Annals of the American Association of Geographers
ISSN: 2469-4452 (Print) 2469-4460 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raag21
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives: Omitted
Livelihoods in the Global Trade in Sand
Vanessa Lamb, Melissa Marschke & Jonathan Rigg
To cite this article: Vanessa Lamb, Melissa Marschke & Jonathan Rigg (2019): Trading Sand,
Undermining Lives: Omitted Livelihoods in the Global Trade in Sand, Annals of the American
Association of Geographers
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2018.1541401
Published online: 25 Mar 2019.
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Trading Sand, Undermining Lives: Omitted
Livelihoods in the Global Trade in Sand
Vanessa Lamb,
Melissa Marschke,
†
and Jonathan Rigg
‡
School of Geography, University of Melbourne
School of International Development, Global Studies at the University of Ottawa
‡
Department of Geography and Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore;
School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol
†
Sand is a scarce resource, extracted from rivers and coasts at rates that exceed its natural renewal. Yet, little
is understood about the political economy of sand extraction, the livelihood vulnerabilities produced, or why
sand grabbing is occurring at unprecedented rates in particular locations. Drawing together literature on
global production network approaches in economic geography and debates on sustainable livelihoods in
development geography—two literatures rarely in conversation with one another—we reveal the links
between new, globalized, cross-border articulations of poverty and prosperity and the sand trade. We situate
our sand case in Southeast Asia across three sites, namely, in Singapore, the world’s top sand importer;
Cambodia, a top-ten global exporter of sand; and an emerging exporter, Myanmar. We examine how sand
mining affects, directly and indirectly, a range of livelihoods, specifically fisheries in Cambodia, riverbank
agriculture in Myanmar, and migrant labor in Singapore. Drawing on our empirical work, we argue that
linking these two literatures with empirical data on sand provides an approach that is broad in its
connections and simultaneously grounded in specific practices, places, and people. This enables us to better
account for often overlooked aspects in the production, erosion, and transfer of value. Key Words: global
production networks, livelihoods, precarity, sand mining, Southeast Asia.
砂石是从河流与沿岸以超越其自然再生的速率採集的稀缺资源。但我们对于砂石採集的政治经济学
、其所生产的生计脆弱性、以及为何砂石掠夺是在特定地点以前所未见的速度发生,却所知甚少。
我们结合经济地理学中的全球生产网络方法文献和发展地理学有关可持续生计的辩论——两种鲜少
相互对话的文献——揭露贫穷与富裕和砂石贸易之间崭新、全球化且跨边界接合的连结。我们将砂
石案例置放于东南亚的三大场所,亦即新加坡——全球最大的砂石进口国;柬埔寨——全球前十大
砂石出口国;以及缅甸——逐渐兴起的出口国。我们检视砂石採集如何直接与间接地影响一系列的
生计,特别是柬埔寨的渔业、缅甸的河岸农业,以及新加坡的移工。我们运用上述经验研究,主张
将此两类文献与砂石的经验数据相互连结,提供关联相当广泛、同时根据特定实践、地方和人们的
方法。这让我们得以更佳地解释价值生产、侵蚀与转移中经常被忽略的面向。 关键词:全球生产网
络,生计,不稳定性,砂石採集,东南亚。
La arena es un recurso escaso que se extrae de rıos y costas a ritmos que exceden su renovacion natural. Sin
embargo, poco es lo que se sabe de la economıa polıtica de la extraccion de arena, las vulnerabilidades al
sustento que se producen, o por que la apropiacion de la arena se esta dando a tasas sin precedentes en
ciertos lugares. Acopiando la literatura sobre los enfoques en redes de produccion global en geografıa
omica junto con los debates sobre sustento sostenible en la geografıa del desarrollo ––dos literaturas que
econ
raramente interactuan entre sı––, ponemos de manifiesto los lazos existentes entre las nuevas y globalizadas
articulaciones transfronterizas de la pobreza y la prosperidad, y el comercio de la arena. Situamos nuestro
caso de la arena en el Asia del Sudeste por medio de lo que ocurre en tres sitios, a saber, Singapur, el
principal importador de arena del mundo; Camboya, uno de los diez mayores exportadores de arena; y un
exportador emergente, Myanmar. Examinamos en que grado afecta la minerıa de la arena, directa e
indirectamente, a una variedad de medios de subsistencia, especıficamente la pesca de Camboya, la
agricultura de las riberas en Myanmar y el laboreo migratorio en Singapur. Con base en nuestro trabajo
empırico, sostenemos que al vincular entre sı estas dos literaturas con los datos empıricos sobre la arena se
ofrece un enfoque lo suficientemente amplio en conexiones y al mismo tiempo anclado en practicas
especıficas, lugares y gente. Esto no habilita para una mejor consideracion de aspectos a menudo ignorados
Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 0(0), 2019, pp. 1–18 # 2019 by American Association of Geographers
Initial submission, February 2018; revised submissions, July and September 2018; final acceptance, September 2018
Published by Taylor & Francis, LLC.
2
Lamb et al.
de la producci
on, erosion y la transferencia de valor. Palabras clave: Asia del Sudeste, medios de vida, minerıa
de arena, precariedad, redes globales de produccion.
T
he sand1 industry was valued at US$1.71
billion globally in 2016 (Department of
Economic and Social Affairs/United Nations
Statistics Division [DESA/UNSD] 2018). Sand is now
extracted at a rate that exceeds its natural renewal,
producing a newly scarce resource (United Nations
Environment Program [UNEP] 2014; Sutherland
et al. 2016), with sand and gravel the most extracted
group of materials globally besides fossil fuels and biomass (Torres et al. 2017). Yet, despite these metrics,
there remains a knowledge gap in terms of the precise
magnitude of sand mining, a general lack of public
awareness of the issue, and shortcomings in its global
monitoring. Data discrepancies between sand imports
and exports are rife, with sand being subject to rampant illegal extraction and trade. The fact that the
industry is often deemed “a matter of national
security” (Comaroff 2014, 141–42) sometimes creates
a climate of secrecy. This is further compounded by
limited collaboration or coordination between the scientific community and sand industry (UNEP 2014).
Significantly, even less is understood about the production networks of sand, the livelihood vulnerabilities produced as a result of sand extraction, and why
sand mining continues at unprecedented rates in particular locations. This article is a starting point to
addressing these intersecting lacunae and highlighting
some of the reasons why they exist in the first place.
To understand the broader effects of sand extraction, linked to a situated and embedded understanding of sand-linked livelihoods, we make a case in
this article for connecting scholarship in two areas.
We draw on, first, work in economic geography on
global production networks and, second, on sustainable livelihoods approaches within development
geography. We bring these together with our empirical work to reveal how value produced in one field
can effectively overlook and sometimes undermine
value in another. Importantly, this omission is not
just due to matters of state and commercial secrecy
but because conceptual models direct our attention
in particular ways, toward particular activities, evidenced using particular metrics. This creates a mode
of accounting in trade networks that overlooks
certain social groups, types of activities, and forms of
value (Bair and Werner 2011; Tsing 2015; Werner
2016; Gibson et al. 2017). As Tsing (2015) writes
“There is a rift between what experts tell us about
economic growth, on the one hand, and stories
about life and livelihood, on the other” (132).
Following Tsing, we argue that mainstream economic geography approaches in the analysis of value
chains and production networks often omit or undervalue important features, particularly those relating to
livelihoods, that do not fit the approach’s epistemological framing. We make this case through the empirical lens of sand mining in Southeast Asia. Singapore
is the world’s top sand importer, Cambodia is a topten global exporter of sand, and Myanmar is emerging
as an important regional sand exporter (DESA/UNSD
2018). Bringing this work on global production
networks into conversation with livelihoods analysis
and its broader assessment of “value,” we connect two
largely unconnected literatures, enabling us to place
livelihoods in broader geographical context and to see
how people’s living and livelihoods are shaped by
flows and networks beyond the local. In doing so, we
make visible areas of life, living, and work that might
otherwise be overlooked in the sand trade.
We open the article with an overview of
approaches in economic geography on global production networks and the links to livelihoods through sustainable livelihoods in development geography,
emphasizing why connecting these two literatures can
offer new insights into Southeast Asia’s sand trade.
We then provide an overview of sand imports and
exports across Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore,
noting the data mismatch in terms of reported exports
and imports. This mismatch presents a challenge for
studying sand extraction, prompting questions not
only about discrepancies in global sand metrics but
also of value. We construe value broadly, moving
beyond economic or commercial value, to include ecological and livelihood values (Scoones 1998). This
provides an entree for a focus on specific sites of sand
export and import, examining how sand mining affects
fisheries-based livelihoods in Cambodia, riverbank
agriculturalists in Myanmar, and migrant labor in
Singapore. Our analysis highlights how sand mining
results in multiple transformations across the social–
ecological system, transformations that severely affect
people’s livelihoods and local ecosystems.
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
Linking Value and Commodity Chains
and Production Networks with
Livelihoods
Coe (2012, 390) encapsulates global production
approaches as “all [being] centrally concerned
with the globally coordinated interorganizational
relationships that underpin the production of goods
and services, and the power and value dynamics
therein.” Global production networks (GPNs),2 for
example, are broad in scope, bringing into the frame
of analysis actors beyond lead firms and suppliers,
attending to a broader swathe of institutions including national governments, trade unions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In contrast to
other global production approaches, GPN takes
social and institutional embeddedness seriously (Hess
and Yeung 2006). That said, the majority of attention has focused on leading firms in high-technology
and high-value sectors and in advanced economies,
with less attention paid to small and medium-sized
enterprises in the Global South (Murphy
2012, 229).
For some time there has been a concern that the
GPN approach has failed adequately to incorporate
the dark side of economic geography, in particular
losing sight of the socially and spatially uneven
nature of the development process (Phelps et al.
2018). More recent scholarship has certainly
shown a willingness to broaden global production
approaches to debates over ethical or fair trade and
corporate social responsibility. Much of this has
focused on the question of labor conditions (Hughes
2000; Barrientos and Smith 2007; Riisgaard 2009;
Barrientos et al. 2011 Arnold and Hess 2017; see
also notes on the work on labor within GPNs in
Coe 2012). Although this work is important and
valuable, it has tended to be empirically quite
narrowly framed on the workers and producers directly connected to the chains or networks under
consideration. Thus, scholars write of gender value
chains in ethical trade in African horticulture
(Tallontire et al. 2005) and ethical learning in
GPNs (Hughes 2006; Hughes, Wrigley, and Buttle
2008) with a consequent focus on labor standards,
practices, and relations. This is understandable
against the backdrop of GPNs’ primary interest in
interorganizational relations.
It is also worth noting here that natural commodities, like sand, have not tended to be objects of
3
concern within global production approaches, and
we see a greater focus on agriculture and manufacturing, and to some extent services (Coe 2013;
Phelps et al. 2018). Bridge’s (2008) work is an
exception, whereby linking oil extraction and GPNs
reveals how the nonrenewable character of oil is
a key consideration in understanding extraction networks (see also Murphy 2012). There has been no
such analysis of sand and, unlike other commodities,
sand has no international regulatory system for trade,
nor does it have “an architecture of non-state certifying bodies to influence management practices and
structure the direction and volume of trade” that
exist in other commodity sectors (Bridge 2008, 415).
In our analysis of the sand trade, we bring GPN
as a frame to illustrate the connections between production and consumption, but we also present the
unrecorded effects of sand mining and the trade in
sand. We are therefore making the connection
between microprocesses and macroforces (Burawoy
2009) and also between historical inheritances and
geographical conditions. In these assertions, we echo
Glassman’s (2011) contention that the global production literature tends to overlook geopolitics and
therefore “has so far largely steered clear of forms of
political and geo-political contestation that illustrate
some of the worst violence and messiness of ‘actually
existing globalization’” (162). Although Glassman
might be concerned to politicize and historicize
GPNs, his focus is still on the network and the
actors who are connected to it.
Notwithstanding growing interest in matters of
labor and geopolitics in GPNs, we believe that three
important groups or actors are neglected in such
analyses, and this neglect has a significant bearing
on whether we can view any given network or chain
as constitutive of good or just development. These
three groups are as follows:
1. Those whose living is implicated in global production
approaches but in a manner that is characteristically
unrecorded and uncounted because it lies out of the
line of sight of such networks or chains. For example,
subsistence and semisubsistence farmers who cultivate
river margins and sand banks. This group is directly
affected by sand mining, as the farming practices on
which their livelihoods depend require sandy banks.
2. Those whose livelihoods are connected to sand, but
indirectly, and are therefore commonly framed out of
consideration. Here attention is paid to how a natural
commodity is transformed and how value is reassigned
during this transformation. With regard to sand, for
4
Lamb et al.
instance, we might point to its role in sustaining the
productivity of small-scale fisheries. Sand mining and
the sand trade are evidently generative of value for
sand miners and industry, but for those fishing in
estuarine or near shore coastal areas, it degrades
livelihoods and produces poverty.
3. The third group includes migrant construction workers
whose livelihoods are founded on a sand-dependent
industry, but their employment is characteristically
precarious. This precarity is translocally produced. It is
partly a product of employment conditions in migrant
receiving countries such as Singapore (see Baey and
Yeoh 2018; Ye and Yeoh 2018). It is also reflective,
however, of processes of immisersation and
marginalization in sending countries, like Cambodia
and Myanmar.
These groups fall outside the frame of reference of
global production approaches, the first because the
activity is semisubsistence or constitutive of a different economic realm and the second and third
because the connection is hidden or indirect, which
in Southeast Asia has been a “persistent vestige” in
scholarship on local economies (Gibson et al. 2017,
131). In this way, we see the business of sand
connecting livelihoods across space and national
and livelihood contexts: undermining fishing and
gardening in one livelihood space while creating
new, albeit precarious, livelihoods in another.
To discern the links between fishers, riverbank
agriculturalists, and construction workers within the
sand trade, we take a livelihoods approach to complement the insights offered by GPN, particularly
the links between production and consumption. The
livelihoods approach dates back to 1987 when
an advisory panel to the World Commission on
Environment and Development first set out an operational definition of sustainable livelihood security.
The approach was popularized by fieldworkers and
development practitioners, particularly an early
Chambers and Conway (1991) paper, arguing that
livelihoods encompass the capabilities, assets, and
activities that are necessary for making a living.
Livelihoods are sustainable when they can “cope
with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or
enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide
sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next
generation” (Chambers and Conway 1991, 6). As
such, livelihoods are dynamic, complex, and often
unpredictable, with goals, preferences, and resources
constantly being reassessed in light of shifting conditions (L. de Haan and Zoomers 2003). A livelihood
analysis recognizes value—of livelihoods, financial
capital, and redistribution—that GPNs might easily
miss (Rigg et al. 2018).
Thus, while providing complementary insights,
we also recognize the critiques of sustainable livelihoods analysis that have focused on three areas of
perceived weakness: a lack of concern for issues of
politics and power, especially in structural terms; a
tendency to fix livelihoods in space and time; and
the approach’s instrumental tone, reflected in the
tendency to write of livelihood strategies (L. de
Haan and Zoomers 2005; Rigg 2007; Scoones 2009).
The second of these concerns has been partially
addressed by work on livelihood pathways or trajectories (A. de Haan 1999; L. de Haan and Zoomers
2003; Scoones 2009). As L. de Haan and Zoomers
(2003) argue, household livelihood strategies might
differ greatly from their livelihood histories. A livelihood encompasses a complex web of activities and
interactions: Livelihood activities are not neutral;
rather, they engender processes of inclusion and
exclusion. Notwithstanding these trenchant critiques
of the livelihoods approach, we regard it as a
valuable, complementary lens to global production
approaches because it expands the productivist frame
to reveal a significant but overlooked facet of the
sand trade: livelihoods impacts. We also recognize
the value that GPN sensibilities bring to a livelihoods approach, focusing attention on vertical connections across scales and the (growing) importance
of commercial and business actors and factors in
shaping local livelihoods.
We appreciate that in connecting the sand production network to livelihoods we are expanding the
scope of a field that has already been criticized—in
GPN’s case—as being so broad that it can include
all links, transfers, and connections, resulting in a
lack of analytical boundary or clarity (Sunley 2008).
If we are interested in the effects or impacts of such
emerging networks on marginal groups and omitted
actors, however, then it is necessary to consider associations and dependencies that lie outside the general line of sight of such studies, “what a GPN
framework does see, and … the dimensions of
developmental change that a network approach
might miss” (Kelly 2013, 84).
By bringing in a people-centered sustainable
livelihoods approach, we are, seeking to humanize
the field of production networks, a field that has
been critiqued as having limited interest in human
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
agency
(Challies
and
Murray
2011).
Notwithstanding growing attention paid to labor
conditions, ethical trade, and gender, this effort is
still corralled within the framework of the chain or
network, so that more distant and less visible
connections and interrelations are often neglected.3
Although GPN theory aims to show how GPNs are
embedded in local institutions and social relations,
in practice the scholarship is not locally situated.
Werner (2016) explained that in attempting to
reveal “constitutive exclusions,” like that of dispossession within the GPN framework, “there is no
clear parallel here with the mainstream literature,
which continues to focus primarily on entities that
are ‘transactionally linked’ to global production
networks” (464). There are other stories that get
missed, including the erasure of “offsite” impacts.
Perreault (2012, 1064), for instance, identified how
the “unintended” effects of accumulation affect communities and that this is linked to both dispossession
and the accumulation of toxic sediments in mining
territories but that these impacts remain outside a
mainstream framing of accumulation by dispossession. Labor scandals across commodity chains speak
to this (Rigg 2015; Marschke and Vandergeest
2016), including the erasure of off-site impacts (cf.
Kelly 2013; Werner 2016). It is this narrowness that
lies behind Phelps et al.’s (2018) recent invitation
to explore the dark side of economic geography. Yet,
livelihoods and “the arts of noticing” (Tsing 2015)
that we take on here are hardly limited to the
dark side.
To see the links between actors in production
networks, we privilege life and livelihoods and bring
into view the actors and, more particularly, the activities that are characteristically omitted from more
usual analyses (Glassman 2006; Perreault 2012).
These livelihood activities have tended to be dismissed in the region and elsewhere by a long history
that sees more legible practices, like paddy rice
agriculture (Scott 1998), and tends to obscure more
informal local economies (Gibson et al. 2017). We
also contend that in contrast to work on land grabbing in the region, the marginal actors in Myanmar
and Cambodia are not only being dispossessed of this
resource in the manner of land grabs, for instance.
The impacts on livelihoods occur in many cases indirectly, almost through sleight of hand. The land
resource might be degraded, but it is not obviously
being grabbed; it might be common property, but it is
5
not being enclosed; and it might be used by local people but usually not directly. Notably, whereas there
has been a good deal of attention paid to the violence
and illegalities associated with the sand trade (Beiser
2018), there is relatively little that pays attention to
local economies and livelihoods. At the same time,
when we consider those GPN studies that have taken
livelihoods seriously (e.g., Kelly 2009, 2013; Carswell
and De Neve 2013; Neilson and Shonk 2014), they
pay attention to those actors who are connected to
such networks, whether through their labor or through
kinship (household) relations. Here we focus not just
on the ‘dark side,’ but on livelihoods which are linked
to commercial activities recognized in GPNs and
impacted by uneven development.
Linking the global production and sustainable
livelihoods approaches provides a means to humanize
the former and globalize the latter by bridging the
vertical perspective embedded in global production
approaches, where connections are traced along
regional and global economic lines of connection,
with the essentially horizontal perspective taken by
livelihoods scholars, with its emphasis on local social
relations of production and reproduction (Bolwig
et al. 2010; Carswell and De Neve 2013). In other
words, we contend that a sustainable livelihoods
approach can help GPN as an approach move
toward achieving a situated, socially embedded analysis. Figure 1 schematically sets out the sand context and how the global production and livelihood
approaches map onto the processes and interrelationships described in the article. There are two aspects
particularly to note: the way in which each approach
tracks a different and discrete set of effects but that
can all be linked back to sand and the gap that
exists at the point of sand extraction between livelihoods and the sand trade. Both rely on sand but
from that point onward are tracked through
very different discursive realms, determined by the
approach adopted. At the risk of simplifying, these
are vertical versus horizontal, economic versus social,
production versus reproduction, and unbounded
versus bounded. Finally, in considering this
approach, it is important to emphasize that the livelihood outcomes we discuss here are not accidents,
nor are they incidental. They are constitutive of the
sand industry and wider globalization processes, how
value is measured, and the way in which sand as a
commodity for construction and land reclamation
discounts sand’s place in livelihoods.
6
Lamb et al.
Figure 1. Tracking value in the sand trade and livelihoods. GPN ¼ Global production network.
Methods
To further develop these arguments, this article
draws on primary and secondary research into livelihoods, sand, and sand mining across sites in
Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore carried out over
the past decade by the authors. Together, we
conducted more than 100 interviews in Cambodia
and Myanmar directly related to livelihoods and
sand mining, with secondary research and observation conducted across Cambodia, Myanmar, and
Singapore. Material on Singapore is secondary,
although one of the authors is based in the city state
and land reclamation is highly visible. The DESA/
UNSD United Nations Comtrade database was
analyzed for regional trade patterns.
In Cambodia, sand mining controversies, particularly in terms of how sand mining affects coastal fishing villages in southwestern Cambodia, were followed
since 2007 through research with coastal villagers,
NGO advocates, and policymakers. Approximately
fifty semistructured interviews over a ten-year period
have been conducted in English and Khmer, in some
cases with the help of a research assistant. In
Myanmar, research was conducted along the Salween
River in the cities of Hpa An and Mawlamyine in
2014, 2017, and 2018. Interviews were conducted
with local officials, NGO staff, sand and gravel
companies, fishermen, and riverbank gardeners; in
total more than fifty semistructured interviews done
in a mix of English, Karen, and Myanmar languages
with the help of a research assistant.
Sand and Sites
Studies of sand mining have assessed the environmental impacts of riverine and marine sand mining
across many countries and ecological contexts (e.g.,
Adedeji et al. [2014] on Nigeria; Sreebha and
Padmalal [2011] on India; Cho [2006] and Kim and
Grigalunas [2009] on Korea; Bravard et al. [2013] on
Mekong; Beiser [2018] globally). For UNEP (2014),
the “negative effects on the environment are
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
7
Figure 2. Singapore sand imports, 2007 to 2016. Source: DESA/UNSD (2018).
unequivocal and are occurring around the world”
and in places the “problem is now so serious that
the existence of river ecosystems is threatened in a
number of locations” (251). Moreover, the scale of
mining is rapidly increasing, rather than stabilizing
or diminishing, reflecting global rates of urbanization
and industrialization.4 Although a substantial literature on the environmental effects of sand mining is
emerging, combined with hints of illegal crimes and
shady practices that can be connected to sand
extraction (Rege 2016), less attention has been paid
to how sand mining occurs or the impacts on local
livelihoods.
Sand in Singapore
Singapore is the world’s largest consumer of sand
on a per capita basis and, in many years, the world’s
largest importer of sand. Extensive construction along
with large-scale reclamation and no domestic resources to speak of has necessitated massive imports of
sand. In 1965 when the city state gained its full
independence, Singapore’s land area was 581 km2
compared with 719 km2 in 2015, an increase of over
a fifth. This expansion is set to continue so that by
2030 Singapore’s land area will have grown by 30
percent since 1965 (de Koninck 2017). Initially sand
was imported from Indonesia and Malaysia; when
both of these countries either banned or limited
exports, the trade moved to Cambodia, Myanmar,
the Philippines, and Vietnam (see Figure 2).
Singapore’s economic vitality and sustainability is
based, in no small measure, on continuing imports of
sand. The expansion of the country’s land area
through land reclamation is essential to its continued
economic growth, and sand for construction is an
equally important element in the city state’s development strategy. It might be argued that livelihood sustainability—in the sense of the continuing prosperity
of Singapore’s inhabitants—is predicated on continuing flows of sand and gravel from neighboring countries. As Comaroff (2014) asserts, Singapore’s sand
security is linked to Singapore’s political survival:
“The need for sand, then, is a kind of original debt:
for the territorial state to survive, land must continually be introduced” (142). The state, since the first
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s premiership
(1965–1990), has made land reclamation, and therefore sand imports, a “pragmatic necessity” (Jamieson
2017, 398), almost a matter of national survival.
Even with the average price of imported sand rising
more than sixtyfold between 1995 to 2001 and 2003
to 2005, from $3 to $190 per ton, Singapore’s consumption has continued unabated (UNEP 2014).
Although the Singaporean government (specifically, the Ministry of National Development) stated
that “strict criteria for imports of sand” exist
(Au-Yong 2017), Global Witness (2010) presented
evidence that “the government does itself purchase
sand” and in fact “stockpiles” it (29). At this
moment, however, it is not possible to identify the
full range of firms or specific companies dealing in
sand. Tracing this network is not our main intention, but it is worth noting that in understanding
the sand trade linked to Singapore, it includes firms
and contractors in Singapore relying on imports of a
variety of sands from across the region, as a single
development project at various stages will require a
variety of sand and aggregate.5 For construction,
builders favor sand from rivers, but sea sand can be
8
Lamb et al.
Figure 3. Sand trade data gaps: Reported exports and imports of sand for Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore, 2007–2016. Note:
Myanmar reported no sand exports to Singapore between 2007 to 2009 even as Singapore reported sand imports from Myanmar during
this same time period. Source: DESA/UNSD (2018).
used if washed for salt. For land reclamation “fill,”
contractors can be less picky, using a variety of sea
or river sands (Beiser 2018).
This sand and the land and economic activity that
it produces help to sustain a migrant labor force in
Singapore of almost 1.4 million workers, or 40 percent of the total workforce. In 2016, 327,000 of these
workers were employed in the construction sector.
Their breakdown by nationality is not publicly available (Tan 2014), but we know that the construction
sector is the biggest migrant worker employer (Ye and
Yeoh 2018). As Baey and Yeoh (2018) noted, “In
the context of transnational labor migration, material
and symbolic conditions of precarity may lie across
borders. Migration … may quickly metamorphosize
into a journey of perilous gamble” (253). We do not
have evidence that links migrant workers as individuals in Singapore back to our sites of sand extraction
in Cambodia and Myanmar, but this is entirely plausible and to entertain such a notion highlights the
point, long recognized in political ecology (Huber
2017), that one person’s accumulation is another person’s degradation. Sand not only sustains Singapore’s
economic growth, generates prosperity in the city
state, and is critical to national security (Comaroff
2014), but its excavation is, at the same time,
compromising livelihoods in source sites.
Sand in Cambodia and Myanmar
In Cambodia and Myanmar, sand is extracted from
rivers and beaches for domestic use and for export to
support Asia’s construction boom, particularly to
Singapore. Between 2007 and 2016, for example,
Singapore trade statistics recorded imports of 80.22
million metric tons of sand from Cambodia and more
than 27 million metric tons from Myanmar, comprising 44 percent of the 242.7 million tons of sand
imported by Singapore over this nine-year period
(see Figure 2). Recorded exports of sand from
Cambodia and Myanmar do not begin to match the
import figures for Singapore (Figure 3), leading analysts to assume that there is a significant illegal trade
in sand, a claim that the Singapore authorities have
disputed (Global Witness 2010; Au-Yong 2017).
Furthermore, in this same time period, the price per
metric ton of sand (sea and riverine) imported from
Cambodia and Myanmar has decreased, from a 2007
high of over US$20 per metric ton of sand to less
than US$5 per metric ton in 2016 (Figure 4).
Although sand prices will range over time and geographic location, sand from Cambodia and Myanmar
fetches a lower price per metric ton of natural sand
(not including silica or quartz sands) than seen in
other countries in Asia (DESA/UNSD 2018).
The data mismatch and lowering prices underline
how some of the sand trade is likely illicit and speaks
to the difficulty of identifying specific firms and their
networks. Operators might have military or mafia
links, and the multiple layers of the production network can obfuscate responsibility. In Cambodia and
Myanmar, primary research by the first and second
authors and reports (Global Witness 2010; Ei Thu
and Kean 2015; Myanmar Centre for Responsible
Business [MCRB] 2017; Thompson 2017) show a
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
9
Figure 4. Sand prices: Singapore’s sand import price from Cambodia and Myanmar (US$/m ton). Note: The price of sand was derived
by dividing import value by import quantity. Source: DESA/UNSD (2018).
mix of companies with backing from a range of
actors involved in not only extraction but also the
ferrying of sand from the site of extraction to large
barges to ship across the ocean to Singapore. The
range of actors is not limited to local entrepreneurs
but includes military and ex-military; ethnic
armed organizations; Cambodian, Singaporean, and
Chinese firms; as well as joint venture companies.
In Cambodia, coastal sand mining emerged in the
mid-2000s (Marschke 2012). Although inland sand
mining was banned in the late 2000s, coastal sand
mining continued at a sustained pace through to
2017 when it, too, was officially banned. Although
sand extraction has shifted in terms of location, the
activity has continued to significantly affect people,
their livelihoods, and local ecosystems. The vast volumes extracted at one site, Koh Sralao, have negatively affected already precarious livelihoods, as
discussed in more detail later. These impacts are
both direct and indirect: direct in the form of mangrove estuary bank collapse and indirect in fisheries
decline and the driving of migration flows as people
search for alternative livelihood opportunities within
Cambodia and abroad.
In Myanmar, the scope, scale, and attention that
sand mining has attracted have been more limited.
Nonetheless, the trade is far from insignificant:
There are diverse sand mining practices and operations, with sand mining taking place along rivers
and beaches across the country (Global Witness
2010; International Center for Environmental
Management [ICEM] 2017). Yet, although the
industry seems to be expanding, there are challenges
and problems in measuring and documenting the
volumes and impacts of extraction. Like Cambodia,
there is a lack of baseline data in terms of both the
industry activity and the river flows and ecologies
and, thus, deciphering impacts is difficult, and
studies on the livelihood impacts are nonexistent.
Research along the Salween River in Karen State
(described later) illustrates a range of impacts on
riverine livelihoods, particularly for those engaged in
the riverbank and alluvial island cultivation of vegetables. Sand extraction is in direct competition for
the fertile sands that support riverbank gardens, a
seasonal practice undertaken as part of a broader
livelihood portfolio. If Cambodia’s ban on coastal
sand mining holds and is effective (admittedly, a big
“if”), it could be that Myanmar will see an increased
demand for its sand. For example, the 2010 Global
Witness report shows how an interest in sand
imports from Myanmar emerged as sand exports were
banned from other parts of Southeast Asia. This
points not just to increasing international demand
for the commodity but to sand extraction’s regional
interconnections.
Connecting Singapore with Cambodia
and Myanmar
Between these different sites, then, sand becomes
a commodity that links livelihoods across national
10
Lamb et al.
space, such that the prosperity and poverty of distant population groups are implicated. Although this
does not necessarily mean that the prosperity
of Singapore is predicated on the poverty of
Cambodian fishers and riverside cultivators in
Myanmar, such that these conditions are coproduced, they are not unconnected. Demand for sand
in Singapore, the associations between Singapore’s
territorial expansion and national development, and
the ways in which sand extraction compromises the
livelihoods of fishers and riverbank cultivators intersect in important ways, and tracing those intersections is our aim. In thinking through these
connections, we follow Bebbington and Humphreys
Bebbington (2011), who explored the impact of
resource extraction on indigenous groups in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru and observed how “value is taken
from certain spaces and distributed to others,” such
that the “spaces that bear the brunt of the externalities generated by extraction are in the vicinity of
the wells, mines, pipelines and smelters … [while]
… benefits and opportunities accrue in other
spaces—in departmental and national capitals” (142).
In addition, however, we argue that the reason
such connections are sustained, often with little
comment, is because of the ways in which sand’s
role in livelihoods takes such different forms,
requiring that we think of sand not as a commodity for land reclamation or construction alone but
vicariously—as a habitat for fish and land for subsistence farming, for example. The need to go
beyond dominant viewpoints where what we see
and take as important is connected to economic
value is second nature to most development geographers but, we suggest, is not normally part of
GPN approaches, let alone capitalism’s repertoire.
Tsing (2015) called this the “problem of alienation,” where “things are torn from their lifeworlds to become objects of exchange” (121), a
process that she applies to both nonhumans
and humans.
Livelihoods Unexamined and at Risk
At present, there has been no detailed livelihood
analysis about how global flows of sand affect people
making a living in the sites of extraction, even if
the media have usefully reported Cambodian villagers’ stories, the illicit sand trade across Asia, and
rapid rise in demand for sand globally. Yet, sand has
a critical role in sustaining livelihoods—shallow
coastal waters are important nursery and fishing
grounds and home to important mangrove wetland
systems that serve as shelter from winds and storms.
Even with the emerging media attention, little analysis is given to the different livelihood choices that
people make in the face of sand mining or the interactions
among
livelihoods,
human-induced
ecosystem change, and everyday life.
In assessing the impacts of sand mining on sites of
extraction, we consider the livelihoods in our case
sites that would be otherwise overlooked in the
value chains or networks of sand as a commodity for
export. In doing so, we show how the processes of
sand extraction can be detrimental to livelihoods,
with sand extraction practices placing already
marginalized farmers or fishers into more precarious
political and increasingly peripheral geographical
positions. How sand mining intersects with livelihoods can be easily obscured in global production
approaches but is significant in the production and
transformation of value. In essence we suggest that
accumulation processes are being smoothed and
deproblematized by the quite discrete and particular
ways in which commodities are counted, valued, and
tracked. After analyzing the livelihood implications
across two of our case sites, in Cambodia and
Myanmar, we turn to an analysis of the extended
networks of value in the production of sand as a
commodity by examining livelihoods transition (and
mobility) in Singapore and its links (back) to
Cambodia and Myanmar.
Livelihoods Unexamined and at Risk in Cambodia
Sand is both valued and functions in a variety
of ways in situ, such as supporting the formation
of alluvial islands, ecosystem functions, and
resource-based livelihoods, including fisheries and
floodplain agriculture. In Cambodia, one village
that has been affected by a decade of coastal sand
mining is Koh Sralao, a 350-household mangroveestuarine fishing village accessible only by boat on
the country’s southwestern coast. The illegal sand
mining industry has been in full force since late
2007, shortly after Indonesia banned the export of
coastal sand (Global Witness 2008). Although
sand mining operations began in just a handful of
sites in and around the village, by 2010 there were
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
an estimated twenty-seven extraction sites within
this area (Global Witness 2010), with sand mining continuing (Marschke 2014) until its ban
in 2017.
Initially, Chinese military staffed the boats
(Global Witness 2008), although over the decade
this shifted to Cambodian-owned boats with their
own workers. According to a former sand dredger
(interview transcript, March 2018), licenses were
bought from a prominent Cambodian business person who controlled sand mining in Koh Kong and
had high-level political connections (Global Witness
2010). Local businesspeople operated boats that
either dredged or transferred sand to larger boats at
sea, where they were paid for the sand. In recent
years these larger boats were, according to our interviews, Singaporean owned and operated. Sand dredging was risky, in that payment for sand could be
patchy, resulting in a rotation of people involved in
the sector. Although exact estimates of the sand
extracted are unknown, the vast majority of
Cambodia’s sand exports to Singapore have come
from this part of Cambodia.
Over the decade during which sand mining was
active, operations moved in and around Koh Sralao
village. At times the dredging could be heard all
night long; at other times operations were a few kilometers or more away. This village lies within a
national wildlife sanctuary and yet no comprehensive
environmental impact assessment ever took place
(Marschke 2012). Although sand mining operations
did shift with time to involve more Cambodian businesses and workers, they were not generally coming
from Koh Sralao or other fishing villages; instead,
workers were typically connected to boat owners or
sand dredgers, who come from the provincial town
and beyond. Other than in a few cases, sand dredging
has not involved villagers from Koh Sralao as
artisanal miners or as workers for larger operations.
Although coastal villagers have not been part of
the sand mining industry in the area, they have
relied on marine resources including shrimp, crab,
and various marine fish for decades as critical
components in their livelihoods. People fish with
mechanized boats using gill nets or crab traps in and
around the mangrove estuarine area or within a few
kilometers of the coastline (Marschke 2012).
Although the main livelihood is crab fishing, a
diversity of other fishing activities are also pursued
by villagers (green mussel culture, grouper fishing),
11
along with various nonfishing activities (small shops,
farming, animal raising) that are linked to a fishing
economy. Livelihoods in the village have never been
easy, with fishers having experienced fish declines
since the 1990s (Marschke and Nong 2003); even
so, sand mining in and around Koh Sralao has further compounded fisheries declines and biodiversity
loss, as seen elsewhere in Asia (Larson 2018). In the
short term, fish habitats and seagrass beds have been
destroyed. The removal of sand for commercial use
deepens shallow channels, which are critical nursery
grounds for various aquatic species, and destroys
aquatic habitat in the process; fish migration routes
are also disturbed, and the water is deemed by local
residents to be more turbid. Sand mining has taken
place near the margins of the mangroves, partially
damaging some trees and completely ripping out
others (Marschke 2014). The landscape is changing,
with villagers noting that one of the island inlets
near the village disappeared in 2015. Several minor
landslides have also reportedly taken place. Fishers’
lives have been dramatically altered in terms of their
ability to fish in local fishing grounds, as shallowwater estuary areas are also where sand mining
typically occurs.
The precise impacts or effects are difficult to
trace, but it is evident that jobs for fishing villagers
have not been created from this endeavor (with the
exception of a few day laborer jobs in recent years),
and the military presence in the ocean space limits
what villagers or others dare to do. Sand mining
operations take place at all hours of the day and
night, and the constant noise of such operations
has been described by villagers as an irritant.
Although livelihoods have transformed as a result
of sand mining, the mobile nature of fishing enables
people to compensate for the sand mining, responding to immediate habitat destruction and fish
declines in particular areas by fishing other grounds.
Sustained sand mining activities add another strain,
turning livelihoods that were always vulnerable into
increasingly precarious ones (Marschke 2017).
Vulnerability, in this context, is seen as an inherited condition tied to making a living from the
land and sea, as distinct from precarity, which is
produced by wealth-creating activities (Rigg et al.
2016), such as sand mining. In the Cambodia case,
local livelihoods do not enter into the accounting
equation in the production of sand, creating an
epistemological gap.
12
Lamb et al.
Sand Extraction on the Salween and Its Livelihood
Impacts in Myanmar
Our second case is from Hpa An, the provincial
capital of Myanmar’s Karen State. Here, sand mining
operations, on both medium and small scales, are
affecting the Salween River and local livelihoods
linked to the river. We see impacts not only on
fishing but perhaps most pointedly on riverbank gardening, both of which are important sources of food
and livelihoods for this city-town of approximately
half a million residents (Ministry of Immigration and
Population, Republic of the Union of Myanmar
2015). Located near the Myanmar border with
Thailand and only fifty or so kilometers (thirty
miles) away by boat from the Port of Mawlamyine,
local sand operations in Hpa An are ideally positioned for both international export and to supply
materials for the rapidly industrializing surrounding
region (Myitmakha News 2016). Sand extraction
here is a mix of commercial and artisanal mining in
rivers, with sand and gravel being extracted at
multiple sites and scales destined for a mix of destinations. This is quite distinct from the kind of sand
and the scale of operations described in Cambodia,
which has largely focused on coastal sand mining for
export to Singapore. That the sand operations are
linked to Singapore, that they are having an impact
on local livelihoods and landscapes, and that these
impacts are being overlooked are similar across both
cases, however.
In the Myanmar case, research reveals an acute
impact of sand mining on river morphology and livelihoods. According to interviews carried out in 2017
and 2018 and during previous visits to Hpa An since
2014, traditionally the Salween’s alluvial islands and
banks in and around Hpa An have been allocated for
the cultivation of vegetables, which were produced
for household subsistence, for sale in local markets,
and for export to Thailand. The majority of gardeners undertake this activity nearly year-round (across
two or three seasons) as their main source of income
and food. Compared with the Mekong, where farmers
tend to cultivate for one season only with an
estimated value of approximately US$25 million per
year (ICEM 2010), those engaged in the practice on
the Salween are more reliant on the activity across
multiple seasons (Lamb 2014). Alternative opportunities are fewer and therefore, we speculate, the
implications of river bank and island degradation for
livelihoods are that much more significant.
Local riverbank cultivators were the first to highlight the rise in sand mining, and they pointed to
the demand for sand and gravel for construction and
development domestically in Myanmar as well as for
export to Sinagpore (Myitmakha News 2016; interviews, May 2017). For instance, in a group interview
with elder riverbank cultivators from Hpa An, interviewees explained that there had been a “double
increase in the sand and marble production! Not
enough to supply the demand. Lots of construction
in the city. Everyone wants a concrete house now,
not a wood one” (interview transcript, May 2017).
As noted in a recent ICEM (2017) assessment of
rivers across Myanmar, sand mining is a challenge
but there are no data available on demand domestically. In 2016, as an indication of sand demand (as
sand and cement are combined roughly two to one
or even three to one to make concrete), cement
demand within Myanmar was 8 million tons, so
domestic demand for sand can be estimated somewhere between 16 and 32 million tons. Moreover,
the demand for construction materials is growing
both domestically and to sell not only to Singapore
but also to China (ICEM 2017).
The increase in the scale and scope of the sand
mining operations on the Salween was further
identified by local sand and gravel companies and
local authorities in Hpa An (interview transcript,
May 2017). In an interview with city officials, they
explained that although removing sand from the
river for construction is a long-established practice,
the way it is being done today and its impacts are
new. One local official stated that “there are lots of
problems with sand mining. It is faster now than in
the past, we used to use people who would be in a
line and then reach from bucket to bucket. Today,
machines: we use boats, loaders, and trucks. Along
with production, it has environmental impacts”
(interview transcript, May 2017). As reported in the
Myanmar media (Myitmakha News 2016; Eleven
Myanmar 2018) and as recounted to the first author
in interviews, Star High Pacific Limited had contracts for dredging the Yangon River and Salween
River, with the sand exported to Singapore.
According to interviewees, the recent rise of sand
mining and the removal of sand has seen dramatic
impacts, in terms of island formation and accelerating
the erosion and sedimentation processes of the river’s
banks. Sand mining also affects local agricultural production: Cultivation relies on seasonal flooding to
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
deposit the river’s fertile sediments on riverbank gardens and islands. Moreover, as new alluvial islands
emerge in the river, a normal occurrence in this area,
sand and gravel companies rather than local cultivators are allocated access rights. This is contrary to the
traditional practices of land and island allocation.
According to Hpa An residents interviewed, such
practices are based on generations of local land governance. New alluvial islands are claimed, after they
emerge and are stabilized, by local groups based on
proximity and then by lottery. The nearest communities (either villages or districts, which could be two
or more) make claims to the island, and the land is
divided into sections and then marked out as individual plots. Within the community a lottery is held to
decide who will receive one of the plots within the
community’s designated portion. If companies continue to claim these islands, with the intention of
their extirpation by mining, this also, and self-evidently, removes them from cultivation. Many questioned whether or how they would be able to
continue with this kind of seasonal cultivation,
which, as noted, is a long-standing practice.
Along the Salween River in Myanmar and in
Koh Sralao, Cambodia, we see changes in the use
and value of sand as it has moved from being implicated in a way of life to becoming a business: new
actors, using new technologies, for new uses, and
with new flows and networks. In the burgeoning of a
lucrative industry such as the sand trade it is easy to
elide local and traditional resource uses and users.
At an elemental level, subsistence and semisubsistence fisheries and riverside farming are not captured
by national statistics. In addition, approaches in economic geography that count value and track networks in narrow ways similarly shade such activities
and the implications of their denudation from view.
So where might a livelihoods approach to sand take
us, as distinct from a GPN approach?
To begin with, it would attend to matters of livelihoods, matters of reproduction and redistribution,
not just of production. It would therefore include
subsistence and semisubsistence activities and the
(re)distribution of the product of these activities,
often by exchange rather than sale, within extended
families and even across communities.
Livelihoods, Transformed
It might seem that Singapore’s role in the story is
only as the destination for the sand that has
13
compromised livelihoods in Cambodia and
Myanmar, as we outlined earlier. Not only do we
connect prosperity in Singapore with precarity in
Cambodia and Myanmar, though; we also see the
country’s migrant workforce as indirectly implicated
in these flows of sand both through the work that it
provides and the precarity that it creates. Migrant
construction workers form the largest group of
migrant workers in Singapore (Ye and Yeoh 2018).
Although Singapore does not offer migrant workers
a home, it does provide them with work. Relative to
opportunities in their home countries, this work is
often well remunerated and, notwithstanding abundant evidence of exploitation, abuse, accidents, even
death (Kitiarsa 2014), is often regarded as positive
in terms of economic value and the contribution
that such work delivers to the material conditions of
the wider household. From a livelihoods standpoint,
it is evident that this work is sometimes propelled by
distress and on occasion by relative prosperity. It can
sometimes bolster household conditions, but in other
instances it produces debt-driven precarity and deepens livelihood exposure. The often aggregated and
characteristically economistic perspective offered by
a GPN approach obscures such intricacies of
connection among sand extraction, migration, work
in distant places, and livelihoods.
This absence of opportunities is partly a product
of underdevelopment but also—and at first sight
paradoxically—of development. This is where sand
mining’s impacts on livelihoods in Cambodia and
Myanmar come into the frame as explanatory
possibilities. In both of our research sites, traditional
livelihoods are being compromised, sometimes extinguished, by sand mining. Sand mining is an important sector in the national economies, generating
wealth for a few in Cambodia and Myanmar, sustaining prosperity in Singapore, and at the same time
producing new articulations of poverty in the sites of
extraction. This, then, creates the local livelihood
conditions that cause people to leave their natal
homes, to seek opportunities in other places, even in
Singapore. In Koh Sralao, for example, between
2007 and 2010, 20 percent of households left the
village because they could no longer make a living,
partly for the reasons we have already described
(Marschke 2012). Such out-migration has continued
(Horlings 2017). Households who remain generally
have children, spouses, or other family members
working either in other parts of Cambodia or in
14
Lamb et al.
other countries in the Southeast Asian region
(Marschke 2017).
Of course, leaving agriculture or the country to
work abroad is not the only response to sand mining
in Cambodia or Myanmar, nor is migration only a
product of sand mining. There exist other changes,
for instance, in relation to the shifting of livelihood
practices in incremental amounts or in re-creating
subsistence landscapes locally. The changing landscape is a source of frustration for villagers in Koh
Sralao, as they have been involved in replanting
more than 800 hectares of mangrove trees since
2000 and in community-based natural resource management activities more generally (Marschke and
Berkes 2006; Marschke 2012). Villagers initially
reacted to sand mining by active protest, lobbying
government ministries and, more recently, took considerable risks in working with controversial advocacy groups (Thompson 2017; see also Baird and
Quastel 2011). Livelihoods are less sustainable than
ever, with (fragile) local resource use practices—
management
and
conservation-related—being
severely hampered as local resource management
committees lose credibility because they cannot
regulate or stop the sand mining (Marschke 2017).
Sand mining has also led to serious tensions—to
protest, do nothing, or take advantage of the very
few laborer jobs offered. Sand mining results in multiple transformations, affecting people’s livelihoods
and ecosystems.
Beyond Calculation: Metrics, Livelihoods,
and the Sand Trade
The available data on the global trade in sand
miss much; they tend to occlude domestic data, and
precise cross-border connections can be difficult to
discern. This in itself is a problem, but not attending to the omissions of the sand economies we
detailed earlier—the distinct forms of livelihood
precarity “on the ground”—reveals more than an
error in global metrics of sand. In both Hpa An
and Koh Sralao, local resource users have identified
that their livelihoods are transformed by sand
extraction. It is not therefore just that the things
that are counted and valued, the methods used, and
the interpretative frameworks employed omit such
matters; this oversight also hides some of the egregious livelihood outcomes that are tied to such
processes of accumulation. As a result, the value of
sand for local resource users is effectively discounted or rendered invisible, with the ways in
which sand feeds into subsistence and semisubsistence activities generally overlooked in the production network. In Singapore, where much of this
extracted sand lands for construction and fill,
migrant workers from those same countries
appear again.
It might be thought that these groups and activities can simply be drawn into the global production
approach, permitting an incorporation of such actors
and their livelihoods. We contend that it is not that
simple because the issue arises from the nature of
the approach itself. It is not by-the-by, merely
requiring a broadening or rearticulation, but bedded
deeply. Approaches are not “innocent” (Burawoy
2009); what theories we embrace, framings we
employ, questions we ask, data we collect, and methods we use are intimately entangled and matter,
often quite profoundly, in shaping the interpretations and conclusions we draw. More particular, with
regard to the global production approach, we argue
that it favors market and private values over subsistence and community values.
Thus, to better understand the impacts of sand
mining on livelihoods, we argue that connecting the
literatures on GPNs and livelihoods enables us to
notice both connections and omissions. Broadly
speaking, GPNs focus on the chain or network and
livelihood analysis overlooks the ways in which people and their conditions and potentialities are implicated in networks stretched beyond the arena of the
local, connecting these literatures, as our sand cases
illustrate, provides an approach that is broad in its
connections and is simultaneously grounded in specific practices, places, and people. This enables us to
better account for the overlooked, untracked, or
omitted aspects in the production, erosion, and
transfer of the value embodied in sand. In the cases
we recount, we identify neither accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) nor accumulation without
dispossession (Hart 2006) but, rather, accumulation
by omission. This, in effect, “cheapens” sand
because it overlooks the values of the livelihoods
directly tied to sand, which we highlight, for riverbank cultivation and fisheries (see Figure 4). It also
stops us from assuming that the “problem of poverty
is fundamentally a problem of production”
(Ferguson, 2015, 36) and instead takes seriously
matters of livelihood, both commercial and
Trading Sand, Undermining Lives
subsistence, as well as (re)distribution at family and
community scales.
We bring together these livelihoods with global
networks of sand traded throughout the Southeast
Asia region as a way to underline such omissions. In
a context where “few think it is important to take a
closer look at the world the economic system
supposedly organizes,” we underline that the stories
we tell of economic growth and production tend to
be foundationally disconnected to the narrations of
life and livelihood (Tsing 2015, 132).
With this in mind, the approach we take identifies
both sand trade networks and sand-linked livelihoods
as connected and emphasizes that one value can, in
fact, inhibit the achievement of the other. Skeptics
might read this simply as extending an analysis of
externalities or even within the scope of an analysis
of accumulation by dispossession that argues that
accumulation of wealth in a capitalist economy both
results in and is predicated on this dispossession.
What we mean to differentiate in this approach is
that the omission of livelihoods limits our understanding of accumulation. These livelihoods, distinct
from labor or worker, are not positioned against capitalist forms (Gibson et al. 2017) but are an integral if
hidden part of the form, and to only view these activities as important in terms of their relations to firms
or labor does not do justice to the extent to which
livelihoods and local economies are lost. Taking a
livelihoods approach provides the means and opportunity to interrogate the blind spots of GPN analysis,
part of what Werner (2016) argued amounts to
“constitutive exclusions.” It provides a way to tell a
livelihoods-inclusive story of the economy of sand, a
story that we consider essential in understanding the
accumulation of wealth and production of poverty in
particular places and for particular people. At the
same time, the merits of GPN can bring greater analytical precision to livelihoods analysis. Together,
they reveal what each framing individually privileges—and in connecting them, we take the opportunity to understand and reveal the implications of
the global sand trade for life and livelihoods.
and comments on GPN matters, and the article has
also benefited from discussions with Peter
Vandergeest, Eli Elinoff, Laura Schoenberger, and
Sangeetha Chandra-Shekeran. We also thank
Iftekharul Haque and Sheena Chan for their support
in creating the figures using UN Comtrade data. In
Southeast Asia, we thank fishers, farmers, and other
interviewees for frank, open, and insightful
discussions.
Funding
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial
support provided by Canada’s Urban Climate
Resilience in Southeast Asia (UCRSEA) project,
jointly funded by the Social Science and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) and the International
Development Research Center (IDRC; SSHRC
Award reference number 895-2013-3004; IDRC
Project No. 107776), and the Singapore Social
Science Research Council (SSRC) project,
“Sustainable
Governance
of
Transboundary
Environmental Commons in Southeast Asia”
(Award reference number MOE2016-SSRTG-068).
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
Acknowledgments
Our original idea for this article emerged after
fieldwork at an Urban Climate Resilience in
Southeast Asia (UCRSEA) meeting in Battambang,
Cambodia, in May 2017. Neil Coe provided advice
15
5.
We use the general term sand throughout the article
as it is used across academic scholarship, reports, and
in local contexts. Although we do not have the space
to draw out the distinctions in this article, we
recognize that sand and gravel can be rather
ambiguous categories (i.e., silt, sediments, sand,
gravel) and what counts as sand can change
depending on size, location, and use.
Yeung and Coe (2015) defined a “global production
network as an organizational arrangement comprising
interconnected economic and noneconomic actors
coordinated by a global lead firm and producing goods or
services across multiple geographic locations for worldwide
markets” (32, italics in original). See also Coe (2011)
on the GPN “acronym soup.”
Or in other cases, livelihoods are related to local
economies of everyday life and are considered
“unremarkable” (Gibson et al. 2017, 134).
Artisanal or small-scale sand mining is prevalent
globally and can have similar—although generally
more localized—economic and environmental effects
(see Masalu [2002] on Tanzania and Mingist and
Gebremedhin [2016] on Ethiopia).
For instance, Singapore’s Changi airport was
developed on reclaimed land and also saw recent
expansion requiring both sea and river sand from
others in the region. Other large projects, such as the
Marina Bay Sands hotel and casino, also relied on
16
Lamb et al.
imports of both. For just these two projects, investors
and contractors included government, local
contractors, and domestic and international firms,
such as the Las Vegas Sands Corp.
ORCID
http://orcid.org/0000-0003Vanessa Lamb
1717-6777
Melissa Marschke
http://orcid.org/0000-00031202-6681
Jonathan Rigg
http://orcid.org/0000-00026563-4640
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VANESSA LAMB is a Geographer in the School of
Geography, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3053,
Australia. E-mail: Vanessa.Lamb@unimelb.edu.au. In her
research and teaching, she focuses on human–environment geographies and political ecology of Southeast Asia.
MELISSA MARSCHKE is an Associate Professor at the
School of International Development and Global Studies
at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5,
Canada.
E-mail: Melissa.Marschke@uOttawa.ca. Her
training is in human–environment relations, and current
research interests include unpacking coastal livelihood
transitions and understanding working conditions in the
seafood sector.
JONATHAN RIGG is Chair in Human Geography in
the School of Geographical Sciences at the University of
Bristol and a Professor in the Department of Geography
and Director of the Asia Research Institute, National
University of Singapore, Kent Ridge Crescent, 119260,
Singapore. E-mail: Jonathan.Rigg@nus.edu.sg. He is joining the School of Geographical Sciences at the
University of Bristol in early 2019. He is a development
geographer interested in understanding the human effects
of social, economic, and environmental transformations in
the Asian region.