The Taste Case The Data Case The International Meeting Crisis in the Opera House The Three Tenors Antitrust Case The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case Music Organization Case Studies Six cases for students studying music organizations in arts management or music business programs. Each case presents a fictional vignette of organizational life, designed to simulate a conflict situation. Authors: Paul Saintilan, JF Cecillon, Michael Smellie, Rob Cannon, Cindy James and Simon Cahill Case study 1: Crisis in the Opera House Case study 5: The International Meeting An artist relations case study © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James This case explores issues such as the management of creative processes, artist relations, prima donna behaviour, organizational culture and values, and artistic leadership. This case explores issues such as the organizational tension that occurs between centralization and decentralization, and tensions that arise between head offices and branches. Case study 2: The ‘Taste’ Case Case study 6: The Three Tenors Antitrust Case Should artistic leaders drive decision making from their own taste? © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon This case explores issues such as artistic decision making, tastemaking, artistic programming, personal taste and artistic leadership. Case study 3: Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data? How useful is customer data for music NPD? © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon This case explores topics such as new product development, market research, data analytics, social media, ecommerce data and audience feedback. Case study 4: The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill This case explores interfunctional conflict at the artistic/marketing interface in large music organizations. © 2013 Paul Saintilan This case explores issues such as antitrust / anti-competitive behaviour and the structuring of joint venture projects. Instead of being a fictional vignette, or conflict scenario, designed to encourage discussion, it presents an analysis of an historical case. These cases can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the authors. They can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. They can be reproduced or excerpted in other publications without payment or additional permission as long as the relevant authors are credited and any changes to the original text are transparently acknowledged. Crisis in the Opera House A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. The tempestuous operatic soprano Valerie Vesuvius erupts, nearly killing an intern and a member of the artistic administration team, and engulfing the national opera company in crisis. The CEO convenes a meeting in the boardroom for senior management to discuss the situation. Senior executives adopt conflicting positions, encouraging class debate on the appropriate course of action. Keywords: artist relations, managing creativity, prima donna, opera, organizational culture and values, leadership Author: Paul Saintilan Crisis in the Opera House © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan About the Author Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked in international roles at EMI Music and Universal Music in London as well as non-profit roles in classical music organizations. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the author. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. Feedback would be appreciated on the case (via paulsaintilan@gmail.com). Readers who provide suggestions which are incorporated will receive acknowledgement in future editions of the case. All characters in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Moffatt Oxenbould AM, former Artistic Director of Opera Australia, for extremely helpful suggestions which undoubtedly improved the case. Dr Guy Morrow also provided generous advice on resources and angles. Designed by Ersen Sen. Images licensed through Shutterstock. Interior opera house image Natia Dat / Shutterstock.com Second edition. First edition published by The Australian College of the Arts (‘Collarts’) in 2013. Crisis in the Opera House: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan 2 Valerie Vesuvius had an international reputation for being ‘difficult’ and her backstage tantrums were legendary within the House. Up to this point, the company had tried to ‘manage’ the issue, retaining a relationship with its publicly adored and ‘bankable’ star, while trying to appease disgruntled cast members and staff. On this occasion the diva had flown in late for rehearsals, and by the end of her first day in the building had missed a number of crucial appointments and insulted most of the people working in the makeup and costume departments. She was supposed to be performing the role of Mimi in Puccini’s La Bohème, which was due to open in only three days’ time. The CEO, Imogen Impresario, had convened a meeting in the boardroom for senior management to discuss the situation. Impresario looked around the table. She had joined the company only one month earlier, and found herself ascending a steep learning curve. Prior to this position she had been CEO of a private foundation which disbursed grants to arts organizations. Marc Monet, the artistic director, was the last to arrive. He glided into the room, immaculately dressed, apparently unruffled by the morning’s tumult. The CEO turned towards him. ‘OK, Marc, perhaps you could start by talking us through your understanding of exactly what happened.’ ‘Certainly. I think we all know the long, tortured history of this saga, but in terms of what triggered the last convulsion ... the sequence of events appears to be that yesterday Vesuvius finally turned up around 10am, two days late, and thus in breach of her contract. She attended one music call, momentarily, but then insulted the production’s Musetta and left. She fleetingly attended a fitting but insulted the wig master and left. She didn’t attend a press call that had been scheduled for her. Instead, she roamed the building, creating a firestorm of ill will in a number of departments. Both our Musetta and the wig master were later seen leaving the building in tears. This morning Michelle from artistic Crisis in the Opera House: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan administration went to see Vesuvius, and privately questioned her professionalism. This triggered a second explosion, where the artist threw a bust of Puccini at her, narrowly missing an intern, but taking out an empty vase. Michelle claims she was hit by shrapnel from the vase, which drew blood. Vesuvius then marched into my office, demanding Michelle’s dismissal. I declined her request. She then stood in my doorway spewing molten lava, before storming out of the House, leaving a trail of sulphurous gases. To my knowledge she is currently uncontactable. We have a full dress rehearsal commencing in four hours.’ ‘Thanks very much, Marc,’ said Impresario. ‘What on earth was Michelle doing taking an intern on a mission like that?’ ‘The meeting was scheduled to take place anyway on quite a different matter – Vesuvius sends them scurrying all over the place on personal errands – but apparently Michelle felt that she had no alternative but to be drawn into a discussion about it.’ ‘Given yesterday’s events, of which she would have undoubtedly been aware, it showed a distinct lack of judgement,’ Impresario responded drily. ‘Is it a mistake to feel that one is entitled to work in an environment without bullying and intimidation? Michelle is a superb member of our team and was doing what she felt to be in the best interests of the company and her colleagues.’ ‘She had every right to bring this to our attention. But she made a mistake in taking everything upon herself. While we would all agree that there is conduct that is unprofessional and unacceptable, before starting down a path that can lead to explosions, we first need to fully understand the implications of that step, which is a complex calculus. She is not in the best position to make that calculation. And secondly, we also need to determine the most effective way of dealing with the situation. Someone at her level has fewer options than we have as a team, which is why difficult artist relations issues need to be brought to my attention, 3 or your attention. We might feel it is sufficient to have a quiet word with the manager or agent, and let them deal with it. We might design a scenario whereby a staff member the artist trusts brings it up at an appropriate moment. We might call a formal meeting with the artist and the manager, and invite a number of staff along to lend it more gravity. We might issue her with a formal written warning. We might advise that we refuse to offer her any future engagements beyond those already contracted. We might terminate her agreement due to unprofessional conduct. There are a range of options.’ Monet played ostentatiously with his cufflinks. ‘Refusing to offer any future engagements might provoke Vesuvius to withdraw, in which case the audience would see her withdrawal as her fault and not ours. It would also send a clear signal to the company as a whole that her behaviour is unacceptable … It’s worth us considering …’ The CEO nodded. ‘Before we leave the subject of Michelle, I also believe she got emotional, raised her voice and became abusive to Vesuvius.’ ‘That’s true. It was highly regrettable, but she was provoked.’ ‘She shouldn’t sink to the same level as the person we’re condemning. I respect you standing up for members of your team, but I expect more professionalism. In this business you need a thick skin. We all know that.’ Colin Cash, the financial controller, chimed in. ‘I would just like to add in terms of the “complex calculus” that we have her performing in the tour we’re running through a number of Asian cities next year. We’re pretty handsomely subsidized for that tour, and so it contributes financially to our year end targets. She has an enormous following out there, and the tour is somewhat built around her involvement. If she pulls out or feigns illness it may jeopardize the tour.’ Monet adjusted his cravat. ‘I don’t see why this is such a big deal. We’ve had artist blow-ups before, and we just deal with them. That is what we do. That is what I do. This is an artistic decision.’ ‘Certainly, but it’s also a corporate decision,’ responded the CEO. ‘There’s too much at stake in terms of revenue, risk, reputation … It impacts on too many other things.’ ‘Everywhere I’ve worked we’ve always had Vesuviuses,’ Monet continued. ‘Perhaps not as Crisis in the Opera House: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan damaging, but there’s always been one. Do we want to work with creative people? Great artists aren’t normal. Great artists are extreme, and extreme people do extreme, mad, crazy things. This is what working in the arts is all about. If you want to work with boring, normal people, go and work in a bank, or for a toothpaste company. Vesuvius is a perfectionist – she’s no harder on the people around her than she is on herself. We need to work with people like her or we shouldn’t be in this business. It is just a case of me going back to her with a stronger line. And I am perfectly capable of doing that.’ The head of marketing, Betty Blacktown, spoke up. ‘Opera is about big personalities. And the media and public love drama; it makes artists interesting. Otherwise she would be some boring, vanilla singer. She’s a prima donna, which is a good thing.’ The human resources director, Sharon Shield, was the next to wade in. ‘Well, as I understand it, “prima donna” simply means “first lady”, or the best person for a role – it doesn’t give someone a licence to abuse, intimidate and humiliate staff. This is workplace bullying. Pure and simple. It opens up the company to legal risks. If we ignore or excuse this sort of behaviour, we send a clear message to staff that we consider bullying to be acceptable. We send a clear message to the other, admittedly few, difficult artists that they can get away with virtually anything while they’re here. It can result in stress leave, allegations of harassment, a hostile work environment and discrimination. Vesuvius is sick, she’s an organizational sociopath or psychopath. She needs help.’ Monet continued the pro-artist line. ‘I think we need to recognize that stars are often insecure, vulnerable and under enormous pressure. They spend half their lives jetlagged, hearing about catty reviews or reading negative social media comments. Most artists don’t actually understand the connection they have with an audience and live in perpetual fear that one night the magic just won’t happen. There is also “creative conflict” in rehearsal situations, which is normal. Sometimes sparks of genius fly off in creative confrontations.’ ‘The conflict here has nothing to do with the creative process,’ Shield replied. ‘She wasn’t remotely near a rehearsal room. My view, for what it’s worth, is that she’s a predatory, narcissistic bitch, and if we don’t put our foot down, we’ll just refuel her belief that she is entitled to get away with it.’ 4 Impresario turned again to Monet. ‘Is there any way we can keep her more isolated and stop her from poisoning everyone?’ Monet retorted, ‘May I remind people that ‘excellence’ is also a value, and that despite her undoubted flaws, she is capable of delivering artistic excellence at an unparalleled level.’ Monet shook his head. ‘I don’t see how in a collaborative art form like opera you can quarantine someone. Particularly the star of the show. Collaborative and collegial attitudes are necessary for the whole ensemble to flourish.’ ‘Yes,’ Shield responded, ‘but if she compromises the work of others, and opera is a collaborative art form, as you say, then the total excellence diminishes.’ ‘In terms of fallout, what’s the conductor saying?’ continued Impresario. Impresario reasserted her authority on the meeting with renewed vigour. ‘OK. There are a couple of practical points I need to go over with you, Marc. What does her contract say?’ Monet smiled, and attempted his thickest Eastern European accent: ‘She is bitch. Big, crazy bitch. She no good for health, like Chernobyl. But very good singer, like Callas. Callas also bitch. They make big, angry experiences. Vot to do?’ ‘I believe that there is a pro forma clause around conduct that would serve as adequate grounds for termination.’ ‘And the director?’ ‘And if we were to sit her down and strongly intervene, what would be her reaction?’ ‘The same.’ ‘I don’t think she would respond constructively.’ ‘I know I’m the boring finance guy’ interjected Cash, ‘but what we need to do at some point is a quick “back of the envelope” cost-benefit analysis. If we can’t afford to lose her, dealing with the aggravation may just be a cost of doing business. We need to explore the financial and practical implications of replacing her. We need to define the parameters in which we can work and know the long term cost before we do anything drastic. What are we actually deciding here? And who is deciding? Is this something that should be decided by the management team, or left to the CEO and artistic director after we have all been consulted?’ ‘And what about her cover? How well covered are we?’ There was a pause. The CEO looked uncertain. Shield continued. ‘It goes deeper than a cost-benefit analysis. It comes down to culture and values. What sort of company are we? What do we actually stand for? What do we expect of ourselves and others? Let’s look at our mission statement. From memory it says something like “we are committed to our values of cooperative teamwork and mutual respect”. I have heard it said in these corridors that “our job is to provide an environment in which an artist can give of his or her best”. Can we honestly say that the environment at the moment is conducive for the other artists in this production to “give of their best”? Of course not. The bottom line is that Vesuvius has no respect for her colleagues. What price do we put on values like respect and integrity? Sure, do your cost-benefit analysis, but at some point you will be trying to price the priceless.’ Crisis in the Opera House: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan ‘Artistically, very strongly. But of course the cover has a much lower profile from an audience perspective.’ Betty Blacktown jumped in. ‘Vesuvius is a big draw, but Bohème is Bohème. I think I could sing Mimi and we’d still get an audience.’ ‘If we do dismiss her,’ said Impresario, ‘what sort of language should we use in the announcement?’ Monet paused. ‘Well, the normal language is that the artist is “indisposed”, whatever that means, or has some cold or flu. But I don’t think that would work in this case. I think tensions have filtered out sufficiently for a few critics and bloggers to know … In which case the clichéd line is that we are parting company on this production due to “irreconcilable creative differences”.’ ‘Is there any other additional leverage we have over her? Is there anything else that we are supporting that we could look to withdraw?’ ‘Nothing out of the usual. I’ll check.’ ‘OK. To wrap up here, Marc, I would be grateful if your Department could construct a highly detailed timeline of recent events, with an accuracy down to the minute, and against each event list the people who witnessed it. Please bring me the bust of Puccini and the broken vase. Also, please 5 check the relevant clauses in the contract plus any other favours we may be doing for her. Finally, at least attempt to track down the diva for the dress rehearsal this afternoon and check on the readiness of the cover. Betty, we need our publicist on standby in case we need to draft a media release. Colin, please work up a draft cost-benefit analysis we can discuss after lunch. Let’s meet back here at 2pm sharp. Marc, would you stay behind? Thank you.’ The meeting broke up. Impresario pondered the dilemma. If they did act, how strongly should they intervene? A gift for handling temperamental artists is seen as an asset in this business. If she is seen to terminate the agreement, would she look like a naïve newcomer who doesn’t understand opera and handling superstar artists? Would a failure to act undermine her authority with the whole company? Would refusing to delegate the decision to Monet alienate the two of them? Could she be complicit in supporting a toxic culture of bullying? Discussion questions: 1. Compare and contrast the conflicting positions around the table. This case appears in the textbook Managing Organizations in the Creative Economy: Organizational Behaviour for the Cultural Sector by Paul Saintilan and David Schreiber. The first edition was published by Routledge in 2018, and the second edition is scheduled for 2023. The textbook examines topics relevant to this case such as managing creativity, personality and creativity, artistic leadership, decision making in creative organizations and organizational culture and values. 2. To what extent should the audience’s ‘rights’ and expectations be considered? 3. Undertake a cost-benefit analysis of dismissing Vesuvius. 4. What should Impresario do, both in terms of the key decision and the way she communicates it? 5. What other policies, practices and processes should she review? 6. In so far as there is positive ‘creative conflict’ in the case, where does it take place? 7. What values should an opera company have, and how should they be prioritized? Crisis in the Opera House: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan 6 The Taste Case A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. Should the artistic leader of a music organization select artists and repertoire based on their own personal taste? Is it natural and inevitable or an unprofessional indulgence? A group of artistic directors and A&R heads argue over lunch ... Keywords: taste, artistic leadership, ‘tastemaker’, A&R, artistic programming Authors: Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon The Taste Case © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon About the Authors Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked in international roles at EMI Music and Universal Music in London as well as non-profit roles in classical music organizations. Rob Cannon is a coach, consultant and educator specializing in the arts and entertainment industry. He is an academic lecturer at the Australian Institute of Music, and has previously held international record company roles. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the authors. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. Feedback would be appreciated on the case (via paulsaintilan@gmail. com). Readers who provide suggestions which are incorporated will receive acknowledgement in future editions of the case. All characters in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Shae Constantine and Jeremy Youett for ideas that strengthened the case. Designed by Ersen Sen. Images licensed through Shutterstock. Sydney Harbour image Ingus Kruklitis / Shutterstock.com. Second edition. First edition published by The Australian College of the Arts (‘Collarts’) in 2013. The Taste Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon 2 Blake and Jade arrived at the restaurant slightly ahead of the others and took their seats at a table overlooking Sydney Harbour. It was a beautiful day, and a ferry glided through the sparkling water, making its way out of the Quay towards Manly. Blake was the artistic director of a large international orchestra and Jade the artistic director of a music festival. Within minutes they were joined by Cindy and Chris, who both worked as A&R heads for major record companies. All four had spent the morning as guests at a government funded seminar on ‘business creativity’. They ordered their meals and spent some time discussing the difference between artistic and managerial creativity, a topic that had surfaced during the seminar. But then the conversation lost momentum. As an aside, Blake commented: ‘I thought it was really interesting what Ariel was saying at the coffee break about the relationship between “taste” and one’s own professional judgement in selecting artists, repertoire and projects. I’ve been reflecting on what my own views are. I think I do drive my orchestral programming decisions out of personal taste. I don’t see how you can do otherwise. Your personal response to music, your passions, your enthusiasms, your musical addictions, how can you clinically disengage them from your professional judgement? And if I personally respond to something, it convinces me that it’s an authentic choice, and if I like it others might like it, and then I can fight for it, and hope it connects with others in the same way it connects with me.’ Cindy reached across the table and grabbed a bread roll. ‘Yeah, I’d like to be able to do that. But I don’t have the luxury of my personal tastes in music. If I was running my own small indie label, then maybe I could, but we’re a big company that needs to cater for a really diverse range of tastes. We’re not creating music for ourselves, we’re creating music for a whole spectrum of artists and audiences. So it needs to be a lot broader than just my taste.’ ‘Sure. But I think to some extent an artistic leader needs to stand for something and take a leadership The Taste Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon position. Or why have them? You need to play to your strengths, not pretend that you know about a million genres when you don’t. You know? If you want someone who knows their way around K-Pop or electronica, don’t come to me. My musical tastes define me, it’s part of who I am. As artistic leaders we need our own signature, our own imprimatur, our own brand. To some degree I was hired for my taste, I’m a ‘tastemaker’, so surely it’s legitimate for me to exercise it?’ ‘That sounds great, don’t get me wrong,’ countered Cindy, ‘but in my situation, it’s really important that I don’t have any emotional skin in the game. ‘Cause sometimes you need to pull the plug on projects, and that’s hard to do if you’re too passionate, or personally committed.’ ‘Sure. But don’t you find that projects are always emotional? They’re always an emotional brawl! I need to fight for my vision on a daily basis. You know there are always doubts and fears and uncertainties in music organizations, and it’s our job to sell new projects and sell them hard. I think an audience can sense passion, and belief and conviction, and the more passionate I am, the more passionate I believe the audience will eventually be. I think we actually impose our taste on others down the line, and in your business people like Clive Davis have been doing that for years.’ Cindy smiled. ‘My job is to make profit. Pure and simple. We’re a publicly listed company. We need a return on investment. So I need to take myself out of the equation and maybe do things that other people will like, even if I don’t. In fact, I need to work on projects that I personally loathe and detest if it connects with some audience we can make a buck out of. And if you can’t do that, you’re not a professional. You know, that’s actually been the problem with some A&R guys, that they’re wanting to be so cool and credible and edgy, that they hate the mainstream bands that actually pay their salary or refuse to sign them in the first place. You also need to understand that the era of ‘gut feel’ has largely ended in commercial music. Our decision making is more and more driven by social metrics and consumer data. 3 ‘Well ... ,’ concluded Blake, shaking his head, ‘I bet that nine times out of ten when an A&R person signs a band, it’s because they like them. And they will selectively choose the data to support their position. Seriously. What do you other two think?’ Discussion questions: 1. Which of the artistic leaders do you agree with and why? 2. Who do you disagree with and why? Chris put down a glass of wine. ‘It’s an interesting discussion. I think artistic leaders should be really transparent and upfront about acknowledging their tastes. I might think that my taste is really broad and Catholic, but it probably isn’t. Have you ever had the experience where you ask someone what they like, and they say “everything”, but when you get down to it, and offer them tickets and stuff, it becomes apparent that there’s a ton of things that they actually hate, things that other people might love. If I declare that I hate salsa or reggae or jazz, then the organization can put decisions relating to those genres out to other people, so it’s worth the organization knowing. Otherwise I may be making decisions that aren’t in the best interests of the business, simply because I don’t have any empathy with a certain type of music.’ 3. Explore how the organizational context in which each executive works has influenced their views. For example, should not-for-profit entities like orchestras differ in how they make artistic decisions over ‘for-profit’ firms like commercial record companies? This topic is further explored in the article ‘Aesthetic preferences and aesthetic ‘agnosticism’ among managers in music organisations: is liking projects important?’ by Paul Saintilan, published in the International Journal of Music Business Research, October 2016, vol. 5 no. 2, pp. 6-25. Available at https://musicbusinessresearch.files.wordpress. com/2016/10/volume-5-no-2-october-2016-saintilan.pdf ‘I agree with that,’ responded Blake. ‘I believe an artistic director needs to stand for something and be hired or fired on that basis. So I agree with you that honesty and accountability are important. If I hate hip hop, and the organization needs hip hop, then fire me and give the gig to someone who loves hip hop. What about you, Jade?’ ‘I believe that I have internalized the audience into my own personal responses. I think I have spent so much time seeing what my audience reacts to, what they love, what they hate, that when I look at new ideas it is impossible for me not to compute that into my thinking, even subconsciously.’ ‘Interesting ... What about people who don’t attend often – who aren’t part of your current audience. Are you choosing for them too?’ A waiter interrupted the conversation, carrying out the first of the meals. They turned their attention back to the sparkling Harbour. The Taste Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Rob Cannon This case appears in the textbook Managing Organizations in the Creative Economy: Organizational Behaviour for the Cultural Sector by Paul Saintilan and David Schreiber. The first edition was published by Routledge in 2018, and the second edition is scheduled for 2023. The textbook examines topics such as decision making in creative organizations, tastemaking and artistic leadership. 4 ‘The Data Case’: Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data? A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. Sheldon Cybertron, the newly appointed VP of Data Analytics at Galaxy Records, was on fire. He had already earned the respect of his colleagues for his valuable marketing insights. Yet he wanted more. He wanted to help guide the new creative work of the label’s biggest stars. But the CEO was dismissive of his ideas. ‘You know, Sheldon, every time the Romans were saying “Vox populi, vox Dei”, “the voice of the people is the voice of God”, that was when they didn’t know what to do!’ Keywords: new product development, market research, data analytics, social media, ecommerce data and audience feedback. Authors: Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data? How useful is customer data for music NPD? © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon About the Authors Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked as an international marketing director at EMI Music and Universal Music in London, as well as in non-profit roles in classical music organizations. JF Cecillon is the former Chairman and CEO of EMI Music International. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the authors. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. All characters in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Acknowledgements Designed by Ersen Sen. Images licensed through Shutterstock. Cover image by spainter_vfx. Internal image by Andrey Po. Second edition. First edition published by The Australian College of the Arts (‘Collarts’) in 2013. ‘The Data Case’: Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data?: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon 2 Sheldon Cybertron had recently been appointed Vice President of Data Analytics and Customer Insight at Galaxy Records. From deep within his social and digital media Command & Control Centre, a nuclear bunker in the building’s basement, his department crunched through enormous volumes of customer data. The sources of data had exploded in recent years, from social media, to e-commerce, streaming and licensing platforms, to new Web3 data coming from NFT sales and the label’s involvement in ‘play to earn’ video games. His work also extended to building the label’s market research capability, proactively testing customer needs, tastes and preferences. at our broader artist and repertoire portfolio, and assess the balance of what we have versus what we should have.” Sheldon’s department enjoyed analyzing behaviours, intentions and affinities, identifying geographic ‘hotspots’ for artists, and personalizing and improving the user experience for fans using their digital assets. Yet he felt - and probably persuaded himself - that he could add more value to the business, and increase his influence, by contributing to discussions on new product development. His future was bright and the application of his work appeared limitless. “In creating new material?” To move forward this potential expansion of his role, he found himself ushered into the office of David Kong, Galaxy’s President. Kong, affectionately known as ‘King Kong’ reclined deeply in his chair. “So you’re the ‘Data Man’? As a President /CEO, I guess I’m seen as a ‘numbers man’, so we have something in common. I don’t mean ‘Data Man’ in a patronizing way, I assure you. I love data geeks, some of my best friends are data geeks, and you’re making a great contribution to the marketing side of the business.” “Thanks. We are supposed to be in The Data Era now - isn’t everything data-driven these days?” “In terms of new product development there’s probably a bunch of things you could do in back catalogue exploitation. There might be some new themes you could identify. You know, The Best Geek Album in the World Ever (sorry). You could also look “I’m already doing work in that area. I was thinking about helping some of the bigger acts with new creative work.” “There are some acts we manufacture from A to Z, ‘boy band’ type acts, you know, but this is actually a small proportion of the roster.” “I think every artist could benefit from the sort of analysis I provide.” “Yes.” “And how would that work?” “By better understanding tastes and preferences of audiences, they will be able to better respond to them.” King Kong smiled. “How long have you been crunching numbers here?” “Six months.” “And over that time, what extraordinary creative breakthroughs have emerged from your analysis?” “I would need to do a bit more work, and I would be looking to better inform the process. We must be able to get more sophisticated at this, as other industries are, and proactively engineer creative work in our favour, so it’s not just a series of random casino bets.” “Even if I gave you a year, do you think you’re ever going to find God in the data? Do you think Monet’s Water Lilies, or Van Gogh’s Starry Night suddenly sprang out of an analysis of art consumers? Do you think the Beatles’ Sgt. Pepper’s album came out of some survey data? Or a focus group? Great art is magic. Great art is extraordinary. Great artists ‘The Data Case’: Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data?: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon 3 lead audiences, they don’t respond to them. They lead out of conviction and passion and inspiration, and remorselessly innovate, staying ahead of the audience. The Beatles could have stuck with their initial success, and been a guitar driven rock and roll band. But they evolved into a psychedelic band, a concept album band, they took listeners on a journey that they couldn’t have imagined. And what could they really learn from an audience? How is an audience going to envision and articulate an entirely new creative direction? So just reflect for a minute or two Sheldon on what this company and the music industry really needs today.” “Well”, replied Sheldon, “if I found the Holy Grail, it would be how to make hits through a deep insight into consumer tastes. The second thing I guess is to do it again and again …?” “I like your enthusiasm and your ambition Sheldon, and so don’t take this the wrong way, but your Holy Grail doesn’t exist. Not so long ago a numbers man bought the great British record company EMI and promised his investors that like King Arthur he knew how to find the Holy Grail. But do you know what happened? He destroyed one of the world’s oldest and most successful record companies, lost his shirt and his investors’ money and EMI was broken up and sold to the other three big companies. You talk about technology. The ongoing viability of this industry is about building on the success of streaming, to increase the number of people paying for and accessing music to every corner of the earth. We also need to develop artists with real longevity to build the catalogue of tomorrow. How many stadium acts are we creating these days? Over the last 20 years long term artists have become short-term, one-hit wonders. Fans have become consumers. Songs have become sounds. Long-term investment has become short-term return. Belief in talent has submitted to belief in data.” “But there is so much talk these days of a new model emerging, a participatory, co-creation model?” “What you’re giving me is an old model. A derivative, conservative, sales analysis model, not a cutting edge artistic leadership model. ‘They liked Ed Sheeran. The engagement indices are high for Ed Sheeran. Let’s try to find another Ed Sheeran.’ Doh!” Sheldon Cybertron looked out of the window dejectedly. It all seemed so much easier for his friends working at Procter & Gamble and Unilever. Their companies really appreciated customer insight. Discussion questions: 1. How should customer data and research inform new product development decisions in music organizations? 2. What data usage is appropriate and what is inappropriate in this context? 3. What type of decision-making process is Sheldon advocating here? Is this an appropriate practice for the creative industries? 4. To what extent do music fans know what music they want to discover?’ Sheldon was taken aback. “But technology is opening up opportunities we haven’t even discussed. Some artists these days are involving audiences in their creative processes, interacting with them. Technology and social engagement are actually part of their creativity, they use the world as an orchestra.” “You know, Sheldon, if we go back to the time of the Romans or the Middle Ages, every time they were saying Vox populi vox Dei (the voice of the people is the voice of God) that was when they didn’t know what to do! In music, the artist is the voice of God. This industry has been built on the work of people who were not normal, not the voice of the people.” This case appears in the textbook Managing Organizations in the Creative Economy: Organizational Behaviour for the Cultural Sector by Paul Saintilan and David Schreiber. The first edition was published by Routledge in 2018, and the second edition is scheduled for 2023. The textbook examines topics such as decision making and managing creativity. ‘The Data Case’: Did You Find the Voice of God in the Data?: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & JF Cecillon 4 The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. This case explores interfunctional conflict at the artistic/marketing interface in large music organizations. Two scenarios are presented where artistic and marketing executives clash, one in a commercial record company context, and one in a non-profit symphony orchestra context. Students are invited to explore the underlying issues that drive the tensions. Keywords: A&R, artistic administration, marketing, interfunctional conflict, artistic/marketing interface, interdepartmental tension. Authors: Dr Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill About the Authors Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked as an international marketing director at EMI Music and Universal Music in London, as well as in non-profit roles in classical music organizations. Simon Cahill is the SVP of Commercial, Media and Audience of Warner Music Australia. Prior to Warner Music he has held positions at Sony Music in A&R, Marketing at BMG and Sales at Mushroom. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the authors. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. All characters in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Acknowledgements Designed by Ersen Sen. Images licensed through Shutterstock. The cover image is by Crazy nook and the inside strip image is by Chenspec. Second edition. First edition published by The Australian College of the Arts (‘Collarts’) in 2013. The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill 2 Sam Stossburg, the A&R Vice President at Galaxy Records sat opposite his marketing colleague in a meeting room. Tension had arisen over a new project for which Sam had great expectations, but which had disappeared from the charts without trace. “Well it was a hit when it left my desk” muttered Sam. “What did you do to it? There was no major marketing and promotional support as far as I could see. You guys f*#%ed it. You f*#%ed me. You f*#%ed the band. You guys are f*#%ed.” The Marketing Vice President Katie Jamieson smiled. “Yeah, well here’s the thing Sam. Before you sign an artist, why don’t you come to us for a reality check and talk to us about the commerciality of the project, the social metrics, the sort of budget we have to promote it, and where it’s likely to land in the market? There was nothing to promote there. No audience to engage with. We should be in sync on these things. Single vision. And by the way, the quality of your analysis doesn’t improve with the number of F-bombs you drop.” “It was a disgrace. And I’m the one who has to pick up the pieces with the band......Now, turning to the Quantum release, we have a problem in terms of timing.” “It’s not slipping?” “Yes, Katie, it’s slipping. It’s going to fall right out of Q3 and into the next financial year.” quarter is the best time to break new music, before you get into the end of year Christmas / Wrapped playlist car crash. If you push this release back you can take an axe to the projections. The other territories who are depending on this to make their numbers are also going to scream. You can take their zoom calls.” “What do you want me to do? If it isn’t ready, it isn’t ready. Do you think Beethoven had someone screaming at him saying ‘If the Moonlight Sonata isn’t ready by the full moon, you’re not getting paid?’” “Some of it must be ready. Can’t we just remix some of their last album, put out a cover, add a US MC, waterfall it as a bundle, and keep the release date? Is it genuinely awful?” “I like where you’re going with this Katie. Let’s butcher the integrity of the whole project so in five years time we can look back and be embarrassed.” “If we continue blowing our numbers, none of us are going to be here in one year’s time, let alone five.” “The artists are going to be here in five years time, and they’re the ones putting themselves out there, not us. Do you think the band or manager care if our annual budget is blown? There’s no contractual breach. If they deliver it next year, there’s nothing we can do.” “But it can’t. We’ve just spent three months putting together the campaign. This is a big release. If it slips, the whole annual budget is blown. What’s the problem?” “Who writes these contracts?” muttered Katie, “It’s crazy.” “It’s just not there. There’s no point in putting out garbage.” The Artistic Administrator Natalie Marnier sat opposite Steve Spring, the orchestra’s new Marketing Director. She had met the previous day with the orchestra’s Principal Conductor and Musical Director, who had expressed grave concerns over the orchestra’s marketing. “Well, if we pull it, we’ve burned our bridges with some pretty key partners. I’ve spent an age doing the set-up, and a lot of the stuff we’ve organized is a one shot deal. Some of these influencers and media partners were doing us a favour, so it’s not like that support is going to be there if we reschedule. This Meanwhile, on the other side of town.... “Maestro Cellini isn’t happy with the draft season brochure.” The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill 3 “OK” “There are some things he says you’ve ‘dumbed down’. You edited down his opening page, removing a lot of information and credits.” “Between you and me it was boring. No one cares. A lot of that stuff should be at the back of the brochure in micro type.” “But I agree with him that it damages morale among team members if they’re not being acknowledged. A mention is a small thing in a brochure, but can mean a lot to the person being credited. And you deleted his comments on the music. Your short little summaries for each event are too glib and simplistic.” “His writing is too musicological. Too technical. Too jargonistic. Too long. We should be writing more experientially about the music, about how it makes you feel. We need to give a richer context that is going to help shape the listener’s experience, and help them relate to the program, even if they know nothing about classical music.” “But we’re not after just anyone. We’re after thinking, active listeners who are going to make an investment in the experience. We’re not going after some mainstream pop audience with the attention span of sparrows. Our core audience are knowledgeable and will feel patronized by what you’re writing.” “If you want to keep the audience to a closed club of dying subscribers, then sure, we can do that, but you will be the last one left here to switch the lights off.” She looked further down her list. “And we took six months to get a photo of the Russian soprano, and you didn’t even put it in.” “It was hideous! She looked like her eyes were going to pop out of her head, hitting a high note. It gives me nightmares just thinking about it. Who does the photos for these artists?!” “And by the way, I would be really grateful if you didn’t use the word ‘product’. That language is quite offensive to some of us. Turning someone’s most personal, spiritual, artistic quest into some plastic commodity, like a tube of toothpaste, it’s just crass and awful.” “Fine. I’ll add that to ‘brand’, ‘content’, ‘NFT’, ‘NPD’, ‘CRM’, and all the other terms I’m banned from using here.” “Also, Maestro complained that in the printed concert program last night you had minutes against each of the movements.” “It helps orientate newcomers so they know roughly where they are in the program. Newbies need assistance to help them navigate the experience. This stops them clapping between movements, which I know really offends you, even though when I hear clapping between movements I am relieved, because it means we have some new people in the hall.” “The thing that offends Maestro is that he may want to take 13 minutes for a movement rather than the 10 minutes stated in the program. He is not a machine. He doesn’t want to be artistically defined by your prescriptions and pronouncements.” “He doesn’t have to. They’re just general indications.” “And your advertisements communicate at the most banal, superficial level. It’s a missed opportunity because there’s so much more we could be communicating, which I’m sure would be better marketing. Sometimes you don’t put all the artists, or all the composers, or there isn’t any information at all on some really important things.” “Natalie, the media environment is so competitive and cluttered, you have to reduce things to one clear, simple proposition, or you make no impact. Artistic Administration always wants a hundred things put across in a 30 second TV spot, or a print ad in a magazine or a social media post. Less is more. We need to make one clear, compelling statement. I’m happy for you to help define that statement.” “But I’m the one who needs to manage disgruntled artists who see themselves increasingly ignored by you in the process. Or steamrolled by your arrogance. You may be following your marketing textbooks, but it is pretty naïve politically to do what you’re doing. You’re annoying some pretty important people.” “I’m just fighting my corner, fighting it hard, and doing what a Marketing Director is supposed to do. Others like the Managing Director can arbitrate, and I’ll live with their decisions.” “Well Maestro isn’t happy, and he says he will be talking to the Managing Director.” The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill 4 Discussion questions: 1. Examine the points of conflict in the case. What are the underlying issues that are driving the tensions? 2. Are these tensions at the artistic / marketing interface natural and inevitable? Can steps be taken to improve organizational effectiveness and the relationship between the two functions? This case appears in the textbook Managing Organizations in the Creative Economy: Organizational Behaviour for the Cultural Sector by Paul Saintilan and David Schreiber. The first edition was published by Routledge in 2018, and the second edition is scheduled for 2023. The textbook examines topics such as organizational conflict, interfunctional tension, and managing creativity. The Artistic v. Marketing Interfunctional Conflict Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan & Simon Cahill 5 The International Meeting A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. This case explores issues such as the organizational tension that occurs between centralization and decentralization, and tensions that arise between head offices and branches. Keywords: centralization, decentralization, structure, multinational, creativity, head office and branch tensions Authors: Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James The International Meeting Case © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James About the Authors Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked in international roles at EMI Music and Universal Music in London as well as non-profit roles in classical music organizations. Michael Smellie is the former chief operating officer of Sony BMG worldwide. Cindy James has worked for Sony Music in Sydney, London and New York, and now works for Virgin Music Label & Artist Services/Universal Music Group. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the authors. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. Feedback would be appreciated on the case (via paulsaintilan@gmail. com). Readers who provide suggestions which are incorporated will receive acknowledgement in future editions of the case. All characters in this work are fictitious. Any resemblance to real persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Designed by Ersen Sen. Images licensed through Shutterstock. London image Pisa photography/ Shutterstock.com. Second edition. First edition published by The Australian College of the Arts (‘Collarts’) in 2013. The International Meeting Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James 2 “Impossible! This won’t work in my market. Just because something explodes in Norway doesn’t mean it will translate to France.” Executives working at an international record company argue about the freedom to pursue local priorities and the impact of increasing centralization. Tom Black glanced around the boardroom overlooking Hyde Park, London, which was abuzz with around twenty international delegates who had flown in the previous evening. All were senior managers of Galaxy Music, an international record company and concert promoter. Big changes were underway at Galaxy, as Black, the newly appointed worldwide president, was pushing hard for greater centralization of the organization. Traditionally they had operated a decentralized, ‘federated’ structure, with geographic territories such as the US, UK and Germany run as separate companies with enormous freedom. Each had the power to make their own business decisions in terms of who to record or tour, and which artists to support that had already been developed by other operating companies. In this internal market, if Galaxy UK developed and broke an artist in the UK, Galaxy Germany could choose to promote the artist in Germany, receiving the revenue from German sales and paying the UK company a royalty. The worldwide president had recently imposed far greater centralized control, a step that had angered some staff. This meeting had been convened to both reinforce that control and address the growing hostility. Black sensed a lull in the conversation and decided to open the meeting. ‘OK, let’s begin. Welcome everyone. I know you’re all flat out and these meetings are tough to make time for, but it’s vital that we’re all aligned and all our planning is synchronized. This is also your opportunity to help define the future of the company. Your collective judgements and sales projections provide us with a mandate to pursue future projects and move into new areas. It is also an opportunity for us to spend a bit of social time together, and I know the UK company has put together a great evening programme for us. So that’s something to look forward to.’ Noticing a few still playing with their phones, he added, ‘And it would be great if you could power down your devices so you’re really present in the room for the discussions, rather than mentally thousands of miles away’. ‘One theme I would like to pursue today is more unified support for those projects which are designated international priorities. For us to be able to make commitments to major artists and major projects we need you to back us. If we can’t count on that, it compromises our ability to pitch for major projects, it reduces our international competitiveness and it means we can’t fully maximize the potential of our artists. In an increasingly global music market we need to break artists and projects internationally, and build international catalogue for the future. An online world also makes old geographic silos meaningless. We need increasingly centralized management and the coordinated marketing of international projects.’ Alain Legrand, the veteran managing director of the French company, quickly interjected before the president went further. ‘Thank you so much, and may I say how good it is to be here with my old international colleagues in London this morning. I would just like to ask whether in this new world, we as local companies will still be able to make our own business decisions, to respond quickly and flexibly to local opportunities, local tastes and local talent. One thing I have always loved about working in this company is that I felt like I was running my own business within the bigger business. I felt like I had the space and freedom to do my own thing. I feel more recently the dead hand of centralization, formalization, standardization, rigidity, all of these things which we know are hostile to creativity. And for me it is a great sadness, because we work in a creative business. How can you reassure us that these new steps will not damage the company?’ ‘Thanks Alain. Look, like you, we want a company of entrepreneurs, not a company of nine to five employees. We want you to feel a sense The International Meeting Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James 3 of ownership in your local company and your decisions. We want you to be handsomely rewarded for your successes, and held accountable for your failures, and this is only fair when you are living and dying by your own decisions. I’m not talking here about your day to day business of identifying local projects which are evolving organically through social media which you might take to the next level. You don’t need any directives from me to pursue these. I’m talking about superstar acts we need to see the full company behind, those projects where we see so much evidence of potential we seek to maximize it internationally. Where we believe it makes international sense to become market makers and drivers in some territories, rather than being purely reactive. We need to keep an eye on the bigger picture. We want you to think global and act local. We’re after a balanced win/win.’ ‘But I don’t think we are in balance, or maybe what is “balance” for you, is not “balance” for me’ replied Legrand. ‘Our market has idiosyncrasies which need to be respected, and which change the risk profile and return on investment. Furthermore, every day we receive some new directive of things that now need to be done differently, things which now need to be centrally authorized, policies and strategic plans that have to be developed for everything. Increasingly we have all these new people from head office (most of whom don’t appear to have worked in the music industry I might add) strangling my staff with bureaucracy and red tape. They tell us the new organization will still be “organic”, “fluid” and “responsive”, but then overwhelm us with requests for reports on a million things. Instead of my people spending time on things which would drive the business forward and help deliver our numbers, they’re compiling piles of statistics for some new intern. And when my staff complain, they are ignored. Maybe we should not create and sell music anymore, because it is getting in the way of all the very important form filling work we should all be doing.’ Black smiled. ‘We have taken on some new staff. They’re all keen to show how much they can contribute to the business, and so we might not be dealing with you in the most coordinated way, and they might not be aware of the opportunity cost of these tasks. So, let me go away and review what we’re doing and see if we can do it better. And thank you for raising it, Alain, because I know you are very respected in the organization, and I want you all to feel comfortable raising problems, so we can try to resolve them. Now let’s turn to the Bangkok Project. I’m interested in twelve-month projections for the next calendar year in terms of Track Equivalent Albums. You’ve previously been sent the material. Katie?’ Katie Jamieson, the US marketing manager, looked up from her iPad. ‘Well, we’re pretty comfortable with this one, because, as you know, the artists will be based in New York for three months, they all speak English, and they’re all committed to promotion. In fact, the hardest part is getting them not to promote it themselves, but to hold back until everything is in place. It’s all pretty strong, the visual identity, video material, the social metrics, the back stories and narratives being woven around it, the whole package. So, we don’t see any reason to change the initial projections that are in the spreadsheet, and we believe it’s a viable investment.’ ‘Great, thanks, Katie. What about the French market, what sort of numbers?’ Philippe Collard, the marketing director for Galaxy France, who sat next to Legrand, paused and shook his head. Black sensed a problem. ‘Let me guess, this project is an affront to the entire French nation, and you would be run out of Paris if you backed it?’ ‘What can I say? You ask me to be honest. It’s impossible. There is no respect in France for this type of project. There is no real social footprint in France that could serve as a platform for this project. There is limited availability from the artists, not to mention language barriers. Just because something explodes in Norway or Shanghai or Albuquerque doesn’t mean it’s going to work in France. We must pass. Throwing money at this project would be throwing good money down the drain. It also means with the tight new budgets that have been imposed, that we have less to spend on artists who we know will be successful in France. This seems like a lose/ lose, not a win/win.’ Black responded: ‘The problem is that if I give you a free pass to opt out, we set a precedent for others as well. We’re then not doing the hard yards around international artist development. We’re not setting ourselves up for the future. I’m the one who needs to look an artist in the eye and say “the entire organization is behind you on this one”, and “we are the best company to be the home for this project”. And then they come to Paris, and they see nothing, and they’re on the phone screaming at me. Sure, there are going to be times when we can get music away in some territory that won’t break in another, but all I’m asking you to do is try. No one has perfect knowledge of their The International Meeting Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James 4 market. There is always something that surprises us. But if you’re not pushing the envelope and experimenting, you leave yourself a hostage to fortune. If you don’t support something that is highly successful elsewhere, and you’re not trying to be a team player, it just makes your territory look poor in comparison, and before long people are whispering “what’s the problem with France?”, which is never healthy for the executives involved. We respect a company’s right to make their own decisions about local artists and repertoire, but for the small category of releases designated international priorities, the situation is quite different. I am not politely suggesting that you release it. We mandatorily require its promotion in all territories, and everyone in this room will be sending us a serious marketing plan for the project with sales projections.’ Black reached across and poured himself an Evian. He knew that with those words the tone of the meeting had changed, and caught a raised eyebrow or two. But how was he to pull together a company that had for so long been run like a group of sovereign states or fiefdoms? This case appears in the textbook Managing Organizations in the Creative Economy: Organizational Behaviour for the Cultural Sector by Paul Saintilan and David Schreiber. The first edition was published by Routledge in 2018, and the second edition is scheduled for 2023. The textbook examines structural concepts and trends in structuring creative organizations. Discussion questions: 1. List the strengths and weaknesses of centralization versus decentralization at Galaxy. 2. What could Galaxy do to ease the tension between the international head office and the operating companies (i.e. geographic branches like France)? The International Meeting Case: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan, Michael Smellie & Cindy James 5 The Three Tenors Antitrust Case: What Did We Learn? A case study for students studying music organizations in music business or entertainment management programs. “PolyGram Holding”, commonly known as “The Three Tenors Case” has been one of the most cited antitrust (anti-competitive) cases of the past twenty years, yet the discussion has been largely confined to legal journals and the U.S. antitrust community. What can managers in large commercial music and entertainment organizations learn from the case? What are the practical implications? The paper argues that the case influences the conceptualization and structuring of certain types of joint venture deals, and that the core problem initially arose from attempting to address an internal conflict of interest issue within PolyGram. The case also demonstrates the confusing nature of antitrust law for a practicing music manager. Keywords: antitrust, anti-competitive behavior, Federal Trade Commission, joint venture, major record company, PolyGram Classics and Jazz, PolyGram Holding, The Three Tenors Author: Paul Saintilan The Three Tenors Antitrust Case: What Did We Learn? © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan About the Author Dr Paul Saintilan is a creative industries ‘pracademic’, author, teacher and industry consultant. He has worked as an international marketing director at EMI Music and Universal Music in London as well as in nonprofit roles in classical music organizations. This case can be used free of charge for educational use, without the permission of the author. It can be freely distributed in soft or hard copy, or placed on digital blackboards and online teaching platforms with no license fee payable. Correspondence on the case can be directed to Dr Paul Saintilan via paulsaintilan@ gmail.com. Acknowledgements Designed by Ersen Sen. This article was first published in the Journal of the Music & Entertainment Industry Educators Association (MEIEA) in 2013 (Volume 13, number 1, pages 13-25). The Three Tenors Antitrust Case: What Did We Learn?: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan 2 Preface The attached article on the Three Tenors Antitrust Case was published 10 years ago, 15 years after the events in question. I should disclose as the author that my research and analysis drew upon more than third party references. I was in fact a star witness in the Three Tenors Trial, the ‘point person’ between the two joint venture parties (Decca/PolyGram and Atlantic/Warner), the person behind the key documentation which the FTC seized upon and quoted extensively in their action. As the marketing director at Decca responsible for Pavarotti releases, and the project manager for the Three Tenors release, I was responsible for issuing directives which lay at the heart of the case. While I was ‘acting under orders’, I personally believed in the legitimacy of what was being asked of me, which is why I was happy to comply and why I eventually supported PolyGram’s legal defence. This involved participating in a deposition in Los Angeles and a trial in Washington. When I wrote up the case from an academic viewpoint I tried to sit on the mountaintop and explore more objectively what we actually learned. I was surprised and reassured by the number of legal academics and antitrust experts who I discovered had criticized the FTC’s position on the case. In discussing the case in an educational context I was also reassured by the number of students who found the judgement counter-intuitive. Even now there are aspects of the FTC’s position that are contested. It remains a fascinating case, still generating controversy all these years later. Paul Saintilan, May 2022 While a general manager can judge whether a decision makes business sense, and hopefully whether it is ethical, the legalities are sometimes more technical, particularly in the area of antitrust law. The fact that business affairs (legal) executives attended all our joint venture meetings didn’t stop us getting into difficulty. When managing the project I had minuted things to both joint venture parties meticulously, not just as professional practice, but as a precaution if the project bombed and the joint venture partner sought to scapegoat me. I wanted to ensure critical decisions we made together were transparently and explicitly recorded. But in an industry where official ‘minutes’ once meant a few scribbles on the back of a drink coaster, these notes were manna from heaven for the FTC when they decided to pursue the case. The Three Tenors Antitrust Case: What Did We Learn?: © 2013, 2023 Paul Saintilan 3 Journal of the Music & Entertainment Industry Educators Association Volume 13, Number 1 (2013) Bruce Ronkin, Editor Northeastern University Published with Support from The Three Tenors Antitrust Case: What Did We Learn? Paul Saintilan Australian College of the Arts (“Collarts”) Abstract “PolyGram Holding,” commonly known as “The Three Tenors Case” has been one of the most cited antitrust (anti-competitive) cases of the past ten years, yet the discussion has been largely confined to legal journals and the U.S. antitrust community. What can managers in large commercial music and entertainment organizations learn from the case? What are the practical implications? The paper argues that the case influences the conceptualization and structuring of certain types of joint venture deals, that the core problem initially arose from attempting to address an internal conflict of interest issue within PolyGram, and the case demonstrates the confusing nature of antitrust law for a practicing music manager. Keywords: antitrust, anti-competitive behavior, joint venture, major record company Abbreviations FTC - the U.S. Federal Trade Commission JV - Joint Venture 3T1 - The Three Tenors 1990 album released by PolyGram 3T2 - The Three Tenors 1994 album released by Warner 3T3 - The Three Tenors 1998 album released by PolyGram and Warner Introduction One of the unforeseen aspects of the Three Tenors legacy is that the franchise has been elevated to star status in the U.S. antitrust community (Verschelden 2007). This group of legal boffins is a niche audience admittedly, but the enthusiasm of their analysis has been noteworthy. The Three Tenors case has been extolled as an important development, clarifying the way certain legal principles will be applied in examining anticompetitive behavior in a joint venture context, with implications for future cases (McChesney 2004; Meyer 2010; Verschelden 2007). But of what relevance is this to managers working in music organizations? This article will provide the background to the Three Tenors case, MEIEA Journal 13 summarize the court case, the ruling of the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter referred to as the FTC), the backlash that ensued from lawyers and law professors, the 2005 appeal, and the backlash to the appeal decision. It will then provide some organizational analysis to look more deeply at how the problems arose, before turning finally to what can be learned from the case and its practical implications for music and entertainment managers. Unless stated otherwise, the facts of the case as outlined below are drawn from the Initial Decision (Public Record Version), published by James P. Timony, Administrative Law Judge on June 20, 2002, which is in the public domain and available online (FTC 2002). While Warner and PolyGram were both involved in the antitrust saga, they were treated as separate cases by the FTC, and this analysis focuses on the PolyGram case. The record label Decca also appears in the case. Decca was owned by PolyGram, and was the repertoire center, or “location-specific-creativeunit” (Bakker 2006, 92) responsible for the Three Tenors recordings within PolyGram at the time of the case. Decca, based in London, distributed its recordings through PolyGram “operating companies,” each responsible for sales in a given country. In the 1990s Decca’s recordings were marketed in the U.S.A. under the label London Records, and its catalog assets are now owned by the Universal Music Group. Background The first Three Tenors concert took place on July 7, 1990 at the Baths of Caracalla in Rome. The concert united José Carreras, Plácido Domingo, and Luciano Pavarotti for the first time. The event coincided with the 1990 FIFA World Cup, launching a tradition that was repeated for future World Cups. PolyGram recorded the concert and it became the most successful classical recording of its era, selling more than twelve million audio units and over three million video units (FTC 2002). This first Three Tenors album was referred to in the legal case as “3T1” (and will be henceforth referred to as 3T1). The Three Tenors (Carreras, Domingo, and Pavarotti) united four years later for a concert on July 16, 1994 at Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles. This concert was recorded by Warner, and is referred to in the legal case as “3T2”. The third Three Tenors recording in the case was of an open-air concert in Paris that took place in front of the Eiffel Tower on July 10, 1998. 14 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) In the spring of 1997 Ahmet Ertegün, the Chairman of Atlantic (a Warner subsidiary based in the U.S.A.), had met with Alain Levy, his counterpart at PolyGram requesting that Pavarotti (who was under exclusive contract to PolyGram) be released to record the project for Warner. Rather than release him (in return for certain considerations), PolyGram proposed that the two organizations create a joint venture agreement. The ensuing joint venture (hereafter referred to as JV) involved Warner distributing the recordings within the U.S.A. and PolyGram distributing them outside of the U.S.A. The parties agreed to a 50/50 split of profits and losses. An US$18 million advance was paid, ultimately shared between the parties, which also included the rights to market a greatest hits compilation and a box set. This third Three Tenors recording was released on August 18, 1998 (and in addition to audio products included video and home television broadcast). It is referred to in the legal case as “3T3”. In 1998 PolyGram possessed a highly decentralized, federated structure (Bakker 2006). Given the significant joint investment in 3T3 (US$18 million), PolyGram wanted its operating companies (which were responsible for marketing the new recording in all territories except the U.S.A.) to get fully behind the new release, and channel the maximum promotional effort and resources into the launch of the new album. There was concern that operating companies might aggressively promote 3T1 around the time that 3T3 was released, effectively cannibalizing sales of the new album. This led to PolyGram and Warner discussing a “moratorium” seeking to discourage aggressive price discounting or advertising of 3T1 and 3T2 around the time of 3T3’s release. The window of protection that was discussed was from August 1 to October 15, 1998. There is disagreement between the parties as to what eventually transpired, and sharp disagreement in the testimony, but there is no doubt that such a plan was discussed, and an attempt was made to execute it, based upon a belief by managers in both companies that they were legitimately protecting their mutual investment in 3T3. The Court Case On July 31, 2001 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in Washington issued a complaint against PolyGram, arguing that the moratorium represented an illegal agreement with a competitor to restrict price competition and promotional activity in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It went to trial in March 2002, and the Initial De- MEIEA Journal 15 cision dated June 20, 2002, found the moratorium to be “presumptively anticompetitive” (FTC 2002, 75). The burden of proof lay with PolyGram to “show that the moratorium was necessary in order to promote competition and benefit consumers” (p. 75). It rejected PolyGram’s “free riding defense,” that aggressive promotion of 3T1 and 3T2 by operating companies may complicate or confuse a consumer’s purchase decision, who would then see three Three Tenors albums aggressively promoted in retail. Nor was the argument that the moratorium was simply a mechanism to ensure internal focus considered persuasive. On July 28, 2003 the Federal Trade Commission released its Final Order confirming the Initial Decision. The accompanying legal opinion concluded, “We find that the moratorium agreement between PolyGram and Warner unreasonably restrained trade and constitutes an unfair method of competition” (FTC 2003, 61). A key issue for the FTC was that the moratorium was agreed to after the JV had been created, which seemed to indicate that it was not essential to its success. Much mention is made of the timing, such as: “[f]urthermore, PolyGram and Warner were contractually committed to the formation of the joint venture and the creation of 3T3 months before discussions of the moratorium began” (FTC 2003, 55). There are also many references in the decision to the fact that 3T1 and 3T2 were not placed into the JV; they were not explicitly included in the JV agreement. The Initial Decision quotes a previous ruling: “It is to be expected that the joint venturers will put their venture-related businesses into the venture and ‘not compete with their progeny’” (re Brunswick, 94 F.T.C. at 1275) (FTC 2002, 58). The Opinion accompanying the Final Order states that a company (i.e., PolyGram) that is arguing “that competitors may agree to restrict competition by products wholly outside a joint venture, to increase profits for the products of the joint venture itself,” is engaged in “a frontal assault on the basic policy” of the antitrust laws (FTC 2003, 41). The ruling continues: “Here, despite Respondents’ [PolyGram’s] invocation of a Three Tenors ‘brand’, there is obviously no such thing, because one entity did not legally control all Three Tenors products. The marketing rights to 3T1 and 3T2 were held not by the joint venture but, rather, independently by the parties to the venture” (FTC 2003, 4142). In addition to this, PolyGram had introduced another case in support of their appeal, but the Commission rejected the comparison saying, “Respondents [PolyGram] and Warner did not bring all of their Three Tenors 16 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) products into a single, integrated joint venture” (FTC 2003, 43). The Ensuing Controversy The ruling quickly attracted criticism from law professors and lawyers specializing in antitrust law. Two antitrust lawyers, William Kolasky and Richard Elliott, published in Antitrust magazine that, “It is said that hard cases make bad law, but sometimes easy cases can make even worse law, especially when theory gets in the way of common sense. A case in point is the Federal Trade Commission’s Three Tenors decision last summer” (Kolasky and Elliott 2004, 50). In their article they argued “that the Commission’s decision was wrong both as a matter of elementary economics and as a matter of the centuries-old law dealing with covenants not to compete among partners in a common enterprise” (p. 50). They argued that the decision was contradictory, as the Commission had no issue with a much broader restriction on competition contained in the JV agreement, where each party was not to release a Three Tenors recording for at least four years. These future recordings would also be outside the JV agreement. They argued that while the JV was criticized for not addressing the issue at the inception of the partnership, in reality it is difficult to anticipate and address all issues from the outset, and very common for such agreements to evolve over time. They argued that the Commission completely ignored the economic issue of opportunity cost in the record companies wanting attention to be placed on 3T3 and not 3T1 or 3T2. They concluded that the Commission’s reasoning was “convoluted and ultimately incorrect” (p. 54). In 2005, Victor Goldberg, a Law Professor at Columbia University, vigorously attacked the decision in the Review of Law and Economics (Goldberg 2005). Highlighting the trivial nature of the issue he entitled his piece “Featuring the Three Tenors in La Triviata.” He argued that there is no way the agreement could be anticompetitive. If it would be permissible for one company to restrain promotion of its products to promote another, then it should be permissible for a joint venture integrated by contract rather than ownership. Commenting on the convoluted logic of the ruling he wrote, “most opera plots make more sense” (p. 59). He failed to see how any market power was operating when three CDs were involved out of thousands, for a ten-week period, and yet market power should be a key issue. PolyGram petitioned to have the decision reviewed in the District MEIEA Journal 17 of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, and in 2005 the FTC decision was upheld (Meyer and Ludwin 2005). It categorically ruled out “the possibility that restraints on competition ‘outside the venture’ can ever be justified based on a need to limit ‘free riding’ or other opportunistic behavior” that may threaten the success of a JV collaboration (p. 65). This decision has in turn drawn criticism for being unnecessarily “unpalatable” (p. 67), creating uncertainty, and potentially harming innovation (p. 70). After the D.C. Circuit appeal Professor Joshua Wright at the George Mason University School of Law criticized both the FTC and D.C. Circuit rulings. He criticized the FTC for displaying “unwarranted hostility” to PolyGram’s “free rider” defense (Wright 2005, 399), a ruling which was “plainly incorrect” (p. 400). He also argued that “the moratorium agreement was improperly condemned” (p. 412) involving a “misapplication” of legal principles (p. 400). Control and Marketing Prioritization in a Decentralized Company To fully understand and relate to the case from a manager’s viewpoint, it is important to delve more deeply into the organizational context. To an external observer, a large multinational music company may look like an integrated, single organization. In the context of a legal trial, it is in the interests of the Commission to consider PolyGram as one integrated entity. However, a large international music organization has its own internal market, its own internal trading between repertoire owners (labels) and operating companies or international affiliates who market and distribute product worldwide. PolyGram in 1998 had a federated, rights-based, decentralized structure (Bakker 2006). The organization believed that decentralization was the key to managing creativity (Arnold 1997). Let us look first at the way Decca functioned as a label, and then how the operating subsidiaries functioned. The Decca label had control of the artists it signed and the way the recordings were priced and presented to the marketplace (Arnold 1997). Unlike pop recordings within PolyGram, classical recordings were not decentralized to the point where operating subsidiaries could use the Decca label to originate their own recordings, except in highly specific circumstances (Arnold 1997). Decca produced recordings which it owned, and marketed them through the network of subsidiary companies. If a label such as Decca makes a major investment in a new product, it is the one 18 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) bearing the risk. It relies on the support of the international marketing and distribution infrastructure to recoup its investment. The subsidiary companies were profit centers responsible for sales within a given country (Arnold 1997). Around the time of the case, PolyGram directly controlled marketing subsidiaries in 45 countries (Arnold 1997). In a federated, decentralized structure, the Managing Director of a PolyGram Australia, or PolyGram Austria, is paid to be highly opportunistic, aggressively seeking revenue from every avenue. The operating company, not the label, was largely responsible for putting up the marketing investment required to support a recording (Arnold 1997). PolyGram labels such as Decca competed in this internal market for attention and marketing support from operating companies, and operating companies had the freedom to choose which products they would support (Arnold 1997). If catalog initiatives will generate income (e.g., 3T1), the fact that they may cannibalize sales of a new product (3T3) may not unduly concern them if they are not bearing the multi-million dollar risk on that new product. Thus while the interests of the label and the operating company overlap, they are not completely aligned. There is an inherent tension in a federated, decentralized organization such as PolyGram between the advantages of centralization and the advantages of decentralization. Decentralization allows the organization to make quick, entrepreneurial decisions anchored in the reality of local marketplace conditions and local consumer tastes. Centralization allows all these disparate nation states to unite around key, international marketing priorities. Centralized control was never strong in PolyGram, with notorious historical lapses such as Casablanca in Los Angeles where control was almost completely lost, resulting in enormous damage (Bakker 2006). (Representatives from the head office in the Netherlands went “native,” joining in the disco label’s festivities which included a secretary in their offices on Sunset Boulevard walking around each day taking the cocaine orders (Dannen 1991). It should be noted in passing that the record industry’s ‘colorful’ U.S. history has probably not endeared it to U.S. regulators). In such a decentralized environment, prioritization can be a hotly contested issue, and there could be frustration in the label when operating companies pursued local priorities in preference to the label’s (Arnold 1997). 3T3 was an international marketing priority. It was in Decca’s interests to have maximum focus on the new recording for the specific MEIEA Journal 19 period surrounding its launch. As in the movie industry, initial chart positions can be enormously influential in determining the sales trajectory and profitability of a project. Decca sought to focus attention on 3T3, to make it a priority in the midst of all the internal clutter, so that the new release had the best chance of success. The Initial Decision in the case refers to this testimony (at point 83), that PolyGram’s management was “concerned about the activities of PolyGram’s own operating companies, and wanted to be sure that they did not promote 3T1 in a way that would divert sales from 3T3” (FTC 2002, 14). The initial concern was internal competition. In this case, the moratorium was being used by Decca as an instrument of control, an instrument to force internal prioritization and focus on the operating companies. The fact that the company was involved in a JV with a competitor only served to complicate the situation. If an operating company is asked to curtail promotion of a product (3T1), and it understands that the JV partner has a product that could act as an equal substitute (3T2), it is natural that it will ask whether the JV partner will also be complying with the plan. This is what occurred, and is what led to the moratorium agreement. The judge’s dismissal of consumer confusion possibly arising through multiple versions is interesting, as discussion of multiple versions and consumers being “overwhelmed by choice” was highly topical at the time (Arnold 1997). At the time of the case “a well-stocked record store might carry as many as eighty recordings of a major work such as Beethoven’s fifth symphony. Deutsche Grammophon carried thirteen recordings of this work in its 1996 catalog, the Decca catalog offered ten recordings of this work, and the Philips catalog carried eight” (Arnold 1997, 12). This was perceived as a problem, inhibiting purchase through confusion (Arnold 1997). Thus a marketing impulse to simplify a consumer proposition may look to an antitrust regulator as an attempt to curtail consumer choice. What Can Managers in Music Organizations Learn? What can music and entertainment managers learn from the case? In terms of practical implications for managers, three recommendations are proposed: 1. Greater care in anticipating issues at the outset of the venture; 2. Greater care in structuring; and 3. A recognition that antitrust law is too confusing and uncertain for general managers to attempt to navigate without highly spe- 20 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) cialized legal assistance. Anticipate Issues at the Outset of the Venture It would have helped PolyGram’s defense considerably if it had been able to anticipate some of the issues that arose, and had introduced them into the JV agreement from the outset. What sorts of opportunistic behavior might arise (Kolasky and Elliott 2004, 54)? How will the JV partners interact once the venture is launched (Meyer and Ludwin 2005, 70)? Exercise Greater Care in Joint Venture Legal Structuring PolyGram’s case would have been considerably strengthened had 3T1 and 3T2 been placed into the JV. The problematic nature of the fact that 3T1 and 3T2 were outside the JV was reiterated in the 2005 D.C. Circuit decision (Meyer and Ludwin 2005). This would presumably have complicated the deal, but had 3T1 and 3T2 been integrated into the JV, pricing and promotional conversations relating to those catalog albums would have been conversations about joint property, that the venture owned and legally controlled, not catalog assets owned by individual organizations. Creativity can be brought to bear in terms of examining every option, for example, “existing products might be wrapped into the venture but subject to a separate set of cost- and revenue-sharing formulae. Or they may be included for some purposes—sales and marketing, perhaps, so as to bring within the venture those functions that might bear most directly on the venture’s success—but not others” (Meyer and Ludwin 2005, 70). To make this point more emphatically, Figure 1 depicts the relationship that existed, with the catalog albums outside the JV. Figure 2 depicts the relationship that would have provided better protection. Get Help — It’s Too Hard If there is one thing that should be clear from this short history and analysis, it’s that the Three Tenors rulings resulted in “confusion” (Verschelden 2007, 465) and “uncertainty” (Meyer and Ludwin 2005, 63). The Three Tenors case was approached by the FTC as an opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the application of antitrust law to joint venture agreements (McChesney 2004). If this was an aspiration, from a managerial point of view it was a comprehensive failure, and the resulting confusion has made it more likely that managers will appear before the FTC. It is understood that healthy debate and dissenting opinions are important to MEIEA Journal 21 Figure 1. 3T1 and 3T2 excluded from the JV agreement. Figure 2. All albums explicitly included in the JV agreement. evolving the law, but the degree of controversy surrounding this case has done nothing to inspire managerial confidence that clear guidelines exist on how one should proceed. If law professors whose specialization is antitrust law can profess incredulity at FTC decisions, what hope is there for the average general manager? It is interesting that PolyGram and Warner had lawyers involved in JV meetings and deliberations, yet this did not prevent the partnership falling foul of the FTC. The author has presented the facts of this case as a cautionary tale to business students in Australia and Switzerland (in the context of marketing ethics and music business courses) and has often received the comment from students that the ruling appeared counterintuitive. This accords with Kolasky and Elliott’s comment that the FTC ruling shows what happens when “theory gets in the way of common sense” (2004, 50). Therefore it is important that general 22 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) managers do not simply employ common sense and their own intuition in crafting agreements! Another point that should be made, given the extensive coverage of murder trials in television dramas, is that music managers may come to an antitrust matter with the expectation that managerial intention will represent a key part of the trial and the defense. They may imagine themselves saying, “At no time did I intend to harm the interests of the American consumer, Your Honor.” One quickly discovers however that, “Modern antitrust law is steeped in microeconomics, and suits rely heavily on economic expert witnesses. Indeed, expert testimony is often the ‘whole game’ in an antitrust dispute because experts testify about dispositive issues such as the competitive effect of a business practice or the relevant boundaries of a market” (Haw 2012, 1261). Conclusion This paper has summarized the background to the trial, the legal rulings, the published criticism of the rulings, and attempted to summarize what can be learned from it all, not for a legal audience, but an audience of music managers. The key learnings are to: 1. Anticipate issues at the outset of the venture; 2. Exercise greater care in structuring; and 3. Recognize that antitrust law is too confusing and uncertain for general managers to attempt to navigate without highly specialized legal assistance. The degree to which contemporary major record companies have become more centralized is the degree to which measures like a moratorium will become less necessary in enforcing marketing prioritization. That said, the case is still highly relevant given the consolidation of major record company ownership, and the fluid, dynamic nature of the contemporary music industry. The creation of deals and partnerships will continue, and history that isn’t understood will be repeated. MEIEA Journal 23 References Arnold, David J. “PolyGram Classics.” Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-598-074 (1997). Bakker, Gerben. “The making of a music multinational: PolyGram’s international businesses, 1945-1998.” Business History Review 80, no. 1 (2006): 81-123. Dannen, Fredric. Hit Men: Power Brokers and Fast Money Inside the Music Business. New York: Vintage, 1991. FTC. Initial Decision (Public Record Version) in the Matter of PolyGram, Decca and UMG Dkt. No. 9298 (June 20,2002). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2002. http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/06/ polygramid.pdf. FTC. Opinion of the Commission in the Matter of PolyGram Holding Inc., Dkt. No. 9298 (July 28, 2003). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2003. http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/polygramopinion.pdf. Goldberg, Victor P. “Featuring the Three Tenors in La Triviata.” Review of Law & Economics 1, no. 1 (2005): 55-64. Haw, Rebecca. “Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic Consensus in the Battle of the Experts.” Northwestern University Law Review 106, no. 3 (2012): 1261-1305. Kolasky, William and Richard Elliott. “The Federal Trade Commission’s Three Tenors decision: ‘Qual due fiori a un solo stello.’” Antitrust, 18 (Spring 2004): 50-55. McChesney, Fred S. “Singing in the Shadows of Law: The Three Tenors Case.” The Antitrust Bulletin 49 (2004): 633-653. Meyer, David L. “The FTC’s New ‘Rule of Reason’: Realcomp and the Expanding Scope of ‘Inherently Suspect’ Analysis.” Antitrust 24 (2010): 47-56. Meyer, David L. and Derek Ludwin. “Three Tenors and the Section 1 Analytical Framework: A Continuum Drawn With Bright Lines.” Antitrust (Fall 2005): 63-72. Verschelden, Catherine. “Is the Quick-Look Antitrust Analysis in PolyGram Holding Inherently Suspect?” The Journal of Corporation Law, (Winter 2007): 448-465. Wright, Joshua D. “Singing Along: A Comment on Goldberg & Muris on The Three Tenors.” Review of Law & Economics 1, no. 3 (2005): 399-414. 24 Vol. 13, No. 1 (2013) Paul Saintilan is the Dean of Collarts in Australia and has held senior positions in Australia and the United Kingdom in the recorded music and performing arts sectors. In the 1990s he was based in London where he worked as an International Marketing Director at EMI and Director of Strategic Development at the Decca Record Company. He has worked in not-for-profit concert presentation as Director of Marketing & Development at Musica Viva Australia. From 2005 to 2010 he headed up the arts and entertainment management program at the Australian Institute of Music and successfully negotiated and launched the Master of Arts Management program at Sydney Opera House. Since then he has worked as a Visiting Lecturer at the Glion Institute of Higher Education, Montreux, and as an Adjunct Professor at Webster University, Geneva. In August 2013 he was appointed Dean of The Australian College of the Arts (Collarts) in Melbourne. Saintilan completed a Bachelor of Music (Hons.) degree at the University of Sydney, studying composition with Peter Sculthorpe. He has an MBA degree from the Australian Graduate School of Management at the University of NSW. He is completing a Ph.D. project in entertainment marketing at Deakin University, Australia, under the supervision of Professor Ruth Rentschler. MEIEA Journal 25