattern for Eastern Europe reflects the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of
communism. Growth collapsed during the period 1990-1995, but began to recover in 19952000 before booming in 2000-2005.
We have divided the contribution of capital input to world economic growth between
IT capital and Non-IT capital inputs. The contribution of IT almost doubled after 1995 from
less than a quarter of the contribution of capital input during 1990-1995 to almost a third
from 1995-2000. The share of IT in the contribution of capital input receded slightly to less
than a third after the dot-com crash of 2000 and less than a quarter after 2005. However, the
contribution of Non-IT investment was more important throughout the period 1990-2009.
10
All seven regions of the world economy experienced a surge in investment in IT after
1995. The soaring level of U.S. IT investment after 1995 was paralleled by jumps in IT
investment throughout the industrialized world.
The contributions of IT investment to
growth in Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle
East, and Sub-Saharan Africa nearly doubled after 1995, beginning from much lower levels.
The contribution of IT investment to growth of the world economy moderated after
the dot-com crash of 2000, due to a fall in the contribution of IT in the G7 and Non-G7
industrialized countries. However, the contribution of IT investment continued to rise for
Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The contributions
of Non-IT investment to world growth remained flat after the dot-com crash, but surpassed
its previous levels during 2005-2009.
Our final objective is to analyze the determinants of the growth of labor input,
focusing on the role of investment in human capital. We have divided labor input growth
between the growth of hours worked and labor quality, where quality is defined as the ratio
of labor input to hours worked. Labor quality growth captures the impact of changes in the
composition of labor input arising, for example, from increases in the education and
experience of the labor force. The contribution of labor input is the sum of the two
components, weighted by the share of labor in output.
We have divided the contribution of labor input between hours worked and labor
quality. Hours worked reflects the mobilization of labor by increased labor force
participation and higher rates of utilization of labor. Hours worked have grown more strongly
that labor quality in Developing Asia throughout the period 1990-2009. Growth of hours
worked has been highly cyclical in the G7 economies and exceeded labor quality growth
11
during 1995-2000, but was negative for the other periods. For the world economy the growth
of labor quality exceeded growth of hours worked in 1990-1995, but hours worked have
grown more rapidly than labor quality since 1995.
5. World Output, Input, and Productivity.
The final step in analyzing the world growth resurgence is to characterize the
evolution of levels of output, input, and productivity for the world economy, the seven
economic regions, the G7 economies, and the seven leading countries of Developing Asia.
We estimate the levels of per capita output, per capita input, and productivity for each of the
122 economies in a given year, using the following methodology:
Per capita output is measured in 2005 PPP$, as in the World Bank’s International
Comparison Program. We create the output level by standardizing to 100 for the US
output level in 2000.
Input combines measures of capital and labor inputs:
o The per capita level of capital input is based on the per capita capital services
value measured in 2005PPP$, standardizing to 100 for the per capita level of
US capital services in 2000.
o The per capita level of labor input is a product of per capita labor hours worked
and the labor quality index, standardizing to 100 for the US level in 2000.
The level of productivity is the ratio of output to input.
Taking the U.S. levels of output, input, and productivity in 2000 as 100.0, we
estimate levels of output, input, and productivity for each of the 122 economies in the
benchmark years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009. In Table 3 we present levels of output
per capita at the beginning of the transition from socialism in 1990, at the start of the
12
worldwide IT investment boom in 1995, at the beginning of the dot-com crash in 2000, the
completion of the recovery in 2005, and the end of the period covered by our study in 2009.
We also present input per capita and productivity for these years.
Taking U.S. output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, world output per capita was a
relatively modest 17.8 in 1990. Using similar scales for input and productivity, world input
per capita in 1990 was a considerable 41.7 and world productivity a significant 42.7. The
level of world output advanced to 18.5 in 1995, jumped to 20.7 in 2000, and leapt again to
23.1 in 2005, and rose to 25.1 in 2009, reflecting slowly rising levels of world input per
capita and rapid growth in productivity. World productivity rose to 43.4 in 1995, 44.0 in
2000, 47.7 in 2005, and 48.6 in 2009. This trend was most notable for Developing Asia.
We observe that world input per capita has converged more rapidly to U.S. levels
than world productivity. Although institutional barriers to accumulation of human and nonhuman capital have proven to be formidable, these obstacles have been gradually overcome.
As globalization has proceeded, the transfer of technologies from industrialized economies to
the developing world has required time and effort. Networks among co-operating activities
must be established and obsolete methods for organizing production must be displaced by
up-to-date techniques that employ information technology equipment and software.
6. Future Uncertainties.
Our methodology for projecting the growth of labor productivity and GDP is
presented in detail in Jorgenson and Vu (2010). The driving forces are demography and
technology. The contributions of hours worked and labor quality can be projected with only a
modest degree of uncertainty and are common to our alternative scenarios. Projections of the
variables that describe technology are far more challenging. In making assumptions for each
13
of these variables, we consider three scenarios: “base-case”, “pessimistic”, and “optimistic”
and label these the alternative assumptions.
We follow the approach of Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2008) in making common and
alternative assumptions for our projections. First, the common assumptions are that for each
economy over the period 2010-2020:
The capital shares will be the same as the average level observed for the historical period
1990-2009.
The value share of reproducible capital stock in aggregate capital stock for all countries
will be 0.761, the average value observed for the US over 1990-2009.
Growth in labor hours worked for the G7 will be the projected growth rate for 2010-2020
of the population aged 15-6410. For the remaining countries the projected growth rate will
be an average of growth during the past ten years and the projected growth rate of the
population.
We extrapolate labor quality growth for all the developing countries for the past ten years
to 2010-2020. Since labor quality growth captures labor composition changes, we expect
that this growth will slow for the industrialized countries over the coming decade. We
assume the average labor quality growth for the period 2010-2020 is a half of the rate
observed over the past ten years, except for the U.S., where our projections of labor quality
growth are based on population projections.
The gap between the growth rates of the reproducible capital stock and output reflects the
proximity of the economy to long-run balanced growth. This gap for the period 1990-2009
is close to zero for the G7 economies but far from zero for most other countries. For the
10
This projection is made by International Data Base (IDB), U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division; the data
for all the 122 economies is available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php.
14
period 2010-2020, we assume this gap is equal to the difference observed for the period
1990-2009 with the following exceptions: For countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle
East & North Africa, we extrapolate the gap observed for the past ten years.
Our alternative assumptions for the more uncertain variables over the period 20102020 are specified in the three scenarios – “base-case”, “pessimistic”, and “optimistic”.
Our assumptions about capital quality growth, reflecting changes in the composition
of the capital stock, are as follows.
The base-case: For the G7 economies this is the rate observed for 1990-2009. For the
economies in Non-G7, Developing Asia, and Latin America, this is the average off
the period 1990-2009 and 1999-2009. For Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Middle East & North Africa we expect that capital quality growth patterns will be
similar to those observed in 1999-2009.
Pessimistic and optimistic cases: For the U.S. we assume the “pessimistic case” for
capital quality growth is the average growth observed for 1990-1995 and 2005-2009.
For the “optimistic case” we assume this growth to be the same as for 1995-2005. For
the remaining economies, the “pessimistic case” and the “optimistic case” for each
country is the deviation from the “base case” by one standard deviation of the base
case assumed above for the economies in its economic group/region.
Our assumptions about TFP growth over 2010-2020 is as follows: The “base-case”:
We assume TFP growth is will be the average observed the period 1990-2009 for all
countries with the following exceptions. For the East European Economies, the high
TFP growth observed for recent periods reflect their recovery from the collapse in the
1990s. For this group, we assume TFP growth is a weighted average of 2005-2009,
15
2000-2009, and 1990-2009 with weights one, two, and two, respectively. For SubSaharan Africa and Middle East & North Africa, we assume that TFP growth is the
average of the past ten years. The “pessimistic” and “optimistic” scenarios: For the
U.S., TFP growth for the “pessimistic” is assumed to be the sub-periods 1990-1995
and 2005-2009 average. We assume the sub-period 1995-2005 average for the
“optimistic” scenario. For the other 121 economies, the “pessimistic case” and the
“optimistic case” for each country is the deviation from the “base case” by one
standard deviation of the base case assumed above for the economies in its economic
group/region.
7. Potential Growth of the World Economy, 2010-2020
Based on the assumptions outlined in the previous section, we project the potential
growth rates of labor productivity and GDP over the period 2010-2020 for 122 economies.
Table 4 summarizes the results for the world economy, each of the seven groups, the seven
major industrialized economies, and seven leading economies of Developing Asia. We
consider three scenarios – “base-case”, “pessimistic”, and “optimistic”.
Productivity growth in the United States will decline somewhat from 1.94 percent in
1990-2009 to 1.49 percent in 2010-2020. This is mainly due to slower growth in labor quality,
the upgrading of the labor force due to education and experience. The baby boomers will
begin to retire, reducing the level of experience. The educational attainment of age cohorts
leaving the educational system has been steady for more than three decades and will be
difficult to improve. These forces will reduce the growth of labor input and the rate of capital
deepening.
16
Second, U.S. GDP growth will decline a bit more than productivity growth, due to a
modest decline in labor force growth. In short, the U.S. growth rate of the past two decades
will be nearly impossible to sustain. This could only occur under very optimistic assumptions
about the development of technology and the additional capital deepening that this would
induce. We also present a pessimistic scenario, based on the continuation of low growth rates
of total factor productivity like those that prevailed after 2005 and before 1995.
Growth of the world economy will decline by less than a quarter of a percentage point,
relative to the robust growth of the past two decades. This is due mainly to the gradual slowing
of labor force growth around the world and the reduced capital deepening that will result.
Growth in the G7, already relatively low during the past two decades, will decline further. The
feverish growth of Developing Asia will also slow by almost a full percentage point.
Nonetheless, the growth rate differential between the two regions will be more than four
percentage points, so that the wide remaining gap in levels of GDP per capita will close at
rapid pace.
Although the growth of Developing Asia will slow during 2010-2020, relative to the
past decade, the share of Developing Asia in World GDP will continue to rise from 28.6 in
2010 to 36.8 percent in 2020. Meanwhile, the share of the G7 will decline from 40.6 percent in
2010 to 33.3 percent in 2020. With this projected pattern of economic growth Developing Asia
will overtake the G7 by 2018.11 In our projections China will overtake the U.S. by 2018 and
India will surpass Japan in 2011.
U.S. growth will continue to lead the G7, even with the slowdown we have analyzed.
All the G7 countries will slow further and growth could disappear entirely in Italy under
11
In this projection, we assume that the PPP exchange rates observed in 2009 will remain unchanged over 20102020.
17
pessimistic assumptions. The mediocre growth rate of Japan for the past two decades will be
further reduced, due to strongly adverse demographic trends. Growth in the United Kingdom
will surpass the pace of the past two decades. Despite relatively favorable demographics and
substantial investment, U.K. growth will lag behind growth of the world economy.
It is difficult to paint an optimistic picture of the outlook for Europe and Canada. The
major European countries failed to make the transition to a knowledge economy called for by
the Lisbon Agenda ten years ago. The European Union has made little progress in formulating
a policy response in its more recent report, Europe 2020. This is understandable in view of
more pressing policy issues arising from the ongoing fiscal and financial crisis. Canada has
come through the crisis very well, especially given its proximity to the U.S. However,
Canadian productivity growth will remain below U.S. levels.
Turning, finally, to the emerging and transition economies, the outlook for China and
India continues to be very sanguine, but quite different. Growth rates in China will fall,
relative to the blistering pace of the past two decades, while remaining in the neighborhood of
7.5 percent per year. India’s growth rate will rise to 6.5 percent, which is not sufficient to
avoid a considerable fiscal consolidation. Russia’s growth will be sufficient to double the size
of the Russian economy within two decades and Russia will overtake Germany in 2019. Brazil
will grow at the same rate as the world economy and will overtake the U.K. in 2012.
7. Conclusions.
The emergence of Asia from the underdevelopment that persisted until the middle
of the last century is the great economic success story of our times. This has created a
new model for economic growth built on globalization and the patient accumulation of human
and nonhuman capital over decades. The new growth paradigm places a premium on skillful
18
management by public and private authorities. The performance of the leading countries
in developing this paradigm – first Japan, then the Asian Tigers, and now China and
India – has changed the course of economic development in Asia and around the world.
While the Rise of Asia will be firmly established by 2020, pessimistic trends in
demography will further undercut growth in Japan and will eventually affect growth prospects
in Korea and China. Demographic developments in Europe will also exert a powerful drag on
growth. No reform initiatives are within sight that could change the pessimistic outlook for
technology in Europe and Canada, but successful educational investments in Asia and Europe
and around the world, except for the United States, will help to sustain economic growth.
The role of the U.S. in the world economy has permanently changed and not for the
better. Unfortunately, this will strengthen populist forces on the left and right, diverting
attention from the policy issues that have emerged from the financial and economic crisis.
Ideological battles threaten to overwhelm the unfinished agenda of formulating and
implementing sustainable fiscal and monetary policies. To quote Winston Churchill: “You can
always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.”
For professional economists the task that remains is to construct an empirical theory of
economic growth that can serve as a guide to policy. The United States and other
industrialized countries will remain far in advance of Developing Asia in terms of per capita
GDP. But the experience of Japan and the four Asian Tigers tells us the advanced economies
can emerge outside Europe and North America. It is only a matter of time until these
developments spread to China, India, and the major countries of Developing Asia. We have
shown in this paper that this time will be measured in decades rather than years.
19
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Jorgenson, Dale W., and Khuong Vu (2010), “Potential Growth of the World
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21
Table 1: The World Economy: Shares in Size and Growth by Group, Region, and Economy
Group
World (122 Economies)
G7 Economies
Developing Asia
Non-G7
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Sub-Sahara Africa
N. Africa and Middle-East
1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2009
GDP Growth GDP Growth GDP
Growth GDP
Growth
Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share Growth Share 1990
GDP Share in World
2000
2005
2009
100.00
50.11
19.16
9.76
8.56
6.25
2.03
4.13
100.00
46.22
22.59
9.26
8.57
6.93
2.15
4.28
100.00
41.48
27.52
8.68
8.63
7.03
2.30
4.37
GDP
Growth
1.71
1.15
2.17
1.26
1.40
1.63
2.34
1.91
1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2009
Growth Share GDP Growth Share
GDP Growth Share GDP Growth Share
Group World Growth Group World Growth Group World Growth Group World
3.63
1.65
4.05
5.48
2.54
2.51
5.42
1.41
0.75
8.65
0.47
4.55
2.06
2.77
6.62
3.07
1.65
6.17
1.60
0.52
10.08
0.54
13.14
5.96
1.99
6.94
3.22
0.59
3.04
0.79
0.52
13.89
0.75
4.98
2.26
1.88
4.40
2.04
0.88
3.00
0.78
-0.75
-12.75
-0.69
13.07
5.93
0.95
5.11
2.37
1.29
9.94
2.58
-0.54
-21.15
-1.14
5.89
2.67
3.38
7.91
3.67
2.47
9.38
2.44
0.05
1.09
0.06
54.75
24.84
4.18
63.53
29.48
2.65
63.05 16.38
0.78
100.20
5.40
100.00 45.37
3.08
100.00
46.40
2.01
100.00 25.98
0.38
100.00
5.39
1990
2.19
4.06
5.90
4.03
9.38
3.71
23.22
52.50
GDP
Growth
9.70
5.08
5.08
7.54
8.47
7.59
6.98
7.64
1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2009
Growth Share GDP Growth Share
GDP Growth Share GDP Growth Share
Group World Growth Group World Growth Group World Growth Group World
48.58
21.58
4.49
42.67
8.97
11.09
65.70 25.87 10.80
68.06
41.02
2.29
1.02
2.63
1.62
0.34
4.05
1.18
0.46
3.08
0.74
0.45
16.62
7.38
5.78
29.89
6.29
6.76
19.03
7.49
7.94
21.57
13.00
9.91
4.40
0.73
1.35
0.28
4.62
3.96
1.56
5.46
3.91
2.36
2.22
0.98
6.13
2.68
0.56
5.34
1.18
0.46
4.24
0.83
0.50
13.05
5.80
5.06
13.35
2.81
4.39
6.10
2.40
3.12
3.30
1.99
7.33
3.26
5.11
8.43
1.77
3.53
2.86
1.13
2.48
1.59
0.96
100.00 44.43
4.57
100.00
21.03
8.12
100.00 39.37
8.42
100.00 60.27
2.20
1.91
7.38
2.06
3.38
-7.43
1.77
3.10
100.00
45.37
52.36
8.99
13.64
-27.23
1.67
5.19
3.37
3.08
4.40
3.76
2.91
2.27
3.44
4.11
100.00
46.40
24.18
10.67
7.58
4.21
2.10
4.86
3.71
2.01
7.68
2.52
2.71
5.53
4.65
4.64
100.00
25.98
43.61
6.51
6.13
9.99
2.62
5.16
3.06
0.38
7.87
1.27
3.19
3.48
4.73
3.52
100.00
5.39
64.88
3.75
9.01
8.54
3.41
5.02
1995
100.00 100.00
52.50 51.79
13.08 17.35
9.71
9.53
8.38
8.89
10.72
6.72
2.11
2.06
3.50
3.66
G7 (7 Economies)
Economy
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
All group
GDP Share in World
1995
2.13
3.84
5.88
3.84
9.04
3.61
23.45
51.79
2000
2.13
3.75
5.20
3.56
7.93
3.68
23.86
50.11
2005
2.06
3.40
4.71
3.00
7.04
3.53
22.50
46.22
GDP Share in Group
2009
1.87
3.06
4.23
2.56
6.06
3.18
20.52
41.48
1990
4.17
7.74
11.24
7.68
17.87
7.07
44.22
100.00
1995
4.11
7.42
11.35
7.41
17.46
6.97
45.27
100.00
2000
4.26
7.47
10.39
7.10
15.83
7.34
47.61
100.00
2005
4.46
7.35
10.18
6.48
15.23
7.63
48.67
100.00
2009
4.50
7.37
10.19
6.18
14.62
7.67
49.48
100.00
Asia 7
Economy
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
All group
GDP Share in World
1990
3.63
0.39
2.99
1.08
0.21
1.42
0.86
10.59
1995
5.79
0.45
3.42
1.41
0.29
1.85
1.12
14.33
2000
7.27
0.43
3.77
1.21
0.33
1.97
1.20
16.18
2005
9.66
0.44
4.44
1.28
0.34
1.99
1.20
19.36
GDP Share in Group
2009
13.21
0.44
5.54
1.40
0.37
1.99
1.17
24.12
1990
34.33
3.72
28.22
10.18
2.00
13.40
8.16
100.00
1995
40.42
3.17
23.88
9.82
2.02
12.88
7.81
100.00
2000
44.94
2.65
23.32
7.48
2.02
12.16
7.43
100.00
2005
49.88
2.28
22.95
6.62
1.75
10.29
6.22
100.00
2009
54.79
1.82
22.95
5.82
1.52
8.25
4.85
100.00
22
Table 2. Sources of Output Growth by Period
Economy
World (122 Economies)
G7
Developing Asia
Non-G7
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
N. Africa & M. East
GDP
Growth
2.20
1.91
7.38
2.06
3.38
-7.43
1.77
3.10
Period 1990-1995
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality Hours
1.43 0.30
1.13
0.45
0.27
0.18
1.08 0.37
0.71
0.30
0.32
-0.03
3.66 0.28
3.38
1.06
0.22
0.84
1.05 0.37
0.68
0.38
0.38
-0.01
1.29 0.14
1.15
0.92
0.14
0.78
-0.03 0.11
-0.13
-1.11
0.06
-1.17
1.09 0.30
0.79
1.85
0.18
1.67
1.69 0.14
1.54
1.75
0.19
1.55
TFP
GDP
Growth
0.31
0.53
2.66
0.63
1.17
-6.30
-1.17
-0.34
3.37
3.08
4.40
3.76
2.91
2.27
3.44
4.11
TFP
GDP
Growth
Period 1995-2000
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All
Quality
1.81 0.58
1.23
0.93
0.25
1.48 0.73
0.75
0.86
0.28
3.69 0.49
3.20
0.91
0.26
1.54 0.57
0.97
1.58
0.30
2.01 0.33
1.68
1.07
0.15
-0.84 0.22 -1.06
-0.17
0.06
1.54 0.48
1.06
1.80
0.21
1.65 0.22
1.43
1.39
0.22
GDP
TFP Growth
Hours
0.68
0.58
0.65
1.28
0.92
-0.23
1.60
1.17
0.63
0.74
-0.20
0.64
-0.17
3.28
0.10
1.07
3.71
2.01
7.68
2.52
2.71
5.53
4.65
4.64
Period 2000-2005
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All Quality Hours
1.75 0.52 1.23
0.62
0.27
0.36
1.07 0.45 0.62
0.25
0.28
-0.04
3.73 0.65 3.08
0.94
0.24
0.70
1.43 0.48 0.96
1.05
0.40
0.66
1.67 0.48 1.19
1.15
0.16
1.00
0.07 0.44 -0.37
0.55
0.26
0.29
2.43 0.66 1.78
1.45
0.17
1.28
2.70 0.77 1.94
0.97
0.16
0.81
TFP
GDP
Growth
1.35
0.70
3.00
0.03
-0.12
4.91
0.76
0.96
3.06
0.38
7.87
1.27
3.19
3.48
4.73
3.52
TFP
GDP
Growth
Period 2005-2009
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality
2.42
0.59
1.82
0.43
0.21
0.93
0.39
0.54
-0.02
0.27
4.88
0.81
4.07
0.77
0.17
1.63
0.54
1.09
0.53
0.20
3.26
1.07
2.19
0.99
0.17
1.69
0.51
1.18
0.43
0.16
3.85
1.03
2.82
1.48
0.18
3.35
0.51
2.84
1.03
0.16
Hours
0.21
-0.29
0.59
0.34
0.83
0.27
1.30
0.87
Period 2005-2009
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality
1.61
0.54
1.07
0.48
0.20
1.09
0.43
0.66
0.47
0.17
0.74
0.39
0.35
0.15
0.07
0.67
0.16
0.51
-0.07
0.05
0.58
0.21
0.37
-0.53
0.14
0.89
0.33
0.56
-0.06
0.14
1.02
0.46
0.56
-0.01
0.41
0.93
0.39
0.54
-0.02
0.27
Hours
0.28
0.30
0.08
-0.12
-0.67
-0.20
-0.42
-0.29
-1.34
-1.04
-0.37
-1.35
-0.60
-0.77
-0.23
-0.52
Period 2005-2009
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality
6.94
1.01
5.93
0.44
0.14
0.97
0.23
0.74
0.69
0.16
4.79
0.85
3.94
1.16
0.15
2.28
0.65
1.63
1.54
0.17
3.53
0.81
2.71
3.54
0.43
1.40
0.33
1.07
-0.18
0.25
1.02
0.28
0.74
0.22
0.17
5.17
0.83
4.34
0.66
0.16
Hours
0.30
0.53
1.01
1.36
3.11
-0.43
0.05
0.50
3.41
1.42
1.99
1.64
-2.83
1.90
1.23
2.58
TFP
0.22
-0.52
2.23
-0.89
-1.06
1.36
-0.59
-0.86
G7 (7 Economies)
Economy
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
All Group
GDP
Growth
1.71
1.15
2.17
1.26
1.40
1.63
2.34
1.91
Period 1990-1995
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality Hours
0.86 0.32
0.54
0.69
0.60
0.09
1.07 0.34
0.73
-0.05
0.49
-0.53
0.94 0.34
0.60
-0.21
0.06
-0.27
0.65 0.19
0.46
-0.43
0.12
-0.55
1.75 0.25
1.50
-0.12
0.33
-0.45
0.66 0.22
0.44
-1.36
0.74
-2.10
1.01 0.48
0.53
0.99
0.31
0.68
1.08 0.37
0.71
0.30
0.32
-0.03
0.16
0.13
1.45
1.04
-0.24
2.33
0.34
0.53
4.05
2.77
1.99
1.88
0.95
3.38
4.18
3.08
TFP
GDP
Growth
4.09
2.08
1.28
3.15
1.24
3.05
3.05
2.94
4.49
2.63
5.78
0.73
6.13
5.06
5.11
4.57
Period 1995-2000
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All
Quality
1.49 0.53
0.96
1.80
0.50
1.12 0.44
0.67
0.89
0.45
0.72 0.36
0.36
-0.08
-0.08
0.99 0.39
0.60
0.88
0.22
1.14 0.40
0.75
-0.21
0.43
1.54 0.92
0.62
1.26
0.63
1.90 1.03
0.88
1.30
0.22
1.48 0.73
0.75
0.86
0.28
GDP
TFP Growth
Hours
1.30
0.43
0.00
0.65
-0.64
0.63
1.08
0.58
0.76
0.76
1.35
0.02
0.02
0.58
0.98
0.74
2.51
1.65
0.59
0.88
1.29
2.47
2.65
2.01
Period 2000-2005
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All Quality Hours
1.45 0.46 0.99
1.16
0.22
0.94
1.19 0.44 0.74
0.36
0.23
0.13
0.47 0.27 0.20
-0.37
0.10
-0.47
0.99 0.20 0.79
0.74
0.25
0.49
0.57 0.25 0.33
-0.11
0.43
-0.53
1.06 0.58 0.48
0.90
0.54
0.36
1.32 0.58 0.74
0.22
0.26
-0.04
1.07 0.45 0.62
0.25
0.28
-0.04
-0.09
0.11
0.49
-0.85
0.83
0.51
1.11
0.70
0.75
0.52
0.52
-0.75
-0.54
0.05
0.78
0.38
TFP
GDP
Growth
4.58
2.43
2.08
2.97
1.98
1.92
1.72
3.31
10.80
3.08
7.94
5.46
4.24
3.12
2.48
8.42
TFP
Asia 7
Economy
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
All Group
GDP
Growth
9.70
5.08
5.08
7.54
8.47
7.59
6.98
7.64
Period 1990-1995
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT
All
Quality Hours
4.97 0.23
4.74
0.65
0.13
0.51
2.29 0.35
1.94
0.71
0.07
0.64
2.64 0.18
2.46
1.17
0.15
1.02
3.69 0.26
3.43
0.70
0.15
0.55
5.72 0.60
5.13
1.51
0.53
0.97
1.94 0.41
1.53
2.61
0.79
1.82
2.92 0.44
2.48
1.01
0.27
0.75
3.61 0.27
3.34
1.09
0.24
0.85
Period 1995-2000
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All
Quality
5.38 0.58
4.81
0.74
0.17
2.01 0.55
1.46
1.08
0.09
3.06 0.32
2.74
0.98
0.18
2.54 0.16
2.38
1.33
0.18
5.47 1.00
4.47
2.80
0.72
1.68 0.81
0.87
0.59
0.93
2.67 0.48
2.19
0.56
0.30
3.85 0.51
3.34
0.87
0.29
GDP
TFP Growth
Hours
0.56
0.99
0.81
1.15
2.08
-0.35
0.26
0.58
-1.63
-0.46
1.74
-3.14
-2.13
2.79
1.88
-0.14
11.09
4.05
6.76
4.62
5.34
4.39
3.53
8.12
Period 2000-2005
Sources of Growth (% ppa)
Capital Input
Labor Input
All
ICT Non-ICT All Quality Hours
5.89 0.91 4.98
0.63
0.15
0.48
1.04 0.31 0.73
0.58
0.18
0.40
3.31 0.60 2.72
1.37
0.14
1.22
1.04 0.29 0.75
0.61
0.16
0.45
2.17 0.81 1.36
1.19
0.40
0.79
1.41 0.40 1.01
1.07
0.87
0.20
1.44 0.38 1.06
0.38
0.36
0.02
3.98 0.69 3.29
0.84
0.25
0.59
TFP
23
Table 3: Levels of Output and Input Per Capita and Productivity (U.S. =100 in 2000)
* The levels for group and the world are averages weighted by population share
Group Summaries
World
G7
Developing Asia
Non-G7
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Sub-Sahara Africa
N. Africa & M. East
1990
17.82
71.01
4.26
57.72
18.35
24.68
4.39
13.04
Output Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
18.49
20.66
23.11
75.56 85.039 90.59
5.83 7.2017 9.54
61.21
71.74 77.43
19.88 21.373 22.97
17.11 19.269 25.75
4.178 4.3387 4.84
13.74 15.317 17.56
2009
25.09
90.18
12.67
79.14
25.04
29.60
5.32
19.07
1990
41.72
82.35
16.62
71.62
29.99
39.05
15.39
24.95
Input Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
42.57
46.98
48.47
85.10
92.25
94.95
19.94
25.00
28.73
73.84
84.15
90.95
30.82
33.52
36.16
37.55
36.04
37.08
15.36
15.74
16.85
26.93
28.53
31.28
1990
68.96
63.79
65.80
60.81
66.37
60.02
81.68
71.01
Output Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
2009
71.10
83.05
89.67 88.40
66.26
74.74
78.53 77.96
71.37
78.28
80.29 82.48
64.63
70.89
71.92 67.97
70.48
73.17
77.51 75.93
64.38
73.54
82.36 82.21
86.54 100.00 107.08 106.79
75.56
85.04
90.59 90.18
1990
81.66
73.28
86.14
68.29
82.63
77.32
87.23
82.35
1990
2.81
60.60
3.09
5.31
61.00
29.11
38.32
4.17
Output Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
2009
4.72
6.81
10.42 15.86
72.41
76.17
91.24 100.39
3.61
4.39
5.71
7.65
7.17
6.94
8.18
9.75
80.57
95.80 111.89 117.58
40.31
47.90
58.26 65.19
51.80
64.12
74.37 81.37
5.85
7.43
10.09 13.76
1990
11.94
76.61
14.06
17.52
64.37
47.67
66.43
16.84
G7 (7 Economies)
Economy
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
All Group
Asia 7
Economy
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
All Group
1990
42.72
86.23
25.63
80.59
61.21
63.20
28.53
52.27
1995
43.43
88.79
29.23
82.90
64.49
45.56
27.20
51.02
Productivity
2000
2005
43.98
47.67
92.19
95.41
28.80
33.21
85.25
85.13
63.77
63.52
53.47
69.44
27.56
28.72
53.69
56.12
2009
48.64
93.49
36.06
82.31
61.13
73.55
28.37
55.37
Input Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
2009
83.54
93.93 101.89 105.99
75.64
82.12
85.83 88.81
86.90
89.10
89.17 92.98
68.91
75.50
79.92 79.73
88.80
92.10
93.62 93.95
73.83
81.92
89.44 92.07
90.87
100.00 101.28 101.95
85.10
92.25
94.95 96.46
1990
84.45
87.04
76.38
89.05
80.32
77.63
93.64
86.23
1995
85.11
87.59
82.12
93.80
79.37
87.21
95.23
88.79
Productivity
2000
2005
88.42
88.00
91.00
91.50
87.86
90.04
93.89
89.99
79.45
82.79
89.77
92.09
100.00
105.72
92.19
95.41
2009
83.40
87.78
88.72
85.24
80.82
89.29
104.75
93.49
Input Per Capita
1995
2000
2005
2009
16.34
25.57
31.12 41.30
82.52
88.83
94.22 97.92
15.40
17.20
20.15 24.94
20.21
22.88
23.23 25.94
79.89
105.70 111.80 131.55
56.67
58.59
64.74 67.16
77.10
86.88
92.46 96.30
20.40
26.38
30.37 37.39
1990
23.55
79.10
21.96
30.32
94.77
61.07
57.69
24.76
1995
28.90
87.76
23.42
35.49
100.84
71.12
67.19
28.69
Productivity
2000
2005
26.64
33.50
85.75
96.84
25.54
28.34
30.33
35.19
90.63
100.09
81.76
89.99
73.81
80.43
28.18
33.21
2009
38.39
102.51
30.69
37.58
89.38
97.08
84.49
36.80
2009
51.59
96.46
35.13
96.15
40.96
40.25
18.73
34.45
24
Table 4: The World Economy: Growth Projections, 2010-2020
Note: The weight for aggregating growth by region and world is based on PPP$ GDP in 2009
Group Summaries
Productivity Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
3.19
2.73
1.71
1.77
6.63
5.70
1.16
1.49
1.01
1.15
4.43
1.57
2.07
0.79
2.54
1.62
Note: * GDP for 2010 is estimated; GDP for 2020 is
World (122 Economies)
G7 Economies
Developing Asia
Non-G7
Latin America
Eastern Europe
Sub-Sahara Africa
N. Africa and Middle-East
1.85
2.75
0.97
1.46
4.00
5.17
0.98
1.52
0.62
1.61
1.36
3.91
1.42
2.47
1.83
2.78
from the base-case
3.65
1.94
6.33
2.06
2.60
6.45
3.52
3.72
GDP Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
3.94
1.56
7.99
2.21
3.06
4.95
4.72
4.25
3.59
1.97
7.10
2.53
3.09
1.09
3.72
3.90
2.32
1.11
5.02
1.48
1.51
0.38
3.21
2.76
3.37
1.60
6.18
2.02
3.21
3.76
4.59
4.24
4.65
2.46
7.55
3.06
4.90
7.33
5.85
4.86
GDP Share in World*
2010
2020
100.00
40.62
28.62
8.39
8.75
6.95
2.32
4.35
100.00
33.30
36.84
7.17
8.42
7.07
2.59
4.61
G7
Economy
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
All Group
Productivity Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
GDP Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
0.91
1.12
1.06
0.07
1.65
1.45
2.27
1.34
1.25
1.69
0.64
1.78
2.43
1.94
1.01
1.10
0.98
-0.05
0.96
1.56
0.99
1.47
1.44
1.37
0.61
1.40
2.15
1.49
1.93
1.78
1.77
1.27
1.84
2.75
1.99
2.06
1.42
0.82
0.50
0.71
1.64
2.05
2.33
1.58
1.36
0.90
0.84
1.98
2.58
1.28
0.90
0.63
-0.43
0.00
1.58
1.67
1.74
1.24
1.03
0.22
0.43
2.17
2.18
2.57
1.81
1.62
1.26
1.00
3.36
3.17
1.71
1.77
0.97
1.46
1.94
1.56
1.97
1.11
1.60
2.46
GDP Share in World*
GDP Share in Group*
2010
2020
2010
2020
1.84
2.96
4.18
2.47
5.95
3.08
20.14
40.62
1.52
2.34
3.23
1.77
4.34
2.66
17.44
33.30
4.52
7.29
10.28
6.09
14.64
7.58
49.59
100.00
4.58
7.03
9.70
5.30
13.02
8.00
52.38
100.00
Note: * GDP for 2010 is estimated; GDP for 2020 is from the base-case
Asia 7
Economy
Productivity Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
9.83
7.87
2.91
2.55
4.73
4.26
3.32
2.76
2.21
2.50
3.91
4.68
3.15
4.15
7.23
6.12
Note: * GDP for 2010 is estimated; GDP for 2020 is
China
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan
All group
5.28
7.00
0.55
2.14
4.23
4.50
0.20
1.91
0.48
2.02
3.88
4.19
3.53
3.91
4.39
5.58
from the base-case
8.72
3.73
4.77
3.61
3.56
4.50
4.29
6.78
GDP Growth
Actual
Projections, 2010-2020
1999-2009 1990-2009 Pessimistic Base-case Optimistic
10.73
4.03
6.99
4.97
5.32
4.29
3.32
8.44
8.93
3.74
6.31
4.54
6.14
5.14
4.63
7.41
5.80
0.90
6.23
1.68
2.10
4.06
3.64
5.27
7.52
2.49
6.49
3.38
3.64
4.37
4.02
6.47
9.34
4.34
6.95
5.33
5.73
5.07
4.68
7.83
GDP Share in World*
GDP Share in Group*
2010
2020
2010
2020
13.92
0.45
5.71
1.42
0.40
2.01
1.24
25.16
20.08
0.40
7.47
1.38
0.40
2.16
1.28
33.18
55.35
1.79
22.68
5.65
1.60
8.01
4.92
100.00
60.52
1.21
22.52
4.17
1.21
6.50
3.86
100.00
25