The grounds of moral obligations concerning well-being are theoretically distinct from those of obligations concerning the continuation of life. This philosophical distinction has an important ideological consequence within the animal defence movement: it separates the Animal Welfarist/Reformist approach, on one hand, from the Abolitionist/Animal Rightist approach, on the other, with the former taking the view that premature (painless) death does not harm the animal that dies. The goal of this chapter is to challenge this position by asking is it morally wrong when, for instance, a free-range pig is kill unexpectedly and instantaneously by, for example, a single shot to the head while it is sleeping? We will see some possible answers to that question, and each of these answers will correspond to different moral reasons why an animal may be harmed by death, even if it does not involve suffering.
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