THE ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CRISIS
Ricardo López Murphy, Daniel Artana, and
Fernando Navajas
The Argentine economy suffered a deep crisis during 2001 and
2002. Poverty stretched to one in every three homesteads in the
suburbs of Buenos Aires, and the traumatic departure from convertibility, together with financial crisis and default (public debt default),
undermined investor confidence, both local and foreign.
Causes of the Crisis
We believe the crisis owed its existence to four main causes: (1)
inappropriate fiscal policy, (2) wage and price rigidities inconsistent
with a fixed exchange regime, (3) a considerable, adverse external
shock, and (4) political turmoil.
Two-Tiered Fiscal Inconsistency
On one side, public expenditure growth measured in U.S. dollars
outpaced GDP growth, corrected by tradable-goods prices. On the
other, the federal and provincial primary fiscal surplus did not rise at
an equal pace with the hike in the financial burden linked to growing
debt and the gradual phasing out of preferential-rate bonds (Brady
bonds and others issued to cancel government liabilities with pensioners and state contractors) replaced in turn by market-rate notes.
The impact and stress on convertibility caused by real shocks has
led many analysts to challenge the fiscal nature of the crisis.1 In our
Cato Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2003). Copyright © Cato Institute. All rights
reserved.
Ricardo López Murphy is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Latin American Economic
Research Foundation (FIEL) in Buenos Aires and is a former Finance Minister of Argentina.
Daniel Artana and Fernando Navajas are Chief Economists at FIEL.
1
Pointing to convertibility or dollarization as basic explanations of the crisis, in order to
downplay structural problems in fiscal institutions, overlooks the fact that they were precisely
chosen after decades of fiscal mismanagement. From an empirical point of view and despite the
many attempted explanations to disregard the fiscal dimension, the only econometric evidence
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opinion, that doubt stems from an incomplete observation of Argentine data and to a misinterpretation of causality between public expenditure and real exchange rates.
A first dimension of the issue bears on the fact that public expenditure relies heavily on nontradable goods and services. An uncontrolled expansion of the nontradables sector leads to real exchangerate overvaluation in small, open economies because the pressure
exerted on domestic prices cannot be offset by tradable-good prices
limited by a fixed exchange rate and foreign prices. Throughout the
1991–2001 period, the three levels of government expenditure rose
77 percent in dollar terms, while the Argentine GDP rose 57 percent
and dollar-denominated tradable prices fell (Table 1).
Even worse, government data do not adequately gauge state outlays because deficit registers systematically underestimate public debt
variation—that is, the official data do not consider as “expenditure”
the issue of new government debt to cancel claims on the government. If expenditure is “corrected” yearly to account for the difference between consolidated deficits and debt variation, public expenditure in the 1991–2001 period grew about 97 percent; in dollar terms
that figure is more than 40 percentage points above tradable-priceadjusted GDP growth. A clearly expansive public spending policy,
financed largely by borrowing abroad, contributed to real exchangerate overvaluation. Actually, government spending in Argentina behaved as if the exceptionally favorable export prices of the 1996–97
interval could have held throughout the whole period. Their subsequent collapse exposed the fragility of the Argentine fiscal policy.
A second dimension of the fiscal problem can be seen when analyzing the evolution of the primary fiscal balance. During the 1991–
2001 period, the federal primary balance averaged a surplus of 1
percent of GDP, while interest payments measured 2.8 percent of
GDP. However, if properly measured, the real primary balance for
the entire 11-year period was in deficit, equal to 0.7 percent of GDP.
Toward the end of that period, the consolidated fiscal balance was in
deficit, equal to nearly 6 percent of GDP. The largely dollardenominated public debt aggravated the problem for 2002 after the
peso devaluation.
Another misinterpretation underlies the comparison of sovereign
debt for Argentina to the European Union’s public debt ceiling of 60
percent of GDP under Maastricht standards. The problem with this
available on the transmissions channels of the crisis point to fiscal imbalances as a central
explanation of the crisis (Powell 2002).
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TABLE 1
ARGENTINE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
(Cumulative Percentage Change)
Public Expenditures (U.S.$)
Primary
Total
Total
GDP
(U.S.$)
Export
Prices
Tradable
Prices
59.4
54.6
3.1
61.7
−1.5
77.0
53.0
15.7
66.3
6.4
97.4
87.1
5.5
82.2
8.4
56.8
50.6
4.1
71.3
−8.5
−0.8
7.0
−7.3
16.6
−14.9
−7.9
1.5
−9.3
7.0
−13.9
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THE ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CRISIS
1991–2001
1991–1994
1995–2001
1991–1997
1997–2001
“Corrected” Expenditures
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approach was that European Community rules were designed for
countries that face no difficulties rolling over principal. This is not
always the case with developing countries, where domestic capital
markets are limited and external capital flows may wane for reasons
beyond their control.
During most of the 1990s, Argentina complied with most of the
Maastricht standards, except the one that is central to public debt
sustainability—namely, the spread over public bonds issued in domestic currency compared with the lowest European country interest
rates. Spreads over Argentine bonds denominated in pesos tripled the
150 basic points admitted by Maastricht. Together with failure to
converge toward investment grade qualifications, this suggested that
Argentine debt would, sooner or later, be judged unmanageable.
For these reasons, borrowing rules for emerging countries must be
tighter, further disclosing the vulnerability of Argentine fiscal accounts (Artana, López Murphy, and Navajas 2003). It is not random
that countries with economies considered healthy, such as Chile, have
debt ratios considerably lower than those of Argentina, both in terms
of the size of the economy and the amount of revenues collected.
The Lack of Flexibility
The problem of economic rigidity has to be dealt with, bearing in
mind that the strict observance of convertibility—under the currency
board system—requires other economic variables to be flexible
enough to accommodate negative external shocks, relying more on
nominal rather than on quantitative adjustment. Response of the
economy to a sudden drop in dollar inflows (either due to capital
outflows or to a fall in exports) may reallocate resources toward tradable activities, or cut imports through a slump in aggregate demand.
A flexible economy performs the first kind of correction; a rigid
economy will muddle through the second kind, which is obviously
more expensive and traumatic.
A first dimension of the rigidity problem is an insufficient exposure
of the Argentine economy to foreign trade. Notwithstanding gains
made in the direction of regional economic integration, judging by
the ratio of imports to GDP, Argentina is one of the least exposed to
international trade. The Mercosur average common tariff is 13 percent, compared with 7 percent in Chile and less than 5 percent in
developed countries. This anti-export bias limited exports to a mere
10 percent of GDP, despite strong economic growth during the
1990s. The low ratio of exports to GDP means that an external shock that
reduces capital inflows by 1 percent of GDP will require an offsetting
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THE ARGENTINE ECONOMIC CRISIS
expansion of exports of 10 percent above trend to avoid economic
contraction.
A second issue is labor regulations and, here, Argentina did not
make enough progress to secure the much-needed flexibility. In particular, reallocation of resources toward the tradables sector faced an
additional restriction: this sector is essentially formal, while an important part of the nontradables activity is informal. Reassigning the
labor force is increasingly difficult given the tax differential that burdens formal activities, in particular, when taxes have an impact directly on hiring labor.
Regarding business flexibility, Argentine bankruptcy legislation is
inappropriate. Debtors already enjoy more protection than they do in
the United States.
Finally, the most notorious inflexibility occurred in public spending. A successful devaluation should reduce both labor costs and the
burden of the state on tradable activities. In the absence of exchange
rate flexibility, the situation called for downward flexibility in government spending or a strict limit on the growth of government. Yet
spending rigidities extended well into the crisis, revealing the magnitude of the problem.
The External Shock
Argentina suffered an external blow of an unusual nature. Our
country traded intensively within the region, exported agricultural
and industrial commodities, and relied heavily on capital inflows.
From 1997 onward all of these factors fell behind. Export prices
dropped around 15 percent between 1996–97 and 1999–2000. In
addition, the country’s situation worsened because its main trading
partners (Europe, Brazil, Chile) depreciated their currencies. With
the peso pegged rigidly to the U.S. dollar, there was no way to offset
competitive depreciations. What the government should have done
was to save in times of bonanza, building reserves to accommodate
lower taxes later, thus supporting a private sector handcuffed by the
strong peso.
Foreign credit gradually waned and capital markets began to believe that the Argentine crisis was not transitory in nature. Capital
inflows, which had averaged 6 percent of GDP in 1997–98, halved by
the year 2000, and reversed completely during 2001. The problem of
external financing was partially cushioned during 2000 and 2001 by
borrowing from multilateral institutions, revealing that the turnaround in private flows was even worse. So long as multilateral institutions cannot increase their net Argentine exposure, the contractive effects may linger on because a country in default, where the
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government has interfered with private contracts, may expect a very
slow return of private capital.
Political Problems
The coalition, sworn in by year-end 1999, responded to the crisis
with hesitation and delay. In 2001, the banking system was further
weakened by a government that borrowed compulsorily from bank
reserves; the exchange rate regime was reformed by pegging the peso
to a basket of currencies that included the euro, in an attempt to
introduce some degree of flexibility; budget constraints were ignored
as both federal and provincial governments issued quasi-moneys; and
pension and retirement funds were interfered with. Those misconducts aggravated the credibility gap and fueled a run on bank deposits
that led to a compulsory freeze, default, and devaluation.
Conclusion
The Argentine crisis combined all evils put together. Social drama
was excruciating, the state was in default, financial paralysis lingered
on, and the fiscal situation was unresolved, waiting for inflation to do
the job Congress failed to achieve. Even worse, the rout ended monetary credibility, disavowed the fiscal responsibility legislation passed
in 1999, and interfered with private contracts, notwithstanding a law
that purportedly protected bank deposits.
Reconstructing Argentina will not be an easy task in spite of the
recent recovery in economic activity. Key institutions have to be reconstructed and made credible again, requiring significant political
reform. Our vision is that robust fiscal institutions underlie macroeconomic stability and precede exchange-rate decisions, given that
fiscal mismanagement is absolutely inconsistent, sooner or later, with
any sustainable monetary regime. In truth, the core of the solutions
must include a harsh, permanent halt to the Argentine mania of
running fiscal deficits, concealing them, and later enduring the consequences of a government that disavows its commitments.
References
Artana, D.; López Murphy, R.; and Navaja, F. (2003) “A Fiscal Policy
Agenda.” In P.P. Kuczynski and J. Williamson (eds.) After the Washington
Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America, chap. 4.
Washington: Institute for International Economics.
Powell, A. (2002) “Argentina’s Avoidable Crisis: Bad Luck, Bad Economics,
Bad Politics, Bad Advice.” Paper presented at the Brookings Trade Conference, Washington, 2 May.
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