Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East

Karen Howells

Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism, 2019

Social media platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries. The data available from social media networks has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries. This article features an overview of the use of social media platforms in facilitating civil unrest, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations' data output. Further programming would allow these socialbots to interact with a target and would be able to disseminate propaganda for the intelligence agencies....Read more

DOI: 10.4018/IJCWT.2019040102 International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Volume 9 • Issue 2 • April-June 2019 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 15 Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East Karen Howells, Near East University, Nicosia, Cyprus https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8270-5279 ABSTRACT Social media platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries. The data available from social media networks has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries. This article features an overview of the use of social media platforms in facilitating civil unrest, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations’ data output. Further programming would allow these socialbots to interact with a target and would be able to disseminate propaganda for the intelligence agencies. KEyWoRdS Middle East, Social Media, SOCMINT, Tactical Intelligence INTRodUCTIoN Social Media Platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries, a process named SOCMINT, or Social Media Intelligence, a phrase coined by Omand et al. in 2012. SOCMINT describes the collection of openly available data that has been created by users of social media, in the context of bringing sensitive information to the attention of national intelligence services, as well as the sharing of information between governments and citizens (Omand et al., 2012). The data available from Social Media Networks, particularly Twitter and Facebook, has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries, especially in the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. This paper features an overview of the use of Social Media Platforms in facilitating civil unrest in a number of Middle Eastern countries since 2010, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The amount of data freely available from such social networks grows on an hourly basis. Only a small proportion of this data is of significant interest to intelligence agencies, as part of their programs of surveillance. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Volume 9 • Issue 2 • April-June 2019 16 through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence and other software, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations’ data output. This paper proposes that in combining socialbots with data mining, it is possible to build an effective software tool that would highlight a target population and could even communicate with and prompt the target to provide more information. Carefully produced socialbots would be capable of disseminating propaganda for intelligence agencies. Currently it is estimated that there are 6000 tweets every second (Twitter Usage Statistics, 2018). Every 60 seconds there are 3.3 million posts on Facebook (Allen, 2017). Inside this massive amount of data are tweets and posts from concerned citizens, revolutionaries, and possible terrorists as they tweet and post their views and opinions. Any affixed photographs could contain the geo-location of their whereabouts. Photos with vehicles could reveal the registration plate of the vehicle, providing extra information for intelligence gathering. With these types of posts and tweets, it would be very easy for a terrorist or similar to find and locate a target. Civilians could also post photos of military operations, showing the insignia of the military unit, as well as geo-location. Social media information can be an effective tool in tactical intelligence collection for the military, and intelligence agencies, as well as for insurgents. From 2009, social media platforms were used by anti-government groups in the Middle East, to different levels of success (Shirazi, 2013). As well as national security intelligence agencies using SOCMINT, it is used by non-governmental organisations. The United Nations also used SOCMINT to a large extent to plan a campaign to aid activists in Libya in 2011 (Sottlemyre & Sottlemyre, 2012). Differing social media platforms have different types of data that may be of interest to SOCMINT gatherers. An individual’s Facebook profile can be a useful tool in intelligence surveillance. A user may be monitored through their posts, likes, shares, or through a new function called a “story”, where they may choose to publish a photograph or video that can be viewed for up to 24 hours. Connections between individuals on social networks such as Facebook can be analysed. Even where friendship is not obvious, it can be implicit through liked photos or comments. The friendships and likes awarded to posts in Facebook can be analysed as a network graph, and it would be possible to analyse the influence of certain individuals over time, as social network analysis can reveal hidden relationships in a Facebook network (Akhtar et al., 2013). SoCMINT IN THE MIddLE EAST Cheong and Lee (2011) suggest that the use of Twitter by terrorists is minimal, but more recently insurgents and activists are increasingly moving to social media platforms to gather information, release propaganda and recruit like-minded people to their cause. By 2014 many insurgents in Iraq and Syria were using Twitter as a platform for disseminating propaganda, with foreign insurgents frequently retweeting already tweeted comments (Klausen, 2015). Insurgents in Iraq and Syria also used many different social media platforms and file sharing software, including Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, What’sApp, Pal-Talk, kik, Viper, JustPast.it., and Tumblr, and in addition to this Klausen (2015) discloses that encryption software is also used by insurgents. Twitter was first engineered as an SMS platform, making use of the messaging sector of the GSM mobile telephones (Mahoney & Tang, 2016, 250). Twitter is low cost, easy to use, and tweets can now contain images as well as text, and links to other platforms. Tweets can easily be forwarded to all members of an address list. While most social media platforms need 3G or some Wi-Fi access, Twitter can work at the lower level of 2G GSM mobile networks (Klausen, 2015). The managers of the insurgent Twitter accounts could be anywhere in the world, and they put on such an air of authenticity that Journalists often quote what they read on Twitter (Klausen, 2015). However, while these accounts seem spontaneous and authoritative, they are in fact the work of senior militants. New recruits give up their mobile phones when they arrive at the training camps, as do recruits in many modern regular armies, and so are unable to tweet.

International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Volume 9 • Issue 2 • April-June 2019 Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East Karen Howells, Near East University, Nicosia, Cyprus https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8270-5279 ABSTRACT Social media platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries. The data available from social media networks has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries. This article features an overview of the use of social media platforms in facilitating civil unrest, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations’ data output. Further programming would allow these socialbots to interact with a target and would be able to disseminate propaganda for the intelligence agencies. KEyWoRdS Middle East, Social Media, SOCMINT, Tactical Intelligence INTRodUCTIoN Social Media Platforms are commonly used as a way to gather intelligence information by intelligence organizations in many countries, a process named SOCMINT, or Social Media Intelligence, a phrase coined by Omand et al. in 2012. SOCMINT describes the collection of openly available data that has been created by users of social media, in the context of bringing sensitive information to the attention of national intelligence services, as well as the sharing of information between governments and citizens (Omand et al., 2012). The data available from Social Media Networks, particularly Twitter and Facebook, has been instrumental in aiding the organisation of rebellious activities in a number of Middle East countries, especially in the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. This paper features an overview of the use of Social Media Platforms in facilitating civil unrest in a number of Middle Eastern countries since 2010, leading to an in-depth depiction of the use of such platforms both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The amount of data freely available from such social networks grows on an hourly basis. Only a small proportion of this data is of significant interest to intelligence agencies, as part of their programs of surveillance. After analyzing the types of data collected by intelligence agencies in the region, a model for filtering social network data DOI: 10.4018/IJCWT.2019040102 Copyright © 2019, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 15 International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Volume 9 • Issue 2 • April-June 2019 through the use of socialbots is suggested. Using artificial intelligence and other software, it is possible to design, create and build socialbots that can scrutinize enemy or terrorist organisations’ data output. This paper proposes that in combining socialbots with data mining, it is possible to build an effective software tool that would highlight a target population and could even communicate with and prompt the target to provide more information. Carefully produced socialbots would be capable of disseminating propaganda for intelligence agencies. Currently it is estimated that there are 6000 tweets every second (Twitter Usage Statistics, 2018). Every 60 seconds there are 3.3 million posts on Facebook (Allen, 2017). Inside this massive amount of data are tweets and posts from concerned citizens, revolutionaries, and possible terrorists as they tweet and post their views and opinions. Any affixed photographs could contain the geo-location of their whereabouts. Photos with vehicles could reveal the registration plate of the vehicle, providing extra information for intelligence gathering. With these types of posts and tweets, it would be very easy for a terrorist or similar to find and locate a target. Civilians could also post photos of military operations, showing the insignia of the military unit, as well as geo-location. Social media information can be an effective tool in tactical intelligence collection for the military, and intelligence agencies, as well as for insurgents. From 2009, social media platforms were used by anti-government groups in the Middle East, to different levels of success (Shirazi, 2013). As well as national security intelligence agencies using SOCMINT, it is used by non-governmental organisations. The United Nations also used SOCMINT to a large extent to plan a campaign to aid activists in Libya in 2011 (Sottlemyre & Sottlemyre, 2012). Differing social media platforms have different types of data that may be of interest to SOCMINT gatherers. An individual’s Facebook profile can be a useful tool in intelligence surveillance. A user may be monitored through their posts, likes, shares, or through a new function called a “story”, where they may choose to publish a photograph or video that can be viewed for up to 24 hours. Connections between individuals on social networks such as Facebook can be analysed. Even where friendship is not obvious, it can be implicit through liked photos or comments. The friendships and likes awarded to posts in Facebook can be analysed as a network graph, and it would be possible to analyse the influence of certain individuals over time, as social network analysis can reveal hidden relationships in a Facebook network (Akhtar et al., 2013). SoCMINT IN THE MIddLE EAST Cheong and Lee (2011) suggest that the use of Twitter by terrorists is minimal, but more recently insurgents and activists are increasingly moving to social media platforms to gather information, release propaganda and recruit like-minded people to their cause. By 2014 many insurgents in Iraq and Syria were using Twitter as a platform for disseminating propaganda, with foreign insurgents frequently retweeting already tweeted comments (Klausen, 2015). Insurgents in Iraq and Syria also used many different social media platforms and file sharing software, including Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, What’sApp, Pal-Talk, kik, Viper, JustPast.it., and Tumblr, and in addition to this Klausen (2015) discloses that encryption software is also used by insurgents. Twitter was first engineered as an SMS platform, making use of the messaging sector of the GSM mobile telephones (Mahoney & Tang, 2016, 250). Twitter is low cost, easy to use, and tweets can now contain images as well as text, and links to other platforms. Tweets can easily be forwarded to all members of an address list. While most social media platforms need 3G or some Wi-Fi access, Twitter can work at the lower level of 2G GSM mobile networks (Klausen, 2015). The managers of the insurgent Twitter accounts could be anywhere in the world, and they put on such an air of authenticity that Journalists often quote what they read on Twitter (Klausen, 2015). However, while these accounts seem spontaneous and authoritative, they are in fact the work of senior militants. New recruits give up their mobile phones when they arrive at the training camps, as do recruits in many modern regular armies, and so are unable to tweet. 16 12 more pages are available in the full version of this document, which may be purchased using the "Add to Cart" button on the product's webpage: www.igi-global.com/article/social-media-networking-andtactical-intelligence-collection-in-the-middleeast/231641?camid=4v1 This title is available in InfoSci-Journals, InfoSci-Journal Disciplines Computer Science, Security, and Information Technology, InfoSci-Journal Disciplines Engineering, Natural, and Physical Science, InfoSci-Networking, Mobile Applications, and Web Technologies eJournal Collection, InfoSci-Surveillance, Security, and Defense eJournal Collection. Recommend this product to your librarian: www.igi-global.com/e-resources/libraryrecommendation/?id=2 Related Content Slow Education and Cognitive Agility: Improving Military Cyber Cadet Cognitive Performance for Better Governance of Cyberpower Benjamin James Knox, Ricardo G. Lugo, Kirsi Helkala and Stefan Sütterlin (2019). International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (pp. 48-66). www.igi-global.com/article/slow-education-and-cognitiveagility/224949?camid=4v1a Types of Terrorism Gus Martin (2014). Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: The Age of Terroredia (pp. 81-95). www.igi-global.com/chapter/types-of-terrorism/106152?camid=4v1a Guide for Modelling a Network Flow-Based Detection System for Malware Categorization: A Review of Related Literature Joshua Chibuike Sopuru and Murat Akkaya (2019). Applying Methods of Scientific Inquiry Into Intelligence, Security, and Counterterrorism (pp. 150-178). www.igi-global.com/chapter/guide-for-modelling-a-network-flow-baseddetection-system-for-malware-categorization/228470?camid=4v1a IT Security for SCADA: A Position Paper Rahul Rastogi and Rossouw von Solms (2015). International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism (pp. 19-27). www.igi-global.com/article/it-security-for-scada/141224?camid=4v1a

1984 Parte primera I Era un día luminoso y frío de abril y los relojes daban las trece. Winston Smith, con la barbilla clavada en el pecho en su esfuerzo por burlar el molestísimo viento, se deslizó rápidamente por entre las puertas de cristal de las Casas de la Victoria, aunque no con la suficiente rapidez para evitar que una ráfaga polvorien-ta se colara con él. El vestíbulo olía a legumbres cocidas y a esteras viejas. Al fondo, un cartel de colores, demasiado grande para hallarse en un interior, estaba pegado a la pared. Representaba sólo un enorme rostro de más de un metro de anchura: la cara de un hombre de unos cuarenta y cinco años con un gran bigote negro y facciones hermosas y endurecidas. Winston se dirigió hacia las escaleras. Era inútil intentar subir en el ascensor. No funcionaba con frecuencia y en esta época la corriente se cortaba durante las horas de día. Esto era parte de las restricciones con que se preparaba la Semana del Odio. Winston tenía que subir a un séptimo piso. Con sus treinta y nueve años y una úlcera de várices por encima del tobillo derecho, subió lentamente, descan-sando varias veces. En cada descansillo, frente a la puerta del ascensor, el cartelón del enorme rostro mira-ba desde el muro. Era uno de esos dibujos realizados de tal manera que los ojos le siguen a uno adonde-quiera que esté. EL GRAN HERMANO TE VIGILA, decían las palabras al pie. Dentro del piso una voz llena leía una lista de números que tenían algo que ver con la producción de lin-gotes de hierro. La voz salía de una placa oblonga de metal, una especie de espejo empañado, que formaba parte de la superficie de la pared situada a la derecha. Winston hizo funcionar su regulador y la voz dismi-nuyó de volumen aunque las palabras seguían distinguiéndose. El instrumento (llamado telepantalla) podía ser amortiguado, pero no había manera de cerrarlo del todo. Winston fue hacia la ventana: una figura pe-queña y frágil cuya delgadez resultaba realzada por el «mono» azul, uniforme del Partido. Tenía el cabello muy rubio, una cara sanguínea y la piel embastecida por un jabón malo, las romas hojas de afeitar y el frío de un invierno que acababa de terminar. Afuera, incluso a través de los ventanales cerrados, el mundo parecía frío. Calle abajo se formaban pe-queños torbellinos de viento y polvo; los papeles rotos subían en espirales y, aunque el sol lucía y el cielo estaba intensamente azul, nada parecía tener color a no ser los carteles pegados por todas partes. La cara de los bigotes negros miraba desde todas las esquinas que dominaban la circulación. En la casa de enfrente había uno de estos cartelones. EL GRAN HERMANO TE VIGILA, decían las grandes letras, mientras los sombríos ojos miraban fijamente a los de Winston. En la calle, en línea vertical con aquél, había otro cartel roto por un pico, que flameaba espasmódicamente azotado por el viento, descubriendo y cubriendo alterna-tivamente una sola palabra: INGSOC. A lo lejos, un autogiro pasaba entre los tejados, se quedaba un ins-tante colgado en el aire y luego se lanzaba otra vez en un vuelo curvo. Era de la patrulla de policía encarga-da de vigilar a la gente a través de los balcones y ventanas. Sin embargo, las patrullas eran lo de menos. Lo que importaba verdaderamente era la Polilla del Pensamiento. A la espalda de Winston, la voz de la telepantalla seguía murmurando datos sobre el hierro y el cumpli-miento del noveno Plan Trienal. La telepantalla recibía y transmitía simultáneamente. Cualquier sonido que hiciera Winston superior a un susurro, era captado por el aparato. Además, mientras permaneciera dentro del radio de visión de la placa de metal, podía ser visto a la vez que oído. Por supuesto, no había manera de saber si le contemplaban a uno en un momento dado. Lo único posible era figurarse la frecuencia y el plan que empleaba la Policía del Pensamiento para controlar un hilo privado. Incluso se concebía que los vigila-ran a todos a la vez. Pero, desde luego, podían intervenir su línea de usted cada vez que se les antojara. Te-nía usted que vivir-y en esto el hábito se convertía en un instinto-con la seguridad de que cualquier sonido

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Social Media Networking and Tactical Intelligence Collection in the Middle East