Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is Nigeria Ready for Inflation Targeting?
Shehu Usman Rano Aliyu and Abwaku Englama
Bayero University Kano, Nigeria, Central Bank of Nigeria
3. January 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14870/
MPRA Paper No. 14870, posted 28. April 2009 05:15 UTC
Is Nigeria Ready for Inflation Targeting?
Shehu Usman Rano Aliyu1 and Abwaku Englama2
Abstract
This paper evaluates whether Nigeria is ready to adopt inflation targeting (IT), a monetary policy
framework that several emerging markets have adopted over the last one decade. The paper reviews
literature on selected conditions for successful implementation of IT and then focuses on whether one
specific precondition of an empirically stable monetary transmission mechanism is tenable. Vector
autoregressive (VAR) model was applied using select monetary policy and other macroeconomic
variables to explore the various channels using the Granger causality tests, impulse responses, and
variance decompositions. Results show that inflation in Nigeria is impassive to monetary transmission
variables in the model. Specifically, weak link between prices and credit and interest rate channels were
established. However, evidence of strong inverse link between exchange rate and prices was found in the
model. This suggests exchange rate pass-through on the level of prices in the economy. The paper,
therefore, recommends the pursuance of IT lite in Nigeria.
Keywords: Inflation targeting, vector autoregressive model, Granger causality test, monetary
transmission mechanism, exchange rate pass-through.
1.1
Introduction
Since early 1990’s inflation targeting (IT) has been increasingly viewed as a good monetary
policy framework and was widely acclaimed by economist and policymakers alike. Because of
its enormous potentials as an effective instrument of managing inflation, nations that have
adopted it never turn back. Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime, which is
characterized by public announcement of official target ranges or quantitative targets for price
level increases and by explicit acknowledgement that low inflation is the most crucial long-run
objective of the monetary authorities. According to Savensson (1999) IT framework sets out very
clear goals for monetary policy, defines responsibilities, and establishes measures of
accountability and transparency. It is however, characterized as ‘constrained discretion’ because
it requires the central bank to not only set out clear targets, but to use appropriate instruments to
hit the target, Fischer (2000). Loayza and Soto (2002) observe that although the term inflation
targeting is now commonly used by bankers and scholars, several features of this monetary
1
Shehu Usman Rano Aliyu is an Associate Professor at Bayero University, Kano. At the time of writing this paper,
he is with the Research Department of Central Bank of Nigeria as a Visiting Scholar on a Sabbatical leave.
2
Abwaku Englama, PhD., is a Deputy Director and Head, External Sector Division, Research Department, Central
Bank of Nigeria.
1
regime and its effects on economic performance remain elusive. After experiencing moderate,
but, persistent inflation rates for more than two decades, industrialized economies have
controlled and maintained inflation at historically low levels in recent years. Evidences have
shown that Inflation targeting frameworks have often been adopted in even economies without a
history of stable inflation; this is particularly so for countries of Latin America and Africa who
were seen as epitome of chronically high inflation. For instance, Chile and Brazil had inflation
rate of 26 percent and 19 percent, respectively, prior to IT adoption and they have had a success
story on inflation targeting.
Since the early 1990s, inflation targeting (IT) has become a popular choice of monetary policy
regime, with more than 20 countries - both developed and emerging market economies that now
adhere to IT framework. Evidences have shown that countries adopted IT under many different
circumstances, ranging from a well-planned switch from a different policy regime (New Zealand,
Canada) to the solution of a currency crisis (United Kingdom). Equally IT has been pursued with
different vigor and under different sets of institutional arrangements - see Bamidele, 2007; for a
detailed review of cross country experiences and prerequisites for successful IT in both
developed and emerging economies. Nonetheless, the prerequisites include but are not limited to:
independence of the central bank; absence of fiscal dominance, that is, where a Central Bank
bears minimal burden of financing government deficit; a single, well-defined inflation target; a
high degree of transparency and accountability of the Central Bank; a good inflation forecasting
model; sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth to be able to
absorb the placement of both public and private debt instruments; etc.
This paper will not assess the merits and demerits of IT as this has been extensively discussed in
previous studies: See, for example, Debelle (1997), Masson, Savastano, and Sharma (1997),
Tutar (2002) and Truman (2003). It has, however, been observed by Bakradze and Billmeier
(2007) that the growing number of countries that target inflation and the perceived success of
this monetary policy strategy serve as a stimulus for countries that engage in alternative regimes
- such as monetary or exchange rate targeting - to shift to IT or to consider more seriously, such a
shift in the near future. Consequently, this consideration raises the question of how to evaluate
whether a country is ready to join the group of inflation targeters now, later or even never.
2
Considerations for IT framework in Nigeria started since 2000 with the presentation of a position
paper on the subject in the Bank; Uchendu, 2000. In furtherance to this, the Bank devoted its
fifteenth annual conference to the theme “Inflation Targeting in Nigeria” in 2006. Similarly,
with the enactment of the 2007 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act, operational autonomy of the
CBN was strengthened. The Bank was charged with the responsibility of achieving price stability
among other functions and the appointment and removal of the CBN Governor is subject to the
confirmation of the Senate as enshrined in the Act. Uchendu (2007) further noted that the
launching of the Financial System Strategy (FSS) 2020, added vigor towards implementation of
IT framework in the country since it hinges on strategic objective of achieving low single digit
inflation. The Bank on its part decomposed its Research and Statistics Department into a
department each with a view to strengthen and improve the quality of data and research output
carried out in different aspects of monetary policy implementation. Recently, modeling unit in
the Research department is charged with the task of developing a robust model for Nigeria. To
date, there is sufficiently large body of literature on lessons deduced for Nigeria on IT.
While these positive developments take place, it is imperative to assess, from empirical
standpoint, whether Nigeria is ready for IT or not. A number of empirical studies have come up
with different conclusions on the level of preparedness of different countries on adoption of IT
framework. Weak Central Bank accountability and high financial instability, for instance, were
the main concern in Chile’s bid to IT according to Mishkin (2000); Central Bank independence
in South Africa according to Jonsson (1999) and Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) hammered on
the need for Georgia’s Central Bank to overcome some institutional and operational weaknesses
before it implements IT. South Africa is ready for IT according to Woglom (2000) and Poland
according to Christofferson, Solk and Wescott (2001). Against this background, the main aim of
this paper is to assess whether Nigeria is ready for the implementation of inflation targeting. It,
therefore, seeks to estimate the quantitative relationship between inflation, monetary policy
instruments and output. The paper extends the analysis further by exploring the nature of some
monetary transmission channels. Empirical data from 1986Q1 to 2006Q4 would be sourced from
publications of the Central Bank of Nigeria.
3
The main indicators are; Consumer price index, gross domestic product, money supply (M2),
interest rate, exchange rate, fiscal balance, ratio of credit to money supply, treasury bills rate and
lending rate
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: following this introduction is literature review and
theoretical issues in section two. Central Bank independence, transparency and accountability
and recent developments in monetary policy implementation are reviewed in section three while
section four presents the research methodology of the paper. Results and discussions come up in
section five and conclusions and recommendations in section six.
II.
Literature Review and Theoretical Issues
The need for stable prices in an economy has since been documented in both theoretical and
empirical literature. This is because of the adverse effect of inflation on the economy – price
distortion, flourishing of rent-seeking activities, misallocation of scarce resources and social
unrest. The negative effect of inflation on of economic growth has been explored in many studies
see, for example, Barro (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1995) and Ghosh and Phillips (1998).
According to Krueger (2005) inflation distorts resource allocation in the economy. It hurts the
poorest members of society disproportionately. It creates uncertainty and it arbitrarily
redistributes income and wealth. It undermines macroeconomic stability and it makes sustained
rapid growth impossible to achieve. The choice of inflation targeting as instrument of
macroeconomic management is increasingly gaining grounds since the pioneering example by
New Zealand and Chile.
To date, over 20 countries, both developed and emerging economies have switched to this
strategy and their performance is remarkable. According to Loayza and Soto (2002) except for
two countries that became part of the European Monetary Union (Finland and Spain), no
inflation-targeting country has ever abandoned the regime. What then exactly is inflation
targeting? Although definitions differ in detail, there is some consensus on the main
characteristics of this monetary regime: the existence of an explicit quantitative goal that engages
the central bank in the primary objective of price stability; the lack of fiscal dominance and the
absence of competing nominal objectives; and a monetary institution that enjoys instrument
independence and operates transparently and openly to the public.
4
The following definition by Mishkin (2000) of inflation targeting captures most of the issues
raised in the literature.
“Inflation targeting is a monetary policy strategy that encompasses five main elements: i) the
public announcement of medium term numerical target for inflation; ii) an institutional
commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy, to which other goals
are subordinated; iii) an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, and not just
monetary aggregates or the exchange rate, are used for deciding the setting of policy
instruments; iv) increased transparency of the monetary policy strategy through
communication with the public and the markets about the plans, objectives and decisions of
the monetary authorities; v) increased accountability of the Central Bank for attaining its
inflation objectives”.
Although in practice no two countries or their central banks implement or have identical IT
framework, yet a combination of the above elements have characterized the implantation of IT in
most countries. Some central banks, for example the Reserve Bank of Australia, have a dual
mandate combining price stability with full employment. In addition, for some central banks, the
target (or sequence of targets) is a point, and for others it is a range, some define time horizon
over which the target is to be achieved while some do not, etc., Truman and Janeiro (2002).
In the case of a point target, for instance, the central bank essentially by construction will not hit
the target every month, quarter or year, but a miss of a certain size triggers a reporting and
review process; this sounds more demanding on the side of the bank. Where the framework on
the other hand involves a range, it does not specify time frame over which inflation is expected
to return to the range. Although this omission may be viewed as a defect of the particular
country’s regime it, however, reduces the rigor of the regime, adding a further element of
discretion.
The main goal of inflation targeting is the attainment of low level of inflation. This paves way
for macroeconomic stability, wipe away uncertainty and promote long term contracts. Seyfried
and Bremmer (2003) stated that the goal of inflation targeting is not on containing current
inflation, but on intermediate and long term goal. As such, Central Banks according to Bernanke
and Mishkin (1997) should pay close attention to indicators that have predictive power of future
inflation.
Pui (2003) cautions that inflation targeting in its pure sense (where output and
economic growth are given no weights) is not likely to maximize social welfare since the
contraction or expansion of the economy does not matter so long as the inflation target is met
5
Evaluating the success of IT countries, Mishkin and Posen (1997) discovered that IT has been
highly successful in helping countries …... to maintain low inflation rates and that there is no
evidence that IT has produced undesirable effects on the real economy in the long run; instead it
has likely had the effect of improving the climate for economic growth. Recent evidences have
shown that the negative effect of high and variable inflation on macroeconomic stability,
economic growth and income distribution largely outweigh the potential benefits derived from
financing fiscal deficits through monetization. That it is no longer fashionable to hold onto the
age-long growth-inflation substitution hypothesis propounded by A.W. Phillips3. Furthermore,
Bamidele (2007) showed that most of the countries on IT framework have been able to
simultaneously achieve a reduction in inflation as well as increase in output.
Notwithstanding the above success stories, a number of baseline studies have investigated both
the theoretical and empirical basis for implementing IT as a monetary policy regime from varied
perspectives; conditions for successful implementation of IT, reasons why countries switch to IT
regime, who sets the inflation targets, constructing and evaluating competitive empirical models,
etc. While Masson, Savastano & Sharma (1997) for instance, argued that the requirements of IT
in most developing countries are absent due to seigniorage or due to lack of consensus on
attaining low inflation as a primary objective; due to lack of powerful models which could
enable successful inflation forecast according to Kadioglu, Ozdemir & Yilmaz (2000); or
because of relatively weak central banks’ accountability and high financial sector instability
caused by flexible exchange rate according to Morande and Schmidt-Herbel (1999) and Mishkin
(2000). However, this concern was examined critically by Reyes (2004) and his conclusion was
that several studies have shown that over the past five to ten years the pass-through effect from
currency depreciation into inflation has been decreasing in emerging economies that adopted
inflation targeting during the mid and late nineties.
3
According to Sterne (2004) the growth-inflation substitution hypothesis has not prevailed on the average for the
countries that have adopted inflation targeting. For example, in the U.K, inflation reduced from 3.7 percent in preinflation targeting regime to 2.2 percent during the inflation targeting period while the real GDP recorded a growth
from 1.2 percent to 1.4 percent. In New Zealand, in the same period, there was a reduction in inflation from 7.5
percent to 2.7 percent while GDP grew from 0.2 percent to 2.4 percent.
6
Since the main focus of the paper is on the assessment of applicability of IT in Nigeria, more
attention is devoted to review of literature in the area4. Studies on appraisal of conditions for
adoption of IT in a number of countries reveal mixed outcomes. Although these studies were
undertaken at various stages; for some countries it was before IT was implemented, and while for
other, well after years of its implementation. A review of them, therefore, will provide some
insights into the practical requirements, in terms of which set of particular variables matter for a
successful implementation of the framework in Nigeria. The following is a review of some of
them:
In South Africa, for instance, Jonsson (1999) examines the implications and relative merits and
demerits of IT and concludes that although the country has satisfied the main prerequisites of
inflation targeting; independence of central bank, none reliance to macroeconomic objectives
which might be in conflict with low inflation, and relatively developed capital and money
markets. However, what is needed is a refinement of the inflation forecasting framework and
further experience with the operational aspects of the IT. Afterwards Woglom (2000) provides
empirical evidences using VAR specifications that South Africa is a good candidate for inflation
targeting. He further adds that the regime of flexible exchange rate which prevailed in South
Africa provides automatic stabilization of IS shocks
Hazirolan (1999) assesses the applicability of the inflation targeting regime in the Turkish
economy and gives a proposal for its implementation. However, Tutar (2002) discovers that
disinflation should be Turkey’s major priority. Her findings suggest that inflation seems to have
a very strong inertial nature that might be caused by high expectation, relative price adjustments
or institutional arrangements and direct linkage between monetary policy instruments and
inflation do not appear to be strong, stable and predictable.
Using a VAR model, Gottschalk and Moore (2001) assessed the link between monetary policy
instruments and inflation in Poland. Their result showed that although exchange rate was found
to be effective with respect to output and prices, direct linkage between interest rate and inflation
4
See: Loayza & Soto, eds. (2002) “Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, Challenges”, Santiago, Chile, Central
Bank of Chile for a detailed overview on Inflation Targeting
7
do not appear to be very strong. Christofferson, Solk & Wescott (2001) found that Poland is
ready for IT. Others include: Jacobson et al. (2001) investigated the empirical basis for inflation
targeting in Sweden using a VAR framework; Thenuwara (1998) evaluates the feasibility of
inflation targeting in Sri Lanka by exploring the causal relationships associated with the
monetary transmission mechanisms; Hoffmaiser (1999) uses the VAR model to calculate
impulse responses to exogenous monetary policy in North Korea and Soikkeli (2002) assesses
the institutional and technical design of IT framework in Norway, etc.
Recently, Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) examined the applicability of inflation targeting regime
in Georgia using a baseline VAR model. Their finding was that Georgia is not yet ready to
successfully implement IT because the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) suffers from some
institutional weaknesses - e.g., a multiplicity of potentially conflicting goals - and de facto
implementation sometimes falls short of the de jure institutional environment. Moreover,
monetary policymaking in Georgia is hampered by the lack of a reliable indicator of the
monetary stance - a short-term interest rate while monetary transmission mechanism highlights
the importance of the exchange rate channel of transmission of monetary policy.
Bulir, et al (2008) using three key IT communication tools - inflation targets, inflation forecasts,
and verbal assessments of inflation factors contained in quarterly inflation reports—provided a
consistent message in five out of six countries; Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Thailand, and Sweden. However, no single central bank, according to them, in the sample stands
out as an exceptionally good forecaster of inflation and communicator of its policies.
Conceptually, IT describes a monetary policy framework in which central banks accept and
announce certain targets of inflation, over a given period of time, as a measure of policy anchor
and are accountable for deviations of actual from set targets. Three main forms of inflation
targeting have been identified: (i) Full Fledge IT (FFIT), that is, when a country is ready to adopt
IT as its single nominal anchor upon which macroeconomic stability would be achieved. This is
suitable for countries with a robust or sound financial environment, and a central bank, which is
transparent, accountable and highly committed to the attainment of the goals of IT. (ii) Eclectic
IT (EIT) when a country, for instance, pursues IT along with other monetary policy objectives in
a stable financial environment which, however, is less accountable and transparent. (iii) Inflation
8
Targeting Lite (ITL): Low profile form of IT pursued by countries, largely due to lack of strong
or credible macroeconomic environment. ITL countries float their exchange rate and announce
an inflation target, but are not able to maintain the inflation target as the foremost policy
objective. Stone (2003) classified 19 emerging market countries as practitioners of ITL. Angeriz
and Arestis (2007) argue that FFIT is not possible in ITL countries because: (a) Lack of a
sufficiently strong fiscal position and high debt/GDP ratio. (b) Lack of a fully developed
monetary and financial system. (c) Vulnerability to economic shocks (especially supply shocks)
owing to their low degree of development. (d) Lack of transparency in the operation and
implementation of monetary policy.
By extension and from the review factor militating against successful launching of FFTL are in
other words necessary its take up. Myriad of these factors have been identified above. Here is a
checklist of some of them.
i)
Central bank independence
ii)
Transparency and accountability
iii)
Sufficiently virile financial markets in terms of both depth and breadth
iv)
Single and well-defined inflation target
v)
Robust econometric model for forecasting inflation
vi)
Existence of stable and predictable relationship between monetary policy
instruments and inflation.
III.
vii)
Absence of fiscal dominance
viii)
Absence of multiple policy objectives
ix)
Institutional considerations
x)
Minimal burden on Central Bank financing of government deficit
Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability
One feature of an effective central bank is independence5; these include clear and precise
mandate; authority and ability to take effective action to achieve its key objectives and effective
5
Sterne (2004) argues that although Central bank independence is a key component of numerous inflation targeting
frameworks, but the literature, that describes central bank independence as a pre-condition for inflation targeting
misses the point, since both inflation targets and independence are themselves part of a broader process of
9
mechanism to hold the central bank to account. In terms of clear and precise mandate, the 2007
CBN Act stated that one of the mandates of the Bank is that of achieving price stability. To
achieve that the Bank has instrument autonomy and does not need to consult anybody or
organization in the choice and use of its policy instruments for monetary management. Similarly,
the Bank has financial autonomy and does not rely on the treasury for its operational expenses.
In fact the 2007 Act vested the power to approve the budget of the Bank in the Board of
Directors. To ensure the independence of the Bank the Governor can only be removed by the
President provided that the removal shall be supported by two-thirds majority of the Senate
praying that he be so removed.
The day-to-day activities of the CBN are quite transparent and truly accountable as enshrined the
CBN Act. Information about the bank’s activities is available on a daily basis on the bank’s
website. Besides, a wide range of monetary and financial data is published at regular intervals.
Specifically, Section 35 of the 2007 CBN Act states: “The Bank shall make public, at all times,
its monetary policy rate”. The Bank has, in addition, powers to hold external reserves, conduct
treasury operations, regulate credits in the economy and manage liquidity, all in pursuance of the
core mandate of the Bank. A committee which is strategic in this regard is the monetary policy
committee (MPC). It communicates its decisions to the public immediately after its meeting
which whole bi-monthly. Section 12 Sub-sections (1) states the composition of the committee as
follows:
“In order to facilitate the attainment of price stability and to support the economic policy of the
Federal Government, there shall be a Committee of the Bank known as the Monetary Policy
Committee (in this Act referred to as “the MPC”) which shall consist of: a) the Governor of the
Bank who shall be the Chairman b) the four Deputy Governors of the Bank c) two members of
the Board of Directors of the Bank d) three members appointed by the President e) two members
appointed by the Governor”
The conduct of Monetary Policy in Nigeria and all activities of the Central Bank of Nigeria relate
with the core mandate of the bank as an apex institution. Therefore, in pursuance of its functions
and in compliance its core mandate, the CBN undertakes monetary policy in order to:
strengthening society’s resolve to develop institutional arrangements that deliver low inflation. The UK experience
from 1992 to 1997 demonstrated that – even without independence – inflation targeting could be a marked
improvement on previous policy regimes, and this may have helped to encourage the decision to make the Bank of
England independent in 1997.
10
Maintain Nigeria’s external reserves to safeguard the international value of the legal currency.
Promote and maintenance of monetary stability and a sound and efficient financial system in
Nigeria.
Act as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government; and
Act as lender of last resort to banks.
Important to the attainment of a sound monetary policy is the identification of a reliable
monetary transmission mechanism6, which best evokes monetary actions into desired target.
Over the conduct of monetary policy in Nigeria has undergone significant changes. From the use
of direct instruments of monetary controls during the pre-adjustment period up to 1986 to a shift
towards an indirect approach anchored on the use of market based instruments in monetary
management. The desire is to wipe away distortions and inefficiencies that had bedeviled the
financial system caused by long years of use of administrative instruments of control. The aim is
also to engender competition among the operators in the financial system and the entire
economy.
Table 1 presents some monetary policy aggregates in the Nigerian economy between 1999 and
2007. For those variables that go in the same direction, high growth rate of M2 prompts high
monetization of the economy and this causes high inflation. Impressively, however, inflation
turned out to be in a single digit in 2006 and 2007 and this is a good outcome for IT. Exchange
rate on the other hand depreciates, though not persistently.
Table 1:
Monetary Policy Outcomes, 1999 – 2007
Aggregate
M2 Money Growth
CPI Inflation
Fiscal Balance
Exchange Rate
Memorandum Items
Real GDP growth
Monetization (M2/GDP)
Credit to the Economy/GDP
1999
32.5
6.6
29.7
29.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
21.3 17.7 19.4 25.0 12.3 16.6 30.6
6.9
18.9 12.9 23.8 10.0 11.6
8.5
15.5 21.7 18.8 15.4 11.5
8.4
4.9
102.1 111.9 121.0 129.4 133.5 132.1 128.7
2007
30.9
6.6
4.8
125.8
3.0
21.9
19.8
3.8
22.8
10.4
6.2
25.5
11.3
4.7
28.1
18.1
6
4.6
29.6
16.7
9.6
28.6
17.8
6.6
19.8
17.3
6.5
18.0
15.5
6.0
19.8
4.14
See Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier (2006), Bakradze and Billmeier (2007) and CBN (2007b) who presented
thorough discussion of the various channels in the Armenian and Georgian context respectively. It also draws from
an ongoing study by Research Department of Central Bank of Nigeria on Monetary Transmission Mechanism.
11
Source: Obtained from Statistical Bulletin and Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts of Central Bank of
Nigeria, various issues.
Fiscal profile of the government declines almost throughout with no serious threat of dominance.
Rate of real GDP growth revealed an impressive performance in 2003 and remained stable at
around 6 percent afterwards. The ratio of credit to the economy to GDP is moderate. Notice that
the above tends revealed only a casual relationship in and between the aggregates. Any definite
cause and effect interaction could be best obtained by recourse to more serious econometric
analysis. We present the research methodology of the study in the next section.
IV.
Methodology of the Paper
In this section, we examine one major empirical precondition7 of inflation targeting regime
mentioned above; trying to build a solid understanding of the relationship between monetary
policy instruments and inflation rate measured in terms of consumer price index. To achieve the
above and in line with the methodology employed by Gottschalk and Moore (2001), Tutar
(2002) and, more recently, by Bakradze and Billmeier (2007), this paper adopts vector
autoregression (VAR) methodology and the Granger causality tests in both bivariate and
multivariate forms. The VAR methodology is commonly used for forecasting systems of
interrelated time series and for analyzing the dynamic impact of random disturbances on the
system of variables.
The general mathematical representation of a VAR is:
Xt = A(L)Xt – 1 + B(L)Zt + εt
(1)
Equation (1) is saying that Xt is a k vector of endogenous variable, Zt is a d vector of exogenous
variables, A and B are matrices of reduced-form coefficients to be estimated, and εt is a vector of
innovations, impulses or shocks. We estimate the reduced-form VAR and identified monetary
policy shocks through the liquidity, interest rate and exchange rate channels. The endogenous
7
According to Sterne (2004), the inflation targeting experience of industrialized countries suggested that central
banks without an established track record for providing durable monetary stability could gain credibility fairly
quickly by designing frameworks that provide appropriate incentives for government and the central bank to deliver
low inflation. These in turn can help to build a constituency for low inflation that involved a virtuous circle of
reducing inflation expectations and strengthening society’s confidence in its monetary institutions.
12
variables in the model consists of the gross domestic product (yt), consumer price index (cpi),
domestic money supply (dms), fiscal spending (fs), interest rate (ir) and exchange rate (er)
Xt = (yt, cpi, dms, fs, ir, er)’
(2)
The ordering of the variables follows the lower diagonal value of a correlation matrix and the
degree of endogeneity to current economic conditions and in line with the Cholesky ordering
criteria. We use data at quarterly frequency from 1986Q1 t0 2007Q4 obtained from the
publications of Central Bank of Nigeria and international financial statistics (IFS) from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The VAR has 5 lags - in line with the information provided
by the lag section criteria, no constant or time trend and uses logarithm for all variables except
interest rate where we have used the level. We run the VAR in levels in line with the Bayesian
methodology, which according to Mountford (2005) the methodology is robust to the presence of
non-stationarity and though it does not impose any cointegrating long run relationships between
the variables, it does not preclude their existence either.
V.
Empirical Analysis
One of the main prerequisite for a successful adoption of inflation targeting framework as
expounded in many empirical studies is the existence of a stable and predictable relationship
between monetary policy instruments and inflation. In this section we present the empirical
results of our VAR model, which contains six endogenous variables as specified in equation (2).
Meanwhile, as a preliminary analysis, the Granger causality tests on some select channels of
monetary transmission are presented as follows.
Table 2 presents the results of the bivariate and multivariate block Granger causality tests for
price (cpi) and output (yt) in Nigeria. The test tests whether an endogenous variable can be
treated as exogenous for each equation in the VAR. Overall, the results suggest the joint
significance of the policy variables on cpi and yt. The joint probabilities for the multivariate tests
suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis. The bivariate tests for cpi suggest that all the
variables except interest rate cause significant variations in cpi. This is consistent with the
expectations; that is, the level of output, money supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending cause
variations in the level of prices or the cpi.
13
The results further show that two key monetary policy variables; interest rate and money supply,
significantly drive output. Government’s fiscal spending too, significantly drives output.
However, exchange rate and prices are insignificant. The findings support one of the main policy
thrust of monetary policy in Nigeria of achieving of price stability and economic growth via
monetary policy.
Table 2: Granger Causality Tests: Baseline VAR, 1999–2006 1/
Effect on price (cpi)
yt
Dms
Er
Fs
Ir
Joint
Effect on Output (yt)
Dms
Cpi
Er
Fs
Ir
Joint
Chi-square
7.23
8.69
8.38
7.60
4.50
34.56
5.6
2.97
4.72
7.66
24.92
49.93
Probability
0.124*
0.069*
0.079*
0.108*
0.342
0.023*
0.231**
0.562
0.317
0.105*
0.000*
0.000*
Source: Authors' calculations.
1/ The block Granger causality test for exclusion of a variable is based on a Wald test and follows
a χ² distribution; * and ** denote rejection of the exclusion at the 1 and 5 percent level.
An intuitive way to interpret the relationship between monetary policy instruments and cpi using
VAR is to compute an impulse response function (IFR). An impulse response function traces the
effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on current and future values of the
endogenous variables. In our analysis, for instance, if there is a strong and predictable
relationship between the monetary policy instruments and future cpi, then it can be said that the
lagged changes in the monetary policy instruments are economically important in explaining
future cpi. Throughout, we use a period of 12 quarters ahead in the analysis of impulse response
function and the variance decompositions and 95 percent confidence interval, is represented by
the dotted lines.
14
In figure 1 below, the quarterly impulse response functions indicate how the monetary policy and
other related variables affect cpi. In other words, it shows how cpi responds to innovations or
shocks in the other endogenous variables as specified in the VAR equation 2. The response of
cpi to its own shocks is contemporaneously very strong and also in the quarter following the
shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons at an average of 4-5 percent, but, less
persistent afterwards. Also, a one-standard deviation shock to domestic money supply results in
an increase in cpi of about 2.1 percent in the quarter following the shock and remains significant
in the fourth quarter. This is despite the initial undershooting in the first and third quarter. The
response stabilizes at an average of a little above 2 percent in the medium and long term
horizons. The response of money supply8 on the other hand, to innovations in cpi is, however,
negative at close to 2 percent in the medium term and an average of 2.6 percent in the long term
horizon. By way of summing up, while expansionary monetary policy, which works through the
liquidity channel, positively affects prices in the economy, inflationary pressure is usually
followed by contractionary monetary measures in the economy.
The response of cpi to positive innovations in output is, however, counterintuitive, though very
strong at average of 3.5 percent in the short and medium term horizons and subsequently up to
5.9 percent somewhere in the long term. This implies that increase in productivity rather than
leads to a decline in prices generate more inflationary pressure in the economy. More consistent
is the response of output to shocks in cpi, which in line with theoretical postulations, shows an
inverse link – see appendix for more results.
8
See the appendix for a full set of impulse responses results
15
Furthermore, consistent with theory is the response of cpi to innovations in exchange rate, which
is very strong, especially in the medium term, it stood at an average of 4 percent. This implies
that persistent exchange rate depreciation causes inflation9. This finding could be expected
because of the reliance of the economy on imported food and other items. This strongly
corroborates the above findings in table 2 and hence a pointer to the strength of the exchange rate
channel as a means of checking inflation. While a number of studies10 show that a flexible
9
The exchange rate-cpi link suggests the effect of exchange rate pass-through, that is, the degree by which exchange
rate depreciation translate into inflation in the economy.
10
See Bernanke et al. (1999), Mishkin and Savastano (2002) and De Gregorio, Tokman and Valdes (2005). Edward
(2006) analyze three key issues in his study: i) the effectiveness of nominal exchange rates as shock absorbers in
countries with inflation targeting, which is closely related to the magnitude of the "pass-through" coefficient. ii)
16
exchange rate regime is consistent with the inflation targeting framework, others, however, show
that this could generate more instability when the exchange rate is allowed to float11.
The response of cpi to fiscal spending is consistent, less severe – at less than 1 percent on the
average, and is less persistent over the time horizons. This is contrary to the results in table 2.
Finally, the response of cpi to interest rate – 3 months deposit rate, is generally weak,
counterintuitive and less persistent. So is also the response of interest to price shocks. This
supports the result of Granger causality test reported in table 2 and as well suggests that interest
rate channel of monetary transmission is weak.
Variance decomposition results presented in table 3 corroborate the above empirical findings
from the impulse responses. The 12 period forecast (3 years) show that, put together, the
variances of output, money supply, exchange rate fiscal spending and interest rate account for
less that 50 percent of variability in cpi. In other words, innovations to these endogenous
variables explain less 50 percent variation in the level of consumer price index in the short and
medium term horizons. This implies that the price behavior is characterized by inertial nature or
is apathetical within these time horizons. Therefore, a policy change in either money supply or
interest rate is unlikely to bring desired change in price as the two accounted for less than 15
percent (jointly) in the short and medium term. In the long term, however, the trend gradually
changes, cpi accounts for less than 45 percent of its variance while output and exchange rate
gained more prominence. This further underscores the need for an increase in productivity and
importance of the exchange rate channel in checking inflation in the economy.
The variance decomposition of output follows suit as it also chiefly drives its own variance in the
first quarter. The variance of interest rate forcefully took over in the medium term, accounting
for over ½ of output variability and over ⅓ in the long term horizon. This truly reflect our
discovery in table 2 where the latter strongly Granger cause the former.
whether exchange rate volatility is different in countries with an inflation targeting regime than in countries with
alternative monetary policy arrangements. iii) whether the exchange rate should play a role in determining the
monetary policy stance under inflation targeting.
11
This connection between inflation targeting and floating exchange rates has led some analysts to argue that one of
the costs of IT is the increase in exchange rate volatility. However, recent study by Edward (2007) argues that there
is no need for the authorities to abstain completely from intervention in the foreign exchange market.
17
Table 3: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4
(In percent of total variance)
Variance Decomposition of CPI:
Period
S.E.
YT
DMS
CPI
ER
1
0.040689 2.271086 3.373526 94.35539 0.00000
2
0.064954 5.849749 4.436332 86.67507 2.103144
3
0.085957 11.78645 4.043581 77.49763 4.39067
4
0.111246 12.64488 6.350427 68.40082 10.55253
5
0.130773 13.3771 8.448556 62.56622 13.47103
6
0.147241 14.59483 8.822429 58.12611 16.12265
7
0.162316 14.54152 8.566143 57.21748 16.64349
8
0.175295 16.0195 9.607804 52.88541 17.55521
9
0.187228 18.12044 10.95031 48.99512 18.18612
10
0.197142 19.82575 10.80463 47.14089 18.07911
11
0.206331 22.87934 10.50636 43.77798 18.40055
12
0.215415 24.39233 10.93614 42.27761 17.78639
Variance Decomposition of YT:
Period
S.E.
YT
DMS
CPI
ER
1
0.048745
100
0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
2
0.060003 85.48264 0.28409 1.10365 0.007869
3
0.069554 69.08072 0.307109 0.762887 0.004502
4
0.079308 53.50970 1.589696 0.462939 0.491839
5
0.09543 41.74796 2.272447 0.591329 0.930217
6
0.105018 35.05878 3.474235 1.366036 2.96312
7
0.115789 31.03246 5.267123 1.900086 6.81929
8
0.12747 28.88327 6.951155 2.3792 10.58112
9
0.139757 28.15783 8.350472 2.796563 13.42415
10
0.151549 28.49554 9.53839 3.186676 14.5649
11
0.163469 29.67405 10.45181 3.561651 14.37312
12
0.174479 31.36517 10.95398 3.848665 13.47403
Cholesky Ordering: YT DMS CPI ER
FS IR
FS
0.00000
0.917074
1.133573
1.095392
0.961304
0.858693
1.567233
1.45628
1.414214
1.865403
1.870787
1.971502
IR
0.00000
0.018636
1.148097
0.955951
1.175791
1.475293
1.46413
2.475797
2.33379
2.284218
2.564985
2.636035
FS
0.00000
0.08432
0.05994
0.121089
0.203024
0.641015
1.365692
2.12932
3.326445
4.513205
5.614539
6.65031
IR
0.00000
13.03743
29.78485
43.82474
54.25502
56.49681
53.61535
49.07594
43.94454
39.70129
36.32482
33.70784
Other variance decompositions12 of the variables in the VAR model show that money supply
drives its own variance in the short term, but, subsequently by variances of output and fiscal
12
See the appendix for a full set of variance decomposition results
18
spending. Exchange rate also shapes its own variance in the short term and then by the variance
of government’s fiscal spending. Earlier, the decomposition of the variance of output shows that
the nexus between fiscal spending and output is very weak - the variance of the latter accounts
for less than one-tenth of variations in the former throughout the three time horizons; short,
medium and long term, this in a feedback effect is confirmed from the decomposition of the
variance of fiscal spending. However, contrary expectations and to what in reality obtains, the
variance of interest rate accounts for over 60 percent (almost two-third of variation in fiscal
spending) in the medium term and more than 50 percent (over one-half of variation in fiscal
spending) in the long term. Lastly, in line with our earlier findings, the variance of output drives
about one-third of variability in the level of interest rate
The nexus between monetary policy instruments and cpi is further explored using additional
endogenous variables by the authors. These include; treasury bills rate, lending rate and ratio of
credit to money supply. A four-variable VAR is estimated using lag 1 and 2 as suggested by the
19
lag selection criteria and the ordering of the variables also follows the Cholesky criteria. Figure 2
presents the impulse responses of only cpi to innovations in other endogenous variables in the
model. Again, the response of cpi to its own shocks, except for the initial overshooting is very
strong in the quarter following the shock and throughout the short and medium term horizons.
The response of cpi to innovations in the other three variables is, however, insignificant even
though is theoretically consistent. The ratio of credit to lagged M2, for instance, deflates cpi in
the quarter following the shock by only a-half of a percent. This remains very low in the medium
term and a little above 1 percent in the long term horizon. The response of cpi to innovations in
the Treasury Bills rate (tbr) is consistent only within the short term horizon although it is highly
marginal also. Counter intuitively, the effect in the medium and long term horizons became
positive and remained very low throughout. Lending rate’s innovations exert negative effect on
cpi as expected but also very insignificant. It was 1 percent in the quarter following the shock
and less than half of a percent throughout.
Table 4: Variance Decomposition: VAR, 1986Q1–2006Q4
(In percent of total variance)
Variance Decompositions of CPI
Period
S.E.
CPI
CMS
TBR
LR
1
0.184575
100
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
2
0.205207 99.18363 0.075026 0.427554 0.313793
3
0.239953 99.17586 0.240278 0.335178 0.248682
4
0.25971 99.22057 0.232488 0.299612 0.247331
5
0.279675 99.19027 0.333436 0.258792 0.217504
6
0.295027 99.20980 0.358532 0.232560 0.199105
7
0.309013 99.15558 0.450295 0.212184 0.181943
8
0.320776 99.12210 0.511277 0.197353 0.169269
9
0.331298 99.05235 0.603438 0.185408 0.158801
10
0.340474 98.99097 0.682645 0.175850 0.150531
11
0.348694 98.91462 0.773971 0.167742 0.143669
12
0.356001 98.84226 0.858722 0.160928 0.138089
Cholesky Ordering: CPI CMS TBR LR
Variance decompositions presented in table 4 attest the above findings. The results show that cpi
uniquely drives its own variance in the short, medium and long term horizons. This unveils the
fact that the level of prices or cpi in the model is an inertial phenomena; meaning predictions
about cpi could best be obtained within the cpi itself. Over 99 percent of the variance of cpi is
20
explained by the itself in throughout the horizons. This implies that past information on the level
of cpi is very critical in the determination of future level of cpi.
VI.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper seeks to explore the applicability of IT in the Nigerian economy based on historical
data from 1986 to 2006. Although the three key conditions for IT have been identified in the
literature; this paper examines only one, which is the existence of a predictable relationship
between monetary policy instruments and inflation (the others being CBN autonomy and
transparency and accountability). The authors employed Granger causality tests and an
unrestricted VAR methodology with five variables in a 4 lag specification.
The bivariate and multivariate Granger causality tests show that the level of output, money
supply, exchange rate and fiscal spending in the economy cause variations in the level of prices
or the cpi while interest rate does not. Output variations were found to be significantly caused by
interest rate, money supply and the level of fiscal spending, while the roles of exchange rate and
prices were quite insignificant.
The impulse response functions from the VAR model show that the response of cpi to its own
shocks is contemporaneously very strong and remain so throughout the short and medium term
horizons, but, less persistent afterwards. The response of cpi to innovations in money supply
(liquidity channel) and interest rate (interest rate channel) were found to be less significant. This
was reinforced by results from variance decomposition of the cpi where the latter two accounted
for less than 15 percent of the variance of the former in both the short and medium term. Similar
results were obtained when additional variables – monetary indicators, such as ratio of credit to
money supply, treasury bills rate and 3-months lending rate, were used. Interest rate, however,
was found to be a strong driver of productivity in the economy. Although these findings do not
suggest total ineffectiveness of the monetary channels, it however raise doubt when the monetary
authority solely rely on them as instruments for achieving effective inflation targeting regime.
On the other hand, the nexus between cpi and exchange rate and cpi and productivity were found
to be robust in the long term although the latter is counterintuitive. Real sector productivity is
21
paramount in any fight against inflation. Also, the significance of the exchange rate channel
given by the inverse link between cpi and exchange rate suggest the effect of exchange rate-pass
through on the level of prices in the economy. Productivity along with exchange rate accounted
for significant percentage of the variance of cpi in both the medium and long term. The results
further show no threat of fiscal dominance in the sample.
In view of the above findings, which in conclusion reveal no strong quantitative link between
monetary aggregates and prices, the paper recommends that Nigeria should not pursue full
fledged inflation targeting rather Nigeria should adopt inflation targeting lite given the enormous
advantage of inflation targeting as monetary policy framework.
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