International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Ten Years of Supporting
Democracy Worldwide
© International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2005
International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests.
Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International
IDEA, its Board or its Council members.
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should
be made to:
Publications Office
International IDEA
SE -103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
International IDEA encourages dissemination of its work and will promptly respond to
requests for permission to reproduce or translate its publications.
Graphic design by: Magnus Alkmar
Front cover illustrations by: Anoli Perera, Sri Lanka
Printed by: Trydells Tryckeri AB, Sweden
ISBN 91-85391-43-3
A number of individuals (and organizations) have contributed to the development of this book. Our thanks go, first
and foremost, to Bernd Halling, External Relations Officer, who coordinated the content development of this book
and for all his hard work and support to the book through its many phases. We also thank Ozias Tungwarara, Senior
Programme Officer, who developed the concept from the beginning and helped in the initial phase of writing and
collection of material, as well as IDEA’s Publications Manager, Nadia Handal Zander for her help in the production
of this book.
Foreword
International IDEA was born in 1995 in a world
which was optimistic about democratic change.
The end of the Cold War had ushered in a period
of opportunity and innovation with democracy as
well as more self-critical analysis of the quality and
achievements of democracies, old and new. The
time was ripe for the idea of IDEA, the creation
by a group of countries committed to democracy
of a special body to assist in strengthening democracy anywhere in the world.
Definitions of democracy differ and evolve. IDEA
has had its own vigorous debates on the issue.
What is clear for IDEA is that democracy goes beyond the rule of law and the protection of human
rights; it means more than good governance and
the effective management of public resources. Democracy is about the use of power and the management of conflict. We may formulate this as a
set of political institutions and processes based on
the principles of popular control over public decisions and decision makers, and equality of respect
and voice between citizens in the exercise of that
control. However, IDEA has been insistent from
the beginning, as now echoed by many, that there
are no blueprints for democracy since every country’s political institutions and practices are shaped
by its history, its culture, and social and economic
factors. The quality of democracy will vary according to how well the institutions allow for these
two principles to be given practical expression,
through processes of participation, representation,
accountability, transparency and responsiveness to
the citizens. Such processes depend on a culture of
participation, in which pluralistic media, an active
civil society, competing political parties and other
mechanisms allow all citizens to acquire political
voice.
It follows that the task of making democracy work
belongs to the countries themselves, their citizens,
civil associations, social and economic forces,
professional associations and religious groups, as
well as public bodies, political parties and institu-
4
tions—hence the notion of local ownership of the
process of reform and development. For significant political reforms and public policy decisions,
there needs to be the space and time for knowledge to be shared, for information to be circulated,
and for opinion groups to form and debate and to
build consensus with key stakeholders. The quality of the dialogue and the inclusive nature of the
decision-making processes will tend to condition
the acceptability and effectiveness of the reforms
in question. Building local capacity for dialogue
as well as for institutional strengthening has thus
been one of the priorities in the work of IDEA.
For IDEA, this has meant on the one hand an emphasis on the importance for local stakeholders
and political elites of using dialogue and public
debate to establish a momentum and a consensusbased agenda for political reform. It has meant an
equally strong emphasis on learning from others,
and developing comparative knowledge and experience so as to enhance understanding about political processes and institutions.
Every situation may be distinct but common elements do emerge: there may be lessons to be
learned in democracy and peace building, in enforcing standards of integrity and transparency for
political parties and institutions, in designing institutional arrangements to enhance participation
and governability, in establishing good practice
in political management, negotiating techniques
and consensus building processes and so on. Such
comparative knowledge and experience is more
than ever in demand by political reformers at local, national and intergovernmental level. IDEA
has specialized in developing such materials in response to needs and demands and in cooperation
with a wide range of partners and user organizations.
The last decade has seen both major changes and
continuity in the business of democracy building. IDEA’s basic premises have been confirmed
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
and vindicated but also sharpened over time. Rising apathy and cynicism in various parts of the
world about democracy’s failure to deliver on expectations or provide any real control over political elites present one set of challenges. Conflict
and insecurity present other challenges: democratic processes should serve as the tools of conflict
management and remain paramount when tackling security threats of all kinds, but they nevertheless need very careful design and development
to avoid contributing to conflict in society. Other
challenges, and also opportunities, arise from globalization, mass communications and technology.
Tackling inequality has become perhaps the most
pressing task for democracy. Political institutions
and processes need to ensure political equality and
popular control but they also need to ensure the
political mandate and capacity to govern and deliver policies which serve to improve the lives of
citizens. Without both economic and political justice, democracy cannot thrive.
These twin objectives need to remain present in
foreign trade and development cooperation policies as well as in specific efforts at democracy promotion by the international community. Compared with a decade ago, there is a vast increase in
talk about democracy building, and much more
knowledge too, although concepts and strategies
still vary widely. There are appreciably more resources available, but here are multiple challenges
and needs. There is also a considerable growth in
the number of pro-democracy actors, both in the
not-for-profit sector at national and international level and in the public sector as an increasing
variety of public agencies—different government
departments, parliaments, judiciaries and so on—
take initiatives related to democracy and governance support.
This is a new environment for IDEA. It started
out as a body with a unique vocation and a unique
structure. The first decade was a period of innovation and passion. IDEA attracted many lively
minds, then as now, and built up great expectations, then as now. There have been many important achievements and this anniversary yearbook
is an excellent opportunity to present some of
these as well as highlight some of IDEA’s current
preoccupations and activities. In the decade to
come, IDEA will continue to be a microcosm of
the international community of democracy-loving nations but it may well develop a more conventional intergovernmental structure and draw
much closer to its Member states in future. It will
certainly remain true to its philosophy of democracy building, but should find satisfaction as more
and more other bodies emulate IDEA, extending
its influence, although reducing its uniqueness.
IDEA will adapt to the changing scene, no more
a lone pioneer attempting to fulfil an impossibly
ambitious global vocation, but acting in future as
a wise and enterprising partner for cooperation
and a dynamic creator of networks in the expanding world of democracy building.
I am privileged to have been part of IDEA’s journey into its second decade, contributing to its renewal and development. It was nearly ten years
ago when I first encountered IDEA on one of its
first missions to start a process of democracy capacity building. At the time, and now more than
ever, I share their vision with all those who consider IDEA to be a wonderful idea. My thanks go
to all those who have contributed to this shining
idea as well as those who have brought this anniversary book into being. May IDEA’s next decade
be as bright as its first!
Karen Fogg
Secretary-General
International IDEA
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
5
Table of Contents
Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................................4
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................................................9
Introduction: A Reader’s Guide to IDEA’s Tenth Anniversary Publication .......................................................11
Ingrid Wetterqvist
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................11
About this Publication...................................................................................................................................................12
Part I: IDEA in the Democracy-Building Context .........................................................................................................12
Part II: IDEA’s Experiences ...........................................................................................................................................13
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................................14
Part I
The World around IDEA …1995–2005 ........................................................................................................................16
1. Democracy Analysis...................................................................................................................................................19
Todd Landman
1.1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................................19
1.2. Defining Democracy .............................................................................................................................................20
1.3. Measuring Democracy ...........................................................................................................................................20
1.4. Analysing Democracy ............................................................................................................................................22
1.5. Lacunae and Further Work .....................................................................................................................................24
References .....................................................................................................................................................................26
2. Democracy Building and the Political Dimensions ..........................................................................................29
Massimo Tommasoli
2.1. Democracy Building and Development ..................................................................................................................29
2.2. Democracy, Poverty and Political Change...............................................................................................................30
2.3. Structural Features, Institutions and Agents ...........................................................................................................33
2.4. Some Implications for Democracy Building ...........................................................................................................34
References .....................................................................................................................................................................36
3. Themes in Democracy Assistance .........................................................................................................................39
Richard Youngs
3.1. Overall Trends ........................................................................................................................................................39
3.2. Reassessing Civil Society? .......................................................................................................................................42
3.3. Government-to-Government Institution-Building Aid ..........................................................................................44
3.4. Political Society: Parties, Parliaments and the Military ..........................................................................................45
3.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................47
References ....................................................................................................................................................................48
6
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
4. Why Governance Matters in Achieving the Millennium Declaration and
the Millennium Development Goals ..........................................................................................................................51
UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo
4.1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................51
4.2. The Millennium Declaration and Democratic Governance ....................................................................................52
4.3. Why is Governance Indispensable to Achieving the MDGs? ..................................................................................52
4.4. Human Development and Democratic Governance as a Framework for Achieving the MDGs ..............................54
4.5. The Challenge of Strengthening Democracy in a Fragmented World .....................................................................56
4.6. Regional Focus on Human Development and Governance .....................................................................................57
4.7. Democratic Governance: the Road Ahead ..............................................................................................................58
4.8. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................................59
References ....................................................................................................................................................................59
5. The People’s Voice: Trust in Political Institutions .............................................................................................61
Michael Bratton, Yun-han Chu, Marta Lagos and Richard Rose
5.1. Limited Trust in Political Institutions .....................................................................................................................62
5.2. What Explains Differences in Trust? .......................................................................................................................67
5.3. Implications for Governance ..................................................................................................................................70
6. From ‘89 to 9/11: of Turmoil and Hope .................................................................................................................73
Konstanty Gebert
PART II
Highlights of IDEA’s Work … Looking Back 1995 – 2005 ......................................................................................83
7. Ten Years of Democratic IDEAs ...............................................................................................................................85
Charlotte Hjorth
7.1. Mandate and Objectives .........................................................................................................................................85
7.2. IDEA’s Guiding Principles ......................................................................................................................................85
7.3. Increasing Trust and Efficiency in Electoral Processes .............................................................................................86
7.4. The ACE Project for Sustainable Elections .............................................................................................................87
7.5. Women’s Participation ............................................................................................................................................88
7.6. Measuring Democracy: State of Democracy and Democracy Assessment ...............................................................89
7.7. Dialogue as a Route to Democracy : Capacity Building for Sustainable Democracy ...............................................89
7.8. Democracy and Conflict Management ..................................................................................................................91
7.9. Democracy and Reconciliation ...............................................................................................................................92
7.10. The United Nations and Democracy ....................................................................................................................92
7.11. Constitutional Reform .........................................................................................................................................92
7.12. Democracy at the Local and Regional Level .........................................................................................................92
7.13. Dialogue and Democracy Building .......................................................................................................................93
7.14. Research and Dialogue on Political Parties............................................................................................................93
7.15. Regional Activities ...............................................................................................................................................94
7.16. Outlook ...............................................................................................................................................................96
8. Optimism to Realism: Ten Years of Electoral Development ...........................................................................99
Andrew Ellis
8.1. Electoral Systems, Institutional Frameworks and Direct Democracy ......................................................................99
8.2. Internationally Run Elections in Post-Conflict Transitions ...................................................................................101
8.3. Looking at Elections from a Development Perspective .........................................................................................102
8.4. Has Election Observation Outstayed its Welcome?...............................................................................................105
8.5. The Independence of Election Administrations ....................................................................................................106
8.6. Election Administration as a Profession ................................................................................................................107
8.7. Gender and Elections ...........................................................................................................................................108
8.8. Participation and Turnout: A Threat to Electoral Legitimacy? ..............................................................................108
8.9. The Next Ten Years ..............................................................................................................................................109
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
7
9. Ten Years of Progress: Enhancing Women’s Political Participation...........................................................113
Julie Ballington
9.1. National Politics: Broadening the Scope of Participation .....................................................................................113
9.2. Key Themes of IDEA’s Work on Women in Politics ............................................................................................115
9.3. Using Special Measures to Increase Women’s Access to Politics .............................................................................118
9.4. Supporting and Encouraging Regional Change ..................................................................................................120
9.5. Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................................................123
References ..................................................................................................................................................................124
10. Democracy in Situations of Deep-Rooted Conflict .......................................................................................127
Timothy D. Sisk
10.1. The Turbulent 1990s: A World in Transition ......................................................................................................128
10.2. Themes of IDEA’s Work ....................................................................................................................................130
10.3. Countries, Regions and the International Community .......................................................................................136
10.4. Conclusion: New Challenges, Themes and Approaches ......................................................................................141
11. The State of Democracy Project .......................................................................................................................145
David Beetham
11.1. Background ........................................................................................................................................................145
11.2. An Innovative Methodology ...............................................................................................................................146
11.3. ‘First-Generation’ Assessments ............................................................................................................................150
11.4. ‘Second-Generation’ Assessments .......................................................................................................................152
11.5. The International IDEA Workshop ....................................................................................................................154
References ..................................................................................................................................................................155
12. Building Democracy, Shaping the Future:
International IDEA in Peru ..........................................................................................................................................157
Kristen Sample and Daniel Zovatto
12.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................157
12.2. Crucible for Political Reform..............................................................................................................................157
12.3. IDEA Begins Working in Peru ...........................................................................................................................158
12.4. Governance ........................................................................................................................................................160
12.5. Political Reform and Political Parties ..................................................................................................................160
12.6. Women and Political Participation .....................................................................................................................162
12.7. Reconciliation ....................................................................................................................................................163
12.8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................165
Annexes
A. About the Authors ..................................................................................................................................................168
B. Former and Current Members of IDEA’s Board of Directors .................................................................................171
C. IDEA Publications .................................................................................................................................................175
Tables and Figures
Table 5.1: New Europe Barometer Surveys, 2004 .........................................................................................................62
Table 5.2: Summary of Institutional Trust ....................................................................................................................63
Table 5.3: Institutions Least Trusted Everywhere ..........................................................................................................66
Figure 5.1: Trusting and Distrusting Citizens, by Continent ........................................................................................64
Figure 5.2: National Differences in Trust within Each Continent .................................................................................66
Figure 5.3: Positive and Negative Influences on Trust ...................................................................................................69
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Acronyms
ACE
ACP
AEC
AHDR
AULA
BRIDGE
CB
CEDAW
DAC
DFID
DPD
DRC
EIDHR
EISA
EMB
EP
EPIC
EU
GBS
GOVNET
GTZ
ICTJ
IDESI
IFES
IULA
MDGs
Administration and Cost of
Elections Project
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
Australian Electoral Commission
Arab Human Development Reports
African Union of Local Authorities
Building Resources in Democracy,
Governance and Elections
Capacity Building (Programme)
Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
OECD Development Assistance
Committee
UK Department for International
Development
Regional Representative Council of
Indonesia
IDEA handbook on Democracy and
Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for
Negotiators
European Initiative on Democracy
and Human Rights
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
Electoral management body
Election Programme
Election Process Information
Collection
European Union
Global Barometer Surveys Network
OECD DAC Network on
Governance
German Agency for Technical
Cooperation (Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit)
International Centre for Transitional
Justice
Institute for the Development of the
Informal Sector (Institute de
Desarrollo del Sector Informal)
International Foundation for Election
Systems
International Union of Local
Authorities
Millennium Development Goals
National Accord Forum
National Democratic Institute
Non-governmental organization
Organization of American States
Overseas development assistance
Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the OSCE
OECD
Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
OHCHR
Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights
ONPE
National Office of Electoral Processes
(Oficina Nacional de Procesos
Electorales)
OSCE
Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
PDP
Participation and Democracy
Programme
PR
Proportional representation
R&G
Rules and Guidelines Programme
SADC
Southern African Development
Community
SEEDS
South Eastern Europe Democracy
Support Network
Sida
Swedish International Development
Cooperation Agency
SSR
Security sector reform
Transparencia Asociación Civil Transparencia
UNDESA
United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs
TRC
Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
UNDP
United Nations Development
Programme
UNEAD
UN Electoral Assistance Division
UNIORE
Inter-American Union of Electoral
Organisations
UNMISET
UN Mission of Support in East Timor
USAID
United States Agency for
International Development
NAF
NDI
NGO
OAS
ODA
ODIHR
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
9
“International IDEA broke new ground. First of all, it was global in its reach and it
was not just about elections in developing countries. It was about the fundamentals
of democracy worldwide. We were as concerned with the funding of political parties
in established democracies as about the interface between democracy and underdevelopment. Our mission remains as valid now as it was when we began.”
Sir Shridath Ramphal, First Chairman of International IDEA (February 1995–June 2001)
And former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. Guyana.
“Today, democracy in Germany is taken for granted. This is the result of our
troubled history and experience with two kinds of totalitarianisms. The fragility and
weaknesses of democracy in the Weimar Republic made it possible in 1933 for the
National Socialists to seize power, and to terrorize and repress the opposition. After
the end of the Second World War, democratic elections were established in the western
part of the divided Germany, but banned by state communism in the Eastern part.
[The two parts] reunited only since 1990, the lesson I draw from our German way
to democracy is that democratization is more than the promotion of freedom and
elections – it can only succeed with the active participation of citizens and open
dialogue. To me, democratization means learning: for overcoming totalitarian and
authoritarian attitudes, for fighting intolerance, discrimination and inequalities
by non-violent means. This is why Germany is keen on contributing to IDEA’s
worldwide effort. IDEA is pivotal in promoting civic and political dialogues necessary
for sustainable democratization.”
Dr Henning Scherf, member of the Board of International IDEA, President of the Senate
and Mayor of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Germany
10
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Introduction:
A Reader’s Guide to IDEA’s Tenth
Anniversary Publication
Ingrid Wetterqvist
Introduction
The International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was founded in 1995
with a mandate to promote sustainable democracy
worldwide by assisting countries in building the
capacity to develop and strengthen their democratic institutions. Ten years down the road, the
organization constitutes an essential interface between academia, policy makers and practitioners,
synthesizing research and providing a platform for
discussion between nations and continents.
Democracy building is as yet a relatively young
thematic area, consisting of a fragmented community of rapidly multiplying players: national governments with diverging policies between development and foreign ministries; international organizations, non-governmental organizations, professional politicians and party functionaries. It seeks
to reconcile diverging aims such as the improvement of development policy, securing stability and
advancing democracy as a normative agenda.
2005 marks the tenth anniversary of IDEA’s work,
which represents a good opportunity to take a step
back and consider what the Institute has achieved
in its first decade of existence. IDEA has therefore
decided to produce a tenth anniversary publication to look at the changing environment of democratization in the last decade and IDEA’s role as
a pioneer in promoting new tools for democracy
building.
One way to bridge the fragmentation is to improve the dissemination of information, multiply
exchanges of best practice, and promote research
to increase understanding of the underlying processes that favour or impede democratization, in
order to further consolidate a common knowledge
base.
The tenth anniversary publication is to be the first
of a series of reference publications for any reader
who wants to keep abreast of the latest developments in the furthering of democracy. Given the
diversity of and the rapid changes in the field of
democracy building, the publication cannot be
an exhaustive account of all developments in the
field, but simply selects some of the topical issues
to represent the whole when it comes to cuttingedge developments.
This publication hopes to contribute to this process by presenting the field of democracy building
from different perspectives in an attempt to summarize the efforts in the field and provide an annual focal point for practitioners and policy makers.
The publication aims to illustrate how IDEA
contributes to democracy building in the practical and theoretical sense, and its experience of
how to make a difference in the field of democracy building. The debate on the different forms of
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
11
democracy building has intensified in the last few
years, but, despite the panoply of competing approaches, a consensus on some core ideas is emerging as common to all who work with democracy
issues. Not by chance, these ideas have been at the
heart of IDEA’s work since the very beginning.
IDEA recognizes that democratization is a process which requires time and patience, and which is
not achieved through elections alone. The IDEA
approach is comparative and nonIDEA recognizes that democratization is a
prescriptive, and
process which requires time and patience,
based on the beand which is not achieved through elections
lief that democracy
alone. The IDEA approach is comparative
can only be built
and non-prescriptive, and based on the
from within in orbelief that democracy can only be built from
der to be sustainwithin in order to be sustainable. However,
able. However, the
the outside world can provide examples of
outside world can
provide examples
best practice and lend support to processes
of best practice and
that are essentially local. The support must
lend support to
be attuned to national specificities, as there
processes that are
are no one-size-fits-all solutions. IDEA
essentially
local.
believes that these founding principles upon
The
support
must
which it operates remain valid to this day.
be attuned to national specificities,
as there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. IDEA believes that these founding principles upon which it
operates remain valid to this day.
True to its principles and to the fundamental principles of democracy, IDEA offers no standard solution, but rather understands the process of democracy building as a dialogue between the different
actors, opinions and approaches. This is also reflected in the structure of this publication, which
in itself can be seen as a dialogue: the articles shed
light on democracy building from different angles and institutional perspectives, and the reader
should form his or her own opinion and organize
the pieces in a pattern that is useful to him.
About this Publication
To better show the interrelationship between the
political environment of democracy building and
the work of IDEA, the publication is divided into
two parts:
12
Part I deals with current developments, the different facets of democracy building and the diverging players represented by the contributions of internationally renowned authors and institutions.
It builds the conceptual and empirical framework
for IDEA’s activities, which are selectively presented in the second part.
Part II describes some of the activities of IDEA
in democracy building, via the perspectives of the
different IDEA programmes and the instruments
employed, and by highlighting the organization’s
work in a sample region (Peru) to show the interplay between broad institutional planning and regional activity.
The ambition is not to render an exhaustive account of IDEA’s activities in the last decade but to
provide the reader with some colourful examples
drawn from IDEA’s vast range of experiences.
Part I: IDEA in the DemocracyBuilding Context
One of the prime questions in democracy building is how to define democracy, and in the next
step, how to assess its quality in a given nation. In
his chapter, Democracy Analysis, Professor Todd
Landman of the University of Essex offers an introduction to how to assess, measure and analyse
democracy and its defining characteristics. A clear
understanding of the model and the caveats of defining democracy is crucial in creating instruments
for effective democracy building.
The chapter by Massimo Tommasoli on Democracy Building and the Political Dimensions of
Development looks at the challenges for the effectiveness of aid in the promotion of democracy and
in poverty reduction. He outlines why democracy
promoters should pay more attention to the role
of structural features, institutions and agents in
change processes, and rethink incentives for political change.
In the following chapter, Themes in Democracy
Assistance, Richard Youngs traces the development of democracy building over the last decade,
its challenges and its different forms as experienced by donor member states and in relationship
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
to other international players.
The UNDP Governance Centre’s contribution,
Why Governance Matters in Achieving the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, addresses the issues of democracy
and good governance in a systematic way by linking development and the realization of the Millennium Goals to democracy building. It presents
its experiences on how to stabilize democracy and
make it work.
While the previous authors try to define and describe democracy building from an analytical or
‘objective’ perspective, the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS) Network investigates empirically how
democracy is perceived by citizens on different
continents. The chapter by Professor Richard Rose
of the GBS Network, The People’s Voice: Trust
in Political Institutions, shows how a comparative
approach can help set the democracy debate in a
country into motion, and how listening to the vox
populi can help achieve local ownership by formulating a political agenda that mirrors the expectations of citizens.
In his chapter, From ‘89 to 9/11: of Turmoil and
Hope, Konstanty Gebert, author and columnist in
the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborzca, invites us
to reflect on the hazards and pitfalls that emerging
democracies encounter on their way to a state system that represents the will of their people. Gebert
describes the changes from authoritarian regime to
democracy against the backdrop of the collapse of
communism and the growth of liberal democracies in Eastern Europe, mirroring the experiences and illusions of millions of people in the last
15 years. He also touches upon the acute issue of
Islam and its relationship to democracy, and the
often crumbled hopes of an increased democratization of the Arab world, arguing that the West
carries a far bigger part of the responsibility in its
failure than it is ready to admit.
range of IDEA’s activities in the different working teams, on different continents and with different methods, a proof of the ‘diversity in unity’
approach towards democracy, built on its underlying principles of tolerance, neutrality and academic excellence. Thereafter IDEA’s different thematic teams give their view of development in their
field.
The chapter on
Optimism to ReOne of the prime questions in democracy
alism: Ten Years
building is how to define democracy, and in
of Electoral Develthe next step, how to assess its quality in a
opment highlights
given nation.
one of democracy
building’s most advanced areas—sustainable electoral processes. Andrew Ellis recounts the development of this area
from the optimistic climate of the mid-1990s to
the sober professional approach of the early 20th
21st century, and the progress made on the way.
Electoral assistance has been a driver in international cooperation in the field, and has played an
important role in the emergence of a defined community of practitioners.
The activity of the Electoral Processes team is a illustrative example of the IDEA principles in practice. It works on the assumption that elections
alone do not define democracy, and shows why
Part II: IDEA’s Experiences
The second part of the publication highlights
IDEA’s own experiences with democracy building
by way of key examples of its work over the last
decade. First, a general overview shows the broad
Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Thorvald
Stoltenberg and Sir Shridath Ramphal at the celebration of
IDEA’s 10th Anniversary held on 28 February 2005
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
13
for democracies to succeed in situations of deeprooted conflict and to counter the threat of terrorist attacks. However, he argues that IDEA’s work
has generated numerous lessons, best practices and
understandings not only of how democracy can
survive in divided, conflictual societies, but how
democratic practices directly contribute to peace
as the only long-term solution.
Karen Fogg, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Sir
Shridath Ramphal, Timothy D. Sisk and Patrick Molutsi at the
celebration of IDEA’s 10 Anniversary held on 28 February 2005
providing examples of best practice and options
for improving institutional frameworks, achieving
local ownership via the training of locals and proposing cost-effective solutions, is so important to
achieving sustainable electoral processes.
In her contribution, Ten Years of Progress: Enhancing Women’s Political Participation, IDEA
staff member Julie Ballington points out that statistics show that ten years of efforts to improve
gender participation are slowly starting to pay off,
although much remains to be done. Information
must continue to be disseminated, comparisons
and examples be given of how an alternative situation could look, and the strategies for how it
could be attained pointed out. The strategies include leverage of political parties, gender quotas,
electoral system design, drawing on and boosting
the influence of those already elected, and, lastly,
raising awareness about the attitudinal obstacles in
patriarchal societies.
An important area in democracy building is the
role of democracy in conflict resolution, affecting
all parts of democracy building. In the chapter on
Democracy in Situations of Deep-Rooted Conflict, Professor Timothy Sisk, IDEA Senior Policy
Advisor, paints a sombre picture of the challenges
14
The chapter on The State of Democracy Project,
by Professor David Beetham of Essex University,
takes on the theme from the first part of the yearbook, democracy assessment and analysis, and
gives an account of IDEA’s role in the process.
Beetham outlines how the democracy assessment
methodology developed by IDEA has proved to
work and influenced other methodologies, and
how it has been used as a teaching tool and even
taken on a life of its own, triggering a second generation of assessments initiated by the countries
themselves.
IDEA benefits particularly from the dynamic between global and regional activities. The close connection with IDEA’s regional offices increases the
relevance of its academic work as there is a need to
connect to citizens and politicians in their natural
habitat. As an example of this important connection, the chapter on Building Democracy, Shaping the Future: International IDEA in Peru gives
an overview of the activities carried out by and the
achievements of one of IDEA’s regional offices. All
work has been carried out in partnership with local groups and through other forms of including
locals, especially women and indigenous peoples,
in keeping with IDEA’s principles on the importance of local ownership.
Conclusion
Given that democracy is a process and not a static
state of affairs, the discussion on democracy building is in constant motion. Although the next decade is likely to witness a further consolidation
of the community of practitioners in democracy
building, the number of policy instruments and
players will multiply and the interdependence of
the national, regional and the international levels
to promote democracy will grow. The increasing
number of democracies will also contribute to a
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
diversification of democracy building.
IDEA will continue to play an important part in
the advancement of democracy building, particularly as a platform for exchange and dialogue and
as a catalyst to promote best practice to the benefit of democracy in all parts of the world. The
tenth anniversary book seeks to contribute to this
process, not only by demonstrating conclusions
and lessons drawn from democracy building, but,
more than that, by opening up new points of departure. It should encourage activists and practitioners to draw their lessons from the past, while
creatively shaping the future.
We hope you will enjoy reading it!
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
15
Masai women outside of Morogoro wait to cast
their ballots in Tanzania’s 2000 elections.
Photo taken by Julie Ballington, Programme
Manager, Gender and Political Participation, IDEA.
Election workers load polling materials for delivery
to remote voting districts outside of Milange,
Zambezia Province, ahead of Mozambique’s 1999
election.
Photo taken by Julie Ballington, Programme
Manager, Gender and Political Participation, IDEA.
PART I
THE WORLD AROUND
IDEA …
-
This section of the book deals with recent and current
developments, the different facets of democracy building and the different players which are represented by
the contributions of internationally renowned authors
and institutions. It builds the conceptual and empirical
framework for IDEA’s activities, selectively presented in
the second part of the book.
‘I have always felt that effective and reliable democratic processes are the best
guarantee of human liberty and happiness, which is why we needed an international
institute to establish and propagate guidelines. I would like it to go further in the
fullness of time and become a recognized arbiter and watchdog of electoral practices.’
Lord Steel of Aikwood, politician, author and former Speaker
of the Scottish Parliament, United Kingdom,
member of the Board of International IDEA February 1995–June 2001
18
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
1. Democracy Analysis
Todd Landman
One of the prime questions in democracy building is
how to define democracy, and in the next step, how to
assess its quality in a given nation. This chapter offers
an introduction to how to assess, measure and analyse democracy and its defining characteristics. A clear
understanding of the model and the caveats defining
democracy is crucial in creating instruments for effective democracy building.
1.1. Introduction
The study of democracy has occupied political science since the days of Aristotle, who used both
normative rules to guide his classification of forms
of rule (good vs corrupt), deductive derivation of
the types of rule (monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy,
oligarchy, polity, democracy), and empirical methods to map his typology onto the states of the day.
Since these early forms of normative and empirical analysis, democracy has been a vigorous idea:
that in human communities it ought to be ordinary people (the adult citizens) and not extraordinary people who rule. For John Dunn (1992),
‘The idea itself is devastatingly obvious but also
tantalizingly strange and implausible’. Moreover, a
comprehensive comparative study of forms of governance stretching from ancient Mesopotamia to
the 20th century argues that the form of rule most
equivalent to democracy (i.e. the ‘forum polity’)
has been the most rare and the most recent in world
history (Finer 1997).
Despite the historical advances and setbacks in democracy, the world witnessed a first wave of democracy that extended from the middle of the
19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, and then three successive waves since World
War II, which advanced across Western and Southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and
parts of Africa and Asia such that virtually 60 per
cent of all independent nation states in the world
are now at least nominally democratic. The second wave comprised those democratic transitions
that occurred largely in Western Europe and Japan after the defeat of the Axis powers. The third
wave included countries that experienced democratic transitions between 1974 and 1989 (mostly
in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia), while
the fourth wave of transitions began with the end
of the Cold War and included countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Scholars and practitioners working in the fields of political science, development studies, overseas assistance and foreign affairs have sought to explain
and understand the contours of this new ‘democratic universe’ while contributing to its successful
consolidation and long-term sustainability. Such
an effort has required working definitions of democracy, measures of democracy, analysis of the
factors that explain its emergence and performance, and policies that help to support countries
in their efforts to consolidate it. This chapter outlines the different ways in which democracy is defined, demonstrates the necessary and inexorable
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
19
link between conceptions and measures of democracy, reviews the main empirical findings from democracy analysis, and identifies remaining lacunae
in the field where further work is needed.
1.2. Defining Democracy
In many ways democracy is a classic example of
an ‘essentially contested’ concept (Gallie 1956),
since there is not now, nor is there likely to be,
a final consensus
on its definition or
Procedural definitions of democracy identify
full content. Nevthe minimum requirements for upholding
ertheless there are
participatory competitive politics. Liberal
certain features of
definitions include the full protection of
democracy about
civil, political, property and minority rights,
which there is sigwhich are meant to curb the possible
nificant consensus,
negative consequences of democratic
and the world has
governance based on majority rule only.
countless
examples of democratic
Social definitions include additional
practices that have
protections for economic and social rights,
existed over long
which are seen as essential for the full
periods of time
participation of citizens in the collective
and have now addecisions that may affect their lives.
vanced across vast
geographical spaces. The idea that democracy is a form of governance based on some degree of popular sovereignty
and collective decision making remains largely uncontested. But it is the concern over the additional
features to this basic formulation that have produced significant and serious debate about the different definitions of democracy. For the purposes
of this chapter, these definitions of democracy include procedural democracy, liberal democracy, and
social democracy, which we now consider in turn.
Procedural definitions of democracy, made most
notably in Robert Dahl’s seminal work Polyarchy (1971), include the two dimensions of contestation and participation. Contestation captures
the uncertain peaceful competition necessary
for democratic rule, a principle which presumes
the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to
challenge incumbents, protection of the twin
freedoms of expression and association, the existence of free and fair elections, and a consolidated
political party system. Participation captures the
idea of popular sovereignty, which presumes the
20
protection of the right to vote as well as the existence of universal suffrage. Liberal definitions
of democracy maintain concerns over contestation and participation, but add more explicit references to the protection of certain human rights.
Liberal definitions include an institutional dimension that captures the idea of popular sovereignty,
and includes notions of accountability, constraint
of leaders, representation of citizens, and universal
participation. But it adds a rights dimension, which
is upheld through the rule of law and includes civil, political, property and minority rights. Social
definitions of democracy maintain the institutional and rights dimensions found in liberal definitions of democracy but expand the types of rights
that ought to be protected, including social and
economic rights.
Taken together, these three definitions of democracy share certain features such as the notion of
peaceful competitive politics and some form of
participation, but then add further features meant
to protect individuals and groups across increasingly wider aspects of their lives. Procedural definitions of democracy identify the minimum requirements for upholding participatory competitive politics. Liberal definitions include the full
protection of civil, political, property and minority rights, which are meant to curb the possible
negative consequences of democratic governance
based on majority rule only. Social definitions include additional protections for economic and social rights, which are seen as essential for the full
participation of citizens in the collective decisions
that may affect their lives. There are thus ‘thin’ and
‘thick’ definitions of democracy, and the differences in them are inexorably linked with the degree to
which political scientists have been able to measure and analyse the patterns in the emergence,
maintenance and performance of democracy.
1.3. Measuring Democracy
Social science measurement establishes a direct
link between background concepts and indicators
by providing a systematized version of the background concept, operationalizing the systematized concept, and providing meaningful ‘scores’
that vary across units of analysis (Adcock and Collier 2001). With respect to the measurement of
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
democracy, the numerous measurement efforts in
political science tend to specify democracy in its
minimal and procedural form or provide indicators for the institutional and rights dimensions
that comprise liberal definitions. Fully specified
measurements of social democracy have thus far
remained elusive, which can be explained in part
by the political culture and ideology of (American) political science itself, which privileges narrower definitions of democracy, and in part by the
serious methodological challenges that have yet to
be overcome in providing valid and meaningful
measures of economic and social rights (Landman
2004).
Political scientists have adopted a number of strategies to operationalize democracy for empirical
analysis, including categorical measures, standards-based measures, and objective measures of
democratic practices. Seymour Martin Lipset
(1959) established the first set of categorical measures of regime type that were used for cross-national quantitative analysis, which ranged across
a ‘democracy–dictatorship’ continuum including stable democracies, unstable democracies,
unstable dictatorships, and stable dictatorships.
More recently, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and
Limongi (2000) developed a dichotomous classification scheme using a set of criteria for judging
whether countries are democratic or authoritarian.
To qualify as a democracy, a country must have
had its chief executive elected and its main legislative body elected, and it must have more than one
political party. These criteria are quite narrow and
specifically exclude questions of accountability,
freedom, participation and rights, among others.
This categorization rests on the assumption that
democracy is an ‘all or nothing’ affair and it tries
to avoid over-counting the number of democracies
in the world. Despite these assumptions and narrow focus, this categorical method has provided
democracy measures with a wide spatial and temporal coverage for use in global quantitative comparative analysis. Typically, the resulting data sets
include over 150 countries for between 40 (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000) and
100 years (Boix 2003). Indeed, for those studies
that reach back into the 19th century, democracy
is specified in even more minimal fashion to include free and fair elections, accountable execu-
tives, and at least 50 per cent enfranchisement for
the male population (Boix and Stokes 2003).
Standards-based measures of democracy also specify a set of criteria for judging countries but, unlike the categorical measures, they assume democracy to be more continuous and provide scales that
range from low to high values. For example, the
Polity data series takes into account both the democratic and the autocratic features of countries, while
its combined score on democracy ranges from
–10 for a full autocracy to +10 for full democracy
(Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Freedom House has two
separate scales for political and civil liberties that
range from 1 (full enjoyment of liberties) to 7 (full
restriction of liberties), which have often featured
in cross-national comparisons in some combined
form as a measure of democracy (see <http://www.
freedomhouse.org>; and Burkhart and LewisBeck 1994). These scales provide greater variation
in the level of democracy (as opposed to an ‘either
or’ classification) and have wide-ranging spatial
and temporal coverage (e.g. between 194 and 200
countries and territories for over 30 to 200 years).
While these measures provide greater variation in
democracy, criticisms have focused on their less
than transparent coding rules (especially those of
Freedom House); their illogical form of aggregation into single indices, which does not take into
account trade-offs between the institutional and
rights dimensions; their inability to differentiate
the democratic performance of those countries
at the extreme ends of the spectrum (i.e. among
mature democracies and highly authoritarian regimes); and the possible presence of ideological
biases (Freedom House in particular) (see Munck
and Verkuilen 2002).
Objective measures of democracy move away from
a fixed set of criteria and judgements about country locations either into categories or on particular scales and concentrate instead on available indicators of democratic practices. To this end, Tatu
Vanhanen (1997) specifies democracy in minimal
and procedural fashion along the lines of Robert
Dahl and then provides separate measures of contestation and participation. He uses the percentage share of smallest parties in the national legislature (100 minus the share of the largest party) as a measure of contestation and he uses the
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
21
percentage turnout in national elections as a measure of participation. These two measures are then
multiplied together and divided by 100 to produce an ‘index of democratization’. While this
measure moves away from subjective and judgemental categories or scales, quite a few problems
remain. First, the measure of contestation does not
take into account the electoral system, which has
a direct relationship with the effective number of
parties in the legislature (Lijphart 1994b, 1999).
Countries with single-member district electoral
systems tend to have a smaller number of parties
than countries with proportional representation,
which may lead to the false representation of contestation. Second, many countries have compulsory voting, which necessarily compromises the validity of turnout as a measure of voluntary participation. Nevertheless, the measure has been used
alongside other measures of democracy for quantitative analysis (Landman 1999).
In addition to these measures of democracy, another measurement strategy avoids making external judgements against pre-established criteria
or using the kind of objective measures outlined
above and relies instead on public perceptions of
democracy through the collection of individuallevel survey data. Such data provide an indication
of the degree to which mass publics support democracy in general, as well as indicators on mass
perceptions of the relative performance of democracy and faith in democratic institutions. The various ‘barometer’ studies began in Europe and have
subsequently been extended to Latin America and
Africa, and are now part of the larger Global Barometer Surveys. In contrast to the other extant
approaches to democracy measurement, these data
provide an indication of citizen supOnce democracy has been established in
port for democracountries with high levels of economic
cy, which exhibits
development, it tends not to collapse. In this
significant variaway, economic development supports the
tion between and
process of democratization but it does not
within regions (e.g.
determine it.
Lagos 1997). Survey data has been
used throughout the social sciences, but the crossnational use of survey data for democracy analysis such as this rests on the vulnerable assumption that all publics have a similar ‘model’ of
22
democracy in their heads when they answer standardized questions.
Taken together, categorical classification, standards-based scales, objective indicators and survey
data have all been used to provide measures of
democracy, and all have sought to establish a direct link with a conceptual definition of democracy, which has tended to be specified in a narrow
fashion to include procedural and in come cases
liberal democracy. All the measures have aimed to
provide comparability across the world and over
time. In this way, the measures use definitions of
democracy that ‘travel’ across many observable
units that vary in time and space. This emphasis
on achieving a greater scope of coverage and comparability has, however, meant that these measures
are operationalized at a relatively high level of abstraction and are less sensitive to the cultural specificities of the different countries that comprise
the world.
But what have been the main findings of empirical
analyses that have used these various measures?
1.4. Analysing Democracy
Empirical analysis in political science has hitherto
examined important questions on the emergence,
maintenance, and performance of democracy.
Since the early work of Lipset (1959), political
scientists have analysed the economic requisites
of democracy. Whether democracy is measured in
categorical or scalar terms, and regardless of the
time period used, global comparative analysis has
consistently shown a positive and significant relationship between high levels of economic development and democracy. Such a consistent finding has led either to the weak claim that the two
are associated with one another or to the strong
claim that economic development causes democracy. Both claims try to identify the endogenous and
exogenous factors for the emergence of democracy.
Endogenous explanations argue that changes internal to the process of economic development
necessarily lead to a series of social and political
changes that culminate in democracy. Such factors
have variously included the rise of an enlightened
middle class (Lipset 1959), the push for inclusion
by the working classes (Rueschemeyer, Stephens
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
and Stephens 1992), and changes in the relative
distribution of land, income and capital (Vanhanen 1997; Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003).
Exogenous explanations argue that factors external
to processes of economic development help establish democracy, including changes in the relative
power and strategic interaction of elites within authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999), the strategic
interaction between elites in the regime and elites in the opposition (Przeworski 1991; Colomer
1991; Colomer and Pascual 1994), and social mobilization for individual rights of citizenship (Foweraker and Landman 1997), as well as important
international factors such as diffusion, contagion,
coercion (Whitehead 1996), and globalization (Li
and Reuveny 2003). Economic development is not
absent from such exogenous explanations. Rather,
they argue that once democracy has been established in countries with high levels of economic
development, it tends not to collapse (Przeworski,
Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). In this way,
economic development supports the process of democratization but it does not determine it (Landman 2001: 235–39).
Since these analyses have been more concerned
with explaining the emergence of democracy, they
have had very little to say about the quality or performance of democracy itself. Efforts to describe
the third and fourth waves of democracy using institutional and rights measures have shown that,
while the world has witnessed a dramatic growth
in the number of democracies, the latest waves
have largely involved ‘illiberal’ democracies (Diamond 1999; Zakaria 2003). Illiberal democracies
are particularly good at establishing the basic institutional mechanisms and protections for holding relatively free and fair elections, maintaining a
relatively free press, guaranteeing freedom of expression, and protecting rights to assembly and
association for the development of political parties, civil society organizations and trade unions,
but they are less good at protecting citizens from
ethnic, religious and gender discrimination, arbitrary detention, and torture, ill treatment and
death in custody. There is thus a significant gap
between the procedural and institutional dimensions of democracy on the one hand and the protection of civil and minority rights on the other.
Human rights advocates add that these illiberal
democracies
are
equally bad at
guaranteeing the
protection of economic and social
rights, and point
to persistent problems with social exclusion and limited
forms of access to
justice, which mean
that, although citizens are legally
equal, they remain
socially unequal.
Illiberal democracies are particularly
good at establishing the basic institutional
mechanisms and protections for holding
relatively free and fair elections,
maintaining a relatively free press,
guaranteeing freedom of expression,
and protecting rights to assembly and
association for the development of political
parties, civil society organizations and
trade unions, but they are less good at
protecting citizens from ethnic, religious
and gender discrimination, arbitrary
detention, and torture, ill treatment and
death in custody.
There are a variety of institutional and cultural explanations for
the presence of such illiberal democracies. Institutionally, analyses have shown that presidential
democracies, and especially those with multiparty systems, are inherently more unstable, prone to
breakdown, and susceptible to extra-constitutional
behaviour of presidents that makes the protection
of rights precarious (Stepan and Skach 1994; Foweraker and Landman 2002). Parliamentary systems
and so-called ‘consensus democracies’ perform
better across a range of indicators including political stability, economic performance, and minority and other rights protections (Lijphart 1994a;
1999). Other institutional explanations focus on
weak and less-than-independent judiciaries (Méndez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro 1999), corruption,
reserve domains of military power, and vestiges of
past authoritarian practices (of either the left or
the right) (Linz and Stepan 1996). Cultural explanations for the presence of illiberal democracies
concentrate on patrimonial and neo-patrimonial
forms of rule (Bratton and van de Walle 1997),
and consistent levels of mass popular support for
security and the quick prosecution of criminals
that undermine fundamentally a commitment to
human rights standards.
Beyond the analysis of conditions for the emergence and maintenance of democracy, political
science has also turned its attention to the consequences of democracy. Research shows that democracies have significantly better human development records (Ersson and Lane 1996) and are no
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
23
worse at promoting
growth than authoritarian regimes
to commit themselves to international
(Przeworski, Alvahuman rights obligations, they also show
rez, Cheibub and
a much lower propensity to get involved in
Limongi
2000).
‘international entanglements’.
Despite the problem of illiberal democracies noted above, democracies are better at
protecting ‘personal integrity rights’ (Poe and Tate
1994; Davenport 2001), which shows dramatic
improvement even after the first year of a democratic transition (Zanger 2000). Democracies (especially new democracies) are also more likely to
participate in the international human rights regime through ratification of human rights treaties.
Fourth wave democracies tend to ratify more international human rights treaties with fewer reservations, followed by third wave democracies and
established democracies. But the inverse is true for
the actual protection of human rights, where mature democracies have better human rights records
than third and fourth wave democracies, respectively (Landman 2005).
Beyond the propensity for democracies
Beyond the propensity for democracies to commit
themselves to international human rights obligations, they also show a much lower propensity to
get involved in ‘international entanglements’. Research on the ‘democratic peace’ has shown that
since the mid-19th century pairs of democracies
do not go to war with one another (Levy 2002),
and, beyond outright engagement in warfare, research has also shown that democracies are simply more pacific
than authoritarian
But, despite the great progress that has been
regimes. For exammade in the global analysis of democracy,
ple, using a crossmuch work remains to be done, including
national and timedevoting more attention to the domestic
series data set of
history of democratizing countries and the
pairs of states (dyhistory of the international system; giving
ads) from 1885 to
more attention to the quality and depth
1992, Russett and
of democratic practices, including those
Oneal (2001) show
that do not conform to the Western ideal;
that the probabiland producing locally ‘owned’ democracy
ity of a militarized
assessments that act as advocacy tools for
dispute between
domestic and international actors to engage
two countries is
in democratic critique, reflection and reform.
greatly reduced if
both countries are
24
democracies, even after controlling for classic ‘realist’ factors such as relative power, distance and
contiguity. Moreover, they have shown that the
presence of one democracy in the pair reduces significantly the propensity to engage in a militarized
dispute with another country, suggesting that democracies are simply less conflict-prone than authoritarian states.
1.5. Lacunae and Further Work
This overview of definitions, measures and analyses of democracy has shown that the considerable
time and effort dedicated by political scientists to
analysis of the emergence, maintenance and consequences of democracy has made great progress.
It is clear that there is a necessary and inexorable
link between conceptions of democracy and the
indicators used to measure it, whether they are
categorical, standards-based, survey-based or objective. It appears that economic development is
a requisite, if not a prerequisite, to democratization, that certain institutional arrangements have
better records of democratic performance across a
range of indicators, and that democracies are generally better at participating in the international
regime of human rights, protecting personal integrity rights, and resolving their international differences more peacefully.
But, despite the great progress that has been made
in the global analysis of democracy, much work
remains to be done, including devoting more attention to the domestic history of democratizing countries and the history of the international
system; giving more attention to the quality and
depth of democratic practices, including those
that do not conform to the Western ideal; and
producing locally ‘owned’ democracy assessments
that act as advocacy tools for domestic and international actors to engage in democratic critique,
reflection and reform.
With a few notable exceptions (Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens 1992; Boix 2003; Boix
and Stokes 2003), the systematic study of the
emergence of democracy pays far too little attention to history. It ignores the historical processes
of both socio-economic and political change at
the domestic level and it has tended to ignore the
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
changing structure of the world political system.
Lipset’s (1959) original study on the social requisites of democracy was a ‘snapshot’ analysis of a
world at one point in time, a time that saw processes of decolonization and the Cold War restructuring of the world. Analyses that added time continued to compare countries from the 1950s onwards, which again populated their samples with
a large proportion of rich democracies and ignored the history of global capitalist development
in which the core countries experienced different
‘routes to modernity’ (Moore 1966) from those
on the semi-periphery and periphery. The exceptions to these analyses have either looked further
back into history to a period that preceded the first
wave of democracy (Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes
2003) or controlled for the ‘location’ of countries
in the world economy (see Burkhart and LewisBeck 1994; Foweraker and Landman 2004).
These latter studies have shown that economic development is indeed a prerequisite for democracy,
but that the overall relationship between levels of
economic development and democracy is different
over time and space such that ‘early’ democratizers required a lower threshold of development to
secure sustainable democracy, while those countries on the semi-periphery and periphery of the
world system accrue less democratic benefit from
patterns of economic development.
Beyond the inclusion of time, history and world
structure in the study of democracy, it appears
that the analytical leverage gained from using fairly minimal definitions and measures of democracy
in global quantitative analysis has meant that we
lack in-depth analyses on the quality of democracy. Even those studies that have sought to differentiate democracy beyond single indices have tended
to stop at liberal conceptions and measures, while
fuller analysis that takes into account the relative
protection of economic and social rights is still
needed. The defenders of liberal democracy argue
that such rights protections are extrinsic to a core
conception of democracy and that they are matters of policy to be decided by any form of government (e.g. Foweraker and Krznaric 2001). But the
human rights and development community have
long argued that the different categories of rights
are related in important ways such that a low protection of social and economic rights may actually
undermine the protection of civil and
political rights.
Beyond the inclusion of time, history and
world structure in the study of democracy,
it appears that the analytical leverage
In addition to the
gained from using fairly minimal definitions
need for greatand measures of democracy in global
er analysis of soquantitative analysis has meant that we
cial and economic
lack in-depth analyses on the quality of
rights under dedemocracy.
mocracy, there is
also a need for a
fuller analysis of traditional forms of rule that contradict largely Western conceptions of the individual and the ways in which relations between the
citizen and the state are mediated. In mature democracies, citizen interests tend to be aggregated
and represented through political party organizations, social movement organizations, and/or
other civil society organizations. However, many
countries in the developing world have other
forms of interest aggregation and social organization that do not fit these models, but nor are they
inherently inimical to stable democratic rule. For
example, it is typical for tribal chiefs in Burkina
Faso to act as intermediaries between the villagers
in a particular tribe and voting in elections. Such
a practice suggests that voting is not ‘free and fair’,
but it differs little from the kind of patron–client
forms of political control in Latin American democracy or the political machines that have operated throughout the history of Chicago politics.
Rather than dismiss these practices outright, there
is a need to examine and analyse how alternative
and traditional forms of social organization represent interests and how such forms of organization
interact with the formal institutions of democracy.
In addition, many societies have large indigenous
and nomadic populations that do not fit the Western notion of ‘fixed’ individuals that participate
freely in periodic democratic elections. Analysis
should thus examine the ways in which such individuals and the group identities to which they
ascribe engage in democratic politics.
Clearly, any attempt to add depth of analysis into
the quality of democracy means that our ability
to make empirical generalizations becomes partially sacrificed and models of democracy will be
less able to ‘travel’ for comparative purposes. The
inclusion of traditional forms of rule, nomadic
populations and indigenous communities, among
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
25
other contextually-specific practices, suggests perhaps that the analysis of democracy requires ‘core’
indicators along the lines addressed in this review
and ‘satellite’ indicators that remain sensitive to alternative forms of interest aggregation and representation. In this way, more grounded and locally
‘owned’ democracy assessments (see chapter 11)
can benefit from the inclusion of such core and
satellite indicators. As the march of democracy
continues across the globe, it covers an increasingly diverse set of countries, societies and peoples.
So far the true meaning of the term ‘democracy’
remains unfixed and is therefore flexible. Yet the
core principles of popular sovereignty and collective self-rule will continue to have wide appeal and
to be universally applicable. Democracy analysis
will continue to compare and contrast the ways in
which this ‘tantalizingly strange and implausible’
idea has been realized throughout the world. Systematic global comparative analysis will continue
to answer certain important questions about the
emergence, maintenance and consequences of democracy. More grounded and locally owned democracy assessments will continue to encourage
civil society organizations, political parties and key
stakeholders to invest in democracy and to advocate for its improvement.
26
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Boix, C., Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge:
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— and Stokes, S., ‘Endogenous Democratization’, World
Politics 55 (July 2003), pp. 517–49
Bratton, M. and van de Walle, N., Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997)
Burkhart, R. E. and Lewis-Beck, M., ‘Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis’, American Political Science Review 88/4 (1994), pp. 903–10
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(2/2002), pp. 43–66
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
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is Not Yet Dead’, Democratization 11/1 (2004), pp.
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Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
27
‘Ten years ago in the mid-90s, when there were great breakthroughs in democracy
building, the concept of having a special organization providing guidance on election
administration and working on electoral processes and political parties was novel.
IDEA’s work was the first systematic approach in this field and a very appropriate
initiative.
Now IDEA has to define how it can promote democracy in connection with
the paramount agenda for security: we can not abstain from the relationship of
development–security–democracy.
How shall IDEA deal with countries like Afghanistan and Iraq? How do we relate
to outside initiatives taken to enforce democracy—for example, Middle Eastern
initiatives, which are seen as part of Pax Americana but have genuine elements of
bringing a better form of government to that region?’
Jos van Gennip, member of the Board of International IDEA and member of the Upper
House of the Netherlands’ Parliament
28
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
2. Democracy Building
and the Political Dimensions
of Development
Massimo Tommasoli
In its first ten years IDEA has been actively engaged
in the field of democracy building. The same period
coincided with greater donor recognition of the importance of the political dimensions of development.
How has this trend changed the way donors take into
account political processes in the context of aid policies
and programmes? What implications does it have for
democracy building? This chapter looks at the challenges for aid effectiveness in the promotion of democracy and in poverty reduction. Democracy promoters
should pay more attention to the role of structural
features, institutions and agents in change processes,
and rethink incentives for political change.
2.1. Democracy Building and
Development
The impact of donor action on democracy building can be seen in two important areas, the most
obvious being through that range of activities that
is traditionally labelled ‘democracy assistance’. It
can also occur as donors attempt to implement
poverty alleviation strategies and, as part of this
process, focus their efforts on structural and institutional issues.
Democracy assistance consists of aid policies and
programmes aimed at promoting and consolidating democracy in partner countries. Carothers
(1999) defines democracy assistance as ‘aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in
a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced
a democratic opening’. More recently, donors have
expanded this definition to address issues of capacity and institution building even if it is not directly related to a ‘democratic opening’. Democracy
assistance can therefore include forms of technical assistance that are deemed useful to strengthen institutional frameworks for democracy promotion—such as electoral registration in Tanzania—or aid invested in static semi-authoritarian
states—such as the funding of international observation missions. Such measures have attracted
increasing resources as aid agencies have become
less willing to support countries with poor governance (Groves and Hinton 2004).
Although the definition of democracy assistance is
fairly straightforward, it covers a wide range of activities, some of which are categorized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) under the broader policy marker of
‘participatory development and good governance’
(OECD DAC, 1995 and 2002), a general label covering everything from public sector management to
peace building. Democracy assistance is, therefore,
a varied landscape encompassing the provision of
technical assistance in more traditional areas (such
as election management, constitutional reform,
parliaments, the judiciary, support to civil society)
and new areas (such as the strengthening of political parties and civil–military relations). It also overlaps with wider development cooperation and humanitarian objectives such as post-conflict rehabil-
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
29
itation and reconstruction (Tommasoli 2004). It is
assistance is fairly straightforward, it
therefore difficult
covers a wide range of activities, some of
to assess the overall
which are categorized by the Organisation
volume of aid flows
for Economic Co-operation and Development
that can be catego(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
rized under the
(DAC) under the broader policy marker
democracy assistof ‘participatory development and good
ance rubric. Nevergovernance’ (OECD DAC, 1995 and 2002),
theless, according
a general label covering everything from
to rough estimates,
public sector management to peace
over the last 15
building.
years up to 10 per
cent of the overall
volume of aid was devoted to democracy, human
rights and governance (Uvin 2004).
Although the definition of democracy
A second, more indirect way of democracy building stems from the recent donor interest in political change and power relations in recipient countries. A growing number of aid agencies see improved governance as a key element of democracy
promotion. Specifically, the need to hold the state
more accountable to its citizens—and in particular to people living in poverty—in partner countries is a means of strengthening other democratization initiatives.
The first, more traditional, approach to democracy assistance is addressed in the chapter entitled
‘Themes in Democracy Assistance’. This chapter focuses on the second approach, namely, the
broader donor interest in political change and
development, the so-called power and ‘drivers of
change’ analysis in development cooperation and
its implications for democracy promotion.
This chapter argues that democracy assistance
could be more effective and achieve more realistic
objectives if it is approached from a country’s historical and political context, rather than by simply applying a system of normative
A growing number of aid agencies see
standards.
improved governance as a key element of
democracy promotion. Specifically, the need
to hold the state more accountable to its
citizens.
30
2.2. Democracy, Poverty and
Political Change
Democratic institutions are a set of socially constructed arrangements for organizing political
competition, legitimating governments and implementing the rule of law. They are based on some
form of popular participation, typically through
free elections to determine the composition of the
legislature and the government. Constitutionalism and the rule of law, both of which establish
the basic rules of the game and protect the political and civil rights and freedoms of individual citizens, are also features of democracy (Luckham et
al. 2000).
Democratic processes are based on inclusive forms
of politics that aim to hold democratic institutions
accountable, participatory and effective. They depend on a culture of participation, in which pluralistic media, an active civil society, competing political parties and other mechanisms allow
all citizens to acquire political voice. Democratic
processes build the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An important aspect of democratic processes is the ability of citizens, acting independently or through government, to hold powerful
private interests as well as agents of the state to
account.
Most people involved in democracy promotion
tend to use established democracies as a reference
point (all too often their own!). The same applies
for assessing how particular institutions work. This
means that ‘gap analyses’ are often based on biased
assumptions which result in the development of
inappropriate prescriptive models. Any discussion
of ‘democracy deficits’, therefore, should recognize
that there is no ‘one size fits all’ institutional arrangement for democracy building and, indeed,
applying an inappropriate solution may turn out
to be highly ineffective and even counterproductive in some cases.
According to Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003),
the challenge for democracy building is to overcome four types of democratic deficit: of citizenship, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability and international accountability. The first
two refer to the gaps between formal democratic
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
institutions and the deep politics of society, and
concern issues of citizenship and representation.
In terms of citizenship and representation, problems may include lack of constitutionally guaranteed rights and effective exclusion from the public
sphere as a result of gender, societal inequalities,
lack of organization, cultures of intolerance, or intimidation and violence. Vertical accountability of
governments relates to citizens’ ability to hold governments, legislatures and political elites accountable for their use of power, their definition of policies and their use of resources, as well as citizens’
space to formulate and aggregate their interests at
all levels. The third democratic deficit, of horizontal accountability, is related to issues of balance of
power and power sharing and the recurring problem of the relationship between powerful and authoritarian executives and the legislature and judiciary. Interrelated problems include patronage,
corruption and civil–military relations. Issues cutting across the dimensions of citizenship/representation, vertical and horizontal accountability
include the degree of devolution and decentralization, and their relevance to both the growth of
democracy, on one hand, and the responsiveness
of service delivery to the needs of the poor, on the
other.
International accountability is assuming increasing
importance and concerns the impact of decisions
of international bodies or other countries on national political and economic processes, especially
in terms of new challenges to global security; political conditionality; and the implications of the
behaviour of multinational corporations.
Mainstream donor efforts in the area of democracy and development aim to increase the level of accountability to the poor people in recipient countries. In theory, such accountability is achieved
through elected governments. Donors recognize,
therefore, that democracy building is related to
political empowerment as a means of addressing poverty. Although there are different expectations of accountability to the poor across the donor community, most governments in aid-recipient countries do not even meet the basic standards
(OECD DAC 2005). Despite this, the potential
for democratization to impact positively on the
poor provides sufficient rationale for promoting
democracy as part of broader development cooperation strategies.
Although broadly-based growth is important for
democracy, there is no clear evidence of causal
links between democracy and poverty reduction.
Strong states can facilitate growth, irrespective of
the democratic or authoritarian nature of their regimes. Some authors like Leftwich (2002) even
argue that democracy is a conservative system of
power and that ‘the rules and operational conditions of stable democratic politics will tend to restrict policy to incremental and accommodationist
options’ that are not necessarily compatible with
the far-reaching and rapid change in the structure
and use of wealth
required by developDemocracy assistance could be more
mental processes.
effective and achieve more realistic
objectives if it is approached from a
Democracy has difcountry’s historical and political context,
ferent outcomes for
rather than by simply applying a system of
the poor, and the
normative standards.
patterns in the relationship between
the degree of democracy, pro-poor growth and
poverty reduction performance are inconclusive.
One of the reasons for this trend ‘lies in wide variations in the substantive content of formal, electoral democracy’. Poor people fail to have the influence and voice that one would expect in democratic contexts due to: (a) their exclusion from
the political process, especially in the case of poor
women; (b) the influence of different factors, both
formal and informal, other than the one often
considered in political analyses (i.e. class identities of people living in poverty) on their vote or
support for politicians, political parties and programmes (like patronage, clientelism, and ethnic,
linguistic or regional identities); and (c) the peculiar difficulty poor people, particularly in rural areas, face in sustaining coherent, encompassing political organizations. As Moore and Putzel (2000)
conclude, ‘in many democracies the poor are often
badly organised and ill-served by the organisations
that mobilise their votes and claim to represent
their interests’.
Effective redistribution of resources cannot be the
direct result of increased political pressure by the
poor. Instead, such measures require (a) the ruling
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
31
classes to be open
to social equity
concerns as a result
play a more important role for poverty
not only of their
reduction than formal democratic
enlightenment but
institutions, whose mere presence will not
also of their internecessarily benefit the interests of people
est in a stable and
living in poverty. Better knowledge about
conflict free social
the political systems in which donors
environment, and
intervene, and the dynamics that drive them,
(b) ‘a state with the
is increasingly seen by donors as essential
institutional
cafor understanding the political conditions
pacity to break the
and consequences of aid.
connections
between venal politicians, rapacious business interests and compliant
bureaucrats’ (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003).
In this sense, the state and its institutions play a
more important role for poverty reduction than
formal democratic institutions, whose mere presence will not necessarily benefit the interests of
people living in poverty. Better knowledge about
the political systems in which donors intervene,
and the dynamics that drive them, is increasingly seen by donors as essential for understanding
the political conditions and consequences of aid
(Moore and Putzel 2000).
accountability, based on the recognition of state
resources as public goods.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the experience of democracy building, where the focus is on
promoting democracy rather than reducing poverty. Carothers’ cautionary remark (1999) that ‘democracy aid, as well as the complementary tools of
diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks, can do
little to change the fundamental social, economic,
and political structures and conditions that shape
political life in other countries’ could well apply to
the broad limitations of external aid, not just democracy promotion (Carothers 2004).
The challenges for democracy promotion and
poverty reduction are similar in one respect: the
need for donors to think less in normative terms,
with a fundamental shift to thinking more strategically, politically and historically. For aid practitioners this means taking a longer-term view of
the factors that shape the incentives and capacities
for pro-poor change. It means also focusing on the
interplay between long-term structural factors and
short-term contingent ones (Unsworth 2001 and
2002). For democracy promoters the challenge is
even greater, as democratic values are enshrined in
particular institutional forms whose existence and
strengthening are often seen as the immediate outcome of aid efforts, and whose social meaning is
drawn from the political environments of ‘consolidated’ democracies. What needs to be done rather than how to help make it happen seems to be
clearer to both aid specialists and democracy promoters. Both need a better understanding of the
political landscape of the context as an indispensable basis for action.
In this sense, the state and its institutions
Building state institutions does not consist of just
translating institutions into a new context because they will work in different ways depending
on the local political, social and institutional environment. Nor can the solution be reduced to
institutional engineering or technical design, because public institutions are constructed through
a political process and their effectiveness cannot be guaranteed by the expert technocratic
knowledge invested in their design. State building also requires a shift in the very concept of
32
Taking the existence of the state for granted is a
typical bias of many democracy promoters. Yet to
fall into this trap could produce paradoxical outcomes, especially in situations where deep patronage structures and opaquely functioning economies shape people’s loyalties—irrespective of the
existence, mandate and procedures of formal institutions—as occurs in many countries in the
Arab region, in the former Soviet Union and in
conflict-prone environments like Afghanistan.
Ottaway (2003) argues that many structural conditions impede democratic transformation and
make semi-authoritarianism more likely. These
include the shallowness of transitions, the extreme
polarization of society, the incomplete processes of
state formation, the asymmetrical mechanisms for
generating power, the absence of embedded democratic elites, and the fallout from semi-authoritarianism itself. She adds that failing to take account
of such conditions may explain the fact that ‘democracy assistance and international pressure for
political change are two of the main reasons why
semi-authoritarian regimes exist’.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
In conclusion, while there is no empirical evidence
that establishes a causal relationship in either direction between democracy and economic growth,
there is growing acceptance of the fact that democratic systems—in as much as they allow citizens’
participation in policy formulation and implementation—are the system of governance most
likely to be responsive to citizens’ needs.
2.3. Structural Features,
Institutions and Agents
Recent policy debates between donors have focused on the political dimensions of development
(OECD DAC 2004). The interest in the links between development, democracy and aid effectiveness was certainly prompted by the rapid changes
in the political landscape that led to a new wave
of ‘democratic transitions’ in the 1990s. It is also
related to the broader debate re-examining the
underlying assumptions on which a range of development issues have been approached: from
growth to service delivery, from good governance
to democracy promotion. As a consequence, the
analysis of the political dimensions of development and aid has become an area of concern for
the same agencies that only a few years ago would
have considered those dimensions as issues well
beyond their mandate. A good illustration of this
trend is the so-called ‘drivers of change’ approach,
launched by the UK Department for International
Development (UK DFID 2003) with the aim of
enhancing donor agencies’ capacity to understand
how change occurs and the relationship between
change and poverty reduction.
Change has always been at the core of development policies and practices. In deploying their
expert knowledge to effect change, development
practitioners have been confronted with the challenge of identifying the obstacles to the change
processes associated with development. They
must also identify the individuals and institutions
deemed to act as change agents, so as to meet the
needs of the expected beneficiaries. The ‘drivers of
change’ agenda is a better way of understanding
the means of achieving poverty reduction in developing countries because it takes into account other
factors at play in any given context. This approach
forces development practitioners to understand
the broader systemic and institutional factors that
are likely to influence a particular course of action
to achieve reform. According to the DFID, such a
process involves three broad factors: structural features, institutions, and agents ‘with relationships
of power, inequality and conflict at their heart’.
‘Structural features’ include natural and human resources, economic and social structure, and other
non-institutional facts; ‘institutions’ consist of the
frameworks and rules structuring the behaviour of
agents; and ‘agents’ are individuals and organizations pursuing particular interests.
The drivers of
The ‘drivers of change’ agenda is a better
change approach
way of understanding the means of
begins with a baachieving poverty reduction in developing
sic country analycountries because it takes into account
sis which identifies
other factors at play in any given context.
the nature of a political community
within a country, government control of the territory, the history of state formation, embedded social and economic structures, and other elements
that shape the basic characteristics of the political
system. Factors such as the institutionalization of
the bureaucracy, policy mechanisms, political parties, civil society organizations, the basis for political competition, the composition of the political
elite, the basis of political mobilization (around
issues or patronage networks), the importance of
ethnicity, and power-sharing issues are also identified. An awareness is also needed of government
capacities, key mechanisms for vertical and horizontal accountability and political resources.
The second step consists of the analysis which is
similar to some aspects of IDEA’s State of Democracy assessment methodology (see chapter 11),
that is, an emphasis on the political system, the
policy process, public financial management and
the private-sector investment climate. Subsequent
steps include an assessment of the role of external
forces, an analysis of the effects on poverty, and
operational implications.
Drivers of change work has so far been carried out
by the DFID in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Nigeria, Pakistan and Zambia. Preliminary results
show that donors’ assumptions about change and
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
33
poverty reduction
are not always correct. More donors
on the political dimensions of development
are interested in the
shares a common concern about the need
same issues. Onto understand political change, based
going work in the
on a better and more in-depth contextOECD DAC Netspecific analysis. Pursuing such an agenda
work on Governwould imply a shift from systems where
ance (GOVNET)
power is heavily concentrated and highly
addresses the popersonalized to systems where power is
tential and limits
more widely distributed, institutions are
of political econmore rule-based, policy making is more
omy analysis as a
predictable and transparent, and political
tool for enhancing
mobilization is based less on local social
aid effectiveness.
identities than on common issues and
In 2002 the Swedish International
interests.
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) launched a series of analyses, covering both formal and informal power relations and structures, focused on actors, processes
and institutions as a means of understanding how
to take account of these factors within programme
planning at a country level. One of the reasons for
this work (carried out in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Kenya and Mali) was the awareness of the limitations of democracy and human rights assessments
which were too focused on formal structures (the
constitution, the political system and other formal
democratic institutions). The German Agency for
Technical Cooperation (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ) is also engaged in
addressing political change and has developed an
analytical tool, the ‘Governance Questionnaire’,
which maps out six areas for assessing the political environment: the state–society relationship;
the political system; the political culture, change
agents and development paradigms; politics and
gender; economic policy and the political frameworks of markets; and international integration.
The current debate in the donor community
The current debate in the donor community on
the political dimensions of development shares a
common concern about the need to understand
political change, based on a better and more indepth context-specific analysis. Pursuing such an
agenda would imply a shift from systems where
power is heavily concentrated and highly personalized to systems where power is more widely distributed, institutions are more rule-based, policy
34
making is more predictable and transparent, and
political mobilization is based less on local social
identities than on common issues and interests.
All these objectives are part of the democracybuilding agenda as well. Addressing the close relationship between political systems, power-sharing
mechanisms and policy making seems to be the
next challenge for development cooperation—and
for democracy promotion as well.
2.4. Some Implications for
Democracy Building
What are the implications of this debate for democracy promotion? So far we have reviewed
‘how’ to make political change and reform happen, and concluded that it is important for external actors involved in democratization to focus on
broad structural features as well as institutions and
agents if change is to be effected.
2.4.1. Incentives for Political Change
Whether the objective is poverty reduction or democracy promotion, donors have started to acknowledge the limitations of external actors to influence change in partner countries. This recognition calls for a rethinking of the concept of incentives and disincentives to bring about political
change.
Traditional instruments of international pressure
may have an impact, but new tools are needed.
The definition of ‘incentives’ provided by the
Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly
Conflict—‘the offer of a reward by a sender in exchange for a particular action or response by a recipient’ (Cortright 1997)—is the other side of the
same coin of traditional tools which include deterrence, sanctions, coercion and conditionality. The
scope of such instruments is limited and is mainly
focused on applying short time pressure in a crisis
situation. Some donors, like the USA, make use
of indicators of democratic governance for aid allocation purposes, as in the case of the Millennium Challenge Account, which sets out measures
of democratic performance for defining eligibility
conditions for recipient countries (Rich 2004).
The drivers of change approach, however, is based
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
on a deeper understanding of the historical, social and political context, and an assessment of the
capacity to effect change of both institutions and
agents within a particular country. As an approach
it embodies more realistic assumptions about the
limited role for external factors, including aid, to
influence change processes.
The concept of using aid incentives for democracy building warrants reconsideration. Within
the DAC context, incentives could be defined as
‘any purposeful use of aid that strengthens the dynamics favouring democratic change’ (Uvin 2004)
with the following objectives:
(a) influencing actors’ behaviour;
(b) strengthening actors’ capacities;
(c) changing the relations between actors (ethnic
groups, political parties, the state and civil society,
etc.); and
(d) influencing the social and economic environment in which political change processes take
place.
These objectives are ranked in order from shortterm through to medium- and long-term; or, to
use a drivers of change terminology, from the level
of individual agents and organizations (objectives
(a) and (b)) to those of institutions (objective (c))
and structural features (objective (d)). Aid may
play a role mainly in the first three categories, and
non-aid instruments are crucial for any meaningful impact on the fourth.
2.4.2. Structural and Agency
Explanations of Political Change
Two frequently used conceptual frameworks for
understanding political change are ‘structure’ and
‘agency’. Structural explanations tend to stress the
significance of the social, economic and political
structures of a society as the main factors determining change, whereas agency explanations focus more on the capacities and action of agents,
that is, individuals and institutions, and their role
in contributing to political change. Approaches
based on drivers of change and power analyses aim
to take account of both structural and agency explanations and the interrelationship between the
two.
In the field of democracy building, the link between the consolidation of democratic institutions
and the strengthening of democratic politics is key.
Democracy-promotion policies and practices traditionally focused on the role of institutions and
agents in democratization processes. Less attention has been paid to the structural features affecting political change processes. Without an understanding of the political landscape, interventions
for poverty reduction, as well as democracy building, can not only fail to achieve their stated objectives; they can do harm.
Structural analysis helps to identify key underlying challenges: state control; deep ethnic divisions;
rents from the extraction of natural resources; or
a dominant and repressive landed class. Understanding the basis of political accountability is essential, both in terms of its implications for work
on political parties, political party funding and
parliaments, and as a fundamental basis for determining the incentive structures of key actors. As
Bastian and Luckham (2003) point out, how particular constitutional arrangements play out depends on context and elite interests. The impact
of civil society action on change should be seen in
context too by developing an underUltimately, there is a need for detailed,
standing of the bacountry-specific information on the
sis of group mobiinstitutions and processes of democracy
lization. The same
building to allow for a proper analysis of
applies to the effects of multiparty
what is needed for democratization. If they
competition which
are to be successful, practitioners need
may yield positive
to be armed with an understanding of the
results—incentives
relationship between the institutional
for less damaging
frameworks, agents of change and
patronage politics,
structural conditions characterizing
more space for indifferent societies.
dependent
media—or even have a
negative impact, depending on the context—corruption, fuelling local identity-based conflict.
Ultimately, there is a need for detailed, countryspecific information on the institutions and processes of democracy building to allow for a proper
analysis of what is needed for democratization. If
they are to be successful, practitioners need to be
armed with an understanding of the relationship
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
35
between the institutional frameworks, agents of
change and structural conditions characterizing
different societies.
In the future, IDEA will continue to meet the
need to adapt institutional design to different
types of country circumstances, shaped by political and historical factors, with a focus on inclusive dialogue among local actors. For an institute
like IDEA that aims to improve the design of key
democratic institutions through a comparative
knowledge of structural and institutional issues
that condition democratic change, the capacity to
understand the context in which democratic institutions are built and strengthened will always be
extremely important.
For an institute like IDEA that aims to
improve the design of key democratic
institutions through a comparative
knowledge of structural and institutional
issues that condition democratic change,
the capacity to understand the context in
which democratic institutions are built and
strengthened will always be extremely
important.
36
References
Bastian, Sunil and Luckham, Robin (eds), Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Change in
Conflict-Torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003)
Carothers, Tom, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning
Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1999)
— Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004)
Cortright, David (ed.), The Price of Peace: Incentives and
International Conflict Prevention, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York (Rowman & Littlefield, Inc.,
1997)
Groves, Leslie and Hinton, Rachel (eds), Inclusive Aid:
Changing Power and Relationships in International Development (London: Earthscan, 2004)
GTZ, ‘Governance Questionnaire: Draft’, State and Democracy Division, Sectoral Project on Democracy
and Rule of Law, Eschborn, 2004
Leftwich, Adrian, ‘Debate: Democracy and Development: A Contradiction in the Politics of Economics’,
New Political Economy 7/2 (2002), pp. 269–73
Luckham, Robin, Goetz, Anne Marie and Kaldor, Mary,
‘Democratic Institutions and Democratic Politics’, in
Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham (eds), Can Democracy Be Designed? The Politics of Institutional Change
in Conflict-torn Societies (London: Zed Books, 2003),
pp. 14–59
Luckham, Robin, Goetz, Anne Marie and Kaldor, Mary
(with Alison Ayers, Sunil Bastian, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Shireen Hassim and Zarko Puhovski),
‘Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts
of Inequality, Poverty and Conflict: A Conceptual
Framework’, IDS Working Paper no. 104, University
of Sussex, Brighton, 2000
Moore, Mick and Putzel, James, ‘Thinking Strategically about Politics and Poverty’, IDS Working Paper
no. 101, University of Sussex, Brighton, 2000
OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC),
‘Chair’s Summary: Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States’, London, 13–
14 January 2005, DAC/CHAIR(2005)3, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Paris, 1 February 2005
— DAC Orientations on Participatory Development and
Good Governance (Paris: Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 1995)
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
— ‘Reporting Directives for the Creditor Reporting System’, DCD/DAC (2002)21, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 30 July
2002
— ‘Summary Record of the GOVNET Informal Workshop on Sharing Approaches to Understanding Drivers of Change and Political Analysis. Meeting held
1–2 June 2004’, Development Assistance Committee, GOVNET, Paris, 1 July 2004
Ottaway, Marina, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of
Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2003)
Rich, Roland, ‘Applying Conditionality to Development
Assistance’, Agenda 11/4 (2004), pp. 321–34
Tommasoli, Massimo, Le développement participatif: Analyse sociale et logiques de planification (Paris : Karthala,
2004)
UK Department for International Development (DFID),
‘What Does Drivers of Change Mean for DFID?
A draft approach paper’, Drivers of Change Team,
DFID Policy Division, London, August 2003
Unsworth, Sue, ‘Understanding Incentives and Capacity
for Poverty Reduction: What Should Donors Do Differently?’, mimeo, 23 April 2002
— ‘Understanding Pro-Poor Change: A Discussion Paper’, mimeo, 20 September 2001
Uvin, Peter, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfield:
Kumarian Press, Inc., 2004)
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
37
‘Sustainable democracy must be home grown. That’s why International IDEA presents
options and not solutions to new and re-established democracies.’
Erling Olsen, former Speaker of the Danish Parliament.
Member of the Board of International IDEA June 1998–June 2001
Acting Secretary-General of International IDEA April 2002–August 2002
‘Even if it is not perfect, democracy is without doubt the best of systems to guarantee
the full development of human beings and national stability. In the last decade
International IDEA has tried to tackle diverse aspects of the complicated democratic
coexistence: electoral systems capable of forging a good political system, guaranties for
a clean vote, and internal dialogues to solve national conflicts. Democracy building is
still a challenge and it constitutes a responsible commitment in the creation of a more
humane world. IDEA has a leading role to play during the next decade. We hope that
when we celebrate the 20th anniversary in 2015, the global map will reflect more
light and fewer shadows on the panorama of universal democracy.’
Lourdes Flores Nano, member of the Board of International IDEA,
President of the Alianza Electoral Unidad Nacional and
candidate in the 2001 Peruvian presidential election
38
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
3. Themes in Democracy
Assistance
Richard Youngs
This chapter traces the development of democracy
building over the last decade, its challenges and different forms as experienced by donor member states
and other international players.
When IDEA was set up ten years ago, most donors
were just beginning to focus in a more systematic
way on using aid resources to encourage democratic change in developing states. The organization itself represented one manifestation of this reassessment. This chapter offers a general (and necessarily schematic) overview of the ways in which
Western governments’ democracy assistance policies have subsequently evolved. It identifies the
more sophisticated approaches to democracy assistance that have taken shape in recent years and
highlights how the attempt to fashion more holistic strategies has brought its own set of problems.
It is argued that efforts to temper the latter will
constitute the next phase in donors’ progressive
honing of their democracy assistance strategies.
3.1. Overall Trends
During the last ten years donors have developed a
relatively standardized range of initiatives encompassing what are seen to be democracy’s constituent arenas: civil society, elections, political parties,
parliaments, civil–military relations, state reform,
the rule of law and good governance. These have
become the familiar categories around which democracy assistance is organized. Donors exhibit
slightly different emphases between these various
arenas, but all spread their political aid between
these broadly convergent conceptual strands of
work. Indeed, the increasing homogeneity of democracy aid profiles is striking, particularly when
considered against a background of perceived divergence of diplomatic strategies between countries in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Focused on what are judged to be the individual
building blocks of political change, the vast majority of donors eschew any overarching classification of ‘democracy assistance’. It is still impossible
to identify total amounts of democracy aid in any
precise fashion. For aid that is ostensibly aimed at
increasing transparency, some donors also continue to be incredibly opaque in sharing information
on their democracy assistance activities.
Definitions in this sense remain elastic. Many initiatives implemented under a democracy assistance label are at
best tenuously reIt is still impossible to identify total
lated to political
amounts of democracy aid in any precise
reform; conversefashion. For aid that is ostensibly aimed
ly, much aid that
at increasing transparency, some donors
has a strong politialso continue to be incredibly opaque in
cal impact is allosharing information on their democracy
cated under other
assistance activities.
aid categories. Donors will support
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
39
almost identical
individual projects
but invariably regextremely modest in comparison to the
ister them under
magnitude of political challenges.
different categories of aid. Some
donors appear intent on over-selling the amount
they invest in democracy assistance; others seem
keen to play down their commitment. Some donors have stretched definitions of political aid in
an effort to convince a sceptical audience that significant resources are being devoted to democracy
and human rights; others insist that the key is to
maximize the chance of projects succeeding on the
ground by defining them as apolitically as possible. The OECD measure of ‘government and civil society’ category contains much support that is
not remotely related to democracy.
The amount of political aid has been
A curious duality has emerged. On the one hand,
donors’ individual ‘blocks’ of political aid (civil society support or rule-of-law projects, for instance)
have exhibited increasing similarities. On the other hand, no commonly agreed indicators to measure the impact of such aid have emerged. Indeed,
the picture has become increasingly disparate, as
democracy-related funding has been forthcoming
from an array of new programmes covering conflict prevention, cultural cooperation, economic
governance and civic education, as well as separate
country-specific initiatives.
• Out of a total European Commission aid budget of 7.5 billion euros for 2004, only 124 million euros was available under the European
Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), but 2.9 billion euros was defined as
contributing to governance and civil society reform more broadly.
• Germany, the largest European funder, now
allocates just over 100 million euros per year
for a broad category of ‘governance’ projects,
which includes democracy, human rights and
conflict prevention work, and another 150 million euros to the Stiftungen.
• The Nordic states have consolidated their presence as proportionately the largest contributors.
Aid for ‘democratic governance’ has consistently accounted for over 10 per cent of total Swedish ODA. Danish funding for ‘human rights
and democratization’ has increased by over a
third since 2001 and is due to be boosted by an
additional 65 million USD up to 2009. Norway gave 9 per cent of its bilateral aid to ‘civil
society and democracy development’ in 2003,
and another 9 per cent to ‘Peace, reconciliation
and democracy’.
• Elaborating a political aid portfolio slightly later than the USA and other principal donors,
Japan has gradually consolidated its position
has a mainstream player in broadly defined
‘governance assistance’, with yearly allocations
of around 150 million USD comparing favourably with most European governments.
With such caveats it can be safely
succeeded in offering a route into engaging
concluded that powith more intransigent states. Authoritarian
litical aid, broadly
states account for a small share of
defined, was one of
democracy assistance budgets compared
the fastest-growing
to semi-authoritarian and post-transition
categories of aid
countries.
during the latter
half of the 1990s,
with the rate of increase flattening off in the case
of most donors in recent years. Notable donor
profiles include the following:
Overall sums remain self-evidently limited compared to the more established, mainstream aid
categories. Few would deny that big infrastructure, health or education projects will naturally
need more resources: to set these areas of ODA
alongside democracy assistance is hardly to compare like with like. It is, however, difficult to refute
the judgement that the amount of political aid has
been extremely modest in comparison to the magnitude of political challenges—as well as to the
significance often claimed for such funding.
• The overall US investment in political aid increased during the 1990s, before reaching a
plateau of approximately 700 million USD a
year, or 6–7 per cent of total overseas development assistance (ODA).
As overall funding has increased, so geographical priorities have shifted. During the 1990s two
parallel logics conditioned the distribution of
democracy assistance. On the one hand, a large
slice of democracy assistance appeared to follow
Significantly, reform-oriented aid has not
40
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
overall aid distribution, tacked onto donors’ primary mainstream poverty reduction programmes
in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, most
donors focused more heavily on post-transition
scenarios, where a commitment to political reform
was evident.
German political aid was, for example, split between these two logics, going primarily to Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa. By the end of
the 1990s, over a third of the US democracy budget was going to Eastern Europe and Eurasia, while
the main gainers after 2000 were states that had
recently enjoyed democratic breakthroughs: Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Peru and Serbia. A similar logic was reflected in Japan’s ‘request-based approach’ to democracy assistance (Japanese International Cooperation Agency 2003). Both Swedish and Norwegian political aid was heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of African
states, including Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia and South Africa, although both these donors have increasingly developed a strong link between conflict and democratic institution building, with increasing shares of democracy assistance going to Serbia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Nepal,
Afghanistan and Cambodia. Several donors have
introduced initiatives offering the ‘reward’ of additional aid where recipient countries demonstrate
democratic progress and a willingness to cooperate on reform initiatives. This is, for example, a
prominent feature of German governance aid and
the US Millennium Challenge Account.
Significantly, reform-oriented aid has not succeeded in offering a route into engaging with more
intransigent states. Authoritarian states account
for a small share of democracy assistance budgets
compared to semi-authoritarian and post-transition countries. In cases such as Libya, Burma,
Zimbabwe, North Korea, Cuba or Syria, relatively
limited funding has been offered to exiled advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) gathering information and monitoring
rights abuses in these states. In order to overcome
obstacles to implementing effective political aid
projects in Russia, donors have increasingly sought
to pursue initiatives through the Council of Europe, Russia’s membership of which is seen to offer
the prospect of greater leverage over Moscow.
While such patterns are discernible, the broad geographical spread of donors is more striking. The
majority of donors have offered a smattering of
democracy assistance with similar thematic focus
throughout the world. This is of a piece with donors’ similarly broad thematic coverage. All donors support most thematic areas and most provide assistance in all sectors. Nuances are apparent: French aid is more oriented towards state elites, German aid towards regional-level governance,
and British aid towards reform of public administration. While these
self-evidently reflect
It would be an exaggeration to argue that
donors’ own dodonors have sought to export wholesale
mestic specificities,
their own particular model of democracy.
it would be an exaggeration to argue
that donors have sought to export wholesale their
own particular model of democracy. Arguably, the
commonalities between donors’ democracy aid
profiles have become more notable than the differences. All donors have adopted something of a
scatter-gun approach, supporting small parcels of
every type of work in a large number of countries.
This represents a response to criticism levelled at
Western governments for being interested only in
supporting democracy in a few select states and
for conceiving democracy to be about elections
only, or civil society only, or bicameral legislative
politics only. By the end of the 1990s it was not
the case that democracy assistance was only being
offered in a small number of amenable countries,
or only where immediate and significant Western
interests existed. In place of undue narrowness,
however, democracy assistance profiles have taken
shape that lack thematic or geographical critical
mass.
Debates in the past three years have centred on the
prospective reorientation of aid away from Eastern
Europe and the Balkans to the Middle East, the
latter being the region that was most sparsely funded during the 1990s. Donors have all announced
intentions to target democracy aid at the Middle
East, and have in some cases followed this through
with new and increased funding designed with
this in mind. New funding under the US Middle
East Partnership Initiative has attracted the most
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
41
attention. Significantly, France has
also initiated politestablished itself as one of the clearest
ical reform projects
trends of the 1990s.
in the Maghreb
and Mashreq. This
constitutes a potentially major change to the nature of democracy assistance. If the latter was previously the preserve of specialists in aid ministries,
one of the most routinely-made suggestions since
9/11 is that democracy aid needs to be invested
with greater strategic purpose. Some tension is
evident between foreign and development ministries on this question. As the latter have resisted
the diversion of funds from the least developed
states into an agenda driven by more instrumental foreign policy objectives, some new Middle
East reform initiatives have appeared within foreign ministries. This is leading to what one leading
practitioner calls the ‘Balkanization of democracy
assistance’, with a plethora of new funds appearing across different parts of Western governments’
policy-making machinery. Tensions have recently
deepened between the European Parliament, the
Commission and the European Council—and indeed within each of these institutions—over the
question of how tightly democracy funds should
be directed in accordance with strategic priorities.
3.2. Reassessing Civil Society?
The drift towards civil society funding
Critics argue that the distribution of European Union (EU) aid has in practice still been more decided by internal trade-offs than coherently deployed
as a foreign policy tool (Santiso 2002: 419). It remains to be seen how far geo-clientelism gives way
to a systematic harnessing of democA far larger proportion of political aid
racy assistance to sebudgets goes to the standard range of
curity policy.
human rights issues—torture, the death
penalty, xenophobia—than on the broader
Another increasingly prominent debate
in this sense relates
to the paucity of linkage between external and internal civil rights policies: without this many practitioners and analysts fear that hardline anti-terrorist provisions within the West leave democracy
promotion policy to survive in increasingly stony
ground.
agenda of political reform.
42
The drift towards civil society funding established
itself as one of the clearest trends of the 1990s.
This was in response to criticisms that donors had
previously focused too narrowly on democracy’s
formal institutional features, and in particular on
elections. The vast majority of donors have gradually reoriented their democracy assistance away
from electoral support and monitoring. The claim
that Western governments are only interested in
democracy’s formal façade is still often heard but is
not one that the evolving profile of democracy assistance invites. Between the mid-1990s and 2004
the share of EIDHR funds allocated to electoral
assistance, for instance, fell from over 50 per cent
to 14 per cent. By 2002, 48 per cent of US democracy funds were being allocated to civil society, up from one-third in 1997 and having climbed
gradually over the decade; the share going to elections and political processes had fallen to only 7
per cent.
Within the category of civil society support, most
donors have continued to channel the largest share
of their funds to NGOs. The largest single group
of such recipients is still the large human rights organizations. Typically, a large international NGO
will be supported to work with one of the two
or three main umbrella human rights NGOs in
the recipient state. A far larger proportion of political aid budgets goes to the standard range of
human rights issues—torture, the death penalty,
xenophobia—than on the broader agenda of political reform. One of the most commonly supported projects within European democracy assistance has been the incorporation of international
human rights treaties and covenants into developing countries’ domestic legislation. While clearly
closely related, the human rights and democracy
strands of Western policies have not always been
entirely mutually reinforcing: one complaint from
aid officers is that diplomatic tensions focusing on
select human rights issues have often complicated
aid projects on broader governance reforms within
the state in question.
To support civil society, donors have espoused a
philosophy based around fostering communitylevel participation and organizational capacity.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Concepts of local ownership that have dominated
development policy thinking have filtered into democracy assistance, making much of the latter look
very much like an extension of new approaches to
development. This is presented as part of a move
towards strengthening general democratic processes and away from trying to engineer specific policy outcomes. Germany’s Development Ministry,
as one representative example, defines the aims of
its political aid to be ‘strengthening the political
dimension of development’, enhancing ‘capabilities for self-reliant problem solving . . . not . . .
prescribing ready-made solutions’, encouraging a
‘citizen-orientation of the state’, and boosting the
participation of the poor in monitoring local government performance (BMZ 2002).
Expediency has certainly not been entirely absent: it is this type of project that has been possible without significant confrontation with recipient governments. Most donors have been reluctant to extend their focus to projects that are
openly opposed by governments. Continuing support for organizations which are denied official
recognition has invariably been problematic. Critics observe that many NGO recipients have been
the more moderate, measured, and arguably coopted sector of civil society. Many donor officials
insist that much-maligned government-organized
NGOs can usefully widen access to government
reformers and provide a foothold from which to
press for more genuine separation between civil
society and the state. But in some cases donors
have stood rather meekly by while government authorities sabotage externally funded projects. Donors flag this as an area where future efforts must
focus: in many contexts the need is not only, or
even primarily, for more funding but for stronger
political backing to ensure that projects are actually allowed to run in an effective manner.
The perception is widespread that the USA remains more drawn than other DAC donors to
supporting overtly politicized groups, dissidents
and direct democracy propaganda through its
civil society programmes. European donors commonly argue that a focus on linking social rights
initiatives to political reform work distinguishes
European assistance from more directly political
US approaches. Even the more forward-leaning
European donors, such as Sweden, have preferred
to support highly politicized groups for their educational or humanitarian work and not simply for
their being anti-regime.
The USA has certainly supported anti-regime exile groups from Iraq, Iran and Syria that other
donors have declined to fund. The State Department has sometimes intervened to channel funds
to openly pro-US groups, for example, in Eastern Europe and in some Middle Eastern countries
(Quigely 2000: 203; and Dalpino 2000). However, overall the approaches taken by the US Agency for International
Development (USA firmly established consensus has taken
AID) have also exroot among donors that democracy aid
hibited an increasneeds to move away from the traditionally
ing orientation tofavoured set of internationally connected
wards long-term,
NGOs to support civil society organizations
democratic capacthat are more organically entrenched
ity building. The
in local communities, and organized
USA and other doaround issues of real daily significance
nors have all been
guilty of abandonrather than abstract debates of competing
ing their caution
political interests.
in supporting the
most critical civil
society organizations only very late in the day. For
example, donors moved to support anti-Fujimori
groups in Peru when transition was already imminent. Democracy aid has invariably followed more
than it has pre-empted tangible political change.
Many activists in developing states in fact judge
European donors to have become more willing
than the USA to fund controversial projects.
Reflecting a now well-worn critique of civil society support, a firmly established consensus has taken root among donors that democracy aid needs
to move away from the traditionally favoured
set of internationally connected NGOs to support civil society organizations that are more organically entrenched in local communities, and
organized around issues of real daily significance
rather than abstract debates of competing political interests. Many donors now aim to support a
smaller number of NGOs, aiming for more tangible impact with locally-rooted groups. Donors no
longer need to be convinced on this routinely repeated point. Talk of the need to move away from
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
43
standardized templates is ubiquitous; how to do
this in practice is a matter of genuine uncertainty. One currently debated question is whether and
how to start incorporating business groups, often key protagonists in democratic transition that
have so far been absent from political aid work.
Another issue is whether donors should begin including Islamist groups within their civil society
programmes; positive indications have been made
on this, but caution, and in some cases opposition,
still prevails at the level of implementation.
3.3. Government-toGovernment InstitutionBuilding Aid
An increasingly prominent area of debate relates
to the role of aid channelled to state institutions
for capacity-building initiatives. A reassessment of
the linkages between civil society and the state has
been evident in recent years. Influential civil society protagonists have themselves advocated a more
holistic approach to democracy assistance which
ceases overwhelmingly to target voluntary associations as substitutes for a strong democratic state
(Edwards 2004: 94).
Significant amounts of government-to-government institution-building aid have been presented
as part of democracy assistance efforts. The corollary to donors’ slightly less rosy view of civil society actors has been a declared intent to pay greater
attention to state-building challenges. The USA’s
most senior democracy aid official argues that resources have shifted into state-building projects in
response to a recognition that civil society support
has invariably failed to generate smooth momentum towards democratic transition (Hyman 2002:
26–32). The state–elite focus has remained a distinctive element of French political aid, with priorities listed as including the ‘training of foreign
elites’; export of the French legal system; social dialogue and the strengthening of trade unions; constitutional support; and negotiated change through
‘national consultative committees’ (French Ministère des Affaires Étranges, (DGCID) (undated)).
Japan sees its main strength as lying in assistance
to ‘improve the efficiency of government capacity building’ (Japanese International Cooperation Agency 2003: 37). Support for more effective
44
links between regional and national public institutions represents the largest slice of Germany’s political aid, drawing on what is seen as a particular,
domestically derived German expertise. Moreover, donors profess a realization that state-building
challenges are often those that need most attention well after formal transition; some donors have
consequently reversed incipient withdrawals from
places like Russia and the Balkans.
Whether and how such initiatives have in fact
served to enhance democratic quality, however, is
in some cases not clear. Most rule-of-law projects
have been strikingly formalistic. Work under this
category has focused mainly on offering support
for setting up ombudsmen offices; legal advice on
incorporating international human rights covenants into domestic legislation; measures to speed
up the processing of cases; provisions for copying
laws; and judicial training, carried out by lawyers.
It has rarely sought to address the broader politics
that continue to limit the effective use of such formal measures. One critic characterizes approaches to the rule of law as ‘breathtakingly mechanistic’, devoid of any linkage to the political process
(Carothers 2003: 9). A recent German Development Ministry policy review raised concerns that
rule-of-law and other state reform projects were
being used in a way that actually fomented locallevel corruption and patronage, and that recipient governments were disingenuously presenting
standard social development projects as a ‘governance’ commitment. One diplomat acknowledged
that, within ‘governance’ budgets, democracy has
so far been ‘the missing link’. With institutional
support budgets exceeding democracy and human
rights funds many times over, these failings represent one of the most debilitating shortcomings of
democracy assistance efforts.
One of donors’ stated priorities has been to marry top–down capacity building more systematically to bottom–up accountability measures in
mutually reinforcing fashion. Official discourse
and policy statements are replete with references to drawing out the ‘complementarity’ and
‘interconnections’ between democracy aid and
those mainstream aid budgets covering areas such
as public administration reform. The declared
aim has been to generate greater ‘democratic
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
spillover’ from good governance projects—the latter recognized to have more political overtones
than previously assumed. A new EU resolution on
governance in 2004 formally enshrined an apparently broader and more holistic concept of good
governance cooperation. The influential ‘drivers
of change’ framework of the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) is predicated
on the notion of building governance elements
into all standard aid projects. Within German aid,
‘democracy’ indicators have been incorporated as
‘mainstream’ criteria within good governance programmes.
Some recent initiatives have attempted to link state
reform work to enhanced civil society access to
public policy making. It remains unclear, however,
how far such trends are likely to extend. Alongside
frequent talk of ensuring better linkages, many officials still conceive a focus on the rule of law as a
separable, and in the short term preferable, objective to democracy promotion. One senior EU aid
official is still able to assert that the rule of law
‘is more important than democracy’ in European
policy. Many rule-of-law projects have continued
to focus overwhelmingly on procedural capacity
and efficiency, with little systematic coordination
to assess qualitative impact on democratic process.
One aid official acknowledges that, while the relevance of public administrative reform to democracy is now recognized, the question remains open
of ‘how do we let people . . . participate in a meaningful way’ in state reform projects. Some democracy officers still tend to see governance funding as
a competitor to their own political efforts, lamenting the large amounts of aid diverted to governance projects that are far more integral (in their
judgement) to economic liberalization than to the
democracy agenda.
In practice, rather than good governance and the
rule of law being approached as prerequisites to
democracy assistance proper, there is evidence to
suggest that they may end up as long-term substitutes for the latter. The assumption is still too
uncritically made that all state-building capacity
work is reform-oriented; as one head of department sweepingly claims, ‘Everything we do [in
this sphere] is conducive to democracy’. It is a belief commonly asserted, but rarely demonstrated.
3.4. Political Society: Parties,
Parliaments and the Military
A corollary to this concern with state–civil society
linkage has been a professed determination to focus more intensively on the bodies often grouped
together under the label of ‘political society’. A
commanding majority of donors list as their main
‘lesson learned’ from the last ten years of democracy assistance the need for a better understanding of the underlying politics of deRather than good governance and the rule
mocracy building.
of law being approached as prerequisites
They recognize that
to democracy assistance proper, there is
civil society’s transevidence to suggest that they may end up
formative potenas long-term substitutes for the latter.
tial has been overestimated and the
essential aggregative role of political institutions
unduly overlooked. Comments from different donors exhibit a striking commonality, averring the
need for greater recognition of ‘the centrality of
politics’; of the democracy agenda’s ‘implications
beyond the development assistance perspective’; of
‘the need for a political analysis of the structures of
power . . . and forces that can brake or promote
change’; of the need to move from isolated ‘technical’ initiatives to a comprehensively ‘political’
approach. The development minister of one of the
largest democracy funders points to a need to recognize that ‘democracy assistance is not simply more
development cooperation’. Several donors reveal
that, partly in response to critiques of the gradualist ‘transition paradigm’, they have begun to compile assessments of underlying power relationships
in a select number of recipient countries.
Relatively limited
shares of democracy assistance have
gone to direct party-building initiatives. All but a small
part of party strengthening work has
been carried out
by the party foundations and, with
the exception of the
US and German
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
A commanding majority of donors list
as their main ‘lesson learned’ from the
last ten years of democracy assistance
the need for a better understanding of
the underlying politics of democracy
building. They recognize that civil society’s
transformative potential has been overestimated and the essential aggregative
role of political institutions unduly
overlooked.
45
foundations, these have continued to operate with
extremely limited resources. The Stiftungen account for 90 per cent of non-governmental party
foundation funds in Europe; no other European
foundation receives more than 5 million euros a
year. The percentage of democracy assistance accounted for by political party work never reaches
double figures. US party work declined steadily
during the late 1990s until in 2001 it represented
under 5 per cent of USAID’s democracy and governance budget—at which stage it was identified
as a priority focus for increased resources (USAID
1999). The most notable exception to such caution in the political party sphere was the explicit
backing given to anti-Milosevic opposition parties
in the Balkans.
donor recognized: ‘This is basic, but we are not
doing it’. Doubts remain over how to combine assistance for the party system in general with the
evident need in many contexts to bolster opposition groups against a dominant party. One observer notes that donors have found it difficult to
fashion meaningful support where parties are programmatically weakest—precisely the situation in
which backing is most needed (Mair 2004: 136).
In practice, initiatives have still been most readily
forthcoming that target individual parties as and
when opportunities for access exist. A dual challenge remains to link such support both upwards
to the systemic level and downwards to strengthen
what are still often conflictual relations between
political parties and civil society organizations.
Conceptually, donors’ main stated concern has
been that the partisan, fraternal party approach
used in Latin America, Southern Europe and
then Eastern Europe shows signs
Relatively limited shares of democracy
of ‘running out of
assistance have gone to direct partysteam’. There has
building initiatives.
been a shift away
from support for
individual electoral campaigns towards longerterm capacity building. Europeans moved in this
direction earlier than the US foundations (Carothers 1999: 150). Another trend is towards more inclusive dialogue, bringing together a wide range of
parties to fashion consensus on basic reform options. The declared aim is to move way from selfstanding political party initiatives towards a more
holistic incorporation of party support into state
reform and civil society work. US officials talk, in
this sense, of a move towards a ‘middle out’ approach, linking party work to other thematic areas of democracy assistance. Sweden has recently
begun to initiate such party system approaches in
Central America and East Africa. Several other donors have begun tentatively to incorporate some
of this work into their own bilateral initiatives,
meaning that political party work is likely to become increasingly less the unique preserve of the
semi-autonomous foundations.
The implementation of such logic is acknowledged to be still in its early stages. Strategies emphasize the broader context of, and structural
impediments to, party development, but as one
Similar trends can be seen in parliamentary support. This is another dimension of democracy
building that has been under-represented in most
donor profiles. As in other areas, approaches in recent years have come to focus on the building of
connections between parliamentary support and
initiatives aimed at enhancing civil society interest
groups’ access to policy making. The largest category of parliamentary work has gone to strengthening the role of women in parliaments. This is
an area that some donors have come to question,
however, expressing a concern that the focus on
women’s rights in parliament has often diverted attention from broader reform work: in many cases,
it is admitted, the problem has been less one of
women’s role within parliaments than of the weakness of parliament per se vis-à-vis the executive—
an area less frequently addressed through democracy assistance. Another trend is towards support
for regional parliamentary forums, with donors
supporting bodies such as the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary
Forum. Parliamentary exchanges have continued to
expand, but it often stretches a definition to claim
that these are concerned with democracy promotion in any direct sense. Some donors have been
concerned that one-off parliamentary exchanges
have had no discernible impact and thus need to be
used as a base from which to develop longer-term
capacity-building assistance. Most donors claim to
be keen to divert funds away from support for formal committee structures, equipping parliamentary libraries and the transposition of new rules
46
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
and procedures in parliaments, towards increasing
parliaments’ responsiveness to citizens. In practice,
much support still goes to funding equipment and
very technical drafting provisions.
The reform of civil–military relations has been
perhaps the most neglected of all democracy’s
constituent arenas. Suffering from a low degree
of awareness among the main makers of decisions
on political aid, this issue has to a significant degree been left to defence ministries. Where it has
been incorporated into democracy assistance profiles it has invariably been through a conflict-prevention lens. Assessments of democracy aid rarely
pick up how much traditional defence diplomacy
has transmuted into security sector reform (SSR)
work. These have developed almost as two different
policy-making worlds. A quid pro quo has increasingly taken root: defence ministries have trimmed
traditional defence cooperation into reform-oriented SSR initiatives; in return an erstwhile sceptical development community has accepted that
SSR does have a genuine place in reform and conflict prevention objectives. The USA launched an
initiative to incorporate USAID-led accountability elements into Defense Department military
training, aimed at encouraging civil society participation in the formulation of defence policies
(USAID, ‘Civil–Military Relations Resources’).
European donors all run similar projects. Sweden
has launched a pilot project on democratic oversight of the military in Honduras, while the Dutch
Government has sought to elaborate an integration of the development, diplomatic and defence
elements of political reform initiatives. A number
of donors have recently been engaged in DAC discussions on the possibilities of incorporating SSR
work into development aid.
While such moves are of significant import, in
overall terms SSR initiatives have only very tentatively moved away from standard military capacity
building towards assistance aimed at the broader
restructuring of civil–military relations. It is widely acknowledged that SSR initiatives are primarily
about consolidating alliances with third-country
militaries, albeit in parallel with new human rights
training and courses on democratic oversight run
with security forces. Where democracy and human rights modules have been added to military
training
courses
there is rarely any
The reform of civil–military relations has
follow-through
been perhaps the most neglected of all
from donors to asdemocracy’s constituent arenas.
sess how these can
be harnessed to
contribute to more reform-minded militaries. The
more self-critical donors increasingly acknowledge
that the proclivity in SSR work towards ‘training
the trainers’ programmes continues with little idea
of what, if any, impact these might be achieving.
Most donors remain cautious of confusing military and development aid too much: the Japanese
Government and others prefer any focus on military reform to be supported through multilateral
institutions.
3.5. Conclusion
Common threads have gradually woven themselves into donors’ democracy assistance programmes during the last ten years. In each case,
the evolution in approaches to democracy building has been simultaneously significant and circumscribed. Most unequivocally, donors stress a
conviction that democracy assistance is moving
away from support for self-standing projects in
different thematic sectors towards the moulding
of holistic linkages between different arenas. At
the same time, political aid still often appears to
function as a relatively modest and hermetically
sealed pocket of aid activity. A shift away from attempts at direct institutional engineering is universally proclaimed and acclaimed; but it is uncertain that what has emerged in its place is capable
of generating significant democratic change. At
best, the value of gradualism remains convincingly to be substantiated, and in the absence hitherto
of assessment mechanisms it has intuitive rather
than demonstrable merit. Few benchmarks have
been rigorously designed or applied that suffice
to hold donors to account against their own logic
of incremental capacity enhancement. Independent monitoring agencies are lacking at the political
level, while on the ground judgement is rarely derived from the participation of local ‘stakeholders’
(Crawford 2003).
It is now widely recognized that democracy assistance will at most impact at the margins, and that
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
47
support relating to the broader context of political
change represents a hitherto underestimated key.
Yet in practice democracy officers commonly remain focused simply on ‘running good projects’
and meeting the reporting requirements attached
to these. Concepts and criteria relate, at one level, to individual projects, at another level to generic macro-level aims: ‘good governance’ and ‘the
rule of law’. One is too narrow to look beyond the
confines of individual parcels of aid; the other is
too broad to guide actionable priorities. A central
challenge for democracy assistance is to fashion
from all the strands of new thinking elaborated in
this chapter strategies able to articulate a linkage
between these two levels.
48
References
BMZ, Good Governance in German Development
Cooperation, Position Paper no. 50 (June 2002)
Carothers, T., Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning
Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1999)
Carothers, T., Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad:
The Problem of Knowledge, Working Paper no. 34
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2003)
French Ministère des Affaires Étranges, Direction
générale de la Coopération International et du
Développement (DGCID), ‘La coopération pour la
promotion de l’état de droit’, ‘La défense et la
promotion des driots de l’Homme’ (undated),
<http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/cooperation/dgci>
Crawford, G., ‘Promoting Democracy from Without:
Learning from Within (Part I)’, Democratization
10/1 (2003), pp. 77-98
Dalpino, C., Deferring Democracy: Promoting Openness in
Authoritarian Regimes (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000)
Edwards, Michael, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2004)
Hyman, G., ‘Tilting at Straw Men’, Journal of Democracy
13/3, (2002)
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Roads to
Democracy and Governance 23 (2003)
Mair, S., ‘Multi-partisan or Bi-partisan Cooperation?
What is the Best Solution for Democracy Assistance’,
in Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy,
Enhancing the European Profile in Democracy
Assistance 136 (2004)
Quigely, K., ‘Lofty Goals, Modest Results: Assisting Civil
Society in Eastern Europe’, in M. Ottoway and T.
Carothers (eds), Funding Virtue (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000)
Santiso, C., ‘Reforming European Foreign Aid:
Development Cooperation as an Element of Foreign
Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 7/4 (2002)
USAID, Civil–Military Relations Resources,
<http://www.usaid.gov/>
USAID, ‘Political Party Development and USAID’,
Democracy Dialogue December 1999
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘Building democracy involves much more than arranging free elections. Freedom of
speech and the press must be protected, as well as the rights to assemble and establish
political parties. A fair judiciary must be built up.
In a country with democratic traditions, these rights are self-evident. But less than
half of the world’s countries that have declared independence and are UN members
are countries where the people themselves determine their government.
The majority of the world’s population does not have ownership of their government.
Typically, power has been secured through the establishment of a single party system,
a military coup or by bloodlines. The state leaders consider themselves owners of the
state, and they see the duty of citizens as keeping them in power. Those who attempt to
rock the boat are prevented from doing so and punished accordingly.’
Harri Holkeri, member of the Board of International IDEA,
former Prime Minister of Finland, and former Head of the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo
50
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
4. Why Governance Matters
In Achieving the Millennium
Declaration and the Millennium
Development Goals*
This chapter addresses the issues of democracy and
good governance in a systematic way by linking development and the realization of the Millennium Development Goals to democracy building. It presents
UNDP’s experiences on how to stabilize democracy
and make it work.
No state can truly be called democratic if it
offers its people no escape from poverty; and no
country can truly develop, so long as its people
are excluded from power.
Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General, United Nations
One of the most important lessons of the last
two decades is that democratic governance
is the glue that holds all other development
priorities set out across the Millennium
Development Goals together.
Mark Malloch Brown, former Administrator,
United Nations Development Programme
current Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary-General
4.1. Introduction
More countries than ever before are working to
build democratic governance. Their challenge
is to develop institutions and processes that are
more responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens,
including the poor. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) works to bring people together within nations and around the world, building
partnerships and sharing ways to promote participation, accountability and effectiveness at all levels. UNDP acts to help countries strengthen their
electoral and legislative systems, improve access to
justice and public administration, and develop a
greater capacity to deliver basic services to those
most in need.
The critical importance of democratic governance in the developing world was underlined at
the Millennium Summit, where the world’s leaders resolved to ‘spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
right to development’. A consensus was reached
which recognized that improving the quality of
*This chapter was contributed by the UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
51
democratic institutions and processes, and managgovernance in the developing world was
ing the changing
underlined at the Millennium Summit,
roles of the state
where the world’s leaders resolved to
and civil society
‘spare no effort to promote democracy
in an increasingly
and strengthen the rule of law, as well as
globalized world,
respect for all internationally recognized
must underpin nahuman rights and fundamental freedoms,
tional efforts to reincluding the right to development’.
duce poverty, sustain the environment and promote human development.
Whether the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) agreed on at the Millennium Summit
will be reached depends in large part on how successful governments, civil society, citizens and international institutions will be in promoting and
implementing the concepts of democratic governance. UNDP believes that political and human development is as important to achieving the
MDGs as economic growth. Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable growth, but it also requires that poor people have political power and
a voice. The best way to achieve that in a manner
that is consistent with the Millennium Declaration objectives and MDGs is by building strong
and deep forms of democratic governance at all
levels of society.
The critical importance of democratic
4.2. The Millennium Declaration
and Democratic Governance
In September 2000 the world’s leaders adopted the
UN Millennium Declaration, committing their
nations to stronger global efforts to advance development and poverty eradication, securing human rights, democracy and good governance. The
MDGs that emerged from the Declaration are
specific, quantitative and measurable targets to be
achieved by 2015 or earlier. The goals focus on
eight essential areas of development, from halving
extreme poverty and hunger, to making primary
education available to all girls and boys, reducing child and maternal mortality, reducing gender
disparities and empowering women, arresting the
spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensuring environmental
sustainability. MDG 8, ‘Global partnership for development’, promises to create a more transparent,
rule-based and non-discriminatory trading and
52
financial system. This goal also includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally.
On current trends, however, at least 59 countries
are unlikely to meet their targets and 33 countries
with more than a quarter of the world’s population will achieve fewer than half of the goals by
2015. If this lack of progress continues, it will take
more than 130 years to rid the world of hunger.
An even more troubling aspect of these bleak facts
is that many of the countries least likely to achieve
the MDGs are the world’s poorest—the least developed countries. Most of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa where 23 of the region’s 44 countries are
failing in most areas (UNDP Human Development
Report 2002).
These discouraging facts beg the question what
is needed to hasten the pace of progress towards
achieving the MDGs. There are various debates
concerning economic growth, technology, macroeconomic policy, or the more elusive concept of
governance. While there are many opinions on
what must come first or which is more important,
most would agree that all these elements are needed, and that all these factors are indeed related to
improving governance in developing countries
(Fukuda-Parr and Ponzio, undated).
The fact is that most of the countries that are not
on track to meet the MDGs do not have free and
democratic political systems. While freedom and
democracy are not necessarily prerequisites for
development, very few democratic countries are
among the world’s poorest. Countries where political rights and civil liberties are limited, where
corruption is rampant, where ruling parties have
dominated for decades, where women have less
opportunities or where there is ethnic or religious
discrimination tend to be among the poorest and
the least likely to achieve the goals.
4.3. Why is Governance
Indispensable to Achieving
the MDGs?
Although most people agree that governance is essential in the development process there are different understandings about what governance means.
In a historical development context it is possible to
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
identify three main phases of the governance concept.
First, from the 1960s to the mid-1980s development was seen to be state-led through a ‘planning’
framework where strengthening public administration was the focus of what is today called ‘governance’. Development assistance during this period was concerned with technological transfers
and building state capacity. In the second phase,
the governance debate turned to implementation
of economic reform programmes that were part of
a larger economic liberalization agenda in developing countries.
During the 1980s and 1990s attention turned to
issues such as the lack of adequate legal frameworks for investors, lack of financial transparency and accountability, weak institutions that were
unable to enforce laws, corruption and ineffective
administration. These concerns can be described
as a good governance agenda that is preoccupied
with creating efficient institutions and rules that
promote development by making markets work
and ensuring that public services are managed effectively. The World Bank is generally seen as the
strongest proponent of the good governance agenda which includes the rule of law (i.e. enforcing
contract and property rights), combating corruption (emphasizing greater financial transparency
and accountability), and ensuring efficient public service delivery and basic social services such as
schools and health care. The good governance priorities are aimed at increasing economic efficiency
and growth by helping to set an environment that
is conducive to private investment.
Few would disagree that economic growth, financial transparency and accountability are essential
to achieving the MDGs. After all, the cornerstone
measurement for MDG 1 of halving poverty is per
capita gross domestic product (GDP).1 The rule of
law, efficient public service delivery and marketfriendly institutions are also necessities to encourage economic investment and growth in developing countries. There is no doubt that countries
with economic mismanagement and rampant corruption are far less likely to achieve the MDGs as
1
such activities distort a country’s ability to invest
in health and education.
The good governance agenda, however, is too narrow for achieving the goals and objectives of the
Millennium Declaration. First, the Declaration
has a broader agenda that covers peace, democracy and human rights. The world’s leaders in 2000
clearly committed themselves to more than just
good governance when they stated that:
We will spare no effort to promote democracy and
strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development. We resolve therefore to strive for the fulfilment of all human rights, including the rights
of minorities, women, migrant workers, to work
against racism and for more inclusive political
processes and to ensure the freedom of the media
and the right to information for all (United Nations Millennium Declaration 2000).
The MDGs have also in many ways become a
manifesto for the world’s poor. In this aspect, economic growth is just one of the means for achieving the MDGs and will remain inconsequential
in many countries unless there is a change in their
governance structures. Economic growth is clearly not enough because the benefits
The fact is that most of the countries that
of growth may not
are not on track to meet the MDGs do
be channelled to
not have free and democratic political
the poor or to exsystems. While freedom and democracy
panding their social
are not necessarily prerequisites for
and economic opdevelopment, very few democratic
portunities.
countries are among the world’s poorest.
Second, although
there is no automatic relationship between growth
and human development, growth can contribute
to human development if increased incomes and
higher government revenue translate into social
and productive spending that positively influences
human development indicators such as health and
education (UNDP 2003d).
The Millennium Goals demonstrate a development agenda that is for human development, not
GDP per capita is also an essential indicator for several human development measures including the Human Development Index.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
53
just economic growth. Goals such as improving access to water and increasing literacy rates are concerned with expanding the well-being of people
as opposed to just promoting economic growth.
As several UNDP Human Development Reports
have pointed out, economic growth is a means to
an end, not an end in itself (UNDP Human Development Report 2000, 2002, 2003).
4.4. Human Development and
Democratic Governance as a
Framework for Achieving the
MDGs
While it may be unclear whether democratic governance enhances economic
growth, it is clear that democratic governance enhances human development.
Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World
Human development is about much more than the
rise or fall of national incomes. It is about creating
an environment in which people can develop their
full potential and lead productive, creative lives
in accordance with their needs and interests. People are the real wealth of nations. Development is
therefore about expanding the choices people have
to lead lives that they value. And it is thus about
much more than economic growth, which is only
a means—if a very
important one—of
The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs
enlarging people’s
aim to secure the environment which can
choices.
produce freedom and human capabilities.
A human being cannot be ‘free’ unless he
Fundamental to
enlarging
these
provides choices.
choices is building human capabilities—the range
of things that people can do or be in life. The most
basic capabilities for human development are the
chances to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for
a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community. Without these,
many choices are simply not available, and many
opportunities in life remain inaccessible.
or she has an enabling environment that
54
In seeking that ‘something else’, human development shares a common vision with human rights.
The goal is human freedom. And in pursuing capabilities and realizing rights this freedom is vital.
People must be free to exercise their choices and
to participate in decision making that affects their
lives. Human development and human rights are
mutually reinforcing, helping to secure the wellbeing and dignity of all people, building self-respect and the respect of others.
UNDP defines human development as ‘development of the people, for the people and by the people’. Of the people because the aim is to lead a
more human life; by the people because development depends on the creative effort of men and
women, not on nature or luck; and for the people
because the objective is not to add zeros to the national accounts but to improve the lives of people.
In this perspective, the true goal of public policy is to provide more options for citizens to live
their lives in an increasingly satisfactory way. In a
word, development is ‘freedom’. And freedom, in
addition to being the objective, is the best way to
achieve development.
The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs aim
to secure the environment which can produce freedom and human capabilities. A human being cannot be ‘free’ unless he or she has an enabling environment that provides choices. The MDGs can
be conceived of as the core tools needed to make
these choices. Moreover, the key economic and social rights, such as the right to food, education and
health, are clearly reflected in MDGs 1-7. Human
development and the MDGs need to be delivered
by environments that provide democracy, the rule
of law and human rights as described in the Millennium Declaration.
4.4.1. Democratic Governance for
Human Development
Whereas the good governance agenda sought to
enhance public service delivery and economic
management in order to promote private investment and economic growth, human development
demands a broader notion of governance. Human
development advocates in the 1990s introduced
concepts such as ‘humane governance’. In contrast
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
to good governance, the concept of humane governance seeks to make governance more peopleoriented, focused on human rights and global security. This concept aims to tackle ‘inhumane governance’ which is characterized by five persistent
global problems:
• the failure to meet basic needs;
• discrimination against and denial of human
rights to women, indigenous people and
others;
• failures to protect the environment and to
safeguard the interests of future generations;
• lack of progress in abolishing war; and
• failure to achieve the spread of ‘transnational
democracy’ (Falk 1999).
A similar approach to humane governance was
introduced in the 1999 UNDP Human Development Report on South Asia. The report developed
a policy agenda for human governance dedicated to securing human development along three
lines: first, structures and processes that support
the creation of a participatory, responsive and
accountable polity (good political governance);
second, a competitive, non-discriminatory and
equitable economy (good economic governance);
and, third, a society in which people are given the
ability to self-organize (good civic governance).
Building on these ideas of governance, the UNDP
Human Development Report 2002 elaborated on
the concept of ‘democratic governance’. Like good
governance, democratic governance seeks efficient
institutions and a predictable economic and political environment necessary for economic growth
and the effective functioning of public services.
But democratic governance shares with humane
governance the objective of securing political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights for all. A
democratic governance reform agenda would aim
at building institutions and rules that are not only
efficient but also fair and are developed through a
democratic process in which all people have a real
political voice. Consequently, good governance
may not be democratic, while democratic governance is always good governance (Fukuda-Parr and
Ponzio, undated).
For UNDP, democratic governance must be the
framework within which countries achieve human development through poverty eradication,
environmental protection and regeneration, gender equality and sustainable livelihoods. The Millennium Declaration clearly supports the same
framework by emphasizing peace, human rights
and good governance as the process for delivering
the MDGs.
Democratic governance is the most human-development-friendly system of governance and the
primary vehicle for the articulation of individuals’
interests and the fulfilment of their deepest aspirations. It is also essential for the nurturing of civil
society as an indispensable partner in the management of public affairs.
From a human development perspective, good
governance means democratic governance. According to the UNDP Human Development Report
2002, democratic governance entails the following:
• People’s human rights and fundamental
freedoms are respected, allowing them to live
with dignity.
• People have a say in decisions that affect their
lives.
• People can hold decision makers accountable.
• Inclusive and fair rules, institutions and practices govern social interactions.
• Women are equal partners with men in the
private and public spheres of life and decision
making.
• People are free from discrimination based on
race, ethnicity, class, gender or any other attribute.
• The needs of future generations are reflected in
current policies.
• Economic and social policies are responsive to
people’s needs and aspirations.
• Economic and social policies aim at eradicating
poverty and expanding the choices that all people have in their lives.
That is why governance for human development
places individuals and their choices at the centre of the development process and embraces the
principles of empowerment, participation, equity and sustainability. Ownership, decency and
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
55
Democracies also contribute to political
stability and thus to human security because
open space for political contests allows for
more peaceful resolution and management
of conflict.
accountability are
among the most
important underlying principles of
governance for human development.
Democratic governance is valuable in its own right. But it can also
advance human development and MDGs for the
following reasons.
• When more than economic growth is considered, democracy can work to put in a political
dynamic to respond to the social and economic
priorities of people and contribute to reducing
poverty and promoting human development.
This is particularly essential for developing
countries that are not on target to reach their
MDGs. A human development-centred democracy would for example prioritize health
and education issues over military spending.
• As Amartya Sen has demonstrated, famines do
not take place in countries where there is freedom of the press and access to information.
Even in times of food shortages, public pressure
obliges the government to act when a famine
is looming. History provides ample examples
of the opposite occurring in non-democratic
countries. In general, democratic institutions
can check authoritarian leaders from adopting
ruinous policies.
• Democracies also contribute to political stability and thus to human security because open
space for political contests allows for more
peaceful resolution and management of conflict. Although riots and demonstrations are
more frequent in democracies, they are far less
destabilizing there than in dictatorships. Empirical studies also show that democracies do
not wage wars with each other. The opposite
can be said about authoritarian regimes, which
are far more prone to conflict and war, which
in turn severely undermines human development and human security.
• Democratic institutions and processes that give
voice to people, and hold rulers accountable, as
well as open competition for power, make politicians more likely to respond to the needs of
ordinary people.
56
Authoritarian leaders promise better outcomes and
argue that democracy must be sacrificed for economic growth and social progress. But there is no
evidence of such a trade-off. Statistical studies find
that neither authoritarianism nor democracy is a
factor in determining either the rate of economic
growth or how it is distributed (UNDP Human
Development Report 2002). The lesson from these
empirical findings is that, while democracy can
contribute to equitable socio-economic progress,
it is neither a panacea for eradicating poverty nor
a luxury for poor countries.
4.5. The Challenge of
Strengthening Democracy in a
Fragmented World
These findings raise some fundamental questions:
where and why do the incentives to respond to
people’s needs fail in democracies? Why does democracy not have stronger links with the equitable
expansion of social and economic opportunities
for the public at large? Why are social injustices
widespread even in long-established democracies?
The UNDP Human Development Report finds that
there are two main reasons why democracy deficits
persist: first, corruption and the control by an elite
subvert democratic institutions; and, second, the
inadequate reach of democratic institutions causes
limited participation.
Corruption, abuses of power, intimidation by
criminal elements—all weaken democratic accountability. Oversight and regulatory agencies
may also fail to act when they have been politicized
or are under the influence of special interests. Judicial proceedings can be undermined when they are
open to bribes, providing little protection to ordinary people, particularly the poor and vulnerable.
Women, for instance, may well get little justice
from male-dominated courts. The issue of money in politics is especially serious because it can
distort democratic institutions at every level. Electoral processes can obviously not operate without
financing; but, where money plays a decisive role
in politics, it turns unequal economic power into
unequal political advantage and undermines the
fundamental democratic principle of ‘one person, one vote’. The issue of money in politics is
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
equally contentious in developed and developing
countries.
What needs to be done to break the vicious cycle
of corruption and control by an elite? Strengthening the key institutions of democracies is a necessary first step which represents a tremendous challenge in new democracies. Capacity building and
support to parliaments, public administration,
electoral bodies, judicial systems, the media and
civil society are some of the areas in which UNDP
and other development actors work in collaboration with national counterparts. Activities in these
areas include, for example, strengthening political
parties, which are often far from institutionalized
and virtually disappear between elections. Many
media bodies are still subject to restrictions or do
not have adequate professional capacity. In many
new democracies, political reforms have not been
consolidated and the executive continues to exercise control over the judiciary and legislature. In
this context UNDP and partners work with the
government to establish independent oversight
bodies for elections or human rights institutions
that are charged with investigating human rights
violations. Capacity building and the strengthening of the judicial system are also key activities, as
justice and the rule of law have been shown not
to be accessible for many citizens in developing
countries. According to the Human Development
Report 2002, only 47 of 81 countries that took
steps to democratize in the 1980s and 1990s are
considered to have completed these reforms.
Strengthening institutions, however, is only part
of the solution. Political pressure and change also
have to come from outside formal structures,
through the emergence of more vibrant democratic politics, led by watchdog media and activist
citizen groups. A global trend of the last decade
has been the explosion across the world of civil
society organizations and civic participation, demanding greater accountability of government
and other powerful actors such as private business
and multilateral organizations.
Civil society organizations can play a critical role
in developing the social and political capacities of
the poor, increasing their effectiveness in influencing governance institutions and making the latter
more responsive to their needs.
4.6. Regional Focus on Human
Development and Governance
Since the first Human Development Report was
launched in 1990, there have been several regional
reports which promote regional partnerships for
influencing change and addressing region-specific
human development approaches to human rights,
governance, poverty, education, economic reform,
HIV/AIDS and globalization.
With regard to democratic governance, the regional reports that have arguably received the greatest
attention are the Arab Human Development Report
(AHDR) of 2002 and 2003.
The AHDR 2002 challenged the Arab world to
overcome three cardinal obstacles to human development posed by widening gaps in freedom,
women’s empowerment and knowledge across the
region. A look at international, regional and local developments affecting Arab countries since
the report was issued confirms that those challenges remain critically pertinent and may have
become even graver, especially in the area of freedom. Nowhere is this more apparent than the status of education and knowledge in the Arab world
at the beginning of the 21st century, and this is
the theme of the second report. Despite the presence of significant human capital in the region,
the ADHR 2003 concluded that disabling constraints hamper the acquisition, diffusion and
production of knowledge in Arab societies. This
human capital, under more promising conditions,
could offer a substantial base for an Arab knowledge renaissance. The Report affirms that knowledge can help the region to expand the scope of
human freedoms, enhance the capacity to guarantee those freedoms through good governance, and
achieve the higher moral human goals of justice
and human dignity. It also underlines the importance of knowledge to Arab countries as a powerful driver of economic growth through higher productivity. Its closing section puts forward a
strategic vision for creating knowledge societies in
the Arab world based on five pillars: guaranteeing
key freedoms; disseminating quality education;
embedding science; shifting towards knowledge
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
57
based production;
and developing an
enlightened Arab
governance’ debate was cast as finding
knowledge model.
alternatives to the state-dominated
The AHDR 2003
economic and social development of
makes it clear that,
previous decades.
in the Arab civilization, the pursuit
of knowledge is prompted by religion, culture, history and the human will to achieve success. Only
defective social, economic and political structures
hinder this quest. Arabs must remove or reform
these structures in order to take the place they deserve in the world of knowledge at the beginning
of the knowledge millennium.
In the 1980s and early 1990s the ‘good
UNDP believes that these reports can help spark
the necessary debate on how countries and regions
should approach democratic governance issues
and strengthen human development for all citizens, including women and the poor.
4.7. Democratic Governance:
the Road Ahead
To achieve the vision and goals of the Millennium Declaration requires democratic governance.
There is a need for democratic governance that
responds to peoples’ priorities and needs, which
amounts to more than people just having the right
to vote. It must be about strengthening voice and
power through democratic politics that make participation and public accountability cut through
elite control of institutions. There is a need for
democratic governance that gives priority to poor
people’s interests, which is about more than institutions and rules
that promote efThe UN system and partner organizations
ficiency; it is also
can play an important role on the new
about fairness and
frontiers of governance policy advice and
social justice.
institutional strengthening, especially in
areas that bring political elements into
Democratic governance in the
fast-changing global community of the 21st century is more than
public management within borders. It also concerns operations, rules and practices beyond borders and by actors beyond the state—civil society
groups and private businesses.
economic and social development.
58
In the 1980s and early 1990s the ‘good governance’ debate was cast as finding alternatives to the
state-dominated economic and social development of previous decades. In the present day, good
governance is more about improving and reforming the functioning of democratic institutions, including the ‘deepening of democracy’, strengthening accountability and exploring more active and
creative roles for non-state actors. According to
the UNDP’s Human Development Report 2003:
Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among
Nations to End Poverty, the development policy
approaches of the 1980s and 1990s focused too
much on macroeconomic and governance reforms
to the detriment of those structural constraints
that keep the poorest countries in a ‘poverty trap’.
While this is true, sound governance is indispensable if the MDGs are to be achieved.
International cooperation in support of democratic governance would need to take on a broader
agenda. Beginning in the early 1990s, many development assistance providers began shifting away
from traditional public-sector management concerns and modest decentralization programmes
to dealing with sensitive governance areas such as
human rights, parliamentary support, judicial reform and corruption. Responding to the growth
in the number of transitional democracies, the
electoral assistance role played by several multilateral and bilateral agencies has served as a key
entry point for undertaking a ‘new generation of
governance projects’. These recent developments
have generated a new kind of demand for research
and analysis relating to governance. The recent
publications, knowledge tools and other governance activities undertaken by organizations such
as UNDP and IDEA are very much evidence of
this recent trend.
The UN system and partner organizations can play
an important role on the new frontiers of governance policy advice and institutional strengthening,
especially in areas that bring political elements
into economic and social development. Besides
institutional constraints on addressing the broader
issues of democratization and human rights—
such as enhancing the functioning of parliaments,
the media, civil society organizations, and state–
citizen relations—the approach to governance by
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
UN organizations will no doubt emphasize partnership rather than conditionality (UNDP, Arab
Human Development Report 2002, 2003).
The importance of partnership is reflected
in MDG 8—the anchor without which the
first seven goals cannot be attained.
The importance of partnership is reflected in
MDG 8—the anchor without which the first seven goals cannot be attained. In calling on the international community to promote a global partnership for development, MDG 8 supports strengthening mutual accountability between North and
South, with the latter countries improving governance and eliminating corruption in order to address their development needs effectively. On the
other hand, developed countries have committed
themselves to increasing overseas development assistance, reducing the debt burden of poor countries, and promoting open trading and financial
systems likely to benefit the South.
4.8. Conclusion
The UN Millennium Declaration of 2000 commits rich and poor countries to advance development and eradicate poverty by promoting human
rights, democracy and good governance. By 2015
or earlier developing countries are to have achieved
the MDGs which range from halving poverty to arresting the spread of HIV/AIDS. At present rates,
however, many developing countries, including
the worlds’ poorest, will not achieve the goals.
Whether the MDGs will be reached depends in
large part on how successful governments, civil society, citizens and international institutions will be
in promoting and implementing the concepts of
democratic governance. The UNDP believes that
political and human development is as important to achieving the MDGs as economic growth.
Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable
growth, but it also requires that poor people have
political power and voice. The best way to achieve
that in a manner consistent with the Millennium
Declaration objectives and MDGs is by building
strong and deep forms of democratic governance
at all levels of society.
References
Falk, Richard, On Humane Governance, quoted in
UNDP, South Asia Human Development Report 1999
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and Ponzio, Richard, ‘Governance:
Past, Present, Future: Setting the Governance Agenda
for the Millennium Declaration’ (undated), <http://
www.undp.org/governance/docsaccount/gov-pastpresent-future.pdf>
UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating
Opportunities for Future Generations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) (2003a)
— Arab Human Development Report 2003 (New York:
UN Publications, [2003]) (2003b)
— Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and
Human Development (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000)
— Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002)
— Human Development Report 2003. Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)
(2003c)
— Making Global Trade Work for People, 2003 (2003d)
United Nations, Millennium Declaration, UN document
A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
59
‘Living together democratically calls for, above all, attaining a profound and
generalized change in individual attitudes to establish a global conscience able to
breed true solidarity. We must learn to reconcile the tension between worldwide and
local interests, in order to little by little become citizens of the world without forfeiting
our respective roots, and to participate actively both in national and community life.
Consequently, what we demand and pursue is education for peace: to prevent
violence, intolerance, selfishness and ignorance. Education should serve the cause of
human dignity through democratic harmony in freedom . . . as well as for modernity
and progress in solidarity.
In so doing, education can and should contribute decisively to bring peace and
sustainable development to the entire world, once and for all.’
Dr Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner, member of the Board of International IDEA
and Honorary President of the Club of Rome
60
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
5. The People’s Voice: Trust in
Political Institutions
Michael Bratton , Yun-han Chu, Marta Lagos , Richard Rose
The Global Barometer Surveys Network investigates
empirically how democracy is perceived by citizens on
different continents. This chapter shows how a comparative approach can help set the democracy debate
in a country into motion, and how listening to the
vox populi can help achieve local ownership by formulating a political agenda that mirrors the expectations of citizens.
If you want to know what is happening in a country, how do you find out? Talking to a cross-section of the people who live there is an obvious
way to determine what people are thinking. Public opinion surveys do just that: they collect data
about knowledge, values, opinions, attitudes and
behaviours and measure the collective views of a
representative sample of a defined population.
Understanding popular attitudes is especially important in new or unstable democracies, because
the authority of ‘governors’—that is, the holders of the chief offices of state, whether elected or
not—is not secure and citizens’ readiness to support democratic political institutions is untested.
In established democracies government agencies
regularly conduct sample surveys of the population to get feedback for shaping public policies;
political parties use polls to formulate their voting
appeal; and the mass media sponsor public opinion polls to provide instant evaluation of what
governors are doing and to conduct hypothetical
‘horse races’ which show who would be the winner
if an election were held that day. Academic social
scientists have the responsibility to dig deeper in
order to find out why government is popular or
unpopular. Is unpopularity due to a dislike of a
political personality who can be voted out of office
at the next election? Is it due to economic failings
that may be the result of a world depression rather
than a government’s mistakes? Is it due to corruption in government? Or does the unpopularity of a
democratically elected government reflect popular
dissatisfaction with democracy itself?
Opinion polls are an extremely effective tool for
comparing and understanding political, economic and social trends. Epictetus, the slave philosopher, addressed the core problem of public opinion: ‘Perceptions are truth because people believe
in them’. Jean Jacques Rousseau, the first major
philosopher to use the term ‘public opinion’, said
‘whoever makes his business to give laws to a people must know to sway opinions and through them
govern the passions of men’. Nonetheless, we need
to be aware of the scope and limitations of public opinion survey
data. Public opinPublic opinion polls are best at answering
ion polls are best
questions about what people are doing,
at answering queswhat they are thinking and what kind
tions about what
people are doof government they would like to have.
ing, what they are
Yet the evidence from opinion polls still
thinking and what
leaves open for discussion why people
kind of governdiffer in their attitudes and what the policy
ment they would
implications are.
like to have. Yet the
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
61
evidence from opinion polls still leaves open for
discussion why people differ in their attitudes and
what the policy implications are.
political concerns are common to citizens in every
political system, lots of questions are common in
GBS surveys across four continents.
The GBS Network is a scholarly collaboration of social scientists that addresses the task of
finding out what people are thinking and doing
by conducting representative sample surveys
in more than 50 societies in transition in
Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America
<http://www.globalbarometer.org>. Its questions
focus on fundamental problems of governance
rather than the ephemeral concerns of a nightly
television show. Independence from government
means that the surveys are designed to increase
understanding of what citizens see as the faults as
well as the strengths of their political institutions.
Each of the four GBS partners writes its questionnaire for maximum
relevance
withAsking citizens what they think is
in its continental
especially necessary if trust in political
context, whether
institutions is to be evaluated. Inevitably,
it is the legacy of
governors want to claim that the institutions
communist rule in
they direct are trusted by the masses. But
Eastern Europe or
political elites are not unbiased judges of
the political conpublic opinion at the grass roots, and the
sequences of povfact that people vote in elections is not
erty and illiteracy
proof that they trust politicians.
in Africa. However, since many
Asking citizens what they think is especially necessary if trust in political institutions is to be evaluated. Inevitably, governors want to claim that the
institutions they direct are trusted by the masses.
But political elites are not unbiased judges of public opinion at the grass roots, and the fact that people vote in elections is not proof that they trust
politicians.
5.1. Limited Trust in Political
Institutions
Trust is of fundamental importance for ‘governance’, the process by which government policies
are carried out through the cooperation of citizens
with public officials. While implementing popular decisions is easy, leaders need the ‘governance
capital’ that trust provides in order to carry out
unpopular decisions. If major political institutions
are deemed trustworthy, citizens are more likely to
cooperate with unpopular decisions necessary for
the long-term benefit of a society. If institutions
are distrusted, citizens may refuse to cooperate or
ignore laws and regulations, and the effectiveness
of government is thereby reduced.
Table 5.1: New Europe Barometer Surveys, 2004
62
Country
Survey dates
Belarus
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine
16–28 November 2004
18–25 October 2004
29 November–6 December 2004
5–19 November 2004
10–30 November 2004
5 November–22 December 2004
3–19 December 2004
24–30 November 2004
1–10 October 2004
3–23 January 2005
3–10 November 2004
26 November–6 December 2004
Jan.–Feb. 2005
Number of
respondents
1,000
1,231
1,071
940
992
956
1,113
943
1,110
2,107
1,036
1,000
2,000
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Table 5.2: Summary of Institutional Trust
Army
Police
A. AFROBAROMETER
Mali
79
Tanzania
72
Malawi
72
Mozambique
49
Lesotho
50
Botswana
60
Ghana
54
Uganda
51
Namibia
50
Kenya
58
Zambia
52
Senegal
61
South Africa
32
Cape Verde
35
Nigeria
21
Afro-Barometer
(53)
Courts
Parliament
2
(% trusting )
Party1
Country mean
63
51
64
50
51
57
51
43
48
28
42
45
35
36
11
(45)
50
54
61
59
58
57
45
51
42
37
49
42
39
43
22
(47)
62
69
38
54
49
37
48
48
47
53
40
25
31
22
11
(42)
58
66
45
64
55
43
51
56
59
65
32
26
32
19
16
(46)
62
62
56
55
53
51
50
50
49
48
43
40
34
31
16
(47)
B. NEW EUROPE BAROMETER
Estonia
57
45
Hungary
39
43
Lithuania
61
33
Romania
60
32
Poland
59
36
Latvia
36
36
Slovakia
48
27
Slovenia
30
33
Czech R
29
28
Bulgaria
38
35
Russia
38
15
New Europe
(45)
(33)
46
45
26
26
22
35
24
25
26
15
21
(28)
18
23
17
15
8
14
12
19
13
7
11
(14)
7
16
10
9
3
10
10
10
15
6
10
(10)
34
33
30
28
26
26
24
23
22
20
19
(26)
C. EAST ASIA BAROMETER
PR China
95
Thailand
76
Mongolia
67
Hong Kong
63
Philippines
54
Korea
59
Taiwan
58
Japan
48
East Asia
(65)
72
60
47
69
50
51
41
61
(56)
86
54
61
52
44
15
20
13
(43)
94
47
42
22
35
15
16
9
(35)
85
58
53
52
46
38
36
36
(50)
1
2
77
55
48
na
47
50
45
48
(53)
Note: trust for the ruling party.
Percentage excludes ‘don’t knows’.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
63
Army
D. LATINO BAROMETRO
Brazil
54
Uruguay
33
Chile
36
Colombia
41
Costa Rica
Na
Venezuela
34
Honduras
27
Panama
Na
Mexico
40
El Salvador
25
Paraguay
23
Argentina
27
Peru
26
Nicaragua
22
Bolivia
19
Ecuador
25
Guatemala
11
Latino Barometro
(26)
1
2
Police
Courts
Parliament
(% trusting2)
37
50
48
37
36
26
33
35
17
34
24
22
23
26
14
17
16
(29)
42
37
20
19
31
19
19
20
13
17
17
16
12
15
16
8
12
(20)
28
25
23
13
20
18
19
17
21
14
14
14
13
11
13
6
10
(16)
Party
Country mean
16
17
13
9
10
14
12
15
10
11
11
8
8
7
6
6
8
(11)
35
33
28
24
24
22
22
22
20
20
18
17
16
16
14
12
11
(21)
Note: trust for the ruling party.
Percentage excludes ‘don’t knows’.
Figure 5.1: Trusting and Distrusting Citizens, By Continent
New Europe
East Asia
Distrust 53%
Little, no trust 42%
Neutral
21%
Trust
26%
Latin America
A lot or some
trust 49%
Little, no trust 75%
Don´t know
9%
Africa
Little, no trust 51%
Don´t know 5%
A lot or some
trust 20%
A lot or some
trust 43%
Don´t know
6%
Source: Global Barometer Surveys <www.globalbarometer.org>, New Europe 2004/05: 11 countries; Latin American 2003: 17 countries; East Asia 2001 – 2003: 8 countries; Africa 2002 – 2003: 16
countries.
Average is for 5 institutions per country.
64
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
During their term of office, political leaders often
become unpopular because of their own behaviour
or because their efforts to deal with such issues as
the economy or rising crime are unsuccessful. In
a democratic system, a low level of popularity can
lead to defeat at a general election, and authoritarian leaders can be deposed abruptly too. When
leaders are unpopular, trust in political institutions provides a reservoir of political support. Furthermore, the rejection of an elected incumbent
does not automatically lead to rejection of the institutions of democratic governance. Finally, while
electoral demands for prosperity cannot guarantee
an economic boom, a high level of popular trust
can make governance work better by encouraging
cooperation between governors and governed.
Trust in political institutions is thus particularly
appropriate to address through surveys of public opinion. Every GBS includes questions about
trust both in key representative institutions (parliament, political parties) and in the key institutions that maintain the state’s authority (the army,
the police and the courts). Since interviews are
conducted in more than three dozen languages,
the exact wording of questions must vary between
continents but the meaning is common. For example, the New Europe Barometer asks: ‘To what
extent do you trust each of these political institutions to look after your interests?’ and the Latinobarometro asks—‘Per favor, mire esta tarjeta y digame, cuánta confianza tiene en cada uno de estos
instituciones?’. The replies show the following.
On every continent there are trusting and distrusting
citizens. In societies in transformation, political institutions have not (or have not yet) secured the
trust of a majority of citizens. The degree of trust
and distrust differs across continents. In East Asia
almost half the evaluations of five major political
institutions register a lot of trust or some trust,
and in Africa more than two in five responses are
positive. However, the pie charts in figure 5.1
likewise show that on each continent about half
withhold trust from political institutions. The situation is less favourable in the post-communist
countries of Europe and in Latin America. Clear
majorities register distrust in political institutions
there. Yet the picture is not totally negative, for at
least a fifth of responses in each of these continents
express positive trust.
There are substantial national differences. Continental averages of trust mask substantial differences between countries within each continent.
Global Barometer surveys demonstrate that in
every society public opinion is not homogeneous,
as political culture theory postulates. The higher
the average level of trust, the bigger the distance
between countries (see figure 5.2 and, for details,
table 5.2). For example, among 15 African countries, trust averages as high as 62 per cent in Tanzania, where a largely rural population has long
experienced the stable rule of a dominant party.
Yet in Nigeria, where a more urbanized population has endured a turbulent history of repeated
military interventions into politics, only 16 per
cent say they trust political institutions. The range
in Asia is similarly great, because an extraordinary
85 per cent of respondents in the People’s Republic of China report trusting their institutions and
in three other Asian countries more than half register trust. However, the average level of trust falls
to 36 per cent in Japan and in Taiwan.
Across half of Europe the widespread distrust of
political institutions remains a legacy of communist rule. In Russia and Bulgaria only one in five
on average trusts political institutions. Trust in institutions is highest, but still at a low level, in Estonia and Hungary, where an average of one in three
show some trust. In Latin America, too, countries
differ only in the degree to which the majority of
citizens are distrustful. Guatemala has the distinction of registering the lowest average level of trust,
11 per cent. Brazil has the relatively highest level
of trust, 35 per cent.
There are big differences between political institutions in the trust they enjoy. In every country on
every continent the degree of trust shown specific
political institutions varies. These differences are
evident within as well as between countries. On
each continent the army—the institution with the
least claim to be democratic—ranks first or second in terms of trust. This is true not only in postcommunist countries and Asia, where the army
has usually remained politically neutral, but also
in Africa and Latin America, where military rule
has frequently occurred. Even in countries where
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
65
the army has been in power and where the overall
level of trust in institutions is low, such as Argentina and Nigeria, the army is nonetheless less distrusted than civilian institutions.
yet to establish a reputation of being independent
of the governing powers and free of corruption.
In African countries the result refers to the level
of trust in the ruling party only, not parties in general.
Source: Global Barometer Surveys
<http://www.globalbarometer.org>.
Even though competitive elections are held in
GBS countries, representative institutions consistently rank lowest in trust. In nine of the 11
European countries newly covered by the New
Europe Barometer, nine-tenths of citizens withhold trust from their political parties. Similarly,
only 14 per cent of new Europeans express trust
in their popularly elected Parliament. Hungary is
the only country in which as many as one-sixth express confidence in both Parliament and the parties. Latin Americans have not been subject to the
intense pressure of communist party mobilization,
but they too distrust both parties and their parliaments. The ‘highest’ level of trust in representative institutions is found in Brazil and Uruguay,
yet only one in four trusts the parliament there
and one in six trusts parties.
Further evidence exists to support the level of trust
in institutions exercising the state’s authority: the
police, for example, usually rank second in the degree of trust on each continent, and first in Latin
America. Even though communist regimes were
often described as police states, because coercion
was the prerogative of special interior ministry and
ruling party personnel, the police register a relatively highest level of trust. The courts rank relatively high in popular trust too. However, in Europe and Latin America the absolute level of trust
is one-third or less, indicating that the courts have
Even if they are not chosen in free and fair elections, African leaders often create a party apparatus to mobilize support and channel patronage.
Hence, the Afrobarometer asks separately about
trust in the ruling party and in the opposition parties. The answers show relatively high trust in the
ruling party, averaging 46 per cent, and relatively
low trust in opposition parties, averaging 23 per
cent. There are wide variations in trust for the ruling party and the parliament. For example, 69 per
cent of Tanzanians say they trust Parliament, as
against only 11 per cent of Nigerians.
Table 5.3: Institutions Least Trusted Everywhere
Figures are percentages of the level of trust
Afro
Army
53
Courts
47
Police
45
Parliament 42
Parties
461
Asia
65
56
53
43
35
Euro
45
28
33
14
10
Latino
26
20
29
16
11
1
Figure 5.2: National Differences in Trust within Each Continent
(Mean trust in institutions)
100%
P.R. China 85%
80
60
Mali/Tanzania 62%
East Asia mean 49%
Afro mean 43%
40
20
Japan/Taiwan 36%
Brazil 35%
Latino mean 20%
Nigeria 16%
Guatemala 11%
Estonia 34%
NEB mean 26%
Russia 19%
0
Africa
East Asia
Latin America
Source: Global Barometers Surveys: <www.globalbarometer.org>
66
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
New Europe
In Asia trust in representative institutions is on average greater, but variations are extreme. Although
Japan is the oldest democracy covered by the East
Asia Barometer, only 13 per cent trust the Parliament and 9 per cent trust the political parties,
which are divided into factions and spend lavishly
in competing for votes. In the People’s Republic of
China, trust appears abnormally high: 94 per cent
say that they trust the party—an answer that may
reflect prudence as much as the positive qualities
of party officials at the grass roots.
people differ in their evaluation of major political
institutions. These include social differences between young and old or between men and women; economic differences between those who see
themselves or their country as better or worse off
financially; differences in political performance,
such as the level of corruption in government; and
cultural differences distinguishing, for example,
Chinese from Japanese or Russians
While all societies require individuals to
from Hungarians.
While all societies require individuals to trust some
social relations, the radius of trust differs radically.
In an established democracy, the radius can extend
from the home to national political institutions.
However, the radius is usually much shorter in authoritarian regimes, because people develop strong
face-to-face ties in order to insulate themselves
from oppressive state institutions. In addition,
people need strong face-to-face ties in order to
cope with the shocks and stresses of change. This
can produce an ‘hour-glass’ society in which ordinary people trust informal face-to-face networks
while distrusting political institutions. This is the
case in post-communist societies: the New Europe
Barometer found that 70 per cent trust most people they know, while only 41 per cent trust most
people in their society, and just 26 per cent trust
major political institutions.
5.2. What Explains Differences
in Trust?
trust differs radically. In an established
Contrasting theodemocracy, the radius can extend from
ries about why peothe home to national political institutions.
ple differ in trust
However, the radius is usually much
have practical implications. Insofar
shorter in authoritarian regimes, because
as generational difpeople develop strong face-to-face ties
ferences between
in order to insulate themselves from
young and old are
oppressive state institutions. In addition,
the chief determipeople need strong face-to-face ties in
nant, there is little
order to cope with the shocks and stresses
that today’s govof change.
ernors can do to
prompt an increase
in political trust. Only the gradual turnover of
generations could alter the trust in political institutions. But insofar as economic conditions are influential, then governors can try to ‘buy’ trust by
promoting a rising standard of living. If political
performance influences trust, governors can earn
more trust by rooting out corruption in the political institutions for which they are responsible.
Just as free elections reveal differences of opinion
about who should govern, so in every country surveyed there are major differences between citizens
about trust in political institutions. In the average Asian and African country, from two-fifths to
one-half of the people interviewed express trust in
political institutions, while the other portion do
not. Moreover, there are differences of degree in
the extent of trust or distrust. The New Europe
Barometer finds that one-fifth of post-communist
citizens are neutral or sceptical about rather than
actively trustful or distrustful of institutions, and
those expressing extreme distrust are outnumbered
by those who are a little or somewhat distrusting.
Before prescribing what needs to be done, we must
determine which of the competing explanations of
trust is best supported by the systematic statistical analysis of evidence. Many explanations of why
individuals in countries as different as Chile, China or the Czech Republic trust or distrust political institutions are stated as universal propositions
about the motivation of people everywhere, for example, ‘It’s the economy, stupid’. The multi-continental scope of GBS allows such generalizations to
be tested by pooling survey data from all countries
on each continent and then identifying influences
and trends and comparing the results to ascertain
similarities or differences between continents.
Many theories are put forward to explain why
Since many citizens have limited knowledge of
trust some social relations, the radius of
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
67
politics, political trust or distrust is more a reflection of a generalized attitude towards political institutions as a whole than a specific view of the
courts or politicians. Individuals
Even though the level of trust may differ
seem to have a prefrom one institution to another, an African
disposition to be
who trusts the police is more inclined to
more or less trusttrust parliament, and a Latin American who
ing of all political
distrusts the courts is more inclined to
institutions. Even
though the level
distrust political parties.
of trust may differ
from one institution to another, an African who trusts the police
is more inclined to trust parliament, and a Latin American who distrusts the courts is more inclined to distrust political parties. Therefore, the
answers that each individual gives about trust are
combined into a single measure of trust, the average of their responses about trust in the army, police, courts, parliament and political parties.
Even though explanations of trust have different
theoretical rationales, they are not mutually exclusive. For this reason we use multiple regression
analysis to determine how strong each social, economic, political and cultural influence is after controlling for the effect of other influences. Given
the wealth of social structure, economic and political measures in each GBS questionnaire, initially
analysis was undertaken with two dozen potential
influences on trust. As is invariably the case, statistical analysis found
that many potenWhat a government does has the biggest
tial influences were
impact on trust. While the point may seem
in fact unimporobvious, it is often overlooked.
tant. Regressions
were therefore rerun taking into account only the substantial influences on several continents.
The results of multivariate statistical analysis are
robust, explaining the 38 per cent of the variation in the extent to which individuals do or do
not trust their political institutions in East Asia,
21 per cent in Africa, 19 per cent in Europe
and 12 per cent in Latin America.2 Analysing
influences across four continents identifies many
common patterns independent of national context. Figure 5.3 shows the seven influences that
across continents have the biggest impact on political trust, whether positive or negative.
What a government does has the biggest impact
on trust. While the point may seem obvious, it is
often overlooked. Governors find it easier to blame
the world economy or foreigners for citizens distrusting them than to accept that distrust is their
own fault. Citizens who see the government treating people like themselves fairly and equally will
have more trust in political institutions than those
who think it unfair. People can be treated fairly
with a professional bureaucracy in an authoritarian regime. However, an authoritarian regime is
less likely to be trusted, and citizens who see their
government as democratic are likely to trust it.
A government that abuses its authority has a big
negative impact on trust. Corruption at the national level can lead to a waste of scarce resources
and the conspicuous enrichment of a narrow political elite. At the local level, corruption can take
the form of officials extracting money from poor
people for doing what public officials ought to do
anyway. Thus, the trust a government gains by being perceived as democratic will be lost if it is also
perceived as corrupt.
Economic conditions have a big impact on trust
in political institutions. The state of the national economy rather than individual circumstances
is particularly important. If individuals view the
national economy positively, then on a four-point
scale their level of trust rises by more than onethird of a point. Government gets the credit or the
blame for the national economy whether or not
its actions are a major cause of prosperity. Many
factors outside the control of government can produce a sense of economic progress, for example,
a boom in oil prices benefits the Russian economy irrespective of what its governors do. Likewise,
a fall in world commodity prices hurts African
economies.
2
Space does not permit us to include the full statistical results as an appendix. In order to focus on the chief findings and their implications here, we propose to publish the statistical details of the regression analysis at <http://www.globalbarometer.org>.
68
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
In established democracies, political interest and
education are expected to encourage positive attitudes towards political involvement. However, in
societies in transition this is only half true. Those
who are interested in politics and identify with a
political party are more likely to trust political institutions. But, insofar as a government is untrustworthy, then the more you understand what is going on politically, the less you will trust it. Thus,
in transition societies, educated citizens tend to
be less trustful of political institutions. A greater knowledge of how a country ought to be governed makes educated people more aware of the
gap between the ideals, including those enshrined
in their national constitution, and how governors
actually use and abuse political institutions. This
implies that political involvement is less likely to
reflect the civic virtues of an ideal democracy and
more likely to be due to individuals calculating
that party ties and being in the know politically
are useful ways to advance their material interests
and career.
An advantage of identifying common patterns of
trust is that the regression analysis simultaneously
identifies exceptions to the rule, including countries where political conditions cause citizens to
differ to a degree from the overall pattern outlined
above.3 The citizens of the People’s Republic of
China deviate most from other East Asian citizens.
Chinese trust in political institutions is two-thirds
of a point higher than would be expected, a boost
big enough to offset the negative effect arising
from the perception of the government as corrupt.
One possible explanation for the Chinese distinctiveness is political. The starting point by which
Chinese evaluate their government may not be an
idealized democracy but the repression and fear of
the Cultural Revolution. Today’s government in
Beijing is thus gaining political trust by liberalizing institutions in comparison with a totalitarian
past. The past has also created a positive economic
legacy. Although China is poor in absolute terms,
during the last decade the economy has grown
at the extraordinary rate of 9 per cent a year. Although the countries included in the Latinobarometro differ in many respects, national context has
less impact on trust. Differences in trust among
Mexicans and among Argentineans reflect individual circumstances that also affect people throughout the continent. Not only is Nigeria’s government distrusted in
the absolute sense,
In established democracies, political
but its political ininterest and education are expected to
stitutions are more
encourage positive attitudes towards
distrusted
than
political involvement.
would be the case if
Nigerians saw their
political system as other Africans do. The effect of
national context may be due to ethnic minorities
Figure 5.3: Positive and Negative Influences on Trust
More 1
trusting
0,5
Good
economy
.35
More
democratic
.33
Grovt
fairer
Political
interest
.33
.10
Party ID
0
.11
- 0,5
-.37
More corrupt
Less - 1
trusting
-.24
More education
Note: Each bar shows the average change in the level of political trust across all continents.
For more detail see <www.globalbarometer.org/trust>.
3
National exceptions were identified by iteratively coding several major countries on each continent as dummy variables in order to see whether their
national context, net of the other influences identified in figure 3, had a substantial impact on trust. The four countries discussed above are the ones that
showed the biggest impact on their continent.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
69
feeling that the federal government does not care
about them or suspicions that popularly elected new leaders are just as corrupt as the soldiers
they have succeeded. Encouraged by
Promoting the rule of law and bureaucratic
economic recovfairness is the single biggest step governors
ery, Russians show
could take to increase trust. The more
more positive attiindividuals perceive their government as
tudes towards their
corrupt and unfair, the less likely they are to
conditions but this
does not boost potrust its institutions.
litical trust. Russians whose attitudes are otherwise the same as those of citizens of
Central and Eastern Europe are less trusting.
Many of the attitudes that increase trust are cumulative. People who see their government treating
people fairly, being democratic and being associated with economic success are likely to be a full
point higher in trust in political institutions than
citizens who view their country negatively on all
three counts. But in some instances the same influences may have the opposite effect. If people view
the economy as successful but regard their government as corrupt, then corruption cancels out the
gain in trust generated by economic success.
5.3. Implications for
Governance
The GBS diagnosis of the causes of distrust also
highlights how governors could act to increase
trust. Since many of the causes of distrust are
due to the actions of governors, prescriptions for
change are within their responsibility. The priority for increasing trust in political institutions is a
change in the behaviour of government officials.
Promoting the rule of law and bureaucratic fairness is the single biggest step governors could take
to increase trust. The more individuals perceive
their government as corrupt and unfair, the less
likely they are to trust its institutions. Even though
public officials may argue that corrupt practices
are traditional, that does not make them any more
acceptable to ordinary citizens who are vulnerable to exploitation by unfair officials. Transparency International not only assesses the extent to
which national political systems are corrupt; it also
70
prescribes steps that can be taken to reduce corruption <http://www.transparency.org>. In addition to abstaining from corruption, officials in societies in transformation need more incentives and
training to be bureaucrats, that is, public officials
who exercise their powers impartially and fairly according to the rules.
Improving democratic practices will also increase
trust. While the great majority of countries covered in GBS surveys hold elections, this is not sufficient to make government trustworthy. Where
free elections are held, if political parties are led by
cliques that blatantly ignore public opinion, few
people will want to identify with a political party.
Distrust will also occur wherever an elected government claims legitimacy yet is seen as the lesser evil, and politicians use office to enrich themselves. In new democracies the sine qua non for
trustworthy government is that elected representatives should be accountable to the courts. If they
are not, laws on campaign finance and civil society
generally will not be enforced and representative
institutions may be viewed with suspicion.
Where government is associated with economic
growth, there is more trust in political institutions,
because growth implies effective government. In a
single term of office the government of a developing country cannot deliver a high standard of
living, but it can achieve economic growth. This
not only encourages citizens to be more optimistic
about the future but also to be more trusting of
political institutions here and now. The example
of China demonstrates that it is the speed of economic growth rather than the absolute standard of
living that promotes greater political trust. Since
the way in which individuals evaluate the national economy is more important for trust than the
economic circumstances of individual households,
this helps the government, since even those who
do not benefit directly from growth will still be
positively influenced by macroeconomic improvement.
Whether an increase in public education has a
positive effect on trust depends on government
performance. Where political institutions are justifiably distrusted, higher levels of education will
go hand in hand with increased distrust. Given
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
the very strong desire of young people in societies
in transformation to become more educated, this
will produce pressures on politicians to make their
institutions more trustworthy or face the consequences of political alienation and an educated demand for structural change in the regime.
The bad news for distrusted governors is also the
good news for political reformers. Political distrust
is not due to shortcomings of individuals, such as
a lack of education, or to a national political culture. Rather, high levels of political distrust reflect
low levels of political and economic performance
by governors. Many of the measures required to
increase political trust are within the hands of governors: improving adherence to the rule of law and
reducing corruption at all levels; making officials
conform to bureaucratic principles of fairness towards citizens; improving the responsiveness of
central democratic institutions such as parties and
parliament; and promoting economic growth. In
short, good government makes for trust and bad
government makes for distrust.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
Many of the measures required to increase
political trust are within the hands of
governors: improving adherence to the rule
of law and reducing corruption at all levels;
making officials conform to bureaucratic
principles of fairness towards citizens;
improving the responsiveness of central
democratic institutions such as parties
and parliament; and promoting economic
growth. In short, good government makes
for trust and bad government makes for
distrust.
71
‘Gorbachev—Glasnost and Perestroika—presented us with the stellar moment when
everything seemed possible. The Cold War was over. The Wall was torn down and
democratization took off. The need for help and advice became obvious and with that
the creation of ground rules for democracy.
Bengt Säve-Söderbergh and Sweden saw the importance of a truly international
institute whose sole ambition was to support and promote democracy worldwide . . .
That was the beginning of IDEA.’
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Foreign Minister of Norway and UN Special Representative in the former
Yugoslavia.
Vice-Chairman of the Board of International IDEA November 1995–June 2001
Chairman of the Board June 2001–June 2003
72
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
6. From ’89 to 9/11: of Turmoil
and Hope
Konstanty Gebert
This chapter invites us to reflect on the hazards and
pitfalls that emerging democracies encounter on their
way to a state system that represents the will of their
people. Gebert describes the changes from authoritarian regime to democracy against the backdrop of the
collapse of communism and the growth of liberal democracies in Eastern Europe, mirroring the experiences and illusions of millions of people in the last
15 years.
We never really believed we would live to see the
day. As the 1980s dragged on, we kept following
our underground routines: writing, printing, distributing, organizing. But this was more out of a
sense of lack of alternative than hope that we would
succeed in tilting the balance. Jaruzelski’s military
regime clearly had the upper hand: Russia’s permafrost still extended to the Elbe, and the West was as
sympathetic to the socialist regime—and as ineffectual—as ever. People were in and out of jail, queues
in front of shops got no shorter, and the lies in the
morning paper and on the evening news remained
cheerfully brazen. What kept us going was the feeling that freedom is addictive. The sheer pleasure
of thinking what you want, writing, printing and
distributing it, more than outweighed the risk of
spending a few years in jail so long as the regime
was not prepared to kill. And clearly it was not:
the relatively few deaths during demonstrations or
in police cells were seen to be working ‘accidents’
rather than murder. At this rate things could go
on indefinitely. We spoke vaguely of our children
growing up in a free Poland eventually.
The rest of the world was an abstraction. Sure,
some of us occasionally could and did travel
abroad, meaning to the ‘West’: a trip to Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria did not count, because there we
saw the same oppression and lies, only in different
wrappings. The West was much too different to be
able to relate to our fate and too different for us to
be able to understand its problems. I myself was
able to spend one summer in France and Italy: yes,
capitalism was decaying—but what beautiful decay! In Paris I ran into a group of Argentinean exiles. We traded experiences, realizing with growing
amazement the similarities of our predicaments,
with one significant exception: their junta was
capable of killing more people each month than
ours managed in eight years. But beyond that,
communication with this group of Argentineans
was impossible: for them Moscow was admittedly a flawed ideal, but also a necessary restraint on
rapacious American imperialism. Yet for us Ronald Reagan was the first US president in decades
who seemed to understand: we rootWhat kept us going was the feeling that
ed for him! When
freedom is addictive.
he called the USSR
an ‘evil empire’, we
were euphoric. This was, after all, what for years
we had been screaming to deaf ears. For the first
time we no longer felt alone in a world afflicted
with moral indifference bordering on insanity.
But, legitimately enough, my Argentinean friends
remained supremely unconvinced.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
73
It was not that we were totally oblivious to their
fate. When I rammed through an article condemning Pinochet in the underground paper I was editing at the time, one of our best editors resigned
in protest. Her father had been murdered by the
Russians in Katyn, and anyone fighting the communists had to be her ally. So, when I published
another article, this time criticizing the invasion of
Grenada, on the ground that it seemed retrospectively to legitimize the invasion of Afghanistan,
I should have been forewarned. I expected some
backlash—but not
that several hunI realized that a system which cannot offer
dreds of readers
even its beneficiaries something which was
would henceforth
available to any Italian passer-by simply
refuse to buy my
cannot last.
‘red rag’ at underground
distribution points. I had betrayed them. This split
continued into the 1990s, when a former leading
underground activist travelled to London to visit
Pinochet, who at that time was under house arrest pending examination of a Spanish extradition
request. The Polish visitor presented the Chilean
general, in the name of the Polish people, with an
ornamental pendant engraved with the icon of the
Black Madonna. I then debated him furiously on
television. ‘I thought that what united us was our
opposition to pulling people’s fingernails’, I told
him ‘and now I see that what divides us is the little detail of whose fingernails are not to be pulled’.
He laughed.
And yet, during that otherwise depressing earlier
trip abroad—no agreement with the Argentineans, and a constant awareness of the fact that I
was seeing what Poland could never be—I had a
sudden flash of insight about the inevitability of
our victory. It happened, of all places, in a provincial Italian bar. Watching the dazzling array of
liquor bottles displayed behind the counter (back
at home, my monthly ration card had a coupon
that entitled me to buy a bottle of vodka), I suddenly realized that no such bar exists between the
Elbe and Vladivostok. Not in the most expensive
hotels for foreigners. Not in the secret den of the
Central Committee building. Not anywhere: the
system could simply not cope with the diversity of
possible choices, nor were the potential customers
on our side of the fence aware it existed. Sipping
74
an espresso ristretto which I chose after mature deliberation (Warsaw coffee shops offered a spoon of
ground coffee in a glass, topped with boiling water—if they had any coffee, that is), I realized that
a system which cannot offer even its beneficiaries
something which was available to any Italian passer-by simply cannot last. And yet, as a religious
friend of mine used to say: ‘I know God will provide. I just hope He provides until He provides’.
But provide He did ... and then came 1989.
Sitting for two-and-a-half long months at the
Round Table negotiations, I saw our communist
adversaries give up position after position, one illusion after another, until they came to the stark
realization that they were wrong, we were right,
they knew it, we knew it and they knew that we
knew. Their humiliation was almost embarrassing
and satisfied any thirst for revenge by our negotiators. Yet success was not predetermined. The Soviet permafrost was beginning to thaw, to be sure.
But we had witnessed such thaws before, and climatic change does not affect tanks. On the other
hand, it was not obvious that people would vote
for us anyway if given a democratic chance. A few
leading personalities aside, all we had was a banner
and a legend. The adversary had public faces, organization and money. During a break in the talks,
the deputy Minister of the Interior, the secret police’s man at the Round Table, earnestly tried to
convince me that we should go for a deal which
would ensure that at least 40 of our leaders would
get safe seats in Parliament. He was worried that
people would not vote for unknown faces: our
guys would not get elected—and then everybody
will accuse the Reds of forging the results. He left
me half-convinced.
We voted on what turned out to be ‘Tienanmen
Day’, 4 June. On the evening news, images of polling alternated with footage from the Beijing massacre, starkly illustrating what the alternative solution could look like. When the dimensions of the
communists’ defeat became clear—the Solidarity
list had taken all 35 per cent of the parliamentary
seats open for free elections under the Round Table deal, and all but one of the 100 freely elected
Senate seats—a group of generals visited Jaruzelski and, pointing to China, tried to convince him
the damage could still be undone. To Jaruzelski’s
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
credit, he refused a repeat performance of his coup
of 13 December 1981 and stuck to his part of
the deal. Two years later, during Yanayev’s farcical attempt to seize power in Moscow, Warsaw TV
sought out General Kiszczak, Jaruzelski’s righthand man, to ask for his opinion about events. ‘I
would have done things differently’, said Kiszczak,
and smiled. He certainly would have. But in July
1989 the National Assembly elected Jaruzelski
president, although Solidarity could have blocked
that vote. One month later a former political prisoner and Solidarity adviser, Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
was appointed prime minister, later unanimously
approved by Parliament. The Great Polish Deal
was under way.
But it was still a Polish deal only. The Soviet empire might, as we now know, have been in its death
throes already, but no one then would have taken
its imminent death for granted. Its armies were surrounding us from all sides; in fact they had a heavy
presence inside the country itself: the Red Army
was to leave finally only a couple of years later.
All the events now associated in popular imagery
with 1989—Berliners tearing down the Wall, the
execution of Ceausescu and his wife, Czechs toasting President Havel—were yet to happen. The
military coup in Poland in 1981 and Tienanmen
weighed heavily on our minds, and we trod cautiously—not on eggshells but on a minefield.
Too cautiously, no doubt. Despite later rumours,
there never was a secret deal not to prosecute the
communists, for, yes, we were determined, once
and for all, to break the vicious circle of revenge.
There was a purge, especially of the police and
the armed forces, but it was far from massive. A
few torturers from the Stalinist times were eventually sentenced to jail, but the trials of generals
Jaruzelski and Kiszczak, for the massacres of 1970
and 1981, drag on inconclusively to this very
day. The Communist Party was not outlawed: it
simply disbanded and renamed itself. And as the
country went into economic shock therapy (with
prices freed and privatization encouraged) former
communists often found themselves on top of the
heap, with their privileged knowledge and access
to the former state economy. Meanwhile former
worker activists often found themselves at the bottom.
With 15 years’ hindsight, the shock therapy seems
largely justified, even if the price paid—Poland’s
20 per cent unemployment rate, currently the
highest in the EU—was huge. But all it takes is a
visit to our eastern neighbours to see the results of
shock therapy’s supposedly soft version—the shock
without the therapy. Shop shelves filled up miraculously in just a few months, and bars like the one
I had marvelled at in Italy became commonplace.
Shops were no longer full of people with money
and ration cards but nothing to buy. Instead, more
and more they were full of goods—and of potential customers, happy to be rid of ration cards, but
without the money to buy what was now freely
available. ‘We fought for free Poland, and what we
got was free prices’, people would grumble. The
fact that Poland’s freedom was in fact a part of
that bargain, soon ceased to impress. We, who had
been surprised that the West takes its freedom for
granted, were now treating ours no differently.
But freedom does not necessary mean justice, especially the kind that compensates, even symbolically, for historical wrongs. There had been no taking of the Bastille. While we, who had been at the
Round Table, lost our desire for revenge in the face
of our adversaries’ humiliation, 40 million Poles
were not present in the room with us at the time.
There was no symbolic event (as in Berlin, Prague
and Bucharest) which would psychologically compensate for Jaruzelski’s military coup on 13 December 1981 and for the terror and despair that
date stood for. A protracted negotiated transition
could hardly foot the bill, and economic recovery,
with all the concomitant injustices, was but a poor
substitute. No, Jaruzelski did not deserve Ceausescu’s fate (I doubt if even Ceausescu himself did).
And yet it would have done no harm to see, just
for a day, the fear
in ‘their’ eyes that
But freedom does not necessary
we had lived with
mean justice, especially the kind that
for so many years.
compensates, even symbolically, for
What we saw inhistorical wrongs.
stead was the selfsatisfied smugness
of former apparatchiks turned successful entrepreneurs. No way could strike leaders or underground printers compete with that.
But at least we had political power. One year after
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
75
being elected, Jaruzelski, by then marginalized and
irrelevant, resigned, and, riding a populist wave,
Lech Walesa, Solidarity leader and Nobel Peace
Prize winner, was elected, effortlessly crushing his
former adviser and first non-communist prime
minister. This was bad enough news for those of
us who had actually voted for the dour-faced, unsexy but responsible Catholic liberal Mazowiecki.
But, worse still, Mazowiecki only came third, defeated also by an émigré businessman from Canada whose simple programme—‘I made millions
abroad, so I know
how to make PoWe assumed that by building an
land
rich’—was
underground civil society, we had
more convincing
successfully promoted the civic ideal of
to voters than Mazresponsible politics.
owiecki’s heroic biography and indubitable achievements. But we should have seen the
writing on the wall: in the 1989 Senate elections,
the only seat not won by Solidarity was taken by
a businessman who (no small feat) had even managed to be expelled earlier from the Communist
Party for corruption. We assumed that by building
an underground civil society and emerging victorious we had successfully promoted the civic ideal of
responsible politics. But Mazowiecki was just one
of the many players of that story, whereas Walesa
was the main actor. And the triumph of consumer
capitalism following our victory had triggered aspirations better expressed by crooked businessmen
than by paragons of civic virtue. We had only ourselves to blame for our delusions.
over, goodness, fairness and justice would somehow automatically prevail. This, of course, is the
illusion lyrique typical of any revolutionary movement. The system made the implementation of
goodness, fairness and justice impossible—but its
removal would only make the implementation,
gradual and incremental at best, of those values
possible. It would not guarantee their triumph.
And though Poles today are split roughly evenly in
their assessment of whether the country is better
off than it was 15 years ago, not one political party
attempts to capitalize on that nostalgia by proposing a return to the past. The present is condemned
in the name of the illusions we held, and not in
the name of the past itself.
So, had it all been worth it? The question had been
asked earlier. When on 13 December the military
came to arrest, for the umpteenth time, veteran
oppositionist Jacek Kuron, they bundled him into
an armoured personnel carrier and let him watch,
through the gun-slits, the army occupying the city.
‘Well, Mr Kuron? Was it worth it?’ a gloating officer asked. ‘You know what?’, Kuron slowly answered, ‘The first time you guys came to arrest me,
all it took was three cops and a car. Now you had
to mobilize all this. Was it worth it?’. Clearly, a
system that could deal with political opposition
only through arrests and eventually martial law
was beyond salvation, and we were right to overthrow it. But because the system was evil, corrupt
and unjust, the expectation was that once it was
Yet even the communist comeback and the free
and unfettered transition of power it entailed was
a victory of sorts. It proved, once and for all, that
the democracy we had built was genuine, to the
point of allowing its former enemies to regain
power by popular will and of their giving it up
peacefully once their popular mandate was withdrawn. By a supreme irony, thanks to us the communists could, at long last, claim the legitimacy
they so craved and could never attain under their
own regime. This ultimate test was to us proof
that Central Europe’s democratic breakthrough
of 1989 could be replicated elsewhere: in the new
states emerging from the rubble of the USSR, in
the Arab world, and ultimately across the globe.
Not that we adopted Fukuyama’s naïve prophecy
76
Only defeated revolutions live on in the popular
imagination as dreams of what could have been.
Successful ones, such as ours, are invariably a disappointment, as what could have been is confronted with what we actually made of it. Social
reality has an inertia of its own and, human nature
being what it is, the dream must inevitably win
and reality must pay the price. Twice already, in
the free and fair elections they had spent 40 years
suppressing, the former communists have been
brought back to power due to the electorate’s sheer
and legitimate disgust over the way their opponents had bungled things once in power. The excommunists being no better, they too got dumped
once their turn in office was over. This provided
us with small satisfaction: we were not supposed
to be as bad as them!
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
of the end of history—we had been immersed in
history far too long and emerged much too scarred
to fall for that one—but we knew that the progress
of democracy is feasible, even if it is not immediately and universally attainable. No homo sovieticus, no putative ‘Russian mentality’, and no ‘Asian
values’ could ultimately stand in its way. To put it
simply: I believe than those who witnessed 1989
have no moral right to be historical pessimists. If
we could do it against such odds, then eventually
anyone could.
Fukuyama’s illusion lyrique was ultimately shattered by 9/11. For us the turning point came much
sooner, with the wars in the former Yugoslavia. On
the face of it, of all the Central European states
that country was best poised to assume the transition to democracy smoothly, and possibly even
to salvage something out of the general socialist
disaster. Its descent into hell, which I witnessed at
first hand, living as my paper’s correspondent in
Sarajevo during the siege, showed that optimism
would have to wait. The war itself was horrible
enough. What made the experience even worse
was the unavoidable conclusion that it was a product not of dictatorship but of democracy, even if
its roots lay deep in the country’s Titoist legacy of
crushing all dissent, which made the negotiated
resolution of conflict impossible. There was no denying that Slobodan Milosevic was elected by a
popular vote: I was one of the international observers of the elections of 1992, and could find
little evidence of fraud. There was also no denying
that this popular vote was a fully conscious one:
it is hard to forget the thousands of inhabitants
of Belgrade cheering their troops leaving to ‘liberate’ Croatian Vukovar. And even if these crowds
were again out on the streets a decade later, to topple Milosevic, one cannot reject the gnawing suspicion that their complaint was not that he had
started the war, but that he was not able to win it.
It seemed, to use a metaphor, that if one wanted
to translate from the language of communism to
that of democracy, one had to change both the vocabulary and the grammar, and that had proved to
be too difficult a task. But if one wanted to translate from the language of communism to that of
nationalism, the task was much simpler: all it took
was changing the vocabulary. The grammar, as it
were, remained the same. The class enemy became
the national enemy, the party leader the leader of
the nation. His job remained that of crushing the
adversary. The quarter of a million dead that followed seemed an inevitable consequence.
And we, the just recently expanded community of democratic states, still basking in the glory
of a peaceful transition, were accomplices to the
crime. We had let genocide happen again in Europe, quibbling over fine points of international
law while war raged. As the American journalist
David Rieff had put it: ‘After Sarajevo we now
know what “Never again!” means. It means that
never again shall Germans kill Jews in World War
II’. Only that, and nothing more. It was hard to
believe. In August 1992, Bosnian Vice-President
Ejup Gani explained to me that ‘soon Europe will
come to defend Bosnia’. ‘No, I am not a fool’, he
responded to my incredulous reaction. ‘It is not
naiveté. They will have to help us not out of good
will, but out of self-interest. After all, we in Sarajevo are defending the very principles on which
Europe is founded. The unacceptability of war.
The primacy of citizenship over ethnicity. Rule of
law. They cannot abandon us without abandoning
these. Therefore, they will come.’
They didn’t, of course. We didn’t. The continent’s
democracies, old and new alike, were tested and
found lacking. Bosnians of all ethnicities and
creeds and their friends worldwide watched with
incredulity and despair. For three years, all over
the Muslim world, from Khartoum to Riyadh to
Kuala Lumpur, people watched on television their
co-religionists being butchered live, with Europe
doing nothing. To their eyes, this was a test within
the test. After all, Europe had been telling Islam
that it is certainly welcome as long as it adopts
European customs and mores. The Bosnian Muslims did, to a point that their more practising
brethren even found unacceptable. They rarely
went to mosque. They emancipated their women.
They drank wine. They intermarried with nonMuslims. They espoused democratic politics with
passion. And genocide was what they got in return. It was impossible for them not to draw conclusions about the value of European promises
and guarantees. It was also impossible not to see
Afghanistan, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine and Bosnia other than as instances of the same thing. The
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
77
Muslim world did not need to wait for Samuel
Huntington to believe that a war of civilizations
is under way. All it needed to do was to turn on a
television set.
None of this should be interpreted to mean that
9/11 was a consequence of the failed policies of
the West in respect to the Muslim world. Al Qaida, in all probability, would have struck anyway
even had the West not failed: its target is conquering the Muslim world, not influencing Western
policy. If anything,
Osama Bin Laden
It is true, of course, that the treatment meted
and his followers
out to Iraqi prisoners by their American
believe the Bosjailers is no different from standards which
nian Muslims got
apply in jails all over the Arab world—but
their just deserts
the West has repeatedly claimed that it
precisely for havis to be judged by its own standards, not
ing abandoned the
strict observance
those of undemocratic regimes. From this
they consider to
perspective, the Americans have failed
be binding on all
miserably, and indeed strengthened their
Muslims
worldadversaries’ cause.
wide. Indeed, the
Islamic Mujaheddin who came to Bosnia to fight against the Serbs
were thoroughly disgusted by their local co-religionists, and they in turn were no less afraid of
these Islamic fighters than the Serbs themselves.
The issue is not so much Al Qaida’s deeds, abhorrent though they are, but the credibility it has
gained in many Islamic societies. Without it, Bin
Laden would be only a criminal, and not a political problem. His message to the Islamic world
is that adopting Western mores and values, from
individualism to democracy, not only is wrong
from a religious standpoint but, more importantly, does not work. Whatever you do, Bin Laden
and his supporters preach, the West will still hate
you for being Muslim. You cannot change that, so
all that remains is to reciprocate the hatred and be
stronger. This is not a question of political choice,
they say, but of naked survival. And they have no
dearth of evidence to support their case—from the
horror of Bosnia to the outrage of the French ban
on headscarves. There is precious little evidence
pointing the other way.
The war on terror, legitimately launched by the
USA after 9/11, fails completely to address this
78
issue. It treats terror not as a symptom but as the
root cause of evil. Even if it succeeds militarily—
which is still very much an open question—by
failing to tackle the reasons behind the legitimacy
that the use of terror enjoys among wide segments
of Muslim public opinion worldwide it will fail
to reach its goal. It is not enough to tell armed Islamic fundamentalists ‘You cannot vanquish us’.
In order to defeat them, one has to convince their
passive supporters that they need not feel defeated;
that a victory of the West can be their victory as
well, for the values in whose name the struggle is
being fought are ones they can identify with too.
That it is worthwhile for them to change both the
vocabulary and the grammar of their political discourse.
For this to be effective, however, talking is not
nearly enough, and military action falls completely short of the mark. Yes, it is true that US military
intervention in the former Yugoslavia, first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, was undertaken to protect
essentially Muslim populations from oppression
at the hands of a regime representing a nominally
Christian nation. Yet the first intervention came
much too late to save a quarter of a million people who were butchered as the world looked on,
and raises the issue of why (since it was possible
in 1995) it did not happen in 1992, which would
have made all the difference. And the Kosovo intervention, though timely, has led to an inconclusive situation in which the Kosovo Albanians are
left stranded short of the independence they legitimately believe to be their only guarantee of their
safety. The pogrom of Kosovo Serbs at the hands
of their erstwhile victims in March 2004, though
despicable and deserving even stronger condemnation than that the international community
made, was an entirely predictable consequence
of this stalemate. With the passage of time, these
shortcomings loom larger than the interventions
themselves and seriously vitiate, in the eyes of its
critics, the argument that the West does, in fact,
care about the fate of Muslim populations.
Afghanistan could have made a much more convincing counter-argument had not the disastrous
war in Iraq almost completely eclipsed the achievements accomplished there. It can be convincingly
argued that since the intervention, for all the
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
blunders made in its reconstruction, Afghanistan
is in better shape today than at any moment in
its recent history. Yet the success of its first-ever
relatively decent elections, made possible by the
US victory over the Taliban, pales in comparison
with the impact of the atrocities committed by
these self-same Americans in Abu Ghraib—and
especially with the relatively muted official reaction to their uncovering. It is true, of course, that
the treatment meted out to Iraqi prisoners by their
American jailers is no different from standards
which apply in jails all over the Arab world—but
the West has repeatedly claimed that it is to be
judged by its own standards, not those of undemocratic regimes. From this perspective, the Americans have failed miserably, and indeed strengthened their adversaries’ cause.
The more so as this outcome can be interpreted
not only as a result of deplorable lapses and abuses
committed in the confusion of war, or as being
due to lack of a clear vision of priorities in the
dizzying worldwide political turmoil of the 1990s.
Samuel Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ seems to have replaced Fukuyama’s promise of an end to history as the theoretical blueprint
of Western strategic thinking—the despot following in the footsteps of a failed utopia. It is of no
importance that Huntington’s theory does not fit
the facts. It fulfils a deeper need, that of providing
an underlying narrative which purports to explain
the complexities of an unfolding political drama.
So what if in the Gulf War a mixed ‘Christian’
and ‘Muslim’ coalition had confronted a putative
‘Muslim’ leader who had for years been butchering other Muslims, be it Iranians or his own unfortunate subjects? Of no importance that in Bosnia most of the ‘Christian’ world sided eventually with Bosnian Muslims against ‘Christian’ Serbia. Inconsequential that, in the second Iraq war,
the attack by a ‘Christian’ USA on Muslim Iraq
was roundly condemned by most of the ‘Christian’ West. Irrelevant that the ongoing slaughter
of Muslim Chechens by ‘Christian’ Russia enjoys the diplomatic support of the very Muslim
Arab League, careful not to alienate a long-standing ally. All these developments seem to be of little import when compared with the stark facts of
Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. The ‘Christian’
USA overtly denies Muslims the protection of the
laws it invokes for itself. Nor is it alone in this
perception of the world. The ‘headscarf ’ crisis in
France is legitimately seen as an example of rank
discrimination, a refusal of Muslim women’s right
to practise their religion as they see fit, and the local enforcement of similar bans in different places
in Germany and Italy adds a Europe-wide dimension. The popularity in Europe of Oriana Falacci’s
anti-Muslim pamphlets is seen as confirmation of
what Europeans really think. For Muslim intellectuals observing the West, Huntington is only the
acceptable face of Falacci’s prejudice.
And what he says can hardly strike them as novel,
for his vision of the world seems to be but the (admittedly intellectually more sophisticated) mirror
image of Bin Laden’s preaching. ‘East is East and
West is West, and never the twain shall meet’: both
of them could probably agree with this succinct
wording of Rudyard Kipling. If the British author
Kipling was the spokesman of an unabashed and
unselfconscious Western colonialism, then Bin
Laden is simply turning his words around to use
them against a West that is no longer colonialist,
in the name of an East which overtly proclaims
conquest as its goal. For all the mad ravings of Al
Qaida’s leader, why should the vision of the flag of
Islam floating over Westminster and Capitol Hill
be more abhorrent than that of a Christian flag
floating over Baghdad and Cairo? After all, the latter actually occurred, whereas the former remains
only a delusional dream.
Yet there is a fundamental difference. Western colonialism collapsed not only under the thrust of
anti-colonial resistance but mainly because the
West itself finally understood it to be both nonenforceable and unjust. The war in Algeria, Europe’s bloodiest post-war colonial conflict, ended
although the Algerian resistance was mainly militarily crushed but a substantial part of France’s
political elites and civil society reached the conclusion that the political price to be paid for
that victory was unacceptable. The war spawned
two coup attempts in France, one of them successful: French democracy was under threat. It
seemed that France could have had either Algeria or democracy, but not both, and successfully
gave up the former to save the latter. But Algeria,
50 years later, still remains a violent dictatorship
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
79
undermined by a bloody civil war: the legacy of
successful violence haunts the streets of Algiers
and Oran to this very day. Similarly, the legacy of
the military success of Tito’s partisans was one of
the elements that led to the outbreak of the wars
of the 1990s: the lesson for many Serb and Croat
leaders was that violence pays. And it does, but at
a price. A price that much of the West has decided
is unacceptable.
Polish civil society drew different conclusions from
the terrible bloodletting the country went through
in World War II. Contrary to its own understanding of history, from the 1950s onwards Poland opposed communist dictatorship by different forms
of non-violent civil resistance. Even General
Jaruzelski’s 1981 military coup did not goad Poles
into taking up arms, though it seems this had been
expected, and possibly invited, by the junta. This
legacy of non-violence led to the peaceful transition of 1989 which, in turn, paved the way for
similar developments elsewhere in Central Europe
and built a solid foundation for the democratic regimes which emerged. To be sure, not every nation
had the good luck of having a non-violent option
available. No one can blame Croats, Bosnians, Kosovars or Chechens, to name only them, for having taken up arms when their very existence was
at stake. Conversely, the abandonment of Bosnia
by the democratic powers had, as we saw, seriously undermined their credibility; and the horror of Rwanda drove that lesson home beyond the
Muslim world. And no one can blame the USA
for having responded militarily to 9/11. On the
contrary, the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaida not only made the world a safer
place but also gave the Afghans their first chance
at democratic development.
internal violence will remain a feature of its political scene, just as it remains one in Algeria. All this
would be serious enough without the added burden of the vision of a clash of civilizations being
endorsed by extremists on both sides of the ever
more bloody, if invisible, front line which today
crosses entire continents.
Fifteen years after 1989, four years after 9/11, the
world is not a safe place. But, just as the illusions
of utopia proved to be groundless, an endorsement of distopia would be unwarranted. As the
Polish poet Stanislaw Jerzy Lec had said, ‘Man favors good over evil, but the circumstances do not
favor him’. Fair enough—and yet these self-same
circumstances are man-made. To quote another
Polish poet, the Nobel Prize winner Czeslaw Milosz, ‘The avalanche changes its course depending on the stones it rolls on’. This last quotation
was often used in our underground writings in the
1980s, although little did we know how quickly
the stones would prevail. Hope does not demand
that we be blind to turmoil, for it is turmoil’s antidote.
Yet violence has a price tag attached. Success in
Afghanistan was one of the precipitating factors
of the disastrous decision to invade Iraq, for reasons that were in part trumped up, in part spurious. The overall impact runs directly against the
historical optimism generated by 1989: not only
has the progress of democracy been seriously impaired by those who would be its standard-bearers,
but the USA is already starting to feel the Algerian
consequences of the war at home. And it is a safe
bet that, whatever happens to Iraq in the future,
80
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Former Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson at
the first Democracy Forum held by International
IDEA in Stockholm, 12-14 June 1996.
Former IDEA Secretary-General, Bengt Säve-Söderbergh and Prof. Muhammad Yunus, Founder and
Director of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, at the
IDEA Democracy Forum, ”Democracy and Poverty:
A Missing Link?”, held in Stockholm, 8 - 9 June
2000.
PART II
Highlights of IDEA’s Work
Looking Back …
-
This section illustrates IDEA’s own experiences with
democracy building by giving key examples of its work
over the last decade. First, a general overview describes
the breadth of IDEA’s activities and methods on
different continents – proof of the ‘diversity in unity’
approach towards democracy building which rests on
the principles of tolerance, neutrality and academic
excellence. Thereafter, IDEA’s thematic teams provide
more detailed accounts of developments in their own
areas.
‘My congratulations on the 10th anniversary of IDEA are combined with personal
recognition of the valuable work being undertaken in democracy promotion: in Sri
Lanka, I was privileged to experience IDEA-moderated workshops bringing together
conflicting parties from different ethnic, religious and political backgrounds; and as a
Board Member of Transparency International I was impressed by the excellent IDEA
study, ’Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns’, giving real help in the
development and management of political parties and their key role in democratic
systems. Just two highlights from the wide range of democracy-promoting activities
initiated by IDEA—activities of great value for the peaceful development of our
world. ’
Jermyn P. Brooks, member of the Board of International IDEA and member of the
Transparency International Board of Directors
‘Electoral administration had been a slow grower in the administration garden, as
practitioners and academics worked at substantially different aspects of common
problems. International IDEA’s great, and lasting, achievement was to bring the two
unfamiliar tribes together in a series of productive projects and publications which
assembled data and formulated norms and then made both widely available. At the
same time its parallel commitment to democracy focused more closely on particular
countries in the round with some pioneering work and through its summer
conferences, which attracted wider audiences. From its inception International
IDEA undertook a job no one else was doing across so broad a range of objectives and
activities.’
Colin Hughes, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Queensland, Australia.
Member of the Board of International IDEA June 1996–June 1999
84
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
7. Ten Years of
Democratic IDEAs
Charlotte Hjorth
This chapter highlights IDEA’s work and experiences
with democracy building. It gives a general overview
of the broad range of IDEA’s activities in the different
themes and regions that have been the focus of IDEA’s
work over the past decade.
IDEA was created in 1995 to assist both nations
in transition to democracy and established democracies to develop and deepen a lasting culture
of democratic institutions and processes. IDEA’s
status is unique: it is an independent intergovernmental organization with a global mandate to promote sustainable democracy.
Ten years later, IDEA consists of 23 member states
from all continents and four associate members
representing international non-governmental organizations, working together to promote sustainable democracy.
The composition of member states balances democracies from the North and the South, developed and developing countries, which both enables IDEA to operate impartially and contributes
to its singular position as a mediator and facilitator in the highly politicized field of democratization.
Part II of this anniversary publication shows how
these principles relate to IDEA’s achievements in
its different programmes and activities. This chapter offers a brief general overview of IDEA’s activities in the last decade which are all addressed in
more detail in later chapters.
7.1. Mandate and Objectives
These features position IDEA effectively to
achieve the objectives set out in its founding
statutes, which are to:
• promote sustainable democracy worldwide;
• consolidate democratic electoral processes;
• disseminate the norms associated with multiparty pluralism;
• support national capacity to build democratic
institutions and processes;
• increase the knowledge, transparency and accountability of democratic electoral processes;
and
• be a bridge-builder between academia and
practitioners in the field of democracy by serving as a meeting place.
7.2. IDEA’s Guiding Principles
From the first seeds of development and the adoption by the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) of the
motion proposing the creation of an international
body to further the
cause of democracy,
IDEA’s status is unique: it is an independent
certain basic prinintergovernmental organization with a
ciples have underpinned IDEA’s acglobal mandate to promote sustainable
tions.
democracy.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
85
Underlying IDEA’s
work are the principles, first, that
first, that democratization is a long-term
democratization is
process which cannot be achieved
a long-term procthrough elections alone; second, that
ess which candemocracy must be home-grown in order
not be achieved
to be sustainable and not something that
through elections
can be imposed from the outside; and,
alone; second, that
third, that there is no universal form of
democracy must be
democracy that is applicable to all nations:
home-grown in ordemocracy must be attuned to each society
der to be sustainaand its people. However, IDEA believes in
ble and not somecertain core democratic values such as
thing that can be
free and fair elections, the existence and
imposed from the
unfettered functioning of multiple political
outside; and, third,
that there is no
parties, respect for human rights and the
universal form of
independence of the media.
democracy that is
applicable to all nations: democracy must be attuned to each society
and its people. However, IDEA believes in certain
core democratic values such as free and fair elections, the existence and unfettered functioning of
multiple political parties, respect for human rights
and the independence of the media.
Underlying IDEA’s work are the principles,
IDEA believes that the result is most effective
when it catalyses debate around the available options and leaves it to local stakeholders to make
the critical choices. So, rather than prescribing an
externally imposed model of democracy, IDEA’s
approach is to present available options and the
means to make comparisons.
7.3. Increasing Trust and
Efficiency in Electoral
Processes
In just ten years IDEA has established itself as a
leading organization promoting sustainable electoral processes and has gained widespread recognition for its work in practitioner and academic
expert circles.
From the very beginning IDEA’s mandate included articulating and strengthening the international standards and guidelines for the conduct, administration and observation of elections. While
the report of the Swedish Parliament preceding
86
the foundation of IDEA suggested electoral observation as the main focus of the organization, in
reality over the last decade IDEA has developed its
niche in the broader area of electoral assistance.
Over the last ten years IDEA has produced a range
of products, tools and resources to support the development of good practice in sustainable electoral processes. These include the codes of conduct
for election observation, election administration
and political parties, as well as the guidelines for
involvement in electoral observation and for the
evaluation of free and fair elections.
The Election Programme (EP) aims to increase
confidence in electoral processes and to facilitate
electoral participation. IDEA has been active in
numerous fields and published a wealth of information, both in hard copy and electronically. All
publications are in English but some have been
translated into Spanish, French and other languages relevant to IDEA’s programme activities.
7.3.1. Landmark Publications
The IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design
(1997, 2002 and 2005) details what to consider
when modifying or designing an electoral system.
As an important institutional setting in any democracy, the choice of electoral system can help
to further specific outcomes, such as encouraging
cooperation in a society torn by conflict and division, or to exacerbate polarization if it leads to a
‘winner-takes-all’ result. Due to high demand, an
updated edition of the handbook was published in
2005, and will be promoted in collaboration with
partners in different regions. The current versions
exist in several languages, as a CD ROM and as a
project web site. The new edition is to be translated into French and Spanish; translations into
Russian, Arabic, Nepali, Singhalese and Tamil are
planned for the future.
7.3.2. Voter Turnout Data Collection
Since 1996 IDEA has been collecting data on voter turnout. Three global reports have been published since then, the latest being Voter Turnout
Since 1945: A Global Report (2002). An online
Voter Turnout Database <http://www.idea.int/vt/
index.cfm> has been updated continuously since
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
1999. This is one of the most comprehensive resources available and includes information on
voter turnout and election results for parliamentary and presidential elections since 1945. A
recent addition is a regional report on Voter Turnout in Western Europe with a special annex on
the 2004 European Parliament elections, entitled
Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Significance of
the 2004 European Parliament Election.
7.4 The ACE Project for
Sustainable Elections
The 1996 elections in India, the world’s largest democracy, involved the mobilization of 4.5 million
polling station workers for the 830,000 polling
booths needed to service an electorate of 600 million. Such numbers show the need for efficiency in
financing and managing elections. Cost-efficiency
is a prerequisite for sustainable democracy, especially in emerging democracies since the international donor community often tends to pull out
after the first or second elections.
In 1998 the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project <http://www.aceproject.org>
was launched to deal with this aspect of elections.
It has produced the first comprehensive encyclopaedia on electoral cost and administration issues,
providing best practices and practical options.
Founded by IDEA in cooperation with the UN
and the International Foundation for Election
Systems (IFES), it is available in English, French
and Spanish as a CD ROM and as an interactive
web site.
It is recognized as the world’s top online resource
in the field, and is currently being transformed into
‘ACE 2’, adding a more dynamic dimension. The
main elements will be knowledge services, including a bulletin board and an online help desk with
experts answering questions, knowledge networking with virtual communities for professional peer
groups, and capacity development building regional and country partnerships, peer exchanges and
courses to increase electoral staff capacity. With
1 million hits per month, of which 10 per cent stay
more than five minutes and 10 per cent come back
within a month, the ACE web site is a continuing
success which clearly responds to a real demand.
The
Election
Process InformaIn just ten years IDEA has established
tion
Collection
itself as a leading organization promoting
(EPIC) Project is
sustainable electoral processes and has
a joint undertakgained widespread recognition for its
ing in partnership
work in practitioner and academic expert
with UNDP and
circles.
IFES, which complements the ACE
Project by collecting comparative data on election
systems, laws, management and administration.
The online database <http://www.epicproject.
org> also contains useful country profiles and is
meant to be a resource for election observers, researchers, practitioners and the media. In order to
continuously improve the database, regional research partnerships are established with electoral
organizations, universities and research centres to
help collect data efficiently. Currently, 12 regional
hubs cover 64 countries, with research on another
50 countries due to come online in 2005.
7.4.1. BRIDGE Training on Election
Management
The Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) project was initiated in 2002 in partnership with the Australian
Electoral Commission (AEC) and the United
Nations Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD)
and has developed course curricula for interactive adult training of election officials on election
planning and management. It is popular among
election managers around the world, and has
been translated into
Portuguese, French,
The Administration and Cost of Elections
Georgian, Russian
(ACE) Project has produced the first
and
Spanish.
comprehensive encyclopaedia on electoral
BRIDGE training
cost and administration issues, providing
material has been
best practices and practical options.
used in projects in
East Timor, Papua
New Guinea, Fiji,
Australia, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Georgia, to name but a few. The continued development of course material, training of facilitators
and further regional promotion are foreseen.
The EP engages in numerous other activities,
including the provision of technical support,
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
87
advisory missions,
and facilitation of
networking
and
that true democracy has been achieved
cooperation
beonly when all sections of society are
tween
electoral
properly represented. This also means full
management
bodrepresentation of women, who make up
ies (EMBs), as well
more than half the world’s population
as research on a
number of important electoral themes such as the media dimension
of elections, and improving access to elections for
the disabled, migrant workers and overseas voters.
The EP has several forthcoming publications, including the Handbook on Electoral Dispute Resolution, the Handbook on Structuring and Financing of
Electoral Management Bodies, and a Handbook on
Direct Democracy, all due for publication in 2005–
7. It is also in the process of developing and translating electoral tools for the Arab world.
From the outset IDEA has understood
there are different types of quota that can be used
strategically to increase women’s representation.
Since 2002 IDEA has collaborated with Stockholm
University on a research project about the use of
quotas to increase women’s representation. The information gathered is being incorporated on an ongoing basis into an online database, Electoral Quotas for Women <http://www.quotaproject.org>,
which was launched in 2003 and contains information on electoral quotas in more than 90 countries,
as well as some 30 case studies.
Workshops on regional experiences of the implementation of quotas in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America and the Arab World have been held and
reports published, including case studies and information on when, where and how quotas have
worked, with the aim of raising awareness on the
use of quotas as a tool to increase female representation.
7.5. Women’s Participation
7.5.3. Regional Support
7.5.1. Gender Participation: Women in
Parliament
From the outset IDEA has understood that true
democracy has been achieved only when all sections of society are properly represented. This also
means full representation of women, who make
up more than half the world’s population (52 per
cent). Whether in new or established democracies,
this goal has not yet been achieved, as only 16 per
cent of the world’s parliamentarians are women.
For a decade now, IDEA has sought to provide
tools and strategies for those who are dedicated to
correcting this political imbalance. A first attempt
was made with the publication of Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (1998). It looks at the
obstacles women face in getting into parliament,
how to overcome them and how they could make
a greater impact once they enter parliament. Written by researchers and parliamentarians, it examines the impact that quotas and electoral systems
have on women’s representation.
7.5.2. Gender Quotas
One way to tackle the imbalance in women’s representation is by the use of gender quotas. However,
88
IDEA has developed regional partnerships to support the role played by women in society. IDEA
also recognizes that structural changes in the electoral system can lead to the increased participation
of women in politics. In Peru, for example, IDEA
collaborated with the Asociación Civil Transparencia (Transparencia) in convening a multiparty
round table to draft an electoral code aimed at introducing reforms for increased women’s participation. One of the recommendations of the round
table—a 30 per cent quota provision for women
on lists at both general elections and for leading
posts within parties—was adopted by the Peruvian Congress in 2003.
Regionalized versions of Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers in Bahasa Indonesian, French,
Spanish and Russian have been useful in the promotion of a stronger role for women politicians
in different societies. In Indonesia, its launch in
1999 started a process that was to end four years
later with the inclusion in the general election law
of the recommendation that parties field a minimum of 30 per cent women. As a follow-up,
the One Hundred Women for Parliament initiative helped identify and train women candidates,
and to prevent party leaders from ignoring the
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
recommendation in the 2003 law.
With numerous projects running across the globe,
IDEA plans to continue in the coming decade to
tackle the challenge of women’s under-representation in politics, and to provide them with the tools
to leverage their position once in power and to
achieve proportional representation at senior decision-making levels within political parties.
7.6. Measuring Democracy:
The State of Democracy and
Democracy Assessment
The issue of how best to analyse democracy and
evaluate democracy assistance is attracting increasing attention within the international community. IDEA has contributed to the debate in many
ways. While stressing its belief in the local ownership of democracy evaluation, the State of Democracy Project was inaugurated in 2000 with the
aim of developing a methodology for assessing the
condition of democracy, and progress towards or
regression from democratic norms and practices in
a given country.
institutional
reform, political parFrom the outset IDEA has promoted locally
ties,
regionalism
driven and owned dialogues and
and local self-govassessment processes as the most
ernment. Twelve
strategic way of strengthening democracy.
discussion papers
were published in
English and Georgian. The IDEA Democracy Assessment Framework was also adapted for South
Asia, where the methodology will be used in a
two-and-a-half-year research project led by the
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in
New Delhi. Dialogues on democracy analysis have
also been initiated in West Africa.
7.6.2. Evaluation and Future Direction
Having taken a lead role in developing the assessment methodology, IDEA has ensured that second generation activities will continue unabated.
The Human Rights Centre at the University of
Essex has been designated as the appropriate institution to provide a core institutional base to coordinate future work on assessments and enable
further developments in this field in partnership
with IDEA.
7.6.1. Creating a New Methodology
Recognizing the difficulty of establishing a democracy index, IDEA developed an alternative—
or even new—method for evaluating democracy
based on a theoretical framework that presents
general democracy denominators which are not
country-specific. Instead of developing numerical indexes which rank countries, it prefers the
development of country reports. The methodology was created through a partnership with professors David Beetham and Stuart Weir, building
on a methodology developed for the UK Democracy Audit. The methodology seeks qualitative answers to a range of universal questions which are
complemented by quantitative data where appropriate.
The methodology is outlined in detail in the
Handbook on Democracy Assessment (2002) and
The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessment in
Eight Nations Around the World (2003). In 2003
a democracy assessment exercise in the South
Caucasus touched upon critical issues, including
7.7. Dialogue as a Route to
Democracy: Capacity Building
for Sustainable Democracy
From the outset IDEA has promoted locally driven and owned dialogues and assessIDEA operates as an impartial facilitator,
ment processes as
bringing together national stakeholders
the most strategic
from all sections of society to produce a
way of strength‘democracy road map’ or democracy reform
ening democracy.
agenda. International experts are often
Since 1996, IDEA
has called this
invited to generate the debate but not to
methodology the
provide a diagnosis.
Capacity
Building Programme for
Sustainable Democracy (CB).
In the first years of IDEA, CB helped to define national democracy agendas and build local capacity
to assess the needs for institutional reform. It was
complemented by the Rules and Guidelines Programme (R&G) which provided the generic and
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
89
parties involved. In this way it constitutes a moral
commitment to working towards the achievement
of the goals set out in the text. The report is then
presented to the government, civil society, political parties, the supreme court, the parliament, the
universities and the international donor community.
In Burkina Faso, certain key recommendations of
the IDEA democracy assessment report Democracy in Burkina Faso (1998) were adopted by the
government in the wake of a political crisis which
prompted the establishment of a council of ‘wise
men’ to advise on how to improve democracy in
that country. The creation of an independent and
permanent electoral commission and the adoption
of a new electoral code are two notable examples.
normative tools to develop guidelines for institutional development and reform.
7.7.1. National Dialogue as a Route to
Reforming Democratic Institutions
IDEA operates as an impartial facilitator, bringing together national stakeholders from all sections of society to produce a ‘democracy road
map’ or democracy reform agenda. International
experts are often invited to generate the debate but
not to provide a diagnosis. The methodology was
first tried on a national scale in Burkina Faso, and
then in Guatamala, Nigeria and Indonesia. Similar, though more limited, interventions have been
made in Nepal, Bosnia and Romania.
The process is initiated with a series of meetings
with key stakeholders in the country such as unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
the government and political parties. A working
group is created out of these representatives, complemented with international experts and IDEA
staff. The group takes responsibility for convening
dialogues and discussions; through this process
it identifies the opportunities and challenges for
consolidating sustainable democracy; and it makes
concrete recommendations for advancing the democracy agenda. The process is finalized with the
publication of a democracy assessment report,
which is endorsed and published in the name of all
90
Both measures reflect IDEA’s emphasis on institutionalizing the democratic process: in this instance
they led to the holding of free and fair elections
and a more equitable representation of the opposition in parliament.
The method developed in the CB programme is
very process-oriented, and any specific projects
undertaken to further consolidate democracy are
informed by the findings of the report. For instance, in Burkina Faso a radio programme was
produced as a means of bringing the debate to the
greater public. Theatre groups staged plays ahead
of the local elections in 2000 about why it is important to vote, how to register to vote and the
voting process itself. In the course of the last decade IDEA has concluded similar projects in Nigeria, Guatemala and Indonesia, and new projects
have been initiated in Georgia and Peru.
The CB programme intended to increase the
number of options available to stakeholders in the
democratization process and to advise the international community on how it could best support
democracy. In the initial years of the programme,
experience was gained in the field on identifying
critical areas for support and methods developed
and tried on targeting interventions that added
value. As the programme matured, so too did the
programme approach, and country programmes
evolved into regional programmes. Although
CB is still engaged in field projects, it mainly
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
focuses on promoting successful methods of democracy support and making them available to
those working in the field. Two specific examples
are the Handbook on Democratic Dialogue which is
currently being written with UNDP and the Organization of American States (OAS), and the new
programme on constitution-building processes.
7.7.2. The Public Agenda Project
The basis of the Public Agenda Project is similar to
the democracy assessment process: it aims to hear
the voice of the people. This is achieved through
a survey. For the first time ever, a regional public
opinion survey, conducted by the South-Eastern
Europe Democracy Support Network with IDEA
support, was carried out in all nine territories of
the Balkans. In 10,000 face-to-face interviews,
public attitudes towards economic, social and political issues and their trust in public figures and in
domestic and international institutions were surveyed. Interestingly, people appeared to be more
concerned about domestic issues such as unemployment, corruption and poverty than about the
historical ethnic tensions and international geopolitical concerns that seemed to occupy the minds
of their leaders. The survey was useful to both local authorities and the international community
because it pointed to the policies for which there is
genuine popular support. A similar survey is used
in IDEA’s dialogue project in Nepal.
7.7.3. Dialogue for Democratic
Development within the ACP–EU
Partnership
In the last two decades the international community has attached increasing importance to democracy and good governance as prerequisites for
sustainable development. In 1998 the European
Commission asked IDEA to organize a conference
around the political dimension of the Lomé Convention, which established the legal framework
for relations between the EU and the 71 states of
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), and
which was up for renegotiation.
The EU wished to build political development
and democracy into the new agreement. The
Lomé Convention had been negotiated at the
level of governments and the European Commission, but the discussions that led to the new
agreement also included actors from civil society.
The resulting IDEA report, Dialogue for Democratic Development: Policy Options for a Renewed
ACP–EU Partnership (1999), identified 80 practical ways of promoting democratic development
within the ACP–EU Partnership. Many of these
recommendations were included in the final text,
the Cotonou Agreement.
On partnership and co-operation agreements:
‘The EU and its partners agree that respect for
fundamental Human Rights and democratic principles and the rule of law underpins the internal
and external policies of the parties and constitutes
an ‘essential element’ of partnership agreements’
(Annual Report 2004 on the European Community’s Development Policy and External Assistance, 2004)
7.8. Democracy and Conflict
Management
As the 20th century drew to a close the majority of conflicts took place within and not between
states. At the same time there was a growing realization that democracy if applied can be a crucial
means of eliminating conflict and building sustained peace processes. In 1998 IDEA published
the handbook Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators. It provides ideas and
options for negotiators to draw upon when brokering peace and building or rebuilding democracy
in a country emerging from violent conflict. The
underlying theme of the handbook is that the democratization process is part of and supports the
conflict management process: not only does it provide a means for countries to emerge from a difficult past, but it also provides the structures which,
if they operate successfully, are able to
As the 20th century drew to a close the
manage endemic
majority of conflicts took place within and
conflict peacefully
not between states. At the same time there
in the future.
was a growing realization that democracy,
The handbook has
been used in training for diplomats
and UN staff and in
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
if applied, can be a crucial means of
eliminating conflict and building sustained
peace processes.
91
university courses. It has been used by those negotiating peace in conflict situations from Colombia
to the Balkans. Numerous seminars and regional
workshops have also been held in the Caucasus,
Asia–Pacific, Latin America and Africa. A regionalized Spanish version was launched in Colombia
in 2001 at a seminar co-sponsored by the Interior Ministry and the UN University for Peace.
The book is available also in Bahasa Indonesia and
Burmese. An updated edition in English is due to
be published in 2005.
7.9. Democracy and
Reconciliation
In 2003 IDEA published Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook, which presents a range
of choices for the design and implementation of
reconciliation processes as part of conflict management and peace-building. Pragmatic advice
and options are provided for policy makers facing the challenge of constructing a shared democratic future for a society divided by a violent past.
Demand has been intense, leading to the book
and summaries being translated into French and
Spanish. The summaries have been translated into
Singhalese and Tamil to support the peace initiatives in Sri Lanka.
The publication of the handbook has given rise to
several important partnerships, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) and the International Centre
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in New York. IDEA
has cooperated with these two organizations on
seminars and the production of policy papers. Assistance has also been provided to Sierra Leone’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in
the dissemination of its report, as well as a number
of activities organized with the TRC in Peru.
7.10. The United Nations and
Democracy
IDEA has cooperated with the UN on peacekeeping and democracy-building initiatives, notably with evaluations of the UN peace missions in
Kosovo and Sierra Leone, with final reports being published in 2004. A preparatory mission was
sent to East Timor in 2003 to plan the assessment
92
of the impact of the UN Mission of Support in
East Timor (UNMISET) and the future role of
the UN in promoting democracy in the country.
A workshop was held in 2004 with a final report
on lessons learned published in 2005.
7.11. Constitutional Reform
In 2000 IDEA contributed to the dialogues on
constitutional reform in Indonesia by providing information on how to increase public participation
and strengthen democratic institutions. In 2003
IDEA provided support to the democratic institutional framework of Indonesia by way of options
for the design of the second chamber, or Regional Representative Council (DPD), which was established after a 2001 constitutional amendment.
IDEA also demonstrated its credibility and effectiveness through a project to support the DPD,
for which the first elections were held in 2004.
IDEA also assisted the constitutional reform process in Nigeria. In Nepal, a dialogue on constitutional processes as a way of addressing the ongoing conflicts and political stalemate in that country engaged key stakeholders at the national and
regional levels.
7.12. Democracy at the Local
and Regional Level
In 2000 IDEA launched the handbook Democracy
at the Local Level: the International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict
Management and Governance at the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) conference
in Brazil. The book recognizes the importance of
participation at the local level as a symptom of
functioning democracy. Local democracy can also
be an important mechanism for communities to
manage conflict situations.
Since then, IDEA has worked on local government in several areas:
• in 2003 Democracy at the Local Level: A Guide
for the South Caucasus (in English and Russian)
was the result of a regional dialogue;
• a capacity-building project for local governments in Southern and Eastern Africa was developed together with the African Union of
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Local Authorities (AULA) in 2003, with the results of four pilot studies on local democracy
assessment released the following year;
• a pilot project on democracy in the Arab world
was initiated in 2003 which includes a regional
dialogue on electoral reform, the political participation of women and strengthening political parties; and
• similar dialogues have been carried out in Peru
and Nepal.
7.13. Dialogue and Democracy
Building
IDEA is to publish by the end of 2005 a handbook
on democratic dialogue as a method for promoting democracy in cooperation with UNDP and
the OAS. This publication draws on numerous
case studies where dialogue has been the method
of facilitating public participation to analyse and
assess democracy, and to develop reform agendas
with genuine public ownership. This methodology is crucial to countries emerging from violent
conflict as they attempt to build sustainable democracy.
7.14. Research and Dialogue on
Political Parties
Political parties are vital to the democratic process due to their capacity to represent different interests, present candidates for representative office,
and provide citizens with political choices. Wherever political parties are weak, democratic systems
are at risk. Yet they face increased distrust, their
memberships are dwindling, and they have trouble renewing their intellectual and organizational
capacity.
IDEA is conducting a global research project on
the impact of external regulation and internal
management challenges on the effectiveness of political parties. In broad terms, the study is seeking to establish how electoral laws, regulations
and financing affect the stability, membership
and internal operations of political parties. Much
of these data, including information on gender
quotas, is assembled on a regional and comparative basis in order to assist with the development
of policy options. Information on the internal
functioning of parties, management
practices, mechanisms to ensure a
diversity of candidates and how
members are included in party
decision-making
processes is presented in order to encourage
within political parties.
Political parties are vital to the democratic
process due to their capacity to represent
different interests, present candidates for
representative office, and provide citizens
with political choices. Wherever political
parties are weak, democratic systems are
at risk.
a culture of democracy
The programme will be conducted in collaboration with regional partners. It began in Latin
America with a focus on the funding of political
parties. Central America was added to the programme next and the research broadened to examine the functioning of parties. Later, Western and
Southern Africa, South Asia, Central and Eastern
Europe and the Andean countries were added;
and in 2005–6 East Africa, the Arab region, other
parts of South America, East Asia, the Pacific, and
lastly Western Europe and North America will be
included in the project.
The intention is to publish and develop an online database as a key part of the project. This will
enable the dissemination of comparative information, best practice and material useful to parties
and others via the IDEA web site. Workshops will
also be held to generate regional debate on political party reform.
7.14.1. The Role of Money in Politics
The sources of funding for political parties influence both public trust and the outcome of elections. They may also affect how many women get
put on party tickets. IDEA’s research
The sources of funding for political parties
produced the handinfluence both public trust and the outcome
book on Funding of
of elections. They may also affect how
Political Parties and
many women get put on party tickets.
Election Campaigns
(2003), which contains one of the largest collections of information
on party finance regulations, covering more than
100 countries, and compares the different laws
and regulations from a regional perspective. The
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
93
Guatemala. At the end of its bloody civil war in
1996, IDEA was invited by the Guatemalan Government to help assess the challenges to the country’s democratization process. The result was voiced
in the report Democracy in Guatemala: A Mission
for an Entire People and a national mechanism, the
Participation and Democracy Programme (PPD),
was created to follow up on the recommendations.
Workshops were held in 2003 with political parties on women’s participation (indigenous women
in particular), the political participation of women
at the local level and internal democracy of political parties.
Peru. IDEA has been involved in a range of activities in Peru including the provision of assistance
to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and conducting a democracy assessment
in 2003.
book analyses enforcement problems and possibilities for the effective public disclosure of party
funding.
7.15. Regional Activities
7.15.1. Latin America
The 1990s saw a wave of democratization sweep
through Latin America. Free and fair elections
were held in many countries, and several autocratic regimes were deposed. However, the region still
faces four important challenges:
• exclusion;
• corruption;
• poverty; and
• inequality.
These are all caused by the political system, which
is controlled by oligarchies; this in turn affects regional stability. The problem of unresponsive and
unrepresentative political systems in the majority
of countries in Latin America has led to crises of
governability, representation and participation,
to institutional weakness, and to low levels of accountability and transparency. Political reforms
have not produced economic reform and are therefore perceived to have failed to deliver tangible
improvements in people’s everyday lives, leaving
them disappointed with the promises of democracy.
94
A regional research study assessing the continent’s evolution in political, electoral, economic and social terms in 20 years of democratization, carried out jointly with the Inter-American
Development Bank, resulted in the report Politics
Matters: Democratic Reform and the Quest for Development (2002). IDEA has also contributed to the
democratization process in Mexico, Paraguay, Colombia, El Salvador and Chile, and plans to continue to work for political reform, participation
of women and other under-represented groups as
well as the strengthening of political parties.
7.15.2. Africa
The African continent is struggling with a number
of difficulties including socio-economic problems,
HIV/AIDS, widespread corruption and endemic
civil wars which hamper its democratic evolution.
Nigeria. The election of General Olusegun Obasanjo as president in 1999 opened up a window
of opportunity for democracy in Nigeria. IDEA
was invited to provide advice on constitutional laws, to assist the independent electoral commission and to assess the transition to democracy. In the course of 2000, IDEA facilitated dialogues between state institutions, the private sector, the military and civil society, which resulted
in the assessment report, Democracy in Nigeria:
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation-Building. IDEA
later provided technical assistance and a postmortem of the 2003 elections. IDEA has also
supported nationally-driven democracy assessments in Burkina Faso, and facilitated expert assessments of democracy in Ghana and Benin.
IDEA holds training courses for electoral administrators in Africa, notably in South Africa and
Mozambique, using material from the BRIDGE
programme.
7.15.3. South and South-East Asia
South and South-East Asia pose many challenges
for democratic consolidation. The region includes
India, the world’s largest democracy, and China,
the world’s largest non-democracy. In between are
a variety of regimes: monarchies, military dictatorships, oligarchies and democracies. IDEA is
conducting a regional assessment on the state of
democracy in South Asia, developing a base-line
study of democracy in five South Asian countries
to assist communities to share information on
how to deal with the common challenges of pluralism, diversity and socio-economic inequalities.
Indonesia. After the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 and the opening up of political space for democratization, IDEA advised
political parties and civil society on the options
for and implications of electoral system choices.
In 1999 IDEA provided technical assistance in the
development of material for civic education and
training women to run for public office. The report Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment
(2000) was the result of political dialogue to assess how best to consolidate democracy. IDEA also
supported efforts to further the constitutional reform process, strengthen the political participation
of women, support the emergence of democratic
electoral processes and institutions, and ensure effective regional representation.
Burma. The political climate in Burma is such that
work for a democratic transition must necessarily take place outside the country, in collaboration
with the supporters of democratic opposition in
exile. In the 1990 elections, the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi won a majority of
the seats contested, but the army stepped in and
the result was ignored. Since 1997 IDEA has been
using a multi-pronged strategy vis-à-vis Burma:
promoting dialogue through the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) network;
mobilizing European Union opinion to support
democratic forces; and supporting activities that
anticipate the transition to democracy. IDEA also
supports the National Reconciliation Programme
which engages the ethnic nationalities in dialogue
on conflict resolution; assists constitution drafting
processes; and works for the increased inclusion of
women in the political arena.
7.15.4. The South Caucasus
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990s, there was enormous potential for democratization, but the transition has been more
difficult than expected. Wars within and between
the three Caucasian republics, lingering authoritarianism, the transition to primitive capitalism
leading to a dramatic drop in living standards and
mass emigration are some of the difficulties encountered. There are positive signs, however, with
ceasefires holding well and the increasing attention the international community is paying to the
region.
IDEA supports the home-bred democratic processes in the South Caucasus. A democracy
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
95
democracy by bridging the gap between academia
and practitioners in the field.
The following chapters outline in more detail
IDEA’s achievements in its ten years of existence.
Much work remains to be done before democracy
can be said to prevail as the state system of choice
worldwide. IDEA will continue to innovate in the
field of democracy in the coming decade in order
to turn the hope for universal democracy into a
global reality.
assessment and report entitled Georgia: Challenges
Towards Sustainable Democracy (2002) were followed by an advocacy phase leading to the development of an agreed agenda for change.
BRIDGE training was carried out in Georgia in
2002 and further strengthening of the election
management capacity is planned through a tailormade BRIDGE curriculum for the South Caucasus. IDEA will also organize debates around the
recently translated handbook Democracy at the Local Level: A Guide for the South Caucasus.
7.16. Outlook
One of IDEA’s founding principles is to operate
at the very forefront of democracy advocacy, exploring the frontiers of institutional design and
reform, and catalysing networks and democratic
processes, thereby supporting the development of
sustainable democracy through loMuch work remains to be done before
cal ownership. Its
democracy can be said to prevail as the
strengths lie in its
state system of choice worldwide. IDEA
being a global orwill continue to innovate in the field of
ganization, which
democracy in the coming decade in order to
is also small and
turn the hope for universal democracy into a
efficient enough
global reality.
to respond fast as
an independent facilitator. As the name implies, IDEA should be
an incubator for new ideas on how to promote
96
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘The combination of countries and people gave us credibility. It was not just seen
as an institution coming from the North again to teach developing countries how
to arrange their affairs. We offered something that incorporated experiences from
different continents, not only from Europe or North America. The idea was quite
obvious – I was surprised that no one else was doing it.
At that time many people were focusing on elections and electoral observation,
expecting that democracy would come more or less automatically. But I knew that
electoral observation doesn’t create democracy. You have to go further down the road
with electoral work, and also with democracy work. You have to combine the two
basic principles of preparing handbooks on good practices with a process that is focused
on institutions.’
Bengt Säve-Söderbergh, First Secretary General of International IDEA (1995 – 2002)
current Ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
‘The right to vote under universal adult franchise gives to every citizen an opportunity
to participate in the democratic process and to select the government. This right must
be used not only to operate and defend democracy but also to make it more effective
and meaningful. This is a tremendous responsibility.’
Dr Subhash C. Kashyap, member of the Board of International IDEA, former SecretaryGeneral of the Indian Parliament’s Lower House, and former Constitutional Adviser to the
Indian Government on PRI Laws
98
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
8. Optimism to Realism: Ten
Years of Electoral Development
Andrew Ellis
This chapter highlights one of democracy building’s
most advanced areas—sustainable electoral processes.
It attempts to recount the development of the area
from the optimistic climate of the mid-1990s to the
sober professional approach of the early 21st century,
and the progress made on the way. Electoral assistance
has been a driver in international cooperation in the
field, and has played an important role in the emergence of a defined community of practitioners.
When IDEA opened its doors in 1995 there was
a great sense of optimism about the future of democratization and the power of elections. Many
countries of Central and Eastern Europe had already held two successful elections, and a process of political change and consolidation appeared
to be well under way. South Africa’s first universal franchise election in 1994 had been successful.
There was a sense that a new wave of democracy
was rolling, with elections as defining moments
and the perception that an external stamp of approval from international observers was a key part
of the process of democratization.
Ten years on, a more sober climate prevails. The
assumption that established democracies know
how to conduct acceptable elections was dealt a
heavy blow in Florida in 2000. Groups seeking to
retain power in transitional countries have sought
to conduct façade elections, acceptable on the
surface but maintaining their single set of established power interests within ‘soft authoritarian’
states. From Chechnya onwards, some elections
have been held under security conditions that did
not come close to enabling the free expression
and debate of ideas during an election campaign.
Since 9/11, there are many who view democracy
as a component part of the ‘war on terror’ and the
quest for security.
The initial euphoria that took hold in the 1990s
as many countries held their first elections has
evaporated. The explosion of interest in elections
since that time has led to many important and
solid gains. Much of the ‘muddling through’ that
characterized the early 1990s has gone. Ethical
codes and guidelines for elections have emerged;
standards have been debated; an enormous pool
of knowledge about what makes elections run well
has been accumulated and is widely accessible; and
electoral administration has grown into a profession of its own, with a distinct identity and skills.
Networks of electoral practitioners have formed
and peer support mechanisms are emerging. The
limited and ad hoc application of electoral experience has been replaced by global sharing of electoral expertise. IDEA has played a major role in
helping to catalyse this process of change and developing the tools and materials to support it.
8.1. Electoral Systems,
Institutional Frameworks and
Direct Democracy
The conventional, if somewhat simplistic, wisdom of the 1990s that elections define democracy is now under challenge. There is increasing
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
99
recognition that successful elections are built upon
the legitimacy of institutional frameworks, even if
this is sometimes obscured by realpolitik. These
frameworks have many component parts, including constitutions, political laws (for example those
regarding the structure of legislatures
The conventional, if somewhat simplistic,
or the regulation
wisdom of the 1990s that elections define
of political parties),
democracy is now under challenge. There
electoral laws and
is increasing recognition that successful
electoral system deelections are built upon the legitimacy of
sign. The essential
institutional frameworks.
interconnection of
all of these is only
now beginning to be understood. For example:
electoral systems influence political party systems,
which in turn influence future electoral system design. Over the last ten years there has been greater recognition that the design of political systems
cannot be imposed, that there are no perfect solutions, and that the involvement of stakeholders
through dialogue is critically important if they are
to achieve legitimacy.
There has been marked, although not universal,
progress towards more practical realism in the field
of electoral system design. In the past, it was rare
for electoral systems to be consciously and deliberately selected. Often the choice was accidental,
with the impact of colonialism and the effects of
influential neighbours especially strong. In almost
all cases, the choice of any particular electoral system had a profound effect on a country’s political
life: once chosen, the electoral system usually remained fairly fixed as political interests solidified
around and responded to the incentives presented
to them.
In the last ten years there has been more conscious
thought and debate about electoral system design.
Whether it is part of a transition, a response to
a political crisis within an established democracy,
or merely because campaigners for political reform
attempt to put electoral system change onto the
agenda, the process of change is fundamentally
political. Electoral system choice is not a question
to which independent technicians can produce a
single ‘correct answer’. The consideration of political advantage is an inevitable factor in the process of change. Political actors with vested interests
100
may use their knowledge of electoral systems to
promote designs which they think will work to
their own partisan advantage. Alternatively, those
involved in the process of designing an electoral
system may lack basic knowledge and information
so that the choices and consequences of different
electoral systems are not fully recognized. Realists
now recognize that short-term, self-interested, sectoral and even venal considerations will be in play
when change is promoted. Democratic reformers need to seek to ensure that long-term and visionary considerations of national interest coexist
alongside them. The necessary information and
tools are now available to help them.
Alongside the choice of systems for elections, the
last ten years have seen an increase in the use of
referendums and citizens’ initiatives. The number
of national referendums worldwide increased
throughout the 20th century, and there is no sign
that the process will be reversed. Direct democracy
instruments are no longer only used in Switzerland, in western states of the USA and on other
isolated occasions. Once direct democracy instruments are in place, it is unlikely that they will ever
be abolished: the strength of ‘They want to take
away your right to decide’ as a campaigning argument is self-evident. Similarly, when a neighbouring country or state has a referendum, there may
well be pressure for the practice to spread, as is
shown by the number of referendums that have
accompanied the process of European integration.
Our understanding of the consequences of direct
democracy is not very far advanced. Electoral participants and stakeholders cannot wish away the
growth of direct democracy. Those who are inherently suspicious of direct democracy confront
those who enthusiastically promote it as the solution to a wide range of problems of democracy. A synthesis has not yet emerged about how direct democracy and representative democracy can
complement and reinforce each other.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral
System Design, first published in 1997, rapidly
became a standard text for electoral system designers and students of electoral system design
worldwide. The New International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (2005) covers the
process of electoral system change and the political and institutional context in which electoral
systems work in more depth than the original
handbook, describing what factors to consider
when modifying or designing an electoral system. Created for policy makers, politicians and
election administrators, it is also an excellent
tool for commentators, students and interested
members of the public. The New Handbook explains in a practical way how countries choose
or inherit electoral systems as well as how and
why they may be changed or modified. It describes how electoral systems interact with the
larger institutional, political and social context
and framework in a country, and how they can
affect participation, reach out to minorities, assist in alleviating conflicts and help instil faith
in a sceptical electorate.
The New Handbook also addresses issues of
increased concern and debate such as the potential role for the electoral system to increase
women’s political participation.
Policy makers are provided with options and
comparative lessons from around the world.
The New Handbook includes:
• a precise and simple-to-understand explanation of the electoral systems in use in more
than 200 independent states and related territories;
• an explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of using different electoral systems;
• 18 case studies written by regional experts;
• an analysis of measures that can be taken to
promote the representation of women and
minorities; and
• a colour-coded map showing which systems
are used where in the world.
8.2. Internationally Run
Elections in Post-Conflict
Transitions
In the last ten years those who have sought to implement democracy, build democratic institutions
and hold pluralist elections have often received
a level of media coverage and international support. Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor all come to
mind, with Afghanistan and Iraq being more recent examples. The attention of the international
community has, however, mostly focused on the
election itself. As these cases have demonstrated,
although factional leaders may emerge from a conflict, there may well be few political incumbents.
The institutional interests of other stakeholders are
even less obvious. Moreover, not everyone is committed to ending the conflict, and international
and external actors may have their own contradictory or controversial agendas. An internationally
organized transitional election also
Electoral participants and stakeholders
involves a major
cannot wish away the growth of direct
investment of redemocracy. Those who are inherently
sources. It is theresuspicious of direct democracy confront
fore unlikely to be
those who enthusiastically promote it as
rejected as ‘unsucthe solution to a wide range of problems of
cessful’ by those
democracy.
involved in the
process, short of
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
101
complete breakdown.
Those whose commitment to democracy is only
limited hold a negotiating card: do it our way—
or at least in a way we can live with—or we will
restart the conflict.
When the choice
Donor countries have often responded
has to be made, the
enthusiastically to forthcoming elections,
reality is more likebut treated them as isolated events.
ly to be that ‘peace’
Regrettably, this approach has the
comes first. Quespotential to yield a variety of undesirable
tions of the acceptconsequences.
ability of an election then become
negotiable. International pressure for ‘positive results’ and the need for continuing donor commitment mean that time will be on the side of those
who are against democratic change. In the real
world, Afghanistan and Iraq are the most recent
examples of political pressure to ‘declare victory’
after the elections without a clear strategy about
post-election commitment of the donor community.
No consensus exists about the notion of democracy building through international intervention, as
there are major unresolved questions which affect
the role of elections and the perception of elections. The international community is often not in
the position to maintain support for ‘international
norms of democracy and governance’ against firm,
if sometimes covert, opposition by significant local actors. When agreements are reached, the pressure has often been to hold elections and to establish new institutions as fast as possible—but
this may merely serve to entrench the major parties to the conflict, as illustrated by the elections
in Bosnia which followed just nine months after
the 1995 Dayton
Agreement. Is it
The planning of future electoral assistance
better (if it is realneeds to emphasize the development of
istic) to hold local
political frameworks and democratic culture.
elections first, with
the opportunities
they may present for cooperation and reconciliation?
Election planners are beset by difficulties or agendas that are beyond their control. The reality of
post-conflict missions funded by the international
102
community is that resources often arrive late or are
insufficient. Worse, elections are sometimes used
as an exit strategy by the international community. Experience shows that timing of elections is
important, that quick elections are not necessarily
beneficial, and that it is always better to back up
a commitment to legitimize government through
elections with complementary measures to enhance the legitimacy of interim governments.
Such elections raise the question of the definition of an ‘acceptable election’. Afghanistan and
Iraq, for example, have shown that security conditions that allow for competitive campaigning, or
even the proper organization of the election itself,
cannot be taken for granted. IDEA’s International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the
Legal Framework of Elections go some way towards
answering the question. Yet more needs to be done
to arrive at a broader consensus on exactly what
constitutes ‘minimum standards’ and who decides
if they have been met or breached.
8.3. Looking at Elections from a
Development Perspective
Donor countries have often responded enthusiastically to forthcoming elections, but treated them
as isolated events. Regrettably, this approach has
the potential to yield a variety of undesirable consequences. For example, only focusing on the election itself unwittingly lends support for replays of
the same semi-authoritarian scenario every four or
five years. At election time, opposition forces are
temporarily allowed enough space to participate
but are ultimately bound to fail. Election performance may show technical improvements, but little
or no long-term progress towards democratization
and pluralism is visible.
The planning of future electoral assistance needs
to emphasize the development of political frameworks and democratic culture. The priority placed
on technical electoral assistance should become
part of a comprehensive strategy of capacity building to strengthen democratic processes and institutions. The relationship between the political,
foreign policy and development agendas is often
sensitive and contradictory and may not necessarily be consistent with the democratization process.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
From the perspective of development, if electoral
support is to produce long-term benefits, it needs
to include three important elements.
First, electoral processes and structures must be robust, credible, cost-efficient and affordable within
recipient country budgets. It is surely better for a
poor country to develop an imperfect yet ‘good
enough’ election mechanism, which can be funded by the national budget with perhaps a small
amount of external support at election time, than
to develop a system that relies on more technically
advanced machinery that is beyond local financial
and human resources, and for which long-term
support is unlikely to be forthcoming. The UN
intervention in Cambodia in 1992–3, for example, cost some 2 billion USD, while with a better
managed election the level of donor assistance for
the 2003 national elections was only 12 million
USD.
Second, investment in electoral administration
capacity makes more sense than ad hoc contributions to electoral events. Twinning arrangements,
cooperation between electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the development of regional and
local training networks and curricula in elections
management—particularly in local languages—all
contribute to longer-term capacity building. The
BRIDGE interactive training course, developed
together by IDEA, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) and the UN Electoral Assistance
Division (UNEAD), offers this possibility.
The ACE Project <http//www.aceproject.org>
provides a globally accessible online information resource on election administration.
Work has now been completed on 12 different
topic areas: electoral systems; legislative framework; electoral management; boundary delimitation; voter education; voter registration;
voting operations; parties and candidates; vote
counting; media and elections; election integrity; and elections and technology. In 2004,
CD ROMs in English, French and Spanish
were produced in addition to the hard copy
and online information.
ACE was originally developed by IDEA in
partnership with the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and the UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA). In 2003 IDEA took over responsibility for the coordination of ACE. In
2004, in preparation for ‘ACE 2’, the project
partnership was joined by Elections Canada,
the Mexican Elections Commission (Instituto Federal Electoral), UNDP and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). ACE
2, in addition to updating the complete content of ACE, is designed to include interactive knowledge services, electoral ‘communities of practice’, and peer group support
networks, building on the online electoral
encyclopaedia and the collection of sample
materials.
The EPIC Project <http://www.epicproject.
org> brings together comparative information
about electoral legislation and regulations in
an easily accessible form. Developed and implemented by IDEA in partnership with IFES
and UNDP, material for EPIC is assembled
through a worldwide network of research partners, each of whom monitors developments in
electoral laws in their own region.
Third, it is important to support and encourage planning and evaluation cycles. In the ‘time–
money–quality’ equation, time is the often the
most critical item—as well as the scarcest—for
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
103
an election administration. Politicians will normally take all the time available to resolve political
questions, because negotiating concessions made
late are almost always more valuable. Although
election administrations have adequate time available in theory, in reality they are always operating
under time constraints to produce a ‘good enough’
election.
Unfortunately many of the international community’s electoral assistance interventions, particularly in the 1990s,
have been found
The time has come to review the emphasis
wanting. Luckily,
donors have learnt
on election observation now that alternative
a number of lesapproaches to transparency and integrity
sons if they are to
are being developed and now that resources
provide effective
are limited.
assistance:
1. Avoid event-driven approaches and short timelines. Electoral support is often considered only
when a polling day is identified, usually 18
months away at most. Political hesitancy can
then curtail the key early planning and training stages of election preparation. Subsequent
short timetables create great pressure to spend
donor funds with little time to implement best
practice.
2. Plan for sustainability. The overall aim should
be the development of the human and organizational capacity to run effective elections that
are both ‘good enough’ and sustainable within
the national budget in the longer term. First
elections are often visible and well funded, and
may even set standards that are too high; second and third elections are equally important
in developing long-term electoral capability.
Commitments to follow up electoral assistance
programmes need political will to outlast polling day. Long-term training and capacity building are the key.
3. Avoid reinventing the wheel. When the only priority is to deliver an election under pressure of
time, with all knowledge and direction coming
from outside, the result can include loss of institutional memory, lack of continuity, and lack
of ownership among local stakeholders in the
electoral process. Each election process should
build on the previous one, using observation
104
4.
5.
6.
7.
reports as an important means of identifying
future technical assistance agendas.
Respond to the trend towards election manipulation through the media. More and more attempts to manipulate elections through the
media are occurring in the weeks before polling
day. Electoral assistance planning needs to provide a means of responding to this challenge:
the development of globally applicable codes of
conduct and guidelines for the role of the media in elections would be valuable.
Ensure technical advice is appropriate. External
advice flavoured by ‘we know what’s best for
you’ is rarely helpful.
Ensure procurement is driven by need and not by
supply. Vendor-driven agendas and lengthy internal donor procedures can result in expensive
options, such as helicopter transport of ballot
papers or chartered plane transport of materials
sourced out of country, rather than more costeffective local solutions that take time to develop. The quality of electoral assistance should be
ensured by value-for-money and accountability
procedures, not compromised by them.
Assist the whole electoral process. Give more emphasis to the electoral planning process, including the consultation and involvement of
stakeholders, the timely drafting and reviewing
of laws and regulations, and the development
of calendars and operational plans. The critical importance of electoral dispute resolution
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
mechanisms should also not be underestimated.
8. Strengthen electoral processes, don’t just judge
them. Funding an observation mission alone
can be an easy, visible and low-risk disbursement of funds allocated to an electoral process, especially where there are controversial issues surrounding it. Local stakeholders find
it strange that funding is available to judge a
process but not to help make it work.
8.4. Has Election Observation
Outstayed its Welcome?
International observation has been a major focus
of activity and expenditure in the last ten years
and is often the subject of debate. The time has
come to review the emphasis on election observation now that alternative approaches to transparency and integrity are being developed and now
that resources are limited.
Early election observation concentrated on the act
of voting. As the authoritarian elites of 1990 struggled to comprehend what was happening around
them and react fast enough, this symbolic presence was often sufficient to prevent manipulation
of the vote. At the same time the international seal
of approval of observers became an important validation of the process of democracy building.
However, large-scale observation raised issues. Allegations of observation as electoral tourism surfaced, sometimes with a real basis in fact. In large
countries especially, international observation missions could only be present in a fraction of polling
stations, and it was not always clear that observers
knew what they were looking at. As a result, observation methodology became stricter and more
professional, observer training more rigorous, and
observer selection more considered. In this respect
both the EU and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) played an important part. Attempts
to steal elections by ballot-stuffing became rarer.
Those who sought to manipulate elections were
learning new ways how to escape control.
Attempts to influence election results by the use
of selective criteria for registration, or selective
application of these
criteria,
became
Most insidious of all was the realization
more common beby some governing elites that the entire
cause registration
electoral process can be allowed to be
takes place when
technically clean as long as the media
there are fewer outenvironment in the months leading up
siders around. Atto the election is sufficiently under their
tempts to affect recontrol.
sults by falsifying
the numbers during counting and tabulation of votes also continued. Observer groups responded by trying to ensure that observation took place throughout the
electoral process, deploying long-term observers
from the beginning of registration through to the
swearing into office of those elected. The wider involvement of civil society organizations in domestic observation and the growing competence and
professionalism of parallel vote tabulations helped
to identify and counter some attempts at fraud.
But the resolution of electoral disputes remained
a problem because these matters could be delayed
until after the international caravan had moved
on.
Most insidious of all was the realization by some
governing elites that the entire electoral process
can be allowed to be technically clean as long as
the media environment in the months leading up
to the election is sufficiently under their control.
Opposition voices may even be allowed during
that short period when the international spotlight
is on. Methodologies for media monitoring have
been developed but need to be deployed effectively before polling commences.
The question is whether international observation
is worth its considerable cost? Is
The question is whether international
it better to use reobservation is worth its considerable cost?
sources to support
domestic observer
networks, or are these most effective with the support of internationals in situations where the opponents of democracy are really determined? Are
audits and peer reviews a better approach to ensuring transparency and integrity in the future? Is
it indeed more effective to concentrate resources
on the development of fully independent, effective
and empowered election administrations?
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
105
8.5. The Independence of
Election Administrations
This concept was so successful that over half of the
world’s EMBs now take this form.
The organization of elections was traditionally a
specialist backwater in the administrations of established democracies, often located within the
government or local government service. Individual committed officials worked in their electoral
service for many years often in isolation and with
their role unrecognized. The considerable independence of the Election Commission of India
was a shining exception too often unknown outside that country.
But realism shows that independence on its own
is not enough. Formal independence laid down in
legislation has been shown to be a chimera when
political control of the appointment procedure
is used to create a compliant body. The election
commission of Ukraine for the late 2004 elections
was formally independent, but inspired no confidence: it had to be completely replaced before the
rerun of the second round of the presidential election. Independence is beginning to be understood
not only as desirable in itself but also as a means of
ensuring electoral management that is impartial,
accountable and transparent—and perceived to be
so. Nonetheless, there are still battles to be fought.
Independent EMBs may have to fight with governments or legislatures to ensure that their budgets are sufficient to organize elections effectively,
and then to receive the money when it is needed.
Elections in ‘new democracies’ in the early 1990s
did not initially address the question of how to develop an election administration.
The lack of public confidence in ex-communist
civil services led to the adoption of election administration practices in which commissions were
filled by political party nominees at every level,
with good practice being assured by the members
mutually policing each other. The optimistic approach to transitions brought huge international
presences: for example, there was one international person in every Cambodian commune for nine
months in 1992-3, and one international supervisor in every registration station and every polling
station in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. Eventually it was realized that the level of resources and
commitment required to mount such efforts could
only ever be one-off, and that such interventions
were in any event disproportionate in scale.
Gradually, the importance of election administration has dawned. When developing democracies started to plan their second elections and the
plethora of international resources was no longer available, the importance of national electoral
management as a manifestation of national sovereignty became readily apparent. African and Latin
American countries joined India in showing the
value of EMBs that
are independent
Independence is beginning to be understood
of the executive
not only as desirable in itself but also as a
branch, reporting
means of ensuring electoral management
to the legislature
that is impartial, accountable and
or even set up as
transparent—and perceived to be so.
a separate fourth
branch of the state.
106
Realism has also, rightly, led electoral management
debate into the realms of sustainability, service delivery and efficiency. The budgets for elections are
significant in almost all countries and enormous
in larger countries. Decisions about equipment are
not easy, especially in the information technology
field, where new systems become obsolete almost
as soon as they are installed and vendors have an
interest in promoting their product whether or
not it is appropriate. Electoral procurement needs
to be transparent and accountable if corruption is
to be prevented. But the challenges of delivering
cost-effective elections against time deadlines, retaining institutional memory in electoral management, and ensuring transparency and appropriate
choice in procurement will not go away.
The staffing requirements for EMBs fluctuate
enormously: in the lead-up to an election, a huge
number of people are needed for a short period, but
only a small core staff is needed on a continuous
basis. The question of what short-term electoral
staff do between elections remains a complex issue
worldwide. To illustrate the scale of this problem,
a general election in a developing country can be
the biggest single organized activity undertaken by
anyone at any time.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
IDEA has played a major role in the last ten
years in bringing together EMBs from around
the world, enabling experience to be shared
and both formal and informal networks to be
created. IDEA’s Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections has played an important role in this process, and is available in English, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. In response to
the current challenges faced by electoral management bodies—especially in the context of
structuring, financing, and issues of sustainability, accountability and good governance—
IDEA is developing tools and resources for use
by policy makers and practitioners in election
law and administration to improve election
management, which will be contained in the
forthcoming IDEA Handbook on the Structure,
Finance and Evaluation of Electoral Management Bodies.
8.6. Election Administration
as a Profession
The isolation of election administrators within
the civil services of their own countries used to
be matched by a lack of contact between election
administrators in different countries. The increasing number of countries which hold elections,
the growth of international interest in elections,
and the explosion in international technical assistance—and indeed observation—have reversed
this. Regional electoral organizations and EMB
networks increasingly share knowledge, best practice and materials with each other, thereby promoting the implementation of professional standards
in electoral management. For example, Southern
African EMBs maintain regular contact through
the SADC Election Commissioners’ Forum, and
those in Latin America through the Inter-American Union of Electoral Organisations (UNIORE).
Election administration is now seen as a profession
that requires training, specialist knowledge and
practical skills. Training material for electoral capacity, such as the BRIDGE curriculum, is important. Courses in electoral management are available in several places such as the University of Calgary, Canada, and Griffith University, Australia.
The building of sustainable electoral administrations relies on the development of the capacity of election administration staff being a priority. In response to
this need, IDEA,
Election administration is now seen as a
the AEC and the
profession that requires training, specialist
UNEAD develknowledge and practical skills.
oped a comprehensive training
curriculum for electoral administrators called
the BRIDGE Electoral Administrators’ Training Curriculum <http://www.bridge-project.
org>. The curriculum covers all aspects of elections and uses an activities-based adult learning methodology to build capacity and develop
professionalism. The training is global in scope
and uses comparative examples to illustrate options and best practice. Throughout the course
guiding principles for election administration
such as impartiality, accuracy and transparency
are incorporated into the course activities.
Currently available BRIDGE modules
include:
• an introduction to electoral administration;
• electoral systems;
• public outreach;
• boundary delimitation;
• registration of voters;
• election contestants;
• preparation for the electoral event;
• polling and the count;
• electoral observers; and
• strategies for sustainability.
BRIDGE materials are now available in Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, French, Portuguese and Russian, with Spanish planned.
The BRIDGE project partners conduct regular
international ‘Training of Facilitators’ courses
where potential trainers are taught how to deliver the BRIDGE course. To ensure the quality
of BRIDGE course delivery, only fully accredited BRIDGE trainers are able to run BRIDGE
training courses.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
107
8.7. Gender and Elections
The last ten years have seen wider acceptance of
the principle that representation of women involves representation by women. Pressure has
grown for both electoral and political legislation
that encourages the election of women through
gender-friendly electoral systems and quotas, and
for action within political parties to encourage the
nomination of more women candidates.
The method of list proportional representation
has been shown to encourage more gender representation as women seize the opportunities for
‘balanced tickets’ on party lists. However, merely fixing the basic form of the electoral system is
not enough. Systems with a larger number of seats
per districts can substantially increase the number
of women elected. On the other hand, a strongly
fragmented party system, in which small parties
elect just one or two male leaders as their representatives, may reduce this number.
Legislation or regulations increasingly
political legislation that encourages the
include provisions
election of women through gender-friendly
for voluntary or
electoral systems and quotas, and for action
mandatory quotas.
within political parties to encourage the
These are more efnomination of more women candidates.
fective if the positioning of candidates on the list is taken into account as well as
gender balance. The development and operation
of quotas have been detailed in the IDEA/University of Stockholm Global Database of Quotas for
Women <http://www.quotaproject.org>.
Pressure has grown for both electoral and
Party procedures for choosing candidates, along
with the nomination and election procedures for
internal party management bodies, play a major
role in determining whether parties are ‘genderfriendly’. Women candidates and potential candidates have created support networks and ‘women
only’ training through cross-party caucuses. However, the quest for stability—and sometimes also
pressure to take action against corruption—has
often led to excessively tight control of elected
members by political parties, by strengthening
the power of the central party leadership. In such
situations elected women have sometime found it
108
difficult to be effective, being expected only to
shut up and follow the leadership’s instructions.
The importance of gender balance in election administration recruitment, from commissioners to
polling station officials, is now better recognized.
There is also more awareness of how women may
be disadvantaged by literacy or access requirements
in registration and polling procedures. Considerable experience and best practice exists in targeted
voter education to encourage women’s participation, and it is important to ensure that this is developed to match local conditions.
Little attention has yet been given to gender aspects of electoral dispute resolution. How are appointments made to adjudicating bodies? Do the
procedures to lodge a claim and have it heard appear more onerous or threatening to women?
8.8. Participation and
Turnout: A Threat to Electoral
Legitimacy?
Participation and voter turnout have been a cause
of growing concern in both established and developing democracies. IDEA has played an important
role in this debate by assembling and maintaining
the worldwide Voter Turnout Database <http://
www.idea.int/vt>. It has taken most of the last ten
years to identify and address the fundamental issues affecting turnout and to develop practical advice for those seeking to promote or protect electoral involvement.
The International IDEA Voter Turnout Database is continuously updated and is a comprehensive compilation of global voter turnout
statistics. The material is a resource for the important debate about voter turnout, participation and effective voter education. Two associated publications, Voter Turnout Since 1945: A
Global Report and Voter Turnout in Western Europe, include statistics from parliamentary and
presidential elections from nearly every contested national election since the end of World
War II. Graphs, charts and tables illustrate
trends in voter turnout and enable a comparison between old and new democracies.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
In addition to the statistics, these publications discuss relevant issues such as the development of the
franchise and voter registration. Voter registration
is a key part of exercising franchise, and is therefore a prerequisite for electoral participation. History shows us that the removal of barriers to registration is essential to the full exercise of a citizen’s
political rights. The Global Report also analyses
voter registration methods around the world.
Much of the existing analysis of participation relates to established democracies. Most people establish their pattern of electoral participation (or
otherwise) in the first three elections after they
reach voting age and this pattern hardly changes
until they die. Any new measures to promote participation are therefore more likely to affect new
voters rather than older ones whose voting pattern
(or lack thereof ) is set.
How people perceive elections is also important.
The habit of electoral participation is more likely
to be developed when election results are perceived
to make a difference to the conduct of government
or when elections look likely to be close, either in
a national context or in the context of the elector’s
own district. This raises further questions. How
does socialization affect voting? What determines
which young people become habitual voters and
which do not? Interestingly, people who vote usually engage in other kinds of citizens’ participation
in community activities.
It appears paradoxical that in some countries,
for example Sweden, interest in politics has increased even though turnout has fallen. The paradox is explained by a big increase in the number
of thoughtful independent people, alongside a big
increase in the number of uninterested, non-partisan people—both of which groups, one may speculate, are made up of younger rather than older
people. The biggest challenge of turnout may be
that of engaging the young, urban, unemployed
and unqualified ‘underclass’ who may be switched
out of society generally.
The widespread reduction of the voting age to
18 has reduced turnout in established democracies. Mark Franklin has described this as ‘a
well-intentioned decision with the unanticipated
consequence of giving rise to a lifetime of disenfranchisement for many of the intended beneficiaries’. Yet reversing this policy and increasing the
voting age again is clearly not politically possible.
What are the implications for voter education?
What knowledge or skills are needed to encourage a new elector to engage with elections? With
the proliferation of media channels on which news
can be found 24 hours a day and with the almost
instant access to information provided through
the Internet, is political awareness now acquired
in a different manner from the way in which it was
acquired in the past? What is the best way nowadays of enabling people to make informed decisions about electoral participation and electoral
choice? Do developing democracies face the same
or worse problems in the electoral area?
Questions about turnout have become clearer in
the last ten years. Political and institutional reformers, election administrators and civic educators now have some understanding about the effects of their choices on participation and turnout.
Yet the implications of their decisions may not become apparent for years and could then take decades to undo.
8.9. The Next Ten Years
When the development of elections in the last ten
years is looked at as a whole, it is possible to draw
much encouragement from it. How to hold an
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
109
acceptable election is now widely understood, although the achievement of higher electoral standards and sustainable elections needs more work in
some countries. Such cases would benefit from the
knowledge sharing and assistance that comes from
electoral management networks and regional peer
support.
The challenge for election administration now
focuses on issues of credibility, transparency,
integrity, protecting electoral processes from partisan pressure, and on how technically efficient
election administrations relate to other interested
players in the electoral process.
In the wider political context, much more needs to
be known about different approaches to institution
building. The new security agenda has placed further political difficulties in the way of promoters
of pluralist, acceptable, professional and sustainable elections. In many countries there are people
who will continue to try to subvert elections to
outmanoeuvre political structures which encourage power sharing and pluralism, and to manipulate independent and professional electoral management processes. The potential for technology
to enable people to express their opinions directly
on individual issues will add a new dimension to
the debate and create tension between representative democracy and direct democracy. Electoral
and institutional reform has moved forward, but
the agenda for future electoral and institutional reformers remains as full as it was ten years ago.
110
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘In the mid-1990s there was not much work done concerning elections and
democracy. We saw an opportunity to do something in this area and there was
great enthusiasm about founding International IDEA. The Institute was one of the
first institutions to discuss women in politics. I believe that the report ’Women in
Parliament’ was an eye-opener for a lot of people, and it started processes in many
countries. I, for example, gave this book to the female foreign ministers when we met
in New York during the UN General Assembly 1997.
Hostile opinions about political parties are often expressed. But I think people
understand that parties are a decisive component of democracy. We need them as
a channel for our views, the primary stream for influence. Efforts must be made to
renew and strengthen political parties, in old as well as in new democracies.’
Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Chairperson of the Board of International IDEA,
former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden, and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Sweden
‘IDEA’s commitment to providing comparative information on how to advance
gender and democracy issues in general, and how to promote the participation and
representation of women in political life in particular, has been valuable to South
Africa as a young democracy and has largely influenced our policies. Belonging to
an international Institute such as IDEA – which does not draw conclusions about
the connection between types of quota provisions and the representation of women
globally, but does provides quantitative information about quota types and rules – has
enabled our nation to implement the quota system in an informed way. While not
legally defined, South Africa’s quota system has stood women a good chance of getting
elected and winning a higher percentage of representation in parliament.’
Dr Brigalia H. Bam, member of the Board of International IDEA, Chairperson of South
Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission and former General Secretary of the South
African Council of Churches
112
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
9. Ten Years of Progress:
Enhancing Women’s Political
Participation
Julie Ballington*
This chapter shows that ten years of efforts to improve
gender participation are slowly starting to pay off,
although much remains to be done.
The year in which IDEA was born was also the year
the world’s governments recognized that, despite
the increased and rapid transition to democracy in
many regions, ‘the popular participation of women in key decision making as full and equal partners with men, particularly in politics, has not yet
been achieved’ (United Nations 1995). From the
very beginning, IDEA understood that women’s
participation in politics was, and remains, central
to democratic governance. IDEA also recognized
that if the world’s new and emerging democracies
were to be truly democratic and benefit from their
previous struggles, half of the world’s population
could not be excluded. It also affirmed that older,
established democracies were failing in their commitments to include women in public life.
For the last ten years, IDEA’s Women in Politics programme has sought to shore up different
methods and models for enhancing women’s political participation. By bridging the gap between
the academics and practitioners, IDEA aimed to
provide
relevant
policy options and
From the very beginning, IDEA understood
data to those workthat women’s participation in politics
ing to find practicawas, and remains, central to democratic
ble solutions to ungovernance.
der-representation
of women. While
taking into account a global perspective, it has
tried to ensure that materials generated also reflect
an awareness of and comparison between national, regional and local contexts. This chapter traces
IDEA’s efforts to enhance women’s political participation over the last decade.
9.1. National Politics:
Broadening the Scope of
Participation
The last two decades have witnessed a widespread
trend towards democratization in most parts of
the world, revitalizing the debate on participatory
democratic governance. Overall the last decade
has seen modest progress with regard to women’s
presence in national parliaments. While in 1995
women accounted for 11.3 per cent of members
of parliament, this figure has increased to 15.6 per
*This chapter was written with contributions from Francesca Binda (Senior Advisor, Political Parties Programme), Kristen Sample (Andean Regional Director), Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham (Head of South Asia Programme), Yee Yin Yap (Assistant to the Director of Operations)
and Leena Rikkilä (Programme Manager, Asia) from IDEA, and Azza Karam, former Senior Programme Officer at IDEA between 1996-1998.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
113
‘insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote
the advancement of women’ as two areas of significant concern where action was critical for the advancement of women. This was further expanded
to encompass women’s participation in post-conflict state building, which finds expression in UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security, passed in October 2000. In the
debate introducing Resolution 1325 in 2000, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that ‘peace
is inextricably linked to equality between women
and men . . . maintaining and promoting peace
and security requires equal participation in decision-making’ (Whittington 2004).
cent in 2005 (IDEA 2005). More than 30 women
have served as heads of government and/or state
since 1995, and in 2005, 19 women preside over
houses of parliament. Yet, while more women now
hold elective office
than ever before,
The slowly changing face of parliamentary
significant
chalrepresentation to include women was
lenges to women’s
political participanot an inevitable consequence of the
tion remain.
broadening of the political space in
democratization processes. Rather, it is the
The equal participation of women
engineering, political party commitment
and men in puband greater recognition by the international
lic life is one of
community for gender equality.
the cornerstones
of the Convention
on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) adopted by the UN General Assembly
in 1979, in force since 1981. Today, more than
20 years since the signing of the Convention, 179
countries are party to it and bound to take measures to promote women’s participation in decision-making and leadership positions.
result of sustained mobilization, institutional
In 1995, the UN Fourth World Conference on
Women held in China generated renewed pressure for the implementation of CEDAW provisions: the Beijing Platform for Action identified
‘inequality between men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels’ and
114
The slowly changing face of parliamentary representation to include women was not an inevitable consequence of the broadening of the political
space in democratization processes. Rather, it is the
result of sustained mobilization, institutional engineering, political party commitment and greater
recognition by the international community for
gender equality. This international discourse has
been the foundation of concerted efforts to support women’s full political participation in the last
ten years. Women’s activism and mobilization at
the country, regional and international level has
been pivotal to keeping gender equality firmly
rooted on the international agenda.
Important progress has been made in some regions, notably the Nordic countries, where women’s representation in parliament averages 40 per
cent. The percentage of parliaments that have
reached the Beijing target of at least 30 per cent
women in parliament has increased threefold in
the last ten years, to 6 per cent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2005). Yet in many parts of the world
real gains in women accessing legislatures have not
occurred. Women have become impatient and are
demanding changes at a much greater pace.
This chapter provides an overview of IDEA’s work
in identifying the key factors responsible for the
gradual increase in women’s representation, including the effect of institutional frameworks, political parties and the implementation of special
measures like quotas. In seeking to bridge the divide between academia and practitioners, IDEA
provided tools and strategies for those men and
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
women who are committed to correcting the imbalance in politics. For the last ten years IDEA has
asked: ‘What are the best strategies to increase the
political representation of women? Which strategies work, and in which structural and political
contexts?’. IDEA always strives to identify and
deal with different national realities. In the area of
women in politics, these realities reveal the various
structural or attitudinal conditions that either favour or hinder the participation of women in public life.
9.2. Key Themes of IDEA’s Work
on Women in Politics
Key themes in the area of women’s political participation have included:
• overcoming the challenges of being elected to
parliaments;
• the effect of socio-economic and cultural biases;
• the central role that political parties and electoral systems play; and
• safeguarding and increasing women’s access to
decision-making bodies through the use of special measures.
Various reform options and information have
been made available in reports and handbooks on
these issues, as well as through the production of
100 country and regional case studies including
85 quota case studies. IDEA is also mindful that
increasing numerical representation is just the first
step in the process of facilitating changes in gender
power relations, as numbers need to be complemented by women politicians using their leverage
to address issues of women’s inequality in society
at large.
9.2.1. Women in Parliament: Challenges
and Opportunities
IDEA produced its first comprehensive handbook
on women’s access to political decision making,
Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, in 1998
(revised in 2005). The handbook is a practical
tool for overcoming the obstacles women encounter throughout the parliamentary electoral process, and provides a number of options on how to
bring about constructive change and influence in
politics. In the Preface, Frene Ginwala explains
the essence of the handbook: ‘The representation
of women and the inclusion of their perspective
and experience in decision making will inevitably
lead to solutions that are more viable and satisfy a
broader range of society’ (Ginwala 1998).
Regionalizing Outreach
Responding to ongoing requests for the translation of the Women in Parliament handbook
into different languages, International IDEA
has produced the following regional versions:
•
•
•
•
•
French 2002
Indonesian 2002
Spanish 2002
Russian (abridged) 2003
English (revised) 2005
[Includes 25 country case studies from all
regions of the world]
The original idea behind Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers was that women in public life require usable information on how to effect political change in decision-making bodies. There is an
emphasis on the entire process of participation—
from the very beginning to the end—as well as the
means of making an impact. The handbook editor, Azza Karam, explains that ‘it is clear that the
more active and engaged women are in politics,
the more there is a need for a culling and systematization of their experiences in such a way as to
elaborate how it is that they make it to these bodies and what they can do once in them’.
With Women in Parliament, the provision of realistic tools and strategies for practitioners seeking to increase women’s participation in political
institutions is central. IDEA frames these barriers as falling into two main categories: attitudinal
and socio-economic factors, and poFor the last ten years IDEA has asked:
litical and institu‘What are the best strategies to increase
tional factors. Althe political representation of women?
though the socioWhich strategies work, and in which
economic and ideological
factors
structural and political contexts?’
cannot be ignored,
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
115
much emphasis has been placed on the political
and institutional factors that influence the levels of
representation of women, and these can, and very
often do, change over a short period of time.
9.2.2. Political Parties and Institutional
Rules Matter
Women in Parliament clearly highlights the effect
that institutions have on women’s access to parliament. In his chapter in the handbook, Richard
Matland illustrates the consequences of different
electoral systems. While they alone do not determine the level of representation of women, electoral systems are important because they can be,
and regularly are, changed. Matland also highlights the impact of political parties: although in
some contexts independent candidates are elected
(typically running on issue-specific or particular
ethnic tickets), political parties assume the primary responsibility for candidate nomination. Parties are entrusted with perhaps the most strategic
responsibility in democracy—to prepare and select candidates for election and to support them in
positions of leadership and governance.
Proportional representation (PR) systems are
viewed as the most ‘women-friendly’. It is no coincidence that 14 of the 15 countries with the highest representation of women in the world have
PR electoral systems and average representation
34.7 per cent women in their parliaments. At the
other end of the
spectrum, the 15
Proportional representation (PR) systems
countries with the
are viewed as the most ‘women-friendly’. It
lowest representais no coincidence that 14 of the 15 countries
tion of women use
with the highest representation of women
plurality or majorin the world have PR electoral systems and
ity systems, averaverage representation 34.7 per cent women
aging one per cent
in their parliaments.
women in their
legislatures.1
As Matland explains in Women in Parliament, there
are several reasons why electoral systems matter.
First, PR systems have higher district magnitudes
which typically produce higher party magnitudes
(the district magnitude is the number of seats per
district and the party magnitude is the number of
seats a party can win in a district). The magnitudes are important because they affect party strategy when choosing candidates. If the district magnitude is one, as it is in majoritarian systems, the
party can only win one seat in a district and cannot
‘balance the party ticket’. Female candidates must
compete directly with men, and winning a party
nomination is heavily influenced by money in politics, name recognition and the advantage enjoyed
by incumbents. When district magnitude increases, the chances that a party will win several seats
increases and party leaders may be more conscious
of balancing the party’s ticket. Party gatekeepers
may also consider balancing the demands of different factions in the party. If a women’s branch
of the party exists, women may well demand to be
allotted winnable positions.
Second, in PR systems, a party receives seats in direct proportion to its overall share of the national
vote, with seats being filled from lists of candidates
submitted by political parties. Most PR systems
use closed lists where the political party determines
the ranking of candidates. This system can be beneficial for women if a sufficient number are placed
in winnable positions on party lists. However, the
absence of party support for women candidates
remains one of the greatest obstacles for women,
as Nestorine Compaoré explains in her case study
on Burkina Faso: ‘While the proportional list system facilitates the promotion of women, its effects
are not really felt unless the political parties have
made the decision to promote women and place
the women on their lists in positions such that
they have a chance of getting elected. Few parties
nominate women, and they are generally placed at
the bottom of the lists’.
Woman-friendly institutions, including PR systems, high district magnitudes and closed party
lists, provide the opportunity for, but do not guarantee, high levels of female representation. Other factors influencing the election of women to
This is not to imply that only electoral systems matter, as representation will be affected by other factors, inter alia the level of democratic
development. Data are taken from Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Women in National Parliament’, February 2005, available at
<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>.
1
116
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
parliament include the cultural standing of women, the organization of women in civil society and
funding. However, the effects of electoral systems
on women’s representation are significant and directly affect political parties’ nomination processes: where parties are willing to nominate women
candidates in sufficient number and place them in
electable positions, there is a higher chance that
political parties will send a representative group of
members to parliament.
9.2.3. Beyond Numbers
It is relatively easy to enumerate the various challenges regarding women’s political participation,
but it is much harder to appreciate the strengths
and positive differences women have made in their
chosen professions. The second theme of the handbook shifts the focus to how women can move ‘beyond numbers’ in parliament to make an impact
on the political process. Azza Karam and Joni Lovenduski outline how women can reform the inherent ‘institutional masculinity’ which characterizes
most legislatures by implementing a ‘rules strategy’. They identify three key areas: learning the
rules, using the rules and changing the rules.
By using the rules strategies, the authors outline
how change can be brought about in four key areas.
(a) institutional and procedural change, to
alter the institution to become more ‘womanfriendly’—a matter not simply of including more
women but of increasing gender awareness;
(b) representational change, by undertaking actions to ensure women’s continued access to the
legislature, placement in important parliamentary
positions and presence in government;
(c) impact and influence on the ‘feminization’ of
legislation and policy, ensuring that women’s issues are put on the parliamentary agenda; and
(d) discourse change, involving change inside and
outside parliament: efforts should be made to alter parliamentary language to integrate women’s
perspectives, while making use of a parliamentary
platform to alter public attitudes.
Partners in the dissemination of IDEA’s
Women in Parliament handbook include:
• Centre for Democratic Governance
(CDG), Burkina Faso
• Centre for Legislative Development
(CLD), Philippines
• Centre for Electoral Reform (CETRO),
Indonesia
• EISA, Promoting Free and Credible
Elections in Africa
• Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
• Mujeres Democrata-Cristianas de America
(MUDCA), Venezuela
• National Democratic Institute (NDI),
selected country offices
• Netherlands Institute for Multiparty
Democracy (NIMD)
• Organisation of America States (OAS)
• Participation and Democracy Programme
(PPD), Guatemala
• SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF)
• Second Vice-Presidency of the Congress of
the Republic of Peru
• Social and Political Institute for Women
(ISPM) of Argentina
• Transparencia, Peru
• UNDP, selected country offices
• UN Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA)
• Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, YJP, Indonesia
In addition to the rules strategy, there are mechanisms to help women maximize their power and
effectiveness. They include working in partnership
with men, enlarging the pool of eligible and aspiring women politicians and taking positive action to increase women’s access to the legislature.
Within the legislature, women’s caucuses and networks and other gender machinery are vital to ensuring that women’s interests remain on the parliamentary agenda, and that gender equality is mainstreamed within different political, social and economic concerns.
Karam notes that far from creating a book to
be added to the dusty bookshelves of many a library, IDEA designed the Women in Parliament
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
117
handbook to be
used as an advocacy tool by its tarthe dusty bookshelves of many a library,
get audience. The
IDEA designed the Women in Parliament
book does more
handbook to be used as an advocacy tool by
than review the litits target audience.
erature on women’s
participation: it is
enormously practical, being based on the experience of the authors, a number of whom are politicians themselves. IDEA’s work has also focused
on how to get the information to those practitioners working in the field. Over the years IDEA has
worked with several regional and international organizations, NGOs, academic institutions, parliaments and politicians.
Far from creating a book to be added to
9.3. Using Special Measures
to Increase Women’s Access to
Politics
9.3.1. The Rise of Quotas and
Reservations for Women
Because of the obstacles women face in the electoral process, special measures have been implemented to safeguard women’s presence in parliament and other elected positions. In terms of
political parties, they may consist of developing
incentives to attract women to the party (such as
providing funding to run an election campaign),
providing networks, training and skills development for women candidates to stand for election,
or setting a target within the party that a certain
number of executive positions will be held by
women. But the most common special measures
are electoral quotas, which are defined as mandatory or targeted percentages of women candidates
for public elections.
The mid-1990s saw the emergence of what has now
been termed a ‘quota fever’: several countries and
hundreds of political parties adopted quota rules.
While some countries experimented with reserved
seats for women as far back as the 1950s, the real
push for quotas came after the UN’s Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
The introduction of quotas in the past ten years
has met with some success. In other instance
118
quotas have not resulted in an increase in the
number of women in politics, and, occasionally,
have had the reverse effect. With the emphasis
placed on quotas as a means of guaranteeing women’s presence in parliaments, IDEA recognized that
gender quotas present many challenges, both in
practice and in academic research. IDEA therefore
prioritized the issue of electoral quotas as an area
requiring further research and gathering of experience to ascertain how and when quotas work best.
This was a natural complement to the Women in
Parliament: Beyond Numbers handbook.
As initial mapping of the implementation of quotas unfolded in 2002, it soon became obvious that
such a research undertaking would require a partner organization, and ideally one involved in largescale research projects. Fortunately such a partner
was close at hand: Drude Dahlerup at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University
has also identified that research on the application
of electoral quotas as a priority. In late 2002, the
IDEA/Stockholm University Electoral Quotas for
Women project was born.
9.3.2. Analysing Electoral Quotas
for Women
Increasing women’s representation and participation in decision-making bodies requires information on which measures have worked in different countries within different political contexts.
As only limited comparative research and data on
quotas were available, the project initially aimed
to gauge whether, and under what conditions,
quotas have been implemented successfully. It also
acknowledged the need to raise general awareness
of the use of gender quotas as an instrument to increase the political representation of women and
to show that they can be, and are being, applied
successfully.
‘The Global Quota Database is the most comprehensive and complete global resource on
electoral quota issues. It is a very useful instrument and simultaneously a wonderful picture
of the progress that has been made.’
Lourdes Flores Nano, 2004 IDEA Board of Directors
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
The first step was the collection of global information on the use of quotas on a country-by-country
basis, detailing the types of quotas and enforcement measures used. The information is made
widely accessible through the Global Database on
Electoral Quotas for Women, which was launched
in March 2003. The initial results were somewhat
surprising: nearly 100 countries had either implemented quotas, previously had quotas or were
considering implementing quotas. Of these, 14
countries have quota provisions guaranteed in the
constitution, and 32 in legislation. In addition,
130 political parties in 61 countries had voluntarily begun experimenting with quotas.
9.3.3. Analysis and Trends
But numbers alone do not tell the whole story. The
web site does not draw conclusions about the connection between types of quota provisions and the
representation of women globally, so further qualitative information was collected through a series of
five regional workshops convened in 2003–4. These
allowed country and regional information on quota
implementation and enforcement to be collated,
and a network of researchers and experts working
in this field to be developed. Workshops were convened in Africa, Asia, the Arab states, Europe and
Latin America with reports compiled summarizing
the main findings of the meetings. This has revealed
some interesting findings.
• Quotas can be effective. Evidence from around
the world suggests that where quota are implemented, and properly enforced, they are a highly effective strategy to accelerate women’s political participation. There are 16 countries which
have reached the target of 30 per cent women in
parliament: ten are from Europe, three from Africa and three from Latin America. While these
countries do not share similar levels of socioeconomic development, 14 of them have implemented quotas. Of these, four have legislated quotas, including Rwanda, which is now the
world leader with 48.8 per cent women in the
Parliament. In a further ten countries, one or
more political parties have implemented voluntary party quotas.
• There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ model. Quotas tend
not to work in isolation and must be adapted to
a particular country context. They usually interact with other factors such as the presence of an
organized and strong women’s lobby both within and outside political parties, the existence of a
political will to increase women’s representation,
and the type of the electoral and party system.
• Electoral systems matter. Quotas are less likely
to succeed in electoral systems based on singlemember constituencies, where a party presents
one candidate, unless reserved seats are used in
that system. Evidence suggests that party quotas
(legislated or voluntary with placement mandates) in multi-member districts are likely to be
the most effective. (Placement mandates specify
which positions women must hold on a party
list, for example, every second or third position.)
• The devil is in the detail. How quota provisions
are formulated directly affects their implementation: many quotas are simply not enforced, either because the law stipulates a target but does
not specify how to obtain it, or because political parties ignore it in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Political parties may meet
a 30 per cent target of women on party lists but
place women at the bottom of the lists in largely
unwinnable positions.
• Golden opportunities. Timing is an important
consideration: there are certain opportunities in
the political process that may facilitate the introduction of quotas. In countries undergoing
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
119
transition and constitutional and legal reform,
there is a small window of opportunity for the
introduction of quota laws. It is much harder to
amend the constitution and rewrite electoral or
party laws in established regimes.
• Post-conflict norm? It is now common for quotas to be considered as a way of securing women’s representation in post-conflict states. In
fact most of the recent experiences with quotas have emerged from transitional and postconflict states. They have taken varying forms,
ranging from voluntary party quotas adopted
by the ruling (liberation) parties in Mozambique and South Africa, to reserved seats and
constitutional quotas, most recently in Rwanda,
Afghanistan and Iraq (Ballington and Matland
2004).
Quotas will not be successful when introduced as
a single measure. In the short term they may dramatically increase the representation of women, but
they allow parties to make concessions to women
without necessarily addressing key gender issues.
The attainment of gender justice in post-conflict
states and in the consolidation of democracy in the
long term depends on a host of factors including the
development of a democratic political culture, the
level of mobilization of women in civil society, and
the transparency and accountability of democratic
institutions. Most importantly, the attainment of
gender justice depends on the political will of party
leadership (Ballington and Matland 2004).
IDEA’s Products on Quotas:
• Global Database of Electoral Quotas for
Women, at <http://www.quotaproject.org>
• Reports on the implementation of quotas in
Africa, the Arab states, Asia, Europe and
Latin America
• More than 80 country case studies
• Global handbook on implementing quotas
to be produced during 2005-6.
120
9.4. Supporting and
Encouraging Regional Change
IDEA understands that change will only be
achieved when all the actors involved in public
life are committed to and employ the tools and
strategies for reform. Francesca Binda notes that
gaining that commitment requires the involvement of parliamentarians, political parties, civil
society, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and the media. IDEA develops regional and country partnerships which acknowledge and support the role played by women
in politics and society, including women’s movements, their involvement in national liberation
struggles and peace settlements and negotiations,
their contribution to post-conflict nation building
and their role in the development of nations.
9.4.1. Latin America
By working through its country and regional programmes, IDEA facilitates a process of information sharing and country comparisons on a range
of issues, whether it is the establishment of new institutions or the reforming of existing practices. In
Latin America, most nations face serious challenges in terms of the depth and quality of their democracies. There is a growing popular perception
that democratic governance systems have failed
to respond effectively to the demands of citizens.
Women remain significantly under-represented in
most Latin American legislatures.
Within this context, IDEA has identified the issue of women’s political participation as a priority.
Kristen Sample explains that this focuses on three
main areas: first, the dissemination of comparative
statistics and experiences on women’s political representation through IDEA’s Mujeres en Parlamento: más allá de los números [Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers] handbook; second, by providing
comparative information on the implementation
and enforcement of electoral gender quotas; and,
third, by research on electoral systems and their
impact on women’s political participation. The
following examples illustrate how IDEA has collaborated with different organizations to disseminate its products and messages and share lessons
learned.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘Transparency in nomination and selection
processes is important to foster a culture of inclusiveness and democracy within political parties. It is apparent that women are confronting
both explicit and implicit barriers when trying
to reach higher positions within parties. Quotas are one mechanism to address these barriers.’
International IDEA, 2003
The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American
Experiences
Peru. In 2002, IDEA identified Peru as a priority
country given its recent transition to democracy
after long years of authoritarian rule. Among the
priorities identified for the Peru Programme were
electoral system reform, political party strengthening and women’s political participation. After receiving requests from different stakeholders, including the president of the Congressional
Commission on Women and Sustainable Development, IDEA provided assistance on the reform
of the election and quota laws, and the development of a political party law. IDEA and its local
partner, Transparencia, supported the creation of
a multiparty round table, which focused on drafting the country’s first political party law. A 30 per
cent quota provision, in terms of both general
election lists and leadership posts within political
parties, was included in the round table’s proposal
and eventually passed by the Peruvian Congress in
October 2003.
IDEA focused on supporting the implementation
of the law through a multi-pronged strategy including designing and implementing gender-sensitive training modules which include clear explanations of the content of the law and its implications.
At least 35 per cent of the participants trained are
women. An inter-party seminar on women’s political participation in Peru was also convened to raise
awareness of the key role of political parties to support women’s candidacies. Following the successful
design and information campaign around the political party law, the IDEA–Transparencia multiparty round table drafted an electoral code which
included reforms aimed at increasing women’s political participation. This draft code was presented
to the Congress in October 2004. A vote was still
pending at the time of publication.
Guatemala. IDEA has focused on disseminating
information and products where women are significantly under-represented in political life in Latin America. In Guatemala in 2002, IDEA worked
in partnership with different women’s groups and
a local partner, the PPD, to discuss the main challenges and opportunities to increase the political
participation of women at the local level, especially
of indigenous women. Women’s political participation in Guatemala is a particular problem due
to their marginalization both because of their sex
and because of their ethnicity. Other countries in
which IDEA has worked with local and regional
women’s organizations include Argentina, Bolivia,
Ecuador and Venezuela.
9.4.2. Asia
IDEA’s main focus has been on supporting democratization processes in South and South-East Asia.
Despite a lengthy history of democratic rule, the
region has long been highly volatile, exacerbated
by a rise in religious fundamentalism, communal
politics and religious, ethnic and social conflict.
IDEA has focused on the areas of electoral system
reform, democracy building and conflict management through sustained dialogue and political party strengthening. Within these areas, IDEA
highlights the importance of supporting women’s
inclusion and participation. The following examples show how IDEA has worked to strengthen
women’s political participation in South Asia.
Indonesia. Since 1998, IDEA has provided strategic advice to government and civil society on options relating to the electoral system, the administration of electoral management bodies (EMBs)
and initiatives to strengthen women’s political participation. Through a dialogue with dynamic and
progressive groups in civil society, members of the
Parliament, political party members and academics, IDEA has aimed to strengthen women’s participation within Indonesian politics at the national and provincial levels.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
121
Obstacles Preventing Women from Becoming
Members of Parliament in Indonesia:
• The cultural context in Indonesia is still
heavily patriarchal. The common perception is that the political arena is for men,
and that it is inappropriate for women to
become members of parliament.
• The selection of candidates by political
parties is usually conducted by a small
group of officials or party leaders, almost
always men. In Indonesia awareness regarding
gender equality and justice is still low, and
thus male political leaders have a disproportionate influence over party politics and
women do not receive much support.
• The media has yet to effectively mobilize
the public regarding the importance of
women’s representation in parliament.
Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers,
Indonesian edition, 2002.
During 2001, the debate on women’s political representation and participation in politics increased
and dominated much of the political agenda, being fuelled by active and outspoken civil society
organizations and activists. One of the critical issues was the adoption of a 30 per cent quota for
women in the electoral process. In 2002, IDEA
produced an Indonesian version of the Women in
Parliament: Beyond Numbers handbook with the
inclusion of case studies from South Asia which
served as the basis for discussions on strategies for
increasing and strengthening effective political
representation in Indonesia’s political institutions.
The IDEA programme specifically addressed
those needs by organizing workshops and disseminating information for women in political parties
and civil society. The goal was to help identify potential women candidates for the 2004 parliamentary elections, provide training on fundamental
campaign techniques, and create linkages between
women candidates and civil society so that they
would have resources to draw on in identifying
the development and political issues to articulate
122
once they were in parliament. IDEA also worked
with the women’s caucus in the Parliament to create better linkages with civil society and helped
to identify a common agenda for women across
party lines. In 2002 IDEA facilitated a series of
Asian Study Visits where Indonesian politicians
and activists, both women and men, gathered
knowledge and shared experiences with counterparts in India, Thailand and the Philippines.
IDEA was invited to provide advice on the design
of a new electoral system in Indonesia. At a gathering of diverse political parties, IDEA provided
various options and models of electoral processes
while stressing the impact that different systems
have on patterns of representation of women, minorities, regions, and new and established political
parties. In the run-up to the April 2004 general
elections, IDEA facilitated training for 27 women candidates, aspiring to be elected to the DPD,
Indonesia’s second chamber. (Nine were eventually elected.) Women were relatively successful in
the polls, taking a total of 21 per cent of seats in
the DPD, nearly double the number elected to
the lower house. Additionally, IDEA has provided practical advice to women in Indonesia and
South Asia on electoral quotas and reserved seats.
A workshop in Jakarta in 2002 provided an opportunity for women to discuss strategies for lobbying for quotas and reform of their individual
electoral systems.
Burma: Dialogue processes. Recognizing that democracy cannot be achieved without the active
participation of women, IDEA both mainstreams
and especially targets women’s political participation and empowerment with capacity-building initiatives. To this end, IDEA works with Burmese
exiles to help prepare them in the event of political spaces being opened up in Burma. IDEA has
organized workshops on negotiating political settlements, on sharing experiences from South Africa, and on federal constitution-making processes, sharing experiences from India and Australia,
which men and women activists attended. IDEA
has also organized specific activities on the role
of women in peace building, sharing experiences
from South Africa and Colombia, Sri Lanka and
the Philippines.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is an interesting case because
it elected the first female head of government in
the world, Prime Minister Bandaranaike, in 1960,
and is the only country in South Asia to have
adopted proportional representation. However,
the rates and strength of women’s political participation in elected bodies have declined in recent
years, to less than 5 per cent in 2005. As a result of
the ongoing conflict and violence in political life,
high rates of literacy and employment have not
translated into increased political representation
of women. Sakuntala Kadirgamar-Rajasingham
explains that IDEA aims to assist key stakeholders
to articulate gender concerns in post-conflict settlements, in the peace and reconciliation processes
and in the building and strengthening of democratic institutions. IDEA is therefore supporting a
publication which reviews women’s political participation and intends to disseminate a ‘Gender
Manifesto’ as the basis of dialogues with political
parties to secure their commitment to mainstream
gender concerns.
Nepal. Nepal is in the throes of one of its most
grave political and constitutional crises after the
royal takeover in early 2005, and the fate of representative institutions and inclusive constitutional
processes is uncertain. Exclusion has contributed
to a deep sense of alienation among many people
and has provided a constituency of support for the
extra-parliamentary struggles taking place in Nepal. The number of women active in the Maoist
People’s Army is considered to be unusually high.
Since working for constitutional reform in Nepal from 2004, IDEA has received requests from
Nepalese stakeholders for information on different electoral systems for ensuring inclusive governance. There is pressure for the Women’s Commission, among others, to be given constitutional and
legal recognition as an autonomous body to facilitate the formulation of gender-sensitive action programmes and electoral system reform. As a part of
a series of dialogues on constitutional processes,
IDEA has organized discussions on special measures and electoral system design, to generate recommendations for improving the participation of
Nepal’s marginalized communities, including its
majority: women.
9.5. Conclusion
IDEA enters its second decade with the understanding that there is still much work to be done
to increase women’s political participation. In
2005 the representation of women in the world’s
parliaments stands at less than 16 per cent. But
numbers do not tell the whole story, and IDEA
will continue to work to understand the issues beyond numbers. Those who work to increase the
participation of women in political life are beginning to ask how women might be more effective
in advancing a women’s agenda in political life.
Many women who are active in political life want
to understand how they can leverage their positions, their knowledge and their networks to make
a difference and to improve conditions for more
women to be actively engaged. Binda argues that
policy makers are beginning to recognize that representation means more than elected politics. It
means that more women must have seats at the
Cabinet table, more women must be appointed to
senior decision-making positions, and more women’s voices must be heard and included when major political reform or transformation is undertaken.
In each country the methods may be different, but
very few governments around the world will deny
that women’s participation in the political system
needs to be increased. It is IDEA’s challenge to examine the options, collect evidence of best practice, provide models for reform and encourage
the reformers. As we strive to inform the debate
on women’s participation we, in turn, learn from
the many courageous, creative and active men and
women who truly believe that democracy can only
be achieved when
all citizens are represented in all poPolicy makers are beginning to recognize
litical
structures
that representation means more than
which effect their
elected politics. It means that more
lives.
women must have seats at the Cabinet
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
table, more women must be appointed to
senior decision-making positions, and
more women’s voices must be heard and
included when major political reform or
transformation is undertaken.
123
‘In truth, many years after the [Women in Parliament] handbook in 1998, I believe that
IDEA’s ongoing contributions to the field of
women in politics still echo down the corridors
of many an institution, NGO, governmental
body and academy. A testament to its leadership, certainly, but also to the hard work of the
diligent and committed staff members. Long
may it continue.’
Azza Karam, 2004
References
Ballington, Julie and Matland, Richard, ‘Political Parties
and Special Measures: Enhancing Women’s Participation in Electoral Processes’, Paper presented at the UN
Expert Meeting: Enhancing Women’s Participation in
Electoral Processes in Post-conflict Countries, Office of
the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement
of Women (OSAGI) and Department of Political Affairs
Expert Group Meeting, New York, USA, 19-22 January 2004
Ginwala, Frene, ‘Foreword’, in International IDEA, Women
in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, ed. Azza Karam (Stock-
Taken together, these features contribute to
IDEA’s unique approach: drawing on facts, lived
realities, combined insights and experiences, and
an emphasis on both the creation of a critical mass
and using the institutions and forging the necessary strategic alliances to make a difference to the
broader political process—and to make sure that
the information provided reflects the realities of
women East, West, North and South.
holm: International IDEA, 1998)
Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Promoting Partnership between
Men and Women in Parliament: The Experience of the
IPU’, in International IDEA, Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers, 2nd edn (Stockholm: International
IDEA, forthcoming 2005)
United Nations, ‘Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action’, 1995, article 15, <http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm>
Whittington, S., ‘UN Goals for Gender Mainstreaming’,
Paper presented at the conference on Women and PostWar Reconstruction: Strategies for Implementation of
Democracy Building Policies, Florida International University, Miami, March 2004
124
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘One of the essential features of a democracy is holding elections at regular intervals.
By themselves, however, elections are not sufficient to ensure the emergence and
establishment of a pro-people government that would honour promises made
during an election campaign and respect the principles of good governance and
accountability.
A pro-people government can only be achieved with the existence of a well-structured,
politically motivated and ever-dynamic civil society acting as a constant watchdog of
democracy, raising its voice and making it heard whenever necessary and relentlessly
keeping the people’s elected representatives on their toes.’
Cassam Uteem, member of the Board of International IDEA
and former President of the Republic of Mauritius
126
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
10. Democracy in Situations
of Deep-Rooted Conflict
Timothy D. Sisk
An important area in democracy building is the role
of democracy in conflict resolution, affecting all parts
of democracy building. This chapter paints a sombre picture of the challenges for democracies to succeed in situations of deep-rooted conflict and to counter the threat of terrorist attacks. However, it argues
that IDEA’s work has generated numerous lessons,
best practices and understandings not only of how democracy can survive in divided, conflictual societies,
but of how democratic practices directly contribute to
peace as the only long-term solution.
When IDEA opened its doors in 1995, the organization stepped into a troubled world that was reeling from deep-rooted ethnic, religious and nationalist tensions. By the mid-1990s, with the Cold
War swept into history by the rapid collapse of
the Soviet Union and a new, ‘turbulent’ period of
rapid political, economic and social change under
way, the drama of addressing deep-rooted conflict
around the world shaped the organization’s democracy promotion work in virtually every corner of the globe. Over the last decade, IDEA’s
programmes in situations of deep-rooted conflict
have explored how, ironically, the process of democratization often heightens deep-rooted conflict
even as the long-term solution to strife in divided societies is to manage conflict through the ballot box and in the halls of parliament rather than
on the battlefield or the streets. The challenge for
IDEA has been, and remains today, to show how
inclusive and participatory processes and institutions of democracy can and do contribute to the
mitigation of tensions in diverse,
conflicted societies.
Today, a new, profound challenge exists
for the promoters of democracy: deep
and widespread scepticism has emerged
IDEA’s work has
about democracy’s ability to succeed in
focused on key
situations of deep-rooted conflict.
thematic areas —
managing transitions, consensus-oriented institutional design,
electoral systems and election processes, political
parties, learning across regional frontiers, and the
UN and democracy. Additionally, its work has focused on states with internal conflicts, as in Southern Africa, Indonesia, Colombia, Nepal and Russia, and in unsettled regions such as the Balkans,
Latin America, West Africa and South-East Asia.
With its worldwide mandate, this work has generated a number of important lessons learned, best
practices, and enduring understandings about how
democracy must be nurtured to survive in deeply
divided societies, and how democratic values and
practices can directly promote peace.
In the 21st century, the organization continues
to confront the 1990s-type challenges of democracy through war-to-peace transitions, as in Afghanistan or Kosovo, and democracy’s capacity to
stimulate new social conflicts, as in many societies
of the Middle East. Today, a new, profound challenge exists for the promoters of democracy: deep
and widespread scepticism has emerged about democracy’s ability to succeed in situations of deeprooted conflict. In a world characterized by fears
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
127
of terrorism and a
global war against
extremist moveand democratic practice directly responds
ments—from the
to the cynics with the message that the
United States to
answer to fear, terror and violence lies in
Russia to Spain,
promoting the democratic values of mutual
Indonesia and the
understanding, trust and tolerance.
troubled
countries of the Middle East—democracy agendas have been set aside
in favour of national security. IDEA’s recent work
on democratic dialogue and democratic practice
directly responds to the cynics with the message
that the answer to fear, terror and violence lies in
promoting the democratic values of mutual understanding, trust and tolerance.
IDEA’s recent work on democratic dialogue
10.1. The Turbulent 1990s:
A World in Transition
IDEA began its work in 1995 in a world that had
transformed democracy promotion in two important ways. First, many of the long-running civil wars and social conflicts that had raged in the
years of Cold War rivalry began to wind down in
the mid-1990s. From Namibia to El Salvador, and
Cambodia to South Africa, long-running wars of
revolution and counter-revolution and struggles
for national liberation ended in sustained peace
processes. In these conflicts, democracy emerged
as the exit path from those struggles despite all the
difficulties of establishing tolerance and trust after
so many years of fighting.
Second, the changing political landscape in many
settings in the 1980s and early 1990s generated
new internal conflicts that precipitated violent
struggles among contenders for power and, in the
worst instances, new civil wars. Most of the transitions that occurred in this turbulent age were in
societies that are highly diverse along ethnic, racial, religious or ideological lines. The quick introduction of democracy could easily exacerbate
conflict and undermine the possibility that, over
time, democracy would lead to freedom, human
rights and peaceful politics. In the Balkans, former
Soviet states, and other societies undergoing volatile transitions—such as Algeria or Indonesia—
widespread social conflict created immediate
128
humanitarian emergencies in the short term and
a renewed determination to find ways in which
democracy can be developed and structured to reduce strife among contending groups rather than
exacerbating tensions.
10.1.1. War-to-Peace Transitions
Superpower tensions, regional rivalries and ideological polarization had fuelled many wars around
the world since decolonization and the emergence
of new and independent nation states. Beginning
in the 1960s and ending with the independence
of Namibia in 1990, many post-colonial countries
had witnessed devastating internal wars fuelled by
the struggle between communism and the West.
As the international system rapidly changed with
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many of these
wars lost their sponsors and the parties in conflict
found themselves trying to negotiate a settlement
to war. From Namibia to Nicaragua, El Salvador,
Cambodia and Mozambique, long-running wars
were settled in the early 1990s through peace
agreements.
The processes of such war-to-peace transitions directly involved negotiating the terms of post-war
democracy. This meant perilous political changes,
such as the holding of national elections, the transformation of rebel forces into political parties, new
institutions to protect human rights, fundamental
social and economic change such as land reform,
and—perhaps the most difficult problem—settling accounts from past episodes of violence or
human rights abuses through processes of transitional justice. Traditionally, democracy theory and
practice had little experience of such complex and
widespread social changes, and much of the early
learning in this area was through costly trial and
error.
The UN especially was often called in to lead the
processes of change and in some situations—as in
Namibia and Cambodia—to organize the all-important transitional governments and tense electoral processes. In ‘complex’ peace operations, the
UN’s peacekeeping doctrines expanded beyond
security mandates to state and democracy building. The landmark UN-administered elections
in Namibia in 1990 and the difficult Cambodian
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
elections of 1993 highlighted the new context in
which democracy as the exit strategy to civil war
is seen. Throughout the late 1990s and today, democracy promotion in countries emerging from
civil war remains a critical element of IDEA’s
work.
10.1.2. Democratization and Conflict
At the same time, new challenges for democracy
as conflict management emerged. On 2 March
1992 a referendum in the troubled former Yugoslav province of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ratify
an earlier decision by separatists there became the
last straw—or the spark that accelerated a brutal
civil war in which crimes against humanity and
genocidal acts later occurred. The turn to a referendum in Bosnia in 1992 was an ill-considered democratic approach for resolving a complex question
of managing a disintegrating federation. Similarly,
democracy’s potential to inflame conflict was seen
in an aborted election in Algeria in January 1992.
In that country, an opposition Islamist party was
poised to win a majority of seats in the country’s
Parliament: when the secularist military and ruling regime saw the likely outcome of democracy
at work, they cancelled the second round of voting. The Islamists revolted and the election debacle precipitated a civil war, which ultimately cost
more than 150,000 lives. Elections are some of
the most visible elements of a nation’s democratization process and therefore highly prone to incite
conflict.
These two instances alone made it clear that democratization could exacerbate tensions in divided societies, evoking fears of loss of citizenship
rights, political power, or separation of church and
state. Along with a myriad other examples of the
new post-Cold War openness, the 1992 events in
Bosnia and Algeria underlined that democratic
processes could well be conflict-inducing and that
transitions to democracy contained real and serious perils for societies and the international community.
This problem both set the stage for IDEA’s entry
into the democracy promotion world and remains
a theme of much of its past and current work.
The rationale is this: as democracy is introduced,
aspirants for political power—both incumbent
elites and new challengers—may well see the route
to victory in elections as espousing divisive themes
that stoke public fears and build support for extremist positions. Appeals to nationalism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic solidarThe turn to a referendum in Bosnia in
ity, or xenophobia
1992 was an ill-considered democratic
and external threats
approach for resolving a complex question
become preferred
of managing a disintegrating federation.
paths to power
through the ballot
box. Democracy—or rather democratization—is
then a driver of conflict rather than a means by
which divided societies can find unity in diversity.
Because democratization can lend itself to elite
manipulation and extremism, and can generate
fears of loss or for survival because the outcome
of elections is inherently unknown (or all too well
known, when there is a dominant majority), there
are clearly inherent tensions for those in the international community, such as the UN, between
the values of introducing democracy and the imperatives of managing conflict. These tensions are
seen before wars, as in Bosnia and Algeria, as seen
above, but also after wars. When the Bosnian war
finally ended in late 1995, there was a rush by the
international community to hold post-war elections in order to legitimate the new government
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
129
just steps in a much longer and difficult process.
Democracy also needs mechanisms to guarantee
a balanced distribution of power between different levels in government as well as state and civil
society.
formed by the Dayton peace accords. The push for
quick elections in September 1996, less than a year
after hostilities had ended, reinforced the power
of nationalist parties. Many observers now believe
that these elections were premature and that they
contributed to the hardening of relations between
the Bosnian ethnic groups for years afterwards.
10.1.3. Solutions: Democratization as
Consensus Building
IDEA’s work has wrestled with these two essential
contexts for democracy promotion in the volatile
1990s and into the 21st century. In situations of
war-to-peace transitions, and with concerns about
democracy as conflict-inducing, the answer has
been to try to marry somewhat disparate approaches in academic research and in reflective practice of
democratization and conflict management. From
the democratization side, lessons of the 1970s and
1980s revealed that democratization processes often involved the negotiation of pacts, or agreements, among incumbent leaders and others such
as security forces and police and opposition elements. Likewise,
the change to deLikewise, the change to democracy unfolds
mocracy unfolds
in a series of stages in which election
in a series of stages
events, while perhaps the culminating
in which election
moment, are just steps in a much longer and
events, while perdifficult process.
haps the culminating moment, are
130
From the conflict resolution field, the emphasis on
consensus building, negotiation and problem solving, managing fear and insecurity, and promoting
reconciliation emerged as the most important elements. Indeed, in war-to-peace transitions, for example, it was realized that from a purely practical perspective democracy could emerge as a conflict resolution instrument of choice for protagonists in civil wars: it could allow them to continue
the fight they had waged on the battlefield, but in
the more secure setting of electoral debates and in
parliament. Democracy, depending on how it is
‘crafted’ or designed, could become a solution in
which all would not be lost, as it would be in the
event of defeat on the battlefield.
IDEA’s work has been underpinned by the core
realization that democracy need not be only about
competition for power through elections, about
winners and losers through the ballot box, or
about the heightening of social divisions through
campaigns to define the national identity and interest. Indeed, well-crafted and designed democracy, emanating from negotiations among the
protagonists in situations of deep-rooted conflict,
can be conflict-mitigating. Much depends on how
democracy is defined, the processes by which it
is created, and how its institutions can be structured to promote ongoing bargaining, inclusion,
tolerance and, above all, the avoidance of winnertakes-all outcomes in favour of consensus-based
decision making.
10.2. Themes of IDEA’s Work
From the outset, IDEA’s work in the field of democracy building and conflict management has
focused on both the processes of democracy making—through negotiation and bargaining, often
with mediation, monitoring, and sometimes implementation by the international community—
and the outcomes of such processes, namely new
institutions. Consistent with the overall approach
of the organization in highlighting the theme of
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘democracy in the making’, the emphasis of its
work has been threefold.
First, the programme has sought to define the
wide range of options, alternatives and practical
tools for building consensus-oriented democracy,
illustrating the panoply of choices in handbooks,
resource materials and databases. The themes on
which it has focused are negotiations in post-war
settings, the overall problem of ‘institutional engineering’ or design, electoral system choice as a
particularly important decision, and public policies to promote inclusion and fairness. These options have been illustrated over time with reference to a wide set of case studies from all regions
of the world, to include sharing lessons learned
from one situation (such as South Africa) to aid
considerations of transition paths in another (such
as Burma).
The second approach has been one of concrete democracy assessments in societies that face severe
problems of social conflict. From post-war Guatemala to post-authoritarian Nigeria, democracy assessments have illustrated the application of crosscutting themes such as rebel-to-political-party
makeovers or electoral system design through indepth studies that involve local actors in democratic dialogues to explore issues and themes in
their own contexts.
Third, IDEA has sought to evaluate how the international community can be better prepared
to help ease the transition to democracy in situations of sharp social conflict. Focusing especially on international organizations such as the UN,
IDEA has emphasized the importance of helping
parties in conflict to design institutions, to organize, hold and monitor elections, to manage processes of transitional justice and reconciliation, and
to empower women and civil society to help make
democracy sustainable in the long run. In this section, some of the key insights and findings from
these three areas are described.
10.2.1. Managing Transition:
Negotiating for Democracy
IDEA’s flagship publication in the field of democracy and conflict management is the rather
voluminous, 414page
handbook,
In war-to-peace transitions, it was
Democracy
and
realized that from a purely practical
Deep-Rooted Conperspective, democracy could emerge as
flict: Options for
a conflict resolution instrument of choice
Negotiators (DRC).
for protagonists in civil wars: it could
Published in 1998,
allow them to continue the fight they had
the handbook prowaged on the battlefield, but in the more
vides a path-breaksecure setting of electoral debates and in
ing synthesis of the
parliament.
democratization
and peace-making
fields. The handbook and the subsequent dissemination efforts dramatically spread the view that
democratization could be conflict-mitigating in
the essentially internal conflicts of the 1990s, and
that there are a wide range of options available to
deliver a sustainable peace through a democratic
transition. In the foreword to the volume, UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan summed up the essential insight that underpinned the work: ‘Building stable and solid internal political structures [in
intra-state conflicts] is not a separate task from crisis management, but needs to be a part of it’.
Themes of the 1998 DRC Handbook
• Importance of Democratic Institutions
“…Making appropriate choices about
democratic institutions – forms of devolution or autonomy, electoral system design,
legislative bodies, judicial structures, and
so on – is crucial in building an enduring
and peaceful settlement.”
• Conflict Management, Not Resolution
“There needs to be … more pragmatic interest in conflict management: how to deal
with it in a constructive way, how to bring
opposing sides together in a co-operative
process, how to design a practical, achievable, co-operative system for the constructive management of difference.”
• The Importance of Process
“The process by which parties reach an
outcome impacts significantly on the quality of the outcome. Attention must be
paid to every aspect of the process of negotiations in order to reach a durable outcome.”
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
131
The DRC handbook brought together scholarly
research and practical field experience in a way
that carefully linked the changing nature of conflict and conflict management in the late 20th
century (especially the phenomenon of internal,
identity-based conflict), analysis of the patterns of
national-level and cross-border conflict dynamics,
negotiation processes and problem solving, democratic levers (institutions), and considerations for
sustaining a settlement over time. In illustrations,
boxes, menus and fact sheets the handbook presented an extremely complex and rich set of scholarly findings and practical lessons learned in an accessible and user-friendly format.
From the peace-making and conflict resolution
field, the handbook highlighted what became
widely accepted aspects of understanding and negotiating war-to-peace transitions, namely, from
the very start of negotiations in the so-called prenegotiation phases, protagonists in deeply divided
societies keenly understand how various democracy-related options, such as elections, devolution or
a truth commission, may affect their interests. In
peace negotiations it is vitally important to develop
a negotiation process that can resolve overall issues
early—such as separation of communities versus
power sharing—that can anticipate and consider
the most important decisions—such as the electoral system—and that as far as possible involves
all relevant parties in the institution-building process, including potential ‘spoilers’. If a democratic
settlement is to emerge from a peace negotiation
process, it must be approached as a design exercise
in which the consequences of decisions made are
understood well into the future.
10.2.2. Institutional Design
The DRC handbook also highlighted that the
choice of alternative institutions—rules for how
the ‘game’ of democracy will be played—is a critical
and possibly decisive aspect of peace negotiations.
Poorly chosen institutions can doom even a wellintended negotiation process or can undermine the
sustainability of democracy over time. On the other hand, aptly chosen institutions can tip the balance from recurrence of violence towards a sustainable, democratic peace. Some of the institutional
choice findings that emerged are as follows.
132
• The basis of representation. Countries in deeprooted identity conflicts face a fundamental
choice: will identity be the basis of representation, for example through ethnic political parties, or should the rules of the democracy systematically promote or even forbid the organization of politics along identity lines? Approaches
can offer starkly different choices for countries
managing cultural differences through democracy, from group-based approaches such as the
political system of Lebanon to more integrative
approaches, such as those adopted in South Africa, or even combining both elements.
• Power sharing. Winner-takes-all institutions, in
which some participants may be absolute losers
and all or almost all participants have the fear
of being absolute losers, are unlikely to lead towards a sustainable peace.
• Autonomy and devolution. There is no single,
simple way to design an autonomy scheme.
While many observers in territorial conflicts
see autonomy as a natural compromise between
claims for secession (or national independence) and territorial integrity, autonomy is an
inherently difficult balance to achieve. Moreover, there are different options for federalism
as well; and the implications of federalism for
economic performance and a just distribution
of national resources further complicate the
choice. Nonetheless, many peace settlements
today feature democratic federalism as a core
compromise.
• Type of executive: presidentialism versus parliamentary systems. One of the most important
choices to be made is between having a strong
president and having a strong parliament with
a relatively weaker executive. In divided societies, this choice is no trivial or technical matter. When an individual president is directly
seen to represent a single identity group to the
exclusion of others, presidentialism becomes a
recipe for conflict. On the other hand, parliamentary systems with coalition-style governments can lead to deadlock in decision making
and ineffective governance.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
• National conferences. National conferences have
had a difficult track record as a means for comprehensively designing new institutions. Because they include a wide range of actors in
conflict situations, they are often too unwieldy
as negotiating forums to achieve much progress
on contentious issues. At the same, national
conferences can be very effective in ratifying
decisions made in prior negotiations by bringing additional parties into the negotiating,
symbolizing national unity, and ratifying final
accords.
These themes and others, such as human rights instruments, transitional justice and truth commissions, and national machinery for gender equality,
are illustrated in the DRC handbook through the
use of case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bougainville, Fiji, Guatemala, Northern Ireland,
South Africa and Sri Lanka. The handbook has
been translated into Spanish for dissemination in
situations such as Colombia, into Bahasa Indonesia for work in Indonesia and into Burmese for
possible work in Myanmar/Burma.
10.2.3. Electoral Systems, Election
Processes
Scholars and policy makers agree that perhaps the
single most important choice a country can make
for effectively managing conflict is a wise and appropriate decision on the type of electoral system.
Because such systems translate votes into seats in
electoral processes, they have important ramifications for who gains power, who is included and
excluded, how political parties form and compete,
how politicians campaign for votes and, ultimately, whether politics is conducted as a winner-takesall system or as a competition for relative or proportional shares in post-election governments.
IDEA’s research and policy work in this area has
been covered in a variety of materials, including
the DRC handbook, the Handbook of Electoral
System Design (ESD handbook), the Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE) Project, and the
Election Process Information Collection (EPIC)
Project. These materials have covered important
issues such as electoral system choice, the implications of electoral system choice for the party
system, electoral
dispute resolution
and election-related violence. Some
of the findings in
each of these areas are highlighted
here.
Scholars and policy makers agree that
perhaps the single most important choice a
country can make for effectively managing
conflict is a wise and appropriate decision
on the type of electoral system.
• Electoral system choice. There is a consensus
among scholars of democracy that electoral systems are the most widely manipulated aspect
of democratic design, that is, how the electoral
system functions can help to tilt the politics of
a country (or other political unit such as a city)
in a particular direction. The stark choice between types of majority rule systems and those
that are based on proportional representation
(PR) has been widely covered in IDEA’s publications. Although there is a presumption that
the emphasis of PR on inclusion, combined
with parliamentary systems, is best for situations of deep-rooted conflict, there have been
situations in divided societies when in fact majority rule options or presidential systems seem
to have had conflict-managing effects.
Electoral System Choice and ‘Engineering’
Moderation in Divided Societies
“… It is increasingly being recognized that an
electoral system…. can help to ‘engineer’ cooperation and accommodation in a divided
society.”
The New International IDEA Handbook of
Electoral System Design (2005)
“The collective evidence from elections held
in divided societies to date suggests that an
appropriately crafted electoral system can help
to nurture accommodative tendencies, but
that the implementation of an inappropriate
system can severely harm the process of conflict resolution and democratization in a plural
state.”
Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options
for Negotiators (1998)
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
133
List PR is
known to be well
suited to managing
conflict management through democratic
conflict in divided
decision making are: inclusion, recognition,
societies. The alterand self-worth for all elements of the
native vote and the
community; and satisfaction of basic
single transferable
human needs, such that no single group is
vote may also be
systematically disadvantaged through
helpful, although
deep-seated poverty.
the impact of the
Fijian experience
is still being analysed. Options that explicitly
recognize the presence of communal groups are
also sometimes valuable. The overall conclusion
is that there is no perfect, ‘one size fits all’ electoral system for divided societies. This makes
IDEA’s efforts to clearly and carefully articulate options and to help policy makers think
through the expected effects of various options
all the more useful in so many conflicted societies today.
Among the key principles of local-level
• Election processes. Ensuring that elections are professionally conducted in a free and fair manner
is important for any society, but in deep-rooted
conflict situations, given the suspicions, fears
and doubts, it is especially important that election management bodies are either composed
of members who are accepted and respected
as independent or are representative of all the
major political forces on a ‘mutually policing’
basis; that they are unbiased in their activities;
that they are able to function in all the various areas of a country; and that they do not
wittingly or inadvertently advance the cause
of any particular faction or group. IDEA has
published a set of ethical guidelines for election administration and worked to ensure their
application in the particularly volatile settings
of deep-rooted conflict.
For example, IDEA evaluated the establishment and performance of the election management authorities in post-war Mozambique to
ensure that the election process was perceived
as free and fair: such a determination is critical
to maintaining peace in the country, in which
former combatants now compete for political power. Similarly, in preparation for East
Timor’s landmark UN-administered elections
134
of 2001, IDEA was involved in a consortium of
international organizations to train local election officials to manage this most important
event in the life of this new nation, focusing on
a variety of topics in election administration.
10.2.4. Public Policy
Beyond negotiation processes and institutional design, much of IDEA’s work has focused on a wide
range of public policy options that inculcate democratic values and promote conflict management
in situations of deep-rooted conflict. Among them
are broad themes of public policy, such as instruments to promote, monitor and protect human
rights; specific policies such as those that relate to
language use; various levels of policy making, such
as managing culturally diverse cities; and processes for making public decisions, such as consensusbased policy making. IDEA’s work has evaluated
many of these public policy issues.
• Diversity policy in multi-ethnic states. Grievances
over diversity issues such as religious, cultural or
language rights are a common and sometimes
pivotal driver of conflict in deeply divided societies. With regard to language, for example, a
debate rages over whether the state should encourage assimilation through the adoption of a
single official language, or whether ‘linguistic
pluralism’ is preferable. Similar debates occur
over whether a democratic country should foster a strong, unified national identity or whether ‘unity in diversity’ is a more realistic and desirable framework for public policy.
In a study of democratizing Indonesia in 2000,
for example, three approaches were advocated
to help promote religious pluralism: inter-religious dialogue processes, participatory activities
among a wide range of diverse groups to foster
trust, and developing a common national identity that explicitly embraces religious diversity as a core essence of being Indonesian. The
study (see below) concludes that: ‘In a democratic nation, every group has an equal right to
speak out and to associate. But there should be
a constitutional guarantee that the foundations
of the nation will not be modified by anyone or
any one group in power’.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
• Local governance: managing culturally diverse
cities. Recognizing that all major metropolitan
areas today are vibrantly multicultural, IDEA’s
work on local governance has also evaluated
how public policies can foster democratic values of trust and peaceful coexistence. In Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation, Representation, Conflict Management, and Governance, policies to foster inclusion and tolerance
in divided cities were evaluated. The findings
of this and subsequent work on democracy at
the local level underscore the close relationship
between inclusion, democracy and conflict
management.
Citizen Participation and
Conflict Management
“Often the difficult issues faced by a community are too complex and involve too many
divergent interests to be successfully resolved
at the ballot box. Facilitating citizen participation in decision-making processes can augment electoral democracy by helping to build
trust and confidence and by managing or resolving disputes that cannot be arbitrated by
elections alone.”
Democracy at the Local Level (2001)
Among the key principles of local-level conflict management through democratic decision
making are: inclusion, recognition, and selfworth for all elements of the community; the
satisfaction of basic human needs, such that
no single group is systematically disadvantaged
through deep-seated poverty; practical methods
of building consensus are essential; the structure of political decision making is equally important at the local level, where in multicultural
contexts power sharing should be encouraged;
conflict can be mitigated by fostering a sense
of local pride and ‘love of place’; and minority
participation in decision making needs to be
encouraged, as does a variety of cultural identities. Among the case studies in the Democracy
at the Local Level handbook are evaluations of
local-level peace building in post-war Bosnia
and a comparative study of
such conflicted
cities as Johannesburg, Jerusalem and Belfast.
The role of ‘collaborative’ decision-making
processes to resolve thorny issues and
deep divisions has been a hallmark of the
local-level democracy work.
• Local governance: consensus-based policy making. IDEA’s local-level democracy work has
also sought to present, describe and evaluate
processes of consensus-based decision making
through a wide variety of public policy making efforts. The role of ‘collaborative’ decisionmaking processes to resolve thorny issues and
deep divisions has been a hallmark of the locallevel democracy work. Such processes involve
systematic information sharing in divided communities, structured consultation, public decision-making approaches, and community-level
dispute resolution procedures.
For example, in South Africa community-level
peace commissions have successfully managed
local-level disputes—and kept them from becoming national-level problems—while at the
same time building the ‘social capital’, or trust,
that has subsequently allowed for the development of more inclusive, tolerant and effective
local democracy structures during the country’s
first ten years of democracy (1994–2004). The
South African experience underscores a more
central point that has resonated in much of
IDEA’s work on local-level conflict and methods for its democratic management: democracy
is not just about elections, it is a form of public
dialogue, sometimes best fostered in highly localized settings.
10.2.5. Reconciliation
In post-war settings, the linkage between successful reconciliation processes and the long-term viability of democracy has become more apparent
in recent years. Without reconciliation in post-war
settings, democracy is impossible because the trust,
tolerance and mutual understanding necessary for
democracy to function—for example, the willingness to risk loss of power in an election—simply
do not exist. Legacies of past violence threaten future democratization.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
135
Some Themes of the 2003 Reconciliation
after Violent Conflict Handbook
• Reconciliation should be pursued for moral
reasons, but there is a pragmatic element
as well: some degree of reconciliation after
internal conflict is an absolute prerequisite
for democracy to succeed over time.
• There is no easy recipe for a reconciliation
process; there is no universally accepted,
perfect model.
• Lessons in failed reconciliation are as instructive as those processes that have been
considered relatively more successful.
• There is a consensus emerging that those
culpable of gross violations of human rights
should be prosecuted.
• Truth commissions are a popular approach,
but they are not appropriate in all settings.
In 2003 IDEA launched a significant publication entitled Reconciliation After Violent Conflict:
A Handbook. With themes, case studies, options
and guides to further resources, the handbook
provides a look at what many analysts see as a prerequisite for successful democracy in societies that
have experienced extensive conflict and violence.
Since the publication of the handbook, IDEA
has launched new activities on the reconciliation
theme in countries such as Sri Lanka.
10.3. Countries, Regions and
the International Community
Developing concepts of consensus democracy and
articulating options are useful only when applied
in specific settings in which careful attention to history, social and economic conditions and regional circumstances, and international action come
together. IDEA’s
work at the counDeveloping concepts of consensus
try, regional and
democracy and articulating options are
international level
useful only when applied in specific
has sought to dissettings in which careful attention to
seminate informahistory, social and economic conditions,
tion, share lessons
regional circumstances and international
learned, and assist
action come together.
in particular transition processes in
136
a number of ways. At the country level IDEA has
worked both on an ad hoc basis, through missions or studies at a particular moment in time,
and more formally with its own offices in especially important countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria. Most important has been its work in sharing
lessons learned from similar or comparable cases, such as the efforts to help democratization in
Burma by convening a workshop on findings that
might be conveyable from a relative success case
such as South Africa.
10.3.1. Country-Level Initiatives
IDEA has launched a number of country initiatives in its first decade, many of which have been
in countries emerging from civil war, those facing
deep ethnic, racial or religious tensions, and those
such as Colombia or the South Caucasus countries that still remain challenged by internal war.
In some of these initiatives IDEA has used the approach and methods of its State of Democracy assessment project to evaluate linkages around peace
in conflict-prone societies. This section highlights
just some of the work IDEA has conducted in several troubled countries.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia’s civil war from
1992 to 1995 left deep social scars which continue
to inhibit the prospects for democracy through the
Dayton peace accords. IDEA has analysed how to
improve democracy in such a war-torn country,
beginning with initial evaluations of the 1996 elections to the creation of local capacities for democracy advocacy through the creation of a Foundation for Democracy within the country. For example, following the 1996 elections IDEA launched
a major fact-finding mission to determine how
the initial stability provided by the international
community’s military and political intervention to
implement the terms of Dayton could be transformed into a strategy for reconciliation and democratic consolidation. The findings of the mission
are found in the 1996 publication ‘Beyond the ‘96
Elections: A Two Year Window of Opportunity
for Democracy, Proposals for the Transition towards Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.
Burma. The continued authoritarianism of
the military junta, the detention of democracy
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
activists such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and ongoing
ethnic and religious tensions characterize the troubles contemporary Burma faces. For several years
IDEA has facilitated a number of dialogues among
Burmese and specialists in the international community to evaluate how a transition to democracy
in Burma could occur, what institutional designs
could facilitate conflict management and how a
process of national reconciliation could unfold.
Among the specific products of this work are reports on dialogues that have been held since 2000
on democratic alternatives, lessons from South Africa for constitution making, and, more recently,
how constitutional arrangements can be structured to help promote minority rights in a democratic Burma.
The State and Minority Rights in Burma
“Burma requires innovative measures, which
are appropriate and realistic for its specific
needs…. The people of Burma must develop
a federal culture through education and practice, even during the struggle, in order to create
a stable and peaceful country. Ethnic and religious divisions are not in themselves inherently
problematic.”
“The real challenge here is not social division
but how these social divisions were dealt with.
The issue is whether the divisions are used to affirm identity or to exclude some groups through
violent or non-violent means and to ensure the
groups have no political space. When this happens, the divisions become unhealthy.”
The Role of State Constitutions in Promoting
Minority Rights Under Federalism: Dialogues in
Support of a Democratic Transition in Burma (2003).
Colombia. Colombia’s civil war takes place in a
country which, despite high levels of violence,
continues to have electoral contests and, despite
widespread violations of human rights, still has
procedural democracy. Commensurate with the
launch of the Spanish-language version of the
DRC handbook, in August 2001 IDEA teamed
up with other organizations for a country-level initiative on Democratic Institutions and Conflict
Former Chairman of IDEA Board of Directors, Thorvald Stoltenberg, at the launch of the Handbook on Democracy and DeepRooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (1998).
Management held in Bogota. On the immediate
agenda was a reform process before the Colombia
Congress. Members of parliament, government
officials, specialists and representatives of civil society engaged in a wide-ranging, lively debate on
how democracy could be improved and how the
devastating civil war could be brought to an end.
Among the topics considered at the event were
electoral system reform, the internal democracy
of political parties, and the financing of political
parties.
Guatemala. Following 36 years of devastating civil war, the parties to the conflict in Guatemala
signed a landmark peace agreement in 1996; the
National Accords featured wide-ranging promise
for change in this deeply conflictual society, where
disputes over land, indigenous rights and statesponsored human rights abuses fed armed conflict
that cost over 150,000 lives. Constitutional and
electoral reforms are among the promises made in
the peace agreements. As the Accords were being
implemented, IDEA launched a dialogue process
in the country to systematically evaluate the twin
goals of implementing the peace agreement and
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
137
building a new democracy. The assessment process yielded a substantial report, Democracy in Guatemala: A Mission for the Entire Nation (1997),
which evaluated the entire range of problems,
challenges and promises for the war-torn country.
One of the most important and enduring findings
of the study relates to the importance of reform of
the state’s security forces, the protection of human
rights by all sides, and the inculcation of a new
culture of respect for the rule of law.
Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
years. In 2000, IDEA conducted a major democracy assessment of conflict-torn Indonesia, which
at the time was experiencing religious and ethnic
tensions, economic stress, secessionist violence,
and tough struggles among newly empowered civil
society and long-powerful military elites.
IDEA’s work in Indonesia featured not only a set
of recommendations on furthering the transition
to democracy and helping to consolidate the new
democratic system, but also a beneficial process of
discussion among a wide array of stakeholders in
the country.
Guatemala
“The credibility of the justice system must also
be salvaged. To accomplish this, reform of the
system cannot be deferred. This does not mean
simply an administrative modernization or a
change in laws and procedures, but rather a
complete reformulation of the administration
of justice within the framework of democratic
institutions. In Guatemala, the democratization of the justice system implies a profound
transformation of the judicial culture, particularly of the officials responsible for providing
justice. This reform must extend beyond simply changing laws and norms, in order to allow
for the building of a system with real support
in the democratic experience, characterized by
equality, equity, socio-economic inclusion, and
respect for human dignity. In this sense, it is
necessary to constitutionally recognize the existence of principles, criteria, and procedures
that indigenous peoples have developed to resolve conflicts among their community members, as well as the validity of their decisions.”
Democracy in Guatemala: A Mission for the Entire
People (1998)
Since the 2000 democracy assessment, IDEA has
pursued a variety of programmes to implement the
findings. It also worked with the Election Commission prior to the 2004 elections and supported
the establishment of the new Regional Representatives Council, including holding workshops for
women candidates and for elected members—for
example, in the field of relationships with constituents and regional-level authorities.
Key Elements for Consolidating Indonesia’s
Democracy
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reform of the state and its institutions
Civilian authority and the armed forces
The structure of the economy and
corporate governance
Democratization and decentralization
Democracy and the rule of law
Constitutional Review and electoral reform
Democracy and a democratic culture
Religious pluralism and peaceful coexistence
Advocacy and monitoring by civil society
organizations
• Women’s participation in politics
Democracy in Indonesia: An Assessment (2000)
Indonesia. The post-Suharto transition to democracy in Indonesia has been one of the most
dramatic, and potentially conflict-ridden, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in recent years. The October 2004 elections, which
were relatively peaceful and featured a transition
from a defeated incumbent to a fairly elected challenger, underscore how far the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country has come in recent
138
Nigeria. Since independence, Nigeria has seen its
share of violent conflict. From the Biafran secessionist struggle between 1967 and 1970 to the
present-day ethnic and religious street violence,
the country has also seen multiple transitions
from authoritarian military to civilian rule. The
latest transition from a military to civilian regime,
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
which is perhaps the most promising, culminated
in the 1999 election of General Olusegun Obasanjo as president. Having already been involved
in the launch of the 1998 DRC handbook, the
new president endorsed a comprehensive democracy assessment—a top-to-bottom review—of the
fractious country that featured consultations with
an exceptionally broad spectrum of Nigerian society. The result was a 414-page report released in
Abuja, the Nigerian capital, in 2000, entitled Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for
Nation Building. The assessment addressed in a
straightforward and frank manner the difficulties
the country faces as it seeks to consolidate democracy under difficult circumstances.
Among the key recommendations of the Democracy in Nigeria report are the following.
• Nigeria needs a new social compact. The success
of the transition to democracy depends on the
extent to which the relationship between the
state and the citizenry can be redefined.
• Constitutional development process. As a matter
of urgency and as part of the development of
a new social compact, it is important to institute a national dialogue process that includes
a constitutional development process based on
the principles of equality, justice, and the guaranteed enjoyment of individual and communal
rights and freedoms.
• Democratic dividend. Priority should be given to delivering the dividends of democracy
through comprehensive social and economic
policy frameworks targeted at poverty alleviation, security, communal harmony and environmental protection.
Since the 2000 assessment exercise, IDEA has
become more extensively involved in democracy
promotion in Nigeria. With an in-country team,
it has continued activities focusing on national dialogues, political participation, constitutional reform and national reconciliation.
10.3.2. Regional Initiatives
Learning across national frontiers has also been
a hallmark of IDEA’s work in its first decade. By
bringing together policy makers and specialists in
regional settings,
Learning across national frontiers has
the organization
has sought to transalso been a hallmark of IDEA’s work in its
fer experiences and
first decade. By bringing together policy
lessons learned, to
makers and specialists in regional settings,
help establish rethe organization has sought to transfer
gional norms and
experiences and lessons learned, to help
operational capaciestablish regional norms and operational
ties, and to build
capacities, and to build networks of
networks of dedemocracy specialists able to provide
mocracy specialists
mutual support and to share knowledge.
able to provide mutual support and to
share knowledge. The regional work has focused
on those areas in which conflict has been an enduring feature of the region, and in which transnational or cross-border monitoring and cooperation
have shown themselves to be effective in helping
provide security and promoting democratic development.
With the troubled transition of the Balkan states
emerging from the former Yugoslavia through war,
division of territory and international military intervention, IDEA has sought to promote peace in
the region through support of the South Eastern
Europe Democracy Support (SEEDS) network.
The project conducted, among other activities, an
important and timely survey in 2002 on citizen attitudes towards democracy. The results, published
as South Eastern Europe: New Means for Regional
Analysis (2002), were significant: most citizens
care more about economic than ethnic issues; European integration is a strongly desired aim; Kosovo has been a relative success, whereas there are
deep concerns about Republic Srpska (in Bosnia),
Bosnia as a whole, and Macedonia; and the region
has a long way to go towards achieving democracy
as a path to conflict management. Other regional
initiatives have focused on monitoring of elections
in Kosovo, local democracy there, gender equity,
and democracy in Romania.
The South Caucasus region has also been troubled
since its independence following the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The war of secession in Azerbaijan, unsettled sovereignty and claims for ethnic
autonomy in Georgia, and endemic problems of
corruption in Armenia and throughout the region
set the stage for IDEA’s democracy promotion
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
139
efforts in this area.
In September 2001
IDEA released a
yielded a report for the UN Millennium
major democracy
Summit in 2000 entitled Democracy and
assessment report
Global Cooperation at the United Nations:
on Georgia, GeorTowards Peace, Development and
gia and the South
Democratization. The report urged the UN to
Caucasus:
Chaleschew a technical approach to democracy
lenges to Sustainpromotion in its peace operations and
able
Democracy,
to embrace more openly the political
which found that
agenda of democracy as peace building; to
the country faces
consider more carefully how elections are
exceptional chalonly a single step in the democratization
lenges of corrupenterprise and to avoid a view of elections
tion and a ‘shadow
as a panacea; and, finally, to resist the
state’, restive ethnic groups seeking
pressure to turn to democracy as a ‘quick
to break away from
fix’ for bringing a peace operation to a
control by Tbilisi,
speedy fruition.
religious tension
and
discrimination, de facto discrimination against women, and
serious electoral fraud in the elections that have
been held since independence.
IDEA’s work on the UN and democracy
In 2003, IDEA conducted a cross-regional comparison of local democracy in the region, which
found that, while some gains had been made in
establishing legal frameworks, the realities on the
ground suggest that all states in the region face
tremendous challenges in creating a meaningful
system of local democracy. IDEA now has a programme officer working in the region to further its
democracy-building work, the highlights of which
are published in a newsletter entitled Dialogue.
Among the regional projects are dialogues for constitution reform.
IDEA’s Africa programme also operates in an exceptionally large and diverse region that has experienced conflict and deep-rooted conflict. Although in many countries such as Mozambique
and Angola, or Sierra Leone and Liberia, wars
have officially ended, problems of conflict still beset many states on the continent. The IDEA Africa programme has, in addition to its work in Nigeria, focused on cross-border learning in West Africa and the development of new democratic institutions, norms and standards in Southern Africa.
For example, IDEA convened a major conference
140
at Goree Island off the coast of Senegal in August
1999 that brought together officials and specialists
from a wide variety of West African states. More
recently, IDEA held a workshop in Sierra Leone
for administration personnel, and new work is
planned on electoral guidelines and election monitoring through the principal sub-regional organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In Southern Africa, IDEA
has engaged in wide-ranging work to help newly
created electoral management bodies manage election processes, to share information and experience, and to develop regional guidelines for political parties in the conduct of election campaigns.
In other regions, such as South Asia, IDEA has begun to build on its work in democracy assessments
and dialogues and has used the State of Democracy assessment approach to evaluate a return to democracy in idyllic but war-torn Nepal, to promote
reconciliation and the peace process in Sri Lanka, and to begin to develop a regional network of
democracy advocates to cooperate across borders
and to include the region’s pivotal states of India
and Pakistan. In the Arab world, where security
concerns loom large in every state, IDEA works
to further buttress the nascent political reform efforts seen in recent years. The focus of activity is
on political party development, gender equality
and women’s representation, and electoral system
reform. Earlier, in 2000, IDEA published a report
entitled Democracy in the Arab World: Challenges,
Achievements, and Prospects; among its key findings
was that managing Islamist political action will remain a dilemma for democracy promoters in the
region for some time to come. While ideally regimes should become open and introduce competitive elections, could extremists come to power
through the ballot box with the intention of destroying democracy once in power?
10.3.3. Democracy and the United
Nations
In April 1999 the UN Commission on Human
Rights adopted a landmark resolution which for
the first time unambiguously proclaimed every
individual’s right to democracy. Supported by 51
governments and opposed by none, Resolution 57
of that year affirmed in a new way that democracy
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
is a fundamental human right that includes, in the
words of the resolution:
(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought, conscience and religion,
and of peaceful association and assembly;
(b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media; (c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens’ rights, interests and personal
security, and fairness in the administration
of justice and independence of the judiciary;
(d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as
well as free voting procedures and periodic and
free elections; (e) The right of political participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates; (f ) Transparent and
accountable government institutions; (g) The
right of citizens to choose their governmental
system through constitutional or other democratic means; and (h) The right to equal access
to public service in one’s own country.
In the same year, IDEA began working on a
project related to the UN’s role in promoting democracy in comprehensive peace operations. In
sum, for the UN, democracy is both an intrinsic
human right and a practical objective necessary for
the creation of viable states and the organization
of legitimate governments, as part of an ‘exit strategy’ for winding up complex peace operations. Beginning in 2000, IDEA has organized a number
of seminars that have brought together UN officials, veterans of peace operations and experts
to evaluate how the twin goals of peacekeeping
and democracy promotion have been pursued in
countries such as Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, East
Timor, and Kosovo.
IDEA’s work on the UN and democracy yielded
a report for the UN Millennium Summit in 2000
entitled Democracy and Global Cooperation at the
United Nations: Towards Peace, Development and
Democratization. The report urged the UN to eschew a technical approach to democracy promotion in its peace operations and to embrace more
openly the political agenda of democracy as peace
building; to consider more carefully how elections
are only a single step in the democratization enterprise and to avoid a view of elections as a panacea;
and, finally, to resist the pressure to turn to democracy as a ‘quick fix’ for bringing a peace operation to a speedy fruition. The UN has adopted
many of the recommendations in the report over
time, as evidenced in the careful and strategically
sophisticated approach the world body has taken
to organizing elections in 2004 in Afghanistan.
A final element of the UN and democracy project
is a series of seminars the organization has held
in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone on the
promotion of local democracy. Recognizing that,
although essential, national elections do not translate into ground-level infusion of democratic values in a war-torn society, IDEA’s work highlights
the importance of elections and citizen participation initiatives in local settings. The results of
this activity are published in a new report, Democracy and Peace-Building at the Local Level: Lessons
Learned (2004).
10.4. Conclusion: New
Challenges, Themes and
Approaches
Like the 1990s, the 21st century has brought with
it an entirely new set of challenges for international democracy promotion in a world beset by violent conflict. Certainly the terrorist attacks in the
United States on 11 September 2001 have placed
national security concerns at the top of the international agenda, often at the expense of human
rights. Moreover, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has dubbed ‘illegal’, was fought in part with the aim of bringing
democracy and liberty to Iraq through the barrel
of a gun. While this enterprise may in the long
run still prove to be successful despite the obvious
setbacks that have been encountered by advocates
of the intervention, both the new climate of fear
and the Iraq controversy have reinforced a deep
and widespread scepticism about the ability of democracy to contribute to conflict management in
today’s tumultuous climate. Added to these security concerns is the fact that in many countries democracy has not been seen to deliver the goods
in terms of contributing sufficiently to economic
development; it is not unusual to hear talk of a
‘democracy deficit’ in terms of public support for
free and fair elections when the public’s principal
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
141
In order to contribute successfully to peace,
political institutions and processes must
concerns are personal and economic security.
clearly and unambiguously advance the
IDEA’s work must
face up to these consecurity and human development. To have
temporary challvalue, democracy in situations of deepenges in much the
rooted conflict today must go well beyond
same way as the
negotiating well-designed institutions—
work of the 1990s
however important that may be—to ensure
addressed
the
that today’s conflicts, too, are indeed best
burning issues of
addressed over time by creating political
that turbulent decsystems in which tolerance, trust and
ade. Today, IDEA’s
mutual understanding are the values upon
efforts focus on
which real world security and development
prior lessons well
learned, such as
imperatives are realized.
the enduring importance of institutional design, engineering and crafting for conflict management. In 2004, IDEA began a new
project to evaluate how constitution-making
processes and institutional choices can contribute to conflict management. In this project, constitutional processes focus on broad inclusion of
all social segments in constitutional talks and the
subsequent implementation and sustainability of
agreements reached. In case studies of constitution
making in countries such as Afghanistan, Guatemala, Nigeria, Colombia and Kenya, among others, the project will take further the evaluation of
the conditions under which clever institutional
choices and well-conceived deliberation can tip
the balance towards peace and away from violence
in divided societies.
very basic aims of governance: human
facilitate more sustainable reforms.
Finally, given the deep and enduring scepticism
that democracy can in fact contribute to the management of deep-rooted conflict, in 2005 IDEA
will launch a new handbook together with an online resource guide to re-evaluate anew the fundamental relationships between democracy and
conflict management. The new project, Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Peace
through Democracy Practices, starts from the
premise that, in order to contribute successfully
to peace, political institutions and processes must
clearly and unambiguously advance the very basic
aims of governance: human security and human
development. To have value, democracy in situations of deep-rooted conflict today must go well
beyond negotiating well-designed institutions—
however important that may be—to ensure that
today’s conflicts, too, are indeed best addressed
over time by creating political systems in which
tolerance, trust and mutual understanding are the
values upon which real world security and development imperatives are realized.
Similarly, the theme of democracy building as a
dialogue is taken up anew in a project that will
draw on the experience of practitioners in a variety of settings to derive lessons for effective processes of structured discussion to evaluate democracy’s quality and performance. The dialogue project
began its work in earnest in 2004 and will yield
a significant new handbook in 2005. The handbook, which is being created in a partnership with
UNDP and the Organization of American States,
has moved beyond the evaluation of democracy itself to key issues of setting national agendas for
improving democracy, consensus building in difficult issue areas, and ways in which dialogue can
142
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
‘Which democracy model did we want to promote? Following extensive consultations
around the world as drafters of the statutes we resolved that IDEA should be
mandated to support sustainable democracy worldwide. Hence, its commitment to
work with both new and long-established democracies. IDEA’s programme to support
democratic development in Burkina Faso, initiated in 1996, was a milestone in the
struggle for advancing democracy in one of the poorest African countries.’
Adama Dieng, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Registrar of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda since March 2001. Senegal.
Member of the Board of International IDEA February 1995–June 2001
144
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
11. The State of Democracy
Project
David Beetham
This chapter provides an account of IDEA’s democracy assessment process. It outlines how the democracy assessment methodology developed by IDEA has
worked and influenced other methodologies, and how
it has been used as a teaching tool and even taken
on a life of its own, triggering a second generation of
assessments initiated by the countries themselves.
The State of Democracy project was established
by IDEA at the end of the 1990s with the following aims:
• to develop a robust methodology for assessing
the condition and progress of democracy in any
country of the world;
• to pilot the methodology with in-country partners in a number of countries, both to test
its effectiveness and as a direct contribution
to democratic development in the respective
countries;
• to draw comparative conclusions from these assessments about the successes and setbacks of
democratization to date, as a guide to the global state of democracy; and
• to promote the use of the assessment methodology more widely by a variety of user constituencies, through the production of a handbook
and other publications, and through the fostering of a global network of democracy assessors.
11.1. Background
An essential element in any country’s process of
democracy building or democratic reform is a
stage of stocktaking—to assess progress to date
and to identify the most serious weaknesses that
should be addressed. This is what a systematic democracy assessment seeks to provide. Its potential
audience is not only political decision makers but
also the public or civil society more widely. Such
an assessment can serve to raise public awareness
about what democracy involves and to inform debate about what standards of performance people
should expect from their government. It can contribute to public discussion about ongoing reform,
and help to identify priorities for a reform programme. It can also provide an instrument for assessing how effectively reforms are working out in
practice.
The idea of systematically assessing the level or
quality of a country’s democracy has a long pedigree, although it became more prevalent during
the 1990s with the emergence of many new democracies. Historically, such assessments have been
designed to serve widely differing purposes. On
one side are the quantitative tables of global democratic performance developed by Freedom House,
the World Bank or the Polity IV dataset, which
enable comparisons to be made between countries
on a small number of key indicators. (Recent examples of these are included in UNDP 2002: 38–
41.) Here every country’s performance on each
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
145
indicator is assessed and aggregated into a single
overall score or league table for rough comparative
purposes. Such quantitative tables have also been
developed and used by social scientists to enable
correlations to be made between levels of democracy and other variables, such as economic development or respect for human rights.
On the other side there are in-depth analyses of
democratic governance in individual countries designed by international development agencies for
an explicit policy purpose: to identify weaknesses
in potential recipients of economic aid, or to locate points where
external political
One of its key principles is that assessments
intervention might
should be conducted by citizens of the
be most useful
country concerned, not by outsiders sitting
or most effective
(Crawford 2001).
in judgement upon it. This is because
These assessments
any process of reform is more likely to be
are typically qualieffective if not only the process itself but
tative rather than
also the definition of its priorities is ‘owned’
quantitative
in
by the people concerned.
form, and they are
sectorally disaggregated so that the respective strengths and weaknesses of different aspects of democratic governance can be individually identified. From this perspective, to sum all these together into a single
score, as is done in the first type of assessment,
not only obscures as much as it reveals; it cannot
provide the evidence needed for a targeted reform
programme.
The assessment methodology developed for IDEA’s
State of Democracy project is closer to the second
than the first type of democracy assessment mentioned above in that its purpose is to contribute
directly to a programme of democracy building
and democratic reform. Unlike the assessments
conducted by other international agencies, however, this one is designed to be domestically rather
than externally driven. One of its key principles is
that assessments should be conducted by citizens
of the country concerned, not by outsiders sitting
in judgement upon it. This is because any process of reform is more likely to be effective if not
only the process itself but also the definition of
its priorities is ‘owned’ by the people concerned.
Outsiders can at most be facilitative rather than
146
instructive or judgemental, although this ought
not exclude the involvement of invited external
experts with comparative experience of conducting such assessments.
This facilitative purpose has characterized the State
of Democracy’s assessment methodology from the
outset. It also has other innovative features which
have gained it international recognition, of which
the following are the most significant:
• the criteria for assessment are derived systematically from clearly defined democratic norms
and principles;
• the framework of search questions provides a
comprehensive and coherent itemization of democracy’s key features, which is readily intelligible and easy to use;
• the assessment process and framework can be
applied to established and emergent democracies alike;
• finished assessments can combine qualitative
and quantitative analysis; and
• the practice of involving a wide range of participants from the outset, and submitting the
preliminary findings to a national conference
for peer review, enhances the legitimacy and
political salience of the assessment process.
The next section will briefly elaborate on each of
these features in turn.
11.2. An Innovative
Methodology
The assessment methodology was originally pioneered by a group involved in auditing the state of
democracy in the United Kingdom, in response to
widespread concerns about the democratic condition of that country at the end of the 1980s. The
methodology was, however, considerably modified and developed for IDEA’s State of Democracy Project. Most important in this was the assembling of an international group of experts from
every region of the world to critique and refine
a draft assessment framework. In the process, significant concerns and experiences from emergent
democracies and developing countries were incorporated into the assessment method. Its distinctive features can thus be seen as the outcome of an
international process of peer review.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
11.2.1. Democratic Norms
Most types of democracy or governance assessment either fail to explain or justify their selection
of items to be assessed, or are explicit about the
normative criteria against which a given country’s
practices are to be evaluated. The State of Democracy method is based on a simple assumption that
democracy is to be defined in the first instance by
a set of norms or principles, and only secondarily by the institutions and practices through which
these principles are realized. When we are trying to
assess how democratic a given institution or practice is, the criterion has to be how far it actually
helps to realize a relevant democratic principle. So,
for example, if what makes elections democratic is
that they enable citizens to choose their rulers and
hold them accountable, then these norms will not
be realized to the extent that the citizen’s choice
is unduly restricted, or the choices made are not
fairly reflected in the governmental outcome, or
a government is able to control or manipulate the
choices in the first place. It follows that it is not
enough to specify a checklist of items to be assessed without explaining what their contribution
is to democratic life and the norms against which
they are to be assessed.
The underlying democratic principles that have
driven the State of Democracy assessment method are twofold: popular control of public decisions and decision makers, and equality between
citizens in relation to those decisions—in short,
popular control and political equality. These principles are applicable to both direct and representative democracy. In relation to the latter, however
(the normal form for contemporary government),
these principles are realized through a set of mediating norms: those of participation, authorization,
representativeness, accountability, transparency,
responsiveness and solidarity. These are the norms
against which the actual working of the main institutions of democracy has to be assessed, whether it be legislatures, the electoral process, access to
justice, the rights of citizens, or whatever. This relationship between norms and practices provides
the underlying logic to the assessment framework
and method (for a convenient summary see International IDEA 2002).
11.2.2. Framework of Assessment
Questions
The assessment framework sets out in a logical order the main elements which together comprise a
functioning democratic polity and society. It begins with the citizen and his or her rights, including the legal institutions necessary
The State of Democracy method is based
to guarantee these
on a simple assumption that democracy is
rights in practice;
to be defined in the first instance by a set of
moves on to the
assessment of the
norms or principles, and only secondarily
institutions of repby the institutions and practices through
resentative and acwhich these principles are realized.
countable government; assesses the
contribution of civil society to political participation and government responsiveness; and concludes with the international dimensions of democracy. In all, the framework has 14 sections, arranged as follows:
• Citizen rights: nationhood and citizenship, the
rule of law and access to justice, civil and political rights, and economic and social rights.
• Representative and accountable government: free
and fair elections, the democratic role of political parties, government effectiveness and
accountability, civilian control of the military
and police, and minimizing corruption.
• Civil society and popular participation: the media in a democratic society, political participation, government responsiveness, and decentralization.
• Democracy beyond the state: the international dimensions of democracy.
Although all these different components can be
treated separately for analytical purposes, they are
all
interdependent, and any overNothing, for example, has more discredited
all assessment has
the democratization process than the
to consider how
assumption that it is largely a matter of
they relate to one
electoral democracy alone, without any
another and work
consideration of what happens in the long
together in conperiods between elections, or of what basic
text. Nothing, for
supportive conditions are necessary if
example, has more
elections are to be genuinely ‘free and fair’.
discredited
the
democratization
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
147
process than the assumption that it is
largely a matter of
in the comparative mode, on the assumption
electoral democrathat democracy is a matter of degree, not an
cy alone, without
all-or-nothing affair, which a country either
any consideration
has or does not have.
of what happens
in the long periods between elections, or of what basic supportive
conditions are necessary if elections are to be genuinely ‘free and fair’. The assessment framework
encourages the different elements to be seen in relation to one another, while also enabling the difference in democratic performance between them
to be identified.
These questions are all deliberately framed
Each section of the framework outlined above
contains a list of four or five search questions,
which an assessment team will seek to answer. By
way of example, the list of questions for section 8
of the framework (civilian control of the military
and police) is:
1. How effective is civilian control over the armed
forces, and how free is political life from military involvement?
2. How publicly accountable are the police and
security services for their activities?
3. To what extent does the composition of the
army, police and security services reflect the social composition of society at large?
4. How free is the country from the operation of
paramilitary units, private armies, warlordism
and criminal mafias?
These questions are all deliberately framed in the
comparative mode, on the assumption that democracy is a matter of degree, not an all-or-nothing affair, which a country either has or
Yet the established democracies are also
does not have. This
in need of reform and improvement, as the
raises the question
widespread collapse in public confidence
of what counts as a
and participation in representative
good comparative
processes demonstrates.
standard against
which a country’s
performance can be judged in each respect. One
of the strengths of the assessment method is that
it is left to the assessors themselves to decide what
is the most appropriate comparator or standard
148
for assessment. Should it be an internal one, for
example some appropriate point in the past, say
the end of an authoritarian regime, from which
progress can be charted, or some target for attainment which the government has explicitly set itself or which is implicit in popular expectations of
how governments should perform? Or should it
be external: the level attained by some appropriate
comparator country in the region, or an international standard of good or best attainable practice?
Assessors may wish to combine these, but the decision must be theirs in the light of which kind of
standard will carry the most persuasive force in the
given context. This is only one of the many ways
in which the framework can be tailored to local
circumstances, albeit within a common method
and question base.
11.2.3. Universal Applicability
At first sight it might seem surprising that an assessment methodology should be applicable to established as well as emergent democracies. Most
qualitative assessments are designed to be applied
to recently established democracies, typically to
determine whether they attain the threshold for
external assistance, say, or for membership of a
democratic ‘club’ such as the European Union.
Here the level of attainment of the established democracies is assumed to be the self-evident standard against which newcomers should be judged.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Yet the established democracies are also in need of
reform and improvement, as the widespread collapse in public confidence and participation in
representative processes demonstrates. They also
have problems with ‘money politics’, with the
defence of basic rights, economic as well as civil,
with social inclusion, with gender equality, with
accountability of the security services, and so on.
Such problems may be more acute in the emergent
democracies, but they are common to all, and we
can all benefit from each other’s experience of how
best to tackle them.
A basic assumption of the State of Democracy assessment method is that the democratic norms and
principles outlined above have a universal applicability and appeal, even though they may not be
universally applied in practice. It is this universal
appeal of democratic values that enables a carefully
designed assessment framework itself to have general applicability. This is not a question of imposing our values or standards on others, as should be
clear from the country-centred approach already
discussed. Indeed, nothing better demonstrates
the universality than having established democracies subject themselves to the same self-assessment
process as is expected of emergent ones. It is for
this reason that the pilot studies in the State of Democracy Project included two established democracies (Italy and New Zealand) alongside others,
even though a concern with the ‘old’ democracies
may not be a central part of IDEA’s mission.
An example of how careful design can enable
search questions to tap into the concerns of countries in very different circumstances can be drawn
from the final section of the framework, on the international dimensions of democracy. That such a
section was included at all was due to the prompting of contributors from the South, who were particularly sensitive to the way in which a country’s
policies can be determined from outside. What
value does the popular control of government
have, they asked, if a government is itself relatively
powerless in the face of international agencies, or
if major decisions affecting the well-being of citizens are taken beyond the state? And can a country be called democratic if it is not consistent in its
respect for international law, or in its support for
democracy and human rights beyond its borders?
These concerns are
precisely reflected
in the search questions of the international section, and
are able to capture
the
democracyrelevant aspects of
a country’s external
profile, whether the
country belongs to
the relatively powerful or powerless
international players.
What value does the popular control of
government have, they asked, if a government is itself relatively powerless in the
face of international agencies, or if major
decisions affecting the well-being of
citizens are taken beyond the state? And
can a country be called democratic if it is
not consistent in its respect for international
law, or in its support for democracy and
human rights beyond its borders?
11.2.4. Qualitative or Quantitative
Findings?
Answering the search questions in the assessment
framework is primarily a research-based exercise,
though this need not involve the assessors in undertaking or commissioning new primary research
themselves. It is rather a matter of identifying existing data and evidence from a variety of sources, including opinion surveys, and organizing it
systematically so that it answers the questions as
closely and convincingly as possible. Often this
requires a qualitative or discursive treatment; at
other times the findings can be best expressed in
quantitative form.
It would be a mistake to draw a sharp contrast between assessment findings in qualitative or quantitative terms. Some issues can only be treated discursively, for example, any account of the legal basis for the respective powers of citizens, legislatures
and executives, and the procedures through which
these are realized in practice, or a survey of the historical and social context which alone can make
a country’s democratic process intelligible. When
it comes to assessing outcomes, some of these certainly lend themselves to quantification and country comparison. Most obvious examples are subjects such as voter turnout, the representativeness
of legislatures, gender participation rates, patterns
of social and economic inequality, and so on. Less
obviously, it is sometimes possible to find one or
two quantitative indicators which throw light on
a whole area of public life; for example, the ratio
of different populations in prison, the percentage
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
149
The State of Democracy Project has
rejected the practice of reducing complex
and nuanced qualitative judgements to
numerical form, which delivers a simple
‘score’, or of then weighting different
aspects of democracy and aggregating the
results into a competitive league table of
democratic performance.
of the prison population awaiting
trial, or the average length of time
taken to bring cases
to court can illuminate a whole criminal justice system.
Here a simple table
can be worth volumes of text.
The State of Democracy Project has rejected the
practice of reducing complex and nuanced qualitative judgements to numerical form, which delivers a simple ‘score’, or of then weighting different
aspects of democracy and aggregating the results
into a competitive league table of democratic performance. The results of such reduction and aggregation are usually arbitrary, and give a misleading impression of objective precision to what are
essentially subjective judgements. The reason for
the currency of such league tables lies in the public demand for simple measures which can be read
at a glance, where few have the time or patience to
wade through a large volume. This is primarily a
matter of presentation rather than of the intrinsic
appropriateness of
numbers or a text.
For assessment findings to have a public
Contributors to the
impact is a question not just of effective
State of Democracy
presentation but of a public recognition of
Project have experimented with various
the legitimacy of the assessment process.
methods of presenting findings in summary or simplified form:
• the executive summary, both as part of a larger
text and for separate publication;
• the selection of a few key findings for a media
handout;
• the development of qualitative as well as quantitative tables; and
• graphic presentations in the form of charts and
diagrams.
These presentational methods have developed as
the project has progressed, and can be developed
further.
150
11.2.5. Legitimacy of the Assessment
Results
For assessment findings to have a public impact
is a question not just of effective presentation but
of a public recognition of the legitimacy of the assessment process. At the end of the day, assessing
the level or quality of a country’s democracy is a
judgemental activity, aspects of which are bound
to be controversial. It is all the more important,
therefore, to be able to defend the integrity of
the process. A number of elements can contribute to this. One is the selection of the assessors,
who need to be credible experts in their respective
fields. A second is the involvement of a range of
potential stakeholders in the planning stages of the
assessment. A third, obviously, is the quality and
objectivity of the data and evidence on which the
judgements are based. The fourth is the practice of
submitting draft findings to a national conference
for peer review by a wide range of opinion. Together these can answer criticisms that the assessment is merely partisan. I have already mentioned
the legitimacy which comes from an assessment
process that is domestically rather than externally
driven and conducted. In addition, the robustness
of the assessment method, the explicitness of its
normative basis and the standing of IDEA itself as
promoter and partner have all contributed to the
legitimacy of the assessments to date. It is to a review of these that this chapter turns next.
11.3. ‘First-Generation’
Assessments
The pilot programme of eight country assessments
financed by the Institute and the various spin-offs
constitute the ‘first generation’ of assessments using the IDEA methodology. Only the most significant outcomes from the pilot programme will be
summarized in what follows.
11.3.1. Pilot Country Assessments
The eight countries selected for assessment by incountry partners were Bangladesh, El Salvador,
Italy, Kenya, Malawi, New Zealand, Peru and
South Korea. All of these produced democracy
assessments covering the full range of the assessment framework, including executive summaries.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
In each case draft findings were submitted for review to a national conference of experts, including
journalists, academics, politicians, human rights
lawyers, and public officials such as electoral commissioners, parliamentary clerks, and so on. The
full reports and summaries were photocopied for
domestic circulation to a wide range of audiences. All were published electronically on the IDEA
web site, and those for Bangladesh and New Zealand were also published in book form by a local
publisher in partnership with IDEA (Barman et
al. 2002; and Henderson and Bellamy 2002).
What sort of impact did they have? This has proved
difficult to evaluate definitively. Many of the assessors were involved in a wide range of other democracy initiatives, and the results of the assessment
fed into their other work and contacts. It is a mistake, therefore, to draw too sharp a distinction between academics and practitioners, since most of
the academic assessors saw themselves as ‘public
intellectuals’ who had a foot in the world of public policy as well as academia, and had developed
their own political and media contacts. A number
of the national conferences to discuss draft findings had a direct impact on the political scene. In
Peru many of the participants were to become involved in the constitutional discussions and interim arrangements following the ousting of President Fujimori. In Kenya the conference brought
together on one platform for the first time leading
representatives of the competing constitutional reform proposals put forward by the government
and civil society, respectively. In Bangladesh representatives from the antagonistic political parties
of government and opposition both attended. In
such contexts the assessment process provided a
neutral meeting point which transcended political
antagonisms.
Time and resource limitations prevented the level of involvement of stakeholders, especially from
civil society, at an early enough stage of the assessment process. Had this been possible, the finished
assessment would have had wider political salience
and impact. Since this was a pilot programme, it
was important to draw appropriate lessons from
it which have been incorporated in the two comparative publications which represent the second
output from the programme.
11.3.2. Comparative Publications
The first of two comparative publications arising from the State of Democracy project was the
Handbook on Democracy Assessment (Beetham
et al. 2002a). As its title implies, the aim of the
handbook was to disseminate and democratize
the process of democracy assessment by providing
a step-by-step guide which any group could use
on its own account. In particular it would stimulate other country assessments beyond those that
could be financed by IDEA. The first part of the
handbook explains the assessment framework and
provides a guide to each stage of the assessment
process, from assembling a group of stakeholders
through to strategies for dissemination of a finished report and media publicity. The second part
gives examples of finished assessments, and different ways of presenting their findings. The third
part offers a systematic compendium to assist assessors in answering each of the search questions
in the framework. Against each question is set a
summary of the types of data required to answer
the question, a list of helpful sources for the data,
and the location of examples of good practice as
possible standards for the assessment. The handbook concludes with a do-it-yourself questionnaire version of the assessment framework, which
could also be used for an elite survey by country
assessors. Since there is no equivalent in the assessment field, the handbook has had considerable international impact.
Whereas the handbook was designed to disseminate the methodology of the pilot project, a second volume, entitled simply The State of Democracy, aimed to disseminate its key findings (Beetham
et al. 2002b). The first part of this volume contains the executive summaries from all the eight
pilot assessments, set out according to each of the
14 sections of the framework in turn. A second
part presents the findings comparatively in a series
of innovative qualitative and quantitative tables.
A third part draws out some general conclusions
about the democratization process from the pilot
studies. These show that some aspects of democracy can be introduced or reintroduced relatively quickly and successfully, especially where the
removal of constraints on basic freedoms simply
requires governments not to act oppressively or
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
151
obstructively. Other features, however, involve a
much longer haul, since they require positive action from governments to develop effective systems of accountability and inclusion, and an alert
and active civil society. One advantage of including established democracies in the pilot scheme
has been to show that they too have experienced
continuing problems, and where there is therefore
mutual benefit to be gained by sharing difficulties
and potential solutions to them.
11.3.3. Influence on Other Assessment
Methodologies
The work and publications of the State of Democracy Project have already had a considerable influence on other organizations working internationally in the field of democracy and governance assessment. Among these, the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) made use of
the methodology in the development of its own
governance assessment framework, and personnel
from the project were involved in designing and
piloting a participatory assessment process for the
DFID in Indonesia and Nigeria. The UN Economic Commission for Africa used the framework
in the design of its
comparative govOne advantage of including established
ernance assessment
democracies in the pilot scheme has been
programme, develto show that they too have experienced
oping the methodology further by
continuing problems, and where there is
adding a citizen
therefore mutual benefit to be gained by
satisfaction
sursharing difficulties and potential solutions
vey and elite questo them.
tionnaire to the research component
of the assessment process. Again, personnel from
the State of Democracy Project were involved in
an advisory capacity. The Inter-Parliamentary Union is currently developing a set of criteria for assessing the parliamentary dimension of democracy
which explicitly takes the IDEA methodology as
its starting point.
These are examples of clearly identifiable influence. Others may pass unnoticed simply because
the process of dissemination of ideas is subterranean and involves a complex mixture of many factors. One way of assisting further dissemination is
152
to develop an international network of those involved in democracy assessment from the many
international contacts already stimulated by the
project. These include the experts involved in
the original design of the framework, the assessors from the pilot countries, those involved in a
second generation of country assessments (see below), and other interested parties from development agencies, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and academia. In addition, members of
the project team have made presentations on the
IDEA methodology at international meetings in
Morocco, Germany and Mongolia (2002–3), and
written them up for the academic community in
Democratization (2004), the Journal of Democracy (2004), and other publications (see Beetham
2004a and 2004b).
11.3.4. Pedagogical Applications
One unanticipated outcome of the State of Democracy Project has been the pedagogical applications of the assessment framework. Although
originally designed as a research instrument, it has
proved to be equally useful as a device for teaching
about democracy and its problems, and in developing analytical skills of assessment for students at
a number of levels. Aspects of the framework have
been used as a component in civic education in
Kenya and Malawi. They have been employed in
international courses for practitioners run by the
British Council. And the framework as a whole
has formed a component in Master’s level modules at universities in Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and the UK. In addition, it has
formed the core of the foundation undergraduate
course in political science at the University of Toronto, where students undertake an assessment of
their own country and one emergent democracy
as their required project. Again, these are only the
applications known to the author through personal contact, and there are likely to be many others.
11.4. ‘Second-Generation’
Assessments
Second-generation assessments are those where
particular countries have taken up the IDEA
framework and methodology on their own initiative and used them with their own sources of
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
funding. Typically, they have adapted the methodology to their own situation and improved it,
while still keeping the basic framework of search
questions intact. All have attempted to involve potential user groups and agencies from both government and civil society in the assessment process
from an early stage. Other innovations or modifications they have made are worth summarizing
briefly.
The UK Democratic Audit has a successful history of identifying under-researched topics of public
importance in the democratic field and publishing research papers on them, prior to a complete
democracy assessment. Its research on public nongovernmental agencies (or ‘quangos’) and on alternative electoral systems for the UK has proved
particularly influential. Its most recent full democracy assessment, Democracy under Blair, using the
IDEA framework, ran into a second edition, such
was the demand (Beetham et al., Democracy under Blair 2002 and 2003). The pamphlets summarizing the assessment findings used diagrams and
visuals in an innovative way, and were circulated
to all members of Parliament (MPs), as well as to
supporters of the main democracy and human
rights NGOs. The authors have acted as advisers
to government and to select committees of Parliament, and are developing the assessment section
on economic and social rights into the first fulllength audit of these rights in the UK.
A group based at the Australian National University has won a major research council grant to finance a democracy assessment of Australia on the
IDEA model. Like the UK, it has adopted a strategy of publishing interim research papers on issues such as electoral systems and political equality, or corruption and Australian democracy, so as
to establish an early public profile. Australia is the
first federal system to be assessed using the IDEA
framework, and it is of considerable interest to see
how it can be adapted for assessing a multi-level
polity. Other distinctive features of the Australian
assessment are its emphasis on deliberative democracy as a key component of public life, and its particularly active web site and assessment network
(see <http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au>).
4
The Democracy in
South Asia project,
One unanticipated outcome of the State
involving comparaof Democracy Project has been the
tive assessments of
pedagogical applications of the assessment
five countries, has
framework. Although originally designed
highlighted new
as a research instrument, it has proved to
thematic
issues
be equally useful as a device for teaching
in the assessment
about democracy and its problems, and in
framework, such as
developing analytical skills of assessment
protection against
for students at a number of levels.
tyranny, and has
developed a multilevel approach to
implementing it. Besides a research component
and an elite survey, it has initiated as series of democracy dialogues between different ‘knowledge
communities’ at regional, national and local levels, and has complemented these with a number
of case studies exploring key puzzles about the
working of democracy in practice. A distinctive
theme of the assessment is the idea that democracy changes as it travels to new countries, and that
a common template has to be sensitive to cultural
specificities in each country and region.4
Democracy assessments recently initiated in the
Philippines and the Republic of Ireland have opted
for implementing the assessment framework as a
rolling programme, in which sections of particular
importance to funding agencies are given first priority. Getting sufficient funding for
A distinctive theme of the assessment is the
a complete assessidea that democracy changes as it travels to
ment is not always
new countries, and that a common template
easy. It should be
has to be sensitive to cultural specificities
said, however, that
in each country and region.
for all these secondgeneration assessments it has proved a strong selling point to potential funding bodies that the assessment method and framework have been successfully tested in
practice, and have now achieved international recognition and credibility. In due course it will be
important to review the experience of these later
assessments, and particularly the innovations they
have made. This process began at an IDEA workshop in June 2004, and will be carried forward at
an international meeting in Canada in June 2005.
The project is led by Professor Peter de Souza at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
153
effects: between, say, contributing to the public
debate or discourse of democracy; enriching civic
education within and without the academy; developing consensus around a reform agenda; influencing specific reforms or reform agents; and evaluating the effectiveness of reforms once undertaken. Some of these effects are easier to assess than
others. It was agreed that it would be mistaken to
prioritize either the short- or the long-term effects,
but that a successful assessment ought to be able to
contribute to both.
11.5. The International IDEA
Workshop
The workshop held in London in June 2004
brought together many of those who had been involved in the development of the assessment framework and in the pilot country assessments, together with participants
in the second genNot all the outcomes of an assessment were
eration of assessexhausted by the impact of a particular
ments. The aims
product or publication, but that the process
of the workshop
itself was also important.
were to review the
State of Democracy Project to date,
to assess its strengths and limitations, and to consider proposals for its development.
Much of the discussion centred around the issue of
how to assess the impact of country assessments,
given that their purpose was to contribute to the
democratization process itself. A number of useful
distinctions emerged from the discussion. It was
pointed out that not all the outcomes of an assessment were exhausted by the impact of a particular
product or publication, but that the process itself
was also important, especially where it involved
a wide range of stakeholders, and contributed to
the development of an ongoing monitoring capacity within civil society. Another distinction was
between longer- and shorter-term influences or
154
Particular interest centred on how the assessment
work undertaken to date might be of use to the
donor community, which tends to be interested in
shorter-term policy outcomes. Attention focused
on how the distinctive expertise of academics in
comparative analysis and the evaluation of different assessment methodologies could be helpful to
donors in the development of more precisely focused governance indicators and in the mounting
of training programmes and conferences. Making
such links between academic and policy-oriented work had always been a distinctive feature of
IDEA’s activities.
As for the future of the State of Democracy Project,
it was agreed that its success to date had given it a
momentum that exceeded its original conception.
The international network created by the first generation of assessments, and publications such as
the handbook, helped to stimulate the second generation without new financial resources being required from the Institute itself. Nevertheless, most
of the suggestions for improvement of the methodology made at the workshop, for developing it
for different user constituencies, for revising the
handbook, and even for supporting further country assessments, could best be provided by a partnership between IDEA and a leading academic institution. The University of Essex Human Rights
Centre has been chosen for this purpose.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
References
Australian National University, <http://democratic.audit.
anu.edu.au>
Barman, D., Rahman, Golam and Siddiqui, Tasneem, State
of Democracy in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Department of
Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Dhaka, 2002)
Beetham, David, ‘The Quality of Democracy: Freedom as
the Foundation’, Journal of Democracy 15/4 (October
2004), pp. 61-75 (2004a)
— ‘Towards a Universal Framework for Democracy Assessment’, Democratization 11/2 (April 2004), pp. 1-17
(2004b)
Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton, I. and Weir, S., International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) (2002a)
Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton, I., Vittal, N. and Weir,
S. (eds), The State of Democracy (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2002) (2002b)
Beetham, D., Byrne, I., Ngan, P. and Weir, S., Democracy
under Blair, 1st edn (London: Politico’s, 2002) and 2nd
edn (London: Politico’s and Methuen, 2003)
Henderson, John and Bellamy, Paul, Democracy in New Zealand (Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific
Studies, University of Canterbury, 2002)
Crawford, Gordon, Foreign Aid and Political Reform (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)
International IDEA, ‘Democracy Assessment: The Basics of
the International IDEA Assessment Framework’, Stockholm, 2002
UNDP, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
155
‘The international community must embrace different brands of democracy as equal
and above all not favour specific cultural or historical models. While the European
Union, the United States and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development countries will be important drivers in the process of further
democratization, it is the young democracies of Latin America, Africa and Asia that
will give credibility to the process. We need ideas, not ideology, as well as collaboration
between equals, not a sermon from developed to developing democracies. The capacity
and willingness to pursue a dialogue is an important feature of a democratic culture.”
Ambassador Andrés Rozental, IDEA Board Vice Chairperson
and President of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations
156
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
12. Building Democracy,
Shaping the Future:
International IDEA in Peru
Kristen Sample, Daniel Zovatto
This chapter provides a glimpse at the activities of
one of IDEA’s regional offices, in Peru. In so doing
it illustrates how IDEA benefits from the interaction
between thematic and regional activities. The lessons
learned on the ground from politicians and citizens
feed into the overall subject work of the organization
and serve to enhance its credibility.
12.1. Introduction
The opening years of the new millennium found
Peru, an Andean country of 27 million people, on
the threshold of political change. After nearly two
decades of political violence and ten years of authoritarian government, and in the wake of a corruption scandal that had shaken the country to
the core, the groundwork was being laid for movement towards more participatory, transparent democracy.
The transition government had called elections
that were held successfully in 2001 and had
launched investigations into the web of government corruption that came to light in late 2000.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
was beginning to gather testimony about the political violence, while the National Accord Forum
(NAF) was bringing leaders of political parties and
civil society together to draw up plans for addressing the country’s major problems.
It was amid this legacy of disenchantment combined with hope for a change that IDEA began
its work in Peru, beginning with various missions,
conferences, background research and meetings
with local actors in 2001 and officially opening its
country office in February 2002.
IDEA has helped to bring politicians and citizens
from across the political spectrum together for dialogue on such issues as the obstacles to good governance, political parties, electoral reform, women’s participation in politics and reconciliation in
the wake of political violence. IDEA’s neutrality
and its ability to bring to the table research and
experience from other countries allowed it to play
an important role in the reshaping of Peruvian democracy.
12.2. Crucible for Political
Reform
Peru’s return to democracy in 1980 was complicated by political insurgency that continued through
a second democratically elected administration,
from 1985 to 1990. By the time of the 1990 elections, the economy was in ruins, inflation was out
of control and political violence—both a cause
and a result of lack of governance, especially in rural areas—had spread.
Peruvian voters held the country’s political parties
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
157
of civil society organizations and churches, came
together in the NAF to discuss common problems
and develop consensus about possible solutions.
A Country Distrustful of Democracy?
The legacy of a decade of corruption and
distrust is reflected in Peruvians’ ambivalence
about democracy.
According to the 2004 Latinobarómetro survey,
45 per cent of Peruvians believe that democracy
is preferable to any other form of government,
down from 63 per cent in 1996 and below the
regional average of 53 per cent. Only 7 per cent,
however, said they were satisfied with the way
democracy functioned in the country.
partly responsible and expressed their disenchantment by electing a political unknown, Alberto Fujimori, who lacked the backing of an established
party and opted for an authoritarian style. In April
1992 he closed Congress (although international
pressure eventually forced him to call a constituent assembly) and placed the judiciary under
presidential control. During the Fujimori administration, Congress passed a law that nearly quintupled the number of signatures required for political organizations to register. This forced most
of the country’s political parties into oblivion.
The collapse of the Fujimori government came
amid a massive corruption scandal in late 2000,
shortly after he began a third term following elections that most international observers considered
fraudulent.
The
transition governIn a region marked by upheaval, helping to
ment
launched
recover and stabilize democracy in Peru
corruption investiwould be good not only for Peru but also for
gations. Alejandro
the entire Andean sub-region.
Toledo then won
the presidency in
the 2001 elections.
During the upheaval, the Organization of American States (OAS) brought many of Peru’s top political figures together for round table dialogue. During the transition government, figures from across
the political spectrum, along with representatives
158
12.3. IDEA Begins Working
in Peru
It was against this backdrop that IDEA decided to
begin working in Peru. There was a feeling within
the organization that IDEA was ready to engage in
a new country programme, and in Peru, as it was
in the process of democratic transition, there was a
solid opportunity for IDEA to contribute.
Weak party systems characterize most of the Andean countries. Parties are the least trusted institutions in all five countries, and political analysts
have commented on the inability of the region’s
parties to offer constructive proposals or interact
with civil society.
In 2001, IDEA launched introductory activities
in Peru under the direction of Daniel Zovatto.
One of the first projects was a democracy assessment that was part of the State of Democracy series. The study was under way when the Fujimori
government fell, forcing the authors to revise their
assessment.
The State of Democracy in Peru, 2000–2001 was
officially released in Peru in July 2001 at a ceremony co-organized by IDEA, the Catholic University, Transparencia, the Andean Commission of
Jurists and the Dialogue and Proposals Institute.
IDEA followed up with a seminar on the state
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
of democracy, co-sponsored by the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and
Transparencia, which drew about 300 people a
day from various sectors of Peruvian society to discuss civil society and public opinion; political parties, representation and the party system; reform
of the armed forces and the national defence; and
electoral reform.
The latter topic was also a focus of IDEA’s early
actions in Peru, with a two-day seminar on electoral system reform followed by the publication of
the content of the event. IDEA co-sponsored the
seminar with the Carter Center, the NDI, Transparencia and the International Foundation for
Election Systems (IFES).
After the elections of 2000 and 2001, IDEA decided to take another step in its commitment,
opening its Peru office in February 2002. IDEA
consulted a broad range of Peruvian figures and
representatives of IDEA’s member states about the
strategic areas in which IDEA could best take action in Peru. The research identified the need to
work with political parties, in partnership with local organizations.
Transparencia, being a non-partisan civil society
organization, already had extensive experience in
civic education, the fostering of citizen participation, especially in elections, and helping to ensure
free, fair and transparent elections. Transparencia
became a key local partner, especially in the drafting of the Political Parties Law and proposals for
electoral reform. The Peruvian organization also
provided IDEA with space for its Peru office during the first year of operation.
Building on the consultation process and with local partnerships in place, IDEA established its office in Peru in February 2002 with a mandate for
support in four programme areas: governance, political reform, women, and political participation
and reconciliation.
Four Interlinked Areas of the IDEA Peru
Programme
• Governance
Following the IDEA democracy assessment
of 2001, IDEA sponsored Citizens for Good
Government. This group of experts examined the exercise of citizen power through the
framework of political parties, civil society and
the media; and key public policies.
• Political reform
— Working with Transparencia, IDEA invited
the leaders of the country’s 12 major political
parties to meet together to discuss the framework for a Political Parties Law. This concluded with the passage of the law in 2003.
— Similar dialogue was established to reach
consensus on elements of a new electoral
code.
— IDEA published an overview of the challenges facing the party system in the region
and proposals for addressing them.
— IDEA launched Agora Democrática in
March 2004, a programme for political participation that will form the core of its work in
the coming years.
• Women and political participation
— IDEA Peru sponsored a workshop on the
implementation of quota laws in the region,
pinpointing areas for improvement. Another
seminar included a focus on women’s political
participation in various Latin American countries.
— IDEA Peru provided political parties with
technical assistance in applying the quota law
and expanding women’s participation within
parties.
— Agora Democrática contributed to increasing women’s participation in politics, not just
in Peru but throughout the Andean region.
• Reconciliation
— IDEA Peru assisted the TRC by providing
a comparative study on the work of truth commissions.
— IDEA and Transparencia jointly sponsored,
and documented the results of citizen gatherings in seven cities.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
159
12.4. Governance
The 2001 democracy assessment, conducted by
four Peruvians with extensive experience in political and social analysis, examined the legacy of
various undemocratic practices that had characterized Peru’s recent history. It found that poor indigenous Peruvians were largely excluded from public
life, that there was a lack of protection for minorities and that people tended to be tolerant of authoritarian leadership. It also revealed that citizen
participation was mainly limited to elections.
Given the new political climate in the post-Fujimori years, both the study’s authors and the IDEA
staff felt that a broader, more participatory assessment was needed. Thus was born Citizens
for Good Government, which brought together
a group of distinguished experts in such fields as
public policy, law, political science, sociology, anthropology, business administration and economics.
‘The idea was
to form a group
institutions—political parties, civil society
that was pluralistic, from a politiand the media—that provide the framework
cal standpoint, and
for the relationship between citizens and
interdisciplinary’,
the exercising of power. The second set
said Rafael Ronof problems was related to key public
cagliolo, who headpolicies for economic growth with social
ed the IDEA Peru
equality; gradual, effective decentralization
office in 2003.
of government; and efficient public
When Peruvian ofadministration.
ficials decided to
relaunch the National Accord Forum in early 2004, Roncagliolo
became the forum’s technical secretary.
The first problem area involved
The group met throughout 2003 and into 2004,
analysing the state of democracy in the country
and identifying several ‘critical knots’ that needed
to be ‘untied’ in order for democracy to function
properly.
The first problem area involved institutions—political parties, civil society and the media—that
provide the framework for the relationship between citizens and the exercising of power. The
second set of problems was related to key public
160
policies for economic growth with social equality;
gradual, effective decentralization of government;
and efficient public administration.
Citizens for Good Government drew up position
papers, holding seminars in various parts of the
country to present the ideas and gather input. ‘It
was important to go out into the provinces to discuss the position papers with people outside Lima’,
Roncagliolo said.
The group continues to meet independently, under the leadership of coordinator Susana
Pinilla Cisneros, the executive president of the
Institute for the Development of the Informal Sector
(Instituto de Desarrollo del Sector Informal, IDESI
Nacional).
Achievements: Governance
• The 2001 democracy assessment (carried
out before International IDEA opened its
Peru office) laid the groundwork and provided direction for the organization’s later
actions.
• Citizens for Good Government, which
broadened the debate on the issues raised in
the democracy assessment, made an important contribution to discussion of governance issues in the country.
12.5. Political Reform and
Political Parties
When IDEA began working in Peru, the country
was the only one in the region that did not have a
law on political parties. Working with Transparencia, IDEA invited the leaders of the country’s 12
major political parties to meet together to discuss
the framework for a Political Parties Law.
The process, which began in 2002 and concluded with the passage of the law in 2003, included
working groups that met in Lima and seminars organized in four other regions of the country with
local party leaders and representatives of civil society organizations. The result was the participatory
drafting of what many experts consider to be one
of the most comprehensive and modern political
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
parties laws in Latin America.
Highlights of the law include requirements for
official registration of parties, including party
by-laws and the establishment of local committees throughout the country to ensure broad participation and avoid centralization; guidelines for
democratic processes within the parties, including
internal elections overseen by the National Office
of Electoral Processes (Oficina Nacional de Procesos
Electorales, ONPE) and mechanisms for public
and private financing of parties. The latter were
modified by Congress when the draft law came up
for debate, but the law provides a starting point on
which the parties can build.
‘The challenge now is to make the law a reality’,
says Kristen Sample, IDEA’s Peru Director. In October 2004, IDEA co-sponsored a Latin American seminar on party financing as another step towards that goal.
The law and the process that gave rise to it drew
the attention of the Rio Group in 2003, when
Peru chaired the group. At the Rio Group’s request, IDEA researched and published ‘Democratic Governance and Political Parties in Latin
America’, an overview of the challenges facing the
party system in the region and proposals for addressing them.
‘The document was extremely good and continues to serve as a reference’, IDEA’s Peru Director
Roncagliolo said. The study’s proposals—including strengthening parties, developing mechanisms
for building consensus, making parliaments more
responsive, reforming party systems, promoting
political education, developing strategies for social
and economic development and fostering cooperation among political parties in the region—were
adopted by the Rio Group presidents at their 17th
Summit in Cusco, Peru, in May 2003.
A dialogue of the type that led to the Political Parties Law was later established to promote consensus on the elements of an electoral reform that
will include a new electoral code. Political leaders are grappling with such issues as whether the
military and police should have the right to vote,
the make-up of districts, and whether to retain the
‘preferential vote’ or use another mechanism for
assigning seats to winning parties. This debate
has included inter-party dialogue, coordinated
by Transparencia in partnership with IDEA, and
a seminar on reform of the electoral system, cosponsored by IDEA in December 2001, at which
speakers from various Latin American countries
presented an overview of experiences in electoral
reform in their nations.
The process that led to Peru’s Political Parties Law
and the study prepared for the Rio Group raised
IDEA’s profile in Latin America and served as a
catalyst for plans to expand into the Andean region.
‘The drafting of the law showed that it is
possible to get members of political parties
from across the spectrum, both those represented in Congress and those that are not, to
sit down together to discuss issues of common interest that lead to the development of
a specific product’.
Percy Medina
Secretary General of Transparencia
Launched in March 2004, Agora Democrática seeks to support political party systems in the
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
161
Andean region. It focuses on four types of result:
proposals for political reform; the promotion of a
culture of dialogue; strengthened political parties;
and training for political and civil society leaders.
During 2004 the programme published three
books: Political Parties in the Andean Region: Between Crisis and Change; Women, Political Parties
and Electoral Reform; and Women in Political Parties in Peru, along with a pamphlet entitled ‘An
Overview of Women’s Political Participation’. It
also sponsored a series of public inter-party dialogues, attended by party leaders and members, as
well as representatives of public and private institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and the media. Debate has focused on strategies
for strengthening political parties and the role
they should play in society.
Eight political training workshops were held in
2004 in various parts of the country for more than
325 people representing 16 political groups and
six civil society organizations. More than 37 per
cent of the participants were women and 60 per
cent were young people. Agora Democrática has
fostered networking among the graduates of these
workshops. It has also provided technical assistance to parties on implementing the Political Parties Law, increasing democracy and women’s participation within parties, and implementing financing mechanisms and oversight.
IDEA’s work in the area of political parties led to a
fruitful relationship with key leaders on Peru’s political scene, including Lourdes Flores Nano, who
heads the Unidad Nacional party and stood for
president in 2001. Flores Nano is now a member
of IDEA’s Board of Directors.
12.6. Women and Political
Participation
Not until 1955 did women in Peru win the right to
vote and hold public office. In 1985, only 5.6 per
cent of the seats in the lower house of Congress
and 5 per cent in the Senate were held by women.
Ten years later, the number had risen, but only to
10.8 per cent in the unicameral Congress.
162
Achievements: Political Reform
• The process sponsored by IDEA and Transparencia led to what is hailed as one of Latin America’s most complete laws on political parties. Both the consensus-based drafting of the law and its content can serve as
models for similar processes in other countries, as well as for other reforms of the
state.
• IDEA’s participation in the process led to
requests from the Rio Group and Latin
American Parliament to prepare documents
on political parties legislation to serve as
a reference for the region. That, in turn,
broadened opportunities for partnership in
the region.
• The process that led to the Political Parties
Law has also served as a model for consensus building on electoral reform, also sponsored by Transparencia and IDEA.
• During its first year of operation in Peru,
the Agora Democrática project provided
training for members of political parties in
various parts of the country on such issues
as political ethics, the electoral system, procedures for party registration, women’s participation in political parties, and financing
mechanisms and oversight.
Peru’s 1997 quota law required that at least 25 per
cent of the candidates on parties’ slates for the legislature must be women. A similar provision for
municipal elections was included in the Electoral
Code. The quota was later raised to 30 per cent
for congressional, regional and local elections. As
a result, the proportion of women in public office has increased, although it remains below the
quota target.
‘Peru was a country where, in spite of quota laws
and a certain level of political development, the
presence of women in political life was quite limited’, IDEA’s Myriam Méndez-Montalvo said.
In February 2003, IDEA sponsored a workshop
on the implementation of quota laws in the region, comparing the experiences of various countries and analysing the gains made and the areas in
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
which improvement was still needed.
In January 2004 another Latin American seminar
was held, focusing on women, political parties and
electoral reform. Participants from different Latin
American countries noted three obstacles to women’s political participation:
1. they must want to be elected;
2. they must receive their party’s nomination;
and
3. they must win the vote of their constituents.
The second barrier was seen as key and, while quota laws are a step towards overcoming it, further
changes are needed within parties, including training, placing women higher on candidate slates for
general elections and greater equality in campaign
financing. Peru’s Political Parties Law took an important step with its requirement that 30 per cent
of the candidates in internal party elections must
be women.
IDEA Peru has been providing political parties
with technical assistance in applying the quota law
and expanding women’s participation within parties. The Agora Democrática programme will also
help increase women’s participation in politics, not
just in Peru but throughout the Andean region.
The training for party members offered through
the programme will both ensure that more women
are prepared to hold office and foster a more positive attitude to women’s participation.
Achievements: Women’s
Political Participation
•
•
IDEA’s emphasis on women’s political participation has helped place that issue high on the
country’s political agenda, with access to experience from other countries that have provided
important input.
IDEA provided technical assistance to political parties in the implementation of the Political Parties Law, in the drafting of the Electoral
Code, and in areas related to women’s participation, such as internal quotas and the training
of women to hold party posts and public office.
12.7. Reconciliation
Peru’s TRC, which spent two years gathering testimony and preparing a 17-volume report on the
political violence of the past two decades, found
deep divisions within Peruvian society, reflected
especially in the disenfranchisement of poor and
indigenous Peruvians. Most shocking of all was
the TRC’s calculation that 69,000 people—twice
the previous estimates—had been killed or disappeared during the violence. Many of the victims
lacked identity documents: as far as the rest of the
country was concerned, they had never existed.
The TRC’s report analysed the factors that led to
Peru’s political violence, the reasons why anti-subversive strategies succeeded or failed, and the consequences of the violence. Most importantly, it
made recommendations for reparations to the victims and changes in the state and society to make
it less likely that the country would suffer a repetition of that dark moment in its history.
IDEA arrived in Peru at a key moment. The TRC
had officially begun its work, but public support
was far from unanimous, government backing was
lukewarm and promised funding had not been
forthcoming. Under those circumstances, international support for the TRC and its work was crucial.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
163
from Uruguay, Guatemala, Chile and Argentina,
as well as Ireland and South Africa, focusing on
the reconciliation and rebuilding that lie ahead
once a country has faced the truth about its past.
Both Peru’s executive branch and the Congress
have been slow to act on the TRC’s recommendations. While reforms such as changes in the procedures for applying for identity documents, political participation and electoral reform, as well
as the inclusion of human rights issues in training
for the military and police, partly respond to the
TRC’s recommendations, far more is needed.
In late October 2004, victims of the violence and
other concerned citizens marched on Congress
to demand action. It remains to be seen whether
their pleas will be heard and what further activities
might help Peru along the road to reconciliation.
IDEA Peru assisted the TRC in a variety of ways.
It prepared a comparative study of the work of
truth
commissions in other LatOf the Latin American countries, it is now
in American counthe political developments in the Andean
tries. With Transregion that have become the focus of
parencia, it also
sponsored citizen
international attention; 30 years ago it was
gatherings in seven
the Southern Cone, and 15–20 years ago
cities around the
Central America.
country, including
the capitals of three
of the departments that had been hardest hit by
the violence.
IDEA focused especially on the reconciliation
aspect, as this would lay the groundwork for rebuilding relations among Peruvian citizens and institutions in the future. IDEA’s 2003 handbook
on reconciliation was an ideal tool for this task
and helped solidify its contribution to the TRC’s
work.
In June 2003, just two months before the commission was to present its final report, IDEA cosponsored an international seminar in Lima called
‘From Denial to Recognition’, focusing on the processes that had followed the work of truth commissions in various Latin American countries. The
event put the Peruvian experience into the regional context by including comparative experiences
164
Achievements: Reconciliation
• International IDEA lent important support to Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. The citizen gatherings that
were held to gather local input for the
commission’s work resulted in the drafting of concrete local, regional and national democratic agendas that described the
problems in the various areas where the
meetings were held, proposed solutions
and suggested steps for beginning to implement the solutions. These agendas are
now in the hands of local and regional governments for implementation.
• The international seminar on reconciliation experiences resulted in a compendium
of knowledge that provided input into the
truth and reconciliation process in Peru.
It is also available to other countries grappling with the effects of political violence
and the need to reconcile sectors of society that have been distanced by disenfranchisement, discrimination and violence.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
12.8. Conclusion
Some Vital Partnerships
Over the past three years, IDEA’s work in Peru has
contributed to dialogue and proposals on crucial
issues related to political parties, political reform,
electoral reform, political participation, especially
by women, and reconciliation after episodes of political violence.
While Peru has clearly taken steps to distance itself from the recent years of authoritarianism and
violence, its democratic institutions continue to
face critical challenges. The other Andean nations
share these challenges, though there are important
differences between countries.
The Andean region has the lowest levels of citizen support for democracy in Latin America.
Throughout the region, people perceive that democracy has not improved their economic situation or made them more secure, and they tend
to blame political parties. There has been a rise
of local and regional populist movements in the
region, some with an authoritarian bent, and in
both Peru and Bolivia mobs have lynched mayors
who were believed to be corrupt.
In all the countries, the party system is characterized by a plethora of political groups and electoral options, a tendency to confrontation instead of
dialogue and consensus, lack of capacity for developing specific policies and programmes, corruption, limited democracy within parties, little turnover in party leadership, weak party organization
and limited capacity for outreach.
Helping the Andean countries to address these
issues is the mission of the Agora Democrática
programme. Expanding from Peru, activities are
scheduled to start up in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in 2005–6. By promoting consensus-based processes for political reform, IDEA
will thus play a role in developing more solid democratic institutions in the region.
IDEA’s work in Peru has created strong partnerships with civil society and regional and international organizations. This has helped lay
the groundwork for plans to expand for Agora
Democratica programming in the Andean region in 2005.
Partnerships between IDEA and other agencies
supporting the consolidation of democracy in
Peru and the region include:
• the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), which helped support the Citizens
for Good Government programme which
led to a series of proposals for strengthening
democracy in the country;
• the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF),
which supported the preparation of the
study for the Rio Group.;
• The British Government’s Department for
International Development (DFID), which
supported the drafting of the Political Parties Law;
• DFID and UNDP, co-sponsoring the Agora Democrática programme to support the
consolidation of political parties throughout the Andean region;
• beginning in 2005, Agora Democrática activities at the regional level will be carried
out in partnership with the Comunidad
Andina de Naciones, Parlamento Andino,
UNDP, DFID, IDB and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD);
• Transparencia: co-sponsor of the process
leading to the Political Parties Law, among
other things.
The challenges are great, but so are the potential
rewards—greater equity and citizen participation,
and a democratic system that is truly representative of and responsive to the needs of the people.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
165
Annex A. About the Authors
Julie Ballington has managed International
IDEA’s work on Women in Politics since 2001.
She has overseen the production of the handbooks
on Women in Parliament, and has spearheaded
the work on Electoral Quotas for Women since
2003. Before joining IDEA in 2001 she headed
the project on Gender and Elections at the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) based in
Johannesburg, South Africa. Her research interests
include issues relating to the political representation and participation of women, voter turnout
and electoral politics.
David Beetham, Professor Emeritus at the University of Leeds and Fellow of the Human Rights
Centre at the University of Essex, was research coordinator for International IDEA’s State of Democracy Project. He has published widely on
democracy and human rights and acted as consultant to many international organizations. He
is currently acting as rapporteur for an international group of parliamentarians developing criteria of good practice for the parliamentary dimension of democracy under the auspices of the InterParliamentary Union, Geneva. His latest book,
Democracy: A Beginner’s Guide will be published by
One World Publishers, Oxford, in spring 2005.
Michael Bratton is Professor of Political Science
and African Studies at Michigan State University.
Among his many publications are Democratic Experiments in Africa (Cambridge University Press,
1997, with Nicolas van de Walle) and Public Opinion, Democracy and Markets in Africa (Cambridge
University Press, 2005, with Robert Mattes and E.
Gyimah-Boadi). He is the co-founder and co-director of the Afrobarometer.
Andrew Ellis has been Head of Electoral Processes
at International IDEA since 2003. He was a senior adviser for the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) in Indonesia (1999–2003), and has worked
for the European Commission on the electoral assistance programme in Cambodia (1997–8), as
168
technical adviser for the establishment of the Palestinian Legislative Council (1996–7), as coordinator
for the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights for the local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997), and as Chief Technical Adviser to the Palestinian Election Commission
for the European Commission technical assistance
programme for all aspects of preparation for the
first Palestinian elections (1994–6). He was previously Vice-Chairman (1980–6) and Secretary General (1985–8) of the UK Liberal Party and Chief
Executive (1988–9) of the UK Liberal Democrats.
He has a BA in Mathematics from the University of
Cambridge, UK; an MSc in Statistics from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK; and a BA in
Law from Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic.
Konstanty Gebert was born in 1953 in Warsaw
and graduated from the Warsaw University
Psychology Department. He was co-founder of the
(unofficial) Jewish Flying University, 1979, and of
the Polish Council of Christians and Jews, as well as
co-founder, in September 1980 in Warsaw, of a
white-collar trade union that soon merged with
Solidarity. After avoiding internment in the 1981
coup, he became known as editor and columnist
of KOS fortnightly and of other underground publications under the pen name of Dawid Warszawski. In 1989 he joined the new independent daily
Gazeta Wyborcza, where he is a columnist and international reporter. In 1997 he founded and until
2000 he was editor-in-chief of the Jewish intellectual monthly Midrasz, and is now its publisher. Since
2005, he has been the Polish representative of the
US Taube Foundation for Jewish Life and Culture.
He has lectured in Poland and abroad.
Charlotte Hjorth is a journalist and communications consultant in Brussels, working with television, the private sector and the EU-institutions. She
has written for several international publications in
Sweden, Belgium, UK and the US, specializing in
reporting on EU affairs, Democracy and International Politics.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Marta Lagos is founder and Director of Latinobarómetro, an annual opinion survey in 17 countries in Latin America, and was formerly head of
a Chilean think tank, CERC, which conducted
opinion polls during the transition to democracy
in Chile during the 1980s and 1990s. She trained
as an economist in Heidelberg, Germany, and is
the founding director of her own polling company
MORI (Chile), associated with MORI UK since
1994.
Todd Landman is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and Co-Director of the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, UK.
He is the author of Protecting Human Rights: A
Comparative Study (Georgetown University Press,
2005), Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics
(Routledge, 2000, 2003), Governing Latin America
(Polity Press, 2003, with Joe Foweraker and Neil
Harvey), and Citizenship Rights and Social Movements: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1997, with Joe Foweraker).
Dr Landman has published numerous articles in
the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, Human Rights Quarterly, Democratization, and Political Studies. He is currently
working on a new book entitled Studying Human
Rights (Routledge).
Professor Richard Rose pioneered the use of Barometer surveys to study mass response to transformation following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Since 1991 he has organized more than 100 nationwide surveys in 16 post-communist countries
in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk>)
and written five books based on this material. His
scientific publications have been translated into
18 different languages. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and director of the Centre for the
Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, UK.
Kristen Sample serves as International IDEA’s
Director for the Andean Region as well as its Regional Coordinator on Women’s Political Participation. Before coming to IDEA in 2003, she was
the Deputy Regional Director for Catholic Relief
Services (CRS), one of the United States’ largest
international development organizations; during
her tenure with CRS, she focused on activities aimed at strengthening civil society. She has
lived and worked in Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala and
Chile. She has a Master’s degree in Public Policy
from Harvard University.
Timothy D. Sisk took his PhD in Political Science
(comparative politics and research methods) with
distinction and is now Associate Professor in the
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, where he also serves as faculty in
the Master of Arts Program in Conflict Resolution
and Director of the BA programme in International Studies. Dr Sisk is the author of five books,
including Democratization in South Africa (Princeton, 1995) and Power Sharing and International
Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1995), and
many articles. He specializes in the nexus between
democracy and governance and the management
of conflict in deeply divided societies, especially
those emerging from a period of intense social violence. His recent research has focused on systematic approaches to conflict assessment and governance institutions, and processes for conflict management.
Massimo Tommasoli is Director of Operations at
International IDEA. He holds a PhD at the Ecole
des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales of Paris.
From 1999 to 2003 he has been Head of the Good
Governance and Conflict Prevention Unit in the
Development Co-operation Directorate (Development Assistance Committee - DAC Secretariat) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In this capacity
he led the Secretariat work of the DAC Networks
on “Good governance and capacity development”
(GOVNET) and on “Conflict, peace and development co-operation” (CPDC). He also worked in
UNESCO and, as senior policy advisor, in the Directorate General for Development Cooperation
of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where
he has also been a member of the Technical Evaluation Unit of the Steering Committee for Development Co-operation. Lecturer at Italian Universities and international training centres, he is author of seven books and various essays and articles
in edited books as well as social and political science journals. His most recent publication is “Lo
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
169
sviluppo partecipativo. Analisi sociale e logiche di
pianificazione” (Carocci, Rome, 2001) (“Participatory Development. Social Analysis and the Rationale for Planning” - also published in Spanish
by Iepala Editorial, Madrid, 2003 and in French
by Karthala, Paris, 2004).
Ingrid Wetterqvist is Head of Planning and External Relations at International IDEA, having
joined IDEA in February 2004. She was previously Director at the Department for Global Development at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which she joined in 1990. She was posted to
Tanzania between 1992 and 1995, and to Zambia between 1995 and 1997. Ingrid holds a BA in
business administration from Uppsala University.
She has been working with democracy and human
rights in development, both as a practitioner and
as a policy maker, for most of her career.
Richard Youngs is Senior Research Fellow at the
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el
Diáologo Exterior (FRIDE) in Madrid, and a lecturer at the University of Warwick, UK. Prior to
joining FRIDE, he was an EU Marie Curie Research Fellow from 2001 to 2004. He studied at
Cambridge (BA Hons) and Warwick (MA, PhD)
universities, and previously worked as an analyst
at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His recent publications include International Democracy and the West: The Role of Governments, NGOs and Multinationals (Oxford University Press, 2004) and ‘Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit
of Middle East Reform’ (Working Paper no. 45,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
June 2004). He has worked on a number of democracy promotion initiatives, including projects
funded by the European Commission, the European Parliament, the British and Spanish development ministries, and a range of research institutes.
economy and democratization. He is the coordinator of the Asian Barometer Survey, a regional
network of surveys on democracy, governance
and development that covers more than 16 Asian
countries. Among his recent English publications
are Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Institute for
National Policy Research, 1992), Consolidating
Third-Wave Democracies (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), China Under Jiang Zemin (Lynn
Rienner, 2000), and The New Chinese Leadership:
Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party
Congress (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Daniel Zovatto joined International IDEA as Regional Director for Latin America in 1997, after
being Executive Director at the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL), a specialized programme at the Inter-American Institute of
Human Rights (IIHR), from 1989 to 1996, and
serving as its deputy director for two years. He has
a Master’s degree in International Studies from
the School of Diplomacy of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Master’s Degree in Human Rights, a PhD in International Law from the
Complutense University in Madrid, and a Master’s degree in Public Administration from John
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA. He is the author of over 60 articles
dealing with issues in law and politics, as well as
14 books on matters concerning human rights,
elections, political parties, and democracy in Latin
America. Among his most recent publications are
De las normas a las buenas practicas: El desafío del
financiamiento politico en América Latina (OAS/
IDEA, co-authored with Steven Griner); Dinero
y política en América Latina: una visión comparada
(FLACSO); and La política importa: Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina (IADB/IDEA,
co-authored with Mark Payne, Fernando Carrillo
and Andrés Allamand).
Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of
the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. He received his PhD
in Political Science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan
University in 1987. Professor Chu specializes in
the politics of Greater China, East Asian political
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Annex B. Former and Current
Members of IDEA’s Board
of Directors
President Martti Ahtisaari
June 2000–June 2003
Co-Chairperson of the New York-based EastWest Institute;
Chairperson of the International Crisis Group, Brussels;
former President of the Republic of Finland
Dr Brigalia Bam
June 2003 to date
Chairperson of South Africa’s Independent Electoral Commission;
former General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches
Mr Jermyn Brooks
June 2003 to date
Member of the Board of Directors of Transparency International;
former Global Managing Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers
Ms Cheryl Carolus
February 2000–June 2002
Former High Commissioner for the Republic of South Africa in London, UK;
CEO of South African Tourism
Mr Thomas Carothers
June 2001–June 2004
Vice President for Studies and Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Dr Adama Dieng
February 1995–June 2001
Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda;
former Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists
Dr Ricardo Díez-Hochleitner
June 2002 to date
Honorary President of the Club of Rome;
former Minister of Education, Spain
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
171
Ms Lourdes Flores Nano
June 2003 to date
President of the Alianza Electoral Unidad Nacional;
candidate in the 2001 Peruvian presidential election
Sir Henry de Boulay Forde
November 1995–June 1999
Lawyer and former Foreign Minister and Attorney-General of Barbados
Dr Frene Ginwala
November 1995–June 1999
Former Speaker of the National Assembly, South Africa
Ms Lena Hjelm-Wallén
June 2003 to date
Chairperson of the Board;
former Deputy Prime Minister;
former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Mr Harri Holkeri
June 2003 to date
Former Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK);
former Prime Minister of Finland
Dr Ignacio Astarloa Huarte-Mendicoa
June 1999–June 2002
Former Secretary for Security and former Under-Secretary of Justice, Spain;
former Secretary-General of the Chamber of Deputies;
former Secretary of the Central Election Commission
Professor Colin Hughes
January 1996–June 1999
Professor of Political Science, University of Queensland;
former Electoral Commissioner of Australia
Dr Kuniko Inoguchi
June 1999 to date
Professor of Political Science, Sophia University, Tokyo;
former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN Conference on Disarmament
172
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Ms Mónica Eliana Jiménez de la Jara
November 1995–June 2003
Rector of the Universidad Catolica de Temuco, Chile;
former Vice-Chair, President of the Board of PARTICIPA;
former Executive Director of Corporación APRENDER;
former member of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Chile
Dr Subhash Kashyap
June 2003 to date
Former Secretary-General of the lower house of the Indian Parliament;
Constitutional Adviser to the Indian Government
Ms Kaci Kullman Five
June 2003 to date
Former Cabinet Minister and Chairperson of the Conservative Party of Norway
Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Manson John Legwaila
June 2001–June 2003
Special Representative to lead the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
Mr Manmohan Malhoutra
January 1996–June 2003
Secretary-General of the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, India;
former Assistant Secretary-General of the Commonwealth;
Adviser to the former Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi
Ms Maureen O’Neil
June 1998–June 2004
President of the International Development Research Centre, Canada
Dr Erling Olsen
June 1998–June 2001
Former Speaker of Parliament, Denmark;
former Minister of Housing and former Minister of Justice, Denmark
Sir Shridath Ramphal
February 1995–June 2001
Former Chairperson of the Board;
former Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and
Co-Chairperson of the Commission on Global Governance
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
173
Ambassador Andrés Rozental
June 2002 to date
Vice-Chair of the Board;
President of the Mexican Council on International Affairs;
former Deputy Foreign Minister, Mexico
Ms Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
November 1995–June 2003, June 2003– honorary board member
General Secretary of the National League for Democracy in Burma and Nobel Peace Prize laureate
Dr Henning Scherf
June 2001 to date
President of the Senate and Mayor of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen, Germany
David Steel, Lord Steel of Aikwood
February 1995–June 2001
Former Presiding Officer, Scottish Parliament;
former President of Liberal International, UK
Ambassador Thorvald Stoltenberg
November 1995–June 2003
Former Chairperson and Vice-Chair of the Board;
President of the Norwegian Red Cross;
former Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence of Norway;
former UN Special Representative in the
former Yugoslavia
Mr Cassam Uteem
June 2002 to date
Former President of the Republic of Mauritius
Senator Jos van Gennip
June 2001 to date
Member of the upper house of the Netherlands Parliament
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
Annex C. IDEA Publications
International IDEA has produced over 150 publications over the past decade. They range from
handbooks, country reports and guidelines to
briefer reports such as policy papers, agendas for
debate, leaflets, and synthesis reports. Most of
IDEA’s publications have been translated into dif-
ferent languages, including Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, Georgian, French, Russian and Spanish.
The following is a selected list of main publications produced between February 1995 and June
2005:1
Handbooks:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (1997, repr. 2002)
Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers (1998)2
Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators (1998)
Democracy at the Local Level: The International IDEA Handbook on Participation,
Representation, Conflict Management and Governance (2001)
Handbook on Democracy Assessment (2002)
The State of Democracy: Democracy Assessments in Eight Nations around the World (2002)
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook (2003)
Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns (2003)
Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook (2005)
Country and region based reports:
Consolidating Democracy in Nepal (1997)
Democracy in Romania (1997)
Democracy in Guatemala (1998)
Democracy in Burkina Faso (1998)
Burkina Faso’s Electoral System: A Report (1999)
Advancing Democracy in Slovakia through Local Self-Governance (2000)
Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment (2000)
Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing Dialogue(s) for Nation Building (2000)
Democracy in Bangladesh (2002)
Democracy in the Arab World: Challenges, Achievements and Prospects (2000)
Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa (2002)
Democracy at the Local Level: A Guide for the South Caucasus (2003)
Elections Assessment in the South Caucasus: 2003–2004 (2003)
Democracy at the Local Level in East and Southern Africa: Profiles in Governance (2004)
Building Democracy In Egypt: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and
Democratic Elections (2005)
• Building Democracy In Jordan: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life
and Democratic Elections (2005)
• Building Democracy In Yemen: Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and
Democratic Elections (2005)
• Developing Local Democracy in Kosovo (2005)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1
A complete list of IDEA publications is available on IDEA website <http://www.idea.int/publications>.
2
A new edition of Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers will be published by the end of 2005.
Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide
175
Codes of Conduct and Guidelines:
•
•
•
•
•
Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Observation of Elections (1997)
Code of Conduct: Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections (1997)
Code of Conduct: Political Parties Campaigning in Democratic Elections (1998)
Guidelines for Determining Involvement in International Election Observation (2000)
International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections (2002)
Voter Turnout:
•
•
•
•
•
Voter Turnout from 1945 to 1997 (1997)
Youth Voter Participation: Involving Today's Young in Tomorrow’s Democracy (1999)
Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report (2002)
Voter Turnout in Western Europe since 1945: A Regional Report (2004)
Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Significance of the 2004 European Parliament Elections (2004)
Gender Quotas series:3
• The implementation of Quotas: Asian Experience (2003)
• The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American Experiences (2003)
• The implementation of quotas: African Experiences (2004)
Other:
• Dialogue for Democratic Development: Policy Options (1999)
• The Future of International Election Observation (1999)
• Democracy and Global Co-operation at the UN (2000)
Selected Publications in Spanish:4
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Mujer, Partidos Politicos y Reforma Electoral (2004)
Acuerdo Nacional: Pasado, Presente y Futuro (2004)
Los Nudos Criticos de la Gobernabilidad: Propuestas para un Buen Gobierno (2004)
Partidos en la Región Andina: De la Crisis al Cambio (2004)
El Estado (2005)
Etíca y Liderazgo Políticos (2004)
Inclusión y Participación (2004)
Sistema de Partidos Políticos (2004)
Sistema Electoral (2004)
Guía Metodológica para la Formación Política (2004)
La Descentralización (2004)
By the end of 2005, IDEA will publish two more reports on gender quotas, which look at experiences from Eastern Europe and the Arab
World. All reports and case studies on gender quotas are available at <http://www.quotaproject.org>.
3
This list includes only some of the recent publications produced by the IDEA regional office in Latin America, some
co-published in partnership with regional and national counterparts. Most of these publications are only available in Spanish.
A comprehensive list of publications on Latin America is available at <http://www.idea.int/publications/browse/la.cfm>.
4
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The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)