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BEYOND THE REACH OF JUSTICE?
COMPLAINANT DELAY IN HISTORIC
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
SINÉAD RING *
I. INTRODUCTION
The publication of the Commission to Inquire into Child
Abuse’s Final Report 1 (the Ryan Report) in May of this year has
forced Irish society to face up to its appalling history of child
physical and sexual abuse in State-run institutions. Few could
have imagined the scale and intensity of the abuse catalogued in
the Report. The publication has generated a renewed public
interest in the criminal justice system’s role in prosecuting those
accused of the sexual abuse of children. However, ever since
society’s “discovery” of child sexual abuse in the mid-1990s, 2
_____________________________________________________
* Sinéad Ring, BCL (Law and German), LLM (Criminal Justice),
PhD Candidate, Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, University
College Cork. Irish Research Council for the Humanities and the Social
Sciences Scholar. Email: sineadmaryring@gmail.com
1
Commission to Inquire Into Child Abuse, Final Report (Stationery Office,
2009).
2
See Lalor (ed.), The End of Innocence: Child Sexual Abuse in Ireland
(Oak Tree Press, 2001). In May 1999 the States of Fear documentary exposed
the extent of physical and sexual abuse within State-funded religious
institutions, giving rise to a public outcry and political and legislative
initiatives. The Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 2000 altered
limitation periods for civil actions where sexual abuse suffered as a child was
claimed. The Sex Offenders Act, 2001 established a Sex Offenders Register.
In 2002 the Government indemnified the religious orders against 90% of the
compensation claims. The Residential Institutions Redress Board Act was set
up under the Residential Institutions Redress Act, 2002. The Commission to
Inquire into Child Abuse was established by legislation in 2000, and was
initially chaired by Laffoy J. She resigned in September 2003, complaining of
lack of co-operation from the Government and inadequate resources.
The Commission, chaired by Ryan J., issued its Final Report in May 2009.
The Renewed Programme for Government 2009 contains a commitment to
fully execute the Government Implementation Plan in respect of the Ryan
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the Irish courts have been grappling with the problems posed by
historic allegations of abuse, made by adults who claim they were
victimised as children. In some cases the time lapse between the
alleged abuse and the making of a complaint to the authorities can
be as much as 40 years. Lengthy lapses of time between the
alleged offence and reporting present huge challenges to the
criminal process, which must vindicate the accused’s
constitutional right to a fair trial, while also seeking to prosecute
these most serious of allegations.
The core argument of this article is that in historic
childhood sexual abuse prosecutions, the risk of an unfair trial is
unconstitutionally high. Support for this contention is found in
two sets of decisions by the Superior Courts relating to historic
child sexual abuse cases: the prohibition decisions of the High
Court and the Supreme Court; and the decisions of the Court of
Criminal Appeal in appeals brought by persons convicted on
historic charges of child sexual abuse. It is argued that in light of
the risks of an unfair trial, guidance from the appellate courts on
directions and warnings to the jury and on rulings in evidential
matters arising from the delay is urgently needed, in order to
safeguard accused persons’ due process rights.
The article first examines the decisions of the High Court
and the Supreme Court in prohibition applications. In these cases
the courts consider whether the trial of the charges should be
halted due to the lapse in time between the alleged abuse and the
trial. 3 Prohibition applications present the courts with an
invidious dilemma: how to ensure the defendant is not put at risk
of an unfair trial, while at the same time recognising that delay in
reporting is a common feature in many child sexual abuse cases.
It is argued that the accused faces an almost impossible task in
trying to show prejudice, and that the reviewing courts rely to an
unjustified degree on the power of the trial judge to counter the
effects of delay by way of rulings and directions to the jury.
That this over-reliance on the trial judge’s ability to
protect due process in historic child sexual abuse cases is not
Report: Renewed Programme for Government, 10 October 2009, available at
www.taoiseach.ie.
3
This article does not deal with the separate but related issue of prosecutorial
and systemic delay; relevant cases are listed at n. 72, below.
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merited is revealed in the second part of this article, which
examines the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in
historic child sexual abuse prosecutions. While the Court is
willing to overturn convictions on the basis of inadequate
warnings, trial judges are left in the dark as to what constitutes an
adequate warning on issues such as delayed reporting,
relationships of dominion, inhibition, corroboration, and
admissibility of evidence.
Finally, two further matters relating to the prosecution of
delayed complaints of childhood sexual abuse are explored:
repressed memories, and the disclosure of the complainant’s
medical and psychiatric reports. These are critical issues that go
to the heart of the fairness of historic child sexual abuse cases.
However they have yet to be subjected to sustained analysis and
consideration by the Irish Superior Courts.
In concluding, it is argued that in light of the difficulties
facing accused persons in trying to mount a defence, and in trying
to establish prejudice, and in light of the lack of safeguards in
terms of (a) judicial rulings on evidential and procedural matters
arising from the delay, and (b) directions to the jury on how to
incorporate the fact of delay into their deliberations, the risk of an
unfair trial is unconstitutionally high, and guidance is urgently
needed for trial judges in historic child sexual abuse cases.
II. DELAY AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
Unlike summary offences, indictable offences are not
subject to any limitation period. 4 However, despite the lack of an
express constitutional right to a speedy trial, the courts have
interpreted Article 38.1 of the Constitution to include an
entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition. 5 Delay in the
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4
This is the case even where an indictable offence is tried summarily:
D.P.P. v. Logan [1994] 3 I.R. 254; S. v. D.P.P. (Supreme Court, unreported, 19
December 2000).
5
Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Round Hall, 2002), p. 17; The State (Healy) v.
Donoghue [1976] 1 I.R. 325; In Re Singer 97 I.L.T.R. 131; D.P.P. v Byrne
[1994] 2 I.R. 236; C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400. The fact that the
entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition is implicit in Article 38.1 does
not dilute its weight: The State (O’Connell) v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362 and
D.P.P. v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236. However, “[t]he right of an accused person
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institution of proceedings can seriously prejudice the accused
person in the preparation of his or her defence: witnesses die or
move away; documentary and material evidence is destroyed or
lost. Particularly in cases of lengthy delay, witnesses’ memories
will have faded. The accused person may be faced with having to
mount a defence against serious charges in circumstances where
corroborative or exculpatory evidence is simply no longer
available,
or
worse,
cannot
be
remembered.
To compound these problems, delay may also mean that the
prejudice to the defence cannot always be demonstrated:
… the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his
case skews the fairness of the entire system.
If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defence
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the
distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always
reflected in the record because what has been forgotten
can rarely be shown. 6
In cases involving delay, the accused can apply to the
High Court by way of judicial review for an order prohibiting the
continued prosecution of the charges. The reviewing court must
decide whether, because of the lapse of time since the alleged
offence, the accused’s trial can no longer be constitutional, and is
in fact a “parody of justice”. 7 The onus of proof lies on the
applicant, 8 and the standard to be reached is the balance of
to a trial with reasonable expedition is separate from and in addition to his right
to a fair trial”: [2001] 1 I.R. 656, at 664, per Geoghegan J., Keane C.J. and
Murphy J. concurring. The fact that it was not until 1986 that the right to an
early trial assumed constitutional status has been described as “somewhat
surprising”: Hogan and Whyte, Kelly: the Irish Constitution (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 4th ed., 2003), p. 1144.
6
Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, at 532, per Powell J.
7
This was how Henchy J. described the hearing of a civil action relating to an
industrial accident some 23 years earlier: O’Keeffe v. Commissioners of Public
Works (Supreme Court, unreported, 24 March 1980). See also the judgment of
Hardiman J. in J.O’C. v D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478, where he describes the
jurisprudence on delay as having its origins in civil cases.
8
Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476.
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probabilities. 9 Applications for prohibition must be made
promptly, and not later than three months from the conclusion of
the investigation. 10 Unlike in other common law countries, 11
the use of the abuse of process remedy in delay cases has been
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. 12 A trial judge does not
have jurisdiction to hear an application to stay or to quash an
indictment on the grounds of delay. 13 Delay issues require
considerable fact-finding, and therefore the separate process of
judicial review is more appropriate than a motion at the
commencement of the trial. 14 This is in addition to the trial
court’s general and inherent power to protect its processes from
abuse and to safeguard the accused from oppression or prejudice
during the course of the trial. 15
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9
The People (D.P.P.) v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236; although see C. v. D.P.P.
[2009] I.E.H.C. 121.
10
Order 84 rule 21(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986. However,
time may be extended at the court’s discretion, if a good reason to do so is
shown: De Róiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] 1 I.R. 190. See also R. v.
D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87, where the three month period was extended.
See also McG. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 294 (Herbert J.).
11
For the English approach to complainant delay see Lewis, Delayed
Prosecutions for Child Sexual Abuse (Oxford University Press, 2006) and
Choo, Abuse of Process in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2nd
edn., 2008). For the most recent articulation of the considerations that are
relevant to a determination of whether proceedings should be delayed as an
abuse of process on the grounds of delay, see R. v. S. [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim.
756; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 23.
12
The People (D.P.P.) v. P.O’C. [2006] 3 I.R. 238.
13
The jurisdiction to quash is very limited, and must be based on some
technical fault in the indictment: The People (D.P.P.) v. P.O’C. [2006] I.E.S.C.
54; [2006] 3 I.R. 238, at 245, per Denham J.
14
P.O’C. v D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 238, at 244-248, per Denham J.; G. v. D.P.P.
[1994] 1 I.R. 374.
15
The State O’Connell v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362.
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III. PROHIBITION APPLICATIONS IN
HISTORIC CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Historic child sexual abuse cases feature lapses of time so
great that, in any other sort of case, the delay would of itself
preclude prosecution. 16 However, historic child sexual abuse
cases have been found to involve special considerations, so that
delayed reporting is not an automatic bar to prosecution. From the
first prosecutions of historic childhood sexual abuse claims,
the courts emphasised that these cases involved a unique set of
issues and considerations that set them apart from other kinds of
criminal prosecutions. The decisions illustrate a growing
recognition that victims of child sexual abuse often suffer from
feelings of fear and shame, particularly where their abuser is a
family member or a person in authority. The abuse in some cases
is so frequent, prolonged and intense, that by the time the matter
reaches the courtroom, the complainants cannot remember how
often the abused occurred. 17 Often the accused person is a
member or former member of a religious community, or is in a
position of authority over children. Typically the accused
person 18 will have had a close relationship with the complainants’
family, and would have spent many hours in the company of the
complainant’s family and the complainant. The accused is often a
family friend, a swimming coach, a volunteer in the Legion of
Mary, a parish priest, a brother, a father. The accused person may
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16
In The State (O’Connell) v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362 a delay of three years
was described as extreme. In one of the first cases to deal with a lengthy delay
in a sexual offences prosecution, Barr J. found that an unexplained delay of
more than 9 years in making a complaint about alleged sexual abuse of a minor
was unreasonably long in all the circumstances. The delay hampered the
accused in the preparation of his defence and thus “deprived him of his
constitutional right to fair procedures and a fair trial”. See N.C. v. D.P.P.
[1991] 1 I.R. 471, at 476, per Barr J. Hogan and Whyte note that the case was
before the “torrent” of sexual abuse cases came before the courts: Hogan and
Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (n. 5 above), p. 1155.
17
See O’Malley, “Responding to Institutional Abuse: The Law and its Limits”,
in Flannery (ed.), Responding to the Ryan Report (Columba Press, 2009),
p. 98.
18
The word “accused” is used in this article to refer both to the accused person
at trial and the applicant making the application for judicial review, in order to
capture the criminal due process nature of the values at stake in prohibition
applications.
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have been investigated as part of an official investigation into
child abuse, such as the Ferns Report. 19 The accused person may
have an “extremely chequered past”, 20 may have left the Catholic
Church in disgrace, or may have been the focus of extensive
media attention. 21
The Courts have recognised that lengthy delay is almost
inherent in the nature of the offence of child sexual abuse and
victims may find it psychologically impossible to report. 22
Broader societal factors are also relevant, since “such was the
climate of disbelief which existed in the community regarding
such allegations until recent times, the victim might well have
been dissuaded by the risk of ridicule and scorn in coming
forward with such a complaint”. 23 It is in this context that the
courts have stressed that an accused should not be allowed to
benefit from the delay in reporting. Indeed in the cases decided
between 1997 and 2006, the accused’s alleged role in causing the
delay was relevant to the reviewing court’s decision as to whether
or not to prohibit the trial. The development of the early case-law
in historic child sexual abuse cases is considered next.
A. Dominion and Balancing: B. v. D.P.P. and P.C. v. D.P.P.
From B. v. D.P.P. 24 onwards, prosecutions that were
unstateable under the previous law came before the courts. B. was
charged in 1993 with indecent assault and rape offences alleged
to have been committed against three of his daughters 20 and 30
years earlier. Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court,
Denham J. held that, prima facie, the delay was an “inordinate
lapse of time”. 25 However, this case belonged to special category
of cases, which involved allegations of child sexual abuse.
The court would balance the accused person’s rights with the
community’s right to have the offences prosecuted. If the accused
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19
As in D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C 48.
J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48.
21
As in J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20.
22
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, 105, per Murray J.
23
Hogan and Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (n. 5 above), p. 1153,
footnote omitted.
24
[1997] 3 I.R. 140.
25
B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 193, per Denham J; Hamilton C.J.,
O’Flaherty, Barrington and Keane JJ. concurring.
20
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169
ran the real risk of an unfair trial, then on balance, the right to a
fair trial would prevail.26 In attempting to balance the
community’s right to prosecute with the rights of the accused, the
court would inquire as to the reasons for the delay in reporting.
Any presumed prejudice arising out of the lengthy delay in
reporting was to be balanced not only by the absence of proven
actual prejudice, but the court would also consider the extent to
which the delay was due to the conduct of the accused. 27
Crucially, the Court’s reasoning as to the justifications for
the delay in B was premised on an assumption that the complaint
was true. This approach prompted McGuinness J. to sound a note
of caution in P.C. v. D.P.P.. 28 The accused was a coach driver
and a swimming teacher at a school. The time lapse between the
alleged offences and reporting was 13 years. Having examined
the automatic disbelief of all sexual complainants in the past,
McGuinness J. noted that it would be “equally unfortunate if the
discredited orthodoxy of the past were replaced by an equally
rigid orthodox view that in all cases of delay … the delay can
automatically be negatived by dominion”. 29 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Keane J. set out the tripartite test to be applied in
such cases, the central pillar of which asked what were the
reasons for the delay and, assuming the complaint to be true,
whether they were referable to the accused’s conduct. 30
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26
[1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 196, per Denham J. See also D. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R.
465 and Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476.
27
In B. the delay was justified by the dominion exercised by the applicant over
his daughters, and so the Supreme Court refused to prohibit the trial. The case
never proceeded to trial, because the accused died one day after the Supreme
Court’s judgment. See Doherty and O’Keeffe, “Justice Denied: Delay in
Criminal Cases” (1998) 49 N.I.L.Q. 385, at 401.
28
[1999] 2 I.R. 25.
29
Since the accused was unable to show actual prejudice, the order of
prohibition was quashed. [1999] 2 I.R. 25, at 43, per McGuinness J.
30
The P.C. test was: (1) Whether, depending on the nature of the charges, the
delay was such that despite the absence of actual prejudice, the trial should be
prohibited; (2) What were the reasons for the delay and whether, assuming the
complaint to be true, the delay in making it was referable to the accused’s
conduct; (3) Whether the accused had suffered actual prejudice such that the
trial should not be allowed to proceed. At this stage, the presumption of
innocence would apply. [1999] 2 I.R. 25, at 68, per Keane C.J.
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The P.C. test centred on the assignment of fault: Could the
victim’s reasons for delay have been caused by the applicant’s
actions? Crucially, it involved an assumption as to the veracity of
the complaint. However, not only was this assumption
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, it also was
unnecessary, since it engaged the court in a fact-finding process
that ultimately did not shed any light on whether or not the trial
would be unfair. After all, the complainant’s reasons for the delay
in reporting were irrelevant to the decision as to fairness. In short,
the P.C. test was indicative of the Supreme Court’s
(understandable) desire to incorporate the complainant’s
experiences into the decision-making process. Unfortunately,
however, this was at the expense of a focus on the accused’s fair
trial rights. Indeed, one commentator queried whether the
construction of fairness in sexual offences had resulted in the
accused’s presumption of innocence being usurped by a
presumption of guilt. 31 Calls for a more coherent rationale for the
courts approach to this “single most contentious area of Irish
law” 32 were answered in 2006, with the institution of a simplified,
actual-prejudice-based test in the case of S.H. v. D.P.P.
B. A New Test: S.H. v. D.P.P.
In S.H. v. D.P.P., 33 the Supreme Court signalled an
important shift in its approach to complainant delay. The accused,
a primary school teacher, was charged in 2001 with 50 counts of
indecent assault against minors. The assaults were alleged to have
been committed some 40 years earlier. 34 Delivering the judgment
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31
Fennell, The Law of Evidence in Ireland (2nd edn., Lexis Nexis Butterworth,
2003), p. 19.
32
Conroy, “Clarifying the Law on Delayed Prosecutions for Sexual Offences”
(2005) 10 Bar Review 214, at 214. See also Fennell, “The Culture of DecisionMaking: A Case for Judicial Defiance Through Evidence and Fact-Finding”
(2001) 1 J.S.I.J. 2; Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse
(n. 11 above), at p. 91; Lewis, “The Presumption of Innocence in Delayed
Criminal Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse: Lessons from Ireland”
[2001] Criminal Law Review 636.
33
[2006] I.E.S.C. 55, [2006] 3 I.R. 575, [2007] 1 I.L.R.M. 401, per Murray
C.J., Denham, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ.
34
The appeal came on for hearing before three judges, but having heard
submissions, the appeal was adjourned for hearing before a court of five.
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of the Court, Murray C.J. held that judicial knowledge of issues
relating to dominion, inhibition, disparity between the ages of the
accused and the complainant and other issues relating to reasons
why a complainant might delay, was now well-established. It was
no longer necessary for the court to inquire into the reasons for
the delay, or whether the accused had exercised dominion over
the complainant, or to make assumptions as to the truth of the
complaints.
Murray C.J.’s judgment set out the new test to be applied
in applications for prohibition on the grounds of delay. The test is
now solely prejudice-based: the accused must show, on the
balance of probabilities, that the delay in reporting has resulted in
prejudice, so as to give rise to a real and serious risk of an unfair
trial. The court also retains a residual jurisdiction to grant an
order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances, where it would
be unfair or unjust to put an accused on trial.
The removal of the fault-based test is a welcome
development, since it was at odds with the presumption of
innocence, and was not relevant to the decision regarding
fairness. It also abolishes the exercise of attributing and
apportioning blame for the delay in reporting, through expert
evidence from psychologists on the reasons why the complainant
delayed. 35 However, an examination of the decisions in
prohibition applications since S.H. reveals that not only are the
courts reluctant to grant orders of prohibition, 36 but that accused
persons seeking to prohibit their trial, on charges often many
decades old, face an extremely difficult battle, where the risk of
an unconstitutionally unfair trial is raised to an unacceptably high
level. This is because of the reviewing courts’ over-reliance on
the trial judge’s ability to ensure due process and the role of the
jury as arbiter of fact, in circumstances where there is a paucity of
appellate guidance on how to deal with the evidential and
procedural problems stemming from delayed reporting.
The prohibition jurisprudence is considered in the next section.
_____________________________________________________
35
See, for example, the discussion of the psychologists’ evidence in J.O’C. v.
D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478.
36
They will only succeed in “exceptional circumstances”: P.D. v. D.P.P.
[2008] I.E.S.C. 22.
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C. The Post-S.H. Prohibition Jurisprudence
and the Risk of an Unfair Trial
The threshold to be reached by the accused in a
prohibition application is the real and serious risk of an unfair
trial that cannot be avoided by appropriate rulings and directions
by the trial judge. 37 It is not an established certainty or a
probability of an unfair trial. 38 However, there seems to be some
degree of confusion as to what standard is sufficient to “get the
[accused] over the line”. Indeed, in a recent case, the burden was
described as a “probability” of a real risk of an unfair trial. 39
Nevertheless, the case law shows that the standard to be met is
clearly very high indeed. 40 The issue of presumptive prejudice
arising from the delay will not of itself normally be enough,
the courts preferring instead to rely on the trial court’s power to
guarantee due process. 41 A remote, fanciful or purely theoretical
form of prejudice is not sufficient. 42 It is now essential for
accused persons to fully and actively engage with the facts of the
particular case, in order to establish whether their ability to
defend proceedings has been fatally compromised.
Before discussing the difficulties facing accused persons
in prohibition applications, it is essential to recall the two types of
prejudice caused by time’s erosion of evidence. Both of these
problems are direct consequences of the delay in reporting and
both relate to issues of credibility.
First, the disappearance or destruction of material
evidence such as records or files, or the deterioration of
witnesses’ memories, can mean that the defendant is unable to
_____________________________________________________
37
Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476; S.H. v. D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 575; P.O’C. v.
D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5,; [2008] 4 I.R. 76.
38
Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476, at 506, per Finlay C.J.
39
J.C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J).
40
McFarlane v. D.P.P. [2007] 1 I.R. 138, per Hardiman J., approved in D.D. v.
D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 47.
41
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5; [2008] 4 I.R. 76. On the exceptional
nature of the prohibition remedy see D.C. v. D.P.P. [2005] I.E.S.C. 77;
[2005] 4 I.R. 281; [2006] 1 I.L.R.M. 348; Devoy v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 13;
[2008] 4 I.R. 235.
42
McFarlane v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 11; [2007] 1 I.R. 134; P.O’C. v. D.P.P.
[2005] 4 I.R. 76.
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Delay in historic child sexual abuse cases
173
test the case against him. In such a situation there exists no
objectively verifiable “island of fact” against which the credibility
of the complainant and other witnesses may be tested.
The second problem, which is caused by the
disappearance of evidence, is that both the disappearance and the
prejudice caused thereby are notoriously difficult to demonstrate.
While the courts are more than willing to engage with the facts of
the case, accused persons can be placed in the catch-22 situation
of having to show how they are prejudiced by the lack of
something that is no longer available to use. The irony is that if
the evidence were available to use, the accused would perhaps not
be as prejudiced by the passage of time, since time has not
affected the evidence available. Unfortunately, in the absence of
demonstrable prejudice, the reviewing Court will be more likely
to presume that the defendant is not prejudiced, and will allow the
trial to proceed.
1. High Threshold of Actual Prejudice: Disappearance of an
Island of Fact
The principal difficulty facing defendants in delayed
prosecutions for child sexual abuse is that evidence, witnesses
and witnesses’ memories may have disappeared, or degraded over
time. If the trial had taken place within a year or two of the
alleged abuse, the complaint would have been more detailed, and
witnesses and evidence would most likely still be available.
Prejudice can result where the complainant makes reference to
specific details relating to the circumstances or timing of the
offences, but the passage of time has resulted in the destruction of
relevant evidence that could have been used to undermine the
complainant’s account. The defendant is therefore unable to
contest a particular island of fact due to the disappearance of
evidence or witnesses:
If a person, who is innocent, is confronted with an
allegation of this sort, he can only hope to counteract it,
in practical terms, if he can show that the complainant
has previously made false or improbable allegations of
the same kind against himself or another person or if he
can contradict the complainant on some important
matter of fact. This, I think is the universal experience
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of those who have prosecuted or defended such cases.
… The position of a person, who is innocent in fact, but
whose defence can consist only of a bare denial (just as
the complainant’s may consist of an unsupported
assertion) is very perilous. 43
A good example of a successful argument on the
disappearance of islands of fact is P.O’C. Although decided under
the pre-S.H. law, it clearly demonstrates the problems at the heart
of historic child sexual abuse cases. P.O’C. v. D.P.P. concerned a
complaint made 14 years after the alleged offences. 44
Significantly, the complainant graphically described how the
applicant would lock the door of a room before committing the
offences. The High Court 45 found that because he was the child’s
music teacher and knew the boy’s parents, and because of the
expert evidence given, the delay was clearly referable to the
accused’s own actions. However, the charges were more specific
than in most sexual abuse trials. Most importantly, details relating
to the locks and keys of the music room doors would have been
clear in the memory of the accused and his colleagues had the
charges been brought sooner. However, the evidence of this had
clearly disappeared. If it were possible to demonstrate that the
complainant’s account of the locking of the doors was untrue,
then the credibility of the complainant's entire account of the
incident could be seriously undermined. Therefore, McGuinness
J. held that there was specific prejudice to the accused in the
preparation of his defence.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Keane C.J. applied the
test set down in P.C., 46 and found that the delay in reporting was
explicable by reference to the accused’s actions, assuming them
to be true. 47 In relation to specific prejudice, the accused’s
_____________________________________________________
43
P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22, per Hardiman J. dissenting.
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. and the President of the Circuit Court (High Court, 4
March 1999). The Supreme Court’s judgment is reported at [2000] 3 I.R. 87.
The indictment contained five counts of indecent assault on dates between
January 1982 and December 1983.
45
Decision of Mc Guinness J.
46
[1999] 2 I.R. 25.
47
This was because of the disparity of ages and the teacher/pupil relationship,
coupled with the uncontradicted evidence of the clinical psychologist.
44
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solicitor had placed before the Court, material that went beyond a
bald assertion of prejudice. Indeed there was evidence that when
enquiries were made of the director of the college at the time,
he stated that “[d]etails such as those you seek constitute the
minutiae that fade from memory simply because they seem of no
particular import at the time”. 48 Had the trial taken place within a
reasonable time, there would have been little difficulty in testing
the accuracy of the complainant's version of events.
The prosecution’s appeal was not allowed.
It is far from clear that, had P.O’C. been decided under
the S.H. test, the order of prohibition would have been granted.
Certainly, from an examination of the cases decided since
S.H. v. D.P.P., it would appear that the courts have adopted a
stricter approach to arguments based on the disappearance of
islands of fact. Indeed, the disappearance of an island of fact
argument has been rejected where the accused argued specific
prejudice on a number of grounds, relating to the disappearance
of oral and documentary evidence.
This arose in C.K. v. D.P.P., where three witnesses had
died, and the van in which the assault was alleged to have taken
place had been destroyed, along with its insurance records. 49 It
was argued that the absence of this oral and documentary
evidence deprived the accused of certain “islands of fact” upon
which reliance could otherwise be placed by the defence, to test
the reliability of the complainant’s account. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, concluding that there was no evidential
basis sufficient to justify the prohibition of the trial. 50
_____________________________________________________
48
[2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 92, per Hardiman J.
For example, the complainant alleged that some of the offences took place
while the accused was babysitting her. The accused denied that he regularly
babysat the complainant and asserted that the complainant’s grandmother had
taken care of the children when the complainant’s parents were out.
The accused asserted that the death of the complainant’s grandmother meant
that he could not put her version of events to the jury. The complainant alleged
that one offence took place in a particular field. The accused asserted that he
could only access this field with the permission of the owner, who had since
died: C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5.
50
C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5. The Court held that the complainant’s
deceased grandmother could have had little or nothing to say on what
babysitting arrangements were in place when she was not present. Equally, in
49
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On the other hand, in a case involving no delay, the trial
was prohibited due to a risk of unfairness flowing from the loss of
telephone records, where an important part of the allegations was
that the accused would call or text the complainant on her mobile
phone asking her to come to his apartment. 51
2. Prosecution Evidence and Statements Reduce the Likelihood of
a Successful Application
It would seem that the more evidence and statements that
are gathered by the prosecuting authorities, the less willing the
reviewing court will be to grant prohibition. The issue of the
unavailability of witnesses arose in a recent case where a former
secretary of a parents’ association and member of the church
choir was charged with rape and sexual assault against three
complainants. The delay involved was 35 years. 52 While
prejudice resulting from the death of a number of witnesses was
alleged, the most crucial was the death of the accused’s mother,
who shared a bedroom with the accused. However, the High
Court rejected the claim of prejudice, holding that the
complainant had neither confirmed nor denied that the accused’s
mother was present during the abuse, and that any credibility
issues could be tested on cross-examination. The Book of
Evidence in the case contained numerous statements from the
complainants and from other witnesses, against whom no
prejudice was alleged, and this was a decisive factor in the
Court’s finding that the accused would not risk an unfair trial.
3. Attempts Should be Made to Locate Alternative Evidence
The difficulties presented by the disappearance of islands
of fact are further compounded by the requirement that accused
persons must show not only that relevant witnesses or evidence
have disappeared, but also that there are no other alternative
witnesses or evidence available. Therefore the accused must
demonstrate that serious attempts have been made to locate
alternative witnesses and evidence. Indeed, in one case, the loss
relation to the field there was no evidence that the gate was ever locked, or that
access to it could only be obtained by way of the owner.
51
R.C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.S.C. 32.
52
C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J.).
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of the accused’s training diaries and the death of two relevant
witnesses was not enough to establish actual prejudice in a case
involving a delay of 16 years, where the accused failed to seek
out the whereabouts of alternative witnesses. 53 Similarly, the loss
of the accused’s work records and the death of a witness who
might have been in a position to vouch for the accused’s
whereabouts was not enough to establish prejudice, where on the
evening in question there was a family christening with a
gathering of the family, and so it was likely that other witnesses
as to the accused’s behaviour on that occasion would be
available. 54
The burden on the accused may be heavier where the
abuse is alleged to have occurred in an institutional setting.
In D.D. v. D.P.P., 55 the accused was a 78-year-old Christian
Brother and former director of an industrial school, charged with
ten counts of indecent assault and one count of assault against six
pupils of the school during the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s.
The accused claimed actual prejudice on a number of grounds:
his recollection of events was no longer clear; the death of several
potential witnesses; the disappearance of documentary records
concerning a broken window mentioned in one complaint;
the death of a witness who could have given evidence as to
whether or not the defendant had access a room where some of
the offences were alleged to have taken place; and the demolition
of particular school buildings where certain offences were alleged
to have taken place. However the Supreme Court held that the
accused had not gone far enough: the nature of the offences was
that they occurred in secret. Any evidence which the deceased
witnesses could have given would at best have been peripheral.
Central to the Court’s decision was the accused’s failure to
indicate whether any of the evidence that the three deceased
witnesses would have given was available from any other source:
The applicant has not engaged with the circumstances
of the case in that he has not indicated whether any of
the evidence which the three deceased witnesses would
_____________________________________________________
53
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5, [2008] 4 I.R. 76.
J.K. v D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 56.
55
[2008] I.E.S.C. 47.
54
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give is available from some other source. In a case such
as the present where the community of the Christian
Brothers was presumably numerous and the residents
of the industrial school ever more numerous,
the appellant ought at least to have recounted his efforts
to obtain such evidence as he might wish to adduce
from other sources. 56
Nor had the accused made any attempt to obtain witnesses
who could give evidence regarding the layout of the demolished
buildings. 57
4. The Accused must Demonstrate the Serious Nature of the
Prejudice Suffered
The prejudice suffered must be demonstrated to be
extremely serious, particularly where loss of memory is alleged.
In a case involving allegations of abuse against a former Christian
Brother dating back almost 40 years, 58 submissions of prejudice
based on the accused’s depression and grave pre-trial anxiety
suffered as a result of vilification in the media 59 was not
sufficient to stop the trial, when the accused had receive medical
care but had not submitted a medical report. The applicant also
deposed that he could only recollect four of the fifteen
complainants. Indeed, his police interviews were “littered with
references to his inability to remember persons and
_____________________________________________________
56
Per Finnegan J., Fennelly and Macken JJ. concurring.
The accused also argued prejudice on the ground of the lack of the
specificity of the charges. Indeed, each of the offences was alleged to have
been perpetrated “on a date unknown” over various time periods, ranging from
4 months to 7 years. He succeeded in having his trial on one charge prohibited,
which related to a single incident within a time span of seven years.
However the Court allowed the D.P.P.’s cross appeal against an order of
prohibition relating to charges concerning two incidents over a six-year period.
The Court held that even though the charges spanned 6 years, the two incidents
could be pinned down to the year 1978. It is regrettable that the D.P.P. did not
delimit the relevant time period in the charges.
58
J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20.
59
The High Court had found that some of the information given to the media
had been leaked by the Gardaí. However the Supreme Court did not place
much emphasis on this point, stating that the majority of the information
relating to the alleged abuse had come from the complainants or people
speaking on their behalf.
57
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circumstances”. 60 However, the Supreme Court held that the
evidence relating to the applicant’s memory was vague and
ambiguous, and there was no medical evidence on the issue. The
approach adopted by the court in this case is a sensible one, and is
aimed at preventing spurious and unfounded claims of prejudice
halting trials; clearly the accused could easily have obtained a
medical report grounding the claim of loss of memory.
The Supreme Court is very careful to contextualise the
accused person’s claim of prejudice. In S.A. v. D.P.P. 61 the
accused faced charges of abuse allegedly perpetrated while he
was a Christian Brother working at the former Artane industrial
school. The number of charges alone was staggering: eight
allegations of buggery, 63 charges of indecent assault, and one of
attempted buggery. The oldest charge dated back 46 years, and
the latest 38 years. The trial judge held that the delay “could not
rationally be considered to be anything other than inordinate”.
Crucially, however, there were certain features of the case which
mitigated the effect of the long periods of delay in the case.
The accused had given extensive interviews to the gardaí, and
these appeared to demonstrate that the applicant’s memory was
functioning and accurate, and that he showed “a marked instinct
for precision”. Furthermore, during the course of the interviews,
the applicant made certain admissions relating to acts that were
“in the nature of inappropriate touching”. The applicant was
alleged to have said that these incidents occurred “in moments of
human weakness”, and that “if the boys have said this, he must
accept it, but that he has no recollection of it. He must accept
what they have said on trust. His memory is not as good as it used
to be … something must have taken place”. He also said that he
remembered two complainants, and he made specific admissions
of conduct in relation to one boy. The Court held that “[h]is
admissions are at least open to the interpretation that he also
concedes conduct of this sort with other, unnamed boys”.
The accused could not say how often he experienced “moments
of weakness”, and did not know if he had behaved in a similar
way with other boys. The Court held that the inability to recall
_____________________________________________________
60
J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20.
[2007] I.E.S.C. 43, per Hardiman J., Macken and Finnegan JJ. concurring.
All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the judgment of Hardiman J.
61
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specific children by name was not gravely prejudicial to the
defence. 62 The admissions did not appear to have been denied or
glossed, so it was reasonable to take them at face value.
The applicant’s appeal was refused. However, it must be
remembered that this was a case of undisputed admissions.
The Court specifically distinguished it from cases where alleged
admissions are hotly disputed and not independently verified.
Presumably, in such cases, the weight to be given to alleged
admissions would be significantly less.
5. The Presumption of Innocence and the Prohibition
Jurisprudence
Echoes of the pre-S.H. case law have been heard in two
recent prohibition decisions, where the court has taken assertions
of innocence as negating the claim of prejudice, and have looked
for a causal link between the delay and the prejudice alleged by
the accused.
The presumption of innocence was thrown into stark relief
in W.M. v. D.P.P., 63 which involved charges dating back 28
years. There, the Supreme Court considered pre-charge
correspondence between the accused’s and the complainant’s
solicitors, in which the accused denied the allegations, and
eventually issued proceedings for defamation. A statement
contained in this correspondence stating that the accused would
vigorously defend any future criminal prosecution, should one be
brought, was taken to constitute evidence that the applicant by his
own admission could not be prejudiced by reason of the delay:
“Crucially and centrally … is the fact that the applicant,
effectively, through his own mouth, makes it abundantly clear
that he has not been prejudiced in any way as a result of the
significant delay which has undoubtedly taken place”. It is
difficult to identify the principle underpinning the court’s
decision: where is the link between the accused’s protestations of
innocence and the conclusion that he has not suffered prejudice –
_____________________________________________________
62
Despite the general nature of the admissions (the fact that they did not
extend to buggery; and the fact that the statements all related to boys and made
no mention of the female complainant), they were still a significant factor.
63
[2007] I.E.S.C. 24. Direct quotations taken from the judgment of Kearns J.,
Denham and Hardiman JJ concurring.
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would a less adamant invocation of the constitutional right to the
presumption of innocence have been indicative of prejudice? The
decision is confusing, and should be distinguished in future cases.
The Supreme Court sought a causal link between the delay
and the prejudice alleged in R. McC. v. D.P.P., 64 in which the
accused was charged with eight counts of sexual assault and one
of unlawful carnal knowledge against his daughter in the mid
1990s. A formal complaint was not made until October 2001.
In the course of an interview with gardaí, the accused had alleged
his brother had witnessed a conversation between the accused and
the complainant in which the complainant admitted the falsity of
the allegations. The accused argued that the death of his brother
in 2002 constituted prejudice such that he ran the real and serious
risk of an unfair trial. In the course of the judgment, the Supreme
Court made reference to the fact that “the [applicant] must show
that the complainant unduly and unreasonably delayed in making
her complaint if he is able to rely on it in combination with the
prejudice he alleges”. It is suggested that this statement is
inconsistent with the decision in S.H. that the reasons for the
delay are no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the crux of the
decision related to the issue of the deceased witness. The Court
held that the allegedly important piece of evidence did not come
into existence until almost the end of the period of delay. 65 It was
in this context that the Court (somewhat confusingly, given the
decision in S.H.) held that the accused’s biggest problem was that
there was “no causal link between the complainant’s alleged
delay and the loss of this piece of evidence”. It would appear that
the main reason for the Court’s decision was that the missing
piece of evidence only arose towards the end of the delay period.
However, it is far from clear why less weight should be attached
to a prejudice that arises at the end of the delay period, as
opposed to one that accrues at a time nearer the commission of
the alleged offence. It is suggested that there is no relation
between when the prejudice accrued and its prejudicial effect on
the accused person’s ability to present his defence, and that this
_____________________________________________________
64
[2007] I.E.S.C. 29. Direct quotations taken from the judgment of Fennelly J.,
Denham J. and Finnegan P. concurring.
65
Furthermore the accused’s account of the conversation could be put to the
garda witnesses and the complainant in cross-examination at trial.
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case should not be viewed as establishing a precedent for future
cases.
D. Exceptional Circumstances: The Omnibus Argument
In S.H. the Supreme Court retained a residual discretion to
grant an order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances where
it would be unfair to proceed with the prosecution.
Such exceptional circumstances have been found where a number
of factors, including the fact that the accused was an elderly man
of 86 years of age and in bad health, meant that in order to protect
the integrity of the justice system the trial should be prohibited. 66
Denham J. was keen to emphasise that the justice system was not
based on vengeance, nor should it be perceived as being so
based. 67
Nevertheless, bad health and age will not always be
sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances. Advanced age
and claims of unfitness to stand trial by reason of physical and
mental disability have not been accepted by the Supreme Court as
amounting to exceptional circumstances. 68 It was stressed that the
ability of the applicant to stand trial was effectively a matter for
the trial judge. Indeed the Supreme Court has gone even further,
stressing that the issue of capacity and fitness to plead is a matter
for the trial judge, and it is an error for the High Court to make a
determination regarding the “alleged cognitive impairment of the
accused”. 69
The exceptional circumstances test is not limited to the
ailments of the applicant. Indeed, in M.G. v. D.P.P., attempts by
the complainant to use the criminal courts as an instrument of
blackmail, in order to extract money from the accused, have come
within the test. 70 The Court held that “it redounds to the credit of
_____________________________________________________
66
P.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 39, [2008] 1 I.R. 701. The integrity of the
criminal process was also cited, in addition to the right to a fair trial, as a
ground for an order of prohibition in C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400.
67
P.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] 1 I.R. 701, at 710, per Denham J.
68
J.K. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 56.
69
D.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 2.
70
M.G. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 4; [2007] 2 I.R. 738. The Court noted
“a singular distinguishing feature” of the case was that the complainant
“persistently and repeatedly resorted to threats, combined with demands for
money, of exposure of the applicant’s sexual proclivities. He ultimately
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the applicant that, although he was clearly vulnerable to
allegations of this type, he never paid or offered to pay anything
as the price of the complainant’s silence”. 71 While the decision in
M.G. vindicates due process rights, it does not sit comfortably
alongside the decision in W.M., 72 where the accused’s efforts to
clear his name were fatal to his claim of prejudice. 73
The dissonance between the two decisions precludes the
discovery of any clear principle.
In addition to the exceptional circumstances test in S.H.,
it is clear that as a general rule the reviewing court is entitled to
consider the “omnibus argument” or the “totality of the
circumstances”, whereby the cumulative effect of all the relevant
factors, including delay, is considered as a ground for granting
prohibition. 74 In a lengthy judgment earlier this year,
MacMenamin J. found this totality of the circumstances test to be
compatible with the S.H. test. 75 The refusal of the prosecution to
take a statement from the complainant’s mother, added to other
factors (including the accused’s advanced age, blindness and
infirmity) has also grounded an order of prohibition. 76 Similarly,
quite apart from the S.H. test, the Court has identified an “interest
resorted to a physical attack on the applicant’s property. These threats were
combined with offers to withdraw charges in consideration of money
payments”: [2007] 3 I.R. 738, at 746, per Fennelly J.
71
[2007] 3 I.R. 738, at 746, per Fennelly J., Murray C.J. and Hardiman J.
concurring.
72
[2007] I.E.S.C. 24.
73
In a creative twist, the S.H. exceptional circumstances test has also been used
to halt the summary trial of a minor for arson. In A.C. (a minor) v. D.P.P.,
Dunne J. held that the emotional and mental vulnerability of the applicant
meant that the case came with the wholly exceptional circumstances test
established in S.H., so that it would be unfair or unjust to put her on trial;
[2008] I.E.H.C. 39, [2008] 3 I.R 398. However it should be noted that the case
centred on prosecutorial delay. This article does not consider prosecutorial
delay, on which see P.M. v. Malone [2002] 2 I.R. 560; P.M. v. D.P.P. [2006]
I.E.S.C. 22, [2006] 3 I.R. 172; T.H. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 48, [2006] 3 I.R.
520; P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22; and O’H. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 12.
74
J.M. v. D.P.P. [2004] I.E.S.C. 47, and D.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 47;
J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48; P.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 39; [2008] 1
I.R. 78.
75
J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48 (MacMenamin J.).
76
R.. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87 (O’Neill J). The case involved a delay of 30
years.
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of justice” jurisdiction justifying the prohibition to be activated by
the cumulative effect of: the Court’s duty to protect due process;
the fact that the proceedings had been before the courts in one
form or another for six years; and the issue of the severance of the
charges. 77
E. Prohibition Applications: Comment
It is clear that persons charged with historic offences of
child sexual abuse face considerable challenges in trying to show
prejudice. The problems in demonstrating prejudice are
exacerbated if the complainant fails to offer specific information
regarding the circumstances of the alleged offence(s). Indeed, as
Hardiman J. has noted, a person in whose case there is an “island
of fact” is perhaps, ironically, both in a potentially better position
to face a trial (because evidence may not, after all, prove
irretrievable) and in a better position to demonstrate prejudice in
an application for prohibition. By contrast a person who cannot
point to any island of fact is not only in what he called “a very
perilous position at a trial”, 78 but is also unable on a prohibition
application to show any prejudice to his defence. It is clear the
threshold for establishing the serious nature of the prejudice
suffered is very high indeed, with some lingering importance still
being accorded to issues such as the accused’s (alleged) role in
causing the delay and the time when the prejudice accrued.
These factors are irrelevant to a consideration of fairness.
Hardiman J. has indicated that, where prejudice arises
from lost or missing evidence or witnesses, there is an onus on the
prosecution to show that the relevant aspect of a given defence
can be proven by alternative means. 79 It is suggested that the
shifting of the onus onto the prosecution to show alternative
avenues of defence so that the accused is not confined to a bare
denial, would more properly safeguard the accused’s right to due
_____________________________________________________
77
D.S. v. Judges of the Circuit Court and the D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 37, [2009]
1 I.L.R.M. 16.
78
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 118, per Hardiman J.
79
“It seems to me that the Director has been able to point to the probable
availability from other sources of at least the essence of the … evidence, and
that this is sufficient to avoid the inference that there is a real or serious risk of
an unfair trial”: P.H. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 3, per Hardiman J.
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process and to a fair trial. This is particularly important given
that, since the abolition of the preliminary examination,
the prosecution no longer has to show a prima facie case against
the accused. 80 Such a development would also ensure the
disclosure by the prosecution of all relevant evidence relating to
the complainant’s state of mind when reporting. 81
Furthermore, while the utilisation of the exceptional
circumstances or cumulative factors test is to be welcomed, it is
suggested that the fact-specific nature of the courts’ decisions in
these cases offer little guidance to trial judges in future cases.
Instead of ordering prohibition, the courts prefer to rely on
the trial judge’s ability to rule on evidential issues and to issue
directions to the jury on the effect of the delay on the accused’s
defence. 82 This approach is not necessarily problematic, in itself,
however when viewed in conjunction with the lack of guidance
offered to trial judges and to juries on the effects of delay, the risk
of an unfair trial is unconstitutionally high. The next section
considers the case law of the Court of Criminal Appeal in historic
child sexual abuse prosecutions.
IV. UNAVOIDABLE UNFAIRNESS OF TRIAL:
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL AND GUIDANCE FOR TRIAL
JUDGES IN HISTORIC CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
On a prohibition application the accused person must
show that the prejudice caused by the delay in reporting is not
only such that he or she runs the real and serious risk of an unfair
trial, but also that the prejudice is not remediable by way of
rulings and directions by the trial judge. 83 Only if both limbs of
the test are satisfied is the defendant entitled to an order of
prohibition. 84 The Supreme Court has reiterated its awareness of
the dangers involved in a trial of historic child sexual abuse and
_____________________________________________________
80
Criminal Justice Act, 1999, s. 9.
The issue of disclosure of medical and psychiatric records is discussed
below.
82
“The unfairness must be irremediable”: R. McC. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C 29,
per Fennelly J.; Denham J. and Finnegan P. concurring.
83
S.H. v D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 575.
84
C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5.
81
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has emphasised that these dangers are best dealt with by
directions and rulings from the trial judge, “who has the
opportunity to see and hear observe witnesses and will guard
against an unfair trial”. 85 However, while the courts have
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the judge’s warnings
and directions on delay in historic cases, and have even described
the duty to give such appropriate warnings as an obligation, 86
there is a distinct lack of guidance coming from the reviewing
courts on how best to advise the jury and how to rule on issues
flowing from the delay. It is therefore useful to consider the case
law emanating from the Court of Criminal Appeal on directions
and rulings by trial judges in delay cases.
A. Directions to the Jury on the Problems Caused by Delay
There is a paucity of guidance from the Court of Criminal
Appeal on the contents of the required direction and the absence
of specific guidelines has led to difficulties for trial judges in
formulating appropriate directions. 87
The length of the delay is not always the determining
factor in deciding whether a warning should be given;
the warning is supposed to mitigate any prejudice caused to the
accused, and not to be a formulaic response to a lapse of time. 88
The content of the warning is usually determined by the prejudice
caused to the defence by the delay. On a number of occasions, 89
the Court of Criminal Appeal has approved the warning given by
Haugh J. in the High Court in The People (D.P.P.) v. R.B. 90
Running to some 100 lines, it warns of the dangers of a contest of
credibility, particularly when there is a lack of detail in the
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85
B.J. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 18.
C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J.).
87
McGrath, Evidence (Thomson Round Hall, 2005), p.181.
88
See Coonan and Foley, The Judge’s Charge in Criminal Trials (Thomson
Round Hall, 2008), p. 497, and the comments of Hamilton P. in Z. v D.P.P.
[1994] 2 I.R. 476, at 495.
89
The People (D.P.P.) v. P.J. [2003] 3 I.R. 550; The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C.
[2006] I.E.C.C.A. 69, [2007] 1 I.R. 749; The People (D.P.P.) v C.C. [2006] 4
I.R. 287; D. W. v. D.P.P. [2003] I.E.S.C 54.
90
Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 12 February 2003. The warning is
reproduced in full in Coonan and Foley, The Judge’s Charge in Criminal
Trials (n. 88 above), pp. 498-500.
86
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complaints due to the delay. Haugh J.’s warning specifically notes
that the prejudice to the defence caused by delay is much greater
than the prejudice caused to the prosecution, when memories
have deteriorated: “… to prosecute it is easier if you do not nail
your colours to the mast because there is less you can be crossexamined on”. This dictum is very similar in tenor to the remarks
made by Hardiman J. regarding the prejudice caused by
allegations that do not contain any “island of fact”. 91
Unfortunately for trial judges and for accused persons, however,
the R.B. warning does not go far enough – as Hardiman J. has
noted, 92 it simply points out the dangers, without offering advice
to the jury on how to act on them.
A complete failure to direct the jury on the effects of delay
in any real way was fatal where the trial judge dealt with the issue
of delay in his summing up in a superficial manner, merely telling
the jury that “these incidents happened more or less a quarter of a
century ago”. 93 He neglected to explain fully the consequences of
the delay, and told the jury to “remember the length of time that
has passed”. 94 The Court of Criminal Appeal held that while it
was not always necessary to go into as much detail as was given
in the R.B. warning, it was nevertheless satisfied that the trial
judge should have dealt “reasonably fully” with all the problems
caused by the delay in this case. 95 The Court of Criminal Appeal
has also found a failure to contextualise the warning to be fatal
where the trial judge neglected to mention that the complainant’s
story was uncorroborated, the events in question had happened
almost 22 years earlier and no contemporaneous complaint was
made. 96
The trial judge must go beyond a general warning on the
effects of delay, and must remind the jury of any specific
problems caused to the defence by the passage of time, such as
_____________________________________________________
91
P.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 118, per Hardiman J.
P.O’C. v D.P.P. (previous note).
93
The People (D.P.P.) v. P.J. [2003] 3 I.R. 550, at 564.
94
[2003] 3 I.R. 550, at 564-565.
95
These included the fact the death of the complainant’s mother and
grandmother before the complaint was made, and the fact that certain medical
and psychiatric evidence was now unavailable.
96
The People (D.P.P.) v. Gentleman [2003] 4 I.R. 22.
92
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the death of a member of the accused’s family and the difficulty
in gathering evidence as to whether he was living in the house at
the time of the alleged offences. 97 However the Court of Criminal
Appeal is keen to emphasise the fact-specific nature of their
judgments in such cases, and so their potential value as guidance
is limited. 98
In The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C., the lack of a warning also
grounded an appeal, even though delay was dealt with as a
preliminary matter, and counsel had failed to make requisitions
on the requirement to give a warning, in circumstances where the
failure to direct went to “a central and critical aspect of [the]
whole case”. 99 The Court placed emphasis on two factors apart
from the delay: there were a number of complaints and various
complainants; and the fact that some of the complainants were
very young at the time of the alleged offences was a factor which
of itself would suggest the requirement for a warning. The Court
refused to set out the warning which should have been given, but
held that there were some elements of corroboration that were
present which would dictate the nature of the warning to be given.
For example, the system described by the various complainants
was very similar, and the applicant admitted being present in the
Savoy cinema with one of the complainants when an offence was
alleged to have occurred. Interestingly, the Court in E.C.
considered that the R.B. direction, although a good example of a
delay warning, was not “appropriate to the present case, or to
every other case”. 100
In a recent decision, the Court held that there is a range of
possible sample jury charges to be given between the very bare
one given in D.P.P. v. C.C. 101 and the more detailed one given in
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97
The People (D.P.P.) v L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517, [2003] I.E.C.C.A. 138.
The Court held that these were “incidents of possible prejudice which were
specific to these proceedings”: [2003] 2 I.R. 517, at 529.
99
The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C. [2006] I.E.C.C.A. 69; [2007] 1 IR 749, at 759.
The Court ordered a retrial.
100
[2007] 1 IR 749, at 758.
101
Where the Trial judge stated: “As to the timeframe … I think I harped on
that repeatedly, highlighting all the contentions, the length of time ago and the
frailties and the question of – I harped, I remember, on witness memories and
so on, so I think the course of the charge in its entirety adequately met that
98
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R.B. or The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke. 102 The exact nature of the
charge to be given depends on the particular circumstances of the
case.
While the Court’s willingness to respond to the factsensitive nature of these cases demonstrates the flexibility of the
common law system, the resulting lack of principles and guidance
for trial judges is problematic from a due process perspective. It is
the opinion of this writer that, while it is important for the
warning on delay to be contextualised to fit the facts of the case at
hand, specific guidance on issues common to all historic child
sexual abuse prosecutions should be offered to the jury. Issues
such as the weight to be given to the fact of delayed reporting
when assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s
account are crucial. Warnings on the lack of medical and other
forensic evidence, which would be available were the
complainant made contemporaneously, could also be given.
Such standardised warnings are particularly important given that
a failure to requisition may be fatal to an appeal where the trial
judge has given some warning on delay. 103
Further issues arise in relation to cases involving multiple
complainants. Historic child sexual abuse prosecutions often
involve numerous complainants, many of whom allege offences
very similar in nature against the accused. The need for an
adequate warning on delay increases in cases involving multiple
complainants. 104 In The People (D.P.P.) v C.C. 105 the Court of
Criminal Appeal quashed the appellant’s conviction for 180
counts of indecent assault and ordered a retrial. The delay ranged
too”: The People (D.P.P.) v C.C. [2006] 4 I.R 287, at 293, per Kearns J.,
O’Donovan, Gilligan JJ. concurring
102
The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 55.
103
See The People (D.P.P.) v. T.O’R. [2008] I.E.C.C.A. 38. The Court noted
that while the trial judge had not dealt with all of the points canvassed by
defence counsel in his closing speech regarding the consequences of the delay,
he had not been requisitioned in relation to his failure to do so As a result the
Court dismissed this ground of appeal. See also Coonan and Foley (above,
n. 88), p. 505.
104
Coonan and Foley, The Judge’s Charge in Criminal Trials (above, n. 88),
p. 503. See also The People (D.P.P.) v E.C. [2007] 1 I.R. 749; S.H. v. D.P.P.
[2006] 3 I.R. 575.
105
The People (D.P.P.) v. C.C. [2006] 4 I.R. 287.
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from 28 to 37 years. The case involved six complainants who
alleged abuse over a nine-year period when the appellant was
their primary school teacher. The appellant was convicted of
abusing the complainants during class in front of a classroom of
pupils. Two of the complainants had no memory of the abuse
when they were initially approached by gardaí. The Court of
Criminal Appeal held that the prejudice caused by delay in the
case of a single complainant:
… can only be seen as exponentially magnified where
there are multiple complainants and a single accused.
His difficulties of recollection, his difficulties in
finding witnesses, or of even remembering the identity
of individual complainants are all magnified in direct
relation to the number of complainants who come
forward. So, while the difficulties of delay may in such
circumstances recede to some degree from the
prosecution’s point of view, they are multiplied and
exaggerated from a defendant’s point of view. 106
In a recent decision, the Court of Criminal Appeal has
offered some helpful guidance on the issue of corroboration and
multiple complainants, where the sexual assaults were alleged to
have occurred simultaneously or in the presence of the other
complainants. 107 The Court held that that, there was no reason in
law why, exceptionally, where the offences were not committed
in private, the eye-witness evidence of one complainant cannot
corroborate the evidence of another complainant, provided that
other criteria are met and that no valid argument is made against
it. 108 However, in the vast majority of cases the offences are
_____________________________________________________
106
[2006] 4 I.R. 287, at 296. The trial judge should have dwelt “at some
length” on the difficulties facing a defendant in old cases, particularly where
no complaints were made in the aftermath of the offences and where there
were few “islands of fact” which would enable a defendant to identify
inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and to address his mind in a
specific way to the presence or otherwise of “certain physical arrangements or
features of the environment in which it is alleged the various offences took
place”.
107
The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 55.
108
Furthermore, the jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accused’s guilt in respect of a complainant in order for a co-complainant’s
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carried out in private, and so the guidance offered in this case is
limited.
Defendants are more likely to be convicted in joint trials
of multiple allegations. 109 Despite the potentially probative nature
of multiple accusations, the jury must be warned against having
regard to the cumulative effect of evidence in respect of offences
of the same character. 110 It is suggested that more guidance from
the Court of Criminal Appeal on how to deal with multiple
allegations and multiple complainants is needed in order to
safeguard defendants’ due process rights.
B. The Need for Guidance on Evidential Rulings
The ease with which inadmissible evidence impinging on
the presumption of innocence might emerge, in spite of rulings by
the trial judge, was clearly illustrated in a case earlier this year.
In order to demonstrate that the absence of particular defence
witness was not material, the prosecution witness gave evidence
relating back to an account of an assault perpetrated by the
accused years earlier, which apparently took place within a very
short time and in the victim’s house. Such evidence was
“illustrative of the formidable challenges that might face the
defence and a trial judge in seeking to ring-fence or segregate
evidential issues”. 111
Cases involving multiple complainants pose additional
challenges, in relation to the admissibility of similar fact evidence
independent and admissible eye witness evidence to be corroborative of the
offence.
109
See Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse (above,
n. 11) at p. 201; Horowitz and others, “A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in
Severed and Joined Criminal Trials” (1980) 10 Journal of Applied Social
Psychology 444, at 453-454.
110
The People (D.P.P.) v. L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517. In The People (D.P.P.) v.
B.K. [2000] 2 I.R. 199 the offences were alleged to have been committed
against young boys in a residential home for children from the Travelling
Community. The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that in respect of
specific counts concerning different boys, the manner in which the offences
were alleged to have been committed differed to such an extent that a joint trial
of the counts had created an unfair prejudice resulting in an unsatisfactory trial.
111
J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48, per MacMenamin J.
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and applications for joinder or severance of the charges. 112
In relation to admissibility, the courts will admit evidence of the
defendant’s previous misconduct, if it is relevant and the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.113
The considerations of relevance and the probative versus the
prejudicial value of the evidence are merged in the court’s focus
on the balancing exercise. 114 The balancing of probative value
against prejudicial effect has been criticised on the grounds that
the two are incommensurable. 115 Nevertheless, where the alleged
abuse offences are alleged to have been committed by the same
person, then the probative value of the evidence increases:
… the probative value of multiple accusations may
depend in part on their similarity, but also on the
unlikelihood that the same person would find himself
falsely accused on various occasions by different and
independent individuals. The making of multiple
accusations is a coincidence in itself, which has to be
taken into account in deciding admissibility. 116
Lewis notes that in some circumstances, evidence of a specific
propensity will be relied on by the prosecution, and reasoning
from evidence of this specific propensity on one count will be
permissible in relation to another. 117 Alternatively, the
prosecution may rely on the improbability of coincidence
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112
It is of course extremely difficult for trial judges to make decisions on
admissibility at the outset of the trial. However in The People (D.P.P.) v L.G.
[2003] 2 I.R. 517 the Court held that the trial judge, when ruling on
applications for separate trials, should also have expressly ruled on the
question of the admissibility of similar fact evidence at the same time.
113
B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140; R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545.
114
Maher cites B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140 and The People (D.P.P.) v B.K.
[2000] 2 I.R. 199 as examples of the effect of this balancing exercise.
See Maher, “Developments in Bad Character Evidence: Undermining the
Accused’s Shield” (2007) 14 D.U.L.J. 57, at 58.
115
See Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence (Clarendon Press, 1989),
pp. 232-233; Carter, “Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence
a decade after Boardman” (1985) 48 M.L.R. 29, at 36.
116
B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 157, per Budd J. See also The People
(D.P.P.) v L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517.
117
See generally Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse
(above, n. 11), ch. 8.
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between allegations made by different complainants. 118 Guidance
on how “cross-admissibility” between the charges is to be shaped
by principles of constitutional due process would be most useful
for trial judges.
C. The Memory Minefield
How credibility is constructed, and how certain truths are
validated or discounted, is central to the production of public
truths in the form of convictions and acquittals. However, despite
the importance placed by the Irish courts on the right to a fair
trial, the issue of the credibility and reliability of the memory that
lies at the root of the allegations is never discussed at any length.
Instead, the reviewing courts prefer to rely on the trial judge’s
power to direct the jury on the burden and standard of proof.
Appellate guidance is urgently needed for trial judges on (a) how
to decide on the admissibility of expert evidence explaining the
reasons for the delay and (b) how to direct the jury on matters of
credibility relating to repressed and recovered memories.
Trial judges also need guidance on how to deal with issues
relating to the disclosure of the complainant’s counselling and
psychiatric records.
1. Decayed Memories
With the lengthy lapses of time involved in historic cases,
it is not surprising that witnesses’ memories will have decayed.
Often witnesses will have difficulty recalling what were mundane
facts and “minutiae that fade from memory simply because they
seem of no particular import at the time”. 119 Indeed, where the
abuse is alleged to have occurred when the complainant was very
young, issues around mistaken identification are very live. It is
for this reason that discovery, post-conviction, of new evidence
that the complainant was previously sexually abused by someone
other than the defendant, may lead to convictions for rape and
sexual assault being quashed, even where there is no significant
delay in reporting. 120
_____________________________________________________
118
Lewis (above, n. 11), p.179.
P.O’C. v D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 93, per Hardiman J.
120
See The People (D.P.P.) v. T.C. [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 63. The allegations of
previous abuse only came to light during a consultation with a psychiatrist who
119
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Hardiman J. has suggested that the dangers associated
with failure of memory, even in trained professionals, should
perhaps form the basis of a specific warning to be given in all
historic child sexual abuse cases. 121 Such a warning could be
similar to the so-called Casey warning which is given in relation
to visual identification. 122 However, such warnings cannot be
given in a “stereotyped” manner, but must be applied to fit the
circumstances of the individual case. 123
2. Repressed Memories
The second problem to arise in relation to memory is that
of recovered or repressed memories. This is where the abuse is
not remembered continuously, but is suddenly remembered many
years after the alleged events. Recovered memories may pose
problems for a number of reasons. The two main theories in this
area, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome 124 and
Betrayal Trauma Theory, 125 share a core emphasis on the
distortion of information (i.e. memories of the abuse) for the
purposes of preserving a relationship. Research on the danger of
suggestion in the therapeutic context and the possibility for
“auto suggestions” as the person seeks to “complete” the
was preparing the Victim Impact Report for the sentencing hearing. The Court
of Criminal Appeal held that, had the previous sexual history evidence been
admitted under the trial judge’s discretion as per the Criminal Law (Rape) Act,
1981, s. 3, the information could have had an important effect on the course of
the trial, on how counsel ran the case, on the cross examination, and on the
jury.
121
J.B. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 66, per Hardiman J.
122
See The People v. Casey (No. 2) [1963] I.R. 33.
123
See for example the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in D.P.P. v.
O’Donovan [2005] 3 I.R. 385, [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 48, where the Court quashed
the conviction on the basis that the warning in the charge consisted inter alia
“… wholly of a quotation from Casey. This was we fear, delivered, as a
‘stereotyped formula’ … it was not at all related, as it should have been, to the
facts of the particular case”: [2005] 3 I.R. 385, at 392, per Hardiman J., Laffoy
and Peart JJ. concurring.
124
Summit, “The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (1983) 7
Child Abuse and Neglect 177; “Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome” (1992) 1 Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 153.
125
On betrayal trauma theory, see Freyd, Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of
Forgetting Childhood Abuse (Harvard University Press, 1996).
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memory 126 pose potential obstacles to the reliability of
complainant testimony in historic cases. 127 Equally, however,
feminist scholars have pointed out that the alleged phenomenon
of “False Memory Syndrome” (where the memory of trauma is
said to be objectively false, and created by a therapist) has not
been recognised by the scientific community. 128
A recent prohibition case illustrates the challenges
presented to the courts in dealing with memories that emerge
many years after the alleged abuse. 129 The High Court considered
the application of an 84 year old man in ill-health, who was
charged with multiple offences of indecent assault and rape
against his niece in the mid to late 1970s. The complaint first
emerged as a direct response to a question from a counsellor.
At the time, the complainant was suffering from depression
arising from her mother’s death, and was being treated with
specialist medication. Her psychiatrist was of the opinion that the
complainant may have had a number of suppressed memories
from her youth which only resurfaced once her mother had passed
away. Six months after making the complaint to the counsellor,
the complainant told her relatives of the alleged abuse, by giving
them written therapeutic notes of conversations between her
childhood and adult personas. While the complainant continued to
receive psychiatric treatment for “some time” after informing her
family of the alleged abuse, no formal complaint was made for
_____________________________________________________
126
Lindsay and Read, “Psychotherapy and Memories of Childhood Sexual
Abuse: A Cognitive Perspective” (1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 281.
127
Suggestibility is also relevant to understanding the ability of family
members to distort memory. See Loftus and Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed
Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (New York: St.
Martins, 1994).
128
See Sheehy, “Evidence Law and ‘Credibility Testing’ of Women:
A Comment on the E Case” (2002) 2 Q.U.T.L.J.J. 157, at 163. Sheehy notes
that FMS is not recognised by the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association: Washington D.C.,
4th edn., 1994). On recovered memories and the law see further Lewis (above,
n. 11), ch. 7; British Psychological Society Research Board, Guidelines on
Memory and the Law (June 2008), available at www.bps.org.uk; Schuman and
McCall Smith, Justice and the Prosecution of Old Crimes: Balancing Legal,
Psychological and Moral Concerns (American Psychological Association,
2000).
129
C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400.
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several years. 130 Indeed, the Court opined that the decision to
make a formal report may have been prompted by an incident,
witnessed by a Garda, where the accused made an offensive “V”
sign to the complainant. While the Court found that the
complainant “credibly” suppressed her memories of abuse for
almost 30 years, the decision to prohibit was ultimately based on
the omnibus test, looking at the cumulative effect of the delay in
reporting, in particular the loss of crucial witnesses and the
applicant’s ill-health. Hedigan J. held that the demonstrable
prejudice to the accused could not be cured by appropriate
warnings and directions by the trial judge. Unfortunately,
therefore no guidance was offered as to how reviewing courts
should approach the issue of suppressed memories, nor how trial
judges should deal with the issue in warnings to the jury.
From a critical feminist perspective, issues also arise in
relation to the construction of women’s stories of childhood
abuse, particularly where psychiatric diagnoses of dissociative
disorders and borderline personality disorder are applied to
female complainants. In these cases, the effects of abuse may be
misinterpreted as “symptoms”, and stigma is associated with the
labels applied. This can mean that when abuse claims are
reported, psychiatric diagnoses are often applied that compromise
the credibility of the complainant. 131 It is therefore important that
trial judges are alert to the dangers of attempts by over-zealous
defence practitioners to cast the complainant as hysterical, in
order to destroy his or her credibility.
3. Disclosure of Psychiatric Records
The third issue relating to memory and historic child
sexual abuse cases is that of disclosure of psychiatric and
counselling records. The Irish courts have not considered in any
_____________________________________________________
130
The complainant stated that she was afraid to bring charges because her two
aunts, sisters of the accused who lived with the accused would deny the abuse
and support their brother. When she finally reported to the authorities, the two
aunts had died. However there was evidence from both the accused and the
D.P.P. that both women denied the alleged abuse.
131
Hall and Kondora, “‘True’ and ‘False’ Child Sexual Abuse Memories and
Casey’s Phenomenological View of Remembering” (2005) 48 American
Behavior Scientist 1339, at 1355.
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great detail the problems associated with the disclosure of third
party records, 132 such as counselling and medical records relating
to the complainant, by the prosecution. In other countries, such as
England and Canada, where there is no appellate review of
decisions to allow trials to proceed, persons convicted of historic
sex abuse have sought to challenge the lack of proper disclosure
of records in order to impugn the fairness of the trial. It is likely
that, in light of the reduced numbers of persons seeking
prohibition since the decision in S.H. v. D.P.P., appeals based on
the lack of disclosure of such records will come more common.
Recovered memories or “flashbacks” experienced by the
complainant during counselling at a psychiatric hospital were the
basis for a rape allegation against Nora Wall, the first person in
the state to receive a life sentence for rape. She was subsequently
granted a certificate of a miscarriage of justice. 133 The fact that
these were newly recovered memories, and other factors that lead
to the granting of the miscarriage of justice certificate, only came
to light as a result of an interview given by the complainant to a
newspaper following the conviction, and not as a result of
prosecutorial disclosure. While there was no suggestion of any
mala fides on the part of the prosecution, or that the prosecution
was aware of the recovered nature of the memories, the case
highlights the importance of full disclosure of all relevant thirdparty psychiatric records relating to the complainant. However,
in this context it is important to remember that the issue of
relevance is a highly controversial one, particularly from a
_____________________________________________________
132
An exception to this general trend is D.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48,
where the High Court (MacMenamin J.) criticised the late disclosure of
psychiatric and counselling records, and noted that any attempt at trial to
demonstrate the “possible interlinkage between the two complainants’
narrative” would actually risk the inhibition of the defence in cross-examining
prosecution witnesses. The late disclosure was also regrettable in light of the
leaked media coverage of the case. See also the dissenting judgment of
Hardiman J. in P.G. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 19, [2007] 3 I.R. 48.
133
See The People (D.P.P.) v. Wall [2005] I.E.C.C.A. 140 and O’Sullivan,
“The Nun, the Rape Charge and the Miscarriage of Justice: the Case of Nora
Wall” (2008) 59 N.I.L.Q. 305. The Ryan Report identifies Ms. Wall as having
beaten children in her care, and finds that she exposed children in her care to
“additional risk” by allowing male outsiders to stay overnight at the home of
which she was the manager. The Report gives Ms. Wall the pseudonym of
“Sr. Callida”: Sunday Tribune, 31 May 2009.
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feminist perspective. The courts must be careful not to
incorporate discriminatory myths about complainants into the
decision on the importance or otherwise of third party records to
the defence. 134
Challenges also arise in relation to late disclosure of
psychiatric and medical reports relating to the complainant(s),
particularly the vexed question of who should adduce the
evidence of such experts at trial. 135 Where there is late disclosure,
issues relating to admissibility and relevance can quickly become
issues for the reviewing court on an application for prohibition,
instead of being the preserve of the trial judge as is normally the
case. Where prohibition is not granted, but both sides have
ventilated arguments relating to disclosure and admissibility,
the trial judge must be prepared to formulate a charge that can
encompass arguments relating to the late disclosure.
D. Trial Judges’ Rulings and Direction to the Jury
There are grave practical difficulties facing trial judges in
warning jurors about the dangers presented by delay. Since jurors
must try the case only on what evidence is laid before them,
there are serious challenges for the trial judge in trying to
formulate a suitable direction on how to incorporate the fact of
delay into their deliberations. The attempt to warn might well
“degenerate into circularity”, 136 while the judge may warn of the
dangers posed to the defence by the lapse of time, she might also
warn the jury of the possibility of the delay being a result of the
abuse, thereby rendering the warning meaningless in terms of
helping the jury in their deliberations and reducing the risk of
injustice. Furthermore, judges must avoid going too far and
_____________________________________________________
134
The key point is relevance – the courts must be careful not to incorporate
discriminatory myths about hysterical complainants into decisions about the
importance of third party records to the defence. See the criticism of third party
records disclosure in Canada: Gotell, “Tracking Decisions on Access to Sexual
Assault Complainants’ Confidential Records: The Continued Permeability of
Subsections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code” (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of
Women and Law 111.
135
See the comments made by MacMenamin J. in J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009]
I.E.H.C. 48.
136
See Hardiman J.’s comments on the difficulties in devising an appropriate
warning: J.O’C. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478, at 523.
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inviting the jury to try the case on what the evidence might have
been, had the case been tried earlier. Guidance from the Superior
Courts on how to address these practical difficulties would greatly
ease the difficult burden facing trial judges in historic cases, and
would contribute to a fairer trial process for accused persons.
It is suggested that a standard warning should be given to
the jury in every delayed prosecution for childhood sexual abuse.
The warning could advise on how to accord appropriate
weightings to the dangers and risk involved in delayed cases,
by analysing the various dangers first separately and then
cumulatively. Trial judges would of course be free to couch the
warning in stricter or looser terms, depending on the individual
case, but some key points of guidance could be provided.
In particular, it is suggested that the jury should be specifically
warned of the difficulties in constructing a defence where
memories have decayed. The jury should be made aware by the
trial judge of the complete absence of medical or forensic
evidence, which would normally be present if the complaint was
made contemporaneously.
Guidance on the meaning of the concept of dominion is
also needed: for example it is not clear what weight should be
attached to an alleged fear of reporting that lasted for thirty years
after the alleged abuse. Furthermore, it is suggested that trial
judges should caution against automatically placing a high
probative value on memories of abuse that materialise only after
many years. In this regard guidance on how to charge the jury in
relation to expert evidence of recovered memories is crucial.
Consideration might also be given to a warning against
according too much weight to the fact of multiple complaints.
Important questions also arise such as to how trial judges should
advise jurors to consider the potential importance (or otherwise)
of the missing evidence of a dead witness? Can the trial judge
advise on such issues without infringing the role of the jury?
Whatever its form, it is suggested that the development of some
standard minimum warning on the issues common to most
delayed prosecutions for childhood sexual abuse. This would be
consistent with the mounting demands placed on accused persons
in prohibition applications, who must show not only that they run
the real and serious risk of an unfair trial, but that also that this
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prejudice cannot be remedied by way of rulings and directions by
the trial judge.
V. CONCLUSION
The silence surrounding child abuse has been shattered by
a litany of reports, revelations and scandals. In the decisions on
prohibition applications and appeals from convictions in historic
child sexual abuse cases, the legal system is constructing the
authenticity of suffering and criminalising those found
responsible. The principled asymmetry at the heart of the criminal
process requires that due process protections, including the right
to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence must be jealously
protected if the system is to be faithful to the moral foundations
of the criminal justice system. 137 It is therefore absolutely
imperative that a principled approach to the fairness of these trials
is developed. Indeed the right to a fair trial requires the courts to
ensure due process “especially … in storms of controversy or the
hardest of cases”. 138
The courts have recognised that historic child sexual
abuse cases take place in a “landscape disconnected from the
normal matrix of surrounding physical and circumstantial
detail”. 139 Reconciling the secretive nature of these offences with
the criminal standard of proof requires much more than a credible
complainant. Therefore, investigating and prosecuting authorities
must be as diligent as possible in seeking out as much collateral
evidence supporting the complainant’s account, and showing the
consistency of the complainant’s version of events if the right to a
fair trial is to be vindicated. 140 Equally, trial judges must be
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137
See Roberts, “Double Jeopardy Law Reform: A Criminal Justice
Commentary” (2002) 65 M.L.R. 393, at 402 and Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (Duckworth, 1977), p. 205.
138
C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400, per Hedigan J.
139
R. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87 (O’Neill J.). That case involved a 30-year
delay. “Older sexual abuse cases invariably take the form of a contest between
bare assertion and mere denial, in an empty landscape disconnected from the
normal matrix of surrounding physical and circumstantial detail.”
140
Hardiman J. has set out the practical steps to be taken by prosecuting
authorities in investigating old allegations of sexual offences. These include a
full record being taken by videotaping or otherwise of the allegation as
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vigilant in protecting the accused person from overly harsh crossexamination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically
criticised cross-examination that oversteps the truth-finding
function of the exercise, and instead makes assertions as to the
disposition of the accused to sexually abuse children. 141
The prohibition case law in historic childhood sexual
abuse prosecutions exemplifies the common law’s ability to adapt
and change in accordance with the needs of society. It also
reflects a willingness on the part of the courts to accommodate
victims’ reasons for delayed reporting and the need to prosecute
serious crime despite problems posed by lapse of time.
By instituting a prejudice-based test the courts have located the
core of the prohibition inquiry in the question of fairness of the
impending trial. This is a welcome development, since the
reasons for the delay in reporting are irrelevant to the issue of
whether the trial should be halted. However, the numerous
inquiries under the pre-S.H. v. D.P.P. case-law into the reasons
for the delay has given birth to a presumption that the accused
will not be prejudiced by the delay. This is evidenced by the
courts’ approach to the issue of demonstrable prejudice and the
lack of importance placed on the disappearance of witnesses.
originally made and of any altered, additional or supplemental allegation with a
view to establishing consistency and the identification and isolation of “islands
of fact”: J.B v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 66, per Hardiman J.
141
The People (D.P.P.) v. D.O. [2006] I.E.S.C. 12; [2006] 3 I.R. 57. In that
case a “remarkable series of questions” was put to the accused, culminating in
the suggestion that he “fitted the bill” of the type of person “that [the
complainant] contends you are a vicious sexual abuser …”. Murray C.J. also
criticised the “comment in the form of a question”: “You don’t seem to have
many erections?”, and the question, “Now back to masturbation, when did you
last masturbate?”. The demeaning nature of these questions was underscored
by their irrelevance to the issues before the jury. The accused was also crossexamined on his involvement with the Boy Scout movement, with counsel
suggesting that his involvement was indicative of his “colossal appetite for
engagements involving boys” and that this involvement was part of the
“profile” of a sexual deviant or pervert. Murray C.J. observed that, “Apart from
the fact that general evidence as to an alleged criminal disposition of an
accused, or a profile to that effect, is inadmissible in law there was no
evidential basis before the jury for such an inference being drawn from the
accused’s involvement in the Boy Scout movement nor any as to what the
‘profile’ of such a deviant or a pervert might be”. Hardiman J. commented that
he had never heard or read a cross-examination like the one in this case.
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The risks of injustice associated with a trial of the credibility of
the witnesses are compounded where the passage of time may
have destroyed material evidence, and relevant witnesses may
have disappeared. Furthermore, the shift from a fault-based to a
prejudice-based test has sidelined arguments relating to the
prejudice caused by the passage of time in itself. Arguably this
has resulted in a lack of adequate consideration of the enormous
task facing trial judges in trying to ensure due process in historic
child sexual abuse cases.
In light of the serious evidential hurdles posed to
defendants charged with historic offences of child sexual abuse,
the difficulty facing defendants in trying to show how they have
been prejudiced by the delay in reporting, and in light of the risk
that an eventual trial may amount to bare assertion countered by
bare denial, the risk of an unfair trial for persons accused of
historic child sexual abuse is unconstitutionally high. Accordingly
it is crucial that trial judges are provided with appropriate
directions and warnings in order to ensure the due process rights
of the accused are guaranteed. The case law emanating from the
Court of Criminal Appeal in historic child sexual abuse cases
reveals that the Court is willing to overturn convictions in
circumstances where the judge’s charge did not adequately deal
with the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.
However, the Court has yet to suggest a standard warning to be
given by the trial judge that deals with the issues common to
historic child sexual abuse cases, such as the weight to be given to
the fact of a deceased witness or missing evidence, or the
prejudice caused by decayed and faulty memories. Particular
guidance would be most welcome in relation to repressed
memories and rulings by trial judges on disclosure and
admissibility of the complainant’s psychiatric and counseling
records. Guidance on rulings and directions to the jury is
especially important given the reluctance of the courts to grant an
order of prohibition on the grounds of delay, even where that
delay extends over decades. It also seems particularly urgent, in
light of comments made by Hardiman J. in April 2008:
Perhaps because of the shock which civil society in
general sustained from the revelation of incidences of
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child abuse by improbable persons and in numbers
much greater than might have been anticipated, the fact
is that the complainant in cases such as this attracts a
considerable level of presumptive credence from judges
and jurors. 142
The provision of appellate court guidance on matters
arising from delayed reporting is paramount if the accused
person’s constitutional right to a fair trial is to be vindicated.
Anything less not only undermines due process, but also risks
miscarriages of justice, 143 and jeopardises the legitimacy of the
entire criminal justice process. 144
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142
P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22, per Hardiman J., dissenting. Indeed the
“presumptive credence” of the investigating authorities was a feature of
The People (D.P.P.) v. Hannon [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 43, where a miscarriage of
justice certificate was granted in respect of a conviction on a number of counts
of sexual assault and of assault. The granting of the certificate only came about
as a result of the complainant’s complete retraction of the allegations. In that
case, which concerned a contemporaneous complaint, the investigating Gardai
“simply did not believe” that a child of ten could make up such allegations.
Hannon is a salutary reminder of the need for rigorous and critical
investigations in all cases of alleged sexual violence. The Court reserved the
question of whether only a person whose innocence is recognised or
incontrovertible is entitled to a miscarriage of justice certificate for a later date.
It is eminently possible that such a case could arise in the context of historic
child sexual abuse prosecution, given the potential for unfairness in these
cases.
143
Dworkin argues that a wrongful conviction is a deep injustice and a
substantial moral harm. It is avoidance of this harm that underlies the universal
insistence on respect for the right to a fair trial, and with it the presumption of
innocence. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (above, n. 137), and
Ashworth, “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence” (2006) 10
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241.
144
A function of the criminal process is to communicate its legitimacy by
demonstrating to the community that its procedures have been fairly applied
and that the best attempt at reaching the truth has been made. See Jackson,
“Managing Uncertainty and Finality: The Function of the Criminal Trial in
Legal Inquiry”, in Duff, Farmer, Marshall and Tadros (eds.), The Trial on
Trial, Volume 1: Truth and Due Process (Hart Publishing, 2004), p.125.