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Louis ThompsonRelated papers
Past, present and future development of West African railways
Journal of sustainable development of transport and logistics, 2020
PROSPECTS AND ISSUES OF RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA
Railways combine speed, carriage space and weight at less expense over long distances than any other mode of land transport. In Ghana, however, the railway subsector holds less than two percent of freight movement alongside with a less than one percent of passenger carriage in the transport economy. Provided that, rehabilitation and maintenance of existing stock, construction of new lines, efficiency and reliability services are enhanced, the railway system will play a vital role in the movement of more goods and people, thus spurring trade and increased commodity production. It will open up the investments frontiers for raw material extraction, commercial agriculture, competitive industrialisation and high quality services' delivery for the country's development. The Government of Ghana has plans to upgrade the existing system and construct new lines to expand it and link it with the railway infrastructure in the Economic Community of West African States and eventually the rest of Africa. This paper examines the current state of the railway system in Ghana, highlighting its socioeconomic contribution and prospects to national development albeit inherent problems. The prospects and issues associated with its development as a significant and an inevitable infrastructural component in the country's socioeconomic development. Data for the paper are drawn through goggle documentary investigation and subjected to contingent content analysis and evaluation. A private-public partnership approach to the development and management of the railway system is proposed within the context of the liberalization policy in Ghana's national development framework.
Assessing the Policy Provisions and Institutional Behavioral Factors Influencing Rail Infrastructure Financing in Developing Countries
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 2021
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON RAIL DEVELOPMENT IN LANDLOCKED AFRICAN COUNTRIES
The abstract examines the economic impact of rail infrastructural development in landlocked African countries. It emphasizes how the present deprivation in transport networks affect trade, inflate export/import costs, and limit access to international markets. The analysis assumes the rail development as a strategic solution. Comparing traditional methods, railways provide an efficient and cost-effective means for bulk goods. The abstract explores the economic impact based on the immediate stimulus from construction projects and the long-term benefits of enhanced trade, productivity gains and regional integration. Establishing a direct link to seaports, railways have the impact of improving economic growth and proper landlocked African nations towards a sustainable future.
The Politics of Railway Transportation and Development in Ghana: A Case Study of Nsawam and Akim Achiase Junction Railway Stations
Railways are significant for the realization of innovation, creativity, and development. Railways contribute to social enthusiasm in addition to market competitiveness by conveying millions of consumers as well as personnel to urban places and villages around the world. All over the world countries are recognizing the important role that railways contribute to their economy. In the 1950s, Ghana’s railway transport was considered to be one of the best on the continent of Africa. The railway was a major transport connecting to the major cities of the country. Railway transport was very efficient, reliable, affordable and safe. The most important aspect of it was how it refurbished the local economy of traders and the conveyance of agricultural products from the production source to the market centers. This scholarly, therefore, examined the politics of railway transportation and development in Ghana. Particularly, its emphasis is on the impact of the railway transport on the people of Nsawam and Akim Achiase railway stations. The study looked at the role of the state in transport provision and the justification for the state involvement in transport issues. The research moreover underlines the political interference regarding the revamping of the railway sector in Ghana. The study, therefore, clinches that by the canons of contemporary economic models, reliable railway systems, if well executed would transform the way nations participate in its trade activities and accelerate the speed at which development would take place for the betterment of its people.
Boosting Railway System Infrastructure in Nigeria: The Public-Private Partnership Option
Rail transportation has continued to play a key role in the movement of goods and passengers in many countries of the world. But in Nigeria, the story is different. Many years of neglect, technical problems, underfunding, government interference with management, inconsistent government policy, falling rolling stocks levels, worn-out and obsolete infrastructure has left a once vibrant sector in a comatose state. The cost of this neglect has been high in terms of growing cost of road transport services, frequent road collapse, and unprecedented carnage on our roads. Although, the government has risen to the challenge in recent times, what may ultimately be required to resuscitate the railway system in terms of funding, investment and expertise is far beyond the financial and managerial profile of the government. There is therefore, the urgent need for private sector participation. The paper strongly advocate for public-private partnership option which has been adopted with success in many countries, as panacea for revitalizing the railway system to enable it play its key development role in the economy of Nigeria.
Unlocking Mineral Resource Potential in Southern African Countries: Is Rail Infrastructure up to the Challenge?
Transportation Research Procedia, 2014
A review and analysis of railway transportation system in the economic community of West African States: Towards the development of sustainable regional goal
Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Advances, 2020
Regional derailment: the saga of the East African Railways
Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2018
Supporting the Sustainable Development of Railway Transport in Developing Countries
Sustainability, 2020
Generally, the development process of the railway transport system is determined by the market pull effects initiated by the economy and society and the market push effects induced by technological progress. The policymakers can provide a balance between these two effects; this results in more effective, safer, and greener future railway systems. In developing countries, the railway systems lag compared to the developed economies. Therefore, the supporting management tools and legal supports for policymakers and strategic management play significant roles in the development of future sustainable transport systems. This paper deals with such required tools and the potential legal framework that support the development of sustainable railway systems in developing countries. The major novelty and advantages of the introduced methodology is the harmonised interaction between society, economic demands, technological development, and regulation. The proposed tools are applied to the Kenya...
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The World Bank and Econonmlc Commission for Aica
SAP Working- PapBer Noi
27250
Seminar on Railway Concessioning
in Africa
Proceedings
October 13 & 14, 1997
Africa Region
The World Bank
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Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program
The World Bank and Economic Commission for Africa
SSATP Working Paper No.32
Seminar on Railway Concessioning
in Africa
Proceedings
October 13 & 14, 1997
Africa Region
The World Bank
e
Foreword
Railways in Sub-Saharan Africa have probably suffered more than most institutions in the transition
from colonial to independent government. Sub-Saharan African governments, struggling to establish
the institutions and policies needed to ensure economic development in an increasingly globalizing
economy, simply have not been able to set the kind of balanced transport policies and stable funding
in the public sector that would have permitted railways to flourish. Also, like railways all over the
world, Sub-Saharan African railways have consistently been limited by a lack of clear definition of
their role or of the limits of political interference in institutions that must survive in competition with
private companies that do not carry "social" burdens. The result of this heritage has been railways
that cannot serve well the needs of their economies, are often poorly maintained, are not
commercially effective, and are often macroeconomic burdens on their treasuries.
International Financial Institutions and donors have worked hard over many years with Sub-Saharan
African railways and governments to put these railways on a sound economic and commercial
footing. Although some progress has been made in individual countries for limited periods of time, it
is clear that the traditional approach of providing money to fix physical problems or merely changing
organizational arrangements while leaving in place policy or political limitations has not led to
positive and sustainable results: something more than the old approach will be needed.
There is, of course, no single, "cookbook" solution. Countries, and their railways, are all different
and these differences are often highly significant. This said, railway concessioning is emerging as at
least one potential tool for use in assisting railways. The objective of this conference was to bring to
senior Sub-Saharan African railway managers and their Government officials the experience of those
who are now engaged in rail concessioning, both inside and outside Africa, so that Sub-Saharan
African officials can make appropriate use of the tool.
The focus of the conference was specifically on experience, not on theory, for two reasons: first,
there is a need to act quickly in order to put Sub-Saharan railways back on track, and experience is
the best guide to practical action; and, second, there is enough experience now available that the
concessioning tool can be confidently applied from hard-earned lessons -- not theory. Participants
were able to show how concessioning actually works, and how Sub-Saharan African managers can
learn from good (and bad) decisions made elsewhere. Potential rail users were able to show how they
have, or will, respond, to improvements in service cost or reliability. Government officials were able
to discuss, in concrete terms, the benefits (and risks) of concessioning from an operational and
policy-driven point of view. Overall, interested parties were able to assess how and where rail
concessioning might be applied for its real utility -- permitting Sub-Saharan Africa's railways to play
their proper role in the critically needed transport system of Africa.
supha B. Crookes
Acting Sector Director
Infrastructure
Africa Region
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Contents
Agenda
Synopsis:
Railway Concessioning in Africa: An Approach Gathers Steam
Session 1:
Opening Address from His Excellency Ezan Akele
(Delivered by M. Achi B. Jonas, le Conseiller technique en transports)
Railways in Sub-SaharanAfrica -- What is at Stake?
by Tidjane Thiam, Special Advisor to the President of the Republique de Cote d'Ivoire, Head
of the Strategic Planning Office
Session 2:
ConcessioningRail Activities to the Private Sector, A New Approach to Railway
Restructuring
by Louis S. Thompson, Railways Adviser, World Bank
Issues and Options in Railway Concessioning
by Olivier Ratheaux, Transport Specialist, Caisse Fran,aise de Developpement
& Karim Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, World Bank
Session 3:
Railway Concessioning in Latin America
by Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management
The On-going Railway ConcessioningProcess in Cameroon
by Messrs. Lucas Kamden, Privatization Committee of the Republic of Cameroon
& E. Ebata, REGIFERCAM
Session 4:
Railway Concessioningin Mozambique
by Messrs. Abilio Portimao, Secretary-General, Mozambique Ministry of Transport &
Communications & Arun Pai, Adviser CFM (Mozambique Railways)
The First Railway Concession in Africa: The C6te d 'Ivoire-BurkinaExperience
Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL
Session 5:
Panel: Concessioning and The Railway Clients:
No formal papers presented
Session 6:
Panel: Investors' and Operators' Perspectives
Railway Concessioningin Africa: An Investor's Perspective
by Henry Posner III, Chairman, Railroad Development Corporation
Summary ofpanel discussion topics
by Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific
Perspectivesdes operateursferroviaireset des investisseurs: La point de vue de SAGA
by Jean-Yves Montpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV)
Perspectivespour les investisseurs et operateurs
by Pierre-Louis Rochet, SYSTRA
COMAZAR: Company Profile and Capacity Statement
by Eric Peiffer
Session 7:
Panel: The Role of Consultant and Financial Advisors in Concessioning
Railway Privatisation: The Role of the Consultant
by Peter Kieran, CPCS Transcom Ltd.
Session 8:
On-going Operationsand Prospectsfor Railway Concessioningin Southern and Eastern
Africa
by Yash Pal Kedia, Sr. Railway Engineer, World Bank
On-going Operationsand Prospectsfor Railway Concessioning in Western and Central
Africa
by Bernard Zoba, Union of African Railways & A. Tchibozo, ECA
Concessioning and the InternationalRail Community
by Philippe Roumeguere, Director General & Vipin Sharma, UIC
Session 9:
No formal presentations
Annexes:
Annex 1: Papers distributed but not presented at the seminar
Annex 2: Africa Transport Technical Note No. 10: Concessioning of Rail Transport
Annex 3: List of participants
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Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSA TP)
SEMINAR ON RAILWAY CONCESSIONING IN AFRICA
Abidjan (C6te d'Ivoire)
October 13-14, 1997
AGENDA
Monday, October 13, 1997
Session I
Chairperson:
Shigeo Katsu,
d'Ivoire, World Bank.
Country Director for C6te
08:30 am
Participants' Welcome and Seating
08:45 am
Official Guests Welcome
09:00 am
Opening Address from His Excellency Ezan Akele, Minister
of Economic Infrastructure of the Republique de C6te
d'Ivoire
09:30 am
"Railways in Sub-SaharanAfrica -- What Is at Stake? ",
Tidjane Thiam, Special Adviser to the President of the
Republique de C6te d'lvoire, Head of the Strategic Planning
Office (F)
10:00 am
Session 2
End of Session I -- Coffee Break
Chairperson:
Bernard Zoba, Secretary-General,
African Railways (UAR)
10:30 am
Union of
"Concessioning Rail Activities to The Private Sector, A New
Approach to Railway Restructuring", Louis S. Thompson,
Railways Adviser, World Bank (E)
1 1:00 am
"Issues and Options in Railway Concessioning", Olivier
Ratheaux,
Transport Specialist,
Caisse
Francaise de
Developpement;
and
Karim-Jacques
Budin,
Principal
Railway Specialist, World Bank (F)
Lunch
12:15 noon
End of Session 2
12:45
Complimentary, at Restaurant Cascade
1
Session 3
Chairperson: Abdelazziz
SITARAIL (F)
Director
General,
14:00
"Railway Concessioning in Latin America", Jorge Kogan,
Mercer Management (E)
14:45
The On-going Railway Concessioning Process in
Cameroon ", Messrs. Lucas Kamdem, Privatization
Committee of the Republic of Cameroon; and E. Ebata,
REGIFERCAM (F)
15:30
End of Session 3 -- Coffee Break
Session 4
Dinner
Thiam,
"
Chairperson:
Cooperation
Gerard
Olivero,
French
Ministry
of
16:00
"Railway Concessioning in Mozambique ", Messrs. Abilio
Portimao, Secretary-General, Mozambique Ministry of
Transports and Communications; and Arun Pai, Adviser,
CFM (Mozambique Railways) (E)
16:45
"The FirstRailway Concession in Africa: The Cote d'IvoireBurkina Experience", Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General,
SITARAIL (F)
17:30
Questions and Discussions of Themes Covered in Sessions 3
and 4
18:30
End of Session 4
Participants' own arrangement
2
Tuesday, October 14, 1997
Session 5
Moderator: Abdelazziz Thiam, Director General, SITARAIL
08:30 am
Panel: "Concessioningand The Railways Clients" (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Diakite, Societe Nationale de Transit
du Burkina; Bozec, Ndong Sima, SNBG (Gabon); Abeke,
COMILOG (Gabon); Kambalame, PCC (Malawi); Mbale,
GRAMIL (Malawi)
Session 6
Moderator:
Bank
9:30 am
Louis S. Thompson, Railways Adviser, World
Panel: "Investors ' and Operators'Perspectives " (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Henri Posner, Railroad Development
Corporation; Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific; Jean-Yves
Monpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV); Pierre-Louis Rochet,
SYSTRA; Eric Peiffer, COMAZAR
11:15 am
Session 7
Coffee Break
Moderator:
Karim-Jacques
Specialist, World Bank
11:30 am
Budin, Principal
Railway
Panel: "The Role of Consultants and FinancialAdvisers in
Concessioning" (E/F)
Participants: Messrs. Marcel Sarmet, Coopers and Lybrand;
Pieter Kieran, CPCS-Transcom; Jorge Kogan, Mercer
Management; Patrice Guiol, Banque Nationale de Paris
12:45
Lunch
End of Session 7
Participants' own arrangement
3
Session 8
Chairperson: Manfred Breithaupt, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (Germany)
14:15
"On-going Operations and Prospects for Railway
Concessioning in Southern and Eastern Africa", Yash Pal
Kedia, Sr. Railway Engineer, World Bank (E)
14:45
"On-Going Operations and Prospects for Railway
Concessioning in Western and Central Africa", Bernard
Zoba, Union of African Railways; and A. Tchibozo,
Economic Commission for Africa (F)
15:15
"Concessioning and the international rail community",
Philippe Roumeguere, Director General, and Vipin Sharma.
International Union of Railways (UIC) (F/E)
15:45
Coffee Break
Session 9
Dinner
Chairperson: Honourable Edward K. Salia, Minister of
Roads and Transport, Ghana
16:00
Discussion
on
Railway
Conclusions of the Seminar
Concessioning
Problems;
17:40
Closing Remarks: Snorri Hallgrimsson, World Bank
17:45
Closure of Seminar
19:30
Complimentary End-of-Seminar Dinner (salle Anono 1)
Wednesday, October 15, 1995
Visit of SITARAIL (concessionaire of the Abidjan/Ouagadougou railway)
(Optional)
8:00 am
Departure from the Golf Hotel
13:00
Return to the Golf Hotel
4
Programme pour les Politiques de Transport en Afrique Sub-Saharienne (SSA TP)
SEMINAIRE SUR LA MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER EN AFRIQUE
Abidjan (C8te d'Ivoire)
13-14 octobre 1997
PROGRAMME DU SEMINAIRE
Lundi 13 octobre 1997
Session 1
President de session: M. Shigeo Katsu, Directeur des
operations pour la CMte d'Ivoire, Banque mondiale
8 heures 30
Installation des participants
8 heures 45
Accueil des personnalites
9 heures
Allocution inaugurale de S.E.M. le Ministre Ezan Akele,
Ministre des Infrastructures Economiques de la Republique de
CMte d'Ivoire
9 heures 30
"Le chemin defer en Afrique sub-saharienne- Les enjeux",
par M. Tidjane Thiam, Conseiller special du President de la
Republique de Cote d'Ivoire, Charge de la planification
strategique et de la prospective (F)
10 heures
Session 2
Fin de la session 1 et Pause-cafe
President de session: M. Bemard Zoba, Secretaire Gendral,
Union Africaine des chemins de fer
10 heures 30
"La mise en concession priveie de l 'activiteferroviaire,une
nouvelle approche de la restructurationdes chemins defer ",
par Louis S. Thompson, Conseiller pour les chemins de fer,
Banque mondiale (A)
11 heures
"Problemes et options de la,concessionferroviaire", par
Olivier Ratheaux, Ingenieur Transport, Caisse franeaise de
developpement et Karim-Jacques Budin, Specialiste
ferroviaire principal, Banque mondiale (F)
12 heures
Fin de la session 2
1
Dejeuner
12 heures 45
Session 3
Dejeuner offert aux participants (Restaurant Cascade)
President de session: Abdelazziz Thiam, Directeur-General,
SITARAIL (F)
14 heures
"Les mises en concession ferroviaireen Amerique latine", par
M. Jorge Kogan, Mercer Management (A)
14 heures 45 "Le processus de mise en concessionferroviaire au
Cameroun", par MM. Lucas Kamdem, Mission de
restructuration des entreprises du secteur public et parapublic,
et E. Ebata, REGIFERCAM (F)
15 heures 30 Fin de la session 3 et Pause-cafe
Session 4
President de session: M. Gerard Olivero, Ministere de la
Cooperation de la Republique fran:aise
16 heures
"La mise en concession des chemins defer au Mozambique ",
par MM. Abilio Portimao, Secretaire General, Ministere des
transports et communications du Mozambique et Arun Pai,
Conseiller, Chemins de fer du Mozambique (A)
16 heures 45
"La premiere concessionferroviaireen Afrique: L 'experience
de la C6te d 'Ivoire et du Burkina", par Abdelazziz Thiam,
Directeur General, SITARAIL (F)
17 heures 30
Questions et discussion sur les themes evoques lors des
sessions 3 et 4
18 heures 30 Fin de la session 4
Diner
Diner libre
2
Mardi 14 octobre 1997
Session 5
Moderateur: M. Abdelazziz Thiam, Directeur General,
SITARAIL
8 heures 30
Panel: "Les clients du chemin defer et la mise en concession"
Participants: MM. Diakite, Societe nationale de transit du
Burkina; Ndong Sima, SNBG (Gabon), Abeke, COMILOG
(Gabon); Kambalame, PCC (Malawi); Mbale, GRAMIL
(Malawi) (F/A)
Session 6
Moderateur: M. Louis S. Thompson, Conseiller pour les
chemins de fer, Banque mondiale
9 heures 30
Panel: "La perspective des operateursferroviaireset des
investisseurs"
Participants: MM. Henri Posner, Railroad Development
Corporation; Paul Victor, Anacostia Pacific; Jean-Yves
Monpert, SECAF (SAGA/SDV); Pierre-Louis Rochet,
SYSTRA; Eric Peiffer, COMAZAR. (A/F)
11 heuresl 5
Session 7
Pause-cafe
Moderateur: M. Karim-Jacques Budin, Specialiste ferroviaire
principal, Banque mondiale
11 heures 30 Panel: "Le r6le des consultants et conseillersfinanciersdans
la mise en concession"
Participants: MM. Marcel Sarmet, Coopers and Lybrand;
Pieter Kieran, CPCS-Transcom; Jorge Kogan, Mercer
Management; Patrice Guiol, Banque nationale de Paris (F/A)
12 heures 45 Fin de la session 7
3
Dejeuner
Dejeuner libre
Session 8
President de session: M. Manfred Breithaupt, GTZ
(Allemagne)
14 heures 15
"Les operationsen cours et les perspectives de mise en
concessionferroviaire en Afrique australe et orientale" par
M. Yash Pal Kedia, Banque mondiale (A)
14 heures 45
"Les operationsen cours et les perspectives de mise en
concessionferroviaire en Afrique occidentale et centrale" par
MM. Bernard Zoba, Union africaine des chemins de fer et A.
Tchibozo, Commission economique pour l'Afrique (F)
15 heures 15
"Les mises en concession et la communauteferroviaire
internationale"par MM. Philippe Roumeguere, Directeur
General, et Vipin Sharma, Union intemationale des chemins
de fer (UIC) (F/A)
15 heures 45
Pause-cafe
Session 9
President de session: Son Excellence Monsieur Edward K.
Salia, Ministre des routes et des transports, Ghana
16 heures
Discussion generale sur les problemes de la mise en
concession ferroviaire et conclusions
17 heures 40 Remarques de cloture, Snorri Hallgrimsson, Banque mondiale
17 heures 45
Diner
Cloture du seminaire
19 heures 30 Diner de cloture du seminaire offert aux participants (salle
Anono 1)
Mercredi 15 octobre 1997
Visite de SITARAIL (soci6te' concessionnaire du chemin defer Abidjan-Ouagadougou)
(Facultatif)
8 heures
Depart de l'Hotel du Golf
13 heures
Retour a l'Hotel du Golf
4
Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)
Railway Concessioning in Africa: An Approach Gathers Steam
Synopsis
On October 13 and 14, 1997, representatives of most of the railways and Governments of
Sub-Saharan Africa met in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, with representatives of the World
Bank, sponsoring donor agencies including Swedish International Development Agency
(SIDA), GTZ (Germany) and Caisse Franqaise de Developpement (CFD), the UIC and
UAR, and a number of international experts and consultants to discuss the progress of
and prospects for railway concessioning in Africa. The conference was arranged by the
Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (a World Bank/UN collaborative program)
and hosted by SITARAIL, the concessionaire of the Abidjan-Ougadougou railway, and
SIPF, the railway landlord corporation of C6te d'Ivoire. In all, over 150 people,
including representatives of railways, governments, rail labor unions, donor agencies,
shippers, international agencies, concessionaires and consultants attended the seminar and
participated in the animated discussions that ensued.
Beginning the first session, the overall theme for the conference was set by Mr. Tidjane
Thiam, Special Adviser to the President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire who strongly
argued the need for change in Africa's railways. Any reasonable reading of the railway
experience in Africa shows a declining role for railways in the transport sector, to the
point that a continuation of existing trends would cause railways to vanish. The potential
benefits from effective railways are far too important to permit this to happen. In the case
of Cote d'Ivoire, the need for railway change fit well into a general program of
restructuring many activities in the economy, so the stage was well set for action.
In the second session, the need for change in the railways, and the overall potential for
concessioning as a tool in that change was further supported by Lou Thompson of the
World Bank who described briefly the fact that railways are often in weak financial
condition, they face a significant change in the needs of the transport sector and confront
increasing competition from other modes. At the same time, their governments can no
longer afford to support them as in the past. Combining these factors with the shift of
many economies to market form and trends toward globalization, railways are not going
to have an easy life in the upcoming decade. Governments are solving this dilemma by
making railways commercial and by increasing the role of the private sector in delivery of
rail services. The World Bank has a role to play in this process, both in financing repairs
or rehabilitation of facilities, environmental cleanup and labor transitional issues, and in
providing technical assistance in planning and managing the transition.
Olivier Ratheaux (Cfd) and Karim-Jacques Budin (World Bank) then provided
presentations on the issues and options of implementing concession schemes in railways.
These presentations highlighted the fact that concessioning is not a "cookbook" answer to
a generalized problem. Instead, implementing concessions requires careful analysis and
answers to a number of specific questions, including the scope of the concession, its
duration, access to the concession facilities by others (if, for example, freight service is
concessioned and passenger is not), the regulatory framework and the interaction between
"regulation' and the concession contract, concession payments (if any), and staffing of
the concession, among many other issues. In addition, the process whereby the
concession is advertised and awarded is important in assuring that the best offer is
identified and accepted. Taken together, these considerations set the structure of the
relationship between concessionaire and government, and they determine the eventual
success of the arrangement.
In the third session, Jorge Kogan (currently Vice President of Mercer Management,
formerly Director of the Coordination Agency for Argentine railway concessioning)
summarized the experience of concessioning in Latin America. Rail concessioning in
Latin America demonstrates the fundamental strength and robustness of the concept.
Concessioning has been used to rescue the freight railways of Argentina and to
dramatically improve the operations of the suburban passenger services, and the Metro, in
Buenos Aires. Similar, positive experience is now being gained in other countries
(Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Chile). At the same time, lessons have emerged from this
experience including the need to adapt the process to individual circumstances, the need
to improve the process of concession award, the critical need to identify issues, such as
labor restructuring, that must be fairly solved if concessioning is to proceed, and the need
for continuing public involvement in ensuring that the terms of the concession agreement
are being met. Overall, change happens only from firm and timely decisions -- most
problems can be fixed in the process, but inaction can be fatal.
Lucas Kamden of the Privatization Committee of the Republic of Cameroon and
Sebastien Ebata of the Cameroon Railway (REGIFERCAM) discussed the status of the
concessioning process now underway in Cameroon. The Government of Cameroon
decided to concession REGIFERCAM for many of the same reasons as elsewhere -- to
improve service and reduce financial demands on the public till. To date, the government
believes that satisfactory progress is being made on the concession.
Session 4 closed the day with a presentation by Messrs Abilio Portimao (Secretary
General of Ministry of Transport and Communications) and Arun Pai Lai (adviser) on the
status of concessioning in Mozambique (three rail concessions originating in Nacala,
Beira and Maputo) and by Abdelazziz Thiam (Director General of SITARAIL) on
concessioning developments in Cote d'Ivoire/Burkina Faso. While concessioning is still
in process in Mozambique and is facing many of the issues common to concessioning
elsewhere, the Abidjan to Ougadougou concession was the first railway concession in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and has now been in operation for over two years. In many ways,
the experience with SITARAIL is quite similar to that in Latin America: traffic has grown
significantly, productivity (especially asset productivity) has climbed, and the concession
appears to be on a sound commercial footing. Based on SITARAIL's experience,
properly designed rail concessioning in Africa can work, and can yield the expected
benefits.
The second day began with session 5 covering the clients' viewpoints toward rail service
and the potential for concessioning. Panelists from Burkina Faso (S. Diakite), Gabon
(Raymond Ndong-Nsima), Gabon (Marcel Abeke), Malawi (Messrs Dennis Kambalame
and Heatherwick Mbale outlined the general dissatisfaction which most shippers now feel
about the quality and costs of African rail service. Shortage of equipment and lack of
control over service reliability has led many shippers to use truck service, even though it
is much more costly; this trend will not be reversed until the railways are more effectively
customer oriented. Panelists felt that concessions might provide better service, a point
that was reinforced by the SITARAIL experience (although SITARAIL admittedly hopes
to make much further improvements).
Session 6 was a panel of officials (Henry Posner of RDC, Paul Victor of FEPASA in
Chile, Yves Montpert of SITARAIL, Pierre-Louis Rochet of SYSTRA and Eric Peiffer of
COMAZAR) who are actually involved in operation of rail concessions in several
countries. Panelists reviewed their experiences in establishing and running concessions,
with particular emphasis on the need for clear Government policies toward the concession
(concerning regulation, ownership and control, labor) and on the challenges in changing
railway culture from public to private approaches. They also emphasized the need for
realization that concessions operate in a competitive market with little room for meeting
social needs without explicit compensation for doing so. Given adequate flexibility,
panelists believed that concessions can and will help in resolving Africa's transport
challenge.
Session 7 used panelists (Marcel Sarmet of Coopers and Lybrand, Peter Kieran of CPCSTranscom, Jorge Kogan of Mercer Management, and Patrice Guiol of Banque Nationale
de Paris) to cover the role of consultants in concessioning. Consultants are customarily
used to translate general policies into practice in particular situations, a task which is a
mixture of experience and creativity. Few countries have the expertise within the railway
or Government to complete the tasks of analysis, concession package design, creation of
bidder interest, analysis of bids and implementation, so some consulting assistance is
critical. A common challenge, though, is that the main repository of information, the
railway, needs to be encouraged to provide inforrnation and assistance freely. If the
railway management is not favorable toward concessioning, this can be a difficult
challenge.
Session 8 covered a number of more general presentations of concessioning in Southern
and Eastern Africa (Yash-Pal Kedia of the World Bank), Western and Central Africa
(Bernard Zoba of the Union of African Railways and Antoine Tchibozo of the Economic
Commission for Africa). Concessioning is quite active in these regions, with programs or
discussions underway in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia in
Southern and Eastern area, and Republic of Congo (in suspension because of civil
conflict), Cameroon and Gabon in the Western area. The UAR, the ECA and SATCC are
providing information and assistance to the process where possible.
Session 9 summarized and concluded the seminar. It was chaired by The Hlonourable
Edward K. Salia (Minister of Roads and Transport of Ghana). In summary, the ensuing
discussion yielded the following generally agreed conclusions:
1.
Concessioning has clearly emerged as the most promising avenue to regaining
profitability for railways. The experience in Africa is more recent than in other
continents, but those African examples which have been developed to any significant
degree point in the same direction.
2.
The meeting was unanimous in the conclusion that, when designing concessioning
agreements, the arrangements to deal with labor redundancies must be based on a
consensus with the labor organizations concerned.
3.
Reforms in the regulation of operations in other modes of transport as well as in
rail will usually be an integral part of the design of a viable concessioning scheme.
4.
Given the long time span that concessioning arrangements usually cover, it is
important to incorporate clear rules for the dissolution and renegotiation of the
concession, should any of the two parties so desire, and/or rules for arbitration prior to
dissolution.
5.
There is no single, simple formula for success. Any concessioning agreement
needs to be adapted to local needs, laws, practices, economic and social circumstances.
The Honourable Oskar Plichta (Minister of Works, Transport, and Communications of
Namibia) extended the appreciation of the participants to the organizers of the seminar
and to the host country.
Session 1
i
iI
t
SEMINAIRE SUR LA MISE
EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS
DE FER EN AFRIQUE
(Du 13 au 14 Octobre 1997)
ALLOCUTION DE BIENVENUE PRONONCEE
PAR MONSIEUR EZAN AKELE, MINISTRE
DES INFRASTRUCTURES ECONOMIQUES
M ...............................
Messieurs les Ministres,
Excellences Messieurs les Ambassadeurs,
Messieurs les representants
Intemationales et Nationales,
des
Institutions
Financieres
Messieurs les dirigeants des reseaux de chemins de fer,
Honorables invites,
Mesdames, Messieurs.
Je voudrais tout d'abord, feliciter le groupe de la Banque
Mondiale, initiateur de cette grande rencontre sur le theme de la
mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique et remercier par
la meme occasion, tous les bailleurs de fonds internationaux
engages aux cRt's de la Cote d'Ivoire pour la poursuite de la
relance de son economie.
Je voudrais egalement souhaiter la bienvenue en terre ivoirienne,
au nom du Chef de l'Etat, son Excellence Monsieur Henri
KONAN BEDIE, 'atous ceux dont la presence a ce forum est pour
nous le temoignage de la solidarite et de l'amitie qu'ils portent a
notre pays.
2
Soumise a un programme d'ajustement structurel, La Cote
d'Ivoire, resolument engagee dans le processus de liberalisation
de son economie. a choisi d'eliminer son deficit budgetaire afin
d'attenuer l'impact de son endettement et donner au
gouvemement, une marge de manoeuvre financiere qui lui
permette de soutenir les investissements productifs.
Depuis 1990, un programme soutenu de privatisation de nos
entreprises a ete elabore afin d'accroitre le role du secteur prive
dans I'activite economique notamment au niveau des
investissements. Dans le secteur des transports, les premieres
operations de privatisation ont porte sur le chemin de fer, en
accord avec le pays frere du Burkina Faso.
En effet, le 24 juillet 1992, les deux Etats ont decide de confier
l'exploitation de la ligne Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Kaya, a une
societe concessionnaire a capital prive majoritaire, la SITARAIL
d'une part, et d'autre part, de creer deux societes de patrimoine:
la Societe Ivoirienne de Gestion du Patrimoine Ferroviaire (SIPF)
et la Societe de Patrimoine Ferroviaire du Burkina (SOPAFER-B).
La RAN, jadis, fleuron des regies ferroviaires en Afrique de
l'Ouest, a connu au cours de la decennie 70-80, la meilleure
periode de son exploitation. D'importants investissements ont ete
realises. En 1978, elle a transporte un million de tonnes de
marchandises et plus de quatre millions de voyageurs dans des
conditions de confort indiscutables.
3
Mais des le debut des annees 80, la crise economique due a
l'effondrement des cours des matieres premieres sur le marche
mondial avec pour consequence une chute de l'activite
economique dans la plupart des pays africains, des problemes lies
a la gestion, vont se poser et seront a la base de la degradation du
transport ferroviaire. La scission de la RAN en deux societes, la
SICF pour la Cote d'Ivoire et la SCFB pour le Burkina et ayant en
charge les deux (02) reseaux dans le cadre d'une gestion separee
convenue par les deux Etats, sera pour le chemin de fer, le pire
des remedes.
Cette situation a conduit a la deterioration du materiel, au
licenciement significatif de personnel, a une baisse importante du
trafic de l'ordre de 60 % pour les marchandises et 50 % pour les
voyageurs.
En trois ans de gestion separee, aucun des deux Etats n'a eu les
moyens de realiser les investissements necessaires au maintien
d'une bonne exploitation.
La mise en concession dans ces conditions est apparue comme la
solution la meilleure. Elle a donc ete decidee pour une periode de
quinze (15) ans. Cette operation a donne ainsi lieu a la toute
premiere privatisation d'un reseau ferroviaire en Afrique. La
restructuration de l'entreprise se traduit par une importante
reduction du personnel et un plan de remise a niveau des
installations et du materiel. Le montant des investissements se
chiffre a 40 milliards de francs cfa, realises avec le precieux
concours de nos partenaires financiers habituels. Je veux parler de
l'IDA, la CFD, le BEI, la BOAD, l'AGCD. Au cours du premier
exercice, SITARAIL a transporte 410.000 voyageurs et 500 000
tonnes de marchandises, doublant ainsi le tonnage transporte apres
seulement une annee d'activite.
.. ./...
4
C'est la preuve que le chemin de fer sort peu a peu de la crise
qu'il a connue il y a quelques temps.
Si cette premiere experience en la matiere ne fait pas apparaItre
de maniere evidente et immediate les effets de sa reussite
economique et financiere, il reste a esperer que le contexte
favorable et la reorganisation drastique du secteur par nos Etats
conduisent a un avenir prometteur.
Aujourd'hui, dans la plupart des Etats africains, le chemin de fer
figure en bonne place sur la liste des entreprises a privatiser. Le
Burkina et la Cote d'Ivoire, en tant que pionniers, sont heureux et
fiers de partager avec eux leur experience.
La geographie, l'histoire, l'interet et le devoir nous imposent, plus
particulierement a nous Africains, d'affronter solidairement les
enjeux d'aujourd'hui et de demain.
I1 y a donc de bonnes raisons de croire au chemin de fer:
I'economie, les contribuables et la population tout entiere
profiteraient ainsi de cet outil indispensable de developpement.
Le Burkina Faso et la Republique de Cote d'Ivoire sortent grandis
de cette experience: le chemin de fer Abidjan-OuagadougouKaya, cordon ombilical qui relie de maniere permanente les deux
peuples depuis pres d'un siecle est sauve d'une mort certaine.
5
En esperant que cette memorable rencontre reunissant les
responsables des reseaux ferroviaires et leurs partenaires, initiee
par la Banque Mondiale permettra a chaque Etat de determiner
avec discemement les moyens de sa propre rgussite, et par voie de
consequence, au succes de notre continent, e declare ouvert, le
seminaire sur la mise en concession des chemins de fer en
Afrique.
Je vous remercie.
CA) (A a
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SIEfVMINAIIRE SURI LA MISE EN CONCESSIO
CIJEMINS I)11 FERI EN AFRIQUJE
.. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .
DES
Abidljan, 13 - 14 Octobre 1997
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EXPERIENCE IVOIRIENNE EN MATIERE DE
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.............................................
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BNE
.............................................................................................................................................
-TD
I
17:
Eui depit des avanitages qu 'elles preseintenit, les ope'ratioui de
privatisationi de lh realisatio,iet dle la gestion des inifrastructures
d 'intire'tgelie"ral conmportenit des risques reels.
Exemples de risques
TYPES DE RISQUES
Mise en place
_
-_
Rupture des accords pendant la periode
_
_
preeedent la signature des accords
_
Construction
..
_
DEFINITIONS
Non respect du cout, de la qualite ou du dMlai de
___
________
real isation
_ ___
Operationnel
L'op6rateur s'engage sur des niveau'x de
Nlarche
performance donnes pendant la duree du contrat
Fluctuation de la demiianide pour les services dii
concessionnlaire
Change
1Reglementaire
.
...........................................
_
~
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Fluctuation moiietaire
Modifications de la reglementationl
~As
131/()1/97
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1997
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I.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~221:
*Volonte politique
* Climat propice:
'I>Saine gestion macro-economique
. Environnement juridique
.|
t
~~Cre'dibilite
]
E*quite dans la repartition des gains et des risques
entre les clients, I 'Etat, les investisseurs et le preteur
...........................................
IS*' 1(97
BVETTI)
_.I............................................................................................................................................:
23.
* Benefices visibles et quantifiables pour I 'opinion
publique et les beneficiaires
* Existence d 'operateurs prives desireux et capables
d 'accepter I 'ensemble des risques lies a ce type
d 'operations
* Bonne politique de Communication
. . . . . . . . ............... .. .. .. .
13=0I'97 BNETD
.............................................................................................................................................
ANNEXES
... .. .. .... . . . .. . . . .. . . . .
. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . .I3/1
. .. 0197
. . . .. BNE
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=
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Session 2
i
i
I
i
I
i
i
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i
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I
i
Railway Concessions: Progress to Date
Louis S. Thompson (Railways Adviser)
and Karim-Jacques Budin (Sr. Railway Specialist)
The World Bank*
Railway Restructuring -- Why?
Few governments have been fully satisfied with the performance of their railways over
the past three or four decades. Stagnant or falling traffic, huge financial losses, poor
service to customers -- these are a familiar railway litany. Governments have eventually
responded by restructuring, including recasting the railway as a government-owned
enterprise rather than a ministry, adopting line of business organizations, spinning off
non-rail activities, reducing labor forces and increasing the role of the private sector in
doing what it does best -- producing competitively determined goods and services for
customers at suitable quality and prices. A particular approach to increasing the role of
the private sector is "concessioning," the subject of this paper.
What is Concessioning and Why Do It?
"Concessioning" is not a precise term. In fact, there is a spectrum of organizational
options, starting with total public ownership and operation, continuing through
outsourcing, then management contracts, then concessions (a term we use to include
leasing or "affermage" (the French term), "franchises," and traditional concessioning),
and then proceeding to Build-Own-Operate (BOO/BOOT, etc.) and eventually to one or
the other forms of actual divestiture of assets leading to total private ownership and
operation. On this scale, concessions are midway as they involve continuing public
ownership and oversight of infrastructure, but generally transfer operating responsibility
and delivery of services to the private sector.
The general thrust in favor of concessioning is now agreed: 1) the private sector can
deliver services at lower total cost to the economy than the public sector; 2) the private
sector operates more efficiently than the public sector; 3) when private resources are
mobilized, the public sector can use its scarce resources in other, higher priority areas; 4)
the private sector does a better job of identifying and serving competitive markets than
does the public sector; 5) the private sector can do a better job of delivering social
services when it is explicitly compensated by the public sector than when the same social
services are jumbled into an unclear public/private mission; and, 6) the public sector does
a better job of environmental and safety regulation of a private provider than it does in
regulating itself. We state these advantages in positive terms: we agree that not all apply
in all cases and some may arguably not be true in some specific cases. This should not
detract from the overall point.
Transport concessions cannot be reduced to a simple "recipe." In order to define a
concession, we need to specify a number of dimensions: 1) what is being concessioned in
2
physical terms; 2) how long will the concession last; 3) who will retain ownership of
what (who will own the wagons and locomotives, for example); 4) will the state specify
the services to be provided or will this be left to the concessionaire and the market; 5)
what tariff flexibility will the concessionaire have; 6) will the state pay the
concessionaire, or vice versa, and in what form will the payments be made; 7) how will
the winning bid be determined (highest payments to, or from, government, lowest tariff,
largest investment promised, etc.); 8) under what conditions can the concession be
renegotiated; 8) what performance guarantees will be required; 9) who will do investment
planning and network planning; and, 10) will the concession be exclusive, or will others
have access to the facilities and under what terms? Each of these dimensions can be
slightly different for railways (for example) in various countries, and they are usually
considerably different among the modes.
Experience is showing that, though all concessions are different, there are several typical
issues that tend to recur. First, the term of the concession must be consistent with the
government's objectives as to the balance of investment between public and private: in
general, the private sector will not finance assets whose service life is significantly longer
than the term of the concession. Second, public enterprises tend to lose interest in
operations and maintenance as soon as plans for concessioning are announced so that the
concessioning process, once started, should be finished as quickly as possible in order to
minimize damage in the interim. Third, concessioning in railways has always resulted in
lower employment levels so a responsible program for dealing with redundant labor must
be developed and implemented. Fourth, risks should be in the right place. It is acceptable
that government retain the environmental risks of cleanup of already polluted facilities,
but questionable for government to take the commercial risk of projecting demand and
cost of operation. Finally, concessions inherently require further continuing government
involvement in regulating safety, monopolistic behavior, and adherence to the pricing and
service requirements of the concession. This does not necessarily imply creation of an
elaborate new regulatory mechanism, but it is clear that the state cannot walk away from
its transport concessions after they are made.
It is also not a trivial matter to define how the "winner" will be selected. Precision in
procurement would suggest that everything be defined perfectly and price alone would be
the determining factor. On the other hand, allowing the concessionaire maximum
initiative argues for broad "performance specifications" from government followed by
flexible offers from the private concessionaire. Even the issue of price needs care as there
can be a choice between, for example, awarding on the basis of maximum payment to
government (or minimum payment by government) as compared with minimum tariff to
be charged to users. There can also be a choice between unrestricted bidding versus
prequalification followed by bids only from those judged fully qualified. There is no
agreed answer to these questions: there are only informed choices, and calculated risks.
Few railways have been truly privatized, although there are recent examples available
including New Zealand, Canadian National, East Japan, Conrail in the US, and the
infrastructure and freight services of the old British Rail. Instead, most governments
3
have preferred to concession ("franchise") their railway. The reasons for the preference
for concessioning as compared to privatization are not always clear, but we believe
that
governments have been wary of what appears to be total loss of control over
their
railway. Governments appear to believe that concessioning offers them a little bit of
the
best of both worlds; they retain ultimate control over the infrastructure (at least in
the
political sense) while at the same time allowing the private sector to carry out
the
operating functions and compete for customers in the market. In some cases, they also
get to put a significant amount of money into their treasury -- never a bad idea compared
with a railway that represents a large drain on the national coffers today.
The Experience With Concessioning of Railways
We should emphasize that rail concessioning is not really new. In fact, many railways
were originally built and operated as "concessions" and, had there not occurred after
World War II a worldwide political wave of public ownership, especially in countries
undergoing decolonialization, many railways would never have been publicly operated.
And, if railways had operated successfully in public hands, there might be no pressures
to
return operations to the private sector.
But the decades since World War II have been hard for railways for two major reasons;
first, governments have promoted the rise of the highway and air modes, often operated
in
the private sector and, second and maybe more important, railways have generally
become mired in politics, often depriving them of adequate capital for repair
and
investment, and always lumbering them with a confused and contradictory set
of
objectives in competition with modes that had a much clearer mission. The results
were
uniformly disappointing.
The downward slide of the nationally-owned railways has happened in parallel
with
increasing globalization and increased pressure on national finances. Governments
can
no longer afford bad rail services, and this has led to politically painful measures
to fix
the problem. With the benefit of some hindsight, we can see that these pressures started
the process of change in the early 1990s in Argentina, the UK, and the early measures
taken by the European Commission. The success of these early attempts, combined
with
a lack of credible alternatives, has caused the process to snowball rapidly in
Latin
America. Concessioning is also beginning in Africa, the Middle-East, and tentatively
in
Asia. A similar process, partly based on concessioning/franchising, and partly based
on
privatization has also taken hold in the European Union (EU) countries.
We give some summary discussion of the cases below with the caveat that there
are
probably more cases than we will discuss. We would welcome additional information
that anyone wishes to give us. In addition, the list is so long that we cannot provide
maps
due to high cost of production. We will present maps in the IRCA Congress,
and can
make maps available to those who request them. We present Table 1 as an overall
summary of all of the concessions that we know of along with some broad comparative
data describing them.
4
Insert Table 1 here
Latin America
Argentine Railways: The Process and Results
Throughout the 1980s the Argentine national railway, Ferrocarriles Argentinos (FA), was
losing approximately US$800 million annually as a result of inefficiency, competition
from other modes, weak management and inadequate investment. Traffic fell from almost
30 billion traffic units (combined tonne-km and passenger-km) in 1965 to less than half
that in 1991 -- and it was still headed downward. The concessioning strategy selected by
the government was grounded in five basic principles: 1) the railway deficit was no
longer sustainable; 2) FA was unsalvageable as an enterprise; 3) some freight services
were probably viable; 4) the Buenos Aires suburban passenger services, though loss
making, were so important to the development of the city that they had to be continued;
and 5) operating efficiency, particularly staffing levels, would have to be improved.
By mid-1990, the government and the World Bank agreed on restructuring the railway
into several separate freight and commuter rail networks, concessioning of these
networks, rationalization of inter-city passenger services, establishment of new rail
regulatory agencies, creation of a metropolitan transport authority for Buenos Aires,
revision of the operating practices and rules, a labor strategy to reduce the size of the
work force and improve productivity, and disposal of redundant assets.
Six freight packages were created for concessioning on 30 year terms, with an optional 10
year extension. The concessionaires have exclusive use of the tracks, although they must
grant access to passenger operations in return for a compensatory track use fee.
Concessionaires were required to hire only existing FA employees at the outset, though
they were given freedom to employ only those they considered necessary for operational
needs. FA made severance payments averaging about two years' wages to staff not hired
by the concessionaires.
The government marketed the concessions worldwide and received sealed bids for all but
the meter gauge Belgrano network (which is being rehabilitated for later concessioning).
All bidders had to meet certain technical and financial requirements. Thereafter bids for
the freight networks were evaluated on the net present value of the level of "canon" to be
paid to the government during the first 15 years of the concession as well as the quality of
business and investment plans, staffing levels, the track access fee proposed for inter-city
trains, and the share of Argentine interest in the consortium. The bids were graded on a 110 scale on each of the seven criteria, with the individual scores being weighted
according to the priority assigned to each category. The bidder's qualifications and the
basic investment program were each assigned a 30 point weight, (with a possible five
point bonus for additional investment), the number of personnel to be retained 15, canon
12, the maintenance plan eight, and five for the track access fee. The weighting reflected
5
the importance attributed to investment in the railways, but also political compromises
over the employment issue.
For the suburban passenger concessions, the bidding documents defined the minimum
service to be provided (seats per hour, frequency, travel time, punctuality) and a
required
capital program to make up for years of neglect of maintenance. Maximum
fares for
standard service, with fare increases as a premium for improved services,
were
established. Those bidders who satisfied the technical and financial requirements
and
produced satisfactory business and operating plans were evaluated on the basis of
their
financial proposal, including the required subsidy. Bidding on the basis of lowest
government payment allowed the government to ensure that the bidding process
was
direct and transparent yet left the concessionaires carrying commercial risks, and making
investment timing decisions.
Currently there are renegotiations over the investment program level and timing.
In
freight, this is because the proven demand will not support the investment
levels
promised: on the other hand, suburban passenger and Metro demand is so much higher
than expected that the government-specified capital program is proving to be inadequate
and new provisions for investment must be made.
By most measures, Argentine railway concessioning has been successful. Figures
1-4
below illustrate the radical transformation in both freight and passenger railway
productivity that the concessionaires have been able to achieve. The freight railways
(except the Belgrano) were concessioned, starting in 1991. There are four broad gauge
concessions - The Buenos Aires al Pacifico (BAP), The Ferro Expreso Pampeano
(FEPSA), The Nuevo Central Argentino (NCA), and Ferro Sur Roca (FSR).
The
Mesopotamico (old Urquiza), a standard gauge railway, has also been concessioned.
Insert Figure 1 here
The suburban passenger railways were concessioned in 1994-95. Figure 2 shows
an
abrupt increase in traffic over these lines, though given poor data collection and
fare
enforcement before concessioning, some of the increase in demand may well
be
attributable to better fare collection rather than actual ridership increase. The subway
system (the Subte) was also concessioned in conjunction with the Urquiza suburban
railway (because they are connected, have similar third rail systems, and both
are
standard gauge). Subte demand is up about 38 percent from 1993 to 1996.
Insert Figure 2 here
Most interurban passenger services operating before concessioning have now been
closed, except between Buenos Aires and Mar del Plata, and a few other shorter
haul
services operated by the provinces. Buses have picked up most of the former intercity
rail
ridership.
6
Figures 3 and 4 below give an indication of the scale of overstaffing on the old FA. The
Figures are slightly misleading, since prior to the concessioning of FA, there was a full
inter-city passenger service, and hence more employees were required. Nevertheless
there is a dramatic decrease in the number of employees on the railway (from a total of
94,800 in 1989 to approximately 17,000 today) and a very large increase in labor
productivity under the new managements.
Insert Figure 3 here
Insert Figure 4 here
It is always dangerous to claim victory prematurely, and there is still room for things to
go wrong. Although most appear stable, none of the freight concessions are fantastically
profitable, and some may even be in trouble financially. It is also true that most of the
intercity rail passenger services have been lost for good. In addition, Table 1 shows that
the traffic density (TU/km) of Argentina's freight railways is quite low and success under
these circumstances will be hard-earned. This said, it is hard to deny the real turnaround
in traffic trends, quadrupling of labor productivity, improvements in service quality,
reductions in prices, and a reduction in the public deficit of about US$600 million per
year (about 0.5 percent of GDP).
Brazilian Railways
There were four principal railways in Brazil, the national railway (RFFSA), the railway
of Sao Paulo State (FEPASA), and the two railways owned by the Companhia do Vale do
Rio Doce (CVRD), totaling approximately 30,000 km of track. RFFSA was the largest of
these, and accounted for approximately 2/3 of the track, rolling stock, and employees.
Just as for most other railways around the world, development of a substantial highway
network in Brazil reduced the importance of the railway over the course of the last three
decades, particularly in the passenger market where there are now almost no inter-city
passenger services. However railways do still account for about 25 percent of the total
freight movements measured in tonne-km.
Government intervention in railway operations has been manifold, including: 1)
prevention of line closure, despite low traffic density; 2) until 1989, strict control of the
level and structure of tariffs -- after 1989, tariff increases remained subordinate to macroeconomic plans; 3) uncompensated public service obligations for non-remunerative intercity and local passenger services; 4) interference in investment plans; 5) political
imposition of redundant labor; and, 6) severe restrictions on capital investment leading to
deferred maintenance and a low level (<50 percent) of locomotive availability.
RFFSA was formed in 1957, by merging 18 independent railways. Though traffic growth
was relatively steady following nationalization, the poor management of the business and
frequent government interference meant poor financial health. There were many attempts
at reform including labor reduction programs, intercity passenger service reductions, and
7
a transfer of the suburban passenger
operations and deficits into a separate
organization
(CBTU). Despite all this, RFFSA remained
in consistent deficit, with an annual average
operating loss of US $380 million between
1988 and 1991, and with all trends downward.
The government considered many different
options for RFFSA before settling
on
concessioning of six exclusive regional
systems as a result of the geographic
characteristics of the country as well
as the gauge differences and the significant
crossregional differences in traffic on the railway.
In fact, of the six regional units developed
for concessioning, only two were physically
contiguous and had the same track gauge
(Nordeste and Centro-Leste). The different
systems also served very different markets:
two (Sudeste and Tereza Cristina) are
dominated by a limited number of commodities
(iron ore, steel, and coal), the Nordeste
is a low density, mixed commodity
regional
carrier, Sul and Centro-Leste carry a broad
mix of commodities, and Oeste connects
the
agricultural region of the south to the
Atlantic ports via FEPASA.
There were two other major considerations
for the government as it assessed
restructuring: employment, and track
and rolling stock conditions. Though
RFFSA had
already made substantial progress in
reducing its work force (from 110,000
in 1975 to
42,000 in May 1995) labor productivity
remained low when compared with both
North
American standards and those of other
Latin American concessioned railways
(see Table
1). There was also considerable variation
in productivity across the network with
tonnekm per employee varying from a low of
200-300,000 on the Nordeste and Tereza
Cristina
networks to nearly one million on the
Sul, Centro-Leste and Oeste, and over
two
million
on the Sudeste. Hence, a redundancy
package was developed as were target
employment
levels which averaged about a 40 percent
reduction from immediate pre-concessioning
levels.
In addition to the legally required severance
payments the package includes incentives
for
early retirement and voluntary separation,
involuntary separation grants for the remaining
redundant staff, re-training programs
based on regional employment opportunities,
and
job search and outplacement assistance.
On average, the total package corresponded
to
about 21 months of salary. The program
was phased so that before concessioning,
the
incentive schemes for early retirement
and voluntary separation were introduced,
with
further involuntary separation depending
on the results. In the second phase,
after
concessioning, RFFSA paid or will
pay involuntary separation grants to
remaining
redundant staff not hired by the concessionaire.
As an example of this process, the Oeste
was concessioned in March 1996 with
a specified minimum number of employees
(1800)
which was 400 short of the employment
level before concessioning. These 400
surplus
employees were therefore compensated
by the government under the involuntary
separation scheme.
Compensation for additional layoffs,
if any, beyond the specified number
is a
responsibility of the concessionaire. Because
the initial employment decision is outside
the hands of the concessionaire (unlike
Argentina), it will be harder for the concessionaire
8
was reflected in the
to reach the most efficient levels of employment. Undoubtedly this
auction prices.
last few years and
Government investment in RFFSA had declined significantly over the
was below 50
the network quality suffered badly. By mid-1995, locomotive availability
locomotives.
percent, and RFFSA was actually refusing traffic due to a lack of available
and the roadbed
In the first eight months of 1995, there were over 200 accidents,
The government
deterioration meant further reductions in speed and quality of service.
stock renewal to
therefore had to make decisions about emergency track repair and rolling
conditions (and
allow the new concessionaires to assume the systems under operable
accident rates
indeed to meet the stipulations of the concession agreement about lower
during the first five years of operation).
of the highest bid
All six concessions have now been auctioned successfully on the basis
are required to pay
above the government's stipulated minimum price. Concessionaires
of pre-determined
an upfront sum immediately after the auction and then a stream
variable, and the
payments over the life of the concession. The upfront sum is the bidding
(now called Ferrovia
government established a reserve price for each network. The Oeste
price), CentroNovoeste) was sold for US$63.4 million (3.5 percent above the reserve
of US$317 million,
Leste (Ferrovia Centro-Atlantica) was sold for its reserve price
the Sul (Ferrovia
Sudeste (MRS Logistica) sold for its reserve price of US$889 million,
the Tereza
price),
Sul-Atlantico) for US$217 million (37 percent above its reserve
and the Nordeste for
Cristina for US$18.6 million (12 percent above its reserve price)
all of the program of
US$15.8 million (38 percent above its minimum price), a total for
about US$1.52 billion.
to sell its ownership
After the RFFSA program began, the Brazilian government decided
that CVRD owned.
of CVRD, which resulted in the privatization of the two railways
and the government
Finally, negotiations are underway between the national government
of RFFSA. The
of Sao Paulo State to concession FEPASA in a manner similar to that
services (Flumitrens)
State of Rio de Janeiro is now concessioning its suburban passenger
is engaged in a
and its Metro along lines similar to those of Buenos Aires. Sao Paulo
in public operation.
similar effort. Within a few years, Brazil will have no railways left
have only
There are as yet no meaningful results from Brazil since the concessionaires
the concessionaires
recently begun to operate the properties. Initial indications are that
5 which shows
Figure
(see
are rapidly developing their traffic base and reducing costs
in Brazil and
labor productivity before and after concessioning in several concessions
are met for traffic
Bolivia). As Table 1 suggests, even if only the minimum projections
higher that
growth and manpower reductions, the starting point in Brazil is sufficiently
results in Brazil should easily equal or significantly exceed those in Argentina.
9
Chile:A DifferentApproach
For several reasons, particularly the continuing importance of passenger
services, the
government of Chile felt itself unable to adopt the approach in Argentina.
Instead, the
government initially decided to concession only the freight services on the
broad gauge
network while keeping the infrastructure and passenger services in public hands.
At the
time (1995), this was possibly the first of the concessions based on
infrastructure
separation.
In its first years of operation, the freight concession (also called FEPASA)
has faced a
difficult battle to stabilize traffic, learn to live with their public sector
infrastructure
partners, get locomotives back in service, and fight back the challenge of trucks
(which is
not easy since the average length of freight haul in Chile is not favorable for
rail). Recent
traffic trends suggest that the battle will be won. The government has not
been fully
satisfied with the operations which remain in public hands and has committed
itself to
concessioning the infrastructure in one piece, and to concessioning the
passenger
operations in one intercity piece and two separate suburban services. These
concessions
will be complex and their implementation will take another year or so for results
to show.
In addition, Chile has also recently concessioned its meter gauge railway
(the old
Ferronorte which had been operated separately from the broad gauge railway)
and the
Arica to La Paz railway, one of the steepest and most difficult railways in the
world.
Bolivia
The government of Bolivia concessioned its railway in two pieces, the Western
(Oriental)
section which connects to Brazil (the Brazilian Oeste concession, in fact) and
the Andina
which connects to Argentina and Chile (the Antofagasta and Bolivia and the
Arica to La
Paz). These were competitively awarded on the basis of maximum price which
was to be
reinvested in the concessions ("recapitalization"). Traffic in Bolivia has responded
well
and Figure 5 shows that labor productivity is rising.
Mexico
Mexico is unusual in that it is a developing country with a border and a free
trade area
(NAFTA) with developed countries. As a result, the Mexican system was
concessioned
in a way that maximizes the opportunity for cross-border traffic as well
as domestic
flows. The system was divided into three major pieces plus a terminal company
serving
the Federal Capital area which will be jointly owned by the three concessionaires.
The
Northeast concession connecting to the US at Nuevo Laredo was sold first
(for about
US$1.4 billion) to a Mexican/US consortium headed by a large Mexican
transport
company (TMM) and a US regional railway (the Kansas City Southern).
The
Northwestern Concession (Pacifico Norte) was recently sold for US$524
million to a
consortium of Mexican industrial interests and the Union Pacific Railroad in
the US. The
government intends to market the Southeastern concession in the near future,
along with a
10
series of short lines that appear to have more value as independent operations like the
short lines in the US.
Interestingly, the Mexican government proceeded in a somewhat different way that
appears to be useful to governments that want to move rapidly. The railway (FNM) was
divided into the four planned concessions which were converted into stock companies
with separate management teams already holding the concession while still in
government hands. The government then sold a controlling interest in the stock by sealed
bids (stock not yet sold must be offered on the stock exchange or purchased by the
concessionaire at the original price). By selling stock rather than the concession, the
government was able to transfer a going concern, a process that can occur more smoothly
and rapidly than a concession alone, and the government was able to influence the
behavior of FNM before concessioning was finished. The concessioning in Mexico is too
recent to be able to report results.
Guatemala
The railway in Guatemala (FEGUA) had reached a point in early 1996 in which labor
disputes had caused it to be shut down with no prospects for restarting in government
hands. After examining all its options, the government concessioned the railway to a
Guatemalan/US consortium on a simple, "best efforts" basis in which rebuilding the
railway and its services is expected to be a long and slow process. There are no results as
yet.
Peru and Uruguay: PlannedConcessions
The government of Peru is now in the process of dividing its railway (ENAFER) into
three pieces for concessioning. After a long period of consideration of options, the
government has announced that sales should commence in the near future. The
government of Uruguay is evaluating approaches to award a concession to haul wood
products from inland to seaports.
Nicaraguaand CostaRica: The Cost of Failureto Change
Similar to the railway in Guatemala, the railways in Nicaragua and Costa Rica had
ground to a halt as a result of non-commercial management and labor disputes. In
Nicaragua, the government was unable to reach agreement on a course of action, and the
railway was liquidated. The railway in Costa Rica is in a sirnilar position after two years
of closure of operations and it is not clear that the railway can now be successfully
restarted even though the government is attempting to do so for the Caribbean side. The
lesson seems clear: at some point, if solutions cannot be found, railways can and will be
liquidated, an outcome that is the worst result for everyone involved.
Africa
The Abidjan-Ouagadougou Raiway: The Process and Initial Results
For many years up to 1989, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou railway (the Regie Abidjan-Niger,
or RAN) was managed and operated by a bi-national public company.
Originally, it
enjoyed a near monopoly on freight traffic to Burkina Faso, but, in
the mid-1970s
financial performance of the RAN suffered because of growing competition
from road
transport, as well as the competition for port traffic which Lome, Togo,
presented to
Abidjan. In 1989, partly as a result of nationalistic pressures, it was split into
two separate
state-owned companies which further aggravated the decline. In July
1992, both
governments decided to reunify the railway and privatize operations
under a single
operating concession.
Partly advised in the later stages by the World Bank, the governments jointly
awarded a
15 year concession in 1994 to SITARAIL which is a consortium of a
private sector
shareholder (51 percent), both governments (15 percent each), railway
staff (three
percent) and local private investors (16 percent). The concessionaire began
operations in
August, 1995 (see Table 1 for basic data). The majority shareholder is itself
a consortium
of international freight forwarders, an international shipping line, an Ivoirian
investment
group, and international railway engineering consultants. The consortium
approach, with
a controlling strategic shareholder from the private sector but with significant
remaining
public ownership is one which has been adopted elsewhere (e.g., Chile, Bolivia,
and some
of the Argentine freight concessions), largely in response to a lingering
political belief
that there ought to be a continuing local awareness of railway performance
and some
public stake in the railway's success.
Unlike most other rail concessions, SITARAIL provides both freight and
passenger
services, and may set its own tariffs for both. The concession contract also
provides for
services to be operated at government (local or national) request as public
service
obligations (PSOs). These services will be run under separate contracts specifying
the
characteristics of service and the financial compensation. To date, there
is no such
service, despite the fact that the concessionaire abandoned all unprofitable
local
passenger services when it took over the railway.
Because of the relatively short concessioning period, the concessionaire does
not own
rolling stock or other equipment; instead, two national patrimony corporations
have been
established. These corporations own both track and equipment, and will
lease rolling
stock to the concessionaire as necessary (though the concessionaire may purchase
its own
equipment if it views that as more appropriate). Infrastructure investment is
also made by
these patrimony corporations, though with advice on priority and desirability
from
SITARAIL, which also contributes a fee for debt service. SITARAIL is also
responsible
for maintenance of the track and for a part of equipment maintenance.
All of these
arrangements are designed to ensure that it is the concessionaire,
acting out of
commercial interest, who makes decisions about investment needs and timing.
12
SITARAIL's payments for the concession are three-fold: 1) a usage fee, to be negotiated
every three years and related to revenues on the railway; 2) the debt service payment
incurred by the patrimony corporations; and, 3) a lease fee for the use of motive power
and equipment. Payments are kept in an investment and renewal fund to allow the
patrimony corporations to refurbish the equipment as necessary.
This approach ensures that commercial motivations are uppermost in investment
decisions, since the concessionaire is both selecting investment timing and level and
paying the debt service. Also, because the usage fee is to be renegotiated every three
years, the concession will evolve over time, depending on the nature of the revenue
streams and the required investment levels. This represents a compromise, a common
feature of concession agreements, between: 1) a desire to remove railway operations and
decision making from the government realm; 2) a hope to reduce the extent of uncertainty
for investors, who are reassured by a staged negotiation; and, 3) the objective of
maximizing government income from the concession.
The concession agreement contains an important, controversial feature. Most railways are
concessioned on an exclusive basis, with perhaps some track access rights for allowing
connecting railways access to certain portions of track, vital to create competition in
major markets (as in Mexico) or for non-competing services (such as passenger services
on freight tracks). The governments granted SITARAIL only a seven year exclusivity
period, after which time SITARAIL must grant track access, for an agreed fee, to any
third party carrier requested by the governments. This again was a clear compromise
between the govermments' perception that reduction of the monopoly power of the
concessionaire, by allowing competitive access to the tracks, would be beneficial versus
the private sector stress on the need to have full control over the tracks and full control
over the market, to make revenues easier to forecast and adequate profitability more
feasible.
We have only a little more than one year's experience with the SITARAIL concession,
but the initial results are encouraging. Figure 6 shows that freight traffic has turned
upward after many years of decline.
Insert Figure 6 here
two
As is universal in state-owned railways, there was substantial overstaffing on the
that
national railways. During negotiations on the terms of the concession it was agreed
select
to
free
was
SITARAIL would take on 1,815 of the 3,470 employees, and that it
staff.
these 1,815. The governments then made severance payments to the redundant
attention
Figure 6 shows that combining traffic growth with staff reductions and renewed
to equipment utilization has produced a significant turnabout in productivity.
Insert Figure 7 here
13
SITARAIL's experience is so limited that caution is clearly in order.
It is fair to say that
the results are positive, and that the trends are in the right direction.
Much that
SITARAIL has done miffors the actions of the Argentina concessions,
and the results
look the same as Argentina at the same stage in the process.
A number of other African concessioning efforts are underway (see Table
1 for statistics
where they are available). Malawi is in advanced stages of soliciting
proposals for a
concession to operate the Malawi Railway. Mozambique has announced
intentions to
concession all three parts of the CFM, and bids have been announced for
the Maputo and
Nacala corridors. Zambia has announced intentions to concession ZR,
and requests for
studies for marketing the concession will soon be advertised. Zimbabwe
has announced
intentions to concession the railway infrastructure (but not yet operations),
a unique
approach. South Africa is intensively evaluating concessioning
of the suburban
passenger services (but not yet the freight or intercity passenger railway).
Madagascar is
in the final stages of receiving bids for a concession. The Republic
of the Congo
(Brazzaville) and Gabon are completing studies of how to carry out their concession,
and
Cameroon will be receiving proposals in the near future. As a final note,
the railways of
Togo and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) were,
until recently,
operated under management contracts. Clearly the role of the private sector
in managing
African railways will be growing.
Other Concessioning and Franchising Programs
The government of Jordan has announced its intention to concession
the Aqaba Railway,
a railway that hauls phosphate rock for the Jordanian Phosphate Mining
Company. This
is likely to be awarded on a minimum tariff basis and consulting efforts
are underway to
finalize the terms of the proposed concession. The government of
Pakistan is
considering options for privatizing part or all of Pakistan Railways, though
the choice
between concessioning as opposed to privatization is still under consideration.
Even
Indian Railways now has a privately invested company, CONCOR,
engaged in hauling
containers over the national network.
Although the main topic of this paper is concessioning, at least a short
mention of railway
privatization seems in order. The old British Rail has been privatized
in its infrastructure
and freight operations. Passenger services on BR were converted into
"franchises" which
in effect are short term, negative concessions to provide services under
limited terms and
conditions. New Zealand sold its railway outright (to the same investor
group that
subsequently bought the old BR freight services). The Canadian government's
shares in
Canadian National were sold to the public, as were a majority of the shares
which the
Japanese
government held in East Japan Railways and Central Japan Railways.
The
US
government nationalized Penn Central in 1971, and later sold its shares
in the successor
company,
Conrail, in 1987.
Perhaps the most important innovation in railway organization in
the next decades will be
the European Commission's Order 91-440 and its follow-on Orders
opening national
14
networks up to operations from all qualified carriers. While Order 91-440 explicitly
it
required only that infrastructure accounts be separated from those of operations,
and
implicitly also required that social passenger services, intercity passenger services
freight services be accounted separately in order to show that state subsidies were limited
clear
solely to social passenger services. The thrust of the Order has actually ignited a
trend in the EU toward institutional separation of infrastructure from operations because
infrastructure is seen as a state responsibility while operations (except for social services)
are seen as commercial. In fact, we argue that one eventual result of institutional
and
separation is going to be franchising or even privatization of most freight services
is
possibly intercity passenger services as well. BR has shown that total privatization
possible, and DB (Germany) and FS (Italy) have already announced plans to privatize
freight
freight services as an initial step. Romania is also considering privatizing
and
services, though there are no plans to privatize infrastructure. Exciting times,
change, are in store for railways!
The World Bank's Role
the
The World Bank has strongly supported the process of concessioning in cases where
the
of
all
proposed conditions appeared to make sense. This has included some or
the
following in various rail concessioning efforts: 1) financing new construction where
or
success of the concession is dependent on new facilities; 2) financing repair
3)
rehabilitation to deliver the rail property in operable condition to a concessionaire;
or
assisting environmental cleanup; 4) helping to finance labor retraining, redundancy
is
retirement schemes; 5) providing partial risk guarantees where policy implementation
in
critical to the success of concessioning; and, 6) financing technical assistance
concession design, packaging and marketing. In addition, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) has taken an investment role in several concessions.
Conclusion
Each country approached its problems slightly differently, and each provides different
insights into what can be achieved through the concession mechanism. However, a few
common themes can be discerned:
1.
Restructuring and substantial government investment in the design of the
concession pay off in successful concessioning;
2.
There are a growing number of companies and consortia interested in investing in
railway concessions if the concessions are offered on reasonable terms;
3.
Both "positive" (where the concessionaire pays the government an agreed sum for
the concession rights) and "negative" (where the government pays the
concessionaire for operating and maintaining the property) concessions are
be
possible, hence loss-making but socially necessary services can also
concessioned;
15
4.
Concessionaires can in fact do exactly what is expected -- increase
traffic,
improve service and enhance labor and asset efficiency, if they are allowed
to do
so; and,
5.
In virtually every case, the new majority owners of the concession were
local
investors -- thus no "recolonialization" occurred. Instead, the local
owners
partnered with foreign operating expertise (thus far US, Canadian,
Chilean,
French, and Portuguese) which held only a minority share in the equity
of the
concession. Moreover, the actual number of expatriates involved in concessions
has usually started with two to five professionals, and then declined to one
or less
as local expertise has grown. Concessions work because government interference
is ended and commercial management techniques are introduced and allowed
to
operate. Beyond this, there is nothing magic about successful operations
of
railways as businesses.
As Table 1 shows, concessions or franchises have already been awarded
for railway
operations in many countries and are under preparation in many others.
This includes not
just European and Latin American systems, but is increasingly the focus
of attention in
Africa. As we have tried to stress, concessioning is not simple, and governments
must
carefully analyze existing networks, their own objectives, and potential
interest in the
concessions, before embarking. Though the process is complex and is neither
a panacea
nor risk-free, the results can be the sort of productivity improvements that
have been seen
in Argentina over the course of the last five years, and as are developing
in C6te d'Ivoire
and Burkina Faso and in Brazil and Bolivia.
Bringing the railways into the market, and allowing commercial incentives
to drive
management decisions creates an environment in which costs are reduced
and railways
can once again play a significant role in meeting the transport needs of a
country. Under
the right circumstances, concessioning works and may be the only
way out of the
downward spiral in which many government-operated railways are currently
trapped.
*The authors acknowledge their debt to Nicola M. Shaw who played
a major role in
earlier versions of this paper and who did much of the organization of the
Bank's analysis
of concessioning in transport. We also thank Kenneth M. Gwilliam who
has contributed
much to the discussion of this issue. Readers looking for more detail
on the general
subject are referred to: Shaw, Nicola M.; Kenneth M. Gwilliam, and Louis
S. Thompson,
"Concessions in Transport," Paper No. TWU 27, Transport, Water
and Urban
Department, The World Bank, October 1996.
M:\thompson\abidjanURCA1097.doc
M:\thompson\abidjan\comp.xls
Table 1
ACrUAL OR POTENTIAL PRIMARILY FREIGHIT RAILWAY CONCESSIONS
(1994 or late available year)
(Italics Indicates railway is alreadyconcessionedor privatized)
|ARGENTINA 1.
NCA
FEPSA
FerrosurRoca
Bs. As. at Pacifico
Mesopotamico
Belgran (no(tonceioned)
P-Km
T-Km
(000,000) (000,000)
6,485
1,189
982
854
2,029
620
S11
Line Km Employees
5,151
29,118
865
4,520
575
5,163
808
4,791
1,079
5,493
524
2,751
1,300
6,400
TU/Kms
(000)
223
263
190
178
369
225
127
TU/Empl
(000)
1,259
1,375
1,708
1,057
1,880
1,183
624
1,389
1,111
2,200
800
505
39,193
926
6,886
20,370
21,715
4,260
7,092
1,770
40,581
4,402
8,608
9,982
1,805
217
971
11,508
966
210
800
2,041
965 1.206401
3,256 1.595626
RFFSA: Sul(Sl Atlantico)
RFFSA: Terezina Cristina
RFFSA: Oeste (Novoeste)
9,019
96
1,916
6,814
168
1,611
10,208
351
2,655
1,324
571
1,189
884
274
722
2,229 2.52237
621 2.269397
1,357 1.8I104
FEPASA
6,520
4,929
15,319
1,546
497
898
1,175
4,991
1,814
55,832
31,915
10,045
20,673
3,698
2,082
1,383
5,255
2,443
1,431
1SS
209
268
20,445
43,000
1,820
775
6,200
3,960
2,200
1,457
6,543
21,300
9,830
9,043
2,053
5,804
2,774
3,535
1,455
469
352
808
1,424
354
333
396
ICHILE FREIGHT (FEPASA) 2.
BRAZIL (RFFSA) 6.
RFFSA: Nordeste
RFFSA: Centro-Leste (CentroAtlantico)
RFFSA: Sudeste (MRSLgistica)
CVRD: EFVM(1994) 7
CVRD: Carajas(1994) 7
BOLIVIA (1993)
Andina
Oriental
MEXICO (FNM)
Northwest (est)
Northeast(est)
Southet (est)
Chihuahua mlPacifico (est)
Short Lines
1,100
50,137
37,500
697
322
370
114
37,200
17,200
14,000
3,200
600
2,300
84
133
203
380
484
5
209
269
241
83
49
110
1,609
1S5
509
915
3,337
450
474
507
414
217
GUA TEMALA (94 est) 8
28
240
640
430
420
624
COSTARICA(estfrom8Sdet)8
S0
72
480
2,300
317
66
417
592
52
295
339
752
1,025
19
92,536
163
450
65
98
421
346
241
9
9,204
1,155
1,006
789
683
510
1,548
1,273
532
33,275
1,823
3,853
3,658
1,893
4,989
4,935
8,544
150,470
502
1,036
148
575
1,490
709
995
53
3,058
318
270
32
208
152
222
148
35
676
293
1,219
2,304
554
8,775
116,026
2,544
192
|PERU (1994)
Southeastern
Central
Southem
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN RAILWAYS
Coted'Ivoire/BurktnaFaso
Cameroun
Malawi
Gabon
Congo (Brazzaville)
Senegpl/Mli (intl only)
Zambia
Togo (mgt. contract)
RSA (Spoomet) 11.
[JORDAN
675
PAKISTAN 10.
5,939
16,385
INEWZEALAND 5.
2,455
525
4,000
4,500
745
662
24,728
6,741
5,202
27,979
5,372
5,702
|US: CONRAIL
128,627
19,082
CANADIANNATIONAL 4.
159,540
29,700
I. Conceuioned between 1993 ad 1995.Subwbenpener cocesrnotnshown.
2. Concesioned in June, 1995
3. Privatized in 1987
4. Pdvatized inlate 1995
5.Pusengert affic estimated.
6. RFFSA concessioning to b complete in 1996 or ealy 1997, except forNordeste.
7.CVRD (Paent company) privated in April, 1997
8. Curntly out of ervice
9. TU means Traffic units, the sum of ton-km (T-KM) and pasenger-km (P-KM)
10. Note majority of traffic is pusenger.
11.Considering concessioning 5 suburban pussger opertions.
M:\thompson\abidjen\hablel xls
800
606 2.985361
7S1 2.0S4862
Ton-Kms (millions)
19741975-
l
19768
1977
1978
1979 --
t
1980 -
1981--
1983--(
1984
--
1985
3
1986
ft
1987
1988
1989
t
fA
86
1990
1991
1992
--
1993
1994-1995
1996
IHf1
140.0
Figure 2-- Buenos Aires Suburban Railways Passengers 1972-1996
120.0
~
~
100.0
~~ ~ ~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~~~~~4ROCA
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
__
-&SARMIENTO
X
00.0
cn
~
~~
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
~
~
~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~-1-URQUIZA
-..- BELGRANO
40.0-
0Te
The Mitre, Sarmiento, and Roca lines have been operated by concessionaires since 1995
The Urquiza, San Martin, and Beigrano lines have been operated by concessionaires since 1994
C661
Z661I
1661
0661
t
S
0
6~961I
B8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~961
v-61
9961
.-61
C
.- t861
5|
|
}
l
.-88~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z61
t
0
.-08~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~161
8
+
6461
.-8061
09461
1461
. 61
a~
~
L
o
|
^
,
0
-
|
Io
*
i
- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C461
0
Figure 4- TU/Employee on Argentine Railways
1.2
0.3
-*Urquiza
0.6 I--E-Belgrazw
-hBroad Giue
--- Suburban Railways
0.4I
o4
I
r
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
!
0
Figure 5 -- Labor Productivity in Brazil and Bolivia Before and After Concessioning
(000 TU/Employee)
3500
3000
2500 -
2000 O Before
* After
1500
1000
500
RFFSA: CentroLeste
RFFSA:
Sudeste
RFFSA:Sul
RFFSA:Terezina
Cristina
RFFSA: Oeste
Bolivia: Andina
Bolivia: Oriental
700 -
Figure 6 -Tonne-kilometers on Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway (000,000)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
No data is available for 1988 and 1989.
I
The concessionaire took over in October 1995 and a full year has been extrapolated from the first nine months.
Figure 7- Productivity on Abidjan-Ouagadougou Railway (1990=100)
300
250
150
50
X
=
= v~~~~~~~~--Umpoe
-U---Dkmwao
Ndataisavailablefor1988and1989.The
No data is available for 1988 and 1989.
V~TI
conesionir_tokveinOcobe195ndaullyerhseenexraolaedeTkmwtn
n
The concessionaire took over in October 1995 and a full
year has been extrapolated from the first nine months.
i
i
Ii
t
I
Olivier Ratheaux, French development agency (CFD)
Abidjan conference, october 1997
1. DEFINE OBJECTIVES
2. APPRAISE THE FEASIBILITY
3. SECURE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
4. SPECIFY THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR'S MANDATE
5. INVOLVE THE OPERATOR AND THE RAILWAY STAFF
6. SPELL OUT THE TERMS OF THE CONCESSION
7. GIVE HEED TO COMMUNICATION
8. BE SELECTIVE WITH THE STRATEGIC SHAREHOLDER
9. CLEAN UP FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL LIABILITIES
10. FAVOUR ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL COMPETITION
11. HARMONIZE COMPETITION TERMS IN TRANSPORT
review the economic and social role of
railway:
- market
- missions
* aim for efficient and sustainable operation
of the railway, rather than the budgetary
benefits of privatization
ISE THE FE.A Si : ILT
2.
(INSTITUTI AN ^ L,TECHNICAL
SeCU^L N'N FINiANCLL)
~'zt.
* legal preconditions
* benchmark business plan
* financial simulations
concessionaire's perspective
-government's perspective
-
* need for clear political will
* the leadership of the ministry for
privatizations should be coordinated with
the transport ministry and the railway
com pany
* ministerial committee / technical
committee for privatization
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
diagnosis
market study
feasibility of the concession
tender documentation and contractual framework
publicity and prospection
support to communication
support to the selection process
accompagnying measures
- sector policy
- prpare the liquidation of the previous organization
5. INVOLVE THE 0O E*:I TOR AN
THE '. AILW^Y ST.A FF
* support or supportive neutrality: the
transitional directorate
* preparatory measures : commercial
initiatives, management streamlining, social
communication, staff reduction
* access to information
T'.nE CONCESSIO*N
a cultural (r)evolution : from tutelage to concession
all, and nothing but the concession contract
a balanced contract: public - private partnership
identify non profitable services obligations and
provide for specific compensations
* government shareholder ?
* no rail landlord corporation
* regulatory authority or ministry of transport ?
*
*
*
*
7. GIVE HEED TO
COMMUNIC,' Tie*N
*
*
*
*
*
open dialogue and transparency
public opinion
railway staff
i nvesto rs
customers
|
8. BE SELCTV WIT THEvcvl
STR.^ TEGIC SH.A cEHo*LDE.i
* investors, operators and clients
* conflicts of interests and monopolies:
neither suppliers, nor contractors
* need for substantial equity
* attract private local investors
9'.CLE ^N U' FIN ANCI.A L ^NA
SO*Cl AL LIA": ILITIES
* concessionaire not responsible for
previous liabilities
* government paid staff reduction
* implementation of work force restructuring
* select the strategic shareholder by
competitive bidding
* eliminate protectionist measures and
government-fixed prices
* anti-trust control:
-competition from road transport
- access of other operators to the track
- arbitration
TEFMS IN T;.A NS- S--T
A problems
of unfair competition : formal I
unformal sectors
* marketing rail and road transport
* infrastructure pricing
* fiscal and customs legislation
- ------
*_..C'AU
,^ MIS
I.NS.mOU,' ;
USSI
zN C*@NC*SSIS*N
Olivier Ratheaux, Caisse franaise de
de1veIoppement
seminaire d'Abidjan, octobre 1997
1. DEFINIR LES OBJECTIFS
2. APPRECIER LA FAISABILITE INSTITUTIONNELLE,
TECHNIQUE, SOCIALE ET FINANCIERE
3. APPORTER LE SOUTIEN DU GOUVERNEMENT
4. FIXER LE MANDAT DU CONSEILLER DU GOUVERNEMENT
5. IMPLIQUER L'EXPLOITANT FERROVIAIRE ET LES
CHEMINOTS
6. EXPLICITER LES RAPPORTS ETAT - CONCESSIONNAIRE
7. SOIGNER LA COMMUNICATION
8. BIEN CHOISIR L'ACTIONNARIAT DE REFERENCE,
9. APURER LES PASSIFS COMPTABLES ET SOCIAUX
10. DEVELOPPER LA CONCURRENCE EFFECTIVE OU
POTENTIELLE
11. HARMONISER LES CONDITIONS DE CONCURRENCE
DANS LES TRANSPORTS
* reexaminer le role economique et social du
chemin de fer:
- marche
- missions
e privilegier
le fonctionnement efficace et
durable du chemin de fer plutot que les
recettes budgetaires de privatisation
* prealables juridiques
* plan d'entreprise de reference
* simulations financieres
- point de vue du concessionnaire
- point de vue de l'Etat
3. ^. "O;TER LE SOUTIEN IU
Go*UVERNEMENT
* necessite d'une volonte politique affirmee
* conduite du processus par le ministere
charge des privatisations en coordination
avec le minist'ere des transports et
1'exploitant ferroviaire
* instance politique / instance technique des
privatisations
4. FIXER LE M^-NIaT *U
CC NSEILLER DU GOUVE ; NEMENT
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
diagnostic du chemin de fer
etude du marche
faisabilite de la concession
dossier d'appel d'offres et cadre contractuel
valorisation du projet et prospection
appui a la communication
appui au choix du repreneur
mesures d'accompagnement
- politique sectorielle
- preparer la liquidation de l'ancienne structure
FER.' oVI.AI'EET LES CHEMINOTS
* appui ou neutralite bienveillante: direction
de transition
* preparer le terrain : mesures commerciales
et de rationalisation de la gestion,
communication sociale, reduction des
effectifs
* acces a l'information
EtIT
-
CO*NCESSIOltNN.A I iE
* une (r)evolution culturelle : de la tutelle au
concedant
* tout le contrat de concession, rien que celui-ci
* un contrat equilibre : partenariat public - prive
* identifier les obligations de services non
rentables et leur accorder une compensation
financiere specifique
* I'Etat actionnaire?
pas de societe de patrimoine
autorite regulatrice, ou plutot ministere des
transports?
7. SS*IGNER L ' COMMUNIC ^TION
*
*
*
*
*
concertation et transparence
opinion publique
cheminots
investisseurs
clientele
8. BIE C'. OISI'?l
L'ACTIS* NN A; I AxT DE REFE.' ENCE
investisseurs, operateurs et clients
conflits d'interet et monopoles : ni
fournisseurs ni entreprises de travaux
obtenir un apport en fonds propres
substantiel
attirer des capitaux prives nationaux
9.. ' U ; ER LES Pz SSIFS
COMPTA
BLES ET SOCkI UX
* concessionnaire non tenu des passifs
anterieurs
* plan social 'a la charge de l'Etat
* conduite du plan social
* choisir le repreneur par appel d'offres
* supprimer les mesures protectionnistes et
les tarifs administres
* controler les abus de position dominante:
-
la regulation par la concurrence routiere
I'acces de tiers a la voie ferree
* problemes de la concurrence secteur
formel / informel
* commercialisation du chemin de fer et de
la route
* tarification de l'usage des infrastructures
* regime fiscal et douanier
I
II
i
i
i
i
i
i
RAILWAY CONCESSIONING
ISSUES AND OPTIONS
Presentation by Karim-Jacques Budin, Principal Railway Specialist, The World Bank, to the
Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa
Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire
October 13-14, 1997
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
2
MAIN ISSUES IN RAILWAY CONCESSIONING
A railway concession is a contractual partnership arrangement between the
Government and a private operator ("Concessionaire") whereby operation of
rail activity is transferred to the Concessionaire under conditions spelled out
in the Concession Agreement.
Main issues in railway concessioning:
*
Shaping the Concession Agreement (Which "rules of the game" for
railway activity?)
*
Selecting the Concessionaire
3
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
SHAPING THE CONCESSION AGREEMENT
* Scope of the concession
*
Regulatory framework
of rail activity
* Access to rail infrastructure
by third-party operators
*
Rail infrastructure management
* Motive power and rolling stock
. Staffing
* Taxation
* Concession fee
* Duration of the concession
*
Control of the concession
and arbitration
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
4
SCOPE OF THE CONCESSION
The Concessionaire is generally responsible for:
*
operation of freight and passenger railway services
*
maintenance, renewal
infrastructure
*
current management of railway-related real estate
and
upgrading
of rail
track
and
other
As an alternative, passenger services might be operated by a specialized
operator distinct from the Concessionaire.
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
5
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF RAIL ACTIVITY
Commercial services
*
Services operated in a competitive and deregulated environment
*
Freedom for the Concessionaire to define service configuration, set
tariffs, contract with specific customers
Services operated under a Public Service Obligation (PSO) scheme
*
Services operated at Government request (mainly passenger)
*
Operation under a "PSO contract" (configuration of services, tariffs,
financial compensation)
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
ACCESS TO RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE
OPERATORS
6
BY "THIRD-PARTY"
*
Government may authorize access to rail infrastructure by third party
operators in case of abuse of "monopoly" power by the Concessionaire
*
Best alternative to tariff control by Government or a Regulatory Agency
*
Trackage fee paid to the Concessionaire by the third-party operator
*
However, the Concessionaire might be granted exclusive operation of
services for a few years at the beginning of the concession
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
7
RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT
Infrastructure ownership to be retained by Government
Operation and maintenance
*
under the sole responsibility of the Concessionaire.
*
maintenance standards decided and set by the Concessionaire, provided safety is
kept at an "acceptable" level
*
costs entirely borne by the Concessionaire
Renewal and upgrading
*
investment programs to be prepared and technically managed by the
Concessionaire. Large-scale operations subjected to Government agreement
(reimbursement of non-depreciated investment at the end of the concession)
*
financing mobilized by the Concessionaire (Government may guarantee loans)
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
8
MOTIVE POWER AND ROLLING STOCK
Existing equipment of the railway company
*
preferably bought "en bloc" by the Concessionaire. Concessionaire free
to sell useless equipment
*
other option: Concessionaire selects and decides equipment to acquire
or lease. Remaining equipment to be sold by Government
New equipment
*
Concessionaire free to buy or lease
*
Government retains a right of first refusal on the sale of equipment by
the Concessionaire
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
9
STAFFING
*
Staff of the Concessionaire (a) to be ruled by the common labor law
applicable to the private sector and (b) to be affiliated to the pension
system applicable to private sector employees.
*
At the beginning of the concession, the Concessionaire will freely select
and rehire staff among the existing railway staff.
*
Government responsible for the dismissal/redeployment of former
railway workers not rehired by the Concessionaire. It will also deal with
pension issues related to railway workers previously affiliated to specific
pension schemes.
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
10
TAXATION
*
Common regime applicable to the private sector, subject to provisions
specific to concessions
*
No specific tax on railway activity which might distort competition
*
Petroleum products used in locomotives exempt from specific Road Fund
contribution (if any)
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
11
CONCESSION FEE
Concession fee paid by the Concessionaire to the Government for the right
of disposing of the rail infrastructure and of operating rail services.
Various options:
*
initial lump-sum fee
*
yearly lump-sum fee
*
a percentage of the revenue of the Concessionaire
*
a combination thereof
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
12
DURATION OF THE CONCESSION
*
Long-term concession necessary to trigger investment and long-term
policy in asset maintenance, staffing, marketing,...
*
Difficult issues arising during the last years of a fixed-term concession
*
"Rolling" concession (e.g., initially 20 years, with option to extend the
concession for another five years, to be exercised every five years) often
an adequate solution
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
13
CONTROL OF THE CONCESSION AND ARBITRATION
*
Generally no need for a Regulatory Agency
*
Government control to be specified in the Concession Agreement (focus
on safety and environmental control)
*
Yearly audit of the concession by an independent auditor
*
Disputes between Government and Concessionaire to be preferably
subjected to arbitration (International Chamber of Commerce rules,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,...)
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
14
SELECTING THE CONCESSIONAIRE
*
A "strategic" shareholder should play a leading role in the equity of the
concession company
*
A bidding process is highly recommended for the selection of the
strategic shareholder
Railway Concessioning - Issues and Options
THE BIDDING PROCESS FOR THE
STRATEGIC SHAREHOLDER
15
SELECTION
OF THE
A three-stage process is recommended.
Stage 1:
Prequalification of bidders
Stage 2:
"Technical" selection ("Fail or Pass").
medium-term Business Plan
Stage 3:
Final selection on the basis of the financial proposal.
Concession awarded to the highest bidder for the concession
fee (or for the sum of concession fee + price paid for the
equipment)
Bidders present a
MISE EN CONCESSION DES CHEMINS DE FER
ELEMENTS-CLES ET OPTIONS
Presentation pr6par6e par Karim-Jacques Budin, Sp6cialiste Ferroviaire Principal, Banque Mondiale, pour le
Seminaire sur la mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique
Abidjan, Cote d'lvoire
13-14 octobre 1997
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options
2
ELEMENTS-CLES D'UNE MISE EN CONCESSION FERROVIAIRE
La concession ferroviaire est une forme de partenariat entre I'Etat et un
operateur prive (le "Concessionnaire") dans laquelle 1'exploitation de I'activite
ferroviaire est transferee au Concessionnaire dans des conditions specifiees
dans la Convention de concession.
Elements-cles d'une mise en concession ferroviaire:
Quelles dispositions adopter pour la Convention de concession (Quelles
*
sont les "r'egles du jeu" de I'activite ferroviaire?)
*
Comment choisir le concessionnaire?
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdfs et options
3
QUELLES DISPOSITIONS ADOPTER POUR LA CONVENTION
DE CONCESSION?
Les principaux points a traiter concernent les aspects suivants
* Champ de la concession
*
* Acces d'autres operateurs
a l'infrastructure ferroviaire
* Gestion des infrastructures
* Materiel moteur et remorque
* Questions de personnel
* Fiscalite
*
* Duree de la concession
* Controle de la concession
Cadre reglementaire
de I'activite ferroviaire
Redevance de concession
et arbitrage
4
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-clIs et options
CHAMP DE LA CONCESSION
Le Concessionnaire sera habituellement responsable de:
*
I'exploitation des services ferroviaires marchandises et voyageurs
*
I'entretien,
le renouvellement
et I'amenagement
des infrastructures
ferroviaires
*
Ia gestion courante du domaine ferroviaire
A titre de variante, I'exploitation des services voyageurs pourrait etre confiee
a un operateur specialise, distinct du Concessionnaire.
S
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdes et options
5
CADRE REGLEMENTAIRE DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE
Services commerciaux
*
A exploiter dans un environnement competitif et dereglemente
*
Liberte pour le Concessionnaire de definir la configuration des services,
de fixer les tarifs et de negocier des contrats avec certains clients
Services exploit6s a titre d'obligation de service public (OSP)
*
Services exploites a la demande expresse de I'Etat (essentiellement
services voyageurs)
*
Exploitation dans le cadre d'une Convention particuliere (fixant la
configuration des services, les tarifs, la compensation financiere versee
au Concessionnaire)
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cdes et options
ACCES D'AUTRES
FERROVIAIRE
OPERATEURS
A
6
L'INFRASTRUCTURE
*
L'Etat conserve le droit d'autoriser l'acces a l'infrastructure ferroviaire
par d'autres operateurs ferroviaires dans le cas d'abus de position
dominante par le Concessionnaire
*
Alternative preferable au contro'le des prix par l'Etat ou une Agence de
Regulation
*
Peage a payer par l'operateur au Concessionnaire
*
Une exclusivite pourra toutefois etre accordee au Concessionnaire pour
une periode de quelques annees en debut de concession
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-des et options
7
GESTION DES INFRASTRUCTURES FERROVIAIRES
Propridt& des infrastructures conservee par l'Etat
Exploitation et entretien
*
sous la seule responsabilite du Concessionnaire
*
standards d'entretien librement arretes par le Concessionnaire, sous reserve
d'assurer la securite b un niveau acceptable
*
couts entierement support6s par le Concessionnaire
Renouvellement et ame'nagement
*
programmes d'investissements prepar6s et geres par le Concessionnaire.
Operations de grande ampleur soumises a I'agrement de I'Etat (remboursement
par I'Etat de la partie non amortie de l'investissement en fin de concession)
*
financement par le Concessionnaire (avec, eventuellement, garantie de I'Etat)
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Eldments-cIds et options
8
MATERIEL MOTEUR ET REMORQUE
Materiels existants en d6but de concession
*
de preference a acheter en bloc par le Concessionnaire, qui pourra
vendre les materiels inutiles
*
autre option:
materiels a reprendre librement selectionnes par le
Concessionnaire. Materiels redondants a vendre par I'Etat.
Nouveaux mat6riels
*
le Concessionnaire a la liberte totale de les acqubrir ou des les louer
*
I'Etat a un droit de preemption sur la vente des materiels par le
Concessionnaire
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-des et options
9
QUESTIONS DE PERSONNEL
*
Le personnel du Concessionnaire sera regi par le droit du travail
applicable aux entreprises du secteur prive et sera affilie au regime de
retraites du secteur prive
*
En debut de concession, le Concessionnaire selectionnera librement les
personnels qu'il reprendra parmi les personnels de la societe de chemins
de fer
*
L'Etat fera son affaire du licenciement/redeploiement des personnels non
repris par le Concessionnaire. 11 reglera egalement les questions relatives
aux retraites des employes affilies aux regimes particuliers de securite
sociale.
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options
10
FISCALITE
*
Regime fiscal de droit commun applicable au secteur prive, sous reserve
des dispositions specifiques aux concessions
*
Pas de taxes specifiques a l'activite ferroviaire qui pourraient introduire
des distorsions en matiere de concurrence
*
Acquisition des produits petroliers en exemption de contribution au
Fonds Routier (s'il en existe un)
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-clds et options
11
REDEVANCE DE CONCESSION
Le Concessionnaire versera 3 I'Etat une "redevance de concession" en
contrepartie de la mise b disposition des infrastructures et du droit
d'exploiter les services ferroviaires.
Principales options:
*
montant forfaitaire payable en debut de concession
*
montant forfaitaire annuel
*
pourcentage des recettes du Concessionnaire
*
combinaison des elements ci-dessus
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - Elements-ces et options
12
DUREE DE LA CONCESSION
*
Une concession de longue duree est necessaire pour inciter le
Concessionnaire a investir et mettre en oeuvre une politique a long terme
en matiere d'entretien, de personnel, de commercialisation,...
*
Difficiles problemes les dernieres annees de la concession en cas de
concession a duree fixe
*
La formule de la concession "glissante" (par exemple, duree initiale de
20 ans, avec prolongation eventuelle pour cinq ans, a decider 3 l'issue
de chaque periode de cinq ans a partir du debut de la concession)
constituera souvent une bonne solution.
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cles et options
13
CONTROLE DE LA CONCESSION ET ARBITRAGE
*
Une Agence de Regulation est en general inutile
*
Le controle a exercer par I'Etat doit etre defini en detail dans la
Convention de concession (accent a mettre sur la securite et la
protection de 1'environnement)
*
Audit annuel de la concession par un auditeur independant
*
Litiges entre I'Etat et le Concessionnaire a soumettre de preference a
I'arbitrage (Chambre de Commerce International, Centre International
pour le Reglement des Differends relatifs aux Investissements,...)
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options
14
COMMENT CHOISIR LE CONCESSIONNAIRE?
*
Un actionnaire "de reference" devrait detenir la majorite du capital de la
societe concessionnaire
*
11 est fortement recommande de choisir I'actionnaire de reference par
appel a la concurrence
15
Mise en concession des chemins de fer - El6ments-cd6s et options
LE PROCESSUS D'APPEL A LA CONCURRENCE
CHOIX DE L'ACTIONNAIRE DE REFERENCE
POUR LE
Un processus en trois etapes est recommande.
Etape 1:
Prequalification des candidats
Etape 2:
Selection "technique" ("Recu ou Recale") sur la base d'un Plan
Etape 3:
Selection finale sur la base de la proposition financiere.
d'Entreprise a moyen terme presente par les candidats
La
concession est accordee au candidat ayant presente l'offre la
plus elevee pour la redevance de concession (ou pour la somme
de la redevance de concession et du prix d'acquisition des
materiels ferroviaires)
i
i
I
i
i
Session 3
- 1--
-
-l ...
-I -
Railway Concessioning
in Latin America
Jorge H. Kogan
Vice President
Abidjan, October 13, 1997
Mercer Management Consulting
MAP OF LATIN AMERICAN
RAILWAY PRIVATIZATIONS
MEXICO
<<7
~~ENTRAL
AMERICA
COLOMBIA
9
BOLIVIA:
~~BRAZIL)
VCuz-
C H IL E <
A.
!/
HRio de Janeiro
tsX
(¢
l
{(
t
jJs~ao Paulo
J
L / Montevideo
Buen s Aires
Mercer Management Consulting
URUGUAY
Argentina s .- ailway
Concessioning
Mercer Management Consulting
The Government Policy and the Legal Framework
State Reform and Public Enterprises Restructuring Law
was passed in August '89 in order to:
* restructure Argentina's economy
- market-oriented
- improve efficiency
* tackle fiscal deficit
* promote a smaller but solid public sector
* encourage private sector operation
of state-owned enterprises
Mercer Management Consuiting
Railway Performance was Poor
*
More than US$800 million loss
(US$3.00 million per sector)
*
Inefficient operations with surplus labor
*
Deteriorating plant and equipment
*
Poor service with declining market share
Miercer Management Consulting
Argentina's Railways were- Collapsing
*
With a network of 35,000 km and more than
90,000 employees, the system was not
achieving its potential
*
Freight market share was less than 10 percent
*
Intercity passenger share was less than 6 percent
*
In Buenos Aires, with a population of 12 million,
250 private bus companies carry 2.8 billion
passengers, versus 274 million carried by rail
and 140 million by subway
Mercer Management Consulting
3
Railway Privatizations in A-rgentina
The Government, determined to face the situation and carry out a
major change, undertook the privatization of these services by
granting them under concession to private operators as a means to
reduce the heavy financial burden represented by railways on
public finance, increase railway activity, and introduce new
management criteria, oriented towards efficiency, service quality,
and profitability.
*The Government
continues to
own track and
equipment
*
Consortia bid
for long term
concessions
Mercer Management Consulting
*
The
Government
pays the cost of
severing excess
personnel
4
Railway Privatization Aims
*
Reduced subsidies, targeted at capital
renewal
*
Improved service and rail market share
*
Transfer of technology and management
techniques
Private sector railway investment to
rehabilitate and renew plant and equipment
Mercer Management Consulting
i
.
z|
a
t
____-;
*
O _0
n
m
s
X
tt
o
a
~
s
\
,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...........
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
.............
/
COMMUTER SERVICES
B.A. Metropolitan Area
X / D Linea Sarmiento
[< 4.jSE
Linea Mitre
Linea Urquiza
112:
Lirnea
--
Roca
.. |Linea
San Mart;
_o_o_ f -_ ., 0 t C.t2Q$t~~QwLaituo
[_S:N:[
Linea Beigrano Norte
' ' :Linea Beigrano Sur
F
11JZ
IItAIIA
W
FS
/
IIIA';$
~~-
*l
An1160
/
'
0
,
I;
A
'.
130 Km
.--.
1
'$W,l
ll
'
.
IAI
g
I
/20 Km \
BUENOS AIRES
\;
SUBWAY SERVICES
Mtro.Carranzaa
F.Lacroze
p.AIem
N
za.de Mayo
Pra.Junta'
on
ConH~~~i-tu
Plaza de
Buenos Aires
'
Vi rreyes/
/
a_.
°
0
'.
, "
i
.' ' .,, ',.
*
A..
:-,< v
Service privatization and restructuring adopted specific
characteristics for each of the three major railway "businesses"
Freight
* Vertically integrated concessions
Buenos Aires Metropolitan
Region Passengers
* Network divided into 6
concessions
Setting up of FEMESA, an
autonomous company hived off
from FA, intended to operate
metropolitan rail services
• Concessions for 30 years plus 10
additional optional years
Verticallyiintegratedconcessions
Metropolitan network divided into
* Assignment of rolling stock and
infrastructure use
*
*
*
* Free rates, in practice
• Payment of an annual fee for the
use of infrastructure and rolling
stock
* Free determination of the number
of employees, to be mainly
selected from FA personnel
*
*
Long Distance
Passengers
*
Assignment of rolling
stock free of charge to
7 concessions
Concessions for 10 years, which
could be extended for equally
long terms if agreed upon by the
parties
Assignment of rolling stock and
infrastructure use
Maximum, regulated rates
Fee/subsidy payment
Free determination of the number
of employees, without the
requirement that they be selected
from FEMESA personnel
Mercer Management Consulting
Decision to eliminate
Federal Government
subsidies to intercity
passenger services
~~~those
*
provinces which
decided to continue
decided to conin e
providing these services
Free;rates
Results
Freight Services
- Concessioning of 20,800 Km of network
- Discontinuance of 6,500 Km
- Creation of F.C. Gral.Belgrano S.A.,
(state-owned private corporation),
company rationaliz;ation of a more
efficient operation
Mercer Management Consulting
Resu ts
Intercity Passenger Services
- Discontinuation of 75% of 1989 services
- Transfer of remaining services to the
provinces
- Privatization of Bs.As.-Mar del Plata:
four bids but not awarded; subsequent
transfer to the Province of Buenos Aires
*
Commuter Services
- Setting up of FEMESA
- Concessioning the whole Buenos Aires
Metropolitan Area rail network and
subways
Mercer Management Consulting
8
Results
*
Workshops
- Transfer of 6 workshops to cooperatives
set up by former railway workers
*
Personnel
- Personnel reduction from 90,000 employees
to less than 16,000
- Changes in industrial agreements
- A sharp increase in productivity
Mercer Management Consulting
Results
Subsidy
- A US$ 280 M contribution from the Treasury
in 1995 (22% of the 1980-87 average)
- Intended for metropolitan services and some
investments in F.C. Gral. Belgrano S.A.
- Without subsidy from the National Treasury
to freight or intercity passenger railroads
Mercer Management Consulting
Freight Concessions
*
Six packages comprising 27,000 Km of track based on
original lines.
*
Concessions for 30 years (plus 10 years).
*
Concessionaire pays fee, investment plan to its risk and
rent for rolling stock
*
Limited rate control
*
Must allow operations of intercity passenger service upon
payment of trackage rights fee
*
Government and employees retain minority shareholding
position
*
About 8,000 Km of remaining network were offered to
Provinces. Branches not accepted will be abandoned.
Mercer Managenment Consulting
Bidding Process - Freight Concessions
Networks were awarded through national and international
competitive bidding. Main aspects considered for selection
were:
*
Technical, Economic, and Financial Stability of
Bidders;
*
Soundness of Business Plans;
*
Number of Public Railway Employees intended to be
hired; and
*
The Economic Offer, consisting of fees to be paid
monthly for the concession and the amount of capital
investment committed for the first five concession
years.
Mercer Management Consulting
12
Freight Concessions
Investment for the First 15 Years
(in Millions of US$)
Rolling Stock
| FEPSA
112
|
NCA
151
BAP
144
Mesop.
5
Ferrosur
80
Belgrano
100
Total
592
Infrastructure
106
222
204
53
86
150
821
16
13
21
6
7
15
78
234
386
369
64
173
265
1,491
Other
Total
Buenos Aires Commuter S-ervices
°
*
Establishment of a separate department (early 1990).
Separation of assets and services into a new state-owned
company, FEMESA, in March 1991.
*
Concession of services together with Buenos Aires Subway
system (SUBTE). Concession period: 10 years for six railway
lines, and 20 years for SUBTE/Urquiza line; optional
10-year increments if agreed by the parties.
*
Bidding Documents have defined standards of services,
fare structure and basic investme;nt projects. Bidders
are proposing business plans and the subsidy (operational
surplus or deficit, plus investment cost) required to
operate the system.
°
Concessionaires will employ FEMESA's and/or SUBTE's
personnel according to their needs.
Mercer M?nennmen! Cnn1gsuftinn
The Bidding Process
. encouragement to maximum participation
. transparent competitive process
* three envelope bidding process
- envelope 1: qualifications with emphasis on the operator
- envelope 2A: business plan for each concession
- envelope 2B: financial proposal and subsidy requirement
. selection made on the basis of:
- bidders satisfying qualifications required
- bidders showing to be capable of operating concession
through their business plans (screening process)
. winning bidder: from all those successfully passing the
previous two steps, the one requiring the lowest subsidy
Mercer Management Consulting
14
Commuter Rail Services
Investment during Concessions
(in Thoustands of US$)
MITRE
271,449.1
SARMIENTO
276,214.7
1)
URQUIZAO
48,382.7
SBASE 1 )
523,169.9
ROCA
120,858.1
SAN MARTIN
86,775.5
BELGRANO NORTE
82,285.6
BELGRANO SUR
61,563.3
TOTAL
(1) 20 - year concession period
(2) By the end of 1995 works worth US$ 355 million were
under execution, and worth US$ 20.2 million had been
finalized
1,470,699.0(2)
Schedule of Privatization of Commuter Services--
ERVICES
|BIDDINC.
SERVICES DOCUMENTS
SUBMISS.
ENV. I
SUBMISS.
ENV. 2
|
SELECTION
STARTING
OPERATIONS
MITRE
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
5 JUN 92
30 DEC 92
27 MAY 95
SARMIENTO
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
5 JUN 92
30 DEC 92
27 MAY 95
SUBWAY/URQUIZA
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
55JUN 92
| 30 DEC 92
1 JAN 94
ROCA
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
26 AUG 92
30 DEC 92
1 JAN 95
SAN MARTIN
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
26 AUG 92
30 DEC 92
1 APR 94
BELGRANO NORTE
15 NOV 91
31 JAN 92
25 SEP 92
30 DEC 92
1 APR 94
BELGRANO SUR
15 NOV 91
31 GJAN 92
25 SEP 92
30 DEC 92
1 MAY 94
.JANUARY '93-MAY '95 - Analysis of optional envelope for winner
- Negotiation of concession contracts and
preparation for take-over
- Signing of contracts
- Transition to take over
Railway Privatizations in Argentina
Positive results have been achieved concerning the Buenos Aires Metropolitan
Region railway services after about 3 years of private management.
Demand, service quality, and Government financing requirement indicators show a
favorable evolution.
Mi.i.nsof
Carried Passengers
Passonrso
((Inmillions)
millions)
50
OperatingSubsidy(l)
4(
414
400
400 -345
300
O
335
M ll;;ns
~~~
200
UJSS/Passenger
/
0
1994
~
1995
1997
1986
0.2
itbWyeam.
04
(YearS)
2003(2)
1
300
_
_
_
_
_
_
_200
0 (m,vcmncni
nn,
Managcmenit
M (.wvmtncitt and
I'rivatc Mgms.t.0.~lllll
l'iatl
1995
(YearS)
(t)Esllmaled waderthe assamplieatbhll.
tt b Urqeu U
whelsubsidy
can beAwe edtotheUrq a Um.
(2) ProjecleI based wiikg bWidnm'oTer
239
Numhcrof
__
1994
1999(2
20032)
(V'earlO)
Sehwaycessiostheb
-
Canceled and Delayed Trains
131
50
1994
(Vear I)
(2) Pr,jm.e basede. winnin biddr,W i-s.
100
1993
1986
(Year 10)
(1)Eslimats1rd.deor
beassmprto.e that in thiw
Il4qiza liee.Subwayecacdlo, tbe
whblt .. b.dy co. be Hllecaled
l the Wlequsi
lIJ.
(In millions)
0.01
0.0_
1999 (2
(Vear!)
lRun Car-Km
ofa,
58
1994
0.53
0.4
M
1996
1I)
)Prjec lio bb.wd
on tiw runs m b
Millions 150
0.8
0.6
~~~~~200
130
~~~~~~~~~~~100
100
nJune 1996 ISSlpassenger)
1.0
246 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~f300
212
1993
Subsidy per Passenger (1)
illionsfJunc996 IS)
Mgnet(.
1996
Source: National Transport Regulatory Commission, Mercer Management Consulting
analysis.
Mercer Management Consulting
100 -
I
(In thousands of trains)
136
11
1993
142
1994
1995
1996
15
Railway Privatizations in Argentina
Encouraging results have also been achieved concerning the Buenos Aires Metro
Concession.
(in millions)
300
(imillions
(In
(In June 1996 uISs/passenger)
of.lune 1996 IISS)
214
Millionso>1
Passcnge1s
200
Subsidy per Passenger (1)
Operating Subsidy (1)
Carried Passengers
2
199
187
171
145
M
171s
1986
1996
19930
Mont
0.8
30
s
0.6-
25-
0.4 -0.21
100
020
0
~~~
0
1993
1995
1994
U
0 (sovnimcnt Migpiut
tl) raetiin basd..d lh,
1997
1996
~~~~~
_
1993
l5rivauc Mastasgeanecit
l
.
n.1s mohs
_
he..
*tloend sobe teqis tie.
whoe subidyc
(2) r.ojcion basedur winning bidders' eIes.
(In minutes)
26
~~~20
of
m
ar
eenslb-
Interrupted Service
(In millions)
30
gtEPiaeMngmn
ocmn
(tI Est_imad under lhe nssnmption that lahe tfirqnia UnSnbbay.oo
whoe sbsidy ca. be alloaedtote Urqs Un.
(2) ProetioI basd onwinnig bidd.'e fre
sion,the
Run Car-Kin
Millions
1996
1986
1996
MPrivatc Management
0 (kovenment-n MgnmtU
u.e Ihe aumiss t.ht ine1 tirqniza ib.-Subway
"III:s1i..wd ...
he year.
~ I ~~~~~~~~~~~0
27
23
Mituics of
Itilerrupted
erie
20
30.000
23.165
20,732
20,000
10,231
9.013
10.000
10
0.
0
1993
1994
1995
1993
1996
1994
1995
1996
0 Govenmiit Mgnmt. U Private Maiagemnti
0 (iovecnilneit Mgnlt. U I'rivalc Martagelsclit
Source: National Transport Regulatory Commission, Mercer Management Consulting analysis.
Mercer Management Consulting
16
Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico
FNM operates a 26,000 km system linking major production and
consumption points with ports and gateways to U.S. based railways.
* 96% of FNM's revenues were gefierated by freight traffic
)\~~~~
~
~
|
-
7b
,
17~
--
~~
4~~~~~
1994 Revenues (M)
Freight
Passenger
Total
N$2,836
N$102
N$2,938
-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
o
ll
5 * USBor
Gateway
Note. All
currency ifl
t1is flocurnent is expressed in nominal new pesos (N$).
Source: FNM Documents
II(II(JIl95(lIf1
I/u.,d/I
/ ......
tJALI AP' I(XN 0Il1nto .s/pe,
Morcet Management Consulltig
Page 5
Transaction Process
Overall, FNM expects an orderly and expeditious transaction process that
is consistent with the objectives of the Mexican Government.
. The Government will offer a lorng term concession to market and provide service and may
consider concession renewal
* The concessionaire will operate within a market-based regulatory regime that minimizes
governmnent regulation and control
* Concessions will be granted with "clean slate" balance sheets with the exception of liabilities
and obligations incurred in the normal course of business
* The Government expects to assume labor costs incurred prior to concession
* The Government expects that there will be a favorable climate for stable and growing
employment in a revitalized railroad
* The concessionaire will be able to determine its own operating practices, including labor
selection and work rules, within the context of Mexican law
* The Government will not require a specific capital program, but expects that investments will be
made to sustain the business and that proceeds from retirement and replacement of assets will
be reinvested to meet the capital requirements of the business
* The Government anticipates that the concession will generate income sufficient to provide an
adequate return to investors
* The limits of foreign investment in the concession are under discussion
* There are no restrictions on repatriation of capital
* The Government will assumne 100% of liabilities for past environmental damage
* The concessionaire is expected to provide cornmercially acceptable levels of safety, quality,
service, and insurance
.*..,s.
'.nI.
S,',l.tI..@,
I tdIAI AV'lSS;I|§§.111 wfe*il@
.
Iierce/
Ma:,agetr,eIt Colnsulfa,II
',.
:t
Concluding remarks
*
It is important to define and manage public and
Government expectations concerning
restructuring
from the outset of the process
*
Need for education and consensus
*
Keep the process simple
*
Reach out aggressively to find good bidders
*
Concessions can be difficult to value correctly
Mercer M.nan-mPnt rnnc,!tinn
Other Examples of . assenger
Railway Concessions in
Lati n ^merica
Mercer Management Consulting
Companhia Paulista de Trens'Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo
CPTM
currently carries more than 240 million riders per year over an electrified 270-km
network.
A
Lines A and D
Lines E and F
*63 million
passengers per year
* 109 route-kms
*83
*234 railcars
*333
* 1372 trains per week
* 1645 trains
LinesB andC *
1
:. :
route-kms
passengers per
year
_
300Lrines pe weekC
*78 route-kms
*342 railcars
-
* Planned Station
per week
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~Power:
3-kv DC on overhead cantenary
38
1.0 m
gauge
M
A-D Lines
o Station
railcars
101~~~~~~~~ milio
/_
E-F Lines
*83 million
passengers per year
C
.:
l
*.-*--.*Average
2*Fare
+\
<
L~~~~~~~~~~~~D
Mercer Management Consulting
Guage: 1.6 m on all lines except as noted
Signaling:_CTCa
C
Age of Railcars: 19 years
Evasion: Minimum 7% (Lines A and D) to
more than 30% (Line F)
D
I
18
Companhia Paulista de Trens'Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo
Mercer's financial modeling of the CPTM system under concessionaire operation estimates that the
system will recover its operating costs from farebox revenues in the future.
• Estimates of future financial performance depend on key assumptions concerning the future environment and
concessionaire performance:
* Strong passenger volume growth driven by population growth and improvements in service quality
* Achievement of benchmarked levels of productivity in transportation and administrative departments
* Increases in fleet availability driven by improved maintenance practices
* Expansion of the railcar fleet as ridership grows
* Programs to reduce fare evasion
* The Government does not anticipate providing operating subsidies to concessionaires
Combined Operating Revenues and Operating Expenses for CPTM Concessions, 1999-2018
Millions of
1995 Reals
450
400
350
300
250
Operating Expenses
200
150_
100
NPV of Operating Revenues (1995 Reais):
NPV of Operating Expenses (1995 Reais):
R$1,616 million|
R$1.288 million
50
0
1999 2000 2001 200.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Mercer Management Consulting
19
Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos - Sao Paulo
However, concessionaires' operating cash flow will be insufficient to fund capital renewal
and system
expansion.
* Taxes paid by concessionaires to the Government will offset some but not all costs of capital
renewal
* The Government is considering several strategies to fund future capital requirements
* Assigning responsibility for capital replacement to concessionaires and requesting a
negative tender
* Assigning responsibility for capital replacement to the government and securing funding
guarantees from an international development bank
* Negotiating Government capital assistance on an annual or project-by-project basis
ma0
Capital Subsidies, Taxes, and Net Transfers for CPTM Concessions, 1999-2018
Millions of
1995 Reals
125
100|
75 -......
aia usde
50
25 '..---'*
...
-"
''
~~~~~~~~~~~Net
Transfers from Govemment to Concessionaire
-25
-50
Taxes Paid by Concessionaires
-75
-100
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Mercer Management Consulting
20
Colombia Urban Transit System Concessioning: Medellin
Mercer is also working with the Metro de Medellin in
concessioning the existing urban transit system.
*Mercer was hired by the Empresa de Transporte Masivo del Valle de Abura
(ETMVA) to assist with the concessioning of the Metro de Medellin (Metro)
transit system.
*The concession has two components:
- The core concession which includes operation, management,
maintenance, and commercial development of the existing heavy rail
system.
- The expansion project concession which includes design, construction,
operation, management, maintenance and commercial development of a
trolley bus system.
*To establish the economics of the project and provide a basis for assessing
concessionaire tender bids, Mercer has prepared an evaluation of the
Metro.
- Mercer evaluation includes a financial profile and comparison of the
Metro with other transit systems in the United States and Latin America.
Mercer Management Consulting
22
Overview of the Metro de Medellin Transit System
The existing Metro system, consisting of Line A and Line B, began partial operations in November
1995 and full operations in late 1996. Line C will begin operations at the beginning of 2001.
Metro System
Niquia
Line A
stallp .
Typical
Numberof
Length' (km)
At
Grade
Line A
23.2
12
Line B
5.6
1
5
95.000
5
Total
Current
System
28.8
13
12
305,000
37'
Line C
5.6
7
-
53,000
15
34.4
20
12
358.000
52
Line
Total
Elevated
7
Weekday Train Units/
Ridership Trolley Buses
210.000
Spare
Units'
.
32
5
4
\
-
San Antoni
( -g t 30)
an Javier
'Does not include junction line of 3.2 km connecting Line A and Line B.
Each train unit ("unidad") consists of a married triplet of three vehicles.
3
Current units in service are 42. Ten additional units (i.e., 30 cars) will be bought by ETMVA at the end of this year.
2
Mercer Management Consulting
23
Bidding Evaluation of the Metro de Medellin Transit System
Each bidder will submit four envelopes at different times. To be eligible to
win the concession, each envelope needs to meet the requirements and
qualify.
Envelope 1: This envelope will contain general information regarding the bidder such as
legal structure, capital, liquidity, etc. Moreover, it will include highlights of the
bidder's past experiences in building and operating transit systems.
Envelope 2: This envelope will have the business plan, with specifications on how the
bidder will operate and maintain the current system
Envelope 3: This envelope will contain the technical proposal where the bidder describes
how it will build, operate, and maintain the trolley bus system
Envelope 4: This is the economic proposal where the bidder will present financial figures for
the concession and estimate its net present value
ETMVA will award the concession to the bidder who presents the economic
proposal with the highest positive net present value.
Mercer Management Consulting
25
Colombia Urban Transit System-Concessioning: Cali
Mercer Management Consulting, Inc. (Mercer) is currently helping the City of
Cali in concessioning its proposed urban transit system.
* Mercer was retained by the City of Cali, the Government of Colombia,
and MASITRANS to assist with the development of the Cali light rail
transit system concession (Cali LRT).
*Cali is preparing a design, build, operate, maintain, and transfer
(DBOMT) concession for a mass transit system.
*To establish the economics of the project and provide a basis for
assessing concessionaire tender bids, Mercer has prepared, an
evaluation of the proposed Cali LRT.
* Mercer evaluation includes a financial profile and comparison of the Cali
LRT with other transit systems in the United States and Latin America.
Mercer Management Consulting
26
Overview of the Cali Light Rail- Transit System
The Cali LRT "core system" consists of Line 2 and Line 3, terminating at
Street 50, and encompasses 19 stations.
Cali LRT "Core System"
AverageN
Weekday
Rldership'
Length (km)
J
(passengers)
Line 2
10.5
136,000
Core Sy' te¶flne 3
8.3
to
174.000
Total
18.8
w -j-.
Number of
1
AOCore
Vehicles
System Stations
1. Carrera50
45
2. Carrera 44
3. Carrera 39
<
4. Carrera 29
Note:
r
Note: Headways 10- and 5-minute Intervals.
12
J
'
/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5.
Transversal 25
~~~~~~6.
Carrera 15
6. Carrera 15
7. Carrera 10
t(eirrera)
g <S
50
|8.
Carrera 5
10. Calle 44N
Optional extension
Construction is expected to begin in 1998, with partial
service on Line 2 to start by early 2001, and full service
to be provided on Lines 2 and 3 by early 2002
to Street 122 (not
included in Mercer
analysis)
\
Stree (Carrera) 122
11. Calle 52
12.
13;
14.
15.
Calle 70N
Calle 15
Plaza de Cayzedo
Calle 29
16. Calle 34
17. Calle 70
18. Calle 72U
19. Calle 55/83
'Mercer estimate based on first full year of operations (2002).
aBased on Mercer's assessment of a bidder's view of equipment needs.
Mercer Management Consultiuig
27
Financial Evaluation of the Cali Light Rail Transit System: Operating income
At a US$0.35 fare, Mercer estimates modest net operating losses during
normalized years, turning into positive operating income starting in 2011.
Projected Operating Income
25
Total Revenue'
Total Operating
20
Expenses-
B
US$M
5
0
_
,
2001 2002
Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2011
2012
2013 2014 2015
2016 2017
'Total revenue includes fare and non-fare revenue.
2
Includus annual capitalized maintenance expenses.
Mercer Management Consulting
28
-
key factor for success?
POLITICAL DETERMINATION
-
most sensitive issue:
STAFF REDUCTION
(UNAVOIDABLE)
-
recommendation
MAKE IT SIMPLE AND
DO IT FAST
-
and remember
ALMOST NOTHING IS FOREVER
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MISSION DE REHABILITATION
DES ENTREPRISES DU SECTEUR
PUBLIC ET PARAPUBLIC
REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
Paix Travail - Patrie
COMMISSION TECHNIQUE
MISE EN CONCESSION
DES CHEMNI1NS DE FER
DU CAMEROUN
Presentation au Seminaire
sur la Mise en concession
des Chemins de Fer en
Afrique.
13 - 14 Octobre 1997
La Consultation
Dans le cadre de son programme de restructuration et de privatisation
des entreprises publiques et parapubliques du secteur des transports,
le Gouvernement du Cameroun a decide de conceder 1'exploitation
des chemins de fer camerounais a une societe concessionnaire
privee. L'objectif de cette consultation est de selectionner une soci6te
actionnaire de reference qui detiendra 51% des actions de la soci6t6
concessionnaire.
Mise en concesslon des chemins
de fer dii Camerouinr
La Consuitaion
La
Consultation
Actionnaire de
R6f4rence
> 51 %
Concessionnaire S.A.
Douala, Cameroun
Doilt exclusif
d'utilisation des
infrastructures
ferroviaires
Duree de
minimale 20
ans (type
"glissant")
Activits
Gouverlernent
du Cameroun
(i
l
L'exploitation technique
et commerciale des
services de transport
ferroviaire
L'exploitation. la
mainteniance. le
renouvellement et
l'amenagement des
infrastructures
ferroviaires existantes
Mise en concession des chemim,
(le fer dii Ca,ineonil)
Les objectifs vises par la mise en concession
-
L'acceleration du processus de restructuration et de
modernisa'tion des chemins de fer du Cameroun.
Le de\veloppement d'un service de qualite pour la clientele
des chemins de fer.
L'exploitation des chemins de fer dans des conditions
commerciales tout en respectant certaines contraintes non
commerciales et en minimisant le coCut de ces contraintes
pour le Gouvernement du Cameroun.
Mise ein concession des clienii.
(le fer dui Cametotiii
Structure de I'actionnariat
Auaous
s4wounwhte
IdIIIoS41.1
3 4 %ix
I
z -c66%
IllicYI
1100 %
Soacite actcmaire deS
fietif!iI
"Actions
Auties actionnaifes
"Actions B""
"
< 49%
>51%
-
I* , .1.1. *p..imna
ii,Ire.a8ub.w%.1. h*t iii.tI.ei.1I .*'eeuv.iiueno. tIttod l
.H iIUOoIiddV .144
aeio.,teo.
r.we.,
fdHISif
uiii.uoioIe
i.
4uh
.Societeconcessionnaire S.A. |_
Douala, Cameroun
*hi loiie.l
iO@112Vi.iNP%
uI.iotX.Ii .o
0i.*
1
i*iI,* |o.tiIi.. Yl
..loaot e ii
l
.i1 .d.1Ide*1.i uxt 1 40 I (Nu I%%Hitt"oii.i % i., WWW i
".1.1
I
4 e *4' o,4i.iIe ilt. Li HIl .11I I(t AM I I 1.1l %o4of4l..i
s
. ni* g..i. .k*Io*ea sls I isvailo
w
uas.s.oH I.',i ist .1.'%
w15550%A to out ImH it.
I. Ii.. *.
losIsol
1II.d
L %iP. -I%ss
' o "Ii ,%%ios
.ii4 i
*i1.iiit
1.
I.505i54l.4
*IAikiiH. II
A,s, -.
*ue.1.
go ioo.~ihi,.*,ii 51i .1.HIavoI
l
*isi'.
Mise eni concession des cheinim
de fer dil Catinerouin1
Structure uridique
Option 1
Societe concessionnaire S.A.
Douala, Cameroun
Option 2
Service
Service
voyageuLr s
imarclianidises
Auilies (&ivetituellenent)
J
L'Etat
Soci6td concessionnaire S.A.
Convention particutliere
x %.v
4) '9,
Douala, Cameroun
iicliiant ilotamimelit
couitraintes non
coniniercales
"Societe fert,miei"
Service
iiafcthandises
Seivice
voyagetu s
Mise en con7cession des cheminis
dle fer dii Camerotini
Droits et obligations de la societe concessionnaire
1. Le concessionnaire exploitera des services de transport ferroviaire, de marchandises et
voyageurs dits commerciaux.
2. L'exploitation d'autres services de transport ferroviaire de voyageurs, dits services
exploites au titre d'une obligation non commerciale qui feront l'objet d'une convention
particuli6re signee entre l'Etat et le concessionnaire.
3. L'am6nagement et l'utilisation des infrastructures ferroviaires, incluant
- les lignes de chemin de fer,
- les gares,
- les ateliers de maintenance,
- tous autres materiels a l'exclusion du materiel roulant.
4. La selection et location ou acquisition des materiels roulants.
5. La selection des personnels pour la societ6 concessionnaire.
6. La paiement annuel d'une redevance de concession en contrepartie de la mise a
disposition des infrastructures ferroviaires existantes et du droit d'exploiter les services.
Mise en concession des chemit
de fer dii Camnerouin
REGIFERCAiM - Le reseau
1 078 Km
Transcam 2
622 Km Yaounde-Ngaoundere
264 Km Douiala-YaounL(e
165 Km Douala-Nkongsamba
Transcam I
Ligne de l'Ouest
27 Km Mbanga-Kumbal
Ces lignes sont a voie unliqLe a
1'exception dLI tronyon
Douala Bessengue-Bessa Station
Mise en) conicessioni des chemin:
(le fer dii Cameroan
CARTE ROUTIERE ET
FERROVIAIRE DU CAMEROUN
A,C
_-es
.,,s.essas:-
:-e-lr -e$le-N
a
¢
r34!a^S;to4-t~~~~
)
..
X;/N<!;Ut~~
Vft
S
f
REGIFERCAM - Indicateurs de Performance
I98/I982
1993/1994
1 078
1 078
1 455000
1 417 000
730 000 000
757 000 000
16 968
18 330
2 471 000
1 792 000
463 000 000
334 000 000
Recettes
5 171
3 483
Marchandises (km en % du trafic total)
61 %
69 %
Voies kilom6tres
Marchandises-tonnage
Tonnes- kilo1 n6tres
Recettes
*
Voyageurs - nombre
Voyageurs - kilometres
Nombre de wagons
1 355
Nombre de voitures
76
Nombre unites-trafic transport par agent
170 000
265 000
millions FCFA
(100 FCFA = 1 FF)
Mise eni concession des chemi
(1o fel (hIICanyoftnin
REGIFEIRCAM - Materiel moteur
61
Locomotives
/--
Nombre
Tpe
Date de mise en
service
29
CC 2 200
1981/1983
20
BB 1100
1969/1982
8
BB 1 200
1981/1982
4
BB 1 000
1979-1983/1989
Mise eln concession des chemiii.
de fer dil Camerouni)
L'actionnaire de reference devra faire
preuve, a-i rninimum :
d'une comp6tence commerciale dans le domaine des transports.
d'une compe'.ence technique en tant qu'op6rateur des chemins de
fer.
d'une assise financiere suffisante pour assurer les investissements
n6cessaires.
d'une connaissance du Cameroun ou de pays comparables.
Mlse el) concession des cheim,.
de fer dii Cameioill)
Description
a.Localisation
dans le Golf de Guinee, superficie:
475 442 Km2
_* Population : 12,9 millions en 1994
2 langues officielles : fran9ais et anglais
Independance en 19,05i
_ 1eres elections libres :21 janvier 1996
Mise eni concessioni des chenuIn).
(Il!fer dii Cat?iefotui
Principaux Indicateurs Economiques (en milliards de FCFA)
19"/19
1992/1993
1993/11994
1994/11995
Produit Interieur Brut
aux prix courants
3 174,4
3 172,1
3 470,1
4 350,0
en francs constants
3 151,7
3 181,5
3 043,5
3 248,0
933,5
960,4
626,6
636,6
PIB par habitant en USD
Taux de croissance du PIB
Taux d'inflation
-3,2 %
0,9 %
-1,2 %
3,3 %
1,9 %
-3,7 %
12,4 %
17,6 %*
Exportations FOB
543
438,3
691,8
1 000,3
Importations FOB
286,8
270,9
450,0
565,0
En-cours de la dette publique
1 975
2 235
4 160
4 303
-296
-275
-207
-190
Solde budgetaire
*apres tine devaltiation de 50 " di I U A at, 1 1 lanvie
199$,(100 I
I A:- 1 Tr)
Mise eni coi1Ccessioi des chemi
d( for dii Cammioftw
SEMINAIRE SUR LES MISES EN CONCESSION
DES CHEMINS DE FER EN AFRIQUE
ABIDJAN / COTE D'IVOIRE
13 et 14 Ocotbre 1997
"M'ISE EN CONCESSION
DES CHEMINS DE FER
DU CAMEROUN
I- LA REFORME INSTITUTIONNELLE
DE LA REGIFERCAM
1.1- Analyse des indicateurs de gestion
de 1982-1983 a 1994-1995
EXERCICE
1982-1983
1986-1987
1991-1992
1994-1995
Chiffre
d'affaires
(millions)
Tonnage
transporte
(milliers)
Voyageurs
Voygus
1 761
1 416
1 279
1 452
1 866
2 268
2 349
1 728
25 362
22 411
23 527
29 734
Ch.persi
Ch.A
46%
72%
45%
35%
Effectifs
6 725
6 639
4 033
3 714
Productivit6
M.B.A.
Subvention Comns
(en milliers (millions demillions de Omnsbus
d'uk)
fcfa)
fcfa)
fcfa)
181
169
299
304
917
-3 548
3 452
8 060
1 356
9 389
98
400
Importantes dates:
1985
1987
1994
ouverture de la route bitum6e entre DOUALA et YAOUNDE
lancement des op6rations de restructuration
int6gration de la R16gifercam dans le r6gime do droit commun on matibre de fiscalit6
lancement de I'etude sur les reformes institutionnelles
2 365
3 198
11sultat net
(millons de
fcfa)
-1 049
3 249
-1 895
1 576
I- LA REFORME INSTITUTIONNELLE
DE LA REGIFERCAM
1.2- Le choix ciu mode de privatisation
A- CESSION DES ACTIFS.
Domaine ferroviaire
Absence de l'Etat
B- AFFERMAGE
SociWt6 de patrimoine
Engagement de l'Etat
C- CONCESSION
Dhsengagement de l'Etat
Contr6le de 1'exploitation du domaine public ferrovialre
PROBLEIATIOUE DE IA PRIVATISATION DES CNEINS DE FEE
ADEQUATION ENTRE:
- LES CONTRAINTES SOCIO-POLITIQUES DES GOUVERNEMENTS
ET:
-
LE SOUCIS DE RENTABILITE FINANCIERE D'UN INVESTISSEUR PRIVE
II- LE PROCESSUS DE MISE EN CONCESSION DES
CHEMINS DE FZR DU CAMEROUN
*
PHASE 0:
Juillet 1994: Signature du decret soumettant la R6gifercam a la proc6dure
de privatisation
* PHASE 1: Travaux preparatoires
1- Cr6ation du Comitd Interminist6riel et du Comit6 de Pilotage
2- S6lection du consultant financier.
*
PHASE 2: Preselection des candidats
1- Pr6s6lection de 12 candidats
2- Pr6sentation g6ndrale de la R6gifercam aux candidats pr6s6lectionn6s
II- LE PROCESSUS DE MISE EN CONCESSION DES
CHEMINS DE FER DU CAMEROUN
*
PHASE 3: Lancement des appels d'offre
1- Elaboration des termes de r6f6rence
2- R6le des diff6rents acteurs:
Le Comite Interminist6riel
Le Comit6 de Pilotage
Le Consultant
La R6gifercam
3- Problemes rencontr6s
Les d6lais de prise de d6cision
*
PHASE 4: Analyse et notation des offres techniques
Methodologie:
Notation
Audition des candidats
Principe des offres techniques r6vis6es
III- RESULTATS OBTENUS A CE JOUR
1- LES CANDIDATS EN LICE
Le Groupement SAGA/SDV/SYSTRA
Le Groupement COMAZARJGEODIS/CFD/TRANSURB
Le Groupement CANAC/SNC-LAVALLIN
2- EVOLUTION TECHNiQUE DU PROJET
Analyse des offres techniques r6vis6es
Analyse des offres financibres
Pr6sentation du processus de d6cision
IV- RESULTAeS ATTENDUS.
1- Am6lioration de I'activit6 dans le secteur du transport ferroviaire
2- Am6lioration des flux financiers vis-A-vis de I'ETAT
IV- PROBLEMES SOCIAUX.
1- REDUCTION DES EFFECTIFS
M6thodologie adopt6e
Financement
2- RETRAITE DU PERSONNEL DU STATUT PARTICULIER PERMANENT
Estimation des charges pendant les 20 ans de la concession: 40 milliards
Estimation des versements du personnel en activit6 pendant les 20 ans de la concession: 1,3 milliard
M6canisme envisag6
3- DETTE SOCIALE VIS-A-VIS DE L'ORGANISME DE PREVOYANCE SOCIALE (C.N.P.S.)
Niveau des arri6r6s dus: 9 milliards
I
l
Session 4
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Private Sector Participatioii Sclheimie
Maputo Corridor Revitalization Project
October 1997
E,
Overall structure of PSP Scheme
Alternatives
Issue
One or two tenders
Decision
Two separate
tenders
Port and Railway
Separation
(d
contract
Private
participation
scheme
.D
,
~~~~~~Concession
Concen
Outsourcing
* Management Contract
* Lease
* Concession
* Outright sale
*
ShareholdingStructure
Issue
!
ti 'I
Tm,, I1 'more
A¶
Decision
*
51
=
Consortium with each holding not
than 20% of voting rights.
I33 %
Shareholding
structure
CFM's role
J
g *
. 16%
CFM & employees
=
minorty shareholders
Participate in Board metings & safeguard
Governments's interests
* Share future profits
* Take over unit at end of term
Social Plan
Decision
Issue
3
, 919gy
Social issues
*
Concessionaires not obliged to take over
any specified number of existing staff but
free to determine the staff required to
manage operations.
* Concessionaires to select required level of
staff from existing CFM workforce.
* Social plan - counselling, retirement
retrenchment packages etc. - to be funded
by GOM with assistance from donors.
Elements of concession
Issue
Alternatives
Infrastructure,
superstructure,
equipment & small
items
_____
7,*______
j
v*-
__-_-_-
s
_,!
'
-
What to concession
gconrc
Infrastructure &
Superstructureconcession
Eqpt- lease or sell
Small items - sell
CFM or Concessionaire CFM. Why?
Assets not to be used
as security for loan
Ownership of
concessioned assets
I
Decision
CFM uses depn. as
deductible expense
-/
Elements of concession
|
1997 -?
IrJ 1
2
Decision
Alternatives
Issue
13 14
Short to long term
*
Im
5-2in N-ww-
*
Term of
c
concession
Entire system or
individual lines
Package size
15 years - feedback
on investment plan
Extension - 10 years
mutal agreement
5 packages - 3 lines,
yard, workshops
* Bidders can bid on any
or all 5 packges
*
Concessionpackages
Perimeter of the Five Railway lots
Ress
:
|S
9
4
:
fr~~~~
~.7
..
I
0,.
4
L_
*
0
A_
9
0b
*
S
"",
L
**
-.
* ;s
*
v
*
*
"
-
_"
r4UEUIUWLX
*
r
W
*./
ll~~~~~~~IIAI
Z
0~~~-TOL
W
*v"
A°"
'PZ
*
,
.
t
s
0
+~~~~~~~~~~~~APT
Elements of concession
Issue
Alternatives
Decision
Tariffs subject to
certain levels or no
regulation
No tariff regulation
Specify investment
program or
minumum standards
*Specify minimum
standards (regional)
Tariff Authority
41!
Investment
Strategy
Fee obligations
Issue
,
j
Alternatives
;9
Decision
Entry fee, variable fee, *Entry fee = US$5 mln.
fixed
>
e fee
*Variable fee = 5% of
gross revenues without
Fee obligations
deduction of tax
*Fixed fee = award
criterion. Payments to be
made quarterly &
suitably indexed.
Elements of concession
I
Issue
Alternatives
Decision
\'-4'
Administrative
court or domestic,
Mediation Commit.
- 7 members
'
A
'
1E
- ~~~~~arbitration..
Mediation
~--~
*
4~
<
Exclusivity
~~~international
*1
international
Investment Law intl. arbitration
Entire or limited
term
*Within perimeter
entire term
-
*Outside perimeter no exclusivity &
company has no first
right of refusal
Concessionaire's obligations & rights
Issue
Decision
Obligations
* Rehabilitate - minimum standards (3 yrs)
* Maintain assets to minimum standards
*
Install maintenance, safety procedures
* Equal access to all users
Rights
* Establish tariff & salary policy
4k.'4
* Negotiate terms & conditions of all
contracts (investment, commercial etc.)
Special decrees
DECREE FOR CONCESSION
purview of investment law
international
for
provision
arbitrartion
ownership of concessioned assets
DECREE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Composition of body
'w
Functions
Degree of independence
Thle PromisedLand
p.
I~~
/- l
/
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La mise en concession des chemins de fer en Afrique
Abidjanl3&14/10/97
La premkere concession
ferroviaire en Afrique:
1experience de la COte dIvoire
et du Burkina
Presentation du 13/10/97
par A.A. Thiam
ntro uction
La declaration du 24/07/92 : debut du
processus
- lancement A.O.
- designation adjudicataire provisoire
-
negociation
-
signature de la Convention de concession le
12/12/94 a Ouagadougou
* L'entree en vigueur le 20/08/95
Plan de la presentation
*
*
*
*
Le reseau
La concession : mecanisme
la concession: ses problemes
Questions pour 1'avenir
Le reseau
* Voie metrique unique,
longueur 1.260 km
i 37 km de double voie
en 3 portions dans le
sud
i demarrage de la
construction
12/01/1904
* Inauguration de la
ligne Abj/Ouaga le
4/12/54
* 41 gares ouvertes
- 28 gares commerciales
- 13 gares securite
Le materiel concede
*
*
*
*
*
20 locomotives GM CC 2200
17 locotracteurs Henschel
600 wagons de marchandises
40 voitures de voyageurs inox
Traction assuree pour environ 180 wagons
de particuliers:
-
hydrocarbures
clinker
Le PIU
Programme d' Investissement
dUrgence
La concession: son mecanisme
* La SITARAIL
* Les bases
* quelques resultats
Societe International de transports africains par rail
* Societe anonyme de
droit ivoirien
* capital 5 milliards
CFA
* repartition du capital
30%
- Etats
*
BF
15
*
RCI
15
- Personnel
-
prives
* Saga/SDV 42,88
* GIP(SICC) 8,04
6,70
* Systra
5,36
* Maersk
4,02
* Transurb
3%
67%
Les bases
* Les acteurs
-
-
Autorite concedante
societes de patrimoine
concessionnaire
bailleurs
* Le principe
* La redevance
DU
-FIR
- Remboursement
* Quelques resultats
La concession: ses probkemes
les questions pour 1'avenir (I)
* La complexite du montage
-
le nombre des intervenants
le nombre des bailleurs
la procdedure de maitrise d'oeuvre du PIU
1 'entree en vigueur precipitee
La concession : ses problemes
(II)
* les effectifs
-
la reprise des effectifs
la selection des agents
le dimensionnement des effectifs
PRORAME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA
CREDIT SIPF / BAILLEURS DE FONDS
SITUATION DES MARCHES (V-OLET c65TE DivoIiggj
LII~
IDA
Ent,.pr,e
DWagnatlond. m-,che
N' d. MA,-hi
Chapite
si4t..n dumarh. (F.CFA)'
100,0
1 7398892291
I 739 889 229
_EMD-GM
61,9
301 565 987j
487231 603
CIglM.LOGERAIL
100 _______
000
28
859
268 590 000
CIM-LOGERAIL
88 108870 _______
BERNABE-CI
________
_100.0
58563842
58953642
E.I.C.
15
99
1 848 9w
1 848 159
E.I.C.
100,0
1
807
084
084
807
___
E.I.C.
100.0 _______
2 034 714
2 034 714
E.I.C.
40,0
1 170 130
2 925 324
E./.C.
40.0 _______
760 744i
1 901 858
E./.C.
40.0
874J
1484
38862184
E.I.C.
______
2 390 674
E.J.C.
2,
17 083 1921
18 400 942
GEMA
100.0
13 736 298j
13 736 298
SORIM
_______
100,0
4.44
24
208
24 258 44.4
METALOCK.
100,0 _______
19 404384
19 454 384
METALOCK(
100,0
160J
20 200
20 200 160
METALOCK
60,0
8 318 000
13 880000
APR/RAIL
100,0 _______
2 033 200
2 033 200
SAEC ASTRAL
3 201 138j
SAEC ASTRAL
100,0
8 424 801
424801
S.AFRECI
4 3109500
8 621 000
OFT/CUEI.
4 158 0006000
80.3
218993230331
2 738534 708
101.61
308017 684
303008,000
SIBM
-or/uervree
b.tonarmdi
015/SI/IFITBACI/96
100,21_______
911977 3386
910000 000
lED BOCCARD
Fourniture atersa mdtalliq...
VOIEET BATIME-NTS 016/SiT/IFfrM/C1196
90.1________
132 530 977
147083 000
CIM-LOGERAIL
Founlur attaches 4. voi- trr. (A)
017/SIT/1F/ATT/CI/96
95.6
183 078 131
201888 800
0181SIT/AF/ATTIC1186 Fourn,itueattachesd. voic terr. (B Ž1C) TRANSTRAOE
_______
100.0
18
136
400
440
18
136
4/
GEISMAR
daovoi
(
.elsudur
ma
Foumitur
0191P/SIFAISOUD/CI/96
100.3
2__91
486440 _ _ 292408290
020/SIF/IFISOUO/Cl/96 Fou-nituremaon/ssodura d. -oi (1. 2, 31 RAILTECH
100.6
690
686
1
330
1
323
0160500
BOCCARD
/E0
kg
e...
1s30
..
Fournit
021/SIT/lF/RAILICI/96
99,7 _______
336 862 784
337 743 700
tED BOCCARD
FournitureraIs 38 kg
022/SIT/IF/RAIL/CI86
___
100,0 ____
431 746 032
431 746 032
SISAG
023/SiTA1P/BALUJCUS6 Fournilurebclast
100,0 _______
70 313 977
70 313 977
AFRICAUTO
AhdevhuesourssLo_1 t2)/
057/SIT/1FVEHICI/97
100.0
14 300000
14 300000
CFAO -Cl
058151T/IFNVEHICI/97 Achat do veh-icuesrue (103)
100.0
13 850030
139800000
PROMOTO
Achat dc vehicuIes -oue- (/0t4)
060/SITFIVFEH/CI/97
MATERIELROULANT
Pices por scrn e GM CC2200
001/SIT/GMi8
CC2200
t.
002/SITIMR/CCGMWCI/968PcepourocrnoeGM
012/SIT,MRITMGMWCI97 Riihab:itab- 21mtur d. ca-Son GM
Re1,abditaSnintllsn air corn rirn
090/SITl1P/..CI/9~7
A6hab.Iita0onCC2205
SC n 2808
R4habilitas- CC2209
8C n1 2822
CC2202
R61habilitcOon
BCn1 2815
RihabilftabonCC2219
BCn' 2825
Riihabilnd-o CC2220
BC n 2833
R6h.b,Iita5onCC2207
BC nW2834
R6habdiltton,CC2212
BCWn2837
R6habddattonCC2201
BCn 2840
Rh.hbildattn egin demanu,,tenStn
BCn" 2808
pont tran.bordeur,
Reha.bilitabon
BC n 2811 at n 2823
Rih.b.dital pon,ntruntet paredsI
BC n2812
lans
pdjirrmcniu
BC rt'2813
Chas ernentdes sAblesetlafrodo
BC n'2814
eitur ou 10 lOOoosCC2200
BC n' 2818
GM
Acha-t coue/cm8
BC n' 2821
Achat peo,ture locomo a GM
BC n' 284.3
Remlseend,tat d. 1. son,d.esehag.
SC n' 2824
Foriuemtraspoor 180odes hWIes
BC nW2938
~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S/TOTAL
4 0878863880
S/TOTAL
22 994 600
CFIE
prisde esr labs
FountrE
8 129000
SITEL
bass do mcre radio
FZournitrjrel
20 806 892
Fourniure de pieces de echcn9crigulsOonSITEL
BCn' 2904
2 537 432
SITEL
Fourolure ai L
BC nW2806
80620000
de rech-gro tel6phore-~ COP/B
Fourrrilua ib
BC nW2801
___2040
/TL
Pournitre radio VHFzone-dAian
BC nW2800
6 511 362
HALL
ELECTRO
6e
Fo,rniur at pose,, 8plits
BCW 2832
2 050 000
MLO
BCn~ 2836 Fourriiturc eguipemant Lbs TOAlidin
5~~~~~~
765
SITEG
BCFoursilure
n 2838 ertuipementsIdlecom
995 870
S/COREL
Rep.mr,so rdcpteur SPM 30
BC n, 2841
3 893864370
229984600
9 129 GOOt
2806892
!2563:7:432
_
8 620 0001
2500
81 721 921
489 175 100
570 164 000
504350 000
14 007 000
68 3844121
499 175 1001_
57 510 400
504 350,
124 007 0301
BC ri' 2802
TELECOMMUNICATIONSBCn,'2803
I__________S/TOTAL
CFO
001/siTAlF/BNRI/Cl//6
VOIE ET BATIMEN4TS 003/SIT/IP/BNRI/C)186
004/SITAP/SZ/CI/96
006/SIT/IP/CIM8
RihcOiitason d'l draisinetadld bourreuce
Fou,rmturedune, bourru_
Fa/ue4 draisine da chantter
Foam/lure dune.draisn diseOn
MAT/SA
MATISA
SOCOFER
GEISMAR
o6o,
100.0
100.0,
I_______
100,0
10001 _______
I________
1 060 0001
1 1845531
~ ~~~922
935,1
497
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~%d.
(5)o
(1)1(4)~
Marhe,06DABXL.
SITARAILC.C11l1l
-i.
-- g.p,,p.t
.b.gl(5
9834 1886751
400 000000
_______
100~,j
~
12781 769 304I
J
20.01________
500
100,0
100
~
TOTALGENERAL
40.01
________
83.71
20900795001
208 0790500
COG/FER
024/SIT/IPIAPPVOIpJCW,6Fsu-itr.r appare,isde usi.
962 780
1~l9
__665420600
SOCOFER
038/SIT/IFIRHSZ/CV96 RAihabilitb-n40 2 draisinasde ohanber
1 414090880/
1 978319 200
S/TOTAL
41 385 4551
41 385 405
,RTCA
Fsurnilur ePo'. dc ab/es
007/SITA1F/STS/Cl/96
11 110350T
111 103550
BOSCH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS008//SIT/AFSTS/CI196 Foumitureradi.oso-train
13 759 2701
137 592 700
1
BOSCH
Fournilure cutocommul.tareur
0/ST/IPSTS/C596
88 235080/
2900001705
S/TOTAL
600
71733
LOGERAIL
CIM
Abis)
(A,
65
wagons.
pieces
Fourn.tur.
062/S/T/MR/WAG/C//97
04 7583301
206 099714
CIM LOGERAIL
MATERIELROULANT 033/SIT/MRNV4AG/C//96 Fsurnitura pieces85 wagos. (B.C,D,E,O(
BEI
2344600
23 448300
ST,
034/SIT/MRAiVAG/C//96 Fou. lr pieces 60 .agons (F,G,H,'L)
890 656
9 908 560
SAECASTRAL
/56__ Fou1rniur 'ptece 65 wagons/J, lN
035/SlT/MR/WAG/C
4
484204
400
44842
COFIE
(A,EH)
Ovoitlures
pour
Foriuepi&c.s
036ISITIMRNVOIT/Cl/96
98 828416
223 511 057
_LOGERAIL
037/SIT/MRNVOIT/C//96 Fourn,iturepi-ce pour 10 uo.ures (BCEIJK) C~IM
95 136 800
152 030000
AFR/RAIL
48 10 voitura--vyageurs
G41151T/MRNVOIT/CI/97 R6hab,iitaSon
09 007224
118 499950
KLI/MBA
4. 1 0otrs-sa us
0421SIT/MRNVOITIC//97 RAh.bilittcOon
19 500 000
750
000
48
APR/RAIL
63
66,S1
Isc...clar
Rehabi/itb.rn do
048/SIT/MR/LT/Cl/97
28 367 500
40520000
APR/RAIL
Rehabli/tuorsnduloCtrcat.urAAllo
049/SIT/MR)LT/CI/97
18711 000
711
000
18
AFRIRA/L
losse
8Ot80
6
gr...
fl6chas
061/SITIMR/GRUE/CS/97 R`ehabi/ita-o
372 167 956
858 057 636
S/TOTAL
14 570482
704
827
145
GE/SMAR
L
do
ol
Fou-ntur -a// gsspci/ie
025/S/TIIF/OUTVOIPJCI/96
0204,2892
08 380 978
RAILTECH
VOIEET BATMMEPNTS026/SIT/AF/OUTV ,C/8Funlr u/ac p4c.ia/isb d. so,e
360571770
3807 770
COM-Ci
Ritcsbon doi talus cu PK 0 495
027/SITA/1/0AIC1186
2458 390
28 456390
COM-C/
Posedune,busc PK 186 n 841
047/SlTI/F/OANCI/97
548'
1_.27
405
AL/MCO
I
at
7)
(lots
Obibmants
des
RbhabidilcOo
091/S]T/IF/BAT/CI/97
151151 739
Rehab,litasondesOmns lt 2 5.16 EN/TA
092/SIT/AF/BAT/CI/87
____
24 144005
00
Reh.biditW8ndee bibats /01
1093/SIT/AP/BATICl/97
41 159 80856 _____
IBATEL
lord4
084/SIT/lPBATICI/97R6hab,iitabondes Obhbinants
132_148524
813 025 113
S/TOTAL
189743 890
___168743 890
ICBM
Pourni,tura iiodntu AS400
01CI/SIT/INF/86
63 090 000
63 080000
SIMO
Pourn,turamicros e npmcts
02C1)SIT/INF/96
INFORMATIOUE
25 078 721
20 079721
AOEMAT
Fo..m/ltorecabinrgsystm
03C1/SIT/1NF/96
9 497 195
9 497 195
SITEG
FournituraIiia/ons normnaSguas
04C1/SIT/INF/96
138890639
13 6908639
UNICAP
Pours/itor.mtril desonesio
06C1/SIT/INF/96
12 958 286
12 958 266
AOEMAT
Fou..nit- reodulur 40tVA
07C1/SIT/ANF/96
25S89000
2 589000
TIERI1
Fourn,iture-ndlers
08C1/SIT/1NP/96
1 080 652
1 580 652
P/mber
RESTA SCES I
Fourn-r.
09C1/SITAlNP/96
298
234 363
234
363
298
S/TOTAL
999144057
102061 865
J.LEFEBVRE
R6f.taclo do ta/us cu PK 25
VOIEET BATIMENTS 039/S/T/IF/OA/C1196
BOAD
000
388600
SYSTRA
05015IT/MO/SYSTRA/Cl/7 Miiadourrasltansucedr
1
951 677 800 _______
MaitPisadoauv,rer6hab.iitcon inhrolructures SYSTRA
05215IT/MO/SYSTRA/Cl/97
_____
414 000 000
SAC/SIC-TP
delu
. carbe
0821S1TlP/BALLICUB97 Fourniturem
_____
134 347276
MANUTENT/ON
083/SIT/IPIENGTP/Cl/87 PF-rnitur. angi-s TP (lot. 1 at 2)
51 750 000 _ ___________
C/CA AUTO
084/51T/PF/ENGTPICI/97
99 944 087
1 293039 941
S/TOTAL
475 114827
050 ALSTHOM
33 mnoeursd. t-coSo GM
Rehabi/ittaoon
JAGCDO MATERIELROULANT 0686/SIT/MR/MTGM/97
0
475 114827
S/TOTAL
(3)0 (2)/(1)
4 391 000000
97,9
100.0
i00,0j________
30. ________
2 310 00000
71,5
100.0
10.0
100
21300000
22,8
0.0
26.0
10.0
10.0
10,0
44.2
58,0
50,6
___
40.0
70.0
1000
1851000000
38,9
1.
90,0
100.0j
___
100,0
____
46 000 5000
21.6
100.0
100.0
100,0
100,01
100,0
100,0
100.0o
100,0
2490005000
100.0
97.4 _______
_______
_____
______
7.7
-
1 957 000000
_______
00
67.51
488000 000
18755 000 000
6
03/11/1997
SUIVI DE LEXECUTION DU CREDIT IDA 2786 WVC
Investissement
A
Donnees
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
B
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
C
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
D
F
Somme Part IDA
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
H
0,00
0,00 88 108 670,00
0,00
150 613,11
0,00
431 746 032,00
738 027,41
738 027,41
2 838 906,32
150 613,11
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
263 232,87
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
2 073 654,70
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
Somme Part IDA
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
529 269,88
Total Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Total Somme Contrevaleur USD
0,00
0,00
0,00
309 622 880,00
529 269,88
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
67 586,70
596 722,74
103 463 977,00
176 861,50
176 861,50
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
9 306 622,13
i
Total
0,00 3 335 942 170,35
0,00
5 702 465,25
0,00
0,00 162 096 029,00 30 000 000,00
0,00
277 087,23
51 282,05
0,00
0,00
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
3 278 141,77
e
41 619 178,00
71 143,89
1 213 088 000,00
2 073 654,70
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
IDA_CI.XLS
d
0,00 1 917 712 935,45
0,00
3 278 141,77
349 082 800,00
596 722,74
Somme Part IDA
Total Somme Part IDA
2 353 179,58
b
Somme Contrevaleur CFA
Somme Contrevaleur USD
Somme Part IDA
G
a
1 376 610 056,90
2 353 179,58
Somme Contrevaleur CFA 1 660 760 200,00
Somme Contrevaleur USD
2 838 906,32
_
E
Proc6dure
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
51 282,05
431 746 032,00
738 027,41
0,00
738 027,41
0,00 1 660 760 200,00
0,00
2 838 906,32
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
150 613,11
3 278 141,77
2 838 906,32
0,00 1 213 088 000,00
0,00
2 073 654,70
0,00
0,00
81 721 921,00
139 695,59
465 128,03
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
5 698 908,05
280 204 699,00
478 982,39
2 073 654,70
349 082 800,00
596 722,74
596 722,74
309 622 880,00
529 269,88
529 269,88
103 463 977,00
176 861,50
176 861,50
0,00
0,00
135 412,91
81 721 921,00
139 695,59
0,00
135 412,91
466 232,48
51 282,05
13 252 891,54
5 444 373 945,90 88 108 670,00 1 917 712 935,45 285 437 128,00 30 000 000,00 7 765 632 679,35
9 306 622,13
150 613,11
3 278 141,77
487 926,71
51 282,05
13 274 585,78
FeuiI4
03/11/1997
PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA
CONVENTION DE CREDIT N° 53 247 75 001 OS/CCI 1078 01
ENTRE LA SITARAIL ET LA CFD
SITUATION DES MARCHES ( VOLET C6TE D'IVOIRE)
ChapIt.
D6sa
MNdu Marchd
Uontant (1)
CFO
tMATERIEL ROULANT
028/iT/MRFwAGICI/96
029/SIT/MRI/WAG/CI/96
030/SIT/MRfWAGVCI/96
031/SIT/MRjWAGWCI/96
I________________ 044SIT/MO/SYSTRAl96
Fourniture
Foumiture
_
Foumiture
Fourniture
pieces
pi_
pieces
pieces
246 wagons (J)
246 wagons (ABCDEPQR)
246 wagons (H)
246 wagons (GKLO)
SAEC ASTRAL
CIM-LOGERAIL
COFIE
GEMAA
SYSTRA
Maitrise d'oeuvre rehabilitation materiels
TOTAL
(3) = (2)/(1)
(5) = (1)/(4)
%de march6se
ont aprvu
SITUATION DU MARCHE (F.CFA)
Entrepres
tIon du marchd
Uont
nt decW
t2) %Decalss6 (3J au budget (4)
30958 665
1 105 308 993
14 273 477
57851183
484 000 000
3 095 870
959 429 998
14 273 477
5 785 118
10.0
86.8
100.0
10.0
482 976 600
99.8
1 692 392 318
1 465 561 0631
86,60%1 1 947 000 000
87%
ana
parra pportsu budgt(5)
SITUATION DES MARCHES ( VOLET BURKINA FASO)
ChapIt&*
CD MATERIEL ROULANT
Ir du March6
_006/SIT/MR/WAG/BF/96
044S1T/MO/SYSTRAN96
045/SlT/MRJWAG/BF/97
046/SIT/MR/WAt3/BF/97
Entreprise
Ddlgtlon du marchf
Foumiture pieces 64 wagons (ABCD PR)_
Maitrise d'oeuvre r6habilitation mathriels
Foumiture piAces 64 wagons (ljL
Foumiture pieces 64 wagons (J)
CIM-LOGERAIL
-SYSTRA
CORIE
SAEC ASTRAL
TOTAL
1%de march6s
angair
r rapport mubudt
Montant Total pr6vu au budget
Montant total des march6s ongag6s
% do march6s engag6s par map
SITARAIL-CelIuIe March6s
rt au budget total
SIT.XLS
Situation du marche
Montant d6calss
Montant (F.CFA)
257 559 228
373 939 237
21 158 000
613 000 000
394 551
3 945 511
948 162
9 481 624
1 000 366 372
280 057 9411
Montant prevu
%DicaIs6 au budget (F.CFA)
68.9
3,5
10,0
10,0
28,00%1
1553 000000
64%
3 500 000 000
2 692 758690
76,94%
03/11/1997
PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE FER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU / KAYA
CREDIT SOPAFER-B / BAILLEURS DE FONDS
SITUATION DES MARCHES (VOLET BURKINA FASO)
Chap_lr
IDA
MATERIEL ROULANT
VOIE ET ATIMENTS
CFO
Ddslgaon du marchi
Pices Paour
ocomotives GM CC2200
Pikces pour locomotives GM CC2200
Rihabilitation 21 motsursd traction GM
Plices pour locomotives GM
Pihces Pourlocomotive GM
064/SIT/IFIVEH/SF/97
O6S/SIT/IFNEH/BF/97
Achat v6hicule routilr Pot31
Achat v6hicuteroutier ots 1et 2)
EMD -GM
CIM-LOGERAIL
CIM-LOGERAIL
EMD -GM
EMD- GM
S/TOTAL
AFRIOUEAUTO
CICAAUTO
SITOTAL
W2/SIT/lF/BNR4BFt96
Remise en &Atduns bour use lourde
MATISA
VOlEET ATIMIENTS 008/SIT/ F/ NRIBFM
Foumituredune boumeus
MATISA
014SIT/IF/BF/9
Foumiture4 draisines do chantier
SOCOFER
051/SIT/MOVSYSTRAIBF/97
Maitrbe Cdoeuv ouvr dcart
SYSTRA
053/SITIMOVSYSTRAIBF/97
Maitiee d'oeuvre intrstructures
SYSTRA
O4/SIT/1F/ENGTP/BF/97Foumiture dauneniveleuso
SFCE
08S/SIT/IF/ENGTP/BF/97Foumiture dune bull et cune chargeuse
CICAAUTO
087/SIT/IF/OA/SF/97
R6habilitation ouvr9es dart (lots 1at 2)
FADOULTECH.
072/$IT/RHSISBF/97
Rehabilitation do 2 draisines de chantier
SOCOFER
073/SIT/IF/APPVOIE/BF/97 Foumiture apails do voie
COGIFER
075/SIT/IF/RAILBF/97
Foumitur ails 30K
IED-BOCCARD
07I/SIT/IFSOU D/BF/97 Foumituro
soudure aluminothermiCu (12.3) RAILTECH
077/SIT/lF/SOUD/BF/97
Foumituro
de matriels de meulae
GEISMAR
07'/SITIIF/OUTVOIE/BF/97 Foumiture oulilae spdalisaes de vole
GEISMAR
079/SIT/IF/OUTVOIE/BF/97
Foumiture
outitga sp665
alis6a de voie
RAILTECH
OB/SIT/IF/rM/BF/97
Foumiture de 5000 travemes m6tallioues
IED-BOCCARD
014/SITA/F/STS/BF/97
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
040/SIT/IF/STS/BF/97
0
IT#F/STS/F/97
071/IT/IF/STS/SF/97
BUE MATERIEL ROULANT
______________
INPORMATQUE
MATeRIELROULANT
S/TOTAL
Foumitureradio aol-train
BOSCH
Foumituredo 4 utocomMutteurs
BOSCH
Foumiture Pices t6iScoms (2 4 et 7b)
SITEL
Foumiture pices til6coms (2biset B)
COFIE
_
IOBF/SIT/INF/96
I 1BF/SIT/lNF/96
12OF/SIINF/96
13BF/SIT/#NF/96
081/SIT/MgfMTGM/8F/97
S/TOTAL
ICBM
SIMO
UNICAF
TIERI
S/TOTAL
Rdhabititation
33 motera de tractionGM
GECALSTHOM
_______________IIIIIIIIIIII
S/TOTAL
SITAPkII -C.lul MArchie
SITMARBFXLS
|
(7)
S
I
montantprnvu
ddcalsd 12) %DkviS40) au budget (4)
106 383721
1000
619 852144
104,2
241731000
90 0 _
|
0.0
_
1 927 966
62 939 6
836
62 939 666
144859 60t
345 098400
302610 000
130 853 110
183 7B 8401
61 103 700
101250 000
0
42 290 340
48 324 750
104365000
5 792950
927231 110
8 157955
11 294 BB0
6 587 6681
408713507
598 475 000
532 862 593
742917 622
416 826 000
97 5508o3n
59647 500_
53 26 259
74 291762 125047 B00
114627
9 233 220 1931
77.2
60,0
5000
600
0
64. 9
40,0
90.0
90.0
0.0
e0.0
30.0
00
30.0
0.0
00
10.0
150 D0000
_
247 5 157 000 000
10 0
100
000
30,0
28040 503
4 484245_
22 381105
42 875 000
2 291081216
14 833050
44 965000
5 751027
2 520 000
_69 077
475 114 827
253000 000
_-
256181 083
44 842 460
223511 087
85 350 000
8s 01000
0 0
475
TOTAL GENERAL
ptrra;;7 au budg
81 05279
244116 000
575 164 000
504 350 000
201 400 000
459417 100
67 693 000
112 500 000
412 270 158
70 483 900
161082 500
240 54S552
347 88330
is 136700
144609 212
57 929 507
130 000 000
C00
28 625561
Foumiture
mini-ordinateur AS400
Foumiture
microset impomanwts
Foumiture
matitel do connexion
Foumitturonduleur
L%demarch*s engt
2 307 487 7
8 252 279
15 253 000
33 027 142
S/TOTAL
Foumiture do matinaux de carrire
0 KANAZOE
RFihabilitation
ouvrage dart (lot 3)
BAUDINCHAT.
R1habilitaton ouVrgm dtrt (lot4 )
NORD-FRANCE
Foumitureamtaches
dlastaques
nonviss6es PANDROL
UK
(3) - (2)/(1)
(5) (1)(4)
Monant (O) Iltant
1 066 38372
594598914
268590 000
83 793724
294121404
3 753 7 979
81 579 560
112 948 800
S/TOTAL
OBSIT/MR/VOITTBF/97 Foumitureotces pour 10 voituree(AE,H) COFIE
087 IT/MK/VOIT/BF
97
Foumiture
oic" our 10voituros(SCEIJUK
CIMLOGERAIL
OSITMR"T/BF/97
R6habilitaion do 4 volturesrageurs KAUMBA
05SIT/MRNVOIT/BF/97
Rtihabilitstion do 4 Volturos-VoyaVours GEMA
013/SIT/IF/SALUSF/97
VOIEET SATIMENTS 06"/SIT/IF/OA/BF/97
069/ITpIF/OA(BF/97
074/SIT/IFIATTISF/97
AGC
sl7i7N DUMARCHE(p.
Entrepda
001WSIT/GM/8
043SITIMR/CCGM/BF/97
056/SITMGM/BF/97
tW/SIT MR/GMfBF/97
089T/MR/GS(BF
10.9
265 000 000
_
_
_
312 473 321
14 833 050
44 965000
5 692255
2 520000
600 305 1
10-0
10 0
100
300
753000 000
13.6 2 81 000 000
100.0
1000
99 0
100 0
6,
150000000
__I_____
____
°
3 424 212 6251
°0
488000000
37 09%1 12 348 000000
75%
6
03/1111997
PROGRAMME DE REHABILITATION DU CHEMIN DE PER ABIDJAN / OUAGADOUGOU
CREDIT SIPP I BAILLEURS DE PONDS
I KAYA
SIUTINDS MARCHES (voLET c6TE DivoiRE)
IDA
MAT
IENII
ROULANT
Ern&opr.
du -mhre
Dd.4eignatn
Nr du Um,hd
Chop"lr
R~~ice0r looovsGM CC2200
001/SIT/GM/96
GM CC2200
locomokve"s
Pices
IT/R/CGM/Cv9
O12/SITlMR/TMGM/CV97 RlhabillitR#on21 motsur de VractIo GM
e
Ri/btaa nIII/asarer
OO0/SIT/iP/..JCI/97
.R*hab4lfa4onCC2205
SCn.12606
RihabOtlla/la CC2209
SCn 2622
Rihabil/aden CC2202
BC *261 5
Rihab4Ia6anCC22 I9
SCn'2825
Rilhbdf/laola CC2220
BC n 2633
fthablita6an CC2207
SC n 2634
fihabiila6an CC2212
SC n 2637
RlhsbIlitatlon CC2201
SC n'2640
ind. -nulenla
Rihabifita/i anen
Cn'2809
piaI Ilrasbardaur
oant
SC n 261 1 at n' 2623
Rihabifiaban po.t rou1anl at appareila
SC n'2612
ue dan
Revisin mecano
SCno2613
C.h-enual dos cAblesallrrdos
SC m*2614
ootaai-as CC2200
in.Pa.r/l1apa l
SC no26l6
Aehal wslbtumIoeao-vae GM
SC nl 2621
SC n1 2643
SC n 2624
SC n 2836
EMO-GM
CIM-LOGEFAIL
CIM-LOGERAJL
SERNASE-CI
E.IC.
ESIC.
E.IC.
.I.C.
E.I.C.
EIC.
E.I.C.
ESIC.
GEMA
SORIM
METALOCK(
METALOCK(
METAL.OCK
AFRIRAJL
SAEC ASTRAL.
Achtl Psialur locamave GM
Rem/es an ila de la tslaS de icehage
F-un/tur miAl4rel pou abo d.. hubs
SAEC ASTRAL.
SAFRECI
F,urmSjrlravraaan bilaar
Fa-milura fravesasn4t.lbques
Faurnitre attacheede vala forre) (A)
Fourn/iJr attchaa do voia ferris (C et C
Fournture matir.Iasoudwred. -aeal4l
vale 112. 3
Fown/lure matkir/la soudure d.-oo
Faumilurs tails 30 kg
Fumnilure rails 36 kg
Fa-urneur babt
Aeht d-6vhiculsa -bue.a I Iota 1.1t2)
raIta3)
Achted-avI-oulsrudom
Aehatd.vi4h!.uilaarou/lota a4)
-----
______________
SC n'2602
TUECOMMUNICATIONS SC n 2803
SC n' 2904
BC n'2306
SCnml2601
SC n' 2606
C n'2832
SC n'2636
SC n'239
SC n' 2641
IEO SOCCARD I
CIM-LOGERAiL!
TRANiSTRADE
GElSMSAR
RAILTECH
IED SOCCARD
ISD SOCCARO
SISAG
AFRICAUTO I
CFAO -CI
PREMOTO
_______________
Rihabililaltan dlI draeinset dl/Ibawurreu MATISA
001/SITAF/SNRV146
MATISA
d'unebourrause
Founilure
006/SITAP/BNRVClff6
SOCOFER
dechardwr
Foumitlre 4 dralainea
0O4/SIT/iF/SZ/I/9
GEISMAR
dlnapeeaon
Foum/lure du.n.drsai/ne
OO6/SIT/IF/ChUS
COGIFER
app-el. do oe
/8Forniumture
0241SITA1P/APPVOI
SOCOFER
Rihabil/lation do 2 drajainosde chanaer
038/81T/FIFRHSZ/C6
rTAL,
_______________
RTCA
Founitureet p-deciblg
007 SITiF 6/SCl/SO
BOSCH
Pomumir radio s.l-taln
TULEOMMUNICArIOS OO6/SIT/IF/STSIC146
BOSCH
Fournilure auloeommutateurs
OOO/SIT/IF/STS/CM4
VOlE!Er RATIUUT
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sm AT61IILROUJLANT
CIM LOGERAJL
CIM LOGERAIL
Fournitre ice.s 86 mago (Al.
Foaurn/oureiieagagonsAlBCAOEAO
06/ITMRIWAG/CV47
O3/IT/MR/AG146
Fournilure pieee Siwagons (J,I
IOvwModue(AH)
Foumn/luepieee
Paurmiture es ulOveikres (SCELJU
RihabIitsdon de 10 voitu,e-vo,vag*urs
FRihabitlitaon de 10 voitures-vyageurs
R6habll/taUndu aeaValeteu681523
Rihabibltiaon du 1aeotrat*ur AAI I0
Rt"itabdil06nlihes grue60el80 tonnes
S/TOTAL
/ao de voie
O25/SlT/1F/CUrVOIE,CI/S6 F.umiture aubta iag
026/SIT/IFOTV0IS/CI/6 Foumi/lur o.0/I&gossp6ieallais de,vaie
R&teesondu tel uePKs5 495
O27/SIT/IF/oAC /9
Fo.. du.ne bu.e au PKC166 .841
047/SITAIF/0AIC147
lte 17)
Rihabilitatlon des bilimter(lot
091/Srr/IF/BAT/C147
Rihabitita.n des b&aments(lat. 2, 6.1
O92/SITiF 6T/CV97
R&
Ahabit/loa des bAlmenta 113)
092/IT/IF/BT/ 147
Rihabfti/aln des bim,ents (lot41
O94/SITAIF/SAT/CV07
S/TTAL
Fournitu- minl-ard/nateur AS400
OICI/SIT NP/96
Ftmlremeo SImpnmnt..
02C1/SIT/INF/
cbigaae
orilr
03CVSIT/INF/90
Fwn/ur lIisn /nlarne/lgSITEG
04CVSITiNPF
Fourniture na%tielsde co.nneion
GOCUITANPM
Fourn/lure anduleur 40KVA
07C0SITANP/SO
Fown/ture onduleur
000 TNP/SO
Foumitureeiaber
___
09 TiNP
03/SIT/U WA4
O3 IT/RIVOIT cv6
037/SIT ANOMITA148
041/SIT/MRNVOIT/CV97
O42*ST/MARNVOT/CIt97
048/SIT/MP/LT/CY97
049/SIT/MRILT/CI/97
061/SIT/MR/GRUE/CI/97
VOlEEfr ATIMaNTS
EPORMATnQUE
I
OD VOlE EfrSAflMSTS
T/MRJMTGK"7
________________
L GEISMiAR
RAILTECH
COM.CI
COM-CI
AUMCO
ENITA
ODI
ISATEL
ICBM
S/MO
ADEMSAT
UNICAF
ACEMAT
TIERI
PRESTA SCES
SYSTRA
-SYSTRA
SAC/SIC-TP
MANUTENTION
CICA AUJTO
~~~~~~~~~~~~
____
_
Rihebdit/ltln33noatursdetfrclan GM --GEC ALSTHOM
6/TOTAL
________________
TOTAL GENERAL
(3) .(1/(1)
1%demreis
SITARAIL.Ceskl Marhia
SAECASTRAL.
COFIE
CIM LOGERAIL
AFRIRAIL
KAUMBA
AFRIRAIL
AFRIRAIL
AFRIRAIL
~
~~~~~ J. LEFEBVRE
25
Rilsthon du talu au PKC
039/SITA/IFACd/S
den
rihebliataon auvn,
Malaised .. maur
060/S1ITMO/SYSTRA1C47
w6urerhebifdtoninfrasrucures
092/SITYSTRNC197 MaiftsiC.
P$fi/BALL/CV47 Foumiluremalrirux de eat/ire
F..n/lure engins TP lola 1 02)
060/SITiF/ENTP/CIf7l
P6A/MNTP/CV97 Faumilur engins TP 10 3)
_______________
ROUJLANT
MGOiFATRIEL
3 201 136
84246801
6
910 000 000
147063 000
201 NO9600
IS6136440
291 416 440
1 323 0165$00
3377432700
431 741032
76 313 977
14 300000
000
136860
S/~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~$TOTAL 4 067 663 NO
22994600
COFIE
teuaaba
Faurnbite appoarla do
6129 000
SITEL
Fourituro banedomsaureadio
2068066692
Faun/tur do pubce da rohange rigulalim SITEL
25237422
SITEL
Fou/urnitoad/a SWU
6 620 000
COFIE
Fourniolureicedorochwve thamie
2 554 000
UFTEL
Foriwerda rado VHFzone dAbiclan
6 511 362
ELECTROHALL
Fourrtw tuposl ode 6sp.
2 650000
MELEDJ
Foumiture 6ul wnts Labo TS "an
6 922 766
SITEG
Fouraltura6uIp montl Alicorn
9656$70
SICOREL
Ri aralomriceptour 6PM 30
________________
CFO
1 739669229
487 231 603
268 500 000
69108670
5 962942
6 49 169
I
1 607 064
2 034714
2 9256324
1 901 859
3 682 164
23900674
16 4006942
13 736296
24 256 444
19464364
20 200160
1366W0000
2 033 200
i
p err
-u bft
SITMARCI.XLS
(5)
S u budet (4)
100.0
67.9
901
1 739 699 229
330 937 710
242 041 740
_____
_______
_
____
100.0 _____
99.9 ______
10,0________
__
100.0___
40,0______40.0 ______
40,0 ______
6 9529842
1 646 159
1907 064
2 034 714
1170130
760 744
1 414 874
_____
____
92,6
8
100.0 ______
100.0_______
100.0
100-0
60,0
1000,0 ____
17 063192
13 736 296
24256 444
19414 364
20 200160
6316000
2 033200
_____
6 424601
4 310 960
8621 000
6
OPITIQUE1.
2 4436077496
634 709
-2 738
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S/TOTAL
3086017684
303066000
SIaM
015/SI/IFTAC/8
016/SITIP/Thl/CI/0
VOtE Er SATIMI4TS
017'SITA/1FATT/CI96
OI8/SITAIF/Arr/Cll9
019/SIFA1F/SOUO/CI/9
O2O1SIFAIF/SOUO/CV/9
021'SITAIP/RAILICV96
022/SIT/AF/RNILJCU98
0230STAIP/SALU/CU9
057/SITA/VENS/CI/97
066/SIT/IFNE 1C/97
060SIT FNEHCI97
MnAntpidv
Sitato du nmarhi IF.CP
antnt E-isaIeed %Dcata-.
AMotant (1)
100.0-
8.
______
- .
911 977 336
132 520977
193076 131
16 136410
2924155290
1 330660686
3366862794I
431 746 032
75 3139177
14 300 000
136850
000
101.6
100.21______
____1
90
95.6 _______
100.0 _____
100,3J
100.6~
99.7
100.0
100.0
100,0.
100.0
3 963 643 370
22 994600
6 129000
2068066692
26537422
6 620 000
25564000
97,9
100,0
1000O
100.0
100.01
100,01
100.01
O
4 391 000CO
__
_______
40,0__
2020
60.0
1 060 000
1 164553
497 936
_
400000 000
83.71
100.0
10.01
100.01
100,0_______
100.0!
30.0
2 310000 000
71'
1000
10.0
9000
300O
Gs
OO
67
66 384412)
6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SCTA
1 721 921
499 176 100
499 175 100
576516400
676164 000
60 350 100
604 350000
2"400700
12070
206 0796500
209 079600
19662 760,
66 642 600
1 414 090680
1978319200
41 366 416
41366 466
11 110366
III 1036$60
1239833430
1376392700
176 309240
2I006170
71 733600
170349 217
206066714
990666
44642460
2236511057
162030 000
90
1164696
46750 000
406525000
16 711000
NO606786M
146 764 627
66 360976
36571 770
26 456300
127406 546
151 161739
24 144 006
41 1596666
6 13025113
169 742890
63 060000
25 079721
9 497 196
136600639
-12 966266
265890~00
1 566 652
298 234 303
102681 6865
38600 000
561 677 000
414 000000
134347276
61 760 000
1 2930306 41
475 114 627
1140627
9s0a6
4 484264
160 266411
66 136800o
69 007224
19600o000
26 3676500
16 711 0001
NO917768621
146814 527'
56390979
386571770
26 466 390
1010
10,0l
60.7 ____
5660_____
60.6 ______
40.0
70.0
100.0 ______
166 1 000 000
59.5!
100.0 _______
100.0
100.0
100.0 ______
269 223 9681
16974266901
83 0600001
25 079 72'
9 497 195
13 600639
12 968266
26689000
1 5666652
266 234 303
69449057
43.91
100,0!
1000!
100,0
100.0
100,0
1000O
1000
100,0
100.0!
9741
12 781 769 3041
9 3226629 46L
~~~~~~~~~~S/TTAL
am8000 000
__
249 000 000
____
_
___
___________
90944"057
~~~~S/TOTAL
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~475
77
1387 000 000
_____
00
466000000
72.91 10 76000
76%
03/11/1907
SITARAIL
C
oU
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
uxuon
.
BEI: BF
OR P N.
MARCHE
N*
FOURNISSEUR
OBJET
MONTANT
ICBM
Ecrns StImprimantn A8400
FCFA
1
1
10IF/SITiNFI96
11 BF ITANF196
12 BF /SlTT/NF196
SIMO
UNICAF
Micros et Imprimant
Matrnl de connexion
FCFA
FCFA
1
1
13BF /SITANF96
086/SIT/MRNOITIBF/97
1
TIERI
KALIMBA
013/SITAF/LUBF/97
KANAZOE
Onduleum
Rhabilitftion do 4voiessvoy gun
FCFA
FCFA
T
1
1
1
074/SITAIF/ATTABF/97
060/SITIIF/OAJBF/97
1
PANDROL UK LMTED
Aftaches atigues sp6cials
NORD FRANCE ENTREPRISE Constuction douvraga d'art
087ISITiMRNVOIT/BFI97 CIM LOGERAIL
08SITAIWM
1
OIT/BF/97 COFIE
t)68oSITrAF/oA18F/97
Mailaux do carri6
BAUDIN CHATEAUNEUF
Pi6ces do rechango pour 10
edoe
porug
o 1
Construction dcouvrag0cdart
_____
_____
___
__
14 833 OK 14 833 0K
44 965 000 44 965 000
5692 255
5602 255
2 520 000
2 520 000
42 675000 42 675 000
FCFA 59 47500 508759
87 SK
FRF 1250 478,00 125 04780
FCFA 74 291 762 74 291 762
FRF
223 511.05
FRF
44842.45
4 484 245
FCFA
53 28 259
53 286 259_
_ _ __ _ _ __
Dat.
CA_
NTurn
A
_PCFA bs
_
_800
22 351 106
449M
_
_1
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
E1.XL3W1n1
SITARAIL
CIUIL
O5CANW1aWUIT
BEI: Cl
ORP
MARCHE N'
DR F
I
FOURNISSEUR
1025/SITAF/OU1VOIE/CI/
L. GEISMAR
_
026/SITAIF/OUTVOIE/CU9
RAILTECH
2
3
I
1
MONTANT
Outilages spWCialls6s de voe
3
1
OBJET
FF
Outllages sp6cialis6s do vos
_
027/SITAF/AOlICU
I
1 312 393,45
FF
FF
396 368.32
COM-CI
03VSIT/MR/IWAG/CU96
REMAFER
Talus do Is vole au PK 5+495 +
F CFA
Avenant N "I_
R6h. 65 wags march. Pots A.Ab) _
033/SIT/MRNWAG/Ca98
CIM-LOGERAIL
R6h. 65 wag. march. (ots B,C,D,E, FF
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
2
__._,_._._FF
3
145 754,82
FF
FF
_
1D6vise
________FF
1 458148,27
171 308,90
16132,56
DECAISSEMENTS
F CFA
Date
DWvise
14 575 482 27-maF97
131 239 345
145 814 827
39 636 832
27.mai-97
14 575 482
39 636 832
27-mai-97
39 636 832
36 571 850
17130890
1 613 256
683 809,78
58380 978
36 571 850
36 571 850
__
_
_
206 099,71
20 609 971
341 893.35
1 155 499,11
1 703 492,17
34189 335
115549 911
170 349 217
F CFA
14 575 482
_
_
20 609 971
27-ma=97
20 609 971
2
0341SIT/MRAWAG/CM98
STI
R6h. 65 wag. march. (ots F,G,H,L) FF
I
035/SIT/MRNWAG/CU98
SAECASTRAL
R6h. 65 wag. march. (lots J et K)
990 866
990 866
27-mai-97
I
036/SIT/IMRNOIT/CU98
COFIE
Psces pour 10 voltures -voyageur FF
44842,45
4484 245
27-mai.97
4484 246
I
037/SIT/MRNOIT/CU97
CIM-LOGERAIL
PFcs pour 10 voitures -voyagour FF
223 511,06
22 351 106
27-ma497
764 753,10
814 599,95
=___________
1 802 864,11
76475 310
81 459 995
180 286411
22 351 106
2
3
F CFA
_
FF
_
1
041/SIT/MRNOIT/CU
2
_
_______________
AFRIRAIL
R6h. 10 voitures -voyageurs
F CFA
F CFA
3
CFAI
__
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
__
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
__
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_85136
I
2
042/SIT/IMRNOIT/CU97
_
PCFA
.2
047/SIT/IFIAO/CU97
CC)M-CI
Pose dune bus. au PK 186+841
F CFA
2
48/SIT/MR/LT/C197
AFRIRAiL
Rhhab. Locotractur BB 163
F CFA
2
491SIT/MRILT/CU97
AFRIRAiL
R6hab. Locotrsctur M 110
KALiMBA
R*h. 10 voiture - voyagurs
_______
_F_
23 446,30
F CFA
45 609000
9 881 950
800
34 949 985
9 881 950
85 136 800 _ _
34
985 27-mr-97
45 609 000
34 949 985
24057239
59 007 224
24 057239
59 007 224
34 949
28 486 390
19 500 000
061/SIT/MR/GRUE/C197
fI
01 CUSiT/NF/96
02 CUSiTANF/96
03 CUSITANF/96
04 CUSIT/NF/96
06 CUSITAiNF/6
07 CUSITAiNF/96
08 CUSIT/INF/96
ICBM
SIMO
ADEMAT
SITEG
UNICAF
ADEMAT
TiERI
Mini Ordinaibur
Mcros et Imprimantes
Cabling Systm
Liaison inform
ues
MMoeriel do connadon
Ondulurs
Ondulurs
09 CUSiTANF/96
PRESTA SERVICES
TECHNIQUES
Climadisurs
F CFA
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AFRIRAIL
__
__
0 000< 00 0 <
Remise en Mtt grue 60T et SOT
__FCFA
22 351 106
45609000
29 645 85
2
3
_
45 609000
990 856
27-mai-97
F CFA
16 210 000
CFA
12 157 5C
<-~~~~~~~~~~~28
387 60C
F CFA
10093 000
8618000
18 711 000
F CFA
169 743 890
F CFA
63090 000
F CFA
25 079 721
F CFA
9 497195
F CFA
13 690 639
F CFA
12 958 266
F CFA
2 589 000
3_
2 344 600
1 585 652
298
234
363
=________ =
29 645 85
28 456 390
98
19 500 000
16 210000
12 157 50C
28 367 60C
10093 000
8618000
18 711 ooa
169743 89 27-mai47
63 090000 27-mn.97
25 079 721 27-mai-97
9497195 27-ma197
13 690639 27-mai97
12 958 266 27-ma197
2 589 000 27.mal-97
169 743 890
63 090 000
25 079 721
9497 195
13 690 639
12 958 266
2 589 000
1 585 652 27-maF97
1 585 652
298 234 363
136 636
_1 2611
298 234 363
=
=
518 013 690
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SIN3IN3SSIV33a SMG
VAL
_1Ivuivs
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
SITARAIL
CELLULE DECAISSEMENT
CFD:CI
Coventkon de Prt N 52 24712 001OMICCI 1077 1 du 02104199t:26 000 000.00FRF sot 2 600 000 000 FCFA
DRF
N-
FACTURE
MONTANT
DATE
Devises
F CFA
N-
DATE
6507
21-nov-96
9640 17-dec-96
2eterme 65%
MATISA
001/SITAF/1NRVCU96
26-avr-96
20jan-9
987
22-mar-9
9051
Solde
MATISA
OO1/SITAIFIBNRUCU96
26-avr-96
18-jun-9
4076
01-aoO-9
10 16-jan-97
FRF
1 958 223,15
195 822 315
18 18-jun-97
FRF
98 955,00
3 18-nov-96
FRF
504350.00
FRF
4 034800,00
20 27-aoO-97 FRF
504 351,00
5 843 501,00
~~~
~~~
.
2203
12-mai-9
2601199
10-jul-96
10-jun-97
_
_
26-r-96
24-mar-97
ce_
50 435 001
403 480001
50 435 10
~ 143
~ 704~~~~~~~~~~~
755
149 752 530
19582231
9 895 59
49 175101
499 1751
57 516 49
DCaissements
Date
26-vr-96
9031
16 09-jun-97
RECLEMENT
RF6
OO1ISITAF/1BNRUCU96
9046/47
149 752 530
575 164,00
CFD/SPF
_
_
_
_
OOISITIIF/BNRUCU96
143704 755
1 497525,30
FRF
TrngmiPFn *
DATE
MATISA
1437 047,55
FRF
8 16-jan-97
_ __
03-mar-97
2e83e tarme
MARCHE
N*
FOURNISSEURS
MATISA
FRF
2 26-ao0-96
4"91751,00
Term de paienent
Acompte 30%
14 24-mar-97
9895 501
|
9034
789
9705008
27-nov-96
Acompte 10%
MATISA
0O3ISITIF/BNRICI96
3t8/96
-
10%
Acomnpte
SOCOFER
004/SITIF/SZ/CU96
30-aoO-96
Acompte 80%
SOCOFER
004/SIT/IF/SZICU96
30-ao0-96
Solde
SOCOFER
004/SIT/IF/SZ/CU97
31-aod-96
17-mai-97
9708010 22-aod-97
16101/199 1548 01-avr-97
18t011991 7047
13-jun-9
16-dec-96
3321
01-jul-9
5560
08-oct-97
504 350 IO5
57 516400
50 435 09
403 480
50 435
504 350
21108/96 6241 25-oct-96
61 532
1 21-aoO-96
FRF
615 320,00
61 532
Divers
Diverses
Remboursement a SITARAIL
SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/IF/95
19-jan-96
4 20-nov-96
FRF
267 750,00
26 775 0
Divers
Dv
Dvwses
Remboursement ASITARAJL SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/IF/95
19-jan-96
7154 20-dec-96
26 775 OD
9 17-jan-97
FRF
178500,00
17 850 oa
Divers
Diverses
RemboursementA SITARAIL
SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SIT/lF/95
19-jan-96
20-jan-97
1183 14-mar-97
17 850 00
15 03-avr-97
FRF
178500.00
17 850 oa
11&12f97
17-jan-97
Remboursement a SITARAIL
SOCIETE L. GEISMAR 006/SITsIF/95
19-jan-96
03-avr-9
2422
1 240 070.00
124007 W
11 28-jan-97
FCFA
4 136 545,00
21 18-sep-97
FCFA
37 228 910
37 228 91
41 365 455
41365 455
111103,55
11 110 355
6 20-nov-96
FRF
Acompte 10%
RTCA/SCIMI
007/SIT/AFISTS/CU96
20-sep-96
Solde
RTCANSCIMI
007/SIT/IF/STS/CV96
20-sep-96
05-nov-96
Acompte 10%
BOSCHTELECOM
O08/STITIF/STS/CU96
20-sep-96
4 136 545 189=01970S/-H08-jan-97
6301104
31-ju-97
760035
FRF
137592,70
13 759 270
760 955
10-sep-96
Acompte 10%
BOSCHTELECOM
009/SlT/IF/STSICI96
30-ao0-96
1190D741,60
110 074 160
2 730 350
11-jul-97
2eme Term.e
BOSCHTELECOM
009/SIT/IF/STS/CU97
30-aoO-96
7 26-nov-96
FRF
209 079.50
FRF
1 672 636,00
17 09-jun-97
FRF
209079,50
2 090 795,00
12 30-jan-97
FRF
199627,80
20 907
167 263 60
20 907 950
28-jan-9
1573
02-avr-9
4 136 54
20/11/1996
7322 30-dec-96
11 110 3S
20/11/199
7046
13 759 27
7051 16-dec-96
16-d6c-96
COGIFER
024/SIT/lF/APPVOIE/CU96
30-ao0-96
26/11/199
5214
31-jan-97
2eme terme 80%
COGIFER
024/SITAIF/APPVOIE/CIV96 30-aoO-96
11-mar-97
1995
23-avr-97
5215
31 -jan-97
Solde
COGIFER
024/SITAIF/APPVOIE/C/96
30-aoO-96
13-jun-97
4071
01-ao0-97
97/9119
30-sep-96 Acompte 10%
20 907
167 263
20 907
209 079
209 079 50
19 962780
17 850
4136 545
FRF
13 11-mar-97
27-mai-9
124 007 000
19 13-oct-97
5 20-nov-96
20t11/199
797 23-jan-97
Acompte 30%
SOCOFER
038/SIT/MR/RHSZ/CV96
10-jan-97
30-jan-9
1055
08-mar-9
19 962
FRF I
TOTAL
1590400120
1443 096 950
CFD.XLS17:2828/10/1997
SITARAIL
vs
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
cm
C F D: SITARAIL
Connntbnon
de PrWt 53 24 75001 OSCCa107901 du 021041: 35000000.OOFRF
soft 3 50 000000 FCFA
DR F
N.
DATE
4
16-an-97
MONTANT
Dewises
FACTURE
F CFA
N
Date
T
Rglement
MARCHE
FOURNISSEUR
do
N.
Objet
rm
Die
Oi.-d.S
FRF
373 939,24
37 39392 96.0008.417
12-d6c-96
Acompte 10%
UM LOGERAIL
006ISITIMRNVAGBFIN96Pices et matibres pour wagons
1 994
23-avr-97
10 09-jiWt-97 FRF
197731,88
197731U 8.449
27-mai-97
Acompte 80%
CIMLOGERAIL
006ISTIMRNVAGIBFI96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
3066
24-jun-97
19 773188
13
984 107,17
98 410 7178.465;8.459; 8.469
18 et 23/6/97
2 bme terme PartilM
CM LOGERAIL
0061SITRURNVAGIBF/96Pices et mati4res pour wagons
4 566
28-ao0-97
98 410 717
22-jul-97
2 nmeterme Parti6l
CIMLOGERAIL
006/9ITARNVAGOBF/96 Pikces et mati6res pour wagons
4 566
28-aoO-97
13-aoO-97
2 Ameterme PartiN
CIMLOGERAIL
0061SITIMROVAG/BF196Pices et mati6res pour wagons
04-jul-97
FRF
16 04-o0-97
FRF
76 560,95
19 02-sep-97
FRF
473 818,07
7 656 09 97.0008.476
47 381807 97.0008.485,497,503
37 393924
7 65609
47 381807
21 04-sep-97
FRF
34 627,88
3 462 788 7.0008.493
13-ao0-97
2 bme terme Partibi
CIMLOGERAIL
0061SITIMRNVAGIBF196Pieces et mati6res pour wagons
3 462 788
25
04-sep-97
FRF
434 807,09
43 480 709 97.0008.512
22-ao0-97
3 4me terme PartiN
CIMLOGERAIL
006fSlT/MRNVAGfBF,97 Pikces et matiAres pour wagons
43 480 709
2
14-jan-97 FCFA
18-d6c-96
Acompte 10%
SAECASTRAL
028/SiTMRWNAGlCU96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
7
14-mai-97
FRF
675 179,00
6751790097.0008.445
05-mai-97
2 8me terme Partibl
CIMLOGERAIL
029MT/MRNVAGICW6
12
04-jul-97
FRF
2 196879,45
219 687 945 8.463 et 8.457
18-jun-97
2 4me terme Partiel
CIMLOGERAIL
17 04-aoO-97 FRF
1 084863,40
108 486 340 97.0008.474
22-jul-97
2 eme terme Partial
CIMLOGERAIL
029/SIT/MRNVAGMlI/96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
20 02-sep-97
FRF
1014 499,12
101449 912 97.0008.491 et495
13-aoO-97
2 eme terme Parti4l
CIMLOGERAIL
029/S1TlMRNvAGlCU96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
22
08-sep-97
FRF
202 315,37
20231 537 97.0008.505
13-aoO-97
2 bme terme PartiAl
CIMLOGERAIL
029/SIT/MRNVAG/CI/96 Pikces et matieres pour wagons
1
14-jan-97
FRF
1 105309,00
110530 900 96.0008.409
13-nov-96
Acompte 10%
CIMLOGERAIL
029/S[TMRANVAGICI96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
853
20-fev-97
11
09-jun-97
FRF
325 910.19
32 591019 39563
27-mai-97
Acompte 80%/
CIMLOGERAIL
0291SITIMRNVAG/CI196 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
4 546
27-aod-97
23
16-sep-97
FRF
399 746.08
39 974 608 454,458, 464, SIN'
1806197e
3 fme terme Parti4l
CIMLOGERAIL
029/SITIMRNVAGICU97 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
2/08/97,
2 Ome terme Partil
CIMLOGERAIL
029/SIT/MRNVAG/CU98 Pices et matibres pour wagons
266
07-mar-97
1 427 347
11 418 781
2 575 592,28
24 26-sep-97
FRF
3 095 870
257 559 228
257 559 228
3 095 870SIN.
____
__
___
___
___ ___ _
__ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___
2 589 598,37
258 959 837 514, 525
9 594 299,98
959 429 998
05/0 5/97
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
879
20-f6v-97
Pikes et matiures pourwagons
3065
24-jun-97
67517 900
029/SIT/MRNVAGICI/96 Pieces et matieres pour wagons
4 546
27-aoG-97
219 687 945
4 546
27-aoO-97
20 231537
FRF
14 273,47
1 427 347 8669
27-nov-96
Acompte 10%
COFIE
030/SITflRNVAGtCU96
9
09-jun-97
FRF
114187,81
11 418 781 8742
22-mai-97
Acompte 80%
COFIE
0301SITIMRNVAGOCI/96Pieces et matibres pour wagons
3 708
15-jul-97
18 06-ao8-97
FRF
30-jul-97
Solde
COFIE
030SIT/MRIVAGCI196
4 567
28-ao0-97
6
21-avr-97
FCFA
5
27-flv-97
14
04-jul97
13-mar-97
FRF
4 829 766,00
482 976 6W 6/12.255/
1978BG001 31-d6c-96
FRF
222061,60
8
09-jun-97
FRF
3 945,51
16-jul-97
FCFA
543162
22 206161 7/03.13211978
Pieces et matibres pour wagons
Acompte 10%
Gnrdraf
de Manufackire
Missionl0O%A et Acompte 40%D
SYSTRA-SOFRETU-SOFRERAIL
044filTASYSTRA196
04-jul-97
031/SITIMRNVAGOC196 Pices et mattures pour wagons
2 396
1 427 349
23-mai-97
5 785 118
482 976 600
Maitrise d'oeuvre r6hab materiel
1 056
06-mar-97
SYSTRA-SOFRETU-SOFRERAIL
0441SITAMOYSTRA,96 Maitrise d'oeuvre rihab. materiel
4 250
14-ao0-97
505 1t2 70
21 156 W(
504 132 600
394 5518729
14-avr-97
Acompte 10%
COFIE
045OITAARNVAGOBF)96Pikces et mati*res pour wagons
948 182 97020697
29-mai-97
Acompte 10%
SAECASTRAL
046iTMRNVAGOISI96
1746614
32 591 019
14 273 477
5 73511 287197
15
TOTAL
1 427 3498774
Pieces et matieres pour wagons
14 273 477
575119
5 051827,60
110 530 900
660 495 553
14-jan-97
14273,49
108 486 340
101449 912
3
142 734,77
3 095 870
_
_
4 251
14-aoG-97
394 551
Pices et matidres pour wagons
1 4473S 337
SITARAIL
c0L6a
erc
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
_
AID: BF
DR F
DATE
W
1
2
3
4
_
6
_
07-aw47
17J-97
17-47
19-ia7
19Jim-l7
11--97
_
__
FACTURES
D_4.
__________
KU-*n-t
Mlni-t
_
-Rr
LetUres de Cr6dd
________
_______
_
2 060953.33
E_gt
________SP&d
Date
W
30.062197 07041997
114 787.43
268 590,00
2146 720,0
3003U97
918299.48 J0.ee7
rer
s
011oW9719
0110711997
62 939 68
6cr
___
__
_
_
___
FOURNISSEURS
Date
_ _ _
N
13aoen9e E M D
CIM LOGERAIL
CIM LOGERAIL
CiM LOGERAIL
CIM LOGERAIL
AFRICAUTO
=
MARCHES
___
_ _
Date Objet
OOIISITIGM195
043/SITIMRICCGM,BF/97
056/SlITTfMGMBF197
0561SITITMGMIBFI98
0431SITIMRICCGM/BFJ97
O64iSiTIiF1VEHJBFI97
__
_
_ _ _
_ _ _
__________
_________
_ _ _
Date
211031199S Pices pour L ocomotives GM
011i1997 PIhces pour L ocomnotives GM
1110411g97 R6habilition 2ioteurs traction GM
1110W11997R6h1bilitation 21moteur traction GM
01J/1997 PlAcea pour L ocomotives GM
2110511997 Achat v6hicules routiUe
=__
__
_
_
_
_
_
REGLEMENTS par I D A
__
________-
_____
D
e-vis-es.5
D
___
____
__
___2
_
e
evises US
=
=
___
$
_
Obervetlons
W
V l u
FCFA
LeUre de CredR
i478 743 Acompte 10%
26 859 00t Acomnpte 10%
Lettrede Credit_
Lettre de Cr6dit
62 939
Solde March
277__
4n
~..
d T~ e
E
DRF
67
_
_
___
=_
SITARAIL
ETAT DES DECAISSEMENTS
CELLULE DECAISSEMENT
C F D:B F
Convention de Pret N 52 287 12 001 OY/CBF 1082 01 et 52 287 12 002 OJICBF 1082 02:
57 300 000.00 FRF solt 5 730 000 000 FCFA
D RF
MONTANT
N
DATE
I
05-nal-97
FRF
3 026100,00
2
05-mnal-97
FRF
3
06-mal-97
FRF
4
06-ma-97
FCFA
5
27-mal-97
6
Devises
FACTURE
F CFA
MARCHE
Situation Pret en FCFA
No
Date
302 610 000
804
22-avr-97
ler
SOCOFER
1 237 000,00
010/SITIIFSZIBF/96
123 700 000
01-avr-97
10-avr-97
183 766 840
ler
302 610 000
1 837 668,40
82 et 84
SYSTRA
81
051/SITIMOISYSTRAIBF/97
10-avr-97
ler
SYSTRA
10-avr-97
053ISITIMOISYSTRAIBFI97
123 700 000
I10-avr97
183 766 840
61 103 700
61 103 700
10497 et
09-avr-97
054/SITIIFIENGTPIBF/97
14-avr-97
61 103 700
FRF
1 488 696,00
148 869 600
9048
12-mal-97
27-mal-97
ler
FRF
3 450 984,00
MATISA S.A
002ISITIIFIBNRIIBF/96
345 098 400
9050
26-avr-96
12-mal-97
148 869 600
ler
MATISA S.A
OO5ISITflFIBNRIIBF/96
7
27-mal-97
01-avr-97
FRF
81 579,55
345 098 400
8157955
760656
07-avr-97
I er
BOCH TELECOM O14ISIT/IFISTSIBFI96
01-avr-97
8
27-mal-97
8 157 955
FRF
112 948,80
11 294 880
P73012
06-mal-97
I er
BOCH TELECOM 040ISIT1IFISTSIB1`I96
9
03jun-97
20-jan-97
FRF
69 531,10
11 294 880
6 953 110
072 at 89
21-mal-97
SYSTRA
051/SIT/MOISYSTRA/BF/97
10
14107197
10-avr-97
FCFA
11 250 000
11 250 000
1642
18jun-97
I er
CICA AUTO
055/SITIIFIENGTPIBFI97
24-avr-97
11 250 000
_____
__
Terme de
FOURNISSEUR
N
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~palement
er et2 Am S.F .C .E
|
Date
Daissements
6 953110 _-
11
22-eoO-97
FRF
1 043 650,00
104 365 000
396
23-jul-97
12
22-ao0-97
1 er
FRF
RAILTECH
57929,50
O76BSIVTIFISOU1DF1197
5 792 950
395
21-jul-97
104365000
13
2310797
22-aoD-97
1 er
FRF
RAILTECH
85 876,68
079/SITIIFIOUTVOIE/BFI97
8 587 668
8777
21-jul-97
5 792950
14
11/0897
02-sep-97
1 er
FRF
COFIE
422903,40
o71SITIFSTS/BF/97
42 290 340
01 -oO-97
I er
SOCOFER
072/SITRFIRHSZ/BFI97
815
05-aoCi-97
8 587668
24-jul-97
42 290340
15
27-jul-97
FCFA
90 000 000
90 000 000
1643
18-jun-97
16
2eme
17-sep-97
CICA AUTO
FRF
055ISITfiFIENGTPIBF/97
483 247,50
48324 750
24-avr-97
9157
29-aoCi-97
90 000 000
ler
COGIFER
073ISITIIFIAPPVOIEIBFI97
17
17-sep-97
21-jul-97
FCFA
9908143
48 234 750
9908143
971DA1494
19-ao-7
lcr
SITEL
O7O0SITflFISTSIBF/97
18
24-sep-97
FRF
56 585,52
5658 552
9770034
18-aoO-97
ler
L GEISMAR
077/ST/IFISOUDIBFI97
19
24-sep-97
FRF
146 609,21
14 660 921
9770035
18-aoO-97
ler
L GEISMAR
TOTAL
1 532392 809
o76ISITIIFIOUTVOIEIBFI97
Non MobLiis
______
29-jul-97
04-ao&-97
05-aoO-97
1 502 075193
4227924807
CFD XLS28/10/1997
eJ!OAIIP O103
L66L eJqOO3 VZ
ua os!esueJJ 83JOWwo3 Op GJqWeBq el IUUAOP Uo!Ie;ueseJd
iai3aeawoA attuiwoaoa,j anod saqwuo3aia salojpn
3HIOAI.a 31Qo 3a.3nori9nld3H VI 13 OS
3UIN3 S3HI1511/H03=13
I VNINunfsl
3i
SIHOdSNVIiL s3a NOIlVJIOIdX31 3Ca NOISS33NO3 N3 3SIW
k
!
!
M _g S
S
i
~~~~F
S:3!S-.INHODAVL4 3( 1jj
3IVIIV.
NN)SU)d *30
LCN
I
TRANSPORT FERRCAJRE
DrE PERSOtNNES EI'DE MARCHANDISES
SOMMAIRE:
I - HISTORIQUE ET CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA LIGNE FERROVIAIRE ABIDJAN/OUAGA/KAYA
11- EVOLUTION DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE
11-1 Trafic marchandises
11-2 Trafic voyageurs
11-3 Chiffre d'affaires
III - LA MISE EN CONCESSION DU RESEAU
111-1 Objectif de la concession
111-2 Principe de la concession
111-3 Presentation de SITARAIL
IV - RETOMBEES POUR L'ECONOMIE IVOIRIENNE
IV-1 Les atouts du chemin de fer
IV-2 Retombees directes
IV-3 Retombees indirectes
SITAR/l 4 I.
4e
a
TRANSPOR FERROVLURE
DE PERW)NE[S EI DE MARCHANDiSES
I - HISTORIQUE ET CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA LIGNE FERROVIAIRE ABIDJAN/OUAGA/KAYA
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~SI
%1 f
TARA II
~~TR 1'.SPOR F-RRQVIAW
1
DE PERSOtNN[S EI
[DE MARCHA NDISES
Les travaux de construction ont debute 'aAbidjan en 1904 pour s'achever
a Kaya en 1988.
* 1960: Convention conclue entre la Cote d'lvoire et la Haute Volta
fixant l'organisation et les
conditions de fonctionnement de la ligne ferroviaire Abidjan/Ouaga
dont la gestion a ete confiee a
un 'tablissement international a caractere industriel et commercial
denomme Regie des chemins
de fer Abidjan-Niger;
* 1989: Abrogation de la convention de 1960 et creation au niveau
de chaque Etat d'une societe
d'exploitation du chemin de fer, la SCFB au Burkina et la SICF en
Cote d'lvoire.
TRANSPORT FERROV1AIRE
DE PERSCNN.FS ET DE W.ft'HAR'CD)SES
Les principales caracteristiques de ce chemin de fer etaient les suivantes:
- Longueur de la ligne 1260 Km a ecartement metrique a l'exception de 3 tron9ons d'une
longueur cumulee de 37 Km, qui sont a double voie et situes sur le territoire ivoirien:
croisement dans les gares.
- 41 gares ouvertes dont 28 assurent le trafic commercial, 13 assurent uniquement la securite;
- La voie se trouve dans un etat moyen et souffre particulierement, sur certains troncons, de
rails ayant atteint le seuil d'usure critique et d'un manque de ballast =: nombreux
deraillements.
- La plus grande partie du materiel roulant se trouve dans un etat de degradation critique due
aux retards enregistres en matieres d'entretien courant;
-
3470 agents en 1994, dont 2100 pour la SIPF et 1370 pour la SCFB.
*
11 -
-
;t1
ITRAN4SPRT
I V Awl
*
FERRQVIAJE
DE PERSOtNNES EIDE AARCHA.NL}SEs
EVOLUTION DE L'ACTIVITE FERROVIAIRE
11-1 Trafic marchandises
n
EVOLUTION DU TRAFIC TOTAL DE MARCHANDISES
_
_
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Tonne-Kilometre is
.......
..... .
....................
......
.........
. ...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.............
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..*
600--_=asaasaa
aR
......
e.::.>:.:::.:.:>B.:-.-.:.:'.:
:.:::B
SisBx
........
: -xa^
...
E:
.
C
..
>.,.
....
........................
....
..................
>>r^,*
||..........
|
c
E.:2x
. ....
300-U.
40
,^6g$,mtaBaBaa
|.......... . .
. ... .|.ar2Rxy
.
t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
'2-i''a0ia_'EEm^a>ga>.Rz....I
aa-fa:aa
. --
.--
600
U
.-
500- . I
100 -200
r
|
H iF
'v-vv1
gL
nne-KilAnnere
1
1g-.gg|||1
:X,X,a2
|
18
018
.
-
X .
Ra ::::R:y5Zy '.t;
1988
19819i9119
1990B
1991
1992t.........
;ESiTARAViI
TRANSPRT FERRRE
DE PERSONNES ET DE MARCWHNDiSrS
11-2 Trafic voyageurs
ii
EVOLUTION DU TRAFIC TOTAL DE VOYAGEURS
2000
1800
1800.b
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
...
...
*~~:*'***
. ....
.....
...
......
....
.a
.'............
. -.-.-.:---.....
28000
un
_Voyageur
. g
.
*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
..4 -voyageur-Kiomelre
1600 3tiSg3-l0 <
4
.':
_:'-.::.g:':B'
'':
:::'.::.
........
.::'::':I.
...............
8
*
--':::':.'.-:B'.:':BBBBB::o:':":'.:::':BB"
A^^
g............8.:.:.:..:.::.-':
&B&'BB'82
BB
........
s2x
;:'-.
gsaaga
.......................
aXB'.&X:
gS2B88R5BS
o aaSB
E 1200
1000
800
R
1000
a
8BB
<:&z
8i,a
-.-
8asassasssssRa
tb8&
sR8a
6. 00
400a i'
co*.......-...8s-'aa*>
200... ..B
200
0J
a
.1987
-
-
s
8
o~~~~18
---
3ga.....BR2..
1
1
A
1990.
199
Ann6os'§XC'
Aai-BBB's
1800
198
3 600
c
.
..
.....
m
=
0
.
.
.
Bi".S:sasSR:U
sS
TRANSPORT FERROVIARE
O1 1)ERSONNES ET DE MARCHANDISES
11- LA MISE EN CONCESSION DU RESEAU
111-1 Objectif de la concession
* Assurer la perennite et le developpement du mode de
transport ferroviaire.
* Contribuer au desenclavement des pays limitrophes
et des regions eloignees de la facade
atlantique.
* Stimuler les echanges commerciaux entre la Cote d'lvoire
et le Burkina et avec les autres pays
de la sous-region.
* Supprimer toute forme de subvention des etats a I'activite
ferroviaire.
i0
--
O1 ||TRANSR FER
~DE PERSONNES ET DE MARCHANDISES
111-2 Principe de la concession
* Les etats sont proprietaires des infrastructures et du materiel roulant par l'intermediaire des societes
de patrimoine.
* La SITARAIL dispose du materiel et des infrastructures en contre partie du versement d'une
redevance dans le cadre d'une concession de service public.
* Les investissements sont finances par les etats qui empruntent aux bailleurs de fonds, SITARAIL
assurant le service de la dette dans le cadre de la redevance.
Par derogation au code des marches publics, SITARAIL est le maltre d'oeuvre du premier Programme
d'lnvestissement d'Urgence (P.l.U).
*SITARAIL est en charge de la maintenance des immobilisations concedees.
*SITARAIL dispose de la liberte tarifaire et de la liberte de definition du plan de transport.
Exclusivite d'exploitation pendant 7 ans.
Duree minimale de la concession 15 ans, renouvelable par periodes de 5 ans, tous les 5 ans.
I i
*
SiTaRAI
a
TRANSPORT FERROVIAIRE
rrE PERSOtNNE;i [-f )E MRARCHAN4 DES
111-3 Presentation de la Societe Internationale de Transports
Africains par Rail (SITARAIL):
l2
REPARTITION FUTURE DU CAPITAL DE SITARAIL
(5 Milliards de F.CFA)
PERSONNEL
3,00%
Ci
15,00%
_
lll
_
SAGA/SDV
42,88%
TRANSURB
4,02%
MAERSK
5,36%
---
SYSTRA
6,70%
-
GIP
8,04%
TRANS$PORT FERROVIAME
Dr-, PER( SCNNE3 [E')E MARCHANIDSES
Quelques Resultats:
Tableau 1: Trafic marchandises:
94/95
Effectif
Tonnage
SICF/SCFB
SITARAIL
Projet hyp haute
Projet hyp basse
3 200
95/96
Effectif Tonnage
96/97
Effectif
Tonnage
305 000
1850
1815
1815
486 000
499 000
504 000
1850
1815
1815
568 000
589 000
540 000
Tableau 2: Trafic voyageurs:
95/96
Voyageurs
(000 vk)
Realisation
410 000
161 000
Prevision Projet
357 750
125 200
96/97
Realisation
Prevision Projet
405 000
477 257
158 000
167 000
TRANSPORT FERRO'vWRE
:DE
PERSFONNES E DE MARCHMSES
IV RETOMBEES POUR L'ECONOMIE IVOIRIENNE
IV-1 Les atouts du chemin de fer
- Au dela de 300 Km, le chemin de fer est plus competitif que la route pour l'acheminement des
produits pondereux;
- Permet 1'evacuation de tonnage important par la composition de trains blocs (hydrocarbures,
conteneurs, etc....);
- Plus de securite et de respect pou'r 1'environnement compare a la route.
TRAISPORT FERROVIAJRE
DE PFERSOtNNE.S EI )DEMARCHANDISES
IV-2 Retombees directes
La mise en concession du reseau ferroviaire a permis:
* De preserver 1100 emplois en Cote d'lvoire dans l'immediat,
* D'accroltre la competitivite du port d'Abidjan,
* De reporter des trafics de I'axe routier revetu nord-sud sur le chemin
de fer
=> Economies substantielles en matiere d'entretien,
de renforcement et de construction de
routes neuves;
* D'eviter une flambee des tarifs de transport routier de l'ordre de 20%
(Cf. 'Interet
economique du transport ferroviaire sur I'axe Abidjan/Kaya' CFD-1990)
qui se produirait
si le chemin de fer venait a cesser ses activites;
* De supprimer les concours financiers de l'etat
- Confiance des bailleurs de fonds a la privatisation: Financement du
PIU a hauteur de 37
milliards. (marches directs passees dans le cadre du PIU avec entreprises
locales a la
date d'auiourd'hui; 2.455.000.000 F.ICFAI
WF
~~TRANSPRT FERROVIARE
DE PERSONNES E1 JDE MARCHANDSES
IV-3 Retombees indirectes
Strategies de SITARAIL: Faire du transport des personnes et des marchandises son activite
principale et sous-traiter tous les travaux annexes a cette activite.
S/traitance des travaux de mecanique, de genie civil et d'entretien du parc par les
entreprises locales (AFRIRAIL, GEMA, GTF, EIC, etc ....... ).
=-AFRIRAIL et GEMA enregistrent deja un chiffre d'affaire cumule d'environ 500 millions de
F.CFA par an avec SITARAIL.
S/traitance des travaux de voie et de la maintenance des engins a l'etude.
Session 5
i
I
i
i
i
i
Session 6
I
RAILWAY CONCESSIONING IN AFRICA:
AN INVESTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Henry Posner III
Chairman
N0 C
sJ J
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
~CORPORATION
381 Mansfield Avenue, Suite 500
Pittsburgh, PA 15220 U.S.A.
Phone: 412/928-0777
Fax: 412/928-7715
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
Theme
Africa's railways are diverse in terms of markets and assets. However,
in financial terms the structural fundamentals are the same. A major
opportunity is therefore to build from the diverse, and often expensive,
lessons recently learned in the USA and Latin America. Conversely, a
major risk is to misinterpret those lessons.
World Bank Railway Seminar
Coast
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
~~~~~~~2
H
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
CORPOATION
*
Background on RDC
*
Successful Restructuring Has Been Driven by Marketing...
*
... Conversely, Misreading the Market Has Led to Expensive Mistakes
*
Africa's Freight Rail Markets Are Fundamentally Sound ...
*
... Making Concessioning Preferable to Commercialization
*
Afiica Will Support Market-specific Private Sector Solutions
*
... However, Many Transactions Will Require Public Investment to Attract Private Investment
*
Results of Concessioning to Date Have Been Mixed ...
*
... And Future Transactions Are Also Likely to Have Mixed Results
*
Conclusions
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
...
H
RAILROAD
ECORPOVLTION
Background on RDC - Businesses
Pittsburgh -based railway investment & management company
Unique in its focus on privatization in the Developing World.
IOWA INTERSTATE RAILROAD
* 1,000 km of former Rock Island trackage between Chicago and Omaha (August 1991).
* Provider of Information Systems to railways in the USA, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and South Africa.
* Host to Management Groups from Latin America, Africa, Asia.
BUENOS AIRES AL PACIFICO
SAN MARTIN
S.A.
* 5,500 km of former Ferrocarriles Argentinos between Buenos Aires and Mendoza (August 1993).
IA
FERROCARRIL
Xs MESOPOTAMICO
General Urquiza S.A.
* 2,500 km of former Ferrocarriles Argentinos between Buenos Aires and Uruguay, Brazil and
Paraguay (October 1993).
TRANSACTIONS IN PROCESS
* Guatemala (Awarded June 1997)
* Chile (Arica - La Paz) (Awarded July 1997)
Background on RDC - Philosophy
Railway aspects are not the most important structural element.
(Descending importance)
1. Committed Seller
2. Transparent, Disciplined Bid Process
3. Local Partners
4. Management Investment
5. Marketing (Revenue)
6. Technical (Costs)
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
5
fE~Em
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Successful Restructuring Has Been Driven By Marketing,.,
EXAMPLES
PHASE I
SURVIVAL
. Identify Core Markets
(Europe)
. Reconfigure A:ssets around Core Markets
PHASE II
GROWITH
(Latin America)
. Build Core Markets
Rolling Stock Allocation
Facilities Rationalization
* Separate Assets Unrelated to Core Markets Excess Property
Social Services
. Attract Investment
* Develop Incremental Markets
PHASE III
PROSPERITY
. Develop Strategic Alliances
(USA)
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory
Coast
Ivory Coast_6
Abidjan,
14 October 1997
Freight vs. Passenger
Block Train vs. Carload Freight
Volume growth
Yield Growth
Rehabilitate Assets
Working Capital
Marginal Traffic
Service-Sensitive Traffic
Multimodal Transportation
Connecting Railways
H
,
J
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
.0. Conversely, Misreading the Market Has Led to
Expensive Mistakes
Examples
Bankruptcies in the USA are typically due
to revenue shortfalls, not cost overruns.
CM&W (USA)
Charterail (UK)
Overoptimistic Bids are often driven by the
auction process to introduce fixed costs
(acquisition debt, capital investment) that
are not sustainable by the market.
CC&P (USA)
FEPSA (Argentina)
Wasted Investment - Investments in assets
to serve markets that shift, disappear or are
illusory.
Conrail Electrification (USA)
Speedlink (UK)
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan,
Ivory Coast
Abidjan,
Octoery
coa9CORPORATION
14 October 1997
7
H
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
The Fundamentals of Africa's Freight Railways
Are Sound . .
REVENUE
COSTS
Southern
Africa
USA
Europe
Latin
America
. Competition
Other RR
Other RR
Truck
Truck
* Market Share
Mature
Mature
Low
Medium
* Traffic Base
Mature
Mature
Expanding
Reviving
Infrastructure
Good
Excellent
Fair
Fair
* Rolling Stock
Good
Excellent
Poor
Fair
* Staffing
Low
High
High
High
* Railway Capital
M arkets
Mature
Emerging
Emerging
Minimal
*
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
8
H
RAILROAD
CDVELOPM ENT
. . Making Concessioning Preferable to
Commercialization
Financing
Political Sensitivity
Focus
Management Stake
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
COMMERCIALIZATION
CONCESSIONING
Public
High
Internal (Process)
Private
Low
External (Customer)
Investment
Salary
n
RAILROAD
CORPORATION
DEL
Africa Will Support Market-Specific Private
Sector Solutions
Se.
Market
Objective
Market Response
Example
Urban Passenger
Minimize Subsidy
Operator Bidding
Intercity/Rural Passenger
Minimize Subsidy
Operator Bidding
FEMESA (Argentina)
UK Passenger Franchises
Trem do Prata (Brazil)
Core Freight
Maxim-iize Purchase/ Operator Bidding
Lease Price
Light Density Freight
Maximize Purchase/
Lease Price
Operator Bidding
International Freight
Divert Truck Traffic
Inter-RR Cooperation Interline Traffic (USA)
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
Conrail (USA)
New Zealand Rail
Regional Railroads (USA)
BAP/FMGU (Argentina)
RD
RAILROAD
CORPORATION
... However, Many Transactions Will Probably Require Public
Investment to Attract Private Investment
Example: "Smaller" Latin Freight Railways
Capital Needs
Colombia
Track
Equipment
X
X
Costa Rica
Market Constraints
Terminals
l
Traffic
Haul
Potential
l
X
X
X
X
X____X__
Guatemala
Jamaica
Panama
X
X
X
X
X
Paraguay
X
Service
Suspended
l_l_
l
X
Ecuador
X
X
X
x
X
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
Length of
__
X
X
X
X
1
11
nfn
DOAD
RAILR
CORPORATION
Results of Concessioning to Date Have Been
Mixed . .
Examples
POSITIVE
Operating Performance
Investment Programs
Traffic Increases
Lower Tariffs
Argentina - BAP, FR, NCA
Argentina, Chile
Argentina
All
*
Traffic Shortfalls
Few Bidders
Argentina - FEPSA
Argentina - I or 2 each
Bolivia - I each
Chile- I
Brazil - 1 to 3 each
Mexico - 1 to 2 each
*
Premature Liquidations/Suspensions
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Guatemala
*
Political Interference
Pakistan
New York
*
*
*
*
NEGATIVE
*
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
, 2
12CORPORTION
R
*
RAILROAD
DEVEL OPMENT
...
And Future Transactions Are Also Likely to Have
Mixed Results
Examples
POSITIVE
. Efficiency of Railways
All
* Capital Markets' Interest
Argentina - BAP Equipment
Brazil - Strong Bidders
* Strength of Macro Economies
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
NEGATIVE
* Sellers' Expectations
Bolivia
* New Entrants' Over-optimism
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
Mexico/Nicaragua/Guatemala/
Costa Rica "Dry Canal"
A
v
13
H
J J
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Conclusions
Positive
higher.
* Afiican railways compete with trucks, not other railways, therefore margins are potentially
* African railways serve reviving economies, have market share upside.
* African railways' cost structure presents much room for improvement.
Negative
* Many African lines present revenue risk due to lack of meaningful historic trends
in Africa
* Difficulty in obtaining debt financing due to lack of experience in financing railways
Other
* Marketing is even more important than cost reduction
will not be
* Commercialization is not a substitute for concessioning, as those leading the process
disciplined by having investment risk.
restructuring), as
* Africa can look to the USA and Latin America, for positive experience (marketing,
well as expensive mistakes to avoid (asset allocation, finance).
World Bank Railway Seminar
Abidjan, Ivory Coast
14 October 1997
14
14
nln n
Ll
11 EE.
RAILROAD
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION TOPICS
WORLD BANK SEMINAR ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST
OCTOBER 1997
Previously, Mr.Kogan of Mercer Mgt. aptly summarized
the
concessioning process in Latin America. The level of
public support
expressed in terms of ton km's and passengers carried,
indicates a
successful result. The historic trendline of declining
output levels
was halted, new investments in infrastructure were facilitated,
and
the issue of labor productivity and transition protection
were
also
directly addressed.
The process has resulted in some general how to principles
developed overtime. From the stand point of a potential
the following points should be considered for a smooth operator
bidding
process and startup:
1.
Stick to the plan and timetable originally express
to
the public.
Delays in the process should only be considered when
a1i registered
parties feel that a delay or change will materially improve
some
aspect of the transaction.
2.
Minimize time from decision date to date of
takeover.
This intermediate time period is extremely risky. During
this
period the existing administration is in a lame-duck
status.
The
historic work flow and purchasing cycles however good
or
bad
to come to a near stand still, generally accelerating deferred tend
maintenance and other operating problems.
3. The new operator must be given the operational
latitude to implement new rules and procedures in the
field.
A common pitfall is the divergence between the policy level where
changes form an integral part of the process versus the regulatory
and bureaucratic level where any change may be subject to
potentially difficult and exhaustive delays.
4. It is generally not desirable to divide control of the
Right of Way from the transportation function.
Capital requirements and their impact on operational procedures
are not easily divisible. Operational rules and standards are
interactive among tracks, signals, and the trains that are operated
over them. If one party cannot control all aspects, the solution
could be a higher projected level of fees for the unknown as well as
potentially excess capital spending.
5. The project must -be of a magnitude to cover certain
threshold costs.
Subdivision of large scale project into pieces to stimulate future
competition is desirable. The key is to insure that each component
has critical mass.
6. The government and concessionaire to some extent
should view one another as partners. Therefore. variable
fees should be factored into the compensation scheme if
possible.
High fixed fees at startup only add to immediate cash needs at the
same time when startup costs are at a high point for training,
inventory buildup, and initial capital programs.
2.
7. Short term traffic goals must be realistic.
that is don't
expect immediate sweeping imDrovement
without
reasonable lead times.
Frequently, at takeover time, the operation is
of physical constraints. Capital programs take at capacity in terms
and deliver results. In addition, the shipping time to implement
must be sold" on the idea that the railroad canor traveling public
reliable service. This implies a period of test supply long term
public to build a base of customer satisfaction evaluations by the
before significant
commitments are made on the part of the shippers
or passengers.
8.
Labor issues must be addressed immediately.
Labor must know the policies and man power
requirements of the
new operator. Failure to provide timely information
misinformation. Once this occurs unfounded rumors will lead to
can lead to
polarized attitudes and potentially dangerous
almost no acts of sabotage have occurred in theactions. To date
privatization
process in Latin America.
Clear procedures must be established for employees
that will
matriculate to the new company as well as for
current
employees
who will be subject to protective labor condition
payments.
3.
iI
iI
i
PERSPECTIVES DES OPERATEURS FERROVIAIRES
ET DES INVESTISSEURS
LE POINT DE VUE DE SAGA
1- Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le Pr6sident, Mesdames,
Messieurs, mon
experience, quoique encore r6cente, de ma participation
a ce type de s6minaires
m'a montr6 que, trop souvent,
* les intervenants ne traitaient pas toujours le sujet demand6,
mais parfois un autre
sujet;
*
leur expos6 d6passait presque toujours le temps imparti;
* enfin, plus que la pr6sentation faite par l'orateur, c'est
avant tout les 6changes
116s au jou des questions/r6ponses, a l'issue de 1'expos6,
qul se r6v6lalent
les plus Int6ressants pour I'auditoire.
Je m'efforcerai, par consequent, d'etre bref et concret,
l'occasion d'aborder ce sujet devant certains d'entre vous, d'autant que j'ai d6ja eu
vous proposant plut6t de
m'interroger ensuite dans le cadre de cette table ronde.
2 - L'an dernier, en effet, a l'occasion du s6minaire a Reperes
)),organis6 par l'UIC
a Rabat, traitant sensiblement du meme sujet, je m'6tais
alors
efforc6, dans un
expose probablement trop " th6orique ,', d'analyser
les diff6rentes motivations
d'une entreprise privee pour s'int6resser aux mises
en concession de lignes
de chemin de for. C'est ainsi que, dans un premier temps,
je n'avais pas distingue
entre l'lnvestisseur pur directement interess6 a la rentabilite
de ses capitaux, le
prestataire de services, pour qui c'est une opportunite
pour
d6velopper ses
activit6s, le fournisseur d'6quipements qui entend accroltre
son
chiffre
d'affaires,
enfin le chargeur dont l'approche s'apparen.e a celle
d'un
utilisateur
directement
int6resse a la qualit6 du service en meme temps qu'a sa
p6rennite
On
voit
ainsi que
les motivations peuvent beaucoup diff6rer selon les
partenaires
priv6s.
Et je
crois qu'au sein de celte table ronde ceote diversite est partiellement
repr6sent6e,
de
m6me qu'on la rencontre souvent au sein des groupements
qui
se
constituent
pour
repondre aux propositions de mise en concession actuelle
de r6seaux ferroviaires.
je m'en tiendrais
3 - Fidele, cependant, a mon engagement d'etre bref et concret,auquel j'appartiens
aujourd'hui a l'approche sp6cifique du Groupement SAGA,
au sein de
depuis 5 ans, et qui, a cet titre, conduit le Groupe des repreneurs a la mise en
SITARAIL, de meme que nous nous interessons tout particulierement
et, a un degr6
concession des chemins de fer du Cameroun (REGIFERCAM),
chef de file), a celle du
cgmoindre )) (c'est Ldire que nous ne pr6tendons pas etre
processus amorc6s au
reseau de I'OCTRA au Gabon, tandis que nous suivons les
Congo (CFCO) et pour le Dakar/Bamako.
ferroviaires que j'ai
Des 4 types de partenaires prives interess6s aux concessions
a la derniere
repertories prec6demment, SAGA appartient, incontestablement,
des
cons6quent,
par
categorie, c'est-a-dire a celle des chargeurs et,
ma
de
la promotion
utilisateurs/clients. Je ne suis pas la, bien sur, pour faire
d'une
au travers
societe mais seulement pour exposer notre approche, illustr6e de SITARAIL. Je
celle
premiere experience, abondamment cit6e dans ce seminaire,
donn6es essentielles
me contenterais donc de rappeler, rapidement, quelqioes puisque j'appartiens
sur SAGA, partiellement transposables d'ailleurs a SDV, d'Exploltation des
desormais a une filiale commune & ces 2 groupe, la Soci6t6
cependant largement
Chemins de Fer Africains (SECAF), o'u nous sommes
directe la oCu
majoritaires, alors que, par ailleurs, SAGA et SDV sont en concurrence
elles exercent les memes m6tiers.
En effet, SAGA a pour principaux m6tiers de base:
* d'une part, la commission de transport et le transit International;
- shipping o ou de la
* d'autre part, les services portuaires, ceux-ci allant du
l'entreposage;
fonction d'agence de ligne jusqu'& la manutention et a
de surface (routiers,
* enfin, la logistique au sens large ainsi que les transports
ferroviaires et fluviaux).
place d'excellence
Sur chacun de ces creneaux, SAGA soefforce d'occuper une
dont la presse a
al6as
sur les trafics nord/sud, en France, avec parfois quelques
implantations
rendu compte en son temps, comme en Afrique, oiu nos premibres
est d6pendante,
remontent A 1929. C'est dire, par cons6quent, & quel point SAGA
l'ensemble du
de
et
africains
ports
en particulier, de la bonne exploitation des
tant pour y faire
r6seau de transports terrestres qui permet de les Irriguer, et de matieres
affluer le fret, essentiellement constituA de produits de base des armements
premieres, destine a l'exportation et charge sur les naviresI'hinterland, et en
maritimes que nous repr6sentons, que pour 6vacuer vers
particulier les pays enclaves, les marchandises g6nerales importees.
2
4 - Quiconque s'est interesse a l'histoire des chemins
de fer en Afrique, et a leur
situation pr6sente au sein des economies nationales,
sait que ceux-ci:
* ont longtemps Wt6 la seule voie d'acces, a partir
des ports, vers l'int6rieur du
continent, meme si desormais ils sont largement concurrenc6s
par la route;
* sont particulibrement bien adapt6s a la nature
des trafics et des flux de
marchandises transitant par les ports;
* souffrent, par contre, de dysfonctionnements de
plus en plus nombreux dont
une des principales causes r6side dans une absence
d'investissements
conduisant & une degradation prononc6e de l'outil ferroviaire.
SAGA, pr6sente dans tous les grands ports de l'Ouest
africain ainsi que ceux
d'Afrique Centrale tout en ayant des filiales tres actives
dans
les pays de l'int6rieur
(Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Tchad, Centrafrique....) s'est
ainsi
retrouv6e
confront6e
& la carence des soci6t6s de chemins de fer, incapables
d'acheminer
l'ensemble
du fret que nous manutentionnons dans les ports ou,
alors
dans
des
conditions
inacceptables pour nos clients : d6lais prohibitifs,
pertes
ou
vols de
marchandises, d6gradations diverses...Mon role
ici
n'est
pas
d'analyser
les
causes diverses de ces dysfonctionnements ni meme
des
meilleurs
moyens
d'y
rem6dier, ces sujets ayant d6ja ete trait6s par ailleurs.
Par
contre,
SAGA,
comme
SDV, figurant au rang de premiers clients de nombreux
r6seaux ferroviaires ne
pouvait, par consequent, se desinteresser de leur sort
alors meme qu'une 6volution
institutionnelle radicale, au travers d'une mise en concession
ou d'un affermage,
semblait se dessiner pour certains d'entre eux.
5 - En effet, outre la n6cessit6 absolue pour SAGA
de
cette modification du mode de gestion, il en r6sulterait s'assurer qu'au travers de
la qualite des services offerts, et par consequent de laune r6elle am6lioration de
satisfaction de nos clients,
la mise en concession de certains r6seaux ferroviaires
excellente opportunit strat6gique en nous permettant offrait a SAGA une
l'ensemble des maillons de la chaine de transport, nous de mieux maftriser
assurant de conforter a
la fois 2 axes forts de notre strat6gie globale:
d'une part, renforcer nos (4 filieres produits )) (bois,
consistant a specialiser certaines filiales et certains cafe, cacao, coton...),
ports a ces trafics tres
sp6cifiques;
3
a bout )) visant a assurer
* d'autre part, d6velopper une strategle de 4(bout
traitement eventuel,
l'ensemble des prestations de logistique (stockage,de garantir a nos clients
acheminement, transport, manutention et livraison...) afin
la qualite des prestations offertes.
De ces choix, nous attendions, par consequent,
a l'import comme a
* d'abord, un accroissement de nos parts de march6s,
le mode ferroviaire, et
l'export, grace en particulier a la confiance retrouv6e dans
a une plus grande satisfaction de nos clients et armateurs;
sein des 6conomies
* ensuite, un rentorcement de nos positions au partenaires majeurs, en
nationales, oCu nous comptons nous affirmer comme
particulier par l'importance des investissements consentis;
plus a politiques ), dans la
* enfin, sur les moyen et long termes, des retomb6es
d'un service public ne
mesure ou la reussite d'operations de mise en concession
des Autorites et des
peut que renforcer notre image de marque vis a vis
principaux acteurs 6conomiques des Etats concernes.
proposais d'etre bref et
6 - J'ai precise, en introduction de cet expose, que je me
d'ajouter que, dans cette
concret. Neanmoins, pour etre complet, je me dois
approche:
maximum de chargeurs,
* nous souhaltons associer a notre entreprise le
nous consid6rons, en
fer:
nationaux et Internatlonaux, de ces chemins de
reprenant les propos de
effet, qu'il n'est de meilleurs actionnaires (ou, du moins, que les clients de ces
la CFD prononc6s ici meme hier, de moins mauvais...) de transparence de
m6mes soci6t6s, la pluralit de ceux-ci 6tant synonyme
la gestion et de dynamisme de l'exploitation;
sur le d6veloppement du
* dans ce but, nous fondons ainsi beaucoup daespoir
les r6seaux
multimodal : chacun sait qu'en particulier, en Afrique francophone,
le
interdisant
achev6s,
et6
ferroviaires des diffrents pays concern6s n'ont jamais
alors,
moins
du
que,
;
maillage initialement pr6vu par la puissance colonisatrice
du transport
cet handicap Initial soit desormals source de d6veloppement choisies et
multimodal en permettant, a partir de gares soigneusement
desservir de nouveaux
pr6alablement equipees de terminaux adaptes, de
en cours ou en projet en
territoires grace au transport combin6. Cela est deja
au depart de FERKE
CMte d'lvoire et au Burkina Faso, vers le Mali en particulier,
nous entendons
et de BOBO DIOULASSO, de meme qu'au Cameroun,
a partir de
Centrafrique
la
d6velopper les liaisons vers le Tchad et
NGAOUNDERE et NGAOUNDAL;
4
* cette recherche d'alliances a, cependant, ses
limites: prenant des risques
financiers importants, que ce soit au travers des
parts de capital des futures
societ6s concessionnaires comme dans la souscription
acqu6rir le mat6riel ferroviaire ou a r6habiliter celui-ci des emprunts destin6s a
et les infrastructures fixes,
nous entendons, en contrepartie, assumer la
responsabilit6
entiere de la
gestion des reseaux que nous nous proposons
de reprendre, du moins ceux
ou nous sommes parmi les premiers clients. Si
j'ai dit precedemment que la
reussite de ces operations ne pouvait qu'avoir d'heureuses
consequences pour
nos filiales implant6es sur place, la r6ciproque est
tout
aussi vraie: tout echec
serait d6sastreux pour un Groupe implante en
Afrique
ans, dont il tire une large part de ses resultats, et depasserait depuis pres de 70
bien 6videmment le
cadre des seuls Etats concern6s ; nous n'avons donc
pas le droit & 1'erreur !
* nous entendons, d'ailleurs, tout autant associer
suivi de 1'exploitation ferroviaire, sous la seule Etat(s) et Personnel au
reserve que nous soit
cependant garantie la libert6 de gestion commerciale,
c'est-a-dire la libre
definition du plan de transport, tout comme la
liberte tarifaire, sans pour
autant exclure, bien 6videmment, d'eventuelles obligations
de service public,
trait6es alors dans le cadre de conventions sp6cifiques.
Dans ce dernier cas, il s'agira, le plus souvent, surtout
Bien que cela ne corresponde pas aux m6tiers de basede transports de voyageurs.
avons su montrer jusqu'alors que nous n'en r6cusions de SAGA, je crois que nous
qu'il me paraisse difficile, en Afrique comme ailleurs, nullement le principe, bien
d'y gagner beaucoup d'argent
tandis que la qualite du service exige, aussi bien
pour la voie que les gares et, a
fortiori, le materiel roulant, en rench6rit singulierement
les couts, d'autant que la
couverture des risques exige, en outre, de solides assurances.
7 - Ayant ainsi, du moins je l'espere, explicite l'int6ret
limites, de groupes tels que le notre pour ces mises en meme temps que ses
en concession de reseaux
ferroviaires ainsi que les principales regles que
nous souhaitons lier a notre
intervention dans de tels processus, je me propose
maintenant de r6pondre a
vos eventuelles questions.
5
de parole qui m'est
Je souhaite, auparavant, cependant mettre a profit ce bref temps cher. En effet, nous
alloue pour appeler votre attention sur un dernier point qui m'est sous la plume des
entendons dire ici ou la, ou nous voyons dans la presse, est faite pour 6tre
journalistes presentes comme autoris6s, qu'une c4convention
permanent avec les
ren6goci6e ),. Si nous sommes partisans du dialogue
Organisations
instances concern6es, Autorites de tutelle, Soci6t6s de Patrimoine,
fructueux,
d'echanges
representatives du personnel, sans lequel il ne peut y avoir
impr6vues, j'ai la
d'ameliorations permanentes ou de prise en compte de contraintes
partenaires priv6s,
faiblesse, cependant, de croire qu'on ne saurait exiger des
a politiques ",
(financiers,
amends a prendre des risques importants
concurrentiel,
commerciaux) pour reprendre et gerer, dans un contexte pleinement en outre, a la
des entreprises de transport initialement delabrees, qu'ils renoncent,
leurs simulations
garantie que le cadre institutionnel sur lequel ils ont 6tabli et a respecter la
soit du moins respect6. Habitues a tenir nos engagements
d'attendre la reciprocite
signature donnee, il me semble que nous sommes en droitl'lnstance de suivi de la
que
de nos partenaires, 6tant entendu bien evidemment
permanents et
Convention de Concession doit demeurer un organisme d'echanges
ferroviaire.
de concertation au profit exclusif du d6veloppement du transport
a nos yeux: on ne fait
Quelques mots ultimes, aussi evidents que fondamentaux,
soclaux, A ce titre,
pas une <oprivatisation )) contre le personnel, et les aspects
d'un dialogue
nous apparaissent donc primordiaux, que ce soit dans l'instauration commune de
recherche
permanent avec les repr6sentants et la Direction, dans la
de la sousdeveloppement
le
solutions alternatives, dans le suivi du plan social,
puisque lui
finale
traitance..., tout en laissant, cependant, au repreneur, la decision
ferroviaire. A.
seul, ensuite, supporte les risques economiques de l'exploitation
parfaitement illustr6
THIAM, hier, au travers de I'exemple de SITARAIL, a, je crois,
notre approche en ce domaine.
et Monsieur avoir
J'espere, Monsieur le Ministre, Monsieur le President, Mesdames
d'un Groupe prive tel
ainsi r6pondu a votre attente en vous exposant le point de vue
des chemins de
que SAGA, principal acteur actuellement des mises en concession
d6sormais a votre
fer en Afrique. Souhaitant ne pas avoir et6 trop long, je me tiens
disposition pour repondre a d'eventuelles questions.
6
000 I/PDG/347-97
SOFRETU
SOFRERAIL
SEMINAIRE CONCESSIONS DES CHEMINS DE FER
ABIDJAN 13/14 OCTOBRE 1997
Resumne le l'intervention (le P.L ROCHET, Prisident(le SYSTRA,
(lurantIa
Table Rondle * Perspectivespour les investisseurs et opdrateurs
4'
QUELLES SONT LES RAISONS POUR SYSTRA D'ETRE
INTERESSEE PAR
UNE CONCESSION DE CHEMIN DE FER ?
-
Comme operateur : c'est la vocation et le m6tier de SYSTRA,
qui est issue de la
fusion de SOFRERAIL et de SOFRETU, et est dlonc Line ingenierie
de transports
ferroviaires et urbains, A forte culture de concepteur-exploitant,
adoss6e A 2 grands
exploitants francais: la SNCF (chemins de fer) et la RATP
(exploitant urbain a Paris
de metros, tramways et bus). Ceci donne A SYSTRA une forte
capacit6 d'initervention
en exploitation et d'appui tecluhique (ces 2 exploitants regroupent
au total 200 000
personnes). A ceci s'ajoutent si n6cessaire les ressources
nord-aniricaines de
CANARAIL et de SYSTRA USA, du meme Groupe.
L'interet de SYSTRA est de mettre en place du personnel
en management
d'exploitation et de fonrer le personnel de la societe exploitante en
vue d'une op6ration
efficace et AcoCit minimum.
Comine investisseur: il est demand6 en g6n6ral A SYSTRA d'etre
investisseur (ce qui
n'est pas sa vocation), le conc6dzat estimant souvent qtue l'op6rateur
technique de
reference doit participer au capital, ceci etanit destine Adiminuer
le risque opr&ationnel.
QUELLES SONT LES CONDITIONS A REMPLIR PAR
LE PROJET POUR
ETRE INVESTISSEUR?
Credibilite:
. politique le consenisus est necessaire,
. tecluhique: le projet doit etre coherent avec l'environinienient g6n6ral
du pays. et d'etre
bien formule tecliniqueiiient,
. financi&re : retour satisfaisaint sur investissemenit pour le concessionniaire,
et
rentabilit6 socio-6conomiqLue pour le conc6dant.
Equilibre:
. dans la repartition des responsabilites,
. dans la repartition des risques.
L'exp6rience montre que les concessionls ou les BOT d6s6quilibr6s
dans ce domaine ne
se font pas ou conduisent Ades situations malheureuses.
0001/PDG/347-97
-
Durabilite:
Une concession avant une duree de 15 a 40 aiis environ, le partenariat public-prive doit
etre equilibre stir la dur6e.
La presence d'un exploitant solide est n6cessaire, y compris lors de la definition du
projet, et pour la duree de la concession.
LES SCHEMAS PEUVENT ETRE VARIABLES ET ADAPTES
. Concessionnaire compreinant l'exploitant.
* Concessionnaire conitractant avec une societe exploitanite.
. Exploitalt contractant avec uine ou des societes de mainlteniance.
comozor
COMPANY PROFILE
AND
CAPACITY STATEMENT
OF
COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
(Registration Number: 95/01226/07)
a private company with limited liability and incorporated
in terms of the Company Law of the
Republic of South Africa
comazor
The address of Comazar's Head Office
is:
Physical Address
Comazar (Proprietary) Limited
Room 810
222 Smit Street
Braamfontein
Johannesburg
South Africa
Postal Address
Comazar (Proprietary) Limited
Room 810
222 Smit Street
Private Bag X47
Johannesburg, 2000
South Africa
Tel. No. (27) (11) 773-3003
Fax. No. (27) (11) 773-2846
comazar
COMAZAR'S OBJECTS
Comazar's objects are to operate rail networks and
provide ancillary services and any other transport
related business either directly or through joint venture
companies.
COMPANY PROFILE
AND
ACTIVITIES
COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA
has a 51 % shareholding in its subsidiary; ((Societe Interregionale
Zairoise du Rail (SIZARAIL)>> which is a private company registered
in Zaire.
SIZARAIL has been operating the Southem rail network of O.C.S.
(Office de Chemins de Fer du Sud) and.the Eastem rail network of
S.F.E. (Societe du Chemin de Fer de l Est) in Zaire since 1 July
1995. The rail network being operated by Sizarail in Zaire comprises
3 500 km of track including 800 km of electrified track.
Sizarail also operates the Port of llebo on the Kasai River in Zaire,
the Port of Kalemie on Lake Tanganyika and the Port of Kindu as
well as the cornidor, Kindu - Ubundu - Kisangani in the North-East in
Zaire.
has completed a study for the Ressano Garcia - Maputo corridor in
Mozambique, Southem Africa, on appointment by Spoomet, for the
purpose of becoming involved at a later stage in the operations on
that project.
has entered into a agreement with a successful Coal mining
concessionaire of Australia for the exploitation of the Moatize coal
mine in Mozambique and has completed the first part of
transportation feasibility studies for the coal concessionaire with the
purpose of operating the coal traffic by rail via the most economical
rail route to a port in Mozambique.
has secured with ((Interafrica Railway Corporation Ltd> the 20 year
concession in favour of ((Interafrica Railway Corporation (Tanzania)
Ltd)) to construct and operate a container transfer terminal on the
Tazara line at Kidatu and to operate trains between Kidatu and
Mwanza on the Tanzania Railways Corporation's (T.R.C.) network.
((lnterafrica Railway Corporation (Tanzania) Ltd) will be operational
to promote unit container trains Northbound from Johannesburg,
South Africa through Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and via the
Kidatu project across Lake Victoria to Kampala, (Uganda) and also
Southbound container traffic.
was preselected in 1996 and is leader of the Consortium with
((Geodis International)) and ((C.F.D.)) of France and ((Transurb
Consult)> of Belgium in the bidding for the concessioning and
privatization of the National Railways of Cameroon, <<Regifercam>>.
Comazar lodged the Technical Proposal of its Consortium at the end
of November 1996 and the financial offer in September 1997.
has submitted studied of railways to the Govemment of Congo
(Brazzaville) and was pre-qualified in 1997 to tender for the
privatization of the railways (C.F.C.O.) in Congo (Brazzaville).
COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN PAKISTAN
partook in the bidding for the RECO- Oil Train project in Pakistan at
the end of 1996 in the consortium with ((C.P.C.S.>> of Canada,
((Marubeni)) of Japan and ((GM (Pakistan))) and await the outcome
of negotiations.
COMAZAR ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL
Ferroeste Project: Paraguay - Cascavel - Curitiba - Port of
Paranagua
com azar
has studied the sourcing of rolling stock and operational staff and
operating of the Ferroeste Project in Brazil.
The Ferroeste Project comprises a '30 year concession for:
a.
The operating of the new section Guarapuava - Cascavel (250
km) that has been completed earlier in 1996 and in need of the
sourcing of locomotives, wagons and staff and the operating of
this section. The traffic potential amounts to 4,5 million tons per
year.
b.
The operating of the terminal at Cascavel.
c.
The operating of the Cascavel - Paraguay section (150 km) to be
constructed.
d.
The operating of the traffic generated from Cascavel on the
existing RFFSA section Cascavel - Curitiba - Port of Paranagua
and with back loads which amounts 1,3 million tons per year.
The Group that won the bid for the Sub-concession from Ferroeste in
December 1996 namely:
*
*
*
FAO ENDREEMOIMENTOS E PARTICIPACOES LTDA:
A subsidiary of -Interfinance Bankw of Brazil.
GEMON GERAL DE ENGENHARIA E MONTAGENS S.A:
A subsidiary of -M.P.E.- of Brazil.
POUND S.A.,
A subsidiary of -Banco Euroinvest S.A.- of Brazil
with COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY LIMITED)
will create a concessionaire company in Brazil before 9 February 1997
with each party holding 25 % in the voting capital. Comazar will operate
the project for the concessionaire company.
COMPANY STRUCTURE
72,
Transnet
Limited
Limited
(South Africa)
(lrqInd)
165 %
100 %
SPOORNET DO
ITD/CSAP/UTIL
BRASIL
INTERFERREA
Servicos Ferroviarios
e Intermodias S.A.
|
(Brasil)
114%
21 %
COMAZAR
(South Africa)
GEMON
GMN
20 %
2%
25 %
7%
FAO_
1
POUN
Garanta
42,5 %
42,5 %
12,5% I 87,5%
Ferrovia Centro
Atlantica
FCA
(Brasil)
80%
7,5 %
7,5 %
20%
INTERFERREA
LOGISTICA
S.A.
(Brasil)
55,2%
48,8%
Ferrovia Sul
Atlantica
Spoornet Tragao
S.A.
FSA
(Brasil)
(Brasil)
(rsl
MIBA
333%
eans
25 %
FERROVIA
PARANA
S.A.
(Brasil)
|
-d ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Africal
51 %
33,3 %
F
I
MICOR
%
10 %
BCZ
Ralph
Judori
Railtex
CSN
CVRD
MPE
SNCC
SIZARAIL
S.A.R.L.
(Congo (DRC))
TRANS AFRICA
RAILWAY
CORPORATION
TANZANIA LIMITED
(Tanzania)
DESCRIPTION OF COMAZAR'S SHAREHOLDERS
The incorporation of Comazar (Proprietary) Limited, a private company with limited liability
registered in South Africa, was the result of the joint venture entered into by its principle
shareholders, Transnet Limited and Transurb Consult, that combined their resources and
capabilities.
TTransnet Limited
is a public company, registered in South Africa and operates through
its divisions and subsidiaries in the transport and logistical markets.
Transnet s rail transport activities are handled by Spoomet the railway
division.
Spoometoperates 35 000 kilometres of rail network in South Africa of
which 6 560 kilometres are electrified.
Spoometowns a fleet of 142 000 rail wagons, 1 410 diesel and 2 092
electrical locomotives and handles 164 million tonnes of freight per
annum. Spoomet also owns and operates 14 000 containers.
Spoornet is a founder member of the Intemational Heavy Haul
Association (IHHA) and a participant since its inception in 1982.
Spoomelis renowned for the operations on its heavy haul export lines
namely Richards Bay Coal Line (60 million tons per year) and the
Sishen-Saldanha Iron Ore Line (20 million tons per year) which was
valued by Mercer Consulting (USA) in its benchmarking, as the best
mass rail transportation systems in the world.
Spoomet also holds the world record for:
*
*
the operations of the longest trains over the longest section of
network; and
the world speed record on narrow gauge (1067 mm) lines.
Spoometoperates its inter city main line passenger services in South
Africa through its division by Interpax.
The daily handling of 2,2 million commuter trips in South African
Metropolitan Centres namely Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban,
Pretora and East London is performed by Metro, a division of Transnot.
Transurb Consult]
was created in 1983 at the instigation of the Belgian state to make the
know-how and experience, which has been acquired in urban and
regional transportation, available to those faced with similar problems.
Transurb Consult is a Belgian company with 72,5 % interest held by
S.N.C.B. (Belgium Railways), 18,5 % held by C.F.L. (Luxembourg
Railways) and Brussels Urban Transport with the remaining 9 %
interest being held by Tractabel and various other private parties.
Transurb is highly specialized in the following transport modes for
passengers and freight:
-
-
Rail transport
Road transport
*
railway
suburban
*
urban
*
urban
regional and international
*
*
-
Intermodal transport and more specifically in:
*
*
*
High speed train systems
Urban Mass Transport
(train way, trolley bus, bus)
Freight Intermodal Transport
The sector-related skills of Transurb are guaranteed by the manpower
potential and technological achievements of its members, together
with its worlddwde experience in some 50 different countries on the 5
continents, partly gained through its subsidiaries.
ArtcoEl Invesents|
|Limited
|
is a company registered in Ireland and is responsible for sourcing
French speaking expatriate managers to the operations of Comazar
on Francophone projects. At this stage the expatriates deployed
in Sizarail in Zaire by Artcole is an efficient and success story.
CD,%
CD,%CD'
C
K
N
CD
CQ
Ql -.
U
0
lWI~
A_
X
s|
SIZARAIL
SOCIETE INTERREGIONALE ZAIROISE DU RAIL SARL
A SUBSIDIARY OF COMAZAR REGISTERED IN ZAIRE
Sizarail is a subsidiary of Comazar that operates the Southem rail network (former O.C.S.) and
Eastem rail network (former S.F.E.) in Zaire.
A mandate for a 5 year pedod, that commenced on 1 March 1995, was signed by Comazar and
the Govemment of Zaire.
Sizarail is in the process of rebuilding the infrastructure and restructuring the railway
organizations of the former S.N.C.Z. in Zaire.
Sizarail is also commercially exploiting the operations in Zaire and the following information is an
indication of the efficient performance experienced over the last year since operations were taken
over by Sizarail.
FINANCIAL RESULTS
I January to
31 December 1996
1 J*to
31 Dommbr 1995
US$
US$
Revenue
a.
Goods traffic
b.
Passenger traffic
c.
Other revenues
Total revenue
53 403 037
19 514 729
3 090 451
1 216 683
12 280 542
5 153 576
68 774 030
25 884 988
11 357 980
9 603 339
51 834 748
13 196 106
Expenses
a.
b.
Contribution to S.N.C.Z. Group
Operating expenses of Sizarail
c.
Contribution to Comazar
1 813 010
Total Expenses
63 192 728
24 612 456
Sizarail is actively involved in implementing solutions for the social problem of workers of
S.N.C.Z. group and has contributed US$ 9,6 million in 1995 to salaries and pensions.
.Sie:ge Sociall.
liiniiietiale
la (mnItnunautit,
le
l vIIt iqtie
20ne ,lrvitage,
Bid du 30Jtuin, B.R 14816
KI NSISIIASA - ZA I R
Direction Gdnerale
'I'61&ecl: 44115
Telecel: 47409-47809-47909
h:Fx
: (001) 212-3769522
LU'BUMBASHI - ZAIRE
SUPPLY CONTRACTS SECURED BY COMAZAR TO SOURCE ITS
PROJECTS
The following supply contracts for resources have been secured by
Comazar to source its activities:
Type of Contract
Description of Resource
With
sourcing
party
1.
Locomotive rental.
Contract for Zaire.
*
20 x locomotives:
(Type GE-U15c)
5 years
Spoomet
2.
Tanker cars
*
100 x Tanker cars
5 years
Spoomet
3.
Interchange contract
for all daily wagon
rentals in Zaire.
*
All Spoomet wagons
in Zaire
5 years
Spoomet
4.
Passengercoaches
*
10 x Passenger coaches Spoomet
5 years
5.
Locomotive lease
Agreement for Brazil
*
60 x locomotives :(Type GM-GT26MC)
30 years
Spoomet
6.
Locomotive lease
Agreement for the
Congo
*
20 x locomotives
(Type GE-U20c)
5 years
Spoomet
7.
Locomotive lease
Agreement for
Tanzania / Uganda
*
8 x locomotives:
(Type GE-U15c)
20 years
Spoomet
8.
Locomotive lease
Agreement for the
Cameroon
*
20 x locomotives:
(Type GE-U20c)
20 years
Spoomet
9.
Locomotive lease
Agreement for the
Moatize Project,
Mozambique
*
40 x locomotives:
(Type GE-U20c)
20 years
Spoomet
10. Expatriates
*
Managers, Consultants
and Operators in
Francophone countries
Artcole Investments Ltd
(Ireland)
Expatriates
*
Managers, Consultants
and operators in
Anglophone and other
countries
Comatrans
International
S.A.
(Luxembourg)
11.
ROLE OF COMAZAR (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED IN A CONSORTIUM
TRANSNET
LIMITED
South Africa
PROTEKONRaly
Consulting, Construction
& Maintenance
CONTRACT
IRCA (Pty) Ltd
South Africa
Risk & Safety
CONTRACTS
Management
Professional
Individual:
-PROTEKONOprts
Supply expertise
& ConsuKtants
PERSONNEL
[
-TRANSB
nkpl=1_
.
| 72,5
S.N.C.B.
%
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
Blgu
TRANSURB
CONSULT
Belgium
2
2%
- - - - -_
COMATRANS
INTERNATIONAL S.A
Luxembourg
INCSENT
CONTRACT
~~~TRANSWERK
Supply
wagons
Managers 8
Openrators
CON TRACT
SPOORNET
Lease of
Lodomotives
ARTCOLE
INVESTMENTS
Ireland
14%
- - - - - - -
_-
_-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _- - - - - - - - - - - -----
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
CONTRACT
Suppl________
>
SupplY
Professional
Managers& -
Operators
a
COMAZAR
(Proprietary) Ltd
South Africa
THE CONSORTIUM
..
A
B
___TOShareholding
1
......
A
"Operator"'
"Partners/Investors"
Legend:
Contracts
. . . .., .:.. : ' --..
,.
. .. . .. .... .''
.L _- -__OPERATING
_
Contract
,
Operate
JOINT
VENTURE COMPANY
FOR THE PROJECT
COMAZAR'S ACCESS TO RESOURCES
c om a za r
can draw on the vast resources of its shareholding
companies Transnet Limited/Spoomet and Transurb
Consult conceming all types of operational resources.
In this regard Comazar has contractually signed up the
provision of 200 diesel electric locomotives which will be
provided by Spoomet for Comazars deployment in projects.
Spoomet has also made railtanker cars, wagons and
passenger coaches available to Comazar for deployment.
CoQ m a z a r
has developed the latest simulation systems to determine
the most cost effective systems for train operations. Its
communications and software systems are technically
advanced.
corn azar
has access to human resources, expertise and managerial
and operational capabilities through its own personnel,
expatriats and consultants resourced by the companies
Comatrans Intemational S.A., a public company registered
in Luxembourg and Artcole Investments Limited, a public
company registered in Ireland as well as Spoomet and
Transurb Consult.
co m azar
through its managers, has the know-how to manage any rail
operation to the highest possible level of efficiency within
the physical designs possible, through the systems and
facilities it owns.
has as part of its capabilities, a group of managers and
experts with years of experience of railway operations in the
field of freight as well as commuter and long distance
passenger transportation.
w
w
SIZARAIL
;'
SOCIETE INTERREGIONALE ZAIROISE DU RAIL
SARL
FREIGHT TRAFFIC
PRIVATE MANAGEMENT SINCE MARCH 1995
Semesters
1994
Traffic
l stt
er
1995
2nd semeter
1st semester
1996
2nd semter
1st semst
| 2nd semester
Import
Export
Local
48 525
0
216 265
24 861
485
234 794
35 996
327
274 088
32 813
1 557
345 022
46 430
50 245
382 795
56 759
40 422
466 432
Total
264 790
260 140
310 411
379 392
479 470
563 613
46 418
33 426
20 832
79 134
131 706
173 284
Passenger
FREIGHT TRAFFIC
550000S
500000-
350000360000 -
2000000--
I
200000-_._Ill
199/1
1995/1
1994/2
Somet
Sic!es.,.ial.
~ ~~
limitetibc title (la
C nmuniuatjt FIL*I6niqutel
2cew awt:ige,
Bltl itl30juii, B.P 14816
KINSHiAS A - ZAIRE
~
~
~
~
~
~
1995/2
1996/1
1996/2
-gt.
'1'Iiecl :4411
Fx: (001) 212-3769522
Direction Ginirale
TIle l 47409-47809-47909
-LLBLMIBASFI-1- ZAIRE
Fepasa
and its Brazilian partners ((Banco Interfinance/Banco
EuroinvestVM.P.E.>> have agreed to study, and if feasible, bid for
the networks in Brazil namely the Fepasa (Sao Paulo network)
networks, which will be auctioned in Brazil during the first quarter
of 1998.
also obtained 7,5 % shareholding in the company <<Interferrea
Logistica S.A.)) in Brazil which will operate unit trains over the
networks of FSA and FCA and will also operate logistical
services in Brazil.
-oOo-
Session 7
4
1
II
Ii
I
i
i
i
I
Railway Privatisation:
The Role of the Consultant
..
I,
..
-
,
-
-
-
13etcr- Kicei'an
CPCS I'ranscom LtAd.
Abi-djC
October 1997
......
Content of the presentation
<,^I ntroduLctionI to CPCSTiIranscom Ltd.
.-- RaiIway privaltisation process
<Roles of tlhe ConsuLltant
:CliCent expectationls
CPCS Transcom Ltd.
on railway an-d port privatisatio
sX
CPCS + F11 ickll I-anlsco
*Comiibinationi of management consUlting and
railway cngyineerl)go
SWe are the leadingo- comiipaniy inc the
plivatisation ofliailways anid ports in Africa
~-Focus
-- A
f
--
Operated by state
railway companies
KPrivatization Projects
Underway or Planned
I Privatization Projects
I Managed or proposed
by CPCS Transcom
Railway privatisation process
:r'Privatisationi is the eind resuIlt ofla
continllULmn of small steps wlhich canl
trans-l'orm a railway flroom a governmient
departmcnit all the way to a pr-ivate company
if desired.
Continuum of
Privatisation/C omrnercialisation
1 l,e ('"onttuuumuillu
(uiuIe,elliel-ciI.liauiol
*urei
S4;.
f"Pa
| riaui
*;
. .g...............
. l
__,_.~
I.
_ re_.e/.#eiiain
Eforenpetter
.. eg~a .. __,l
(Xr.,ieg
legy
|. C isaInftstIiuep
.. .e.I.a _)
{
--
E
[
Je ge
-- cuvga
j
c
L17
I'rleul
of
Olion
.$ Iii^
I:utqwE aeiaaiire*
6%
R fss
IXagle eel
_
j
._
-|-
-.
Railway privatisation process
- YouL ImuLlst be liv iln the overall inicrease
in
the efficienicy'olfthie private sector
"Do niot make substantial inivestmenits in the
iifinastl-rLcturle beb'or-c the pr-ivatisationi - you
alrc Lilikely to get the inoniey back
6_.
-
-~
e
e-~
6
_X
_
-~
~
C~~~C
_
0 ~
cr~:
0
0
Rol.e of the Consultant - 2
4''>PIelilminary sta(yes
cominiiicrcialisatioii
costilng
performiiance coIntracts
conitr actintg out ofl services
elimiiination of loss making services
dlelfinition of publ'ic service obligations
Role of Consultants - 3
;rivatisationl
Conisultanits Role
IInvest igation
i Iol'nlorlationi
Ieviewv o foptions
(lecisioni to proceed
detailed desi,bmi
establislh pi-ocess
detailed anialysis
ecoinomlic anialysis
regulatioll
legislationi
i-ivest. priotiotioi
prepaation of,
p)1re selectioni
dimeii
implemienuLtion
plrloilnotioln
s
Role of the Consultant
-
4
esimplemerntation: The bidding teams
for the
concessioni canl iniclude:
r'ai lway operatingl comiipaniies
^ service pr-ovidels (maintcnance)
riailway encgineering consultants
^ imianiagemelent conisultanits
%
^ tranisportation comiipaniies
investors
Client expectations
'Sensitivity to the pcolitical and social.
.
.
envira&ment
"I KInowledge of.experiencc.and. lessorns
learned rom both.. the. gove.mment anid the
..
..
investor side
AbiIity.:to communiicate hew. concepts and
ideas.
La privatisation des chemins de fer:
Le role du conseiller
Peter Kieran
CPCS Transcom Ltd.
Abidjan October 1997
i
i
I
Table des matieres
CPCS Transcom Ltd.
-La societe CPCS Transcom Ltd.
.La processus de pri%atisation
- Le role du conseiller
-Les attentes du client
awPrivatisation des chemins de fer et des ports
'CPCS + Hickling Transcom
Integration des conseils et du g6rie en
matierre de chemins de fer
.- En Afrique. nous sommnes la societe
dominante en matiere de privatisation des
chemins de fer et des ports
La processus de privafisation
-Le privatisation est le resultat d'une
succession de petites etapes i laide
desquelies on peut transformer, si on le
desire, une lipe de chemins de far, d'un
rministere a une socicte privee.
- 4w.
urSn
La continuum de la privatisation et
de la commercialisation
_~C
I
i-
I
______
Ur
--
_________________________________
Le processus
-On doit 6te convaincu que le secteur priv&
est en gin6ral plus efficient
=D ne faut pas faire d'investissement
importants d infrastructure avant de
privatiser - cet argent sera perdu
.1
t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Le r6le du conseiller
Le r6le du conseiller - 2
-Les conseillers jouent un role dans chaque
-Les etapes pr6limiinaires
. commercialisation
. etablissernent des couts
. contrats plans
. contrats de service avec des entrepreneurs
* elimination de services deficitaires
* definition des obligations de service public
etape
* Les etapes preliminaires
* La pniatisation -l'octroi de concession
* La mise en oeuvrc
R6le du conseiller - 4
Le role du conseiller - 3
'
La privatisation
* enquete
* exiCfn dc opoons
* decioon de condinuer
* conciztion de ontainuer
* rigpemention
* promotion des invest
* Pri-selecion
* ien oS ve
a
* informaton
* cion du preuus
. azulse approfaidze
a
mise en oeuvTe: les equipes pour la
concession peuvent comprendre:
w La
R6le
a
. xegislayon
* priparaton de
documcnts
. promotion
* des
soci6tes d exploitation de chemin de fer
. des fournisseurs de services (entrctien)
* des conseillers en genie ferroviaire
* des conscillers en gestion
* des societes de transport
* des investisseurs
Les attentes du client
Les attentes du client - 2
a Sensibilite au milieu politique et social
wMaximisation de la valeur pour l'Etat aussi
bien que de 1'investisseur
'Prestation de soutien, d'arguments
nationaux et d' exemples en faveur d' un
changement structurel
wMaximisation des avantages pour
1'economie local, en assurant un transport
ferro%iaiare efficient et concurrentiel
aConnaissance de 1'experience et des lecons
apprises du cote de l'Etat aussi bien que de
' investisseur
aCapacitd de communiquer de nouvelles
notion et id6es
Session 8
------
CONCESSIONING STATUS
COL' rRY:
ZA MBI1A
RA-IL SYsTrEM:
ZLAN\IBIA RA-%IIL-WAYS
GOVERNMENT CONIMII TMEN r:
SUBS
LrN
FII.\_LL C0IN I lITED TO
PRIVA.\TIZ.\TION BtLT NO TIME TABLE
\S Y-ET
RAIL\\VA YS CO.\I.\IITM EN r:
SUBSTAN ri.LLY
AOcmmi
C
r,TED
INFRASTRLUCrTURE CONDITION:
4
OPERAT\ING .ASSETS:
7
RESTRLUCTU RING PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING:
-
ALMOST NO RESTRICTING
SOME STAFF REDUCTION
ASSETS REVALUED
NO CLEAR STRATEGY FOR
FlRTHER STAFF
REDLUNDANCY
-
-
-
NO KNO\WN STEPS ro\.ARDS
RE\VS;ION OF RAILW\.AYRELATED LEGISLATION
RA
TWO-YEAR MIANAGEMENT
CONTRACT UNDER
NEGOTIATION
REGULATORY FRA.\EW\ORK
STILL TO BE DISCUSSED
CONCESSIONING MODE:
NO DECISION AS YET
CONCESSIONING METHOD:
NO DECISION
CONCESSIONING STATUS:
CATEGORY - C (LNCERTAIN)
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:
JUNE '000
'ONCESSIONING METHOD:
POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL
COM PETI TI VE
CONCESSION[NG STATUS:
CA.\ECORY- B LIKFLY TO
II.\PPEN
I'KELY D.A rE OF SIGNING:
JULNE I'99
COLN'TRY:
ZI \I B.\ BWE
'AlL S'S,
STEM:
NA TIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE
GO\ERNMENFV COMMIITNMIENT:
DECISION TO SEPARATE
i\FRASVTRUCTLrRE FROM
OPERA FIONS AND CONCIESSION THE
NFR.\s rR L TC'RE BL'T \NC) FORM1.AL
ST.A TE.IENT
RAIL-WAYS CONMMI FMENT:
rrED
IO\INII
r- ChANGE BUT
SKEP FICAL ABOL[r SEP.ARATION
INFRNSTRUCTLRE CONDITION:
S
(PERATING ASSETS:
RESTRUCTURiNG PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING:
SLBSTANTI.ALL
RES TRL CTU RED
* 30 STAFF REDUCTION
DURING THE LAST THtREE
YEARS
-
ORGANIZATION
RESTRL CTURING
-
-
RATIONALIZATION OF
INFRASTRL CTURE AND
OPE RATIG .ASSETS
ASSETS REVALLED
' )PERATIONS RESTRLCTLRING
CLEAR STRATEGY FOR
FLURTHER STAFF
REDUNDANCY
-
RAIL.WAY ACT 7NDER
REVISION
-
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
STILL TO BE DISCUSSED
CONCESSIONING MODE:
-
SEPARATION OF
INFRASTRUCTURE
-
CONCESSIONING OF
INFRASTRUCTURE AFTER
SEPARATION
I
CONCESSIONING ST.vTLS
OLNTRY:
R.-NIL SYSTEM:
M1O ZA.\MBIQUE
IWIR.A PORT R-IL SYSTEM
(o\'ERN.\IEN r COMMITMENT.
i:u Il
RAILWAYS CONINIITMIENT:
LL" CONI.MI I'TED
C ONCERNS A BOU T 'STAl:F
REDU.NDANCY
INFR-R\STRLUcTrURE CONDITION
-
comm VrrED
KEY CO-MPONlENT OF FRA\SPORr
POLICY
Fl
ON ONE LINE
I!ON TE
SENA LINE
OPER.- rING ASSETS:
RESTRL CTU'RING PRIOR TO
-
ASSET' RE VAL L ED
NO CL-EAR S FRATEGY FOR
--TAFF REDlUNDANCY
LEGAL FRA.kNIEW ORK UNDER
-
STLDY
REGLULATORY FRAME.\WE\ORK
CONCESSIONING:
-
STILL UNDER DISCLUSSION
CONCESSIONrNG MODE:
ONE CONCESS10N FOR THE WHOLE
SYSTEM OR
ONE CONCESSION FOR THE
OPERATING PART OF THE SYSTEM
WHILE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE
REST OF THE SYSTEM IS
ESTABLISHED
CONCESSIONING METHOD:
NO DECISION
CONCESSIONING STATUS:
CATEGORY - A (MOST LIKELY TO
HAPPEN)
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:
DECEMBER 1998
.CONLTRY:
NIOZ \"I BIQU E
;(AIL SY STEMt:
AI.\PL TO PORT RAIL SYSTEM
C,CV R.NIEN r C(O)\N\lITMlE\NT:
LY CO.\ I IITTTED
KEY COMPONENT OF TR.\NSPWORT
i'Ol. ICY
RAILWA YS Co\\IN ITNIENT
F l LLY COMINIITTED
CONCERNS ABOLUT STAFF
REDUNDANCY
INFRASrRLCFIRE CONDITION:
-
ON A ONE TO TEN SCALE
O(PER-\ riG .\SSETS:
REs rRL CTL RING PRIOR TO
CONCES'iONING:
-
\SSETS RE\ALLUED
\0 CLEAR STRA [EGY FOR
STAFF REDLUNDANCY
L EGAL FRANI.\IEWt)RK UNDER
STU DY
REGULLATORY FRAM.\E\\WORK
'STILL LUNDER DISCU'SSION
CONCESSIONING MODE:
ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE
SYSTEM OR
SEP.ART'PE CONCESSION'S FOR THE
THREE LINES. MARSHALLING YARD
AND \ ORK,SHOP
CONCESSIONING NtETHOD:
IN'TERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE
BIDDING
CONCESSIONING STATUS:
CATEGORY- A (MOST LIKELY TO
HAPPEN)
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:
MARCH 1998
COUNTRY:
MlOZ.\ANBIQLE
AlL SYSTEM:
\ACAL.\ PORT R.IL SYSTEM
(OVTERNNIEN r cONi i I NiEN-T
FJ LLY CONINl ! r ED
KEY' C,()\IPO\I.N -OF IRA\SPCRIT
?OL ICY
R-IL\\ \YS COMNII \I\Tr.
I
F LLLY C )IN I lTTED
CON\CERNS ABOUT STAFF
RE D U\DA.NCY
INFR.-\A rRL CTLRE CO\DI 110N
- ON AONE TO TEN SCALE
oPERATING ASSETS:RESTRUCTURING PRI(-R
CCYNCESSIONING:
rF)
-
-
A\SSETS REVALL ED
NO C LEAR STRA FEGY FoR
SJTAFF REDLNDANCY
LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER
S TL DY
REGLUL.FrORY FRA.\IEWO PK
STILL UNDER DISCUSSION
CONCESSIONING MIODE:
ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE
-SYSTEM
CONCESSIONING MIETHiOD:
DIREC r NEGOTIATIONS WITH AN
LNSOLICITED BIDDER
CONCESSIONING STATRS:
CATEGORY- A
.MOST
-IAPPEN)
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:;
MARCH 1998
LIKELY TO
I
ii
I
1
i
i
I
I
it
(UNTRY:
MALAWI
I AIL SYSTENM:
\IAL.\WI R\ILW\AYS
(;(\Ai:R\\iE\ r C.O)MI\]TMIE\r:
FU1.LYCCONi rtiED
KEY CO.\P )NENl OF rRANSPORT
RAIL\\ .XYS COMmI rmENT:
FULLY COMMITTED
!NFR.S I R CTl RE C(C)NDI r0N
8
.PERA rING, .ASSETS:
RES FRL CTLTR1\G PRIOR TO
C(NCESSIONING:
-
*
-
-
RE DLNDANCY
COMNPLETEL) RESTRLUCTURED
sEP.\RA-\rE
NEW COMPANIES
FOR RAIL .ANDLAKE SERVICES
I\CORPORA rED
t@hOST.\FF RETRENCHED
50%v ASSETS DECLARED
SL RPLL'S
*ASSETS REVALUED
OLD MALAWl RAIL\W AY'S
5NDER 'INDING LIP
CLEAR STRATEGY FOR
FU-RTHER STAFF
*DD C LEG.AL FRAMEWORK CLEAR
REGULATORY FRAMEWOR.K
LNDER DISCU'SSION
CONCESSIONING MODE:
ONE CONCESSION FOR THE WHOLE
SYSTE.M
CONCESSIONING METHOD:
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE
CONCESSIONFNG STATUS:
CATEGORY- A (MIOST LIKELY TO
HAPPEN)
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:
JUNE 1998
"AILWAY SYSTEMS CONSIDERED:
I'
GOVERNMEN r CONtMIITMlENT:
FUt.LLY COMNII I
*roCONCESSIONING
SUBS r.\NTIALLY
COMNI%T'rED.- 5
UNCERT.\IN -5
CONCESSIONING FIMIET.\BLE:
1998 - 4
1999 - 3
L000 - 5
CONCESSIONING MODE
ONE CONCESSION
FOR T1HE WHOLE
RAILW\.AY - 6
\IORE THAN ONE
CONCESSIONS IN ONE
RAIL WA -'
SEPARATION OF
INFRASTRUCTUR.E- 2
UNCERTAIN - 7
RESTRUCTU'RING ST.-\TUS
SUBSTANTIAL - 4
SOME - 4
NEGLIGIBLE -9
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
SOME THINKING - 4
"OLNTRY:
KENYA
'L\IL SYSTEM:
rHE \k IIOLE RAILWAY SYSTEM
CiUV LRN\MENT COMINII FNiFN F.
S LBST.\
R.AILWY\\\S O)NMITN1ENT
sli13ST\N TI.\ . LLY CO
rl. .LY C ON\1.\I 1-1 )
\1 I rI If)
INFRAS rRL 'C'L RE CON DI HION
')PER- [ING .\SSE rs
RtRC TRING PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING
RES
VERY LITTLE
*O\C. SSION!NG MODE;
\0 DEC!SION BL'T CONCLES: ..0NING
xND COPEN -\CCESS LIKELY
CO\CESSIONING ME [HOD:
NO INDICATION
CONCESSIONING SrT. rLS:
C.ATEGC)RY- C (VNCER FA.\\
LIKELY D.ATE OF SIGNING:
LNCERTAIN
U.GAN DA
COUNTRY:
TIlE WIHOLE RAILW.\' SYSTEM
i.AlL SYSTEEM:
.)VLRN1Ntl'N
CO\I .I TIEN\T.
R.\ILVAYS.x\'< COMMITMl'r\lENT:
S'BS r.AN 1.\LLY CONINtI fTED
NO IND1C \ [IION
IN FRASTrRL CTL'RE C(-ON'DITION:
OPERA rING .ASSETS:
REST RLCTURING PRIOR ro
CONCESSIONING:
\ERY LITTLE
CON\CESSIONING MODE.
NO DECISION BL'T CONCCESSIONCING
LIKELY
CONCESSIONING METHOD>
NC) INDICATION
CONCESSIONING ST.ArT'S:
CA FEGOkY - C VUNCERTAINX
LIKELY DATE OF SIGNING:
UNCERT.-\IN
'OLNrRY:
TANZANI A
i(AIL SYSTE M:
TANZANIA RAILWAY CORPORA riON
GOVEfRNMENT COCIMMITMEIEN r.
F LI.LY COmmIrFED
RAII -WAYS *(TNII
\ 1BSFMEN
F \NTII I I
C\ENFUI FrTED
INFR\STRL CTL RE CO-N DI I-ION.
OPER\ FING ASSETS
4
RESrRL CTL'RING PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING:
-
-
-
SOME RESTRICTING
VERY LirTLE STAFF
REDL CTION
AS'ETS REVALUED
O0 CLEA%R STRATE(GY FOR
STAFF REDUNDANCY
-OPERATIONSRESTRLUCT RING
NO KNO\\W S'TEPS TOWARDS
REVISION OF RAILWAYRELATED LEGISLATION
REG ULA TO RY FRA.\IE WO,R
STILL TO BE DISCLSSED
CONCESSIONING .MODE:
NO DEC'SION .AS YET
CONCESSIONING MIETHOD:
N0 DEC!SICON BLT INTERNA T' oN.AL
COMIPETITIVE BIDDING LIKELY
CONCESSIONING STATUS:
CATEGORY
HAPPEN)
LIKELY D.ATE OF SIGNING:
DECEMBER 1999
-
.A(MIOST LIKELY TO
cou\ rRY:
A.. I1.S STEM1:
BIOTSWANA. SWAZILAND. TAZARA.
SO'TH AFRICA
WHOLE RAILWA.\Y SYSTEMS
INDIC.\TION
(o\uIER\N\ENT COMMNII f\ENT:
N\
RAILWAY.\S C(N)NIII FMENT
\C) INDIC\ FION
INFRASTRU.CTURE CONDIriON
6-8
OPERA\ ING A\SSETS
6-8
RESTRUCTURING PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING:
VARYING
CONCESSIONING NMODE:
NO INDIC.A rION
CONCESSIONING METHOD
NO INDICATION
0ONCESSIONING STA rUS
' IKELY DATE OF SIGNING.
C.\TEGORY - C (L-`NCERT.\IN
UNCERTAIN
COLNTRY:
AlL SY STEM1:
GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT:
NANMIBIA
\\WHOLE RAIL\\AY SYSTENt
INTENTION Bro SEP.-RA rE
INFRASTRUCTrRE FROM
!PERP lIONS BU'T NO INDIC.I\ rON
ON CONCESSIONING ulR
PRI VA IVZ
ION
RAILWAY S COMMITMENT:
NO INDICATION
INFR-\STRU CTURE CONDITION:
7
OPERAkING ASSETS:
8
RESTRUCrT RING PRIOR TO
CONCESSIONING:
-
CORPORATE RESTRICTING
COMPLETED RAIL\WAY A.
SEP ARATE AUTONOMOUS
COMPANY
V ERY LITTLE STAFF
REDUCTION
NNOT
N0W\ N
NO KNOWN STEPS TOWARDS
REVISION OF RAIL-WAYRELATED LEGISLATION
REGULLATORY FRAM.\lEWORK
STILL TO BE DISCLUSSED
JNCESSIONING MODE:
NO DECISION
ONCESSIONING METHOD:
NO DECISION
JNCESSIONINTG STATUS:
CATEGORY - C (UNCERTAIN)
KELY DATE OF SIGNING:
UNCERTAIN
i
i
i
I
I
UNION AFRICAINE DES
COMMISSION ECONOMIQUE
CHEMINS DE FEER
POUR L'AFRIQUE
MISE EN CONCEESSION FERROVIAIRE
EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE
BREF APERqU SUR LES EXPERIENCES
EN COURS
Expose presente au Se'minaire sur la Mise en Concession
Ferroviaire en Afrique
Abidjan, 13-14 octobre 1997
Bernard ZOBA
Secritaire G6n6ral
Union Africaine des Chemins de Fer
Antoine TCHIBOZO
Expert Ferroviaire
Commission Economique
Pour I'Afrique
i
!
1. REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE
DU CONGO
A. CAS DU CHEMIN DE FER MATADI-KINSHASA
(CFMK)
Ce chemin de Fer est g6r6 par l'Office
National des Transports (ONATRA).
OPTION DU GOUVERNEMENT
- Concession de l'exploitation ferroviaire
au secteur pnv6
- Creation d'une soci6t6 priv6e de
maintenance du mat6riel ferroviaire
- Creation d'une societ6 privee d'entretien
et de renouvellement de la voie
- Sous-traitance d'autres activit6s
connexes (exemple: carriere a ballastre)
- ONATRA devient une societe de
patrimoine
PROJET DE L'ONATRA
- Creation d'une soci6t6 de materiel
roulant (filiale du CFMK)
- Favoriser la creation des soci6t6s
de wagons et acquisition des wagons
par des
tiers (clients importants du CFMK)
- Creation d'une soci6t6 de maintenance
du materiel ferroviaire
- ONATRA conserve les installations
fixes du CFMK (T6l6communications,
signalisation, voie) mais scus-traite
les grands travaux
- ONATRA conserve l'exploitation
du Chemin de Fer du CFMK
- Cession de l'action commerciale
au secteur priv6 par la cr6ation des
commissionnaires - exp6diteurs
Le projet de I'6tude de mise
en concession du Chemin de
Fer MATADIKINSHASA (CFMK) est en cours
de r6alisation par l'ONATRA et sera
soumis au
Gouvernement de la R6publique
D6mocratique du Congo.
CHEMINS FER DU CONGO (SNCC)
B. CAS DE LA SOCIETE NATIONALE DES
SNCZ, exploite actuellement 3729 km de
Cette societe, precedemment denommee
du Katanga).
voie et a son siege a Lubumbashi (Province
PROJET SIZARAIL
creation en 1995, de la Societe
- Sur decision du Gouvemement de 1'ex-Zaire,
interconnecte.
SIZARAIL chargee de 1'exploitation du r6seau
(entreprises publiques zaTroises
- Structure de SIZARAIL : 49 % d'actions zafroises
ZaTre, contre 51 % d'actionnariat
et entreprises d'interets belges installees au
ET SPOORNET).
etranger (COMAZAR, comprenant TRANSURB
- Projet SIZARAIL comportait deux phases:
de 5 ans;
. une phase de collaboration elargie d'une duree
la periode de 5 ans,
. une phase de concession envisageable apres
de la premiere phase
sous reserve notamment d'une 6valuation positive
de collaboration;
SIZARAIL, entre autres:
- Nombreuses critiques formulees sur le projet
consid6re comme trop
. niveau d'intervention de COMAZAR dans SIZARAIL
SNCZ n'en possedait que
eleve (51 % des actions, alors que le Groupe
une alienation du
20 %), ce qui apparaissait au niveau local comme
prive;
patrimoine national au profit d'un groupe d'interet
A titre d'exemple, le
. apport financier de COMAZAR juge insuffisant.
de l'Office des Chemins de
programme triennal 1995-1997 de redressement
etait estime a
Fer du Sud (O.C.S.), un des membre de la SNCZ,
global de COMAZAR sur 5 ans
29.049.134 $US, alors que l'apport financier
n'etait que 2.500.000 $US;
juge excessif (4.000.000 $US/an,
. cout du partenariat SNCZ avec COMAZAR
par rapport a l'apport de 500.000 $US/an).
4
CHANGEMENT INTERVENU
Avec la lib6ration du ZaTre, devenu
R6publique D6mocratique du Congo,
les
nouvelles Autorit6s, estimant que le projet
SIZARAIL frisait le bradage du patrimoine
national, ont d6cid6 d'y mettre fin.
La SNCZ, devenue depuls lors, la SNCC
a, par la r6vocation du mandant donn6
A SIZARAIL, r6cup6r6 sa fonction
d'explottant dep transports ferroviaires
et
demeure une SocI6t6 d'Etat.
11. REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
(CFCO)
CAS DU CHEMIN DE FER CONGO-OCEAN
A. DEMARRAGE DU PROCESSUS
avec le choix en 1996 par le Gouvemement
Le processus a d6marr6 effectivement
Ltd pour:
Congolais, de la Soci6t6 CPCS Intemational
de Privatisation, qui, dans le cas du
- apporter un appui au Comit6 National
de cette entreprise;
CFCO, devait piloter la mise en concession
du CFCO durant la p6riode
- assurer une administration provisoire
int6rimaire (_ 12 mois).
B. CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA CONCESSION
sur des periodes de 5 ans
- Dur6e : 20 ans, avec possibilite de prolongation
par un Comite de suivi.
- Suivi d'execution et reglement de litiges
- Le concessionnaire assure:
des services marchandises
I'exploitation technique et commerciale
et voyageurs;
l'am6nagement des
Ia maintenance, le renouvellement et
infrastructures ferroviaires;
Ia gestion domaniale du domaine public.
notamment) qui seraient exploites a
- Les 6ventuelles services (voyageurs
l'objet de compensation financiere.
titre d'obligation de service public feront
ans) dont beneficie le concessionnaire
- A l'issue de la p6riode d'exclusivite (5
utiliser, notamment sur
des op6rateurs secondaires pourront egalement
contre paiement au
demande de I'Etat, les infrastructures ferroviaires
concessionnaire d'un p6age.
restent propriete de I'Etat et mises a la
- Les infrastructures ferroviaires sont et
de pret a usage.
disposition du concessionnaire au titre
pris en location par le
- Les materiels ferroviaires du CFCO seront
le cadre de contrats de location.
concessionnaire (apres selection) dans
du personnel du CFCO librement
- Le concessionnaire reprendra une partie
prevu pour le personnel non repris.
s6lectionn6 par lui. Un plan social sera
redevance, en contrepartie de
- Le concessionnaire versera a I'Etat une
6
l'utilisation des infrastructures et du droit d'exploiter
les services ferroviaires.
- La Soci4t4 concessionnaire sera
une societe anonyme par actions de droit
congolais, et sera structur6e de la maniere suivante:
. I'actionnaire de ref6rence possedera 67 %
du Capital de la Soci6t4
(Action A), dont la moiti6 au moins appartiendront
aux actionnaires
nationaux, ou entreprises de droit congolais;
. I'autre partie du Capital de la Soci6t6 concessionnaire
(Actions B)
sera souscrite a plus de 50 % par des personnes
physiques de
nationalite congolaise ou par des entreprises
de droit congolais ; 5 %
seront reserves au personnel de la societe
et 15 % au maximum A
I'Etat.
C. ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DU PROCESSUS
- Le Cabinet CPCS International Ltd a depose
en f6vrier 1997, un rapport
diagnostic.
- Des problemes lies au conflit de comp6tence
entre la Direction du CFCO et
l'Administrateur Delegue ont conduit a la r6daction
de nouveaux termes de
reference sur les activit6s du Consultant qui,
d6sormais, est a Conseiller
en privatisation du CFCO )) et non plus
Administrateur Delegue.
- Le planning initialement retenu est le suivant:
lIancement de I'appel d'offres
:15 juillet 1997
. remise des offres techniques
:15 novembre 1997
. evaluation des offres techniques
et demande des offres financieres
: 15 janvier 1998
. D4p6t des offres financieres
: 1er mars 1998
. Selection de l'adjudicataire
: 15 mars 1998
. Reprise par l'adjudicataire
: I er juillet 1998
La guerre survenue a Brazzaville a momentan6ment
interrompu le processus.
7
Ill. REPUBLIQUE DU CAMEROUN
DE FER DU CAMEROUN
CAS DE LA REGIE NATIONALE DES CHEMINS
(REGIFERCAM)
A. DEMARRAGE DU PROCESSUS
le choix par le Gouvernement
Le processus a d6marr6 concretement avec
CONSULTANTS (Paris) en
camerounais, de la Societe COOPERS & LYBRAND
pour conseiller et appuyer le
liaison avec COOPERS & LYBRAND Afrique Centrale
la REGIFERCAM.
Comit6 de pilotage de la mise en concession de
B. CARACTERISTIQUES DE LA CONCESSION
- Dur6e: 20 ans, renouvelable.
cr6er sont et resteront
- Les infrastructures ferroviaires existantes ou A
et amenagement
propri6t6 de l'Etat. Leur maintenance, renouvellement
seront finances par le concessionnaire.
disposition du
- Les biens du domaine ferroviaire sont mis A la
fin de concession.
concessionnaire par l'Etat aqui ils sont rendus en
par d'autres operateurs
- Possibilite d'utilisation du reseau ferroviaire concede
du concessionnaire, soit a
moyennant conventions passees soit a l'initiative
la demande expresse de l'Etat.
concessionnaire, soit
- Mat6riel roulant de transport est soit propri6te du
propri6t6 de tiers en location ou location-vente.
en contrepartie
- Une redevance sera versee A l'Etat par le concessionnaire
de l'utilisation des infrastructures.
est l'un des elements
- Le nombre d'agents de la R6gie repris par le candidat
effectifs cible est fixe A
important d'appreciation des offres. Le niveau des
3.000 agents.
structuree de la manikre
- Lactionnariat de la societe concessionnaire sera
suivante:
r6ference
1. Les 66 % des actions de la Societe Actionnaire de
; 34 % etant
(actions A) appartiendront aux investisseurs etrangers
r6serv6s aux actionnaires nationaux.
maximum 51 % de la
La soci4t6 actionnaire de ref6rence poss6dera au
societ6 concessionnaire.
La participation d'int6rets 6trangers
au capital de la soci6t6
concessionnaire n'exc6dera donc pas
34 %.
2. 30 % des actions (actions B) seront
souscrites pour des personnes
physiques ou morales de nationalit6
camerounaise, 15 % au
maximum par l'Etat et 5 % au minimum
par le personnel.
C. ETAT D'AVANCEMENT DU PROCESSUS
En janvier 1997, suite a l'analyse
des offres techniques de la mise en
concession
des chemins de fer du Cameroun,
les trois groupes d'entreprises ci-apres
ont 6t6
admis a presenter une offre technique
revisee et une offre financiere:
- CANAC, SNC/LAVALIN
- COMAZAR, TRANSURB-CONSULT,
GEODIS-GETMA
- SAGA, SDV, SYSTRA-SOFRERAIL-SOFRETU
Le calendrier previsionnel se presente
comme suit:
. 04/08/97
. 30(09/97
: Lancement de l'inventaire du patrimoine
de la REGIFERCAM,
: remise des offres techniques revisees
et des offres
financiWres,
. mi-octobre 97: depouillement des
offres et analyse et r6ception des
resultats de l'inventaire de patrimoine
de la R6gie.
9
IV.
REPUBLIQUE DU GABON
FER TRANSGABONAIS (OCTRA)
CAS DE L'OFFICE DU CHEMIN DE
comme suit
de mise en concession se presente
L'etat d'avancement du processus
pour la reprise de 1'exploitation de
Environ 14 societes sont int6ress6s
I'OCTRA
lanc6 le 25/01/1997;
- L'appel d'offres a ete
lieu le 30/09/1997;
- La remise des offres a
une epreuve
offres se fera en deux etapes avec
- Le depouillement de ces
prevu une selection.
technique au terme de laquelle if est
qui determinera le
Ensuite, interviendra l'epreuve financiere
-
concessionnaire.
totale libert6
accordera a la Societe retenue une
- La mise en concession
et
d'investissements pour le maintien
dans la gestion, avec engagement
l'amelioration de l'outil.
".I
:
Sg
~the Railwary of the 21st
CenWrv
"ConsX 'lk chemi-n de fer "du21e sice:
"'Gestalt' g der.7Bahn.-ties 21.Jh.
§3UiC
uc
"Shaping
Railway of2
the
the 21nst Certyr"
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Annexes
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ANNEX 1
Seminar on Railway Concessioning in Africa
Abidjan, Cote dlvoire
October 13-14, 1997
THE CAPITALIZATION OF THE BOLIVIAN STATE RAILWAY
The Railroad Privatization Experience in Bolivia
Benjamin L. Anderson, CFA, ASA
ANDERSON CONSULTING GROUP
90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700
New York, N.Y. 10016 USA
Good morning. My name is Ben Anderson and I am a principal
in Anderson
Consulting Group in New York City. I recently had the privilege
of serving as the
Strategic Advisor to the Government of Bolivia in the capitalization
of the Bolivian
State Railway, also known as 'ENFE." On December 14, 1995,
the Government of
Bolivia successfully auctioned a 50% interest in each of the two
new railway
companies created from ENFE. Cruz Blanca of Chile was the
successful bidder for
both of those companies.
During my presentation, I would like to review the technique of
"capitalization"
and how it differs from a conventional privatization. I will also
describe some of the
alternative models for the privatization of railways, including
the traditional
concession model. Then I would like to focus on some of the
issues facing the
capitalization of ENFE (or any other railroad privatization), and
how we resolved them
in Bolivia.
I. CHOOSING THE PRIVATIZATION MODEL
There are a number of different ways to privatize a railway. Choosing
the best
method is a matter of developing a set of criteria for selecting
the privatization model.
The model that satisfies the largest number of those criteria, according
to the political,
social, and economic context of the particular country, is the
one that should be
chosen.
The criteria are the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
political acceptability;
attractiveness to private sector investors;
attractiveness to the govemment;
network benefits available from maintaining the
integrity of the national system;
the amount of privatization benefits achieved;
the degree and complexity of regulation required; and
minimization of legal impediments to the privatization.
Brazil and
The regional concession model -- such as that used in Argentina,
although
identified,
be
can
Bolivia -- is one of at least nine privatization models that
three
into
Divided
there may be more or less depending on how they are classified.
major categories, the models are as follows:
A.
Single Unit Transaction
1.
2.
3.
4.
B.
Subsystem Transaction
1.
2.
C.
Sale as a single unit, without a prior restructuring
Concession as a single unit, without a prior restructuring
Sale as a unit, preceded by restructuring
Concession as a unit, preceded by restructuring
Sale of regional subsystems
Concession of regional subsystems
Separation of Operations from Infrastructure
1.
2.
3.
Grant of exclusive operating rights to the entire railway system
Grant of non-exclusive operating rights ("open access") to the
entire railway system
Grant of exclusive or non-exclusive operating rights to designated
portions of the national system
of every
Unfortunately, we don't have time to discuss the all the characteristics
Two of the best
model, but some examples may make them seem more familiar.
option A-3, that is,
known are Conrail and New Zealand Railways, both representing
National
Japanese
"sale as a unit with prior restructuring." The privatization of the
before,
said
as we
Railways represents option B- 1, "sale of regional subsystems." And
option B-2. Other
Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia chose the regional concession model,
within the
variations
using
are
useful examples include Sweden and Britain, which
operations."
from
third general category, Category C, "separation of infrastructure
as it has
One of the major benefits of the regional concession model, at least
investment by the
been applied in Argentina, is that it requires the minimum prior
transaction, the
government before the privatization. Typically, in a subsystem
capital
agreed-upon
makes
railroad is not rehabilitated first. The concessionaire
of the
government
the
improvements as specified in the concession contract, relieving
privatized.
it is
obligation to restore the physical condition of the railroad before
immediately upon
ceases
losses
operating
of
funding
Furthermore, the government's
(usually the
the startup of operations by the concessionaire, although someone
All of these
workers.
displaced
for
government) must take financial the responsibility
to the
attractive
very
model
the
make
factors, except the worker severance benefits,
govemment, helping to satisfy Criterion #3.
2
If displaced workers receive severance benefits, the political acceptability
of the
privatization is increased (satisfying the first criterion), and the fact
that the
government (not the concessionaire) may fund those benefits helps
satisfy Criterion
#2 (attractiveness to investors).
The regional concession model also avoids other problems. The
government's
lack of clear title to the railroad property becomes far less important,
because
everything but the property title is transferred to the concessionaire.
This helps us
meet Criterion #7, the minimization of legal impediments.
Political acceptability (always the most important criterion!) is further increased
by the regional concession model because the grant of a concession may
be presented
to the public as an interim step (rather than an irreversible sale)
that may or may not
lead to full privatization. The government may subsequently regain the property
upon
the expiration of the concession, or upon a breach of the concession contract
by the
concessionaire.
The preservation of network benefits (Criterion #4) was not a significant
in Bolivia because the national railway was already divided into two separate factor
systems
that were not interconnected. Furthermore, many of the benefits of an integrated
national railway system may be preserved by making provisions for voluntary
cooperation (as in the United States by the Association of American Railroads)
or by
regulation. For example, Brazil is now implementing voluntary co-operation
mechanisms to integrate the operations of its six regional concessions.
Multiple regional systems also reduce the amount and complexity of regulation
required, helping us to satisfy Criterion #6. Multiple concessions provide
a basis to
judge the fairness of one railroad's tariffs with those of another, much like
the
phenomenon of "yardstick competition" between electrical utilities in the
United
States. However, the most meaningful comparison or "yardstick" is that
between
transportation modes, not between railroads, except in the case of captive
traffic that
can only be moved by one mode.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BOLIVIAN CAPITALIZATION PROGRAM
Now I would like to describe the model selected by Bolivia and how that
county
employed an unusual technique to accomplish what has been achieved
by
"privatization" in other countries. In Bolivia, the state-owned railway was
not "sold"
in the conventional sense. Rather, the enterprise was "capitalized" through
the
infusion of new capital in an amount equal to the company's book value,
for which the
investor received a 50% ownership interest and management control.
Each newly
capitalized company (called the "SAM," or Sociedad Anomina Mixta,
or "mixed capital
company') was granted an exclusive concession to operate a designated
national railroad for a period of 30 years. In Bolivia, the national system section of the
was divided
into two subsystems, the "Andina" and the "Oriental." Each was the
subject of a
separate capitalization.
3
I must emphasize that this was not a case of the investor buying 50% of a
company from the Bolivian Government. Rather, it was a contribution, or infusion, of
capital in that company. The difference between this and a privatization is that when
the investor takes control of the company, the money he has "paid" is still in the
company's treasury, not in the treasury of the Government.
If we were to look at the balance sheet of the newly capitalized company, we
would see that on the left-hand side, the cash account has increased by the amount
of the capital infusion; on the right-hand side, the eguitv account has increased by
the same amount. The investor, the so-called "strategic partner," now owns 50% of
this new equity and has management control. The Government owns the other 50%,
but it is the intention of the Bolivian Government to turn this half interest over to the
Bolivian people by contributing it to privately managed pension funds.
If the strategic partner manages well, he will have a satisfactory return on his
capital because his 50% interest in the newly invigorated company will be worth more
than a 100% interest in the company that existed previously. Both the investor and
the Bolivian people will benefit.
Of course, achieving this result will be a difficult task. The remainder of my
presentation will describe some of the major issues in implementing the capitalization
model relative to a railroad. Not only are these issues common to both privatization
and capitalization, they will be encountered in any transfer of railroad operations from
the government to the private sector.
III.
MAJOR ISSUES IN THE CAPITALIZATION OF ENFE
I would like to discuss five significant issues that we faced in the capitalization
of the Bolivian State Railway:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
the treatment of ENFE's debts;
the disposition of ENFE's excess real estate;
subsidies and tariffs;
the regulatory mechanism; and
what to do about excess employees.
These aren't the only issues, of course, and we probably haven't come up with
the definitive solution for any of them. Our goal was to come up with a solution that
would be, first, politically acceptable, and second, lead to a successful transaction.
We could not afford to alienate either the Bolivian people or the prospective investors.
If you do not satisfy both groups, you will not have a successful transaction.
Although my bias was toward making the transaction attractive to investors, the
Government had to deal with political realities. Usually, the political realities are the
deciding factor.
4
1.
The Treatment of ENFE's Debts
Regarding the treatment of the state railway company's debts,
we sought to
minimize the amount of debt to be assumed by the new company.
This was advisable
for two reasons: (1) the larger the amount of debt in the SAM
after the capitalization,
the less equity the investor would be willing to infuse; and
(2) much of ENFE's
existing debt was related to projects that a commercially operated
railway would never
have undertaken. Furthermore, servicing the old debt would
remove capital from the
SAM, thereby contradicting the intent of the capitalization, which
was to infuse cash
into the new company rather than remove it.
We decided to include in the opening balance sheet only that
portion of the
external debt directly related to the operating, non-infrastructure
assets,
that is,
locomotives, rolling stock, and equipment. Infrastructure assets
were not included in
the opening balance sheet of the new company; instead, the
right to use that
infrastructure was granted under a long-term concession.
"Infrastructure assets"
included land; track and track structure; and buildings, including
stations and shops.
This technique minimized the debt to be included, while leaving
a meaningful
amount of debt to be assumed by the new company. If the
bidders had been allowed
to suggest, as part of their bids, the amount of debt that they
would be willing to
assume, an aggressive bidder would have taken on as much
debt as possible (and
minimized his equity contribution). Fixing the amount of debt
any
assume discouraged such behavior. All the bidders were thereby bidder had to
given the same pro
forma balance sheet for the SAM; all agreed to assume the same
amount of debt.
Because it created a natural constraint on the bidding process,
this approach
discouraged bidders from creating the impression of a higher
bid by simply agreeing
to assume more debt.
At the same time, it would have been politically difficult to
allow the bidder to
begin with a completely "clean" balance sheet. Therefore, the
transfer of a low level of
debt that was supportable by the economics of the business
was a judicious
compromise. Because the people of Bolivia would be partners
in the new company,
the Government had to be concerned about the financial success
of the new
enterprise.
2. Disposition of Excess Real Estate
Relative to the disposition of excess real estate, the Government
decided that
all non-operating property, including real estate that could
be developed, should
remain in what we will call "ENFE Residual." This decision
was very important from a
strategic perspective, because otherwise the bidding process
would have been
distorted by the presence of bidders whose principal objective
was real estate
speculation rather than railway operations.
5
Proceeds from the orderly liquidation of this property will be used to fund
employee separations and repay that part of the external debt that was not
transferred to the SAMs. ENFE thereby would become a "liquidating trust," much like
the Railways Corporation in New Zealand or the Japan National Railways Settlement
Corporation, both of which were established for the same purpose.
3. Tariff and Subsidy Policy
Although the Government of Bolivia has not determined the exact outline of its
tariff policy, it has developed a plan for the gradual elimination of subsidies over a
five-year period. Tariff regulation is contemplated only where there is an absence of
effective competition.
We believe that it is very important to prepare a schedule for the gradual
elimination of subsidies. If all the bidders respond to the same schedule, it is easier
for the government to evaluate the bids. This technique is preferable to having each
bidder state his minimum required subsidy, or his own schedule for the elimination of
the subsidy. It reduces the possibility that bidders will propose a low required
subsidy in order to win the concession, and then threaten to discontinue railroad
operations if no additional subsidy is forthcoming.
In Bolivia, the government subsidy will be gradually replaced by a "subsidy"
created by the increased efficiency of the new operator. On the Oriental (the eastern
network that connects with Brazil), the old tariff, which was also the maximum tariff,
will be reduced by a "compulsory efficiency adjustment" of 7.5% each year as the
subsidy is gradually eliminated. On the Andina (the western network that connects
with Chile), where effective competition exists, there will be no compulsory efficiency
adjustment and no regulation of tariffs.
The fixed subsidy (on the Oriental) that existed before the capitalization acted
as a disincentive for ENFE to become more efficient, as well as a disincentive to the
development of a parallel road as an alternative mode of transportation. Tariffs for
soybeans had risen to a high level despite the subsidy. ENFE claimed that without
the subsidy, the transport of soybeans was uneconomical; at the same time, the
shippers said the subsidy was necessary to protect them from monopolistic pricing by
the railroad. The result was an excessive tariff for exactly the kind of traffic that the
railroad should have hauled most efficiently.
Under the new approach, protection against monopoly abuses on the Oriental
is accomplished by the yearly reduction in tariffs, and efficiency is promoted by the
eventual elimination of the subsidy. If the rate reductions had been more aggressive,
however, the soybean producers would not press for the completion of the new road
between Santa Cruz and Brazil. Now the railroad must become more efficient in order
to meet the actual or potential competition of the highway. Once the highway is built,
tariff limitations will no longer be necessary, because the highway will impose a
natural limit on how high those tariffs can be set.
6
4. The Regulatory Mechanism for the Railway
Sector
The regulatory model (including tariff
Bolivia. However, we know that most railroadregulation) has not yet been finalized in
regulation takes two fundamental
forms: the economic regulatory function
(analogous to that of the former Interstate
Commerce Commission in the United States),
and the safety function (analogous to
that of the Federal Railway Administration
in the United States).
In Bolivia, the gradual elimination of subsidies
will be closely related to the
development of a system of tariff regulation
that will accomplish two important
objectives: tariffs that assure the economic
viability of the new railroad companies,
and the protection of shippers from monopoly
abuses. Where there is effective
competition, the market will determine tariffs,
and the Government will not be
involved in determining the reasonableness
of rates.
Ultimately, we know that unless the Bolivian
railroads are allowed to set rates
based on economic forces, they will be unable
to
attract
sufficient capital to survive as
private enterprises. At the same time, the
system of regulation must ensure that
captive shippers are protected from the
effects of monopoly. The mechanism must
determine when rates applicable to such
"captive" commodities exceed a reasonable
level, consistent with the goal of providing
an
railway. The result should be a set of prices adequate return to the operator of the
those that are subject to certain regulatory that combines market based prices with
constraints.
Two other regulatory issues frequently
investors: standards for track maintenance, arose in our discussions with potential
and abandonments.
We recommended that the regulatory mechanism
include well-articulated
provisions for the abandonment or discontinuation
of
operations.
The new Bolivian
regulatory agency, in reaching a decision,
should
profitability of the line, the expense of continued balance such factors as the
operation, the likelihood of future
profitability, the availability of alternative
transportation, and the extent of harm to
local communities. These standards could
be similar to those in the United States,
where, based on public convenience and
necessity, the government permits the
termination of service after balancing the
needs of shippers and communities against
the burden on the rail carrier from continued
operation of the line in question.
We also recommended that maintenance
level of traffic on the line; this is best expressed standards should be related to the
in terms of the maximum operating
speed for the specific line. This would allow
the
because the operator would have an economic standards to be self-enforcing,
interest in maintaining an
economically important line at a high level.
Conversely,
he would not want to
maintain a little used line at a high standard.
Locomotives
and rolling stock, on the
other hand, should have absolute maintenance
and
safety
standards
unrelated to
track speed or economic justification.
7
5. Labor Issues
and job rights to which
Finally, labor issues, including severance benefits
aspects of the transfer of a
workers are entitled, are usually the most controversial
The simplest solution is to
railroad from the government to the private sector.
should be an economic issue
recommend that the number of retained workers
decided by the bidder.
workforce as possible to insure
We know that a railroad must have as small a
have the right to determine the
its economic viability; ideally, the bidder should
this view, redundant personnel should
number of workers needed. Consistent with
which would be responsible for all labor
become the responsibility of the Government,
liabilities arising out of the transaction.
view. It requested bidders to
In Bolivia, the Government chose to take this
of workers necessary for an efficient
specify what they thought was a reasonable level based on a composite of those
operation. A "required" level was then determinedremained with "ENFE residual,"
estimates. Workers not needed by the new SAMs
employment or the payment of severance
which will be responsible for their continued
benefits.
III.
CONCLUSION
overview of some of the
During this presentation, I have given you an
the regulatory system, have not
significant issues we faced in Bolivia. Some, notablywhile fundamentally sound, has
itself,
yet been finalized; the capitalization program
the technique of 'capitalization" and
about
talked
not yet been fully tested. I have
I have also described some of the
how it differs from a conventional privatization.
including the traditional
alternative models for the privatization of railways,
concession model.
achieved two significant things.
It is clear from our experience that Bolivia has
success, a new model for transferring
First, it has already implemented, with some
is well suited to capital-short
state enterprises to the private sector. This model
significant domestic opposition, it has
countries like Bolivia. Second, in the face of
traditional symbol of state sovereignty,
completed the transfer to private control of a
a politically difficult task has been
the national railroad system. The fact that such
of the model but to the
accomplished is a testament not only to the integrity
Government's resolve.
8
Seminaire de la Concession du Chemin de Fer
en Afrique
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire
le 13 - 14 octobre 1997
LA CAPITALISATION DU CHEMIN DE FER
BOLIVIEN
L'Experience de Privatisation en Bolivie
Benjamin L. Anderson, CFA, ASA
ANDERSON CONSULTING GROUP
90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700
New York,N.Y. 10016 USA
Bonjour. Je m'appelle Ben Anderson et je suis
le principal responsable de <<Anderson
Consulting Group >>ANew York City. J'ai eu
recemment le privilege de servir en tant que
Conseiller Strategique au Gouvernement de Bolivie
pour la capitalisation du Chemin de Fer de
Bolivie, aussi connu sous le nom de <<ENFE
>>. Le 14 decembre 1995, le Gouvemement de
Bolivie a vendu aux encheres un interet de 50
% dans chacune des deux nouvelles compagnies
crees Apartir de l'ENFE. Cruz Blanca est le
candidat qui, avec la meilleure offre, a remporte
ces
interets pour les deux compagnies.
Pendant ma presentation, je voudrais developper
la technique de <<capitalisation >>et
comment elle se differencie de la privatisation
conventionnelle des chemins de fer, ainsi que
du
modele traditionnel de concession. Puis je me
concentrerai sur certains problemes concernant
la
capitalisation de 1'ENFE (ou de toute autre privatisation
d'un chemin de fer), et la maniere dont
nous les avons resolu en Bolivie.
I. LE CHOIX DU MODELE DE PRIVATISATION
Il y a plusieurs manieres de privatiser un chemin
de fer. Choisir la meilleure methode est
de developper un ensemble de criteres pour
selectionner le modele de privatisation. Le
modele
qui satisfait la plus grande partie de ces criteres,
selon le contexte politique, social, et
economique d'un pays, est celui qui devra etre
choisit.
Les criteres sont les suivants
1. l'acceptabilite politique;
2. l'interet des investisseurs pour le secteur prive;
3. l'interet du gouvemement;
4. les avantages disponibles du reseau pour
le maintien de l'integrite du systeme national;
5. la somme realisee des benefices/avantages
de privatisation;
6. le degre et la complexite des regulations
exigees; et
7. la minimisation des obstacles legaux Ala
privatisation.
ceux utilise en Argentine, au Bresil, et en
Le modele regional de concession -- tel que
bien qu'il
de privatisation qui peuvent etre identifies,
modeles
neuf
moins
d'au
l'un
est
Bolivie
dont ils sont classifies. Divises en trois categories
puisse y en avoir plus ou moins selon la facon
majeures, les modeles sont les suivants:
A. Transaction d'Entite Simple
1.
2.
3.
4.
reconstruction prealable
La vente en tant qu'entite simple, sans aucune
aucune reconstruction prealable
La concession en tant qu'entite simple, sans
reconstruction
La vente en tant qu'entite, precedee par une
une reconstruction
La concession en tant qu'entite, precedee par
B. Transaction de Sous-systeme
1. La vente de sous-systemes regionaux
2. La concession de sous-systemes regionaux
C. La Separation des Operations de l'Infrastructure
sur le systeme de chemin de fer en
1. L'accord de droits d'operation exclusifs
entier
ouvert >>) sur le systeme de chemin
2. L'accord de droits non-exclusifs (<< acces
de fer en entier
des portions designees du systeme
3. L'accord de droits exclusifs ou non sur
national
de discuter de toutes les caracteristiques de
Malheureusement, nous n'avons pas de temps
nous les rendre plus familiers. Deux des
chaque modele, mais quelques exemples peuvent
New Zealand Railways, tous les deux representant
modeles les mieux connus sont Conrail et
Et
tant qu'entite, precedee par une reconstruction.
l'option A-3, celle concemant la vente en
de
le Bresil, et la Bolivie ont choisit le modele
l'Argentine,
t6t,
plus
dit
l'avons
nous
comme
et
exemples significatifs comprennent la Suede
concession regionale, l'option B-2. D'autres
des
la troisieme categorie, la Categorie C, <<separation
de
variations
les
utilisent
qui
l'Angleterre,
operations de l'infrastructure >>.
la
de concession regionale, tout du moins de
L'un des avantages principaux du modele
minimum
est qu'il exige un investissement prealable
maniere dont il a ete applique en Argentine,
sous-systeme,
Typiquement, dans une transaction de
par le gouvernement avant la privatisation.
Le concessionnaire realise une augmentation
le chemin de fer n'est pas rehabilite en premier.
de concession, ce qui soulage le gouvemement
prevue du capital comme specifie dans le contrat
de fer avant sa privatisation. D'ailleurs, la
de l'obligation de restaurer le bon etat du chemin
cesse immediatement avec le
subvention des pertes d'operation par le gouvemement que quelqu'un (d'habitude le
bien
commencement des operations du concessionnaire,
ces
financiere pour les travailleurs deplaces. Tous
gouvemement) doive prendre la responsabilite
2
facteurs, except6 les indemnites de rupture des travailleurs,
font que le modele est tres attractif
pour le gouvemement, tout en satisfaisant le critere
#3.
Si les travailleurs deplaces re9oivent des indemnites
de rupture, l'acceptabilite politique
de la privatisation est augmentee (satisfaisant le premier
critere), et le fait que le gouvemement
(pas le concessionnaire) puisse payer pour ces benefices
aide Asatisfaire le critere #2 (l'int6ret
des investisseurs).
Le modele de concession regionale evite egalement d'autres
problemes. Le manque de
bon titre de propriete devient moins significative car
tous les droits sauf le titre de propriete est
transfere au concessionnaire. Cela nous aide Arealiser
le critere #7, la minimisation des
obstacles legaux.
L'acceptabilite politique (qui reste le critere le plus important!)
est de plus augmentee par
le modele de concession regionale puisque l'accord de
concession peut etre pr6sente au public en
tant qu'etape temporaire (au lieu d'un vente irreversible)
qui peut ou non aboutir Ala
privatisation complete. Le gouvernement peut recuperer
par la suite la propriete en cas
d'expiration de la concession, ou apres infraction du contrat
de concession par le
concessionnaire.
La preservation des avantages du reseau (critere #4) n'a
pas ete un facteur significatif en
Bolivie puisque le chemin de fer national etait dejA divis6
en deux systemes s6pares qui n'ont pas
e connectes entre eux. D'ailleurs, plusieurs avantages
d'un chemin de fer national integre
peuvent etre preserves en faisant des provisions pour
une cooperation volontaire (comme le cas
des Etats-Unis avec « The Association of American
Railroads >>) ou par la regulation. Par
exemple, le Bresil developpe maintenant des mecanismes
de cooperation volontaire afin
d'integrer les operations de six concessions regionales.
Les systemes regionaux multiples reduisent la quantite
aussi bien que la complexite de la
regulation exigee, qui nous aide Asatisfaire le critere
# 6. Plusieurs concessions constituent une
base pour juger l'equite des tarifs d'un chemin de fer
face Aceux des autres, tout comme le
phenomene de comparaison des tarifs entre les different
foumisseurs d'electricite aux Etats-Unis.
Pourtant, la comparaison la plus significative est celle
concemant les modes de transport, autre
que les chemins de fer, sauf dans le cas d'un monopole
lorsque les affreteurs n'ont qu'un seul
moyen de transport A leur disposition.
II. RESUME DU PROGRAMME DE LA CAPITALISATION
BOLIVIENNE
Maintenant je voudrais decrire le modele choisi par
la Bolivie et comment ce pays a
employe une technique exceptionnelle afin d'accomplir
ce qui a ete realise par < privatisationx>
dans les autres pays. En Bolivie, le chemin de fer d'Etat
n'a pas t <<vendu >>dans le sens
conventionnel. L'entreprise a et plut6t < capitalisee >>
par l'apport d'un nouveau capital dans
une somme egale a la valeur comptable de l'equite de
la societe, pour laquelle l'actionnaire a
requ un interet du droit de propriete et du contr6le de
gestion. Chaque compagnie recemment
capitalisee (appelee la <<SAM »>,ou Sociedad Anomina
Mixta) s'est vu accordee une concession
3
national pendant une periode de 30
exclusive a operer sur une section designee du chemin de fer
<<l'Andina >>et
ans. En Bolivie, le systeme national a ete divise en deux sous-systemes,
(<l'Oriental. >>. Chacun a e le sujet d'une capitalisation separee.
50% de la compagnie
Je dois preciser que ce n'etait pas un cas oui l'investisseur a achete
ou un apport de capital dans la
du gouvernement Bolivien. Ceci etait plutot une contribution,
que quand l'actionnaire prend le
compagnie. Le difference entre ceci et une privatisation est
la tresorerie de la compagnie, et
contr6le de la compagnie, l'argent qu'il a verse est encore dans
non pas dans la tresorerie du Gouvernement.
on verra que d'un
Si nous regardons le bilan de la compagnie nouvellement capitalisee,
et que de l'autre le compte d'equite
cote le compte d'especes a augmente du montant de l'apport,
strategique >>, possede maintenant
a augmente de la m8me somme. L'actionnaire, ou <<partenaire
Le gouvemement possede
50% de cette nouvelle equite et detient le contr6le de la gestion.
cette moitie au peuple en contribuant
l'autre 50%, mais le gouvemement Bolivien compte donner
aux caisses de retraite gerees en prive.
un benefice satisfaisant sur
Si le partenaire strategique gere correctement, il aura en retour
vaudra plus qu'un interet de
son capital puisque son interet de 50% dans la compagnie fortifiee,
et le peuple Bolivien en
100% dans la compagnie qui a existe auparavant. L'actionnaire
beneficieront tous les deux.
de ma presentation decrira
Bien entendu, un tel resultat sera difficile a obtenir. Le reste
de capitalisation relatif a un
quelques problemes principaux dans l'implementation du modele
et la capitalisation, et ils seront
chemin de fer. Ces problemes sont communs a la privatisation
de fer du gouvemement vers le
rencontres dans tous les transferts des operations de chemin
secteur prive.
DE L'ENFE
III. PROBLEMES RENCONTRES LORS DE LA CAPITALISATION
lors de la capitalisation du
Je voudrais developper cinq problemes significatifs rencontres
Chemin de Fer Bolivien:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
la traitement des dettes de 1'ENFE;
la disposition des exces d'immobilier de 1'ENFE;
les subventions et les tarifs;
le mecanisme regulateur; et
que faire avec l'excedent d'employes.
certainement pas trouve
Ce ne sont pas les seules problemes, bien entendu, et nous avons
trouver une solution qui soit
une solution definitive pour chacun d'eux. Notre but a ete de
deboucherait sur une
d'abord acceptable politiquement et qui dans un deuxieme temps,
le peuple Bolivien, pas plus
transaction reussie. Nous ne pouvions pas nous permettre d'ecarter
groupes simultanement, il n'est
que les eventuels investisseurs. En ne satisfaisant pas les deux
pas possible d'aboutir a une transaction reussie.
Bien que mon penchant ait e de rendre la
transaction attrayante aux investisseurs, le gouvemement
a dfu faire face Ades realites politiques.
Habituellement, les realites politiques forment
le facteur de decision.
1. Le Traitement des Dettes de 1'ENFE
En ce qui conceme les dettes du Chemin de Fer
de l'Etat, nous avons oeuvre de facon a
reduire au minimum la dette qui devrait etre assumee
par la nouvelle compagnie. Ceci a e le
meilleur choix pour deux raisons: (1) le plus le
montant de la dette du SAM apres la
capitalisation, le moins l'investisseur auraient voulu
investir, et (2) une grosse partie des dettes
existantes de 1'ENFE correspondait Ades projets
qu'une operation commerciale du chemin de fer
n'aurait pas pu supporter. De plus, combler l'ancienne
dette aurait diminue le capital du SAM
s'opposant ainsi a l'intention de capitalisation qui
etait d'augmenter le capital plut6t que de le
diminuer.
Nous avons decide d'inclure dans le premier bilan
seulement la partie de la dette externe
directement en relation avec les biens operationnels
hors infrastructure, c'est-A-dire, locomotives,
wagons, et l'equipement. Les biens d'infrastructure
n'ont pas ete inclus dans le premier bilan de
la nouvelle compagnie, alors que le droit d'utilisation
de cette infrastructure a ete accordee sous
une concession Along terme. Les biens d'infrastructure
inclussent le terrain, les voies et leurs
structures, ainsi que les batiments comprenant
gares et ateliers.
Cette technique a minimise la dette Ainclure, tout
en laissant un montant consequent de la
dette a la charge de la nouvelle societe. Si les encherisseurs
avaient ete autorises Asuggerer le
montant de la dette qu'ils voulaient prendre en
charge, un encherisseur agressif aurait suggerer
le
plus gros montant possible (en minimisant ainsi
sa contribution d'equite). En fixant le montant
de la dette a prendre en charge par tout encherisseur,
un tel comportement a ete evite. Tous les
encherisseurs ont donc fourni le meme bilanproforma
pour le SAM, tous d'accord pour
supporter la meme charge de dettes. Parce que
cela Acr6e une contrainte naturelle sur le
processus d'encherissement, cette approche a decourage
les encherisseurs de creer l'impression
de hautes encheres en acceptant de supporter plus
de dettes.
En meme temps, il aurait ete politiquement difficile
d'autoriser un encherisseur A
commencer avec un bilan compltement propre.
C'est pourquoi le transfert d'une dette de bas
niveau Asupporter par le resultat economique
de l'entreprise a ete un bon compromis. Parce
que
le peuple de Bolivie d6sirait etre partenaire de
la nouvelle societe, le Gouvemement a e
concern6 par le succes financier de la nouvelle
entreprise.
2. La Disposition des Exces d'Infrastructure
Gouvemement a decide que
Concernant la disponibilite des exces d'infrastructure, le
etre developpees, devrait rester
toute propriete non operationnelle, incluant les biens qui pourrait
a ete tres importante pour la
dans ce que nous appelons 1'<< ENFE residual »>. Cette decision
aurait ete deforme par la
perspective de strategie parce que sinon le processus d'encherissement
immobiliere plut6t que les
presence d'encherisseurs dont le principal objectif est la speculation
operations de chemin de fer.
seront utilis6s afin de fournir les
Les benefices de la liquidation progressive de ces biens
la dette externe non transferee au SAM.
terminaisons des employes et de financer cette partie de
la meme maniere que <<Railways
ENFE deviendrait alors une compagnie en liquidation, de
Railways Settlement Corporation »,
Corporation >>en Nouvelle-Zelande ou que <<Japan National
qui ont tous les deux e crees dans le meme dessein.
3. Politique des Tarifs et Subventions
exactement sa politique de
Bien que le Gouvemement de Bolivie n'a pas determine tres
des subventions pendant une periode de
tarifs, il a developpe un plan pour l'elimination graduelle
la oiu il y a une absence de competition
cinq ans. La regulation des tarifs est observee seulement
efficace.
l'elimination graduelle des
Nous croyons qu'il est important de preparer un plan pour
il est alors plus facile pour le
subventions. Si les encherisseurs repondent au meme plan,
est preferable plutot que d'avoir chaque
Gouvemement d'evaluer les encheres. Cette technique
ou son propre plan d'elimination des
encherisseur qui fournit son attente minimale de subvention
soumette une demande de
subventions. Cela reduit les risques que chaque encherisseur
ils menacent de cesser l'activite du
subvention minime pour obtenir la concession et qu'ensuite
chemin de fer si d'autres subventions ne sont pas versees.
remplacee par une
En Bolivie, la subvention du Gouvernement sera progressivement
operateur. Du c6te Oriental (le
«subvention >>generee par la meilleure efficacite du nouvel
egalement le plus eleve, sera reduit par
reseau de l'est qui relie le Bresil), l'ancien tarif qui etait
annee jusqu'A ce que la subvention
un <<rajustement d'efficacite obligatoire >»de 7.5 % chaque
qui est relie au Chili), oii
soit graduellement eliminee. Sur l'Andina (le reseau de l'ouest
d'efficacite obligatoire >>et pas de
veritable competition existe, il n'y aura pas de <<rajustement
regulation de tarifs.
capitalisation a agit comme
La subvention fixee (sur l'Oriental) qui existait avant la
efficace, et empechant 6galement le
mesure dissuasive, empechant 1'ENFE de devenir plus
de transport. Les tarifs pour les
developpement d'une autoroute parallele comme alternative
L'ENFE a pretendu que, sans la
graines de soja ont atteint un haut niveau malgre la subvention.
en meme temps les affreteurs
subvention, le transport des graines de soja n'etait pas economique;
contre le prix monopolistique
ont pretendu que la subvention etait necessaire pour les premunir
exactement le type de trafic que le
du chemin de fer. Le resultat a e un tarif excessif pour
6
chemin de fer aurait du transporte le plus efficacement.
Avec la nouvelle approche, une protection contre les abus du monopole sur l'Oriental
est
etablie par une reduction des tarifs a l'annee, et l'efficacite est promue par l'eventuelle
elimination de la subvention. Si les rabais avait pourtant ete plus agressives, les
producteurs des
graines de soja n'insisteraient pas pour l'achevement de la nouvelle route entre
Santa Cruz et le
Bresil. A present, le chemin de fer doit devenir plus efficace afin d'atteindre
l'efficacite reelle ou
potentielle de l'autoroute. Des que l'autoroute est construite, des limitations
de tarifs ne seront
plus necessaires parce que l'autoroute imposera une limite naturelle concernant
la hauteur
possible des tarifs.
4. Le Mecanisme de Regulation Pour le Secteur Ferroviaire
Le modele regulateur (comprenant la regulation des tarifs) n'est pas encore
finalise en
Bolivie. Par contre, nous savons que la plupart des regulations ferroviaires
prennent deux formes
fondamentales: la fonction de regulation economique (analogue a celle de l'ancienne
<<Interstate
Commerce Commission >>aux Etats-Unis) ; et la fonction de securite (analogue
a celle de la <<
Federal Railway Administration >>aux Etats-Unis).
En Bolivie, l'elimination progressive des subventions sera liee etroitement
au
developpement d'un systeme de regulation des tarifs qui aboutir a deux
objectives importantes:
les tarifs qui assure la viabilite economique des nouvelles compagnies
ferroviaires, et la
protection des affreteurs contre les abus d'un monopole. La ofi il y a la
veritable competition, le
marche determinera les tarifs, et le Gouvernement n'aura pas a s'engager
dans un choix
raisonnable de tarifs.
Finalement, nous savons qu'a moins que les chemins de fer boliviens
soient autorises a
definir les tarifs base sur les forces economiques, ils seront incapables d'attirer
un capital
suffisant pour survivre en tant qu'entreprise privee. En meme temps, le
systeme de regulation
doit assurer que les affreteurs qui n'ont qu'un seul moyen de transport
a leur disposition (les
<<affreteurs captives >>) sont bien proteges contre les effets d'un monopole.
Le mecanisme doit
determiner quand les imp6ts locaux applicables de telles commodites <<
captives >>excedent un
niveau raisonnable, compatible avec le but de fournir un benefice convenable
a l'operateur du
reseau ferroviaire. Le resultat devrait etre une s6rie des prix combinant
les prix du base du
marche avec ceux qui sont sujets a certaines astreintes de regulation.
Deux autres problemes reguliers frequemment abordes dans nos discussions
avec les
investisseurs potentiels: les standards pour le maintenance des voies ferrees
et les abandons.
Nous avons recommande que le mecanisme regulateur inclue les conditions
bien
articulees pour l'abandon ou la discontinuite des operations. La nouvelle
agence regulatrice
bolivienne, en abordant une decision, devrait peser de tels facteurs face
a la rentabilite de la
ligne, la depense d'une operation continue, la vraisemblance de rentabilite
future, la disponibilite
d'une alternative de transport, et l'etendue des nuisances aux communautes
locales. Ces
standards pourraient etre similaires aux ceux des Etats-Unis oui, base sur
les avantages et l'utilite
7
publique, le gouvemement autorise l'arret des services apres avoir evalue les besoins des
affreteurs et des communautes contre le fardeau de l'operateur en fournissant le service en
question.
Nous recommandons egalement que les standards de maintenance soient lies au niveau de
trafic sur la ligne; cela est mieux exprime en termes d'une vitesse maximum approprie pour la
ligne en question. Cela permettrait les standards d'etre autosuffisant, puisque l'operateur aurait
un interet economique Amaintenir une ligne lucrative Aun haut niveau. Les locomotives et les
wagons, d'autre part devraient avoir des standards de maintenance et de securite absolus sans
rapport avec la vitesse de la voie ferree ou la justification economique.
5.
Les Questions du Travail
Finalement, les questions de travail, comprenant les indemnites de rupture et les droits de
travail auxquels les travailleurs sont attaches, sont habituellement les aspects les plus
controverses du transfert d'un chemin de fer du secteur public au secteur prive. La solution la
plus simple est de recommander que le nombre des travailleurs retenus doit etre une question
decidee par l'encherisseur.
Nous savons qu'un chemin de fer doit avoir le plus petit main d'oeuvre que possible afin
d'assurer sa viabilite economique ; idealement, l'encherisseur doit avoir le droit de determiner le
nombre des travailleurs necessaires. En accord avec cette consideration, le personnel superflu
doit devenir la responsabilite du Gouvemement, qui serait alors responsable pour tous manques
de travail relevant de cette transaction.
En Bolivie, le Gouvemement a choisit cette position. I1 a demande Ace que les
encherisseurs precisent ce qu'ils estiment etre un nombre raisonnable des travailleurs necessaires
pour une operation efficace. Un niveau <<exige >>a e enfin determine base sur un melange de
ces previsions. Les travailleurs qui n'etaient pas demandes par les nouveaux SAMs sont restes
avec 1'<< ENFE Residual >>, qui sera responsable pour la continuite de leur emploi ou pour le
paiement d'indemnites de rupture.
IV. CONCLUSION
Au cours de cette presentation, je vous ai presente un resume de quelques questions
significatives auxquelles nous avons et confrontes en Bolivie. Quelques-unes, notamment A
propos du systeme de regulation, n'ont pas encore ete finalises; bien que le programme de
capitalisation soit solide, il n'a pas encore ete completement epreuve. J'ai parle de la technique
de <<capitalisation >>et comment elle se differencie d'une privatisation conventionnelle. J'ai
egalement decrit aussi certains modeles alternatifs pour la privatisation ferroviaire, incluant le
modele traditionnel de la concession.
I1est evident Apartir de notre experience que la Bolivie a acheve deux elements
significatives. D'abord, elle a dejA mis en cruvre, avec succes, un nouveau modele pour
transferer les entreprises etatises au secteur prive. Ce modele est bien assorti aux pays a faibles
8
capitaux comme la Bolivie. Deuxiemement, en face d'une opposition nationale
significative, elle
a acheve le transfert au controle prive d'un symbole traditionnel de la souverainete
de l'etat, le
systeme national du chemin de fer. Le fait qu'une telle tache politiquement difficile
a ete realisde
est un preuve non seulement de l'integrite du modele, mais aussi de la volonte du
Gouvemement.
i
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i
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1
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I
ANNEX 2
Africa iranspow
Technical Note
R)X
Railway Restructuring (RR)
A New Approach to Restructutring Railways in Sub-Saharan Africa
Concessioning of Rail Transport
Karim-JacquesBudin
T
I f he concessioning of rail op-
This-Article was5 pubIshued itherativity,
July-August 1995 issue of the rail-
The purpose of this series is to
share information on studies of the
SSATP. The opinions expressed in
SSTh
sTudieshae thoseiof thexauthosiitself
and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the World Bank or any of
its affiliated organizations.
For information on these notes,L
contact Leita Jones in the Africa
Technical Department of the
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Internet address:
Ijones2@worldbank-org-
The primary goal of concessioning
rail transport is to increase efficiency.
This happens when the railway op-
erator manages the operations in a
solidly commercial way, adapted to
the needs of the market.
Concessioning also clearly defines
relationships between the state and
the rail operator and, in particular,
prevents the state from mismanaging day-to-day railway operations,
which is often at the root of railway
corporations' problems. Whatever
formal measures may exist concerning the management autonomy of
3
the railway, the railway's status as a
erations is a partnership be- public enterprise still leaves it open
tween the state and a private to state mismanagement.
operator (the concessionaire) in
which, while maintaining ownership Finally, concessioning is the opporof rail infrastructure, the state trans- tunity -in the same way other refers railway operations to the con- structuring plans would be -to free
cessionaire under conditions spelled the railway sector of "past sins," esout in a concession agreement. Rail- pecially railway corporations' weak
way operations are handled by the financial structure and overstaffing.
concessionaire as a commercial ac- Concessioning should bring an imat its own expense and risk. provement in the financial perforDepending on the mode of invest- mance of the rail sector, which
ment financing, the railway conces- would then cease imposing a heavy
sion is generally made up of two dis- burden on public finances. The
tinct legal structures: the concession state's financial contributions in the
and a leasing arrangement. Rail- sector would then be limited to
way concessioning is not a complete
whatever compensation its public
privatization of rail activity since the service obligations might impose on
state retains ownership of the infra- the railway.
structure and, conceivably, some of
*
the railway equipment.
Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)
*
Concessioning's
"Rules of the Game"
The concession's mechanisms are
defined by the concession agreement,
a contract signed between the state
and the concessionaire. The principal mechanisms cover the scope of
the concession, the regulatory framework for rail activity, the management of railway infrastructure and
the locomotives and railway wagons,
the concessionaire's staff, the concession fee, the tax scheme applicable
to rail activity, the duration of the
concession, and the monitoring of
UNECA -aKid The Woirid Baink
__
2
of the 20th
At the end of the 19th and the beginning oferathe
2h
ads te beginning
Atteendtofithe 19thmanyr
centuries, many railroads were built and operated by
private enterprises under a concessioning scheme,
most notably in Europe, Latin America and North Africa. Beginning inthe 1930s, this railway management
method gave way, for the most part, to state management, generally through national corporations. Today,
State management is the rule in almost all the railroads
of Sub-Saharan Africa. While in the past few years
many railroads in developing countries have suffered
through a major crisis, private sector operation of rail
activity in a concessioning framework now appears to
be a promising method for restructuring, thus permitting railroads to be converted to commercial enter-
prises. The formula was first used in the early 1990s
in Argentina, where the existing rail network was re-
-Transport en Afrique
Railway activity regilatoryframework.The regulatory
the
framework for railway activity must encourage
concessionaire to adopt commercial behavior as well
as encourage competition with other transport modes.
Since railway activity is essentially commercial, operated in a competitive and deregulated environment,
the concessionaire must be free to set configuration,
fix public tariffs, and negotiate individual contracts
with large freight forwarders. At the request of the
state, or locality, the concessionaire might also be
required to run certain operations as a public service,
particularly those for local, rural, or sub-urban passenger transport. These operations should be conducted under specific agreements signed with the state
or locality, with the concessionaire receiving compensation for deficits incurred while carrying out the
public service obligation.
structured, forming six freight railways and three groups
of suburban railways, all concessioned. In Sub-Saharan Africa, C6te d'lvoire and Burkina Faso signed a
joint concession agreement in December 1994 with the
private corporation SITARAIL for the operation of the
agreement
The agreement
railway.
Abidjan/Ouagadougou/Kaya
. Inlightofthe
Abidjan/toutagadoffectiugou/sat r
was to take effect in August 1995. In light of the (still
The state would also compensate the concessionaire
for other public service obligations imposed, such as
Budin, Railway Specialist in the Transport division of
the World Bank, here introduces the main features of
railway operations concessions and examines the options and methods which might be recommended for
putting a concession into practice.
by the concessionaire. This would be allowed after a
period of exclusive operation granted to the concessionaire for a few years at the beginning of the concession. Any third-party operators that the state assigned after examining the concessionaire would use
rare) recent experiences on the subject, Karm-Jacques
fare reductions for certain clients, or the maintenance
of infrastructure for national defense. To dissuade or
prevent either rate abuse by the concessionaire ona
market segments where the railway might enjoy
no
ih influence
ala
hr hfalling
tsget
mak
under the
or rail activity
monopoly,
of a cartel, the concession agreement should allow
for other operators on the infrastructure managed
the infrastructure, on a non-discriminatory basis, for
a fee paid to the concessionaire.
the concession by the state and the resolution of con- Management of railway infrastructure.Although owned
by the state, railway infrastructure ismanaged and mainflicts between the state and the concessionaire.
tained under the technical and financial responsibility
Scope of the concession. The concessionaire will usually of the concessionaire. The concessionaire should be able
be responsible for (i)the technical and commercial op- to establish maintenance standards and methods, with
eration of freight and passenger rail transport services the caveat that rail traffic safety, according4o the nature
and activities linked to transport; (ii)the operation, of the operations, not be compromised. The concessionmaintenance, refurbishment and expansion of existing aire also has responsibility for initiating, establishing,
rail infrastructure (excluding new construction of infra- and supervising infrastructure improvement and expanstructure expansion, which generally remains the respon- sion programs.
sibility of the state); and (iii) routine management of the
public railway domain. Generally, separating the man- Management of locomotives and rolling stock. The conagement of transportation services (carried out by the cessionaire must be granted complete responsibility for
concessionaire) from management of infrastructure (car- determining the number, features, and origin of the loried out by a separate public agency) is not a solution. comotives, freight wagons, passenger coaches, and other
On the other hand, it may be advantageous to assign rail equipment. The concessionaire decides whether to
the operation of passenger services to a different opera- purchase, rent or lease equipment, and selects equiptor than the concessionaire. In such a case, the passen- ment for the operation from among that available at
ger operator would run its trains - for a fee - on the the outset of the concession. This equipment is generally bought or, more often, rented by the concessioninfrastructure managed by the concessionaire.
Note technique
aire from the state on commercial terms. New equipment needed to develop or expand the concession during its course will be acquired or rented directly by the
concessionaire, without state intervention; however,
the state should maintain the right to lay first claim on
equipment sold by the concessionaire, particularly during the last years of the concession.
Concessionaire's Staff. For effective management, the
concessionaire's staff must be governed by legislation
13
carry out adequate policy on investments, staffing, and
marketing. However, the state should also be wary of
choosing too long a concession, which could reduce the
concessionaire's incentive to remain competitive. These
two contradictory needs can be reconciled by adopting
a "rolling" concession, of an initial 20 years or so, which
can be extended by both parties after each five-year period for successive five-year periods.
StateMonitoringofthe Concession andDispute Resolution.
and regulations (work code, collective agreements) applicable to private sector companies and be affiliated with
the private sector's health insurance and retirement
funds. The special status which railway workers in many
railway corporations enjoy (often like that of civil servants) cannot be preserved. When a railway corporation is handicapped by redundant staff, as is often the
case, the concessionaire cannot be required to hire all
the existing staff. At the start of the concession, the concessionaire selects the employees whom it wishes to hire
from among the staff of the railway corporation. The
state bears responsibility for severance programs and
for training and re-employment for personnel not hired
by the concessionaire. The state will also have to deal
with questions of rail workers previously covered by
special social benefit plans (special fund for the railway
The state's monitoring of the concession should not interfere with the management of the concessionaire's
company. In practice, monitoring should apply to the
safety of rail operations and environmental protection.
The concessionaire should send the state information
on its activity in documents whose content and issuing
are clearly specified in the concession agreement. An
annual audit of the concession, exploring the conditions
in which the mechanisms called for in the agreement
are applied, should be carried out by an independent
auditor. Finally, litigation concerning the concession
agreement should be handled through arbitration, preferably, for example, according to the arbitration rules
of the International Chamber of Commerce.
corporation, civil servants' funds).
Choosing the Concessionaire
Concessionfees. In exchange for the use of rail infrastructure and the right to operate rail services, the concessionaire will pay the state a concession fee. This fee can
be either a fixed annual sum, which could vary from
year to year, and be indexed to inflation, or established
according to the physical volume of rail traffic; or, it
can be set as a percentage of the concessionaire's receipts.
In addition to this fee, the concessionaire pays rent to
the state on rolling stock, as well as specific annuities
owed on any investments the state has made in infrastructure upgrading and expansion.
Once the rules have been defined to promote the business-like management of rail transport, in healths competition with other transport modes, the concessionaire
must be carefully chosen.
To be effective, the concessioning company must possess strong leadership which is committed to the idea
that rail transport management be on commercial
grounds, and is commited to implementing this approach. This requirement will be met by having a strategic investor within the concession corporation who
holds a majority on the board of directors and designates the company's general manager. The strategic investor must hold a significant - not necessarily a majority - share of the company's capital. International
competitive bidding to choose the strategic investor is
strongly recommended; this guarantees the transparency
of the selection and, if done properly, yields the most
favorable proposals. Choosing the strategic investor by
direct negotiation would be acceptable only in very special cases, such as when the concession is awarded to an
almost exclusive user of the railroad.
Taxation. The tax scheme applicable to the concessionaire must be the common law applicable to private corporations in the transport sector. In the concession agreement, the state must guarantee that it will not impose
any special taxes which might introduce distortions into
competition between the railway and other transporters. Since the concessionaire will bear the expense of
maintaining, upgrading, and developing railway infrastructure, petroleum products used in locomotives and
other engine cars should be exempted from the portion
of the fuel tax collected by the state as user costs for
road infrastructure.
The concession corporation's shares, other than those
held by the strategic investor, would be acquired accordDuration of the concession. The concession should last ing to mechanisms defined by local capital market conlong enough to allow the concessionaire to form and ditions. When a stock exchange exists locally, listing the
4 1
stock on the stock exchange (following, if necessary, a
period of stock carrying either by the strategic investor
or by other organizations) is one way of fulfilling the
company's equity subscription. The concession
corporation's staff can also enjoy privileged conditions
for acquiring shares of the capital. At first glance it may
seem inadvisable for the state to acquire capital in the
concession corporation; but this isacceptable if its share
is a minority one and its stock does not form part of
that of the strategic investor. State shareholding should
also be planned so as not to open the door to meddling
in the company's management. In fact, if public minority shareholding in the concession company's capital
becomes necessary, the shares should be held by a public establishment which has a direct interest in the
smooth running of railway operations, such as, for example, a port enterprise.
Transport en Afrique
* In a final selection phase, the candidates chosen after
the second phase will be invited to make an offer of
their proposed concession fees, based on the concession
agreement details as finalized by state decree. The candidate with the highest offer will then be selected as strategic investor for the concession company.
Ideally, this bidding process should take about twelve
months. Four to six additional months would be required for the concessionaire to prepare the railway's
operational start-up (creation of a corporation, employee
selection, etc.).
The state must set up a structure for liquidating the
former public railway corporation (this could be the
public railway corporation itself). The liquidation structure will carry out a staff redeployment and reduction
plan for those not hired by the concessionaire, resolve
In all cases, local private stockholders should be encour- questions concerning employee retirement funds for
aged to invest in the capital of the concession corpora- those belonging to special retirement schemes, and sell
tion, including the strategic investor. Ifnecessary, a mini- the railway assets not taken by the concessionaire. This
mum percentage of local private stockholders could be liquidation structure must also ensure the financial settlement (payment of debts and arrears) of the former railimposed on candidates.
way corporation.
Recent experiences involving the choice of strategic investors for concessioning companies -whether for rail- As with many railways in developing, and developed,
ways or in more-or-less similar sectors (water, electric countries, Sub-Saharan Africa's railways are now at a
energy, telecommunications) - point to a three-step crossroads. Facing increased competition, the African
set of recommendations for the use of international com- railways will play an important role in the national and
regional transportation systems only if they reform their
petitive bidding:
management practices and redefine their economic role
* The first step concerns the pre-qualification of candi- by concentrating on the market segments where they
dates for strategic investor. In practice, it is always made perform better than their competitors.
up of consortia. The pre-qualification process is based
on technical capacity and financial stability criteria. This Where the state has the will to reform railway transstep must be preceded by an intense effort to find po- port completely and wishes to make full use of the
strengths of the private sector, both foreign and national,
tential candidates in order to open up competition.
the concessioning of railway operations seems one of
* The pre-qualified candidates receive a complete con- the most promising techniques for transforming the railsultation file which will include, most importantly, the road into a true commercial enterprise.
proposed concession agreement. The candidates will be
invited to present a draft medium-term business plan,
including their comments and suggestions on the proposed concession agreement. The state and the candidates will then discuss these matters. Following these discussions, for the final step of the procedure, the state will
select the candidates that present a satisfactory business
plan and will finalize the text of the concession agreement.
21rw.ibrt en Afr,'ije11
IIIcD -!technique x e
N
t..q
.L.. T-iL c h n.que
e
Note No. Io
Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) Railway
Restructuring(RR)
UNECA and the NVorld Bank
La Mise en Concession
de 1'Exploitation Ferroviaire
Julillet 1997
Une Nouvelle Approche de la Restructuration
des Chemins de Fer en Afrique Sub-Saharienne
L
Karim-Jacques Budin
a concession d'exploitation ferroviaire peut etre d6flnie comme une forme
e partenariat entre l'Etat et un op6rateur priv6 ("le concessionnaire")
dans laquelle I'Etat conserve la propri6t6 des infrastructures ferroviaires et
transfere 1'exploitation de l'activit6 ferroviaire au concessionnaire, dans
des
conditions specifiees dans une convention de concession. Lactivite ferroviaire
sera exploitee par le concessionnaire a titre d'activit6 commerciale, a
ses frais,
risques et perils. La concession ferroviaire sera en g6neral un melange des
deux
formes juridiques que distinguent, en fonction du mode de financement des
investissements, les juristes de tradition frangaise, la concession stricto sensu,
investissements, juristes
d'une part, et l'affermage, d'autre part.lesLa
concession ferroviaire n'est pas
privatisation de l'activite ferroviaire au sens complet, puisque l'Etat conserveune
la
propriete des infrastructures (et, eventuellement, d'une partie du materiel
ferroviaire).
Le principal objectif de la mise en concession de l'activit6 ferroviaire est
d'accroitre l'efficacite des transports ferroviaires, grace a la mise en oeuvre
par
l'operateur, soumis aux disciplines de gestion du secteur prive, d'une gestion
type resolument commerciale de l'activit6, orient6e vers la satisfaction des de
besoins du march6. La formule permet egalement de clarifier les relations
entre
l'Etat et l'op6rateur ferroviaire, et interdit notamment l'ing6rence de l'Etat
dans
la gestion courante de l'activite ferroviaire, ingerence qui est souvent pour
une
part importante aLl'origine des difficultes des entreprises ferroviaires et
que, dans
la pratique et quelles que soient les dispositions formelles relatives a l'autonomie
de gestion de l'entreprise ferroviaire, le statut d'entreprise publique du chemin
de fer peut toujours laisser craindre. La mise en concession est enfin l'occasion
- au m8me titre que le seraient d'autres schemas
de restructuration - de
lib6rer le secteur ferroviaire des "p6ch6s du passe" qui pesent lourdement
l'activit6 du secteur, notamment pour ce qui concerne l'inadaptation de la sur
structure financiere de l'entreprise ferroviaire et les sureffectifs du personnel.
Globalement, la mise en concession de l'activit6 ferroviaire devrait conduire
a une
am6lioration
notable de la performance financiere du secteur ferroviaire, qui
cesserait ainsi de peser lourdement sur les finances publiques, les concours
financiers de l'Etat au secteur se limitant alors a la compensation eventuelle
des
obligations de service public qu'il imposerait au chemin de fer.
Get article a ete publie
dans le numero de JuilletAout 1995 de la Revuie
getierale des chemins de
recommandatioris qui y
sont presentes ne
refletent pas
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~obligatoiremen
la
politique officielte de la
Banque mondiale
L'objectif de cette snrie
est de partager
l'information sur les sujets
traites dans les etudes du
SSATP. Les opinions
exprimees dans letude
citee et dans cette serie
nengagent que les
aucune maniere etre
attribuees au groupe de la
autres partenaires au
SSATP
Pour tout renseignement
sur ces notes contactez
Leita Jones au
Departertent
pour t'Afrique technique
a la
Banque mondiale,
Washington. DC
Adresse surInternet
z
Africa Transport
I
Les regles du jeu de I'activite ferroviaire
dans un regime de concession
-qui
la concession
Les mecamismes de
de Fautivt
deglaconessionjeu
Lcnstmtuenismes
constituent les "regles du jeu" de l'activite
ferroviaire - sont d6finis par la convention de
concession, document contractuel signe entre
l'Etat et le concessionnaire. Les principaux
mecanismes concernent le champ de la
concession, le cadre reglementaire de l'activit6
ferro'%riaire,
la gestion des infrastructures
ferroxiaire,sIa estio des irteructresq,tatique
ferroviaires et du materiel moteur et remorque,
le personnel du concessionnaire, la redevance de
concession, la fiscalit6 applicable Al'activite
ferroviaire, la dur6e de la concession et le
contr6le de la concession par l'Etat et l'arbitrage
des conflits entre l'Etat et le concessionnaire.
A la fin du XIXe siecle et au debut du XXe siecle,
de nombreux chemins de fer ont 6te construits et
exploit6s par des entreprises privees, sous le
r6gime de la concession, notamment en Europe,
en Amerique latine et au Maghreb. Ce mode de
gestion de l'activit6 ferroviaire a dans la plupart
des cas c6de la place, A partir des annees 30, A
une gestion par l'Etat, en general par
l'interm6diaire de soci&es nationales. La gestion
est en particulier la regle aujourd'hui
pour la quasi-totalite des chemins de fer d'Afrique
sub-saharienne. Alors que de nombreux chemins
de fer dans les pays en voie de developpement
connaissent depuis plusieurs annees une crise
profonde, l'exploitation de l'activite ferroviaire
par le secteur prive, dans le cadre d'une
concession, apparait aujourd'hui comme une
modalit6 prometteuse de restructuration
permettant de transformer ces chemins de fer en
entreprises commerciales. La formule a 6te pour
la premiere fois mise en oeuvre, au debut de la
d6cennie 90, en Argentine, oui le reseau ferroviaire
existant a et6 restructure en six chemins de fer
marchandises et trois groupements de chemins
de fer de banlieue, tous mis en concession. En
Afrique sub-saharienne, les Etats de C6te d'Ivoire
et du Burkina ont conjointement sign6 en
Decembre 1994 une convention de concession
d'exploitation du chemin de fer Abidjan/
Ouagadougou/Kaya avec l'entreprise priv6e
SITARAIL, dont l'entree en vigueur est prevue en
Budin, Specialiste
Aout 1995.a laKarim-Jacques
de la Banque
Division 'fransports
~~~~ferroviaire
de
la
da
Traprts
vsen
pr
moniale,
mondiale, presente ci-apres, a la lumiere des
matiere,
la
en
r6centes
(encore rares) exp6riences
les principales caract6ristiques de la concession
d'exploitation ferroviaire et examine les options
et modalit6s qu'il semble possible de
recommander pour sa mise en oeuNTe.
de la concession. Le concessionnaire
*
Champ
sera normalement responsable (i) de
l'exploitation technique et commerciale des
services de transport ferroviaire de marchandises
et de voyageurs et des activites annexes au
transport; (ii) de l'exploitation, la maintenance,
.
,
et
eransor;
infeastrenouvesem fetroair aesmexisantdes(A
infrastructures ferroviaires existantes (a
l'exclusion de la construction d'infrastructures
nouvelles de developpement, qui resteront en
g6neral de la responsabilit6 de l'Etat); et (iii) de
la gestion courante du domaine public
ferroviaire. De maniere generale, la s6paration
.
'
de la gestion des services de transport (qui serait
effectuee par le concessionnaire) de la gestion
des infrastructures (qui serait effectuee par un
organisme public distinct) ne constituerait pas
une solution adequate dans les chernins de fer
consideres. Par contre, il pourrait dans certains
cas s'averer opportun de confier l'exploitation
des services de transport ferroviaire voyageurs AL
un operateur distinct du concessionnaire;
l'operateur voyageurs ferait alors circuler,
movennant peage, ses trains sur les infrastructures gerees par le concessionnaire.
* Cadre rgglerentaire de I'activit6fermoviaire. Le cadre reglementaire de l'activit6 ferroviaire - qui doit etre
entierement defini dans la convention de concession - doit encourager le concessionnaire Aadopter une
comportement commercial et etre incitatif Ala concurrence avec les autres modes de transport. L'essentiel de
l'activit6 ferroviaire correspond aux services de transport Acaractere commercial, qui scront exploit6s dans un
cnvironnement concurrentiel et d6reglement6; le concessionnaire devra avoir toute liberte d'en d6finir la
Technical Notes
configuration, d'en fLxer les tarifs publics et de n6gocier
des contrats particuliers avec les chargeurs importants.
Le concessionnaire pourrait 6galement etre amen6 a
exploiter certains services a titre d'obligation de service
public, a la demande expresse de l'Etat (ou,
6ventuellement, des collectivit6s locales), en particulier
dans le domaine des transports %'ovageurs locaux,
rurautx ou suburbains; ces sernices devraient etre
exploit6s par le concessionnaire dans le cadre de
conventions particulieres sign6es avec l'Etat ou les
collectiNit6s locales, avec versement au concessionnaire
de contributions pour obligation de service public
compensant les d6ficits encourus du fait de l'activite.
Dans les memes conditions, I'Etat compenserait
financierement le concessionnaire pour les autres
obligations de service public qu'il pourrait lui imposer,
par exemple dans le domaine des r6ductions tarifaires
au profit de certains clients, ou de maintien en service
d'infrastructures pour les besoins de la defense
nationale. A titre de dissuasion, afin de pr6venir tout
risque soit d'abus tarifaire par le concessionnaire sur
les segments du marche sur lesquels le chemin de fer
disposerait d'une position de monopole ou d'une
position dominante, soit de cartellisation de l'activit6
fcrroviaire, la convention de concession devrait ouvrir la
possibilit6 pour d'autres op6rateurs d'exploiter des
services ferroviaires sur les infrastructures ger6es par le
concessionnaire, a l'issue d'une p6riode d'exclusivit6
d'exploitation accord6e au concessionnaire pour
quclques ann6es en debut de concession. Les tiers
op6rateurs 6ventuels, que l'Etat agr6erait apres avoir
cntendu le concessionnaire, utiliseraient les
infrastructures, sur des bases non discriminatoires,
moyennant paiement d'un peage au concessionnaire.
* Gestion des infrastrucwuresferro%iaires.Les
infrastructures ferroviaires, dont la propri6te est
conscrv6e par I'Etat, seront ger6es et entretenues sous
la rcsponsabilite unique et a la charge du
conccssionnaire; les standards et les methodes
d'entretien m6ritent d'etre librement arret6s par le
conecssionnaire, sous r6serve que la securite des
circulations ferroviaires soit assuree a un niveau
acceptable compte tenu de la nature des services
exploit6s. En matiere de renouvellement et
d'am6nagement des infrastructures, l'initiative, la
d6finition et la maitrise d'ocuvre des programmes sont
6galement a confier au concessionnaire. Le
fiinancement des investissements de renouvellement et
I 3
d'amenagement devrait, de pr6ference, etre assure
directement par le concessionnaire. Toutefois, cette
formule peut ne pas toujours s'av6rer faisable; les
capacit6s d'endettement du concessionnaire pourront
etre limit6es, et les credits commerciaux auxquels il
aura acces pourront assez frequemment s'averer
inadequats, en particulier en ce qui concerne leur
duree, a financer les investissements en infrastructure.
La mobilisation du financement de ces investissements
par l'Etat constituerait alors une formule acceptable,
pourvu que le concessionnaire en supporte le cofit, par
versement a l'Etat d'annuites specifiques permettant
d'assurer l'amortissement et la remun6ration du capital
investi par l'Etat.
*
Gestion du niate1riel nteur et renwrque. Le
concessionnaire devra etre entierement responsabilise
pour ce qui concerne la definition du nombre, des
caracteristiques et de l'origine des locomotives, wagons
marchandises, voitures v,oyageurs et autres mat6riels
ferroviaires; il pourra choisir entre l'acquisition, la
location ou le leasing des mat6riels. Parmi les
mat6riels existant en d6but de concession, le
concessionnaire selectionnera les materiels necessaires
a son exploitation; ces mat6riels seront soit achetes,
soit, le plus g6neralement, lou6s par le concessionnaire
aupres de l'Etat, dans des conditions commerciales.
Le principal objectif de la
mise en concession de
I'activite ferroviaire est
d'accroitre 1'efficacitL des
transports ferroviaires
Les materiels nouNeaux, necessaires au titre du
renouvellement ou du d6veloppement de l'activite en
cours de concession, seront acquis directement par
le concessionnaire ou loues par lui. au choix du
concessionnaire, sans intervention de l'Etat;
toutefois, l'Etat devrait conserver un droit de
preemption sur la vente des materiels appartenant au
concessionnaire, particulierement pendant les
dernieres ann6es de la concession.
4
I
. Personntel du concessionnaire. Afin de permettre au
concessionnaire de mettre en oeuvre une gestion
efficace de l'activite, il est indispensable que son
personnel soit regi par la legislation et la
reglementation du travail applicable aux entreprises du
secteur priN'6 (Code du travail, conventions collectives)
et soit affilie au regime de securite sociale maladie et
retraites du secteur prive. Le statut particulier,
souvent inspire du statut de la Fonction publique, dont
beneficient actuellement les cheminots dans de
nombreuses entreprises ferroviaires, ne pourra ainsi pas
etre conserv7. Dans une situation oiu l'entreprise
ferroviaire est souvent handicap6e par d'importants
sureffectifs, il ne peut etre impose au concessionnaire
de reprendre la totalite des effectifs des personnels
existants. En debut de concession, le concessionnaire
selectionnera librement les personnels qu'il reprendra
parmi les personnels de 1'entreprise ferroviaire. LEtat
fera son affaire de la mise en oeuvre et du financement
du programme de redeploiement et de reduction des
personnels non repris par le concessionnaire. LEtat
aura aussi a traiter les questions relatives aux retraites
des cheminots anterieurement affilies aux r6gimes
particuliers de securite sociale (Caisse particuliere de
l'entreprise ferroNiaire, Caisse des fonctionnaires).
L'essentiel de l'activite ferroviaire
correspond aux services de transport
a caractere commercial
* Redevance de concession. En contrepartie de la
mise a sa disposition des infrastructures ferroviaires
existantes et du droit d'exploiter les services
ferroviaires, le concessionnaire versera a l'Etat une
redevance de concession. Cette redevance pourra soit
rck-6tir la forme d'un montant forfaitaire annuel,
cventuellement variable d'une annee a I'autre, et
index6 sur l'inflation, soit etre d6terminee en fonction
du volume physique du trafic ferroviaire, soit enfin etre
fix6e comme un pourcentage des recettes du
concessionnaire. A cette redevance s'ajoutera le
paiement par le concessionnaire des lovers des
Africa Transpart
mat6riels roulants loues aupres de l'Etat, ainsi que des
annuites specifiques dues au titre des eventuels
investissements de renouvellement et d'amenagement
des infrastructures finances par l'Etat.
. Fiscalite. Le regime fiscal applicable au
concessionnaire doit etre le regime de droit commun
applicable aux entreprises privees du secteur des
transports. LEtat doit s'engager dans la convention de
concession a ne pas imposer de taxes specifiques a
l'activite ferroviaire qui pourraient introduire des
distorsions en matiere de concurrence entre le chemin
de fer et les autres transporteurs. Le concessionnaire
supportant, selon les mecanismes decrits ci-dessus, les
charges d'entretien, de renouvellement et
d'am6nagement des infrastructures ferroviaires, les
produits petroliers utilises dans les locomotives et
autres engins sur rail devraient etre exempt6s de la
fraction de la taxe sur les carburants per,ue par l'Etat
en contrepartie des cofits d'utilisation des
infrastructures routieres.
* Duree de la concession. La concession devrait avoir
une duree suffisamment longue pour permettre au
concessionnaire de concevoir et mettre en oeuvre une
politique adequate dans le domaine des
investissements, du personnel, du marketing.
Toutefois, l'Etat pourrait etre reticent a l'egard d'une
concession trop longue, qui pourrait par ailleurs etre
moins incitative a la recherche de la competitivite par
le concessionnaire. Une bonne solution pour concilier
ces imperatifs contradictoires est d'adopter une
concession "glissante", d'une duree initiale d'environ
20 ans, et qui peut etre prolongee d'accord parties, a
l'issue de chaque periode quinquennale, pour des
periodes successives de cinq ann6es.
. Contr6le de la concession par l'Etat et arbitrage.
Le contr6le de la concession par l'Etat doit etre concu
de maniere a eviter toute interference de l'Etat dans la
gestion de la societe concessionnaire. Dans la pratique,
le contr6le devrait concerner essentiellement la
securite des operations ferroNiaires et la protection de
l'environnement. Le concessionnaire devrait
transmettre a l'Etat des informations sur son activite
par l'interm6diaire de documents dont le contenu et la
periodicite seront definis avec precision dans la
convention dc concession. Un audit annuel de la
concession, examinant les conditions dans lesquels sont
Technical Notes
appliques les micanismes prevus a la convention,
dc%Tait etre effcctu6 par un auditeur ind6pendant.
Enfin. les litiges relatifs a la convention de concession
dovraient. de pr6f6rencc, etre resolus par voie
d'arbi\trage, par exemple selon les regles d'arbitrage de
la Chambre de commerce internationale.
Comment choisir le concessionnaire?
Les regles du jeu 6tant d6finies de maniere A
promouvoir une gestion commerciale de l'activite
ferromiaire, en concurrence active et saine avec les
autres modes et entreprises de transport, le succes de
la concession implique que ... le concessionnaire soit
bien choisi.
Pour ere efficace. Ia societe concessionnaire doit etre
dotee d'une direction forte, entierement acquise a
lid6e d'une gestion commerciale de l'activite
ferro%iaire et disposant des movens pour mettre en
oeuvre sa politique. Cette e.xigence sera satisfaite par
la presence, au sein de la soci6te concessionnaire, d'un
actionnaire "de r6f6rence", qui d6tiendra la majorite au
Conseil d'administration et designera le Directeur
general de la soci6te. L'actionnaire de ref6rence devra
a cet effet d6tenir une part significative dventuellement, mais pas obligatoirement, majoritaire
- du capital de la societe. Lappel a la concurrence
internationale pour le choix de l'actionnaire de
reference est fortement recommande; une telle formule
est garante de la transparence du processus et permet,
si elle est bien conduite, d'obtenir les propositions les
plus int6ressantes. Le choix de l'actionnaire de
ref6rence par n6gociation directe ne serait acceptable
que dans des cas tres particuliers, lorsque notamment
la concession serait octroyee A un utilisateur quasiexclusif du chemin de for.
Les actions de la societe concessionnaire autres que
celles ddtenues par l'actionnaire de ref6rence seraient
souscrites selon des mecanismes a definir en fonction
des conditions locales du marche des capitaux.
Lorsqu'il existe localement une Bourse des valeurs, le
placement des actions en bourse - a l'issue, le cas
cchCant, d'une periode do portage des actions soit par
l'actionnaire de r6ference, soit par d'autres organismes
- constitucra tine des modalites ad6quates de
souscription du capital do la soci6t6. Le personnel de
la socikt6 concessionnairo pourrait par ailleurs
b6n6ficicr do conditions prihil6gi6es d'acquisition
15
d'actions pour une fraction du capital. La participation
de l'Etat au capital de la societe concessionnaire ne
semble a priori guere souhaitable; toutefois, dans le cas
oii l'Etat l'estimerait indispensable, cette participation
serait acceptable si, minoritaire, elle s'effectuait en
dehors de l'actionnariat de reference et etait con,ue de
maniere Ane pas ouvrir la porte A l'ingerence de l'Etat
dans la gestion de l'entreprise. En fait, si une
participation publique minoritaire au capital de la
societe concessionnaire est jugee n6cessaire, il
semblerait plus judicieux que cette participation
s'effectue par l'intermediaire d'etablissements publics A
caractere 6conomique int6resses directement au bon
fonctionnement de l'activite ferroviaire, par exeemple
une entreprise portuaire.
Pour etre efficace, la societe
concessionnaire doit 6tre
dot6e d'une direction forte
Dans tous les cas, la participation importante
d'actionnaires veaux prives auans le capital de la socide
concessionnaire, y compris au sein de l'actionnariat de
reference, merite d'etre encouragne. Un pourcentage
minimal de partiipation d'actionnaires prives locaux
dans l'actionnariat de ref6rence pourrait en particulier,
le cas 6cheant, etre impose aux candidats.
L
es experiences recentes de chos' d'actionnaires de
reference de societes concessionnaires, tant dans le
domaine ferroviaire que dans celui de secteurs plus ou
momis semblables (eau, energie
flectrique,
t6necommunications) et les diffncultes rencontrees
amenentA recommander l'adoption d'une proc6dure
d'appel a la concurrence internationale en trois etapes.
La premiere dtape de ia procedure concerne la pre
qualification des candidats a I'actionnariat de
refrence-qui seront dans la pratiquc toujours
-Africa Transport
6
constitues en consortiums - cette pre-qualification
6tant effectu6c sur des criteres de capacite technique
et de solidite financiere. Cette etape devTa etre
pr6c6d6e d'un intense effort de prospection des
candidats potentiels, de maniere a ouvrir le plus
largement possible la concurrence.
Les candidats pre-qualifies recevront un dossier de
consultation complet qui comprendra notamment le
projet de convention de concession. Les candidats
seront inmit&s a presenter un projet de Plan d'entreprise
a moven terme, accompagne de leurs commentaires et
suggestions sur le projet de
convention de concession.
Ces elements seront discut6s
entre l'Etat et les candidats.
Une structure dc liLuidiation- qui pourrait etre
l'entreprise publique de ehemins de fer - devra etre
mise en place par l'Etat. avee pour mission de mettre
en oeuvre le programme de red6ploiement et de
reduction des effeetifi; dii personnel de l'ancienne
entreprise publique ferro;iaire non repris par le
concessionnaire, r6soudre les questions relatives aux
retraites des personnels affiliCs a des regimes
particuliers de retraite et vendre les actifs ferroviaires
non repris par le coneessionnaire. Cette structure de
liquidation devra 6g;1lenient assurer l'apurement
financier (reglemcnt dles dettes et arrieres) de
l'ancienne entreprise
ferroviaire.
Les chemins de fer dAfrique sub-
Les chemins de fer
d'Afrique sub-saharienne,
A l'issue de ces discussions,
comme de nombreux autres
la
a
aujourd'hui
sont
saharienne...
I'Etat selectionnera pour la
chemins de fer dans les pays
crois6e des chemins
phase ultime de la
en voie de developpement
procedure 1'ensemble des
... et dans les pays
candidats avant present6 un
sont
developpes,
plan d'entreprise juge
la croisee des
a
aujourd'hui
satisfaisant et arretera
a faire
auront
ils
oii
futur
contcxte
un
Dans
chemins.
concession.
de
d6finitivement le texte de la convention
face a une concurretnce accrue, les chemins de fer
africains ne pourront conserver un r6le important dans
Dans une derniere etape de s6lection, les candidats
les systemes nationaux et r6gionaux de transport que
a
invites
agrees a l'issue de la deuxidme etape seront
s'ils savent a la fois reddfinir leur r6le economique en se
convention
la
de
presenter, sur la base des dispositions
concentrant sur les segments du marche oi ils peuvent
leurs
l'Etat,
par
de concession definitivement arretee
etre plus performants que leurs concurrents, et
concession.
de
propositions en matiere de redevance
profondenient lcurs modes et pratiques de
reformer
plus
la
proposition
Le candidat avant presentee la
oiu l'Etat a une reelle volonte de r6former
Li
gestion.
de
actionnaire
6levee sera alors retenu comme
l'actimit6 fcrroviaire et souhaite utiliser
profondeur
en
r,6f6rence de la soci6te concessionnaire.
pleinement les capacites du secteur priv6, etranger et
national, la mise en c.oncession de l'exploitation
La duree totale de la procedure d'appel a la
ferroviaire semble desormais constituer l'une des
8tre
devrait
concurrence telle que decrite ci-dessus
techniques les plus prometteuses pour transformer le
a
quatre
de
d'environ 12 mois, auxquels s'ajouteraient
chemin de fer en *ine veritable entreprise commerciale.
de
effective
reprise
sLx mois pour la preparation de la
concessionnaire
le
par
l'exploitation ferroviaire
(cr6ation de la societe, selection du personnel...).
ANNEX 3
List of Participants
Liste des participants
Name
|
Contact
DONOR/INTERNA TIONAL ORGANIZA TIONS
Adolehoume, Amakoe (Mr.)
Delegue General
SITRASS
INRETS, 2 Avenue General Malleret Joinville
94114 Arcueil Cedex FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 47 40 726
Fax: 33 1 45 47 56 06
Email: amakoe.adolehoume@inrets.fr
Adolehoume, Beatrice (Mrs.)
Charge du pole transports
Institute des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Equipement et de
1'environnement pour le developpement (ISTED)
6 rue Talleyrand
75007 Paris, FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 44 186 392
Fax: 33 1 45 55 72 82
Bonnamour, Luc (Mr.)
Directeur d'Agence
Caisse Frangaise de Developpement
8th Rangoon Close, P.O. Box 9592
Airport, Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 77 87 55/77 87 56/77 38 40
Fax: 233 21 77 87 57
Breithaupt, Manfred (Mr.)
415 - Energy and Transport
GTZ
Postfach 5180
D-65728 Eschborn, GERMANY
Telephone: 49 61 96 79 16 19
Fax: 49 61 96 79 71 44
Jahn, Helge (Mr.)
Project Manager, East Africa Department
Kreditanstalt fur Wideraufbau (KfW)
Palmengartenstrasse 5-9
60325 Frankfurt am Main, GERMANY
Telephone: 49 69 74 31 0
Fax: 49 69 74 31 2944
Khorsi, Zahia (Mrs.)
Chief, Infrastructure & Industry Division
West Africa Department
African Development Bank (AfDB)
01 Boite Postale 1387
Abidjan, COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 204 444 ext. 4115
Fax: 225 21 63 73
Olivero, Gerard (Mr.)
Direction du Developpement
Sous-direction du developpement economique et de
I'environnement
Bureau infrastructure et services collectifs
20, rue Monsieur
75700 Paris 07 SP
FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 53 69 30 36
Fax: 33 1 53 69 37 17
1
Name
Rieckhoff, Kurt (Mr.)
Smagghe, Jean (Mr.)
Souley, Mani (Mr.)
Tchibozo, Antoine (Mr.)
Werner, G6sta (Mr.)
Contact
Senior Railway Engineer
Kreditanstalt fUir Wideraufbau (KfW)
Palmengartenstrasse 5-9
60325 Frankfurt am Main, GERMANY
Telephone: 49 69 74 31 0
Fax: 49 69 74 31 2944
President
Institute des Sciences et des Techniques de l'Equipement et de
1'environnement pour le developpement (ISTED)
6 rue Talleyrand
75007 Paris, FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 40 81 24 06
Fax: 33 1 40 81 23 31
Banque Ouest Africaine de Developpement
Lome
TOGO
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
P.O. Box 3005
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA
Telephone: 251 1 51 72 00
Fax: 251 1 51 03 91
Project Manager
SIDA, INEC/INFRA
S-10525 Stockholm, SWEDEN
Telephone: 46 8 698 5431
Fax: 46 8 698 5620
COUNTRY PARTICIPA TION
BENIN
Agbayahun, Jean (Mr.)
Ahimakin, Camille (Mme)
Bonou, Raphael (Mr.)
Degila, Blaise Mahoutondji (Mr.)
Directeur Adjoint de Cabinet
Ministere des Finances
BP 302
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 30 17 73
Fax: 229 30 18 51
Directeur du Contr6le de Gestion
Organisation Commune Benin-Niger (OCBN)
BP 16
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 311 794 / 31 33 80 / 31 33 83
Fax: 229 31 41 50
Directeur-General
Organisation commune Benin-Niger (OCBN)
BP 16
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 313 360 / 31 33 80 / 31 33 83
Fax: 229 31 41 50
Secretaire General
Ministere des Travaux Publics et Transports
BP 35
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 312 100
Fax: 229 310 617
2
Name
Denonkpon, Comlan Georges (Mr.)
BURKINA FASO
Diakite, S. (Mr.)
Faho, Elisabeth (Mrs.)
Yameogo, Souleymane Zassin (Mr.)
Zongo, Oumar (Mr.)
CAMEROUN
Favre, Jean-Paul (Mr.)
Mballa, Isabelle (Ms.)
Makang Mbeinun, Jean (Mr.)
Ngabmen, Hubert (Mr.)
Sindeu, Jean-Bernard (Mr.)
Contact
DAEP/MPREPE
Commission technique de decentralisation CTD/MPREPE
08 BP 18
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 31 43 82
Fax: 229 31 23 15
Directeur General
Societe nationale de transit du Burkina (SNTB)
Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO
Telephone:
Fax:
Economiste
Ministere des Transports et du Tourisme (MTT)
03 BP 7048
Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO
Telephone: 226 30 62 11, poste 453
Fax: 226 31 19 04
Representant de SITARAIL au Burkina Faso
SITARAIL
01 BP 5699
Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO
Telephone: 226 31 07 39
Fax: 226 31 07 33
Directeur General
SOPAFER - BOI BP 192
Ouagadougou, BURKINA FASO
Telephone: 226 31 35 99
Fax: 226 31 35 94
Conseiller Technique
Ministere des Transports / Ministere des Travaux Publics
Yaounde
CAMEROUN
Telephone: 237 22 47 57
Fax: 237 22 47 57
Yaounde, CAMEROUN
Comite Technique de Suivi des Mesures Finances et Economiques
(CTS)
Yaounde, CAMEROUN
President du Comite de Privatisation
SNI Building, 9th Floor
Yaounde, CAMEROUN
Telephone: 237 23 51 08 / 23 97 50
Fax: 237 23 51 08
Coordonnateur du PST
Ministere des Transport
Yaounde, CAMEROUN
Telephone: 237 22 96 94
Fax: 237 22 97 05
Name
CONGO
Kimbatsa-Koudimba, Joseph (Mr.)
Koutoundou, Jacques (Mr.)
Nguimbi Manitou, Ted (Mr.)
COTE D'IVOIRE
Bahi, Edouard Kore (Mr.)
Blanc, Eric P. (Mr.)
Diallo, Mariam (Mrs.)
Essoh, S. (Mr.)
Hounsinou, Folli Francis Thomas Joel (Mr.)
Kadjo, N'Guetta Louis (Mr.)
Koffi, Konan Rene (Mr.)
Labonne, Philippe (Mr.)
T
Contact
Directeur d'Equipement au CFCO
Membre du Comite de Privatisation du CFCO
Chemin de Fer Congo-Ocean (CFCO)
BP 651
Brazzaville, CONGO
Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 04 47
Fax: 242 94 12 30 / 94 18 98
Chemin de fers Congo-Ocean
Boite Postale 301 Pointe-noire
Brazzaville, CONGO
Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 73 60
Fax: 242 94 12 30
Chef Departement Juridique et du Contentieux
Membre du Comite de Privatisation Chemin de Fer Congo-Ocean
BP 651
Brazzaville, CONGO
Telephone: 242 94 12 30 / 94 04 47
Fax: 242 94 12 30 / 94 18 98
Directeur Administratif et Financer
Ste. Ivoirienne des Gestion du Patri. Ferr. (SIPF)
16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16
COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 96 24
Fax: 225 21 39 02
Adjoint au Conseiller
Ambassade de France
Abidjan
COTE D'IVOIRE
COTE D'IVOIRE
BNETD
Abidjan
COTE D'IVOIRE
Chef de Departement contr6le de gestion
SITARAIL
16 BP 1216, Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 06 36
Fax: 225 22 48 47
Directeur Technique
Ste. Ivoirienne de Gestion du Partr. Ferr. (SIPF)
16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16
COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 96 24
Fax: 225 21 39 62
Directeur General
Societe Ivoirienne de gestion du Patrimoine Ferroviaire
16 BP 1415 Abidjan 16
COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 96 24
Fax: 225 21 39 62
DGA-ADM Finances Commercial
SITARAIL
16 BP 1216, Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 06 36
Fax: 225 22 48 47
4
Name
Malu-Malu (Mr.)
Niagne Lasme, Eugene (Mr.)
Nouhoun, Keita (Mr.)
Thuveny, Michel (Mr.)
GABON
Abeke, Marcel (Mr.)
Bayle, Yves (Mr.)
Damas, Richard (Mr.)
Gora, Firmin (Mr.)
Meye Bekourou be Obame (Mr.)
Ndong Sima, Raymond (Mr.)
Contact
Marche Tropicaux
Abidjan
COTE D'IVOIRE
President du Conseil d'Administration
Ste Ivoirienne de gestion du patrimonie ferroviaire
16 B.P. 1415 Abidjan 16
COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 96 24
Fax: 225 21 39 62
SITARAIL
16 BP 1216 Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 06 36
Fax: 225 22 48 47
DGA Ferroviaire
SITARAIL
16 BP 1216 Abidjan 16, COTE D'IVOIRE
Telephone: 225 21 06 36
Fax: 225 22 48 47
Administration - Directeur General
Compagnie Miniere de d'Ogooe
BP 27-28 Mouanda, GABON
Telephone: 241 6773 10
Fax: 241 66 11 57
Directeur-generale Adjoint
Compagnie Miniere d'Ogooe
BP 27-28 Mouanda, GABON
Telephone: 241 6773 10
Fax: 241661157
Coordinateur
PAPSUT
BP 114 Libreville
GABON
Telephone: 241 76 58 30 / 751 775
Fax: 241765831
Directeur-general
OCTRA (Office du Chemin de Fer Transgabonaise)
B.P. 2198 Libreville, GABON
Telephone: 241 7021 93
Fax: 241 70 20 38
Secretaire du Comite de Privatisation de la Republique Gabonaise
Ministere des Finances, Charge de la Privatisation
B.P. 9672 Libreville
GABON
Telephone: 241 76 06 77
Fax: 241 76 59 74
Directeur General
HEVEGAB
B.P. 316 Libreville
GABON
Telephone: 241 72 08 29 / 37
Fax: 241 72 08 30
5
Name
GHANA
Adams, David Annang (Mr.)
T
Contact
First Trustee
Railway Workers' Union of TUC (GHANA)
Box 206
Takoradi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 31 22181 / 22505
Fax: 233 31 4966
Adinkrah, Oscar (Mr.)
Agboletey, Samuel Kwashivi (Mr.)
Amoah, John Kwesi Asmah (Mr.)
Ampah, Mavis (Ms.)
Amponsah, Major (rtd) Samuel Kwame
Arthur, Moses Kaku (Mr.)
Azumah, Dominic A. (Mr.)
Barnafo, Albert Owusu (Mr.)
General Secretary
Railway Works Union of TUC (Ghana)
Box 183
Sekondi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 466 56
Fax: 233 21 31 49 66
Ag. Deputy MD (Admin & Opr)
Ghana Railway Corporation
P.O. Box 251
Takoradi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 31 22181
Fax: 233 31 23797
National Secretary
Association of Railway Senior Officers
Ghana Railway Corporation, Box 251
Takoradi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 31 22181 / 22189
Fax: 233 31 23797
Consultant
Ministry of Roads and Transport
P.O. Box M38
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65
Fax: 233 21 66 71 14
Member of Railways Board of Directors and Member of Parliament
Ghana Railways
c/o Managing Director
Ghana Railways
Takoradi, GHANA
Managing Director
Ghana Railway Corporation
P.O. Box 251
Takoradi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 31 237 97
Fax: 233 31 237 97
Chairman, Parliamentary Committee on Roads and Transport
c/o Ministry of Roads and Transport
P.O. Box M38
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65
Fax: 233 21 66 71 14
Managing Director
Aldo Consulting and Engineering Services Limited
P.O. Box 15644, Accra-North, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 77 21 18
Fax: 233 21 77 30 34
6
Name
Kwakye, E.A. (Mr.)
Oboh, Isaac Anaful (Mr.)
Opoku, Emmanuel (Mr.)
Poku, Eric (Mr.)
Salia, Edward Kojo (Honourable)
Yeboah, Johnson (Mr.)
GUINEE
Camara, Marguerite (Mrs.)
Diallo, Alpha Abdoul (Mr.)
Diallo, Mamadou Larry (Mr.)
Contact
Director (Planning)
Ministry of Roads and Transport
P.O. Box M38
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65
Fax: 233 21 66 71 14
Deputy General Secretary
Railway Enginemen's Union
Ghana Railway Corporation
P.O. Box TUC 13
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 666 757
Fax: 233 21 667 285
Project Manager
Ghana Railway Corporation
P.O. Box 2203
Takoradi, GHANA
Telephone: 233 31 22648
Fax: 233 31 237 97
National Chairman
Railway Enginemen's Union
Ghana Railway Corporation
Loco Running Shed
P.O. Box 143
Takoradi, GHANA
Minister of State
Ministry of Roads and Transport
P.O. Box M38
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 66 64 65
Fax: 233 21 66 71 14
Sr. Economics Officer: World Bank Desk
Ministry of Finance
P.O. Box M 40
Accra, GHANA
Telephone: 233 21 665 441, ext. 6387
Fax: 233 21 66 70 69
Directrice-general
ONCFG - Office Nationale des Chemins de Fer de Guinde
BP 715
Conakry, GUIN1E
Telephone: 224 45 46 13 /41 36 39
Fax: 41 35 77
Chef Division Gestion Portefeuille
Ministere Economie et Finances
BP 579
Conakry, GUINEE
Telephone: 224 41 3717/40 43 67
Fax: 41 34 21
Chef, Section Formation des conducteurs
Direction Nationale des Transports Terrestres
Ministere des Transports
BP 715
Conakry, GUINEE
Telephone: 224 41 27 68
Fax: 224 41 35 77
7
Contact
Name
Falilou, Barry (Mr.)
Sylla, Alseny (Mr.)
KENYA
Murage, Zachariah (Mr.)
MADAGASCAR
Andrianantenaina, Solofomaharavo Jaona (Mr.)
Rakotoniaina, Richard (Mr.)
Rakotonirina, Charles (Mr.)
Rarivony, Elisabeth Thdodore (Mrs.)
Razafindrabe, Daniel (Mr.)
MALA WI
Dzanjalimodzi, Respicius P. (Mr.)
Administrateur Civil, Conseille Industriel du Ministre
Ministere de la Promotion du secteur prive de l'industrie et du
commerce
BP 468 Conakry, GUINEE
Telephone: 224 45 32 62
Fax: 224 41 39 90
Directeur National Adjoint du Department Industriel
Ministere de la Promotion du Secteur Prive, Ind. & Commerce
BP 648 Conakry, GUINEE
Telephone: 224 45 18 65
Fax: 224 41 39 90
Corporate Planning Manager
Kenya Railways Corporation
P.O. Box 30121
Nairobi
KENYA
Telephone: 254 2 221 211
Fax: 254 2 340049
Chef du Service des Transports Ferroviaires
Minisere des Transports et de la Meteorologie
BP 4139
Antananarivo, MADAGASCAR
Telephone: 261 2 261 48
Fax: 261 2 240 01
Chef de Departement Etude
Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy
1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo
B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR
Telephone: 261 2 205 21
Fax: 261 2 222 88
Directeur des Transports Terrestres
Ministere des Transports et de la Meteorologie
BP 4239
Antananarivo 101
MADAGASCAR
Telephone: 261 2 249 06
Fax: 261 2 240 01
Attachee aupres de l'Administration Delegude
Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy
1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo
B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR
Telephone: 261 2 205 21
Fax: 261 2 222 88
Administrateur Delegue
Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy
1, Avenue de l'Independance Antananarivo
B.P. 259 MADAGASCAR
Telephone: 261 2 205 21
Fax: 261 2 222 88
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Finance
P.O. Box 30049
Lilongwe 3, MALAWI
Telephone: 265 782 199 / 783 440
Fax: 265 781 679
8
Name
Limbe, Enoch (Mr.)
MALI
Dicko, Housseiny (Mr.)
Kone, Lassana (Mr.)
Sanogho, Khalilou Bougounno (Mr.)
MOZAMBIQUE
Elias, Alberto (Mr.)
NAMIBIA
de Paauw, Eugene (Mr.)
Plichta, Oskar (Honourable Minister)
Contact
General Manager
Malawi Railways 1994 Ltd.
P.O. Box 5144 Limbe
MALAWI
Telephone: 265 640 844 / 640 747
Fax: 265 640 683
Conseiller Technique
Ministere de l'integration Africaine
Bamako
MALI
Telephone: 223 23 63 44
President - Directeur-general
Regie du Chemin de Fer au Mali
BP 260
Bamako, MALI
Telephone: 223 22 59 68
Fax: 223 22 54 33
Conseiller Technique
Ministere des Travaux Publics et des Transports
BP78
Bamako, MALI
Telephone: 223 22 33 80
Director
Mozambique Ports and Railways
Praca does trabalhadores
Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE
Telephone: 258 1 300 360
Fax: 258 1 301 508
Deputy Director
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Government of Namibia
Rehobother Road
Snyman Circle
Private Bag 13341
Windhoek, NAMIBIA
Telephone: 264 61 208 8806
Fax: 264 61 224 060
Minister of Works, Transport and Communications
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Government of Namibia
Rehobother Road
Snyman Circle
Private Bag 13341
Windhoek, NAMIBIA
Telephone: 264 61 208 8809
Fax: 264 61 224 381
Contact
Name
Poolman, Stefaans (Mr.)
NIGER
Aboubacar, Nomao (Mr.)
Moussa, Maiga Mahamoudou (Mr.)
Souleymane, Djambouto (Mr.)
Yonli, Soukari (Mr.)
NIGERL4
Alao, Abiodun (Mr.)
Dange, Alhaji Mahe (Mr.)
llukwe, Gregory Chinwuba (Mr.)
Under-secretary for Transport
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Government of Namibia
Rehobother Road
Snyman Circle
Private Bag 13341
Windhoek, NAMIBIA
Telephone: 264 61 208 8803
Fax: 264 61 224 060
Directeur des Transports Terrestres
Ministere des transports
BP 12 130
Niamey, NIGER
Telephone: 227 73 54 89
Fax: 227 73 55 53
Directeur-general Adjoint
OCBN - Organisation Commune Benin-Niger des Chemins de Fer
et des Transports
BP 16
Cotonou, BENIN
Telephone: 229 313 284
Fax: 229 31 41 50
Directeur Trafic et Fret
Conseil Nigerien des Utilisateurs de Transports Publics (CNUT)
BP 11048 Niamey
NIGER
Telephone: 227 735 185 /73 21 87
Fax: 227 73 52 11
Secretaire General
Ministere des Transports
B.P. 12130 Niamey
NIGER
Telephone: 227 7354 89
Fax: 227 73 55 53
Assistant Director
Federal Ministry of Finance
P.M.B 14 Garki - Abuja
NIGERIA
Telephone: 234 9 234 0437
Fax: 234 9 234 3609
Director-General, Chief Executive
Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology Zaria
P.M.B. 1148
Zaria, Kaduna State
NIGERIA
Telephone: 69 34095 / 343 58
Fax: 69 34095
Sole Administrator
Nigerian Railway Corporation
P.M.B. 5016
Abuja, NIGERIA
Telephone: 9 523 1913 / 523 7535
Fax: 9 5231913
10
Name
SENEGAL
Camara, Serigne Ahmadou (Mr.)
Dembele Sall, Salimata (Mrs.)
TANZANL4
Kyesi, Prosper (Mr.)
Liamba, B.A.N. (Mr.)
Mboma, Linford (Mr.)
Shamte, Rukia (Mrs.)
Contact
Directeur Cellule de Gestion du Portefeuille de
l'Etat
Ministere de l'Economie de Finances et du Plan
B.P. 5700 Dakar/Fann
SENEGAL
Telephone: 221 233428/23 34 29
Fax: 221 22 56 31
Expert
Programme d'Ajustement sectoriel des Transports
(PAST)
CP 12 Fann Residence
Dakar, SENEGAL
Telephone: 221 257 358 /257 356
Fax: 221 258061
Project Coordinator
Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC)
P.O. Box 468
Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA
Telephone: 255 51 110 693
Fax: 255 51 116 525
Ministry of Communications and Transport
P.O. Box 9144
Dar-es-Salaam, TANZNIA
Telephone: 255 51 112 858
Fax: 25551 112751
Director General
Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC)
P.O. Box 468
Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA
Telephone: 255 51 112 695
Fax: 255 51 116 525
Chief Commercial Manager
Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC)
P.O. Box 468
Temba, Gregory (Mr.)
TOGO
Fiaty, Yao Hetsu (Mr.)
Gbedessi, Afatchao Prosper (Mr.)
Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA
Telephone: 255 51 112 529
Fax: 255 51 116 525
Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC)
P.O. Box 468
Dar-es-Salaam, TANZANIA
Telephone: 255 51 110 599
Fax: 255 51 116 525
Directeur du Budget
Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances
B.P. 1183
Lome, TOGO
Telephone: 228 21 03 16
Fax: 228 21 09 05
President du Conseil d'Administration
Societe Natinale des Chemins de Fer du Togo
BP 7226
Lome, TOGO
Telephone: 228 21 22 11
Fax: 228 21 22 19
Contact
Name
Twesu, Koukou A. (Mr.)
UGANDA
Kwesiga, Samwiri M. (Mr.)
ZAMBIA
Littleford, David (Mr.)
Mutambo, George Lytton (Mr.)
Nyendwa, Rosanna (Mrs.)
Simasiku, Godfrey (Mr.)
Simpasa, Charles (Mr.)
Simpungwe, Patrick (Mr.)
ZIMBABWE
Kudambo, Lea Nyembezi (Mrs.)
Conseilleur technique
Secretaire d'etat charge des Transports et de Ress. Hydrau.
B.P. 13078
Lome, TOGO
Telephone: 228 22 16 26
Fax: 228 22 17 16
Acting Managing Director
Uganda Railways Corporation
P.O. Box 7150
Kampala, UGANDA
Telephone: 256 41 254 961
Fax: 256 41 344 405
Board Member - Zambia Railways
P.O. Box 31830 Lusaka, ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 1 227 339
Fax: 260 1 227 277
Manager - Metal Exports
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
Mutondo House
P.O. Box 20172
Kitwe, ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 2 245 009
Fax: 260 2 222 854/245 736
Programme Officer
Trade and Economy
Swedish Embassy
Haile Selassie Avenue
P.O. Box 30788
10101 Lusaka
ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 1 251 711
Fax: 260 1 254 049
Deputy Minister
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
P.O. Box 50062
Lusaka, ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 1 253 388
Fax: 260 1 250 012
Ministry of Communications & Transport
Lusaka, ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 1 251 444
Senior Business Analyst
Zambia Privatisation Agency
Privatisation House
P.O. Box 30819
Lusaka, ZAMBIA
Telephone: 260 1 238 303
Fax: 260 1 225 270
Deputy Secretary for Finance and Administration
Ministry of Transport and Energy
P.O. Box CY595
Causeway, ZIMBABWE
Telephone: 263 4 700 693
12
Name
OTHER COUNTRIES:
Anderson, Ben (Mr.)
El Gueddari, Mohammed Dahbib (Mr.)
Gerard, Quentin (Mr.)
Guillot, Gerard (Mr.)
Guiol, Patrice R. (Mr.)
Krohn, Ted (Mr.)
Laporte, Andr6 (Mr.)
le Bussy, Roger-Herbert (Mr.)
Contact
Principal
Anderson Consulting Group
90 Park Avenue, Suite 1700
New York NY 10016 USA
Telephone: 212 249 1981
Fax: 212 249 2884
Email: 110272.2055@compuserve.com
Directeur Finances et Gestion a l'ONCF
Office National des Chemin de Fer du Maroc
Rue Abderrahmane El Ghafiki
Agdal-Rabat
MOROCCO
Telephone: 212 7 779 623
Fax: 2127773919
Charge de mission
SECAF
38, Quai du Point du Jour
92659 Boulogne Billancourt
FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 41 41 55 48
Fax: 33 1 41 41 50 38
Ingenieur Transport
Caisse Francaise de developpement (CFD)
35, rue Boissy d'Anglas
75379 Paris Cedex 08, FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 40 06 34 56
Fax: 33 1 40 06 38 62
Head of Advisory - Africa and Latin America
Banque nationale de Paris
Emerging Markets Group
1, rue Taibout
75009 Paris
FRANCE
Tel.: 33 1 4014 1568
Fax: 33 1 4014 3889
Director, International Policy
Federal Railroad Administration
US DOT
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C., USA
Telephone: 202 632 3153
Fax: 202 632-3705
director, Business and Development Africa
Consultants CANARAIL
1140 boulevard de Maisonneuve Ouest, bureau 1050
Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3A 1M8
Telephone: 514 985 0930
Fax: 514 985 0929
Consultant ferroviaire
Gerant de la Societe GEMA a Abidjan
Avenue de roi Albert, 52 - 1340 Ottignies
BELGIUM
Telephone: 32 4 338 91 15 (w)
32 10 414 535 (h)
Fax: 32 4 338 91 85
13
Contact
Name
Maubouche, Francois (Mr.)
Nizard, Alexandre (Mr.)
Punungwe, Godwin M. (Mr.)
Reuter, Jochen W. (Mr.)
Sichula, Ingwa (Mr.)
Tarczay, Geza (Mr.)
Wrighton, John (Mr.)
PRESENTERS/PANELISTS
Ebata, Sebastien (Mr.)
Kambalame, Dennis (Mr.)
Associe
Coopers and Lybrand Consultants
32, rue Guersant
75833 Paris Cedex 17
FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 45 72 82 63
Fax: 33 1 45 72 84 01
Sales Manager, Africa
Shell Additives International Ltd.
Shell Centre
London SE1 7NA UNITED KINGDOM
Telephone: 44 171 934 5045
Fax: 44 171 934 3558
Railway Expert
SATCC
CP 2677
Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE
Telephone: 258 1 420 246 / 14
Fax: 258 1 420 213
Head of Regional Department Africa/America
Deutsche Eisenbahn-Consulting GmbH
Oskar-Sommer-Strasse 15
60596 Frankfurt am Main
GERMANY
Telephone: 49 60 63 19 340
Fax: 49 69 63 19 333
Regiional Sales & Customer Support Manager
ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation (South Africa) Ltd.
(Adtranz)
P.O. Box 857
Johannesburg, SOUTH AFRICA
Transportation Economist
TRANSCONSULT
3465 Cote des Neiges, Suite 301
Montreal, Quebec, CANADA H3H 1T7
Telephone: 514 931 0504
Fax: 514 931 0504
Head of Railways
Crown Agents
St. Nicholas House
Sutton, SMI IEL
UNITED KINGDOM
Telephone: 44 181 643 3311
Fax: 44 181 770 7448
Directeur du Contr6le de Gestion
Regie nationale des chemins de fer du Cameroun (REGIFERCAM)
BP 304
Douala, CAMEROUN
Telephone: 237 42 97 59
Fax: 237 42 32 05
Lilongwe
MALAWI
14
Name
Kamden, Lucas (Mr.)
Kieran, Peter (Mr.)
Kogan, Jorge (Mr.)
Mbale, Heatherwick(Mr.)
Montpert, Jean-Yves (Mr.)
Pai, Arun (Mr.)
Peiffer, Eric (Mr.)
Portimao, Abilio David (Mr.)
Posner, Henry (Mr.)
Ratheaux, Olivier (Mr.)
Contact
Commission Technique de Privatisation et des Liquidations
Mission de Rehabilitation des Entreprises du Secteur Public
et
Parapublic
SNI Building
Yaounde,CAMEROLTN
Chairman
CPCS Transcom
350 Sparks Street
Suite 602
Ottawa KIR 7S8
CANADA
Telephone: (613) 237-2500
Fax: (613) 237 4494
Buenos Aires, ARGENTINA
541 394 0184 (w)
541 394 6488 (w)
541 784 8338 (h)
541 449 292 (cell)
541 326 7445 (fax)
U.S. Voice Mail:
(202) 778 7000
(202) 778 3031 (voice mail)
Email: Isolda-Rodriguezgmercermc.com
Lilongwe
MALAWI
Societe d'exploitation des chemins de fer africains (SECAF)
38, quai du Point du Jour
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt
FRANCE
Telephone: 1 41 41 54 92
Fax: 1 41415038
Advisor
Mozambique Ports and Railways
P.O. Box 3158
Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE
Telephone: 258 1 300 360
Fax: 258 1 301 508
Director of COMAZAR & SIZARAIL
Kinshasa
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Transport and Communications
P.O. Box 276
Maputo, MOZAMBIQUE
Telephone: 258 1 416 236
Fax: 258 1 431 539
Telephone: (412) 928-0777
Fax: (412) 928-7715
Ingenieur
Caisse Francaise de Developpement (CFD)
35 rue Boissy d'Anglas
75379 Paris Cedex 08
FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 40 06 32 53
Fax: 33 1 40 06 38 63
15
Name
Rochet, Pierre-Louis (Mr.)
Sarmet, Marcel (Mr.)
Sharma, Vipin (Mr.)
Thiam, Abdelazziz (Mr.)
Thiam, Tidjane (Mr.)
Victor, Paul (Mr.)
Waterkein (Mr.)
Directeur Zone Afrique
Zoba, Bernard (Mr.)
Contact
Chairman and CEO Systra
5, avenue du Coq
75009 Paris, FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 40 16 6301
Fax: 33 1 40 16 6350
Coopers and Lybrand Consultants
32, rue Guersant
75833 Paris Cedex 17
FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 45 72 84 01
Fax: 33 1 45 72 84 00
Director, World Division
International Union of Railway (UIC)
16 rue Jean Rey
75015 Paris, FRANCE
Telephone: 33 1 44 49 21 20
Fax: 33 1 44 49 20 29
Directeur Gendral
SITARAIL
16 B.P. 1216 Abidjan 16
COTE D'IVOIRE
Tel.: 225 21 06 36
Fax: 225 22 48 47
Chef de la Cellule de Strategie
Prdsidence de la Rdpublique
Abidjan, COTE D'IVOIRE
c/o Larry McCaffrey
New York:
Telephone: (212) 687-9500
Fax: (212)687-9501
TRANSURBCONSULT
Belgian Transport & Urban Infrastructure Consult
Rue Ravenstein 60
B18
B 1000 Bruxelles, BELGIUM
Tel.: 32 2 548 5311
Fax: 3225139419
Email: transurb@mail.interpac.be
Secretaire-General
Union Africaine des Chemins de Fers
869 A. Tombalbaye
B.P. 687
Kinshasa I
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Telephone: 243 12 23861/25166
Fax: 871 1125 125
Alternate Address:
c/o ESACC - GT
BP 13225 Brazzaville
CONGO
Fax: 242 836839
16
Name
WORLD BANKSTAFF
Budin, Karim (Mr.)
Hallgrimsson, Snorri (Mr.)
Jones, Leita (Ms.)
Katsu, Shigeo (Mr.)
Kedia, Yash Pal (Mr.)
Mbi, Emmanuel (Mr.)
Thompson, Louis (Mr.)
Contact
TWUTD
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-4764
Transport 2
Africa Region
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-4997
Transport I
Africa Region
World Bank
1818 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-5030
Country Director
World Bank Resident Mission
Abidjan
Cote d'lvoire
Telephone: 225 44 22 27
Transport I
Africa Region
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-4544
Transport 2
Africa Region
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-4953
TWUTD
World Bank
1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: 473-3785
October 30, 1997
17
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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